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EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE:
AN UNATTAINABLE QUEST

Mr. Sandro Kunz

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
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
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
Accepted by the Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master's Degree

..... Dean of the Graduate School
(Associate Professor Pornpote Piumsomboon, Ph.D.)

THESIS COMMITTEE

..... Chairman
(Professor Dr. Chaiwat Khamchoo)

..... Thesis Advisor
(Assistant Professor Surat Horachaikul)

..... External Examiner
(Associate Professor Pratoomporn Vajrasthira)

ศูนย์วิทยุโทรพยากร
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บทความวิเคราะห์ปัจจุบันมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อการประมวล a) ประสบการณ์ทางประวัติศาสตร์
b) ข้อแม้ทางการเมือง c) ความเห็นชอบของคนในขณะนั้น d) ยุทธการร่วมที่สหภาพยุโรปใช้ในการ
จัดการกับการห้ามไม่ให้เกิดการสร้างระเบิดปรมาณู

งานวิจัยนี้เป็นงานวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพที่ตระหนักถึงปัจจัยทั้งในอดีตและปัจจุบันของงานวิจัยซึ่ง
รูปแบบงานวิจัยเป็นการยืนยันถึงรูปแบบการป้องกันและจัดการเกี่ยวกับระบบการสร้างความรู้ความ
เข้าใจเกี่ยวกับงานปรมาณูของสหภาพยุโรป ผลการวิเคราะห์ถูกกำหนดส่วนมากโดยการนำเอางานวิจัยที่
มีการวิจัยมาก่อนหน้านี้ นำมาวิเคราะห์อีกครั้งหนึ่งโดยการวิเคราะห์สี่สิ่งพิมพ์รวมถึงสี่สิ่งพิมพ์
ออนไลน์ โดยเน้นที่มีการนำเสนอเรื่องราวเกี่ยวกับความแตกต่างทางด้านวัฒนธรรมและการเมืองที่มีผล
ต่อความคิดทางด้านปรมาณูของประเทศในเครือสหพันธยุโรป สมาชิก 3 ประเทศในสหภาพยุโรปได้ถูก
นำมาพิจารณาในงานวิจัยนี้ โดยสาธารณรัฐฝรั่งเศสและสหราชอาณาจักร ได้ถูกเลือกให้เป็นวัตถุประสงค์
หลักในการวิจัย เนื่องจากทั้งสองประเทศนี้เป็นประเทศที่รู้จักกันโดยทั่วไปว่ามีระเบิดนิวเคลียร์อยู่ ส่วน
เยอรมนีก็ถูกรวมในงานวิจัยนี้ เนื่องจากว่าชะตาของประเทศถูกกำหนดโดยการพัฒนาของสหภาพยุโรป
นอกจากนี้ประเทศเยอรมนียังมีความสำคัญกับประวัติศาสตร์โลกในศตวรรษที่ 20 นี้เป็นอย่างมาก และมี
แนวโน้มว่าจะมีอิทธิพลกับประวัติศาสตร์โลกต่อไปในอนาคตด้วย

ผลการวิจัยยังแสดงให้เห็นว่าความคิดเกี่ยวกับการจัดการด้านการบริหารระบบปรมาณูของ
สหภาพยุโรปถึงแม้ว่าเทคโนโลยีและอำนาจการเงินของสหภาพยุโรปจะมีมากแต่ก็มิได้ทำให้นโยบายนี้
ถูกบริหารได้อย่างมีคุณภาพ ความแตกต่างทางด้านลักษณะของการบริหารระบบปรมาณูของแต่ละ
ประเทศในสหภาพยุโรปมีมากทั้งในแง่ของความเข้าใจและการบริหารรวมถึงมุมมองและระบบการ
ป้องกันโดยรวม โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งการใช้อาวุธนิวเคลียร์เป็นสำคัญ

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The present analysis aimed to assess the conceptual divergences based on a) historical experiences, b) political settings, c) popular perceptions, and d) strategic contemplations that inhibit the creation of a common European nuclear deterrent.

The study was performed as to assess the qualitative characteristics of both the historic as well as the contemporary dimensions which have shaped the concept of both defence in Europe in general as well as the notion of nuclear deterrence in particular.

The analysis is largely based on literature review which encompassed both the print media as well as online content with special consideration of the dissimilar cultural aspects which shape both the public as well as the political perception of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

Three member countries of the European Union are assessed in this study. The French Republic and the United Kingdom were selected as objectives of this study, as the nuclear arsenals of both nations constitute the only European nuclear deterrent. Germany is included in this study as her fate largely shaped not only the development of the European Union, but furthermore greatly influenced World History in the twentieth century and is likely to continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

The analysis reveals that the concept of a European nuclear deterrent, albeit Europe's technological and financial potential, is to remain an unattainable quest as for the EU's member countries divergent characteristics and diverse conceptual understandings of defence in general and the implications of nuclear weaponry in particular.


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จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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ศูนย์วิทยธุรกิจ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|---|
| AWE | Atomic Weapons Establishment |
| BRD | Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany – FDR) |
| CDU | Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands (German Christian Democratic Union) |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CSU | Christliche Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union of Bavaria) |
| DDR | Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic – GDR) |
| EC | European Community |
| ECC | European Economic Community |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EDC | European Defence Community |
| EMU | European Monetary Union |
| ESDI | European Security and Defence Identity |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| FDP | Freie Demokratische Partei (German Free Democratic Party) |
| FN | Front national (French National Front) |
| GLCM | Ground-Launched Cruise Missile |
| HMNB | Her Majesty's Naval Base |
| HMS | Her Majesty's Ship (prefix to Royal Navy Ships) |
| INF | Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty |
| MAD | Mutually Assured Destruction |
| MDC | Mouvement républicain et citoyen (French Citizen Republican Movement) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NPT | Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty |
| NSDAP | Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist Workers' Party) |
| NWS | Nuclear Weapon States |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PCF | Parti communiste français (French Communist Party) |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PRG | Parti Radical de Gauche (French Radical Party of the Left) |
| PS | Parti Socialiste (French Socialist Party) |
| RAF | Rote Armee Fraktion (German Red Army Fraction) |
| RPR | Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic – France) |
| SDR | Strategic Defence Review |
| SED | Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| SLBM | Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile |
| SNF | Short-Range Nuclear Forces |
| SNP | Scottish National Party |
| SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) |
| SRBM | Short-Range (pre-strategic) Ballistic Missile |
| SS | Soviet Surface-to-Surface Missiles (NATO designator) |
| SSBN | Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (British nuclear submarine) |
| UDF | Union pour la Démocratie Française (Union for the French Democracy) |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| V-1 & V-2 | Vergeltungswaffe 1 & 2 (retaliation weapon) |
| VEC | Les Verts (The Greens – France) |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |



ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Background and Issues

During the course of the history of humanity, considerable efforts were made to attain and maintain the capability to project power as either an aggressor towards a potential victim (in the form of attack, thus to wage war) or in the role of defender of claims of territory and tenure (in the form of defence, thus to prevent war).

Since the collapse of the old European power system after World War I, where for the first time non-European nations (e.g. USA and Russia), suddenly appeared to resolve an initially European conflict, to the implementation of a bipolar geopolitical, ideologically motivated, system of conflicting world powers after the defeat of the Axis powers, to the re-emergence of the not just old conflicts and qualms, but to the recurrence of power patterns as they had existed before the Cold War *freeze*, the analysis of historical truths is paramount for the understanding of the European view on defence.

The appreciation of both the British and the French nuclear weapon capabilities, which originated in the 1950s, has widely been seen in the context of the historical experiences of both nations.

France, which has been in a state of war with her eastern neighbour none less than three times within a period of only 75 years (1870-1945), decided in the middle 20th century to defend and bolster its perceived need for security and independence by creating *la force de frappe*.

Britain, which twice stood on the brink of defeat in both World Wars and was the only European power left to defend against the Nazi aggression, which swallowed

continental Europe during the dark days of WWII, always adhered to its policy of supporting the lesser European powers and opposing the dominant continental authority. Hence the United Kingdom usually tended to present a counter-balancing pole in the classical European power struggle.

The rise of the European Union (EU) as an economic world power since its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC (European Economic Community) is currently being complemented by the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This potentially allows the EU to develop from an economic world power into a truly global player on the geopolitical world stage. The amalgamation of the French and British nuclear arsenals is a logical extension of the current CFSP. Despite this, the European Union has up to the present time remained a successful economic phenomenon while attempted, mostly unilaterally initiated schemes (e.g. EDC, Fouchet Plan), for a truly European defence policy fell short.

The resolve of the rationale for, despite available resources (e.g. financial potential, existing national military assets and technical know-how) and political willingness (e.g. Anglo-French declaration at the Saint-Malo summit 1988), Europe's non-performance, if not phobia, as a global power incorporating not just conventional armaments but the option of a nuclear deterrence could very well provide the key to unlock the present European impasse in regard of a common defence policy.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร

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2. Research Objectives

The objective of this paper is the analysis of the causes of a non-emergence of a common European nuclear deterrent. The analysis need to be based on the historical developments of the two European nuclear powers, the French Republic and the United Kingdom, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany, a country which shaped to large parts not only European, but world history, in the 20th century. Furthermore, the political landscapes and the sentiments of the populace in those three members of the European Union were scrutinized as to determine the constraints of an independent European nuclear deterrent. This paper aims to reveal the substantial obstacles for the Europeans to create an effective, indigenous security structure for the European continent.

3. Hypothesis

The European Union is unwilling to attain a common policy on European nuclear deterrence. This inability to integrate Europe's potential into a comprehensive defence framework is rooted in national pride and the concept of the nation-state. The perception and application of defence policy in general and nuclear deterrence specifically, of the two European nuclear powers (France and the United Kingdom) diverge too widely to constitute the basis for a universal European nuclear deterrence. This is further complicated by the electorates in EU member states such as Germany and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark), who are strongly opposed to a nuclear element. The decisive conclusion of ESDP, a common European nuclear defence policy, the convergence and Europeanization of the ultimate *hard power*, has thus to remain elusive.

4. Scope and limitations

In an attempt to appraise the matters raised in the hypothesis, a geographical approach was elected, considering that historical, conceptual, political and ideological contentions are best supported by national notions and experiences. As stated above, the actors listed in the theoretical framework cannot be limited to European powers, however in order to attain a reasonable scope, actors depicted do not include non-state entities such as international organizations (e.g. UN, OSCE, multinational corporations and international terrorism). Additionally, a reemerging Russia, as a major force with nuclear deterrent capability continuing to shape Europe's destiny, was omitted as Russia's doctrine of nuclear defence ought to be the focus of an independent research project.

5. Theoretical Framework

Europeans like to think of themselves as being good at '*soft power*' (Everts,+ 2003), whilst the notion of a military resolute and a sturdy European Union still is elusive. The rationale for a military emasculated European Union is not a lack of resources, as the combined European armed forces incorporate not just conventional weaponry such as literally thousands of tanks, large number of maritime vessels (from minesweepers to aircraft carriers) and impressive air power integrating the latest technologies (e.g. Eurofighter Typhoon, Saab Gripen, etc.) but also a, though comparatively small (France approximately 300 nuclear warheads, UK approximately 200 nuclear warheads) but potential, nuclear element of deterrence which can be deployed by their governments, if deemed necessary, without NATO or U.S. consent (Feld, 1993).

6. Ideological Divergences on Defence

The proposed thesis attempts to analyse the issues listed below and synthesize feasible responses and viable scenarios:

6.1 Traditional Realism

Traditional Realism envisages the system of international, intergovernmental, relationships to be ruled by structural anarchy and power politics due to the absence of an effective international authority governing international relations. The realist approach puts the topic of national sovereignty as essential for the strife of the survival of the individual countries. As such, national defence, including the component of nuclear deterrence, must remain in the domestic sphere of a state and thus a common defence policy (such as proposed by the ESDP) is unfeasible.

6.2 Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal Institutionalism, while acknowledging the anarchic nature of international relations, rouses the notion that questions of security and defence do not just involve *hard power* (e.g. military) but also *soft-power* (e.g. economic, political and social forms of power including concerns over access to natural resources such as oil, gas and water), thus adds a non-military dimension to security and defence considerations. The realization of the futility of the attempt to tackle the complexity of the

interdependence of non-military and military aspects of security by individual states calls for increased international cooperation by means of multilateralism and institutional integration; thus a multidimensional approach to defence and security, including the element of nuclear deterrence, cannot remain in the realm of individual states.

6.3 Critical Security Studies

Critical Security Studies replaces the state by societal groups or individuals as the focus of security and rebuffs the thought of international relations to be inherently anarchic. This is in stark contrast to both Traditional Realism and Liberal Institutionalism. Critical Security Studies emphasizes the role of non-state actors (e.g. terrorism) and the non-military role of security (environmental and social considerations). To the followers of the Critical Security Studies, the military and thus nuclear deterrence, are of subordinate meaning, if not insignificant, and consequently can be effortlessly ignored

7. National and International Divergences

Too numerous deep ideological splits among the members of the European Union prevent further integration in the area of defence, especially nuclear deterrence. This predicament is exacerbated by the fact that a multitude of camps among the member states exist such as Atlantism (UK, the Netherlands) versus Europeanism (e.g. France), “New Europe” (e.g. Spain, Poland) which embraces trans-Atlantic

cooperation versus “Old Europe” (e.g. Germany, France) which hedges deep scepticism towards existing transatlantic realities (e.g. NATO). Nations which actively pursue the option of nuclear defence (UK, France) encounter member states where nuclear armament is considered deplorable (e.g. Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany) and a nuclear-free European continent is envisioned. The European Union (EU) as an entity is not a *soft power* by design; rather it is a victim of conflicting national interests which prevent the EU to attain a role as a global power.

8. Geopolitical Framework

A common European security and defence policy is not necessarily devised by just European actors, but overseas entities such as states (e.g. USA, Russia, China) and international organizations (e.g. multinational corporations and international terrorism) increasingly imposing their views and concerns on Europe, could either strengthen the cause for an integrated European nuclear deterrent or void any attempt for an European accord on defence. Taking this into consideration, it must be accepted that European defence policy, with all its aspects, must be regarded from a global perspective rather than from a purely European point of view (Hyde-Price, 2001: 30-31).

9. The British Perception

Britain has up to the present time consistently resisted political in general, and defence in particular, integration with Europe. Although Britain was an ally of France

during both World Wars, such cooperation was more of an ad-hoc basis and usually short lived once the threat vanished.

The reasons of such British aloofness to an integrated European defence policy are manifold:

1. Britain sees itself physically (thus geographically) as well as intellectually separated from Europe. Whilst Britain always attempted to not allow a single European power (France, Nazi Germany) to dominate Europe, it itself has never sought to dominate the European continent either militarily, culturally or philosophically. This is in stark contrast to France, which sees itself as a cultural and philosophical leader in Europe. Thus any concept regarding essential elements such a common European defence policy, and common nuclear deterrence in particular is conceived as dangerous to the British concept of distinctiveness
2. Whilst London was ready to cooperate with other European powers to avert potential crisis and threats, such efforts were intra-national rather than supra-national. This was demonstrated by the British detachment to concepts such as the proposed EDC (European Security and Defence Community, proposed by France in 1950), even the declaration of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo at the 1988 Anglo-French summit was bilateral rather than incorporating the notion of super-nationality.
3. Britain dreads the domination of foreign ideologies. In an historical context, Britain was alarmed by foreign, i.e. European, conceptions such as Catholicism, republicanism or communism, as such foreign notions were

perceived to disturb the social order on the British Isles. European ideologies often were perceived by Britain as not pragmatic and antipathetic to British concerns and traditional values. Ideological and political developments (Reformation, French Revolution) historically formed the notion of British isolation and distinction; until the present day Europe is often referred to as '*The Continent*' to emphasize the segregated, if not insular, perception of *Britishness*.

4. The notion of a commonly organized Europe following the ideologies, concepts and rules formulated by foreign entities, and thus undermining Britain's strength, independence and self-determination. Common European structures, such as the present day ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) implement rules and decisions by either majority voting or by unanimity (the later as in the case of ESDP), thus British interests are perceived to be served best by abstinence from super-national structures or, more realistically, resistance, attempting to delay and limit the field of application of common European policies.
5. Britain as an island has a totally different approach to defence than other European powers. Even relatively modern attempts of invasion such as Goering's *Luftwaffe* failed due to the geographical segregation of the UK from the rest of Europe, even though the Channel has a width of merely 20 kilometres. In thus the main Isles of Britain were not subject to occupation, the defence element in British policy is exceptionally varied from the concept of defence of countries such as France or Germany. European nations traditionally employed (and still do) massive armies with hundreds, if not thousands, of tanks and armed vehicles to defend their borders and territories,

because an attack on any country on continental Europe were to signify the potential loss of the homeland (*Vaterland*). In this the existence of national defence with its characteristics such as conscription is not just tactically but very much politically motivated as armed forces exist as an actualization to the claim of sovereignty. British understanding of defence differs as such as Britain and modern-day UK, conditioned by experience, successfully implanted its military might to protect its former colonial and territorial interests of distant possessions (Falkland War) or economic concerns for access to raw materials (Gulf War 1990-1991). As such, European and British concepts of purpose of defence diverge widely and are most difficult to be consented with in a common defence policy (Chuter, 1997: 105-110).

10. The French Perspective

10.1 France's Nuclear Doctrine

The emergence of an independent French security policy was devised by General de Gaulle after the resumption of power as the head of the Fifth Republic, also referred to as the *Gaullist* doctrine. At the heart of this doctrine is the notion of the nation-state and its political legitimacy based upon the capacity to defend its territory and population from foreign invasion. Countries cannot share the sovereignty in defence affairs, lest they put their legitimacy at risk, thus a nation-state must retain an independent defence potential and must uphold security through national efforts rather than international cooperation. In Gaullist eyes an order of guaranteed international peace and order would be not attainable and

thus is concurrent to *traditional realism* described above. In a world where all nations claim autonomy there can be by definition no power above the state that could assure security to any degree approximating the state's capability to guarantee civil peace within its borders. In the anarchic world of international relations, states therefore cannot rely on other entities and must remain independent in matters of national security (Sauder, 1999: 118).

In contrast to the Gaullist doctrine, modern, Europeanized France is committed to the European integration and the development of a European identity and very well comprehends that:

“The matter of a European nuclear doctrine is destined to become a major issue in the establishment of a common European defence policy. The gravity of the subject will assert itself as the European Union realizes its political distinctiveness along with its security and defence identity, although such a prospect remains distant, it should not be left out of sight. With a nuclear option, the autonomy of a common European defence policy is attainable, without it is impossible.” (Balladur, 1994: 56).

The French concept of nuclear strategy however, has considerably changed in the late 1980s, lacking the consideration of France's European neighbours. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, France's nuclear deterrent was shaped by the notion of allowing a weak state to deter against a strong state (*la dissuasion du faible au fort*), this especially in the context to the Cold War. But this thinking has been

reversed into the deterrent of the strong (France) against the weak (Libya, Iran). This new thinking mirrors the perception of a new threat of a nuclear precision attack where Europe, especially France, could be held ransom (Howorth, 1997: 29). This issue touches on the concerns of *nuclear proliferation*, where the freedom of European states and the USA to intervene militarily against states which possess nuclear weapons could be severely hampered (Cottey, 2007: 220).

10.2 France's Rationale for an Europeanization of Nuclear Deterrents

The reasoning for the French pressure for the Europeanization of the nuclear forces is threefold:

The cost of nuclear deterrence is such that savings resulting from a collectivization of the European nuclear armory would be considerable. Given the chronic financial predicament of the French government and the disappearance of the threat of a Soviet attack after 1989, an Europeanization of France's defence capability, especially cost-intensive nuclear defence deterrent, would be welcomed (Sauder, 1999: 123-137).

1. Conversely, with the British decision to base UK's nuclear force on the *Trident* system, such efforts had been delayed for decades.
2. The legitimacy and popular backing for national nuclear armed forces have been losing support rapidly, especially considering the

disputed French nuclear tests on the atoll of Mururoa in French Polynesia from 1980s to the 1990s. In addition it is assumed that a Europeanized nuclear force would find not just domestically but more importantly internationally wider support. On the other hand, for some countries such as Finland or Sweden the problem is not the consideration whether nuclear armed forces are nationalized or Europeanized but the nuclear weapons themselves. Many a European nation has been endorsing a *nuclear free* Europe for decades, and the concept of a common European *force de frappe* (nuclear strike force) is undoubtedly going to be met with vehement resistance in many EU member states.

3. The assembly of a common European foreign and security policy (CFSP) specifically and the construction of a unified, globally prominent, Europe in general cannot be continued earnestly with the exclusion of the potential of a common nuclear deterrent; the European Union can ill afford to postpone this issue ad infinitum. With EU's enlargement more and more states have become eligible for the security guarantee as postulated in the *Treaty of Brussels* which led to the creation of the *Western European Union (WEU)*. The question how credible such a security assurance can be without the power of a common nuclear deterrent arises. European members definitely need to consider the options whether to rely on a transatlantic orientated NATO structure or to opt for a strong, integrated, truly European, defence structure such as the WEU (Croft, 1997: 142-143).

11. The United States' Concept of European Security

Despite the initial American support for a more integrated Western Europe, the enthusiasm in Washington for an autonomous European security and defence effort vanished after the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) caused by the French rejection in 1954. In addition, the prospect of atomic and hydrogen weaponry under the control of an independent, European-only alliance contradicted U.S. policy of non-proliferation of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction).

As a result, the Americans did not encourage the development of an independent European security and defence plan, rather the U.S. administrations in the 1960s and 1970s wished for a “burden sharing” of the cost of maintaining the security of Western Europe by American led NATO. Since the end of the Cold War the American defence budget has been substantially higher than the combined defence budgets of the highest spending EU member states. This growing spending gap understates the U.S.-European capability gap, especially in terms of high-tech weaponry. Americans view that the EU ought to play a larger role in maintaining the security of the Continent and therefore should shoulder more of the financial burden of the European defence (Howorth *et a*, 2004: 4).

America saw NATO as the primary tool in guaranteeing Western Europe's security and any European initiative in establishing ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) should at most complement NATO but by no means attempt to replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, e.g. NATO was central to Western security provisions and thus remained the U.S. institution of choice until after the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Although Franco-German instigation of establishing a Western European system of security and defence, the developments during the Gulf crisis and the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia (both in 1991), Europe's uncoordinated reactions strongly contradicted to the determined and swift American resolve and military prowess; and many an observer concluded that an American lead NATO was to remain the most effective tool to deal with European security problems.

Developments during the summer of 1991 however, nearly nullified NATO's *raison d'être*: although the coordinated response of the North Atlantic Allies during the Moscow coup appeared to validate NATO's contemporary worth, the resulting collapse of the Soviet Union suddenly removed the threat upon which NATO justified its existence. At the same time, the Bush administration was heavily focused on the Middle East peace process and preferred not to get involved, by means of deployment of NATO troops and assets, in areas which still were considered in the sphere of Russian interests, such as war torn Yugoslavia, lest to upset the frail Yeltsin government; thus whilst NATO's influence diminished, the then EC gained relevance in security and defence issues.

The events in Yugoslavia and Moscow in the summer of 1991, gave rise to calls for NATO's reorientation, e.g. away from a purely military organization to embrace political and technical assistance programs in the former Soviet bloc countries (Eastern liaison). This posed a dilemma for the U.S. administration:

1. NATO's role and influence was enhanced through political activities and technical assistance programs.

2. Any reorientation might lessen the importance of NATO's military role.

As such, a redefinition of an American led NATO was much more preferred by Washington, than a purely EC-led defence structure, by means of incorporating the WEU (Western European Union), which aspired to formulate an independent European Defence Identity. The American support of European unity since the end of hostilities in 1945 in effect was contradicted by an American fear of an independent, and thus, uncontrollable common European defence entity, as envisaged by France and Germany in the early 1990s (Kurpnick, 1994: 115-132).

12. Germany between Atlanticism and Europeanism

After the rearmament, official German defence doctrine followed two very distinctive but divergent policies: "*Atlanticism*" with emphasis on Germany's integration into NATO and the significance of Germany's relations with the United States. On the opposite side of the German spectrum still is the concept of "*Europeanism*" which favoured the integration into a purely European framework and the support of the French vision of a European defence policy.

The threat of a Soviet attack upon Western Europe ultimately had the positive effect for the Western European nations to overcome national differences and squabbles which had been the base of their relations for centuries. In essence, the Cold War was, despite the potential for mutually assured destruction (MAD) of not only the two superpowers USA and USSR, but for Europe as the battlefield of any such conflict, an

era of peace and stability in both Western as well as Eastern Europe¹. Conversely, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet threat, many a German started to hedge doubts on the legitimacy of Germany as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The American support for the German rearmament in the 1950s and the German reunification some 40 years later (a topic to which especially France and Britain to a lesser extent had a rather cautious attitude), reminded the leadership in Bonn of the magnitude of their relationship to Washington and had not the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization most effectively assured peace and thus economic prosperity for Western Germany?

The German-American relationship however was put to the test over to the intended modernization of the NATO short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) stationed on West-German territory. Not only German public support for *Deutschland's* membership in NATO hit a low, but also the most ardent supporters (CDU/CSU) of the German-American relationship and Germany's integration into NATO hedged if not apprehension than doubts.

During the eruption of civil war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, German leaders voiced stern caveats against Serbia, which Berlin perceived as aggressor, and support for Bosnia, whose declaration of independence Germany was one of the first European nations to recognize (much to France's and Russia's consternation). Albeit Germany's stance in that episode of international relations, the "*Bundeswehr*" (German Federal Defence Forces) were not deployed during the Yugoslav conflict, due to historically and

¹ Lest to be unmentioned is that conflicts between the two ideological camps, e.g. the USA and USSR, simply were "exported" to lands far away from the European coastline: e.g. the Israeli (US supported)-Arab (equipped by the USSR) conflicts of 1967/1973 or the Vietnam War.

politically motivated apprehensions towards the prospect of armed German forces operating beyond NATO's territory. That tribulation was further complicated by the legal constraints of the *Grundgesetz* (German Constitution) which still vehemently imposes severe restrictions on the deployment of armed German forces abroad (Rempel, 1994: 159-167).

Germany's political landscape was dramatically altered by the German Green Party ("*Die Grünen*"), especially during the party's role in the German government (by means of a collation with the Social Democrats). The German Green Party's ideology not only rested on pillars such as ecology (hence the Party's name) and social justice, but also on grassroots democracy and nonviolence.

Given the popular distrust of the German electorate towards nuclear energy and the historically motivated phobia towards German military involvement, any attempt to integrate Germany into a common defence policy which ultimately incorporates the nuclear component is bound to fail, even with the Green party in current opposition in the German parliament.



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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Books and Articles

Werner J. Feld's *'The Future of European Security and Defence Policy'* defines the nuclear deterrence policy of the two European powers with nuclear weapons (France and the UK) as based on national interests rather than supranational considerations.

Adrian Hyde-Price's definition of the three distinct ideological approaches to the concept to security studies in *'Europe's New Security Challenges'* is especially helpful in analysis and perception of the fundamental principles for nationally motivated nuclear defence policies and provides arguments for both the Europeanization of nuclear capabilities or the abolition of such.

David Chuter's article in *'The European Union and National Defence Policy, The State and the European Union'* is extremely helpful to comprehend the British view and motivation on nuclear defence.

The perspective of the French Gaullists and their arguments in support of traditional realism is very clearly portrayed in Axel Sauder's essay in *'Redefining European Security'*.

Both Jolyon Howorth in *'The European Union and National Defence Policy, The State and the European Union'* as well as Andrew Cotter in *'Security in the New*

Europe’ point out the risks posed by nuclear proliferation, where either European states could be held ransom by powers in pursuit of nuclear capabilities, or the diminished capacity of the West to intervene against entities armed with nuclear weapons.

The dilemma whether a common Europeanization of defence ought to occur within the framework of NATO or the option of a truly Europeanized, supranational defence policy is touched on by Croft Stuart’s essay in *‘The European Union and National Defence Policy, The State and the European Union’*.

The ever increasing gap of defence budgets of the United States compared to those of the European member states is very clearly elaborated on, and accompanied by graphs, by Jolson Haworth and T.S. Keeler in *‘Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy’*.

The American point of view on European security is detailed comprehensively in *‘Disconcerted Europe, The Search for a New Security Architecture’* by Charles Kuprick. Anand Manon’s essay on France in the same book is essential for the appreciation of the motives of the French nuclear deterrent from a historic point of view.

In *Time and Time Wait No Man* Karel de Gucht and Stephan Keukeleire recap the initial endeavours of the West German left in what was later to be known as *“Ostpolitik”*, e.g. the German attempts to establish a relationship with the leadership of the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin. Those inner German contacts, across the “Iron Curtain”, are of special significance as they transpired during times of heightened tensions between the USSR and the USA.

The particular French domestic circumstances which lead to a broad acceptance of the French nuclear deterrent in both the French politics as well as the French public are clearly elaborated on in *French security policy in a disarming world – Domestic challenges and international constraints* edited by Philippe G. Le Pestre.

In *French Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War*, Paul Boniface, Director of the *Institute des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* not only exhibits the role of the French nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War era, but also explicitly explains the key elements of the French nuclear policy, the correlation of the French nuclear deterrent and European defence, as well as the connection of French politics and *la force de frappe*.

Simon Duke's *The Elusive Quest for European Security From EDC to CFSP* is critical in the comprehension of a potential approach to a unified European structure which would enable the EU to continue to rely on NATO, and thus its trans-Atlantic partners, whilst tendering a truly European defence organization, with the addition of diminished causes for aggravation of the Russian leaders in the regard to the expansion of the EU in Central Europe.

The Command Paper *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent* issued by the British Secretary of Defence the Secretary of State and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in December 2006, is valuable as to determine the official view of the British government under then incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair of the rationale, nature and future perspectives of the British nuclear deterrent.

As to gauge public perception on the issue of nuclear deterrence the Simons Foundation Report on global public opinion on nuclear weapons offers deep inside of

not only the populace's views of the three European Union members, e.g. the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, but also on the public's opinion in Italy, the United States and Israel. The Simons Foundation Report is a valuable asset to appropriately determine the masses' opinions, removed from the high politics issues of defence and international relations.

Sir Lawrence Freedman's paper in the Stimson publication on perspectives of advanced nuclear nations greatly helps to comprehend the aspects of the British nuclear deterrent. The paper unambiguously not only conveys the historical, political and strategic aspects of the UK's nuclear forces, but most decisively reveals the economic dimension of the Kingdom's nuclear weapons programme.

Major Mark Gose's paper *The New Germany and Nuclear Weapons* exhibits Germany's uneasy relationship with nuclear weapons. Although Germany herself is not a nuclear weapons state, Major Gose's essay accurately divulges the German predicaments of NATO's nuclear weapons stationed on *Deutschland's* soil in correlation with Germany's security requirement during the decades since the end of hostilities in 1945. The composition also reveals that despite Germany's status, together with France, as engine of the European process of integration, has a categorically different viewpoint on matters of defence in general and issues of nuclear weapons in particular than the two European nuclear powers.

In Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence Robert Jervis articulates the perceptive aspects of nuclear deterrence, such as the divergent discernments of values, credibility, the potential alternatives of an adversary in a situation of deterrence, the phenomenon of self-deterrence, problems of rationality, potential miscalculations of trade-offs during a nuclear stand-off, and the impacts of decision avoidance. Albeit

the book's focus on the mutual deterrence of the former USSR and the USA, it offers remarkable expertise on the conceptual aspects of nuclear deterrence and strategy.

The dilemma of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in which a common European deterrent needs to be embedded are portrayed in Stephanie Anderson's *Crafting EU Security Policy – In Pursuit of a European Identity*

2. Limitations of the Literature Review

Albeit a considerable availability of literature on European security and foreign policy, U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy, and the imperative issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, resources on nuclear weapons and deterrence in Europe are scarce. Literature both printed as well as on-line, is readily available on both the French and the British deterrents; however the theme of a “pan-European” deterrent appears to be obscure in literature. A common European policy and strategy has to, by definition, include both European nuclear powers and all 25 non-nuclear member states. The concept of a European nuclear deterrent can not consist of an “either-or approach”, e.g. a common nuclear deterrent can exclude neither the French nor the British nuclear assets. Furthermore, the question arises whether a truly European nuclear deterrent needs to be based on indigenous weapon systems, e.g. warheads and delivery vehicles, or if a common EU nuclear deterrent based on NATO weapon systems still were to allow for an independent European policy of nuclear deterrence. Further research and analysis is certainly called for to construe the current and potential capabilities and enthusiasm of the EU member states.

CHAPTER III

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

1. Deterrence and Perception

Nuclear deterrence is a game of reversed perception. A deterrent can only be as good as the target of the deterrence perceives it. Many statesmen assume that others see the world through their lens. It is often assumed what is logical to one's own side must also hold true for all the other parties. However this is often misled, as the deterred party can perceive a deterrent's intentions and policies very much differently. For any policy to be effective, the deterrent party must analyse how the target of such policy perceives such a course of action. What appears beneficial for the party that implements a policy of deterrence can be perceived as adverse not only to the targets of such policy but also to all involved stakeholders, especially if the concept of a nuclear deterrent of "ambiguity", as analysed in chapters four, e.g. France, and five, e.g. the United Kingdom, is implicated. If a deterring state perceives its particular stance as a sign of strength, the target of the policy is probable to see such a policy of deterrence as an indication of weakness. What one side sees as ascertaining peace and stability can be seen as threatening and destabilizing by the other side. An effective policy must be based on the perception of the target of the policy; however, policies are usually formulated as the initiator perceives it. As such, the intention which motivates prevention very well can result a converse result.

One actor deters another by the attempt to convince the other side that the expected value of a certain action is outweighed by the expected punishment. Such punishment is composed of two elements: the perceived cost of the punishment which

can be inflicted and the perceived probability that such punishment will be actually executed. Deterrence is prone to misfire if the two sides hedge different beliefs about either factor (Jervis, 1984: 59-83).

1.1 Perception of value

What is understood as punishment by one side can very well be considered as a reward by the other side. For example, when Saddam Hussein's Baht regime targeted Israel with Scud Missiles, Israel gained the sympathy of the world community, and thus was rewarded. When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, the British were given the benefit of the support of the population of the Falklands and the legitimacy to firmly re-establish UK's claim on the islands. As such, a deterring party needs to determine what the other side values, rather than what appears of value to one's own perception. Any failure to do so could cause the deterring side to be out of touch with reality. In as such, a punitive action can very well be exploited as an incentive by the targeted side.

The expansion in central Europe of the EU in the first decade of the 21st century is regarded as process to guarantee stability and concord by Brussels, whereas it is regarded as expansionist and thus as threat to Moscow. When Russia attains to regain influence and control over territories which it regards as

rightfully its sphere of influence, the West perceives such action as threat, despite no threat towards the West was intended by Moscow. The old doctrine that no action also denotes an act is true: EU's avoidance to establish a common nuclear deterrent can be interpreted by other entities as the European Union's determination to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which can be perceived as a threat. Conversely, if the EU were to be able to establish an independent nuclear deterrent, Russia, non-EU states in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East would be reassured by a European Union with a tamer nuclear doctrine than that of the Americans. If further European expansion were to continue under a purely European security policy, the EU's neighbours would feel less apprehensive than a European expansionist policy assured by NATO guarantees of security.

1.2 Perception of credibility

Any policy of deterrence, nevertheless its size, depends on its credibility. A party in possession over immense capabilities of retaliation is given to be convinced of its own strength and determination to use its assets; however this is not necessary the perception of the target of the deterrence, especially if the deterring side appears to be wavering in other aspects of guidelines, such as economics or domestic policies. Conversely, a nation with feeble assets of defence, which perhaps are purely intended for defence, can be perceived by the other side as very threatening if the first

country pursues bold politics in economics or other fields of policy. A large deterrence loses its credibility when the party in control of such capabilities is given to ambiguities to be actually prepared to use such assets. A miniscule deterrence of just one weapon can be an enormously efficient deterrent, if the other side can be convinced without doubt that the weapon will actually be used.

In as so much, it must be analysed whether is nuclear deterrence the appropriate strategy for the 27 member states of the European Union. To achieve credibility, a strategy of nuclear deterrence must be unanimous; any target of deterrence must be convinced that a European nuclear retaliation would be forthcoming beyond any suggestion of doubt. Furthermore, undue delays caused by deliberations or disagreements among the 27 members would vehemently discredit the deterrent's credibility, as a retaliatory response would not be immediately forthcoming. Given the poor performance of the EU in regard to previous performances on the global stage, such as the division between "old Europe versus new Europe" over Iraq or the indecisiveness during the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, a potential antagonist's perception of the credibility of a European nuclear deterrent certainly would be restrained.

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2. The Adversary's Alternatives

Deterrence works if the aggressor can be convinced that the prize of aggression offsets the perceived loss of opportunity. Deterrence is not only bound to backfire if the defender misinterprets the aggressor's values and fails to convey its credibility, but also if the aggressor's alternatives are wrongly assessed. A deterrent is often based on the possible gains an aggressor could achieve; however this is by no means the only reason for aggression. An aggressor could be actually forced to fight by, for instance, domestic strifes (e.g. Argentina in 1982) or external circumstances (e.g. natural resources). As such, non-aggression can not only mean to forgo potential gains, but to face grave losses. For an effective and credible policy of deterrence, the defender must be able to understand what pressures and predicaments possible adversaries face in order to correctly estimate the prize an aggressor would be prepared to pay for the hostility, as well as to assess the actual level of threat the antagonist poses.

3. Self-Deterrence

States can unintentionally deter others successfully. A party can be deterred by its imagination, thus perceive assets or capabilities of the opponent, which do not really exist. Clever schemes of deception are bound to fail, if they do not fit with what the target of the deception already believes. For instance, the British were convinced of the supremacy of the German Luftwaffe in World War II, based on the few raids London had to suffer during World War I. The fact that the Nazi's air force was designed to support ground forces, and thus ill-equipped for areal bombings, was entirely missed by the United Kingdom, but the British government was caught under pressure by the public for protection of feared German air raids. The attacks areal attacks by V-1 drones and V-2

missiles in the later stages of World War II, were circumstantial, and should have actually alerted London of the inadequacy of the German air force, as the Nazi regime had to resort to such novel and thus unreliable weaponry. It is as such not what a partaker actually possesses in assets and capabilities, but what the opponent thinks to be the first party's features.

4. The Problem of Rationality

Perceptions are not necessarily rational. First, a nation can be overconfident in their abilities. This can be either caused that a party has no access to pertinent information, or worse still chooses to ignore relevant facts, and thus is impaired in its cognitive abilities. Furthermore, analogies with previous events, such as previous victory, rather than present facts, serve to assess one's present capability. Moreover, entities might fall victim to their own, pre-existing, perceptions and thus are unable to absorb new information which would help them to assess the actual capabilities correctly.

5. Misevaluation of Trade-Offs

Any policy comes at a price. A policy of deterrence comes at the price of perceived aggression of the target of the deterrence, costs of installing, maintenance and updates to the devices of deterrence, as to main credibility. However, a policy of non-deterrence results in other forms of costs or trade-offs, such as dependency on other entities for protection, or potential aggressors can hedge perceptions of either overconfidence in their own abilities or can perceive the party which chooses the path of non-deterrence to be indecisive and weak. As such any intended effect of a policy needs to be assessed of its possible trade-off such as undesirable side-effects. A determined

attempt to safeguard one's borders comes at the trade-off of the perception of one's belligerence by one's neighbours. One's, restrained policy of security, nonetheless of one's foresight, comes at the trade-off of the perceived danger of the presence of a vacuum of security or lack of one's commitment by others, and thus has the potential to prompt their action. An aggressor's decision of a forward attack comes at the trade-off exposing the rear. An entities carriage of non-violence comes at the exchange of not only the other's perceptions of one's unreliability, but also of discernment of encroachment of their own security. As thus, the implementation of a policy can be just as costly as the decision not to pursue a particular guideline.

6. Assimilation of Information to Pre-Existing Believes

Significant information can be lost due to one's convictions. If an entity's doctrine consist the assumption of a sustained immediate threat, possibilities of the eradication of such a threat can be missed. If one holds the dogma of one's own peaceful intentions, signals for instantaneous risks can be missed. It is not so much what reality really presents, rather it is what one wishes the reality to be, so information contrary to one's believes is often misinterpreted, misperceived or just ignored. In order to maintain a coherent world view, as such to avoid bewilderment, one is predestined to be persistent to hold fast on one's concepts and believes. Such a practice is beneficial as it avoids an overload of stimuli which has the potential to initiate irrational conclusions which lead to sudden sways of policy with the potentially destabilizing effects. On other hand, such devotion to one's notions and convictions prevents the apt perception of considerable intelligence. A policy of deterrence which might deter one potential aggressor is therefore likely to be ignored or misinterpreted by another opponent, as others also fall victim to their own beliefs and ideas. This raises the question, whether a single chosen path of

deterrence has the potential to discourage every decision-maker. One target of deterrence might be convinced of one's determination of deterrence, based on the target's self-imposed beliefs and notions, where another target might, willingly or unconsciously, ignore or misunderstand one's posture of preclusion, based on that entity's principles and inspirations. As such, one's credibility, the essence of an effective policy of deterrence, is based upon the other's system of belief. A nation with a large navy is not likely to be perceived as a threat to a land-locked opponent, as the non-costal nation is convinced that its territory is outside the reach of the naval forces; however that dogma very well can prevent the interior nation to acknowledge the ship's guns and missiles which threaten its territory. What is evident to one side can be obscured by the other side's convictions.

7. Decision Avoidance

A party can either choose to ignore or understand imperative recognition of realities as to avoid commitment to a choice. A nation can possess cognition of an imminent threat, but choose not act as the perceived costs for such a decision are too high. Cognitive decision making is deferred persistently, conveying the notion to the aggressor that the target of the aggression is not aware of the threat, and thus an attack would be successful. Conversely, a nation might decide to attack, cognitively well aware of the low probability of success, however because of fears of the perceived costs of trade-offs, such as domestic political unrest, economic pressures, or strategic disillusion. For instance, Nazi Germany's failed attempt of air supremacy over Britain, which led to operation Barbarossa, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, a time where a decision of non-attack would have been more imperative and thus, would have avoided the cataclysmic outcome for Berlin. Avoidance of essential decision making thus harbours dangers for both a deferrer and the target of the deterrence.

8. The Credibility of a European Nuclear Deterrent

The member states of the European Union like to perceive themselves as the promoters of political stability, economic integration and success, cultural diversity, democracy and good governance. Such a perception is based on Judeo-Christian ethics and beliefs. However, a potential adversary, e.g. Iran or North Korea, is not necessarily constrained by the same value system. As such, what is intended to be of good means, e.g. equality, social democratic values, etc, by the European Union is unlikely to be interpreted in the same fashion by societies adherent to diverse belief systems, e.g. theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, or dissimilar political philosophies such as the People's Republic of China. Those dissimilar perceptions obviously contract to cultural divergences. This is, indubitably, valid for all nations and societies, and nuclear powers such as the United States, India or Pakistan certainly are no exception; as not just strategic, e.g. long-range, but nuclear weapons of any type, for instance pre-strategic, e.g. short and medium-range nuclear weapons, exert considerable brunt on issues such as global proliferation of nuclear weapons or fluctuations in global strategic balances by way of alliances or treaties.

Further still, precisely because of Europe's cherished cultural diversity, a common "pan-European" belief system, on which concepts such as good governance, sovereignty, threat assessments, or requirements for aegis are based, further conceivably inhibit a common European perception.

For a nuclear deterrent to be credible, an assured level of decisiveness needs to be projected by the deterrent. Such authority is best personalized by a figurehead of

compelling standing such as the French or U.S. Presidency². For an effective deterrent, a solidified and resolute tenacity needs to be projected into the perception of not only latent adversaries but to the global community in toto. Additionally, such a deterrent cannot be ambiguous or suffer of capricious hesitancy, lest an unintended, thus dangerous, interpretation is identified by other nations. However, given the hitherto rather uncoordinated foreign policy pursued by the European Union has provide little potential for a coordinated, thus credible, carriage in foreign relations in general and a common defence policy in particular. The Lisbon Treaty implies considerable rectifications in the appropriate track, however both the incumbent High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton, as well as the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, appear not necessarily selected for either their resolve, experience in international relations or charisma but rather for the lack of such. All in all, a successful nuclear deterrent needs a decisive, credible, cohesive, and intrepid leadership, of the European Union has shown very little since its inception through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.

² see also “The Nuclear Monarch” subheading 7, chapter 4 of this paper

CHAPTER IV

LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

1. The nature of the French nuclear deterrent

Although two nuclear powers are member states of the European Union, the EU as itself is far away from a cohesive nuclear deterrence. The nuclear deterrence of France is designed to protect her sovereignty, whereas the British deterrent is intended to project British influence and protect British assets on a global basis.

France's policy is one of dissuasion, of assuring the sovereignty of the French territory. The concept of the French deterrence is a concept of "no-war", as such that any entity which attempts to threaten France's independence needs to be brought aware that the risk of an attack on France outweighs any possible gain. The French deterrent employs the concept of a "minimal dissuasion", as thus it has never been in France's interest to match of the American or Soviet arsenals, but to be independently able to inflict enough damage on an aggressor as not to be pulled into hostilities. For French strategy, two possible scenarios exist:

- a) The threat of the attack will be large-scale, and thus the adversary needs to be credibly persuaded that a nuclear counter-attack would be resultant, and thereby the aggressor would be deterred.
- b) The threat of the attack will be small-scale, and the use of nuclear weapons (e.g. limited nuclear warfare) would not be justifiable.

Here the French strategy of "tous ou rien" is very clearly evident. As thus, the French leadership, and along with it many political parties and a considerable part of

the population in France, do not perceive the nuclear arsenal as an asset of war, but to preclude war, e.g. "*non-guerre*".

2. Historic Background

France's stance definitely must also be appreciated in historic terms. French territory was invaded no less than three times within a period of only 75 years, e.g. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Western Front during World War I (1914-1918), and the German occupation of France (1940-1944). It is evident that the French leadership after the end of hostilities perceived the nation's frontiers as vulnerable, especially in consideration that the new Soviet threat was located barely 200 kilometres east of the Rhine River in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany. The French leadership, especially under General de Gaulle's 5th Republic, was also painfully aware that outcomes of both World Wars was majorly due to the involvement foreign powers, e.g. the United Kingdom to a lesser extend and the Unites States of America to a larger extend. Additionally, the once prided French colonial empire (e.g. Algeria, Indochina) was crumbling away as a direct result of the hostilities which ended in 1945. "La Grande Nation" was free, but not so grand anymore. The sanctuary of the French territory, moreover the notion of French autonomy could not be further compromised. The presence of American air bases and troops on French soil certainly did not help to alleviate the notion of injured confidence and continued dependence on foreign powers for the nations' security. Additionally, two occurrences convinced the leadership of the 5th Republic (signature of the new French constitution on October 4, 1958) under de Gaulle for France to embark on a path of independence and unilateral deterrence. Firstly, the confounded ramifications of the First Indochina War between France and the Viet Minh communist revolutionaries in 1954 where France saw herself abandoned by both

the United States of America as well as the United Kingdom in her battle at Dien Bien Phu³. Secondly, the refusal of the Eisenhower administration to support the Franco-British attempt to regain control over the Suez Canal in 1956, e.g. the resultant political bungle for the two European U.S. allies⁴, certainly further convinced the French leadership under de Gaulle to attain autonomy in her defence. As thus, the French strive for an *independent* nuclear deterrent must be assessed from the perspective of the historic French trauma and puts the French nuclear policy into a unique perspective.

3. The French Deterrent after the Cold War

Since the threat of attack from USSR vanished, one could argue that the main threat to Western Europe as practically disappeared. However, in a speech by socialist

³ Albeit extensive logistical help, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to assist Paris unilaterally, especially with ground troops, as renewed direct confrontation with China, which supported the North-Vietnamese rebels, as to avoid a repetition the events of the Korean War just a few months earlier. Furthermore, the American and French interests in Vietnam diverged largely: the U.S. administration was intend to preclude a “domino” effect, where one country after another was feared to “tumble over” into communist control; as such an establishment of a Western oriented regime in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the French forces was envisaged. The French, on the other hand, saw the conflict in Indochina as a “colonial” conflict, and were perceived unlikely to depart after a long and costly war. The British were opposed against military action prior to peace talks which were to be held at the Geneva Conference in May and July 1954, as the UK government under Prime Minister Anthony Eden felt that the long-term security in Southeast Asia would be better served by diplomatic means than by short-term military actions. As the Eisenhower administration felt that only a collective action by France, USA, and the UK can effectively deter increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, Washington decided not to intervene in the crucial battle at Dien Bien Phu, which resulted not only in the French defeat in the First Indochina War, but marked the final stage of the fall of the French colonial empire in places such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. (The Pentagon Papers, 1971)

⁴ The Eisenhower administration found itself in a dilemma. Firstly, a joint American-French-British intervention on Israel’s side certainly would have consolidated the Western alliance against any future aggressors. Secondly, for U.S. the Suez Canal was of no economic significance, but much more so for the European, e.g. the shipping routes for oil tankers from the Middle East to Europe. The Eisenhower administration decided that the risk of American military intervention, e.g. the support of imperialist, or colonist, interests of both France and Britain would drive many an Arab leader into Nasser’s arm. Furthermore, the potential of conflict with the Soviet Union, which supported Nasser’s Egypt, had the Eisenhower administration to believe that acceptance of Egyptian nationalization of the Suez zone, and appeared to be the preferable option. (McDermott 2004)

Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, on September 1997 declared that "... it should be noted that the nuclear deterrent was neither created nor conceived purely in the context of the Cold War." (Boniface, 1998). However, the 1994 White Paper on defence states that the possession of a nuclear arsenal is essential to assure France's autonomy and to defend her interests and to convince any adversary that the costs of attacking France would be unacceptable. Furthermore, the documents reject the concept that French nuclear weapons are for combat. The paper henceforth clearly distinguishes between the differences the use of nuclear weapons and the aspect of dissuasion which those arms offer. This concept especially refers to the White Paper on Defence of 1972 "render the recourse to all-out war inconceivable as a political option". The document clearly states that the strategy of deterrence is not directed towards a specific threat, but to assure France's sovereignty and integrity of her national territory, its dependencies, its air space and surrounding waters. The French nuclear deterrence remains undirected, especially since the disappearance of the Soviet threat, as crisis are perceived to come from many diverse directions and in many different forms. Despite of this, Russia still is in possession of an enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and as thus Russia's weight remains unrivalled by any other European nation, which France's strategy seeks to counterbalance by her strategy of dissuasion, which validates the original concept that a weak (France) can deter a the strong (Russia). China's economic raise, which allows the Beijing's leadership to modernize the army, and unequalled demographic weight, also has the potential of threat not necessary to the French territory, but to her interests (e.g. Africa). This is an additional possible example of a weaker party deterring a stronger. It therefore appears prudent to ensure France's position, not as defence, but to avoid any form of potential blackmail or diktat. As such, it would appear as irresponsible to disregard the prospect of a Chinese threat in the long term. For these reasons, France's nuclear deterrent is remains to be perceived as essential.

4. The Public Perception

Additionally, the French public opinion appeared to support the consensus. The Simons Foundation's report on global public opinion on nuclear weapons reveals these remarkable findings: 37.1% of the French respondents perceive the use of their country's nuclear weapon justified as a defence against a possible attack [question 6a] (British respondents: 28,6%; U.S. respondents: 20.2%). Furthermore, 48.4% of the French appear to feel assured by the presence of nuclear weapons [question 7a] (U.S. respondents: 47%; British respondents: 46.3%). This is confirmed by the fact that just 39.0% of the French respondents felt that nuclear weapons should be eradicated globally [question 8] (American respondents: 48.7%; British respondents 50.9%). Many French, 38,1% of the respondents, also seem to perceive that the possession of a nuclear arsenal puts their country in a unique position, and as such it would not be advantageous to partake in any accords to demote or abolish the nuclear armament [question 12a] (U.S. respondents: 37.6%; British respondents: 35,7%) (The Simons Foundation, 2007).

Studies of public opinion trends in Mitterrand's France revealed that despite France's status as a nuclear power, the French public appeared much less concerned about the possibility of a nuclear confrontation than citizens of other Western European nations. The French public exhibited high levels of acceptance of their country's nuclear strike force, and as thus felt that France had not to rely on U.S. protection.

Additionally, the widespread support for the *force de frappe* went along with the refusal of most respondents of the study to ever consider the use of their country's nuclear deterrent, even in case of an invasion.

That attitude of the French public led to two alternative interpretations. Firstly, the concept of *responsible nationalism* views the relative calm of the French public as an appreciation of de Gaulle's decision to base France's defence on her own national resources and to renounce all foreign, e.g. American nuclear umbrella, security assurances and thus to withdraw from the NATO. *Responsible nationalism* was viewed by both the French Socialists as well as the public as proof of good sense. Secondly, the theory of *nuclear pacifism* states that the French public felt so assured by their nation's nuclear umbrella, thus significantly distorted the concept of deterrence, that the possibility of aggression towards French territory can be excluded. *Nuclear pacifism* relates to the concept of an eternal state of *non-war*. Furthermore, the deliberate ambiguities of the French nuclear doctrine led many of the public to imagine that if an international armed crisis over basic defence policy was renounced for the U.S. conventional and nuclear security guarantees. As France consistently pursued a course of national self-reliance in defense of her security interests, protests against nuclear weapons and their delivery systems such public support for nuclear deterrence turned into a myth that the French citizens will be saved the horrors of war, at least within the borders of their motherland (Mason, 1989).

5. The Political Consent

What is especially noteworthy is the political unity in respect to the French nuclear deterrent. All three major political parties, RPR (*Rassemblement pour la République*, far-right, Gaullist); UDF (*Union pour la Démocratie Française*, center-right); and PS (*Parti Socialiste*, left-wing) support the notion of the French dissuasion. The Socialist Party (PS) originally hedged opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific, which the party leadership believed to threaten the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but

not to the concept of dissuasion. However, during the presidency of the socialist François Mitterrand (1981-1995), nuclear deterrence was not relinquished. Since the termination of French nuclear testing in 1996, the objections of the PS were completely diminished.

Obviously, opposition parties, such as FN (*Front national*, extreme-right); PCF (*Parti communiste français*, far-left); and the VEC (*Les Verts*, the Greens, centre-left) dissent with the notion of a minimal nuclear deterrent, however this does not prevent such parties to ally themselves with the one of the three leading parties mentioned above which support the nuclear deterrent.

It was not until the then minister of foreign affairs, Alain Juppé (RPR), revived the debate in January 1995: “After developing a joint doctrine between France and the United Kingdom, should our generation fear the prospect, not of a shared deterrent, but at least discussing the issue of dissuasion with our main partners? Might not adopting a single currency and a new Franco-German contract alter France’s perception of its vital interests?”(Boniface, 1998).

However the debate over an extended, Europeanized, nuclear doctrine was effectively terminated by the lifting of the moratorium on nuclear tests in 1995 followed by several test “shots” on the Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. Although French leaders to attempt to outline, that the tests were not only for France’s benefit, but useful for the European security, not only the testing came under harsh international criticism but also the concept of an extended nuclear deterrent in particular, and nuclear weapons in general. Paris had severely miscalculated the level of sensitivity towards nuclear testing in Europe. What the French leadership perceived as major concession and progress, e.g. the potential for an extended, European deterrent, was effectively of no interest in most of France’s partner countries, especially in Germany. Furthermore, many in Europe expressed their dislike of being “nuclearized” against their will and were

additionally suspicious that a French offer of a European nuclear deterrent would involve considerable financial implications for France's partners in Europe.

The French leadership sees the nuclear deterrent as necessary to assure the country's security and independence and as a mean to avoid confrontation, whether conventional or nuclear, in Europe; whereas most in Europe see it at most as an unnecessary provocation towards Moscow. The sentiment in other countries, such as Austria and Sweden, are strongly ant-nuclear, regardless whether for civilian or military purposes and any proposal of nuclear deterrence is bound to encounter harsh criticism.

Further consensus among the parties was created by a policy which both supports a national nuclear deterrence and vows to work for disarmament under the NPT. Such a broad framework even accommodates parties opposed to nuclear armaments such as the communists or the greens, especially in a system of alliance with the PS. This was especially evident during the years of cohabitation of Jacques Chirac (RPR) as president of the French Republic and Lionel Jospin's (PS) as prime minister (1997-2002), whose cabinet was composed of a left-wing alliance between the *Parti socialiste*, the French Communist Party (PCF), the Greens (VEC), the Left Radical Party (*Parti Radical de Gauche*, PRG), and the populist left wing Citizen Republican Movement was formed (*Mouvement républicain et citoyen*, MDC). The need of government solidarity forced political parties, e.g. PCV, VEC, which as such were opposed to a nuclear defence policy into a compromise which consisted of:

- 1 a minimal dissuasion,
- 2 a rejection of the option of nuclear war,
- 3 a relation between the French nuclear arsenal and European defence,
and

4 an active pursuit of nuclear disarmament

6. The Active Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament.

The decision to remain with a purely defensive nuclear concept is critical. The French nuclear arsenal also included short range pre-strategic ballistic nuclear system (SRBM) such as Hadès with a range of approximately 480 kilometres, as well as Pluton with a range of a mere 17-120 kilometres. Those two delivery systems, which were decommissioned in 1996 and 1993 respectively, were both designed to counter a possible Soviet attack in Western Europe and were thought to send a last “warning-shot” before deployment of the long-range strategic missiles. The deployment of SRBM, which are referred to as ‘tactical delivery systems’ in NATO, was thought to repel a Soviet invasion by “limited “ or tactical nuclear warfare before foe’s forces could infringe French territory. An estimate of map of Europe during the time of the Cold War easily reveals that such a confrontation would have taken place within West Germany. A leading German officer was reported to remark: “the shorter the range, the deader the Germans.”, and had at a time severely soured the Franco-German relations. A continuation of the concept of war fighting certainly would have prevented a political consensus among the French parties

Public acceptance of French nuclear weapons policy can perhaps be related to its symbolic value as a totem of national modernization and international prestige in a broader sense (Mason, 1989). Ideologically high levels of support of the national defence policy in recurrent opinion polls, as well as continued public tolerance towards high defence budgets as well as remarkably low levels of draft evasion. Secondly, the theory of nuclear pacifism states that the French public felt so assured by their nation’s nuclear

umbrella, thus significantly distorted the concept of deterrence, that the possibility of aggression towards French territory can be excluded. “Nuclear pacifism” relates to the concept of an eternal state of non-war. Furthermore, the deliberate ambiguities of the French nuclear doctrine led many of the public to imagine that if an international armed crisis in Europe were to occur, France, exactly because of its own nuclear potential, has the capacity to abandon all her alleys and withdraw into her own national *réduit* (fortified defence). In such, nuclear pacifism is comparable to the idea of the Swiss armed neutrality. The French public’s support for nuclear deterrence was further propagated by the fantasy of French citizens to be spared the horrors of war, at least within the borders of their motherland. The French public sees itself distant from U.S. political leadership and their debates on security policy, thus public French opinion was not affected by the American concept of a ‘limited’ nuclear confrontation, *which was significantly* responsible for the anxiety on other Western European countries, especially in keeping the “le tout ou rien” (everything or nothing) notion which lies at the heart of the limited deterrent. Further divergences of French and German views are also apparent. France has been lucky in the 20th century, as she was spared the material destruction and political occupation as suffered twice by Germany. However, the lasting trauma was not to have lost sovereignty, but to have her status of “*la grande nation*” tarnished twice in the 20th century.

A strong consensus between the leaders of the four major parties (PRP / UDF / PS and PCF) allowed French policymakers great resources for managing public responses to nuclear policy questions, to create unparalleled record of “pre-empting” opposition to their policies within the Western bloc. This allowed the French state to pursue nuclear energy development without major opposition, thus gave France’s apparent “immunity” from the nuclear debates that have plagued nuclear policymakers in other Western countries. (Mason, 1989)

French “nuclear nationalism” has supported two related developments:

1. emergence of a strong presidential regime, legitimated by direct elections
2. strategic policy based on the *force de frappe*

Together they represent fundamental features of the Gaullist political settlement, enduring changes of political generations between the generation of the Resistance to 1968, shift in ruling parliamentary majorities from right to left in 1981, left to right in 1986, and back again in 1988. (Mason, 1989)

7. The Nuclear Monarch.

De Gaulle’s once remarked to J.F. Kennedy: “Without the effective sovereignty that only nuclear weapons guarantee, the chief executive would lack the authority to command his armies’ loyalty or resist the party leaders in the National Assembly”(Debré, 1989: 51).

President Mitterrand on the basic principle of the nuclear presidency: “Authority to command nuclear weapons cannot be shared. It cannot be shared given French institutions and simply given the nature of the weapons themselves which forbid it – even in France. Deterrence can only exist on the condition that decisions are taken by a single man, and quickly – otherwise it does not make much sense.” (Lacaze, 1984)

Mitterrand further stated: “The keystone of deterrence strategy in France is the head of state, that is myself. All depends on my determination. All the rest is only inert matter.” (Mason, 1989)

The Fifth Republic is also referred to as “nuclear monarchy”, as it credits the French president with discretionary powers in defence and foreign policy unheard of in other Western systems of government. Under the current constitution, the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He alone can order them in and out of action, and can do so virtually without the consultation of anyone but the chiefs of staff, his personal aids, and the prime minister. Most importantly, it has become accepted that the president alone can by decree command the French strategic forces into action. (Cohen, 1986: 50-51).

The President’s discretion in decision making along with the right to secrecy that covers these decisions from any legislative or cabinet review, provides the French president the widest latitude of any Western chief executive (and quite possibly any former Eastern party leaders as well) in decisions concerning the use of military force. However, the constitution has also invested important responsibilities in the hand of the prime minister, who is the head of the secretariat for national defence and responsible for the coordination of all the assessments taken by the different agencies with national security responsibilities. As long as the French President and the Prime Minister collaborate, such an organization works well, however in absence of any such relationship, power can very well shift to the bureaucracy.

Nuclear consensus of the four major French parties consists of three essential principles: Firstly, “Minimal Deterrence” adequate to deter direct attacks on France’s national territory and thus preserve French sovereignty. This is in agreement with the concept of the deterrence of the “strong by the weak” as the nuclear forces need only be proportional to France’s value as strategic stake in the international system. Secondly, the “*le tout ou rien*” doctrine defines the minimal deterrent. According to French strategists, France is too weak to engage in a prolonged conflict whether conventional or

nuclear, as such the to manage any crisis France's security perimeter is to deter the enemy by application of nuclear threats to maintain the condition of non-war, followed by confronting an aggressor with a rapid escalation of a potential conflict beyond the threshold of war. The limitation of an enemy to an "all-or-nothing" choice is based on the assumption that both conventional as well as nuclear conflicts would prove too destructive for Europeans to tolerate. In French strategic thinking, the number of nuclear assets must be limited, lest to draw unwanted strategic attention to France, and thus undermine her own security. Conversely, French strategic thinking is that even a medium-sized power can effectively deter a superpower despite the apparent imbalance in strategic resources. The French strategic view is that strategic defences of a superpower are sufficient to protect military targets, but that ultimately are not sufficient to protect 'soft' targets (e.g. centres of population) against a reprisal counter force attack.

Thirdly, the element of "strategic ambiguity" is a major element in the consensus of the main French political parties on the usage of both conventional as well as thermonuclear resources. This essentially signifies that France is neither to identify the conditions under which her nuclear forces were to be applied, nor the adversary against whom such the French nuclear forces would be committed to. This element of ambiguity is majorly based on the conviction that the French sovereignty and security would be compromised if the French government were to allow treaty obligations to either NATO or the German ally to automatically engage the French military forces should a confrontation with a superpower become reality. As such, strategic ambiguity is a necessary precondition for the effective preservation of national control over the decision whether or not to go to war. As such France's 'strategic ambiguity' is a direct consequence of the French view that deterrence cannot be shared; that France is not to rely on others for her national survival, not can others rely on France. In the Gaullist view, French strike forces are designed to deter attacks both on France's national

territory, referred to as *sanctuaire nationale* or the ‘first circle’ of France’s defence perimeter, and France’s *vital interests* beyond her borders, effectively Germany, or the “second circle”. Any attacks, regardless whether chemical, biological, nuclear or conventional, on French territory are supposed to immediately trigger a nuclear response, however the threshold defined by France’s “vital interests” beyond her national borders have always been left open.

Such an ambiguity has, of course, allowed different political views and parties to pick the enemy for their choice. As such, for the majority of the socialists and obviously for the right, the enemy used to be the former Soviet Union and remains Russia until the present day. Conversely, for the communists, the extreme left and some factions of the socialists and Gaullists, the principle political threat has always loomed from Washington. Effectively, the concept of “strategic ambiguity” allows for a consensus on nuclear deterrence of all major parties. Due to the abstract nature of “strategic ambiguity” dissimilar strategic and political perceptions can coexist under one nuclear “umbrella”, e.g. all major points of dissention among the major parties have been covered up for years, and in the case of the Socialists, among the major currents within the party. However the pursuit of the element of “strategic ambiguity” is indeed a balancing act which perplexed both the German and the U.S. partners

8. Nuclear Deterrent and European Defence

In order to establish a truly European deterrent, a European defence system needs to be created. Although the member of the European Union have forgone a considerable part of their sovereignties by the acceptance of the “*acquis communautaire*” of all the member states and the adoption of the European Monetary Union (EMU) by 16 members, defence remains to be integrated into the EU. As defence is a very much

associated with perception of national sovereignty and awareness of national pride, political European integration needs to evolve considerably, as to allow overcoming for these conceptions to be overcome. As such, without political unity, rather than economic, a comprehensive European defence system, of which a European deterrent needs to be an integral part,

In the past, France saw her nuclear deterrent as a purely national issue, which cannot be shared, as stated in a 1972 White Paper on defence. Although France did not subscribe to the American notion of a European-scale nuclear deterrent as proffered by NATO, France did not wish to propose a less potential substitute. As such France sees its nuclear deterrent neither in contradiction nor in competition to NATO's nuclear umbrella over Europe, but rather as a compliment. Hence, the French see their nuclear deterrent specifically designed to protect France's sovereignty and her vital interests within the Western alliance. Paris sees the nuclear deterrent as an asset to the Western alliance in general and to European security in particular, where France can assure for her own security, albeit France's stance towards NATO and her determination to maintain an independent policy of not just nuclear deterrence, but defence as general.

French leaders increasingly encountered a dilemma during the 1990s. The French dissemination of European Unity, especially in regard to the Franco-German relationship, which increasingly appeared to be in contradiction of the French definition of nuclear dissuasion as a policy of purely national interest. Although the French white paper on defence from 1972 reiterated the purpose of the French deterrent as of vital national interests, Europe benefited from the French strategy as the limits of French interests are vague, e.g. a potential adversary of Europe is also a potential adversary of France, and is hence deterred effectively. The French Army Chief of Staff, General Méry went in 1976 so far as to speak of a "broadened territory", which caused considerable uproar, and the subject was quickly dropped. As recent as 1984, the then incumbent

president Mitterrand that France cannot accept responsibility for the security for the whole of Europe. The defence White Paper of 1994 clearly stated: “A European nuclear doctrine and European nuclear deterrent will only be achievable when there will be European vital interests, considered as such by the Europeans and understood as such by others. Until then, France does not intend to dilute its national defence resources in such a field under any pretext.”(Boniface, 1998)

The notion of “minimal dissuasion” is the possession of nuclear weapons in numbers small enough to discourage any potential attacker, but to exclude nuclear warfare, was originally determined by budgetary restraints, but has since a political and diplomatic necessity. The French leadership understands that too many nuclear weapons would void their rationale, “*trop des nucléaires tue le nucléaire*”: too many nuclear weapons kill them altogether.

The independency of the French nuclear arsenal of NATO, allowed France not only to dissuade the Soviet threat during the years of the Cold War, but also allowed the “Palais de l’Élysée”, e.g. Presidency of the French Republic, to peruse a relationship with Moscow which was distinctly singular in comparison to other West European nations. Without debilitation of the Western solidarity, France felt neither restricted nor inhibited in the relation to either superpower. Furthermore, France’s policy of minimal deterrence did not compel the perusal of extensive conventional and nuclear arsenals such as those of the two superpowers, but allowed France the status of a nuclear power.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER V
THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. British Nuclear Deterrence Defined by Domestic Politics

When the Conservatives (The Conservative and Unionist Party) won the 1987 elections, the British nuclear deterrent was to remain. The Labour Party made opposition to the British defence budget in general and the financial burdens implicated by the nuclear deterrent a major issue during the election campaign which ended in a calamity for the left-wing party. Labour's internal appraisals of its performance during the 1987 elections, revealed that the party's anti-nuclear policy lost it nearly five percentage points of the electorate. As an opposition party, Labour was forced to revise its ant-nuclear stance, which proved to be evidently unpopular (Freedman, 2009: 23-56).

In its 1997 party manifesto, Labour committed to the preservation of the Trident SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) on board the four Vanguard class SSBNs (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear) which constitutes the British nuclear deterrent in the new millennium. Labour also reasserted the relationship to NATO, and a "strategic defence and security review to reassess [...] essential security interests and defence needs". After the a clear election victory for the Labour Party, the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, set about to initiate the SDR (Strategic Defence Review), which led to a decrease in the number of warheads carried on board the four Trident submarines from 96 down to 48. This reduced the number of warheads by one third, although it was understood that newly developed warheads would be more deadly due to increased accuracy and the possibility of individually targetable warheads within one delivery vehicle, the American built Trident missile.

The number of available British warheads was approximately 400, which was scheduled to be further reduced to about 300 under the previous Conservative government. The Labour instigated SDR however, decreased the number of warheads to below 200 and effectively rendered the British nuclear arsenal as the smallest of all the established nuclear powers (USA, Russia as successor of the former USSR, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom, as determined in the NPT – Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968), with an explosive yield of less than one percent of the global total.

Although the British deterrent relies on a single weapon system, the Trident missile, the 1998 SDR called for the nuclear arsenal to be deployable in a “sub-strategic” role as an option for a limited nuclear strike which would not automatically lead to a global nuclear confrontation.

2. The Concept of Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

The concept of “minimum nuclear deterrence” was epitomized by the operational terms of the four SSBNs: one boat was always kept on patrol, as not to exacerbate a crisis in the case of a sudden return to the seas. However, the submarines were not to be operated intensively, with only one single crew assigned per boat, and with the missiles kept on a low level, or dormant, state of alert, which would prerequisite days to attain full operational status.

Albeit the four SSBNs were commissioned before the end of the Cold War, the Vanguard class boats, *HMS Vanguard*, *HMS Victorious*, *HMS Vigilant*, and *HMS Vengeance* (Military Today, 2910), entered service after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Although only a few years in service, the Labour government demanded for preparations for the replacement of the submarines in 2007 to the tune of £ 25 billion, which included the costs of research, development, construction and the subsequent operation over twenty years of a new fleet of nuclear submarines, lest the system to become obsolete. The estimated expenditure for the new submarines was based on the continued cooperation with the United States, which thus would preclude any additional costs for the development of any indigenous delivery systems, e.g. missiles. The ensuing debate, which previous generations of Labour leaders, would have avoided at all costs, was surprisingly muted. In fact, the Labour Government argued that in an era of uncertainties and continued proliferation, e.g. Iran and North Korea; it was unwise for Britain to abolish the nuclear deterrent. Although it could have been argued that the expenditure would be considerable and not serve to address any particular purpose, the debate was listless and with scant public interest. Although support of the Conservatives was necessary in the vote in March 2007, dissidence within the Labour Party was slight at best.

One remarkable opposition to the future of the British nuclear deterrent comes from Scotland. The British Vanguard fleet operates out of *HMNB Clyde* (Royal Navy, 2009), Scotland's nuclear base. Scottish opposition, such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) (Scottish National Party, 2009), has always been more sceptical about the need for nuclear deterrence than the rest of the UK. The Scottish Parliament opposed by a 71 to 16 vote a renewal of Trident, with most Labour members abstaining and only the Conservatives in favour for a renewal. Such an opposition casts some doubt over the future of the Clyde base for the Trident submarines, should Scotland attain independence.

3. The Economic Implications

Britain's atomic warheads are built and maintained by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE, 2009) at Aldermaston. AWE is managed by a consortium, in which one third of the shares are held by the US firm Lockheed Martin. Although the UK warheads are built by the AWE, the design is based on U.S. specifications, this in accordance with the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (British American Security Information Council, 2008). In 2005, the Labour Government announced an extensive research programme to assure the effectiveness and safety of the warhead stockpile, for which expenditures of £ 350 million over a period of three years were budgeted. The government further anticipated substantial further investments, with the cost of AWE at Aldermaston to increase 20% to 3% of the British defence budget, for the maintenance and safekeeping of the nuclear warheads. That cost is exclusive the purchase, maintenance and operation of the American built Trident missiles and the operational costs of the four SSBNs.

Britain had initially purchased 58 Trident D5 missiles from the United States. The approximate current stockpile is 50 missiles, due to occasional test firing over the years. The Labour government decided to participate in the U.S. life extension program for the D5 missile to extend the operational life of the projectiles until early 2040s. The costs for the extension program is estimated at £ 250 million, which would allow an additional twenty years of operation, and thus any decision on a successor needs not to be made until the 2020s.

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4. The Public Opinion on the British Nuclear Deterrent

The Simon Report revealed that 39.7% of the British respondents felt their nation should use its power and influence in a way that it serves its own interests, compared with 24.3% of the French and 21.6% of the American respondents. Amazingly, 26.4% of the German respondents also thought that their country should apply its power in a manner which serves its individual concerns [question 1].

When asked if the use of nuclear weapons by their country would be justified, 16.9% of the British responded positively in the context of an actual war, and 28.6% of the UK respondents regarded the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a possible attack as permissible. The same questions yielded 15% and 37.1% respective favourable reactions from the French and 24.9% and 20.2% respective approving retorts from the U.S. respondents [question 6a].

Furthermore, 46.3% of the British respondents expressed that they felt safer in the knowledge that Britain possesses nuclear weapons. This result is akin to those from France (48.4%) and the United States (47%) [question 7a].

37.6% of the American respondents and 28.1% of the French respondents responded that nuclear weapons give their countries a unique position, and as such it would not be in the interest of that country to participate in treaties that would reduce or eliminate the nation's nuclear arsenal. These findings are nearly convergent to the equivalent British sentiments (35.7%) [question 12a] (The Simons Foundation, 2007)

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5. The British Rationale for a Nuclear Deterrent

The rationale for the British continuation of a nuclear deterrent has been consistent, albeit the disappearance of the Cold War threats. In stark contrast to the French perception of nuclear deterrence, no national prestige or benefits to the nation's status as a power are associated with the nuclear deterrent in Britain. The UK's nuclear policy is regarded as Britain's contribution to NATO's strategy.

The British underlying principle for its small nuclear deterrent is the concept of "multiple decision centres" from which the North Atlantic Alliance would gain strength. This concept has been consistently adhered to since the 1960s, by governments of both parties, Conservatives and Labour, and endured the drastic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. The British view is that, while Her Majesty's government has complete confidence in the U.S. security guarantees, potential adversaries might be less so. A second centre of nuclear decision making within NATO, especially one geographically closer to a probable conflict, would further convince an adversary of the alliance's determination of deterrence. The official British view is that an antagonist might be prepared to speculate on the American deterrent, especially should in regard to issues which might be perceived of a lesser relevance to Washington, but that an opponent is unlikely to speculate on the determination of an American and a British deterrent simultaneously. The British Secretary of Defence under Margaret Thatcher stated in 1981: "... that I would feel more than a touch of discomfort if France, with her clear policy of non-commitment to Alliance strategy, were the only West European nuclear power." (Freedman, 2009: 37) This perception, whilst not a reprimand for the then French absence of dedication to NATO, reflects the British notion that a credible Western nuclear deterrent cannot be restricted on a single national entity, in addition to

the credibility of such a deterrent needs to be convincing not from the deterrent's perspective but in the perception of the party to be deterred.

Despite the official declaration that the British deterrent served no nationalistic ideals and is to be seen as closely linked to the UK's allies, e.g. NATO, much debate on the British deterrent was linked to its true state of "independence". The possibility of employment of British nuclear forces needs to be recognized in the context of an European crisis, e.g. an aggression of the Soviet Union during the Cold War or Russia in the predictable future, but the British leadership, irrelevant of the political spectrum, attempted to argue that the British nuclear deterrent was not designed to substitute the nuclear potential of the United States. As such, the British deterrent is perceived as an additional impetus to a combined US/UK strategy for the nuclear forces; as such the British nuclear deterrent is an extension, the European branch, of NATO, which is able to operate under independently British control, but not detached from the Western alliance.

Although contentious, the adherence to the Western alliance is further underscored by the consecutive governments' permission to host American nuclear weapons on British territory. In 1976, the then incumbent Labour Government agreed to let the numbers of stationed U.S. F-111 bombers to be increased to approximately 160 units from the original 70 planes that had been based in the United Kingdom since 1971. Those bombers offered sufficient range and payload to attack targets well within the Soviet Union and the arrival of those additional American bombers, along with their nuclear payloads, did not initiate much of a debate.

The deployment of 96 American cruise missiles in Britain as the result of the NATO's 'double track' decision and the consecutive failure of the Geneva arms reduction talks in November 1983, however brought about opposition to American bases in Britain. The opposition to the deployment of the American missiles was not as such

targeted against the presence of American forces as such, but was rather caused by British concerns that the Americans might initiate an attack from British bases unilaterally instead of the acknowledgement of a “joint decision” making process between the United States and the United Kingdom. Ninety-four percent of the British respondents did not oppose the American bases but demanded dual-key control, which is combined American-British authority, over all US nuclear weapons based in the UK at that time. This perception is an indication, by reciprocal means, the U.S. nuclear forces in Britain are perceived as a reinforcement to a common American-British strategy, as the UK nuclear assets, e.g. the four SSBNs with their current total of 192 SLBMs, are regarded as an extension of NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

The most reputable contention is that the British deterrent is rendered irrelevant by the presence of the American deterrent. Such a perception was a cause for predicament for the Labour Party in the 1980s, as opposition to U.S. bases in the UK would have endorsed a justification for the British nuclear forces, lest Labour would have been perceived in denial of any protection against a threat from the Warsaw Pact. However, that was exactly what the Labour Party conveyed in the 1987 election campaign. Labour opposed the nuclear umbrella, whether offensive in form of the American nuclear forces based in the UK, or the defensive version in the form of the British nuclear deterrent. The overwhelming victory of the Conservatives and the Labour’s subsequent extensive confinement in the opposition unquestionably brought about a transformation in the Labour Party manifesto.

The issues of both threats from the Soviet Union and the nuclear deterrence soon lost their impact on the political landscape, after the signing of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). Since the tensions between the Warsaw Pact and NATO

appeared to ease, no immediate changes to the British nuclear deterrence policy appeared to be necessary.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the rationalization for a British deterrent became more intricate, as any immediate threats appeared to have disappeared. Nonetheless, Britain retained the Cold War validation of “second centre of decision-making” for her nuclear deterrent. The British Secretary of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind (Conservative), stated: “...any tendency towards thinking that there could be a major conflict in Europe in which the question of nuclear use arose which did not involve the vital interests of the allies, including the U.S.”(Freedman, 2009: 42) However, the successive British leaderships envisaged circumstances where Washington’s commitment might be doubtful, and as such the United States could prove either unwilling or unable to intervene. Although the nature of such a potential situation is indistinct, the occurrences of 1956 could be taken as precedence. As such, the British nuclear deterrent needs, in addition to its affiliation to NATO and the U.S. American nuclear strategy, to be understood as an “insurance policy”.

Prime Minister Tony Blair stated:

“The future is uncertain: accurately predicting events over the period 2020 to 2050 is extremely hard. There are worrying trends: nuclear proliferation continues, large nuclear arsenals remain, and some are being enlarged and modernized; and there is a potential risk from state-sponsored terrorists armed with nuclear weapons.”(Freedman, 2009: 44).

The notion of a foundation of security on French and British capacities is assumed to lack the element of credibility in comparison to the American security guarantee. For Britain, the French security policy, which is based on nationalist notions and on the

concept of a national sanctuary, as well as the discrepancy in the balance of forces in comparison to those of the United States, and in consideration of potent threats such a re-emerging Russia, impedes cooperation with France on the issue of nuclear deterrence.

However, the official rationale for the nuclear deterrent is astoundingly analogous to the French vindication:

“Our defence strategy will continue to be underpinned by nuclear forces as the ultimate guarantee of our country’s security. Nuclear weapons guard against any attempt by an adversary to gain advantage by threat or coercion. They are also uniquely able to ensure that aggression is not a realistic option, by presenting to a potential aggressor the prospect of a cost that would far outweigh any hoped-for-gain.”(Freedman, 2009: 42).

6. The Rationale for an Independent British Nuclear Deterrent

The British not only view the nuclear deterrent in context with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but furthermore as insurance in conditions where Britain would deem herself detached from her alliance partners:

“Potential adversaries could gamble that the US or France might not put themselves at risk of a nuclear attack in order to deter an attack on the UK or our allies. Our retention of an independent centre of nuclear decision-making makes clear to any adversary that the cost of an attack on UK vital interests will outweigh any benefits. Separately, controlled but mutually supporting nuclear forces therefore create an enhanced overall deterrent effect.”(UK Secretary of Defence, 2006).

This statement by the Secretary of Defence clearly outlines the official British perception of the nuclear deterrent as insurance against uncertain future developments where support by other nuclear allies, e.g. the United States and France, might not be forthcoming.

Furthermore, the official paper outlines five principles as to define the British methodology of the nuclear deterrent:

1. Deterrence: The nuclear arsenal is designed to deter an attack and as such is not considered as a military asset, but to nuclear prevent intimidation by adversaries. The British nuclear arsenal is only to be applied when threats against Britain's vital interest cannot be countered by other means.
2. Limited Deterrence: The UK government is to maintain only the minimum amount of nuclear weapons needed to maintain the objective of deterrence.
3. Deliberate ambiguity: The UK does not to divulge the circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons is considered, nor does the Royal Government disclose the severity of a potential employment of the nuclear arsenal. Consequently, the first use of nuclear weapons by Britain is not ruled out.
4. Collective security through NATO: The UK nuclear deterrent is seen as a contribution to NATO for the North-Atlantic area
5. Independent decision centre: The British government maintains the perception that an independent decision centre within the North-Atlantic coalition contributes to the overall credibility, and thus effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent of NATO.

Especially relevant is point three above, where first use of nuclear weapons is not ruled out. As such, the British nuclear weapons could be used as a pre-emptive asset rather than a purely preventive instrument.

The British concept of nuclear deterrence thus significantly diverges from the French model as such as a) the British nuclear weapons are an implicit part of the North-Atlantic alliance, e.g. NATO, and b) the British nuclear weapons could potentially be applied for a first strike under the postulation of deliberate ambiguity. This differs vastly from the French conception of nuclear deterrence, where the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated as justifiable by the notion of the preservation a national sanctuary which is to be shielded by an entirely sovereign, thus isolated, nuclear strategy.



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CHAPTER VI

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

1. Historic-political nexus

1.1. The Birth of the German Federal Republic

Initially, the General Treaty of 1952 (*Deutschlandvertrag*) between the Western Allies of World War II (the United States of America, United Kingdom and the French Republic) and the Federal Republic of Germany which conferred sovereignty to West German (BRD: *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) was based on the assumption that West Germany would be a member of EDC (European Defence Community), along with France, Italy, and the Benelux countries. However, upon the failed ratification of the EDC by the French parliament in 1954 it was proposed to allow West Germany to join the Washington Treaty, the precursor of NATO. This allowed for the, from Washington desired but grudgingly accepted by Paris, rearmament of West Germany, albeit Germany had to pledge to not pursue nuclear or biological weapons (Adenauer's non-nuclear pledge). However, a debate over nuclear weapons ensued in the late 1950s. The cause for this debate lay in the consideration of Germany's overall security and NATO's nuclear defence doctrine. NATO planners envisaged the *Bundeswehr* (German Federal Defence Forces) soldiers to be trained in nuclear defence systems. This was the commencement of a deep political rift within Germany and amongst the Germans in regard not only to nuclear deterrence but also foreign affairs in general. During the decade which started in the late 1950s, tactical, or sub-strategic weapons, were

considered by many leaders as a mean to offset the perceived quantitative inferiority of the Western conventional forces in comparison to the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, many saw the deployment of short range weapon delivery systems for nuclear warheads as the logical evolution of conventional defence systems, and thus a necessity to avert any aggression of the Soviet led bloc.

Some high ranking German politicians, such as the then incumbent German Federal Minister of Defence (Franz Josef Strauss, CSU – *Christiliche Soziale Union in Bayern* – Christian Social Union of Bavaria) and Chancellor Adenauer himself informed the German press that the *Bundeswehr* needs to be equipped with American-made tactical nuclear weapons, albeit the fact that U.S. nuclear stockpile was already present on German soil.

The trauma of the consequences of the brutal and disastrous military follies of the Nazi Regime still was very much felt in both the BRD (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland* or West Germany) and the DDR (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik* or East Germany) with reconstruction of destroyed cities, towns and industrial infrastructure hardly accomplished (to a larger extend in the BRD, due to the Marshall Plan; and to a lesser extent in the DDR, where hardly any such help from Moscow was forthcoming) and German POWs (Prisoners of War) still suspected to be missing beyond the Iron Curtain. These horrors of a war recently lost collided bluntly with the new harsh realities and daunting tensions of the Cold War, such as the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the Berlin Crisis of 1961, when U.S. and Soviet tanks, only separated by a few

meters with pending commands to fire, faced each other at Checkpoint Charlie which culminated in the erection of the Berlin Wall.

These colliding sensations pledged conservatives against socialists, polarized academia and inflamed the disagreement between capitalists and communists in Western Germany, relative defence policy in general and the nuclear deterrent in particular. For obvious reasons, such discussions were not known to take place publicly in the DDR, which was to remain under the Soviet sphere of influence for several decades.

A *nuclearization* of Germany was vehemently opposed by scientific and religious groups within the country. Those groups found themselves in an unlikely alliance with the centre-left SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* – Social Democratic Party of Germany), which caused the conservative-liberal CDU (*Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands* – Christian Democratic Union of Germany) – CSU alliance to retract its stance on nuclear armament of the West German troops. The CDU/SCU electoral victories of 1957 however renewed the discussions of German nuclear arsenal. Such concepts were passionately contested by the emerging German peace movement, which was led by the nuclear-physic community and churches, besides various dedicated antinuclear organizations.

In addition to the apprehension of a nuclear holocaust in Germany in case of an armed conflict between the two opposing blocs, e.g. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in Europe, the opposition to a *Bundeswehr* equipped with weapons of mass destruction was, although marginally, based on the

fear that the such an equipped German military could hedge aspirations which do not conform to the democratic rules laid out in the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, or the West-German constitution. The advocates of a nuclear armed German military by contrast were alarmed by the prospect of a German political landscape destabilized by faction of extreme social forces, which had the potential to recreate the conditions which had spelled the end of the Weimar Republic and had given rise to the NSDAP (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* – The National Socialist German Worker’s Party) some 35 years earlier. Such anxieties on both side of the then political divide in Germany are proof of the inherent trepidations present in Germany at the time, despite the economic success (*Deutsches Wirtschaftswunder* – German economic miracle) on the nuclear armaments of the German military. Additionally, the deliberations of a German nuclear option were more and more replaced by overall reflections on the overall strategy on NATO planning and the deployment of the alliance’s assets in Europe.

1.2. Germany During the Height of Cold War Tensions

The concept of the “flexible response” doctrine⁵ as well as the emergence of the SPD as a greater political power however lessened the

⁵ The “flexible response” doctrine was initiated under the Kennedy administration in 1961. The doctrine was based on the realistic assumption that to respond to an attack of the Soviet Union on Europe, the U.S. strategic forces ought to have the option to employ conventional weapons before resorting to nuclear weapons. This aimed to reassure the European allies while maintaining the deterrent to the Warsaw Pact. The “flexible response” effectively assured the continued presence of sizeable conventional forces in Europe.(Gaddis, 2010)

intensity of the political discussion in nuclear arsenals. However, the replacement of outdated Soviet SS-4 (the abbreviation “SS” is the NATO designation for Soviet “Surface-to-Surface” missiles (Parsch, 2010)) and SS-5 missiles with SS-20 missiles which were capable to be fired by mobile launchers by the Soviet Union was thought to shift the balance of mutual deterrence towards the Soviet Union. The U.S. administration under President Regan with consultations with the NATO leadership, decided to embark on a “double track” strategy to counter the Soviet SS-20 deployment: one track necessitated arms control negotiations between the United States and the USSR to attain a mutual reduction of INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, e.g. delivery systems for nuclear warheads with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometres; whereas the other track called for a U.S. deployment of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) with a single warhead in addition to 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. The arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union started in Geneva, Switzerland, in the fall of 1980. The Reagan administration announced a negotiation proposal in which the United States would have agree to dismantle all the GLCMs and Pershing missiles stationed in Europe in exchange for a Soviet abolition of all SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. This proposal become known as the “zero-zero offer”.

The Soviet delegation to the arms control negotiations conversely proposed a reduction of all medium-range missiles and nuclear-able aircraft to a maximum on both sides, inclusive the French and British nuclear delivery system. The U.S. position however, was to exclude the

nuclear delivery systems of both the European nuclear powers from the Geneva negotiations. This essentially caused the collapse of the Geneva arms reduction talks in November 1983⁶, and consequentially the deployment of American GLCMs and Pershing II missiles was commenced in 1984⁷.

But even before the arrival of the first American cruise and ballistic missiles, the German populace strongly opposed the deployment. Led by, as in the 1950s, the scientific⁸ groups, religious assemblies, and unions (Rupp, 2010) in Germany, the German Peace Movement attempted to avoid the deployment of the missiles. The German leadership found itself in a paradox, as the centre-left SPD under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in coalition with the liberal FDP (*Freie Demokratische Partei* – Free Democratic Party) with foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher formed the German government. Although the SPD/FDP coalition appeared aware that Germany's security could only be assured by both the presence of

⁶ The Soviets felt strongly about an exclusion of the French and British nuclear weapons and delivery systems, e.g. missiles and aircraft, which would have unfavorably destabilized the nuclear ratio in Europe, and as such the French and British forces needed to be encompassed in any arms limitation talks with the West. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, is reported to have stated: "Imagine that a terrible tragedy has occurred and that say, a nuclear-armed British missile is in flight. Should it carry a tag? 'I am British'? Or imagine, a French missile flying. Perhaps it will also carry a tag saying. 'I am French, I should not have been included in the count.'", C. Jones, *Soviets and Germans*, (The Harvard Crimson, 2010)

⁷ Also refer to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination on their intermediate-range and short-range missiles (U.S. Department of State, 2010)

⁸ *Göttinger Achtzehn, Göttinger Wissenschaftler für Frieden und Abrüstung*, is a group of originally 18 German nuclear scientists which demands peace and nuclear disarmament since the 1950s which is still active today.

NATO forces in Germany and the inclusion of German armed forces into the North Atlantic alliance, opposition to the increased U.S. deployment of sub-strategic, e.g. limited range, missiles on German ground was persistent mainly from the left spectrum of the political union. Although by far not the sole cause, the consequences of the political fallout were sombre for the SPD, as its coalition partner switched to align itself with the opposition, CDU/CSU, to materialize the new German majority in the *Bundestag* under the newly elected Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1983.

1.3. A Parallel German Security Policy

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) proposed demilitarization of Europe in order to attain European security in the 1980s. The means to accomplish such demilitarization was the suggestion of “strukturelle Nichtangriffsfaehigkeit” or the structural inability of military blocs to launch an attack. This involved amendment to size, structure, training and foremost strategy of the armed forces in Europe, as to incapacitate an offensive, and thus provoke a preventive or pre-emptive attack of any military force in Europe. In as such, the SPD’s goal was the creation of a Europe security structure free of nuclear weapons and to pursue the objective of stability assured by conventional means at the lowest possible level (De Gucht *et al*, 1991: 33-40). In the view of the SPD, NATO should give up the concept of both early and first use of nuclear

weapons. To avoid a preventive attack, all medium- and short ranges weapons should be dismantled and any nuclear battlefield weapons banned from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was believed by the SPU that these measures would ensure the success of the management of any arising crisis by political means and eradicate an escalation of a crisis fuelled by the presence of present military units or weapon systems.

The SPD was successively blamed for the statement of their ideas in a few elaborate phrases, which were designed for the consumption of electorate. After the SPU was forced out of power in 1982, Chancellor Kohl and his CDU/CSU party later accused the SPU for the creation of an image of an unreliable Germany and the pursue of a “parallel German foreign policy”. In fact, the Social democrats, whilst in opposition in the Bundestag, the German parliament, held discussions with various Eastern European communist party leaders, without the involvement of the Federal government, as the SPD leadership was able to use the contacts made during the party’s almost fifteen years in government. Significant rapprochement was reached with the SED, “*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*” – the East German Socialist Unity Party, which effected many reciprocal visits and sometimes close personal relations among SPD and SED officials. Furthermore, talks were held with the communist parties of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European beyond the “iron curtain” as to evaluate the possibilities of economic, ecological, and cultural cooperation. It is notable, that the Federal government, under CDU/CSU

leadership, later indirectly took of advantage of some of the good contacts previously established by the SPD, despite the CDU/CSU's harsh criticism.

A remarkable consequence of the SPD's efforts was a document titled "The struggle between the ideologies and joint security" (Der Streit der Ideologien um die gemeinsame Sicherheit, Grundwertekommission der SPD und Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED) in mid-1987, drafted together with the SED and published in the SPD's party newspaper "Neues Deutschland". Whilst confirming fundamental differences between the political systems of the East and the West, the paper called for a "de-emotionalizing" those differences. Further, the document called for open discussion as to achieve reform and terminate the rivalry between the systems in Europe. Additionally, the significance of freedom of information, travel, and assembly among others were emphasized. It is noteworthy, that the inclusion of terms such as "reform" and the statement on freedom shed further light into the GDR's enormous internal predicaments, barely two years prior to the fall of the East German leadership.

1.4. Wiedervereinigung (Reunification)

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the German reunification (*Deutsche Wiedervereinigung*, 1990) have, albeit the abolishment of the

long dreaded inner-German border brought forward new predicaments for Germany. The substantial threat of a Cold War conflict was replaced by a set of completely different predicaments. Firstly, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, that effectively segregated the European people for forty years, the economical successful West German states (*Bundeslaender*) were inundated with economic migrants who attempted to escape the financial misery in the former Warsaw Pact states. Secondly, historic antagonisms in Europe, which were mostly either subdued or forcefully suppressed, e.g. Tito's Yugoslavia, during the years of the Cold War, rapidly remerged, e.g. the growing nationalist tensions resultant in the peaceful segregation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Thirdly, external terrorist threats, e.g. Islamic extremist, increasingly posed challenges to Germany's security, albeit the fact that the then West German authorities had effectively combated terrorism before, e.g. the extremist left-wing RAF (*Rote Armee Fraktion* – Red Army Faction or Baader-Meinhof-Group) (Miko, 2007). Conversely, the re-emergence of a unified and economical potential, Germany brought about historically rooted fears in the neighbouring countries, e.g. France, the Netherlands, or most impotently Poland. The German leadership was trapped in the dilemma of assurance of the security of a newly unified *Deutschland* whilst avoidance of apprehension in Germany's neighbours was essential. This predicament was further confounded by the perception that the U.S. nuclear umbrella might have lost its justification, although many in Germany view the Soviet threat merely replaced by a Russian threat. .

2. “Not with Us”

The reasons for the fierce public opposition to the U.S./NATO deployment of additional and upgraded sub-strategic nuclear delivery systems in the 1980s are best explained by the “not with us” attitude of the German populace. *Deutschland’s* population is in a state of rejection to accept foreign policy from the perspective of defence. The German relationship with the past is very much unlike the French rapport with history. François Mitterrand’s statement that “France does not confuse pacifism as a postulate with peace as a result” is starkly inspired of the events of 1938 when both France and Britain capitulated in face of Nazi Germany’s demands because of their weakness. As such, in popular French view, security, stability and thus peace necessitate strength, both in the diplomatic as well as the military sphere. The German view of history in contrast, is shaped by the start of World War II in 1939 and the resultant catastrophe, utter destruction and humiliation of the German nation in 1945. Many Germans equal pacifism as the absence of military strength, because military prowess is seen responsible for Germany’s anguish in both 1918 and 1945. Whereas in France the term “nuclear” has a largely positive connotation, in particular as it allows *la grande nation* to preserve her national independence in both the energy as well as the military sector, the peaceful use of nuclear power in Germany was poisoned by the totally negative impact of military power, especially nuclear armed forces. Demonstrations, as the witnessed by during the anti-nuclear rallies in Germany, have two causes: either a total rejections of the established public system or a manifestation of democracy, where the population can freely and openly express their opposition. These two forces were combined in the German peace protests and marches, mainly because the large majority parties, e.g. SPD, CDU/CSU, as well as FDP, were unable to offer a perspective of the concerns of the German population (Grosser, 1981). As such a clear cleavage between

the German political scene and the German population was evident in regard to the deployment of NATO nuclear delivery systems. As such, any notion of a European or purely German strategy of nuclear deterrence would be condemned to failure.

3. Public Perception on Nuclear Arms

56.2% of the German respondents of the Simons Foundation Report on global public opinion on nuclear weapons indicated that NATO's nuclear sharing concept violated articles and II of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). This was only surpassed by the Italian respondents (56.7%) [question 5].

The antagonism of the German population towards nuclear weapons is obvious in the response of 76.9% of the German respondents that the use of nuclear weapons by NATO not be justifiable under any circumstance [question 6b]. In comparison, 69.9% of the Italians stated that the use of nuclear weapons is not acceptable, whereas 48.8% of the British respondents and 43.4% of the French respondents indicated that the application of nuclear weapons would be unacceptable, regardless of the circumstances.

Similarly, 59.8% of the Germans answered that they feel safer in the knowledge that their country does not possess any nuclear weapons [question 7b]. This is in stark contrast to both the French (23.9%) and British (37.1%) attitudes that the absence of a nuclear deterrent would increase their perception of safety.

Many Germans (80.7%) appear to regard the abolition of nuclear weapons as an objective of high priority for their government [question 8]. This view is shared by 50.9%

of the British respondents and only 39% of the French respondents of Simons Foundation survey.

60% of the German respondents are additionally opposed to nuclear sharing under NATO, and thus believe that their nation should not participate in that deterrence concept, as it is morally wrong, regardless whether nations agree or not. [question 12b]. Once again, the German public opposition to a nuclear deterrent is more pronounced than that of the Italians (51.3%) (The Simons Foundation, 2007).

4. Future Options of German Security

4.1. Option 1: Continuation of Status Quo

Large parts of the German population and the German leadership believe that the current security situation in Europe does not warrant changes in the current security arrangement. The proponents of this model argue that NATO nuclear weapons need to remain on German soil as signs of trust and commitment of a new, united Germany and the continued commitment by the USA and NATO to Germany's security. This model assumes that the USA remains coupled to Europe and thus the German security guarantee is not amended in any major fashion, and as thus Germany is not to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. This essentially were to preclude any active German commitment to an alternative European strategy of deterrence and thus is the most viable option for a large fraction of the German populace, albeit

the manifestos of the major German which call for a complete withdrawal of NATO and American nuclear forces from German territory.

4.2. Option 2: Preparations for the End of NATO

This option assumes that NATO's commitment either shifts away from the defence of Europe or that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ceases to exist as its *raison d'être*, the threat of Soviet aggression, dissipated. In such a scenario, the FRG were to remain reliant on NATO's security guarantee as long as it would be upheld or the Atlantic alliance lasted, but with any indications otherwise, Germany would be forced to contemplate the attainment of means of alternative nuclear deterrence, inclusive the possibility of a German independent nuclear deterrence.

4.3 Option 3: Europeanization of Security Structures

Should NATO either shift its focus away from Europe or cease in its existence, Germany could elect to remain in a security arrangement within the EU or WEU (West European Union). In such a structure, Germany would both demand an equal role and be requested to accept larger responsibility in the defence in Europe. Additionally, a continued integration in a structural European security arrangement would go a long way to alleviate fears of

Germany's neighbours of a strong recurrent *Deutschland*. In such a scenario, the French and British nuclear deterrents could be of vital significance to the security of Europe. However, as a resurgent Germany would be likely to demand equality among such a European treaty organization, Germany might still consider acquiring her indigenous nuclear assets.

4.4. Option 4: Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation

Should a military alliance structure within Europe fail to materialize, an alternative possibility were a bilateral cooperation with one of the nuclear powers in Europe, whilst an independent nuclear capacity would be pursued. Such a proposition has already been brought forward by France, however with less than enthusiastic reception in Germany. Firstly, as long as Germany remains firmly embedded in the North Atlantic alliance, no motive for a bilateral cooperation outside the NATO framework is apparent. Secondly, the Germans have always recognized that the French nuclear deterrent, *la force de frappe*, as an icon of French independence and sovereignty. Thirdly, the French suggestion of the extension of their nuclear deterrent to include Germany has been looked at, if not suspicion, but with puzzlement in Bonn and later in Berlin. The French stance on defence and deterrence used to be perceived by the German leadership as an attempt to keep Germany restrained as not allow for reunification. This was

epitomized by the French Nobel Price laureate François Mauriac's statement: "I love Germany so dearly that I hope there will always be of them." Albeit the fact that Germany is willing to partake in multilateral and bilateral forces, e.g. NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Franco-German Brigade, a historical mistrust towards both France and Great Britain appears to persist. Reliance on the nuclear deterrent extended by Washington is one thing, reliance on a nuclear deterrence provided by either Paris or London; however appears to be problematic from a German perspective as sentiments of national rivalries remain persistent. In the absence of an encompassing European security structure, Berlin is rather to pursue an independent nuclear option than to rely on her partners in Europe.

4.5. Option 5: Unilateral Defence Policy

A reorientation or disintegration of today's North Atlantic alliance, NATO, in the absence of the emergence of a unified European defence structure would leave Germany severely exposed to perceived security threats. Such a scenario has the, albeit remote, potential for Berlin to embark on a truly indigenous nuclear deterrence in a Europe where every state is to provide independently for its security requirements. Such a development obviously would not only spell the halt of a continuance of


European integration but additionally is likely to alarm Germany's neighbours (Gose, 2006).

5. Nuclear Sharing: Ideal for Germany

Germany pressed the U.S. for the participation of nuclear planning, decision making, command and control over nuclear weapons in the context of the NATO membership. The nuclear weapon states (NWS), however wanted to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a compromise, the system of "nuclear sharing" in NATO was established in the 1960s, thus allowing European NATO allies participation in decision making and discussion on nuclear policy and doctrine. This enabled "negative control", e.g. political veto, of the use of weapons under NATO command of the six non-nuclear NATO members (Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Turkey) as well as the United Kingdom which are signatories to bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with the U.S. This allows American nuclear weapons under NATO command to be deployed on for use on aircrafts of non-nuclear NATO countries in an event of conflict, for instance German Tornado fighter-bombers based at Buechel Airbase. In peacetimes the U.S. forces retain custody over all U.S. weaponry, however in case of actual deployment, the armed nuclear weapons are loaded onto the allies' aeroplanes and once airborne become the sole responsibility of the aircrew of that particular aeroplane (PENN Research Note, 1997).

Although it is debatable whether such practice constitutes a breach of the NPT, such an arrangement has been preferable to either an indigenous or European nuclear arsenal for the successive German governments. No "positive control" on part of German servicemen is involved, as the launch codes, storage of the nuclear weaponry, as well as

the arming of the nuclear devices are the responsibilities of the U.S. forces. As thus, “nuclear sharing” does not comprise direct involvement on part of Germany in nuclear policy. Therefore, Germany is capable to participate, and thus benefit, in the NATO nuclear deterrent, short of actual involvement in the development, maintenance and the doctrine of the NATO nuclear deterrent. “Nuclear sharing” allows the German leadership to avoid the likely political consequences and the repetition of public uproar of the 1980s which intensified political, technical, financial, and strategic responsibilities in the participation in a European nuclear deterrent certainly were to bring about. In deliberation of to the potential predicaments a European nuclear deterrent, which would call for active political, strategic and financial commitments of all member states, were to bring about, Germany is likely to adhere to the status quo as long as NATO, and thus the United States, remains committed to the defence of Europe.



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CHAPTER VII

PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION

1. National Initiative

A common European nuclear deterrent is to be appreciated as the culmination of the creation of a unified European defence concept. However, any suggestion of the nature of such a model for a universal European defence structure is ideally to be formulated by either of the two European nuclear powers as to allow for the credibility of a pan-European nuclear deterrent.

2. The Fourth Pillar: A British Proposal

When Britain held the EU Presidency from January to the end of June 1998, the then incumbent British Prime Minister stated that Britain ought to lead Europe. The British Foreign Secretary reiterated a few months earlier in 1997 that the Queen's government had a secure maturity and additionally a strong leader in Tony Blair and is thus predestined to shape the future of Europe.

Such an objective must be understood as an approach of the Labour government to distance itself from the euro-sceptic attitudes of the Conservatives. As such the drive to assume European leadership is motivated in the domestic programme and in respect to the sustained dismay of the Conservative Party, where relations towards the Europe and Britain's role within the EU remained highly discordant. The Conservatives were especially preoccupied of the notion of "selling out" British defence capabilities to Brussels.

As for the choice of subject for the Blair government to make an impact on the European institutions, defence rather than other areas of EU activity, such as

agriculture, economics, social or political affairs, was elected in considerations to the special status of Britain within Europe.

The concept for the British initiative in defence was based on a publication by Charles Grant of the centre of European reform. Grand argued that Britain could assume a leading role in European defence, as only Britain, besides France, has the capacity to project power beyond Europe. By shedding both its traditional antagonistic attitude towards the suggestion of a coordinated European defence concept as well as her pronounced tendency to be in line with the USA, Britain had the opportunity to fundamentally redefine her position and image within the European community. The European security architecture, or rather its absence, was described by Grand as an “unsatisfactory mess”. This opinion was based on the obscenity of the WEU, “an organization in search of a role”, the continual French semi-detachment to NATO, and the detachment of a weak nascent EU’s foreign policy from any tangible military assets, that could support Europe’s position. It was also argued by Grand, that Britain could appear to be a laudable member of the European Union in the defence area, and thus the Blair government would be able to harvest considerable credit with UK’s partners. Additionally, the incumbent British government might have realized that it is possible to attain high levels of good-will both in the European Union as well as domestically, by admittance of concessions which were symbolic rather than substantial.

Grant’s proposal summarily comprised:

- Britain is to strengthen European defence without spoiling her special transatlantic relationship to Washington or impairment of NATO.
- The UK is to establish bilateral military relationship, especially with the other European nuclear power.
- Britain ought to attempt to arrange for a compromise between the US and France, as to allow Paris eventual full reintegration into NATO.

- British efforts to lead to the restructuring of the European defence industry were not to vane.
- The UK is to propose the abolition of the WEU. Its political functions were be transformed as the EU's "fourth pillar", whereas its military functions were included into NATO. Article V, which obliges WEU members to defend each other from attack, of the Brussels Treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence, would be transferred to the "fourth pillar".

The benefits of the proposed British actions outlined above would, according to Grant, be:

- The WEU would be "put out of its misery", as it is incapable to develop any further, unless it were to replicate NATO's functions
- The CFSP (i.e. "second pillar") would be reinforced, as the European Union could rely on its own military assets to underline, if necessary, its assertions. As such, the foreign and security policy of the Union would gain tremendously in authority and reach.
- Such a restructured European defence system would settle the matter of the European defence identity; furthermore, it would convince all EU members of NATO's significance for Europe and ensure the continued US military presence in Europe.
- A "fourth pillar" would enable the Union to adopt members unwilling or unable (e.g. predicaments of neutrality) to join a defence organization
- Russia is less likely to voice opposition to EU enlargement, particularly, if the military guarantee were not to apply to all EU member countries, e.g. Baltic States.

Britain's presentation of Grant's plan at the EU Pörschach summit in October 1998 needs to be interpreted in various ways. Firstly, the 'fourth pillar' idea may have been an effort to convince the British public that the UK holds a leading role in Europe. Secondly, the abolishment of the WEU and the accrual of European defence into a new "fourth pillar" might have inadvertently served to demonstrate the obvious – the continued dependence on Washington's commitment to Europe. Thus, the Blair government might have actually underlined the significance and permanence of Britain's transatlantic relationship, rather than actually propagating an independent, truly European, path towards defence. Thirdly, the removal of the defence dimension from CFSP (i.e. "second pillar") would have opened up the possibility for further development for a common European foreign and security policy, whilst allowing for constitutional and political sensitivities of both present as well as new member states. Furthermore, the creation of a "fourth pillar" allows emphasizing security in Europe, whilst permitting NATO, and thus the USA, to ascertain its essential defence function in Europe. The "fourth pillar" approach had undeniably appeal to all EU members, as the scheme's flexibility would allow accommodating all the security needs, comprising those of neutral and non-aligned member states.

Britain's initiative was essentially matched by bilateral proposals, such as the joint Franco-British declaration by President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair declaration of St. Malo on 4th December 1998, which called for an amplified independent European military capacity. The declaration pronounced:

"In order for the European Union to take decisions and suppress military action where the Alliance (i.e. NATO) as a whole is not engaged, the Union (i.e. EU) must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have resources to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)" (Duke, 2000: 354-355).

The declaration furthermore added that a reinforcement of European armed forces would command a “strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.”

The St. Malo statement is noteworthy as it clearly stated Britain’s change of attitude towards her relationship with European security and defence. Additionally, the joint Franco-British declaration emphasized that a credible European military aspect needs to be constructed in the nexus of the two European nuclear powers. However, the language applied in the treaty attempts to conceal both some relevant concerns and possibly national divergences in the French and British positions. For instance, the demands for the Union to create the competence for “autonomous action” whilst performing in conformity with “our respective obligations in NATO” (Article 2). Such axioms leave cleavages for ambiguous interpretations, especially in regard to London’s traditional Atlanticism in contrast to French penchant for an independent conventional and nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, the call for autonomous action infers the possibility for the European Union to act where the Washington may not. The reference to unnecessary duplication, very well implies the abolishment of the WEU and the establishment of a direct link between NATO and the EU by means of a “fourth pillar” dedicated to defence.

The promising inspiration of the St. Malo declaration to a constructive improvement for European security was disastrously destabilized by the disparate views of France (and other members of “old Europe”) and Britain over the US and British involvement in Iraq. This is much so more tragic, as the unilateral actions, regardless of the justifiability, of Europe’s closest ally effectively eradicated the Union’s most prospective outlook on an effective European defence system, for which without active support of both European permanent members of the UN Security Council no further hope can be hedged.

3. Divergence of Security Dimension

The EU member states are divided into the Atlanticists camp (the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal and to a lesser extent the Netherlands), the integrationists (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece), and the neutrals (Ireland, Sweden and Austria) (Anderson, 2008: 1-34).

The notion of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) appears paradoxical. While realists argue that states should integrate in areas of low politics – for instance, trade and culture – they should not in areas of national security. Additionally, a common security policy potentially jeopardizes the very reason of the existence of the individual states. As such, ESDP seems to be imprudent because of three reasons. Firstly, ESDP has the potential to compromise a cheap, effective and proven defence alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Secondly, a common European security police could provoke the United States to pull out of Europe and as such promote US isolationism, especially in times of a US budget about to spiral out of control. The creation of the ESDP creates a level of division among the member states, and is as such not only prone to demolish the perception of unity within the European Union (Atlanticists versus integrationist versus the neutrals) but also between the United States and Europe – a division which Russia has sought to exploit. In short, the ESDP very well could negate motto of the first Secretary General of NATO of keeping the Americans in and the Russians out (Schorr, 2009).

The concept of ESDP evokes further questions. As twenty-one of the EU members are also members of the North Atlantic Alliance, the rationale for the European Union to extend into another security organization is not easy to perceive. As Europe appears so secure, so prosperous and so free, the creation of new security dimension seems absurd. Have not the crises in former Yugoslavia and as well as the Gulf Wars proven, that Europe really is a civilian power and military aspects are best left to individual states to avoid a further upset the union.

To further complicate matters, the non-NATO EU members classify themselves as neutral, yet they support the ESDP. One might think that membership in ESDP compromises the very reason to abstain NATO, that is neutrality. EU member states diverge considerably, not just in size (Germany in comparison to Malta), but also military might and inclination to get involved in crises. With such dissimilar abilities and interests, it is inexplicable how the EU member could cooperate in such a sensitive area as defence. Furthermore, a credible ESDP demands essential and sustained funding which member states are less than likely to be keen on.

As such, the European Union should not waste resources and energy on the creation of a security and defence identity that duplicates both NATO and the national armed assets.

4. European Deterrence Impeded

As the analysis in chapter 3 shows, a strategy of nuclear deterrence needs to fulfil a set of criteria such as a perception of value, the perception of credibility, a wholesome appreciation of the alternatives of a potential adversary, a degree of vigilance as to assimilate information to pre-existing beliefs, and the awareness of the dangers of decision avoidance. Given the multitude of divergent perceptions moulded by the dissimilar cultural, economical, political and sociological dimensions of the 27 member states of the European Union, it appears unlikely that a common set of values and perception can be agreed upon, lest be projected onto a potential adversary .

The study of the historical circumstances of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany reveals the origins of ideological diversities existent in the EU's three most significant member states. While both the French and the British notion of nuclear deterrence are both based on the concept of national defence by a minimal nuclear deterrent, their justifications are dissimilar:

France's deterrent policy is shaped by the aspiration of national self-reliance supported by and indigenous technology of the warheads and their delivery systems, whereas the British deterrent is embedded as a "secondary decision making centre" in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supported by U.S. technology, e.g. warhead design and the Trident delivery system. French nuclear ambiguity denotes that the intended targets remain to be covert; the British concept of ambiguity does not exclude a first strike option. As the French deterrent is defined as a guarantee of a state of "non-war", the British deterrent is regarded as an "insurance policy" in a conflict that does not preclude limited warfare.

However, most importantly, the French and the British conception of nuclear deterrence are shaped by three dimensions: a) the former status of colonial powers b) the awareness of the decisiveness of their military resolve that helped to bring about the defeat of Nazism, which ultimately lead to c) the general public and politic acceptance for the perceived necessity for a national nuclear deterrent. These three dimensions are not merely absent in Germany, yet reversed as a) Germany's attempts as a colonial power overseas were paltry and consequently replaced by the theory of "*Lebensraum*", e.g. "living space" which lead to the expansion eastward on the European continent, which ultimately resulted in b) not only the annihilation of Germany at the end of World War II, but also the distress of segregation into two adverse states for four nearly four decades, which lead to c) a public and largely political opposition to the concept of militarism in general and nuclear weaponry in general. As thus, the suggestion of a common European defence strategy, lest a universal European nuclear deterrent, is doomed for rejection.

Europe has evolved dramatically since the signatures of the Treaty of Paris, which established the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1957. Nonetheless, the European integration has not progressed sufficiently to allow for an independent, but unified European nuclear umbrella, which renders the European nations with the choice of two options. Firstly, an exclusively national nuclear deterrent, e.g. "*la force de frappe*", which is prone to exacerbate nuclear proliferation

and thus eventually endanger the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to which all EU member states have acceded. Conversely, the second alternative is to abide to the agreements set forth by NATO, and thus remain reliant the alliance's sustained commitment to the strategic defence of Europe.



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จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

BIOGRAPHY

Sandro Kunz was born in Zurich, Switzerland, on the fifth of November, 1964. After completion of high school, he attended Dickson College in Canberra, Australia and the Federal State College of Commerce in Winterthur, Switzerland from where he graduated with the Swiss Federal Diploma in Business Administration in 1986

His fascination with the airline industry led him to seek employment with a Swiss regional carrier, as catering supervisor at Zurich Airport, before he was given to opportunity to work for a major U.S. cargo airline, from 1989 to 1992. During those years he received extensive training in weight-and-balance calculations for a broad range of cargo aeroplanes, various aircraft handling operation related activities such as pre-flight planning, aircrew briefing, and ramp supervision. His extensive exposure to the air cargo industry ultimately led to his employment with a major Thai airline, for which he was active in Switzerland from 1992 to 2001. During that time, he used the opportunity to travel extensively in Asia, North America, and Europe.

Mr. Kunz made Thailand his home in 2001, and he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Business Communication from Sripatum International College in 2008 and a Master of Arts in European Studies from Chulalongkorn University in 2010. He is currently active as English editor and lecturer at Kasetsart University in Bangkok.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย