การสร้างความไว้วางใจต่อประชาชนในพื้นที่ผ่านโครงการพัฒนาของกองทัพบกในสถานการณ์ความขัดแย้ง:
กรณีศึกษาโครงการญาลันนันบารูในพื้นที่สามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของไทย

นางสาว มาร์ทีน แวน เอส

TRUST BUILDING THROUGH ARMY DEVELOPMENT

INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT SITUATION:

THE CASE OF YALANNANBARU IN

SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES

OF THAILAND

Mrs. Martine van Es

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

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Thesis title:	TRUST BUILDING THROUGH ARMY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT SITUATION: THE CASE OF YALANNANBARU IN SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES OF THAILAND
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
(Eakpant Pindavaninja, Ph.D.)

มาร์ทีน แวน เอส: การสร้างความไว้วางใจต่อประชาชนในพื้นที่ผ่านโครงการพัฒนาของกองทัพบกในสถานการณ์ความขัดแย้ง: กรณีศึกษาโครงการญาลันนันบารูในพื้นที่สามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของไทย (TRUST BUILDING THROUGH ARMY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT SITUATION: THE CASE OF YALANNANBARU IN SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES OF THAILAND) อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก : Yukiko Nishikawa, Ph.D., อ. ที่ปรึกษาวิทยานิพนธ์ร่วม : รศ. ดร. ฉันทนา หวันแก้ว, 100 หน้า.

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นการศึกษาถึงโครงการญาลานันบารูที่ดำเนินการโดยหน่วยงานทางทหารในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย เพื่อที่จะศึกษาว่าโครงการฯได้มีส่วนในการสร้างความเชื่อมั่นจากประชาชนในพื้นที่หรือไม่ การศึกษานี้ใช้หลักทฤษฎีเรื่องความเชื่อมั่นและความไม่ไว้วางใจในสถานการณ์ความขัดแย้งและการพัฒนาที่ริเริ่มโดยเจ้าหน้าที่ฝ่ายทหารของไทย โดยเลือกที่จะศึกษาเพียงโครงการญาลานันบารูเพียงโครงการเดียวอย่างละเอียด โครงการญาลานันบารูเป็นการจัดค่ายอบรมสำหรับเยาวชนในการต่อต้านยาเสพติดในพื้นที่สามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ จากการวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลที่ได้จากการศึกษาพบว่าโครงการฯ ก่อให้เกิดทั้งมิติที่ทำให้เกิดทั้งความเชื่อมั่นและความไม่ไว้วางใจ ซึ่งชี้ให้เห็นว่าลักษณะของความสัมพันธ์ในสถานการณ์ความขัดแย้งนี้มีมากมายหลายรูปแบบ และมีความเป็นไปได้ที่โครงการฯนี้ได้สร้างความไม่ไว้วางใจควบคู่ไปพร้อมกับความเชื่อมั่น ยิ่งไปกว่านั้นเมื่อนำทฤษฎีว่าด้วยมาตราวัดความเชื่อมั่นและความไม่ไว้วางใจมาอธิบายก็พบว่า ข้อขัดแย้งกันระหว่างความคาดหวังและผลลัพธ์ของการพัฒนาที่ริเริ่มจากหน่วยงานทางทหารมีอิทธิพลต่อทัศนคติของผู้เข้าร่วมโครงการ

การศึกษาพบว่าการจัดทำโครงการดังกล่าวมีหลายขั้นตอนและขั้นตอนเหล่านั้นก็สร้างให้เกิดความเชื่อมั่นและความไม่ไว้วางใจในระดับบุคคลได้หลายระดับระหว่างผู้เข้าร่วมโครงการฯ กับเจ้าหน้าที่ทหารที่รับผิดชอบโครงการฯอย่างไรก็ดี การจะสร้างความเชื่อมั่นระหว่างกลุ่มโดยใช้โครงการดังกล่าวนี้ยังมีข้อจำกัด ความไม่ไว้วางใจในสังคมแห่งนี้ยังคงอยู่ในระดับที่มีข้อจำกัดต่อการจัดกระบวนการสร้างความไว้วางใจ จากการศึกษานี้ได้ข้อสรุปว่าการสร้างความไว้วางใจผ่านโครงการพัฒนาที่ริเริ่มโดยหน่วยงานทางทหารเช่นโครงการญาลานันบารูนั้นต้องมีการวิเคราะห์ถึงความสัมพันธ์และการสร้างความเชื่อมั่นโดยทำความเข้าใจกับพลวัตของความขัดแย้งอย่างกว้างขวาง รอบด้าน แต่ถ้าปราศจากซึ่งการแก้ไขที่ปัญหารากเหง้าของความขัดแย้งนี้ การพัฒนาของหน่วยงานทางทหารก็จะมีความเป็นไปได้น้อยที่จะปรับปรุงสถานการณ์ในสามจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ให้ดีขึ้น

สาขาวิชา การพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ   ลายมือชื่อนิสิต

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MARTINE VAN ES: TRUST BUILDING THROUGH ARMY DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN CONFLICT SITUATION: THE CASE OF YALANNANBARU IN SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES OF THAILAND. THESIS ADVISOR: YUKIKO NISHIKAWA. THESIS CO_ADVISOR: CHANTANA WUNGAEO. 100 pp.

This study focuses on the Yalannanbaru program run by the Thai army in the southern border provinces of Thailand in order to examine whether the project contributes to obtain trust from the local people. In so doing, this thesis introduces theories on trust and distrust to the conflict situation and development initiatives run by the Thai army. The study utilizes an in-depth single-case study on the Yalannanbaru program; a drugs re-education camp for youth in the southern border provinces. In the course of analysis, the notion of separate dimensions of trust and distrust is applied, acknowledging the multifaceted character of many relations and the possible coexistence of trust and distrust in a relationship. In addition, the theory of calibration of trust and distrust is introduced in order to examine how the discrepancy between expectations and outcomes of army development initiatives can influence participants' attitudes.

The study revealed that through various processes, the program has been able to change levels of interpersonal trust and distrust between the participating youth and the army officers directly involved. However, the potential to address intergroup trust and distrust through the program is currently very limited; the existing distrust in society is a strong restraint on any trust building process. From the study, the thesis concludes that trust building through development initiatives by the Thai army like Yalannanbaru requires more careful analysis on relation and trust building with thorough understanding of wider conflict dynamics. Without focusing on resolution by tackling the root causes of the conflict, army development programs have little potential to contribute to improving the situation in the southern border provinces.

Field of study: International Development Studies

Academic year 2009

Student's signature: _____

Advisor's signature: _____

Co-advisor's signature: _____

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ABBREVIATIONS

BERSATU	Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan
BRN	Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani
ISOC	Internal Security Operations Command
KAMPAR	Kumpulan Melayu Raya
ONCB	Office of Narcotics Control Board
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organisation
SBP	Southern Border Provinces
SBPAC	Southern Border Administrative Center
TRT	Thai Rak Thai (Thaksin's political party)
YB	Yalannanbaru

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Since 2004, violence in the southern border provinces of Thailand has become a daily concern for many people. An important issue in the conflict is the distrust between the state and the people; the state's actions have sent the message that people can not depend or rely on the state's bodies. In addition, the credibility of the Thai forces has been severely undermined because of its suppressive and violent actions (NRC, 2006: 19; McCargo, 2008: 130). As a result the government's ability to effectively respond to the situation has, among other aspects, been hindered by this legacy of mistrust and mutual suspicion between the government and the community (ICG, 2009)

In order to counter the attacks and killings, Prime Minister Abhisit argues that it is important to address this damaged relationship and make local people feel they are treated fairly by authorities, which is supposed to ease distrust and contribute to ending the insurgent violence (Bangkok Post, 2009). Development initiatives are an important means to this end and are used as a strategy to counter the ongoing violent conflict in the southern border provinces of Thailand. The Thai army is actively engaged in southern development by designing and implementing programs (McCargo, 2008: 113). These army-run development projects aim to build new relationships with the people and especially win over the hearts and minds of the local population (Southern Situation, 2009).

Many resources are being spent on these projects. Last March another budget of 76-billion bath has been approved by the government to address development in the Deep South (Bangkok Post, 2009). The Thai army receives significant parts of the development budget for the southern border provinces to implement programs (Royal Gazette of Thailand, 2007). Nevertheless it is unclear whether they are actually successful in winning hearts and minds. More insight in the process of trust building

related to army run projects is thus necessary to understand the potential success of the strategy.

      In order to further investigate this issue, this research attempts to study the trust building aspect of a specific development project in southern border provinces of Thailand. The following section explains the problem statement and objectives and then outlines the research questions. Subsequently, research methods and the significance of the study are addressed.

1.2 Problem Statement

      The involvement of the Thai army in development is an interesting aspect of the conflict in South Thailand. Over time the state has realized that the conflict can not be tackled by force only; gaining the hearts and minds of the people is crucial (Rungrawee, 2009: 75). Various strategies to win over the people are present and according to the 4th Region of the Thai army development initiatives is one of the ways to do so. So the regional army does not only take a conventional military role but also aims for cooperation with the local population in its role as development agency in order to win over hearts and minds. The army is thus trying to fight the insurgency directly but also indirectly by using a tactic to build trust with the local population (Pimonpan, 2009). However despite these efforts, the public's trust in the military and the police is still a big issue (Jitpiromsri, 2009c)

      The question is thus whether the army actually has the ability to effectively build trust through development projects. Currently there is a lack of knowledge on this aspect of development work by the army to be able to answer this question. There is a necessity of examining trust building capacity of military projects and studying a specific army run development project in the South can generate more understanding on the issue. The following research will therefore focus on the Yalannanbaru project and investigate its potential for developing trust in the relationship between the army and the local population.

1.3 Research Questions

The main research question to be addressed in the thesis is:

How has the army-run Yalannanbaru project yielded trust from the people in the southern border provinces of Thailand?

The sub-questions to address this central research question are the following:

- What is the background of the distrust in the relationship between the army and the local population in relation to the conflict?
- What are processes and necessary conditions to build trust between parties in a conflict situation through development initiatives?
- What positive or negative trust building aspects can be identified in the Yalannanbaru project?
- What are the likely short and long term impacts of Yalannanbaru on the relation between the army and the population?

1.4 Research Objectives

- To understand the background of the distrust between the army and the southern population
- To describe army-run development initiatives like Yalannanbaru in the southern border provinces of Thailand
- To identify the process of trust building of the Yalannanbaru project
- To examine the potential of the Yalannanbaru project to build trust between the army and communities

1.5 Methodology

1.5.1 Case-study

An in-depth single-case design is applied. Based on the explanations of the case-study methods by Tellis (1997), the study has both exploratory and explanatory aspects. Because of the contemporary character of the study with respect to existing

social studies on the topic, the case explores the field and attempts to draw preliminary conclusions on the set of outcomes regarding trust that is still considered to be unclear. The study however also aims to be explanatory in the processes observed in the case by applying theoretical explanations. This case study builds on several sources, most importantly direct (participant) observation and interviews, to triangulate the evidence.

The army development initiative selected for the case study is the Yalannanbaru Project. Yalannanbaru is a drug re-education and rehabilitation program for youth between 14 and 25 years old in the southern provinces. The program entails a 7-day training camp in which participants are educated about drugs and taught about life style, religion and self-sufficiency economy. The direct aims are to prevent the youth from using drugs in the future.

The reasons for selecting this case are multiple. First of all, the program has the explicit aim to improve trust relations with the population through its activities. The character of the program involves intensive direct interaction between local people and the army and thereby gives room for examining interpersonal trust building. Furthermore, while many initiatives fail, this program has had more positive evaluations. According to Srisompob Jitpiromsri (personal communication, June 10 2009) this project is one of the few successful projects of the army in the region. Srisompob Jirpiromsri has argued that some signs of trust building have been detected, while other projects have not been able to achieve that. This project thus provides an opportunity to examine trust building processes of army-run development initiatives. Finally access to the program sites has been granted by the officers in charge, which is crucial for observation and interviews but is not obvious regarding the situation in the southern border provinces.

While this program is regarded a good case to focus the study on, it has to be acknowledged that it not automatically resembles the entire set of development initiatives of the army. The types range from major investment industrial projects to small community level programs based on job creation, agriculture, environment or education (Pimonpan, 2009). Each has its own characteristics which might diverge from Yalannanbaru, however selecting this case facilitates learning which might be applicable in some ways to other initiatives.

The thesis has additionally employed research based on both secondary material and qualitative methods. Foremost, the research is built on secondary data from the field of conflict studies and trust aspects. Literature and research on the conflict, on trust and distrust and trust development are used to come to a solemn theoretical analysis of the project's impact on the relationship between the army and the people. Literature is thus used to investigate the processes in and potential of the Yalannanbaru project in relation to trust building and to examine trust restoration.

1.5.2 Field research

The observation and interviews were done during two trips to the southern border provinces. Two locations of the Yalannanbaru camp have been visited. The main test site has been the Yalannanbaru camp in Pattani at the army base of the 15th Pattani Taskforce. The 7-day camp was visited three times, on the first, third and seventh day. During these multiple hours visits interaction between the participants and the trainers and supporting army staff were observed and the classes and activities were contemplated. Visits were also brought to the Yalannanbaru camp in Yala, which is located opposite to the Sirinthorn army camp. In addition to the Yalannanbaru camp visits, three different villages were visited in which youth had participated in Yalannanbaru and set up a club. Also some related post-program projects were visited.

With respect to the observation during the field research, behavior of involved individuals was observed and intentions were made to determine the change in or extent of trusting behavior. The standard used for evaluating the behavior is based on a description by Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns (2009) and their hypothecation of trusting behavior: "*Because the term trusting behavior implies positive behavior toward the out-group, we hypothesized people who are more trusting of the out-group tend to act in more positive ways toward out-group members. More specifically, we hypothesized that they would more willing to approach members of the out-group than would people who are less trusting of the other community. ... people who are more trusting of the out-group would be more inclined to act in less negative ways toward out-group members. They would be less prone to aggress against them or avoid them.*"

For the interviews a key informants approach is applied. Key informants are selected based on their role in the case that gives them the position to provide key information. This gives the opportunity to gain the required in-depth information in a relatively short time period. However, it should not be assumed that the informants necessarily represent the entire community (Marshall, 1996). According to Burgess (in Marshall, 1996) with selecting informants it should be kept in mind to represent a wide range of views. The key informants for the research thus come from different groups (an overview can be found in appendix A):

1) <u>Army officers in charge of, or training at the camp</u>. The colonel in charge of the overall program was interviewed three times. The lieutenant leading the Pattani-camp and a military trainer were also questioned in person. One trainer was asked questions through email. This person had a unique insight into the program, as he was not with the army, but temporarily hired as a trainer and consultant from the local population, but he is not with the army. He could more easily relate to the local population and could therefore contribute valuable insights.

2) <u>Participants</u>. Eight of the 75 youth participating in the camp, batch number 194, at the time of visiting have been interviewed. Some conversations took place in a small group, other participants were interviewed individually.

3) <u>Former participants</u>. At the camp sites and in the villages interviews were held with seven youth that had formerly participated in Yalannanbaru. Participation was in camps with batch numbers between 131 and 185.

4) <u>Village headman</u>. The village headman is one of the many community leaders involved Yalannanbaru by selecting youth for the program.

5) <u>Family members of (former) participants.</u> Four family members of participants were interviewed during visits to local communities and the camp.

6) <u>Academics</u>. Three academic experts of the situation in the southern border provinces have been interviewed concerning army-run development initiatives, trust and Yalannanbaru. They are able to give a perspective from a more academic and general perspective. The respective academics are Srisompob Jitpiromsri (Prince of Songkhla University), Kriya Langputeh (Yala Islamic University) and Duncan McCargo (University of Leeds).

During the interviews it has been taken into consideration that interviews as a research method can be subject to response bias in general (Tellis, 1997). On the one hand, interviews with (former) participants of Yalannanbaru took place in supervision of security forces and Yalannanbaru trainers. This might have influenced the interviewees' freedom to talk, possibly leading to omitting information or providing biased information. For the interviews with the trainers of Yalannanbaru a certain degree of subjectivity has been expected. Answers might have been answered in a socially desirable way or circumstances might have been described more positively in order to defend or promote the work of Yalannanbaru.

1.5.3 Analytical framework

In order to structurally address the problem statement, an analytical framework has been developed based on literature and theories on trust. Trust and distrust relate to expectations of a person or group about the intentions and behavior of another person or group (Marsh & Dibben, 2005). Lewicki & Tomlinson (2003b) talk about how trust can be violated resulting in a lack of trust or even distrust. They additionally argued the importance of trust restoring activities to create processes rebuilding. Furthermore, trust and distrust develop along separate dimensions (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998) and trust and distrust can be offset against each other to describe a relationship; different aspects characterize the relationship based on those dimensions. The level of trust and distrust in a relationship can shift. Trust building and trust violation processes influence those levels of the dimensions. The calibration of trust and distrust during interaction between actors or parties is an important process through which the levels can be influenced; the relative evaluation of outcomes of interaction are measured to the initial expectations and discrepancies between the expectations and outcomes determine changes in trust or distrust. As this research tries to examine changes in the trust relationship between the southern population and the army, it is important to acknowledge these continuums. To analyze this, the research is based on the following analytic framework for trust building (figure 1). So when trust has been violated (or is non-existed or in case of strong distrust) in a relationship, but one or both parties aim to restore trust, trust building activities can be initiated. The actual activity determines to a large extend what

processes can and do take place and what the affects of it are. One type of trust that can be restored is interpersonal trust which is between individuals. Subsequently, because of the interconnectedness between interpersonal and intergroup perceptions, intergroup trust might be affected by the activities as well (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). In case of success, the overall relationship can be influenced possibly resulting in changed perceptions and behavior.

Figure 1: Analytical framework

Along this concept, the research starts addressing trust issues in the conflict in South Thailand. It discusses the past and present that have caused the currently difficult relationship between the army and the local population. Subsequently, the trust building activity, the Yalannanbaru program, is extensively investigated. Aspects of its design and implementation are discussed. To examine whether the program has affected interpersonal trust, findings from the field research in combination with theoretical processes are analyzed. Considering the continuum-concept of trust and distrust it is assessed whether attitudes and perceptions related to (dis)trust have changed over the course of the program. Attitudes related to trust and distrust are the existence and level of fear, scepticism, monitoring, vigilance, hope, assurance and initiative. Chapter III further elaborates on the recognition of trust and distrust, the type of attitudes and the type of change. This would indicate changes in the level of trust and distrust for the participants and possibly indicate trust building or decrease of distrust. Then attempts are made to relate the trust processes to intergroup trust

development. Impacts would involve a change in perceptions between the local population and the army. The overall result of a successful process would be that increased trust and decreased distrust can contribute to resolution of the conflict. In analyzing the trust dynamics, the main focus of the study lies on trust from the population in the army; or the participants in the army officers.

1.6 Limitations

Some remarks regarding the limitations of the research are necessary. First of all, the research has been limited to the study of one single development program. While the selected program has specific advantages as a case study, it does not represent the overall variety of army development programs being implemented in the region. Each of these programs has its own characteristics, internal aims and strategies for implementations and these aspects are likely to influence outcomes. Moreover, the target group of the program, namely youth using drugs or at risk for using drugs, is only a specific subset of the population and is thus not necessarily representative for the entire southern population.

The thesis has furthermore been restricted to studying only one side of the trust relation; the focus has been on trust attitudes of the participants and local communities in the army. The reverse of the relationship, the trust attitudes of the army officers in locals, has been excluded. However a functional relationship requires mutual trust and trusting behaviour from both sides, so two-way trust development is relevant.

Finally, the study has been restricted to the first and main part of the Yalannanbaru program; the 7-day re-education camp. Yalannanbaru also includes a set of follow-up initiatives, which have however been largely left out of the field research. While trust elements can be studied by focusing on the re-education camp, further processes and relevant development are expected to take place in the remainder of the program.

1.7 Significance of the research

This study takes a new stand on conflict by introducing trust building elements into resolution; a fairly new approach to understanding the conflict dynamics in South Thailand. More specifically, a trust building framework is applied to part of the Thai army's resolution activities and the aim is to learn from observations in that context. The research contributes to the existing body of knowledge by providing preliminary analysis and insight in the impact of army run projects on trust building in the conflict situation. By offering understanding of a specific empirical case, contributions are made to the existing body of work on army conflict resolution strategies. This experimental approach thus tries to capture trust building elements in order to develop understanding. The findings of this trial should be further developed in future research.

This research can also start a contribution to a more refined discussion regarding the role of the army in development in South Thailand. In Thailand it is hardly contested whether the army is actually the right party to do development work, not only in the South, but also in other regions. More insight in possible effects can trigger the discussion and more informed and critical attitudes towards this situation.

Furthermore, the research findings may introduce an initial understanding of effects of army run development work on relations with the local population as well as more insight in where problems might possibly arise and what positive and negative impacts can arise. This gives opportunities to learn about impact and effectiveness of the strategy of development initiatives as a method for conflict resolution.

1.8 Thesis structure

The thesis contains six chapters in total, of which this Introduction is the first one. In the following four chapters literature and field research are reported; the final chapter provides takes the findings together. Chapter II provides a background and analysis of the conflict in the southern border provinces and especially goes into the relations between the various conflict actors. From this analysis follows that trust is an issue in the conflict situation. In order to gain the necessary understanding of trust and

related concepts like distrust and trust restoration, chapter III provides a conceptual overview on trust and discusses the issue of trust and distrust in conflict settings and its potential role in conflict resolution. A relation is also made to the southern border provinces conflict. Next, chapter IV examines what has created the existing distrust by discussing trust violations that have taken place by the army. Now that the concept of trust and the issues of distrust in the conflict have been discussed, chapter V goes into the Yalannanbaru program as an activity for trust restoration. Here the qualitative findings are reported and an evaluation is made of how Yalannanbaru yields trust. Finally, chapter VI provides conclusions and thus an overall answer to the problem statement. It furthermore explains implications and gives suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH THAILAND

This chapter provides an overview of the main issues of the conflict situation in the southern border provinces of Thailand. First the background on the conflict is sketched following by an analysis of the actors in the conflict. Considering the fact that this thesis looks into the trust relationship between two main conflict actors, the attitudes and expectations among them have to be clear. The focus is on the state and the security forces in opposition with the southern population. It finally addresses how the local population relates to both the state and the insurgency.

2.1 Conflict background

The roots of the conflict in South Thailand go back to the beginning of the 20th century, when Patani, a prosperous sultanate, came under Thai rule. Since then the southern most provinces of Thailand; Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and to a lesser extent Songkhla (see figure 2), have been rejecting the Thai dominance with varying intensity (McCargo, 2007). At the same time, the Thai government has tried to keep control over the region and implemented a variety of policies to increase influence over the region (NRC, 2006: 56).

The population in the South is mainly Malay Muslim and thus differently composed than the mainly Buddhist population of the rest of the country. The Malay Muslim

Figure 2: The Southern border provinces of Thailand

Note: ICG, 2009

population has a strong identity and different culture based on religion, language and history which differs from the Thai Buddhist majority in the country (McCargo, 2007). The assimilation policies have formed a pressure on the Malay Muslim identity and have caused grievances among the Muslim community in the South (NRC, 2006; Funston, 2008).

Furthermore, the three provinces are mostly agricultural and economically poor compared to the other southern provinces and large parts of the country, yet the border provinces are not a mere exception in the country, since north-eastern provinces have similar or even lower living standards. A more important issue within the southern provinces related to the conflict is inequality between sections of the population and the fact that the Muslim people are disadvantaged compared to the Buddhist population in educational and economic opportunities and governance representation; these are results of structural and cultural violence (Srisompob & Panyasak, 2007; Funston, 2008).

The conflict was of low intensity in the 1980s and 1990s. The relative peacefulness of this period has been contributed to various factors, but the politics of the then governing Democrats with less focus on assimilation and more on integration are perceived to be an important cause (McCargo, 2007; Funston, 2008). In the early 80s, the Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 (CPM 43) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) were established. CPM 43, part of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), gave citizens and the police more influence in security. The former SBPAC executed development projects and public relations initiatives, increased local participation and formed an important channel of communication. The general opinion is that those bodies diminished grievances contributed to peace building (McCargo, 2007; Funston, 2008).

Figure 3: Number of annual incidents between 1993-2005

Note: NRC, 2006: 9

Starting from 2001 and especially from 2004 however, violence strongly increased again in the region with a rising number of incidents and causalities (see figure 3) (NRC, 2006: 9). Until May 2009 8,908 violent incidents have taken place in the Deep South, resulting in 3,471 deaths and 5,740 injured since January 2004 (Srisompob, 2009c). Along with the international war on terrorism and international Islamic reform, Thaksin Shinawatra's regime is seen as an important factor in this upsurge (Funston, 2008). When Thaksin came to power in 2001, the existing policies supporting cultural diversity and the established administrative order were changed. He abandoned both the CPM 43 and the SBPAC in 2002 and turned to hard-line policies to suppress violence. However, quite extensive development funds and projects were still part of the politics regarding the South. Overall, Thaksin's strategy did not result in less violence and the local population strongly rejected his politics as seen in the 2005 elections in which he and the TRT lost all seats (Ukrist, 2007). Nonetheless the coup on Thaksin in 2006 has not led to a decrease in violence. Unrest in the national politics has taken away attention from the South. However in June 2007 large-scale operation were initiated by the army involving 60,000 troops sent to the South and more than 100 billion bath spent on both security and development. This seems to have had a positive impact as the monthly number of incidents has decreased. However, since June 2009 violence is intensifying again (Srisompob, 2009c).

2.2 Actors in the conflict

Understanding of the conflict actors is crucial when studying trust building in a conflict situation. Perceptions and expectations between actors are often a cause to the problem. Diverging needs, goals and positions create problems but also intragroup difference might be of importance in the conflict. In the conflict in South Thailand the relations between the conflict parties have become complicated. On a general level, the main actors seem to be the people in the South versus the central Thai authorities. Their respective positions can shortly be described as the first fighting for autonomy and secession and the latter aims to keep control over the region. However, under this surface more is going on. The parties are not internally cohesive; instead various parties exist within these two blocks and needs and interests vary thus intra-group conflicts are present (Ranee, Chittpapat & Ekkarin, 2008). This paragraph therefore starts with a description of the main actors involved in the conflict and subsequently describes the mutual perceptions and expectations between the actors most important for this research: the army, the insurgents and the local population.

2.2.1 The state: Government, army and police

For the central government, maintaining power and legitimacy over the southern provinces is the most important aim. The government has tried to ensure power and legitimacy over the region through oppression of the insurgency and violence. In the Constitution Section 1 is stated that '*Thailand is one and indivisible Kingdom*' (Gotham, 2006). The fact that the Thai government in the past has taken over control over the sultanate Patani, gives the current government legitimacy to defend its territory against the insurgency. The call of autonomy and the strong identity of the southern Muslim population however threaten the claim to legitimacy of the state in the southern provinces. Moreover, separatism does not fit in with the ideology of one indivisible Kingdom (Gotham, 2006). Nevertheless, resolving the conflict has been part of national politics. After the Democrat government in the 1980s and 1990s largely focused on political measures and the Thaksin regime that worked mainly with hard-line approaches, the current government under PM Abhisit has made addressing the conflict one of the most urgent issues and has focused

policies for resolving problems in the South on issues of justice, security, education, and especially development (Deep South Watch, 2009c). This complies with recommendations from many sides, especially the NRC (NRC, 2006: 3). Despite that, significant results have not been booked yet (Deep South Watch, 2009c).

A problem that has been identified regarding the government and state bodies is that various groups of people have different beliefs and perception regarding the conflict in the South. This has caused a divergence in compliance to policies and the spread of inconsistent messages about the state's approach towards the problem and the people. Consequently, the lack of unity has hindered effective policy implementation and citizens have no certainty on the behaviour of officials and therefore vigilance towards authority has persisted. The translation to practice is thus often hindered by the intermediate layers of officials (NRC, 2006; Mark & Somkiat, 2009).

The military has a significant role in addressing the issue; it is even argued that the military has a strong political role and influences policies relating to the South. Anyhow, it has been the most important responsible institution in managing the situation (DSW, 2009c; DSW, 2009b; Pimonpan, 2009). Military operations in the southern border provinces fall under the Fourth Region's Forwards Command, which is divided in four task forces. Units of other regional armies have also been stationed in the region to provide support and make up for the lack of forces (Pimonpan, 2009). Currently about 70,000 security personnel are deployed in the South under the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) of which about 35,000 are soldiers. The police have 18,000 people deployed and 11,500 are other security forces like the Navy and Armed Forces. The other 7,000 are civilians (DSW, 2009a). Significant resources are allocated to the security forces to deal with the conflict. In the 2008 budget for security, 21% of the expenditures were allocated to the security for the southern provinces (Royal Gazette of Thailand, 2007). Soldiers and police also receive a hardship allowance battling the insurgency (Bangkok Post, 2009).

So according to the state's increased focus on political measures regarding the conflict since the Abhisit-government, the army's counterinsurgency strategy has two components. Apart from the solely military tactics, it has also included a politics-led military approach (King-oua, 2009). This approach involves a winning hearts and

minds strategy and development initiatives in the South. The aim to win over people's hearts and minds is guided by the strategy of 'Understand, reach out (to the people) and (step up) development' (Pimonpan, 2009). According to NRC (2009: 72) political primacy for reconciliation should be an overall strategy and not a mere tactic for intelligence gathering.

While political supremacy has been subject to governmental strategy in the past, implementation in practice has been limited due to the diverging stands in the government and especially the army where the political supremacy has been perceived as obstructing the military approach (Chantana, 2009). Presently, it is still questioned whether the political approach has potential in practice. The government has made large budgets available for political approaches but there are problems with the implementation because organizational structures for development are still under supervision of the army. Also a lack of common vision between the government and the military and inconsistency in implementing solutions by various agencies are likely to hinder a real political strategy. Finally, there is little transparency on how development budgets are spent (King-oua, 2009; Sarosi & Janjira, 2009: 3)

Rotation of soldiers and officials is a common practice and some are stationed in the South for only one-year periods. These rotations have negative effects on continuity and effectiveness of operations as well the understanding and knowledge of the situation and the local people (Rungrawee, 2009). The issue of divergence in compliance to policies by officials has also been identified in relation to the army. Additionally there are differences in approach and strengths across the various military units, which limit consistency and therefore success in addressing the conflict (Pimonpan, 2009).

Police forces work together with the army under ISOC. During Thaksin the police gained more power and it is still an important institution in the South (Pasuk & Baker, 2004). Over time, tensions between the army and the police resulted in a power struggle. The police have adopted a strategy more leaning towards militarization instead of forming a civilian buffer between the people and the army (McCargo, 2008: 116-117). The War on Drugs has been largely under the responsibility of the police and is associated with human rights violations like extrajudicial killings. Other issues with the police have been the organizational culture, which includes corruption and

heavy drinking. Overall the police have thus not been able to respond to the local needs (McCargo, 2008: 117).

For both security institutions officers are rarely locals and do not share the Malay Muslim culture, which has created problems. Misunderstanding is very common and cultural values are often not respected (McCargo, 2008: 132)

2.2.2 The South: Insurgency and local people

Violence in the South is generally attributed to insurgent movements, even though many incidents are not claimed by any organisation (Srisompob & Panyasak, 2007). A variety of insurgency movements participate in the southern provinces. Separatist movements first took shape around 1947, when the association of the great Melayu races (Kumpulan Melayu Raya - KAMPAR) was set up. Later on other associations were formed like the BRN, PULO and BERSATU. It is believed that currently the BRN-Coordinate is the strongest separatist group. Generally, the movements are thought to have an ambiguous structure and operate as independent cells. Also an agitation force of no more than 10,000 people gathers intelligence and causes daily disturbances (NRC, 2006: 13; McCargo, 2008). The groups have evolved over time and currently more educated and youths have joined the movements. A part of them is intrinsically idealistic and dedicated to the goal. A further strength of the insurgents is their ability to increasingly infiltrate at the village level (Rung, 2007: 132).

It is generally assumed that the stated ultimate goal for most of the insurgents is the creation of a separate state. The motivation lies in the divergent history of the region and the fact that the current control by the Thai state can be regarded as colonial or unjust. Exact goals are however unclear as no insurgency leaders have stood up to discuss their aims, which complicates resolution (Rung, 2007; Funston, 2008). Authorities furthermore argue the existence of a seven-step plan aiming to establish an independent Patani through revolutionary war. Methods to attain that, encompass creating animosity toward Buddhists, blaming government officials for problems, creating a culture of fear, and encouraging Muslims to retaliate against the Thai government (DSW, 2009a).

Identity politics are amply used to gain support from the local population. The insurgent movements call upon the shared ethno-religious identity drawing on common history, culture, religion and language. At the same time the inequality within the society and the grievances resulting from the historical interactions with central authorities, further provide strength to the separatist case (Gotham, 2006).

Besides the violence in name of insurgency, the unrest also provides incentives for unknown third parties to pursue their own interests. Especially when considering the presence of organized and petty crime, small-arms trade, smuggling, and drug trafficking in the South, criminals' involvement or violence seems very likely (Croissant, 2005). From the attacks on citizens in 2004/2005 a significant part, estimated around 15% has been attributed to such criminals or personal conflicts (NRC, 2006: 122).

Furthermore in the southern provinces, the insurgency movements are not necessarily representing the local population. Almost 80% of the population is Malay Muslims, but research has shown that many people do not support and often even oppose the insurgency and their use of violence. The core of the movements is very small compared to the total populations (NRC, 2006: 28). In interviews by Tan-Mullins (2007), the majority of the Muslim population resents the actions of the militant groups as they create a negative reputation for the Islam, and the people perceive it as a destructive strategy; violence and fear complicates life in the southern provinces.

The southern population does however have strong grievances because the Thai authorities have been very suppressive over the Muslim identity and culture. Also the large differences in wealth and opportunities in employment and participation in governance compared to the Buddhist or Thai population have created grievances. Education is another issue, because of the lack of access to it as well as because of the ambivalence between religious and secular education which leaves youth in a disadvantaged position (NRC, 2006: 27). The actual needs of the locals are overall not separatism but local participation through better governance, acceptance of the culture and local identity and promotion of justice and equity (Gotham, 2006; Funston, 2008).

A distinction should be made between the Buddhist minority and the Muslim majority of the population of the southern provinces. Over time, the division between the two population groups has increased (NRC, 2006: 91; Funston, 2008). Initially violence was directed towards state forces, however since 2004 violence increasingly targets citizens. Currently civilians with non-governmental occupation account for over 50% of violent attacks; both Muslims and Buddhist account for about half of the victims (Sarosi & Janjira, 2009: 8 & 11). This has increased fear for both population groups because they are both in danger, but also because of the ambiguity of the employed strategies. However, both groups have different perceptions towards state forces. While these have been the traditional opposition for the Malay Muslim population, the army is mainly associated with protection for the Buddhist population. From research by Klein (2005) followed that the Buddhist population does not oppose nor fear the security forces. Because of feelings of insecurity and increased nationalism, a larger portion of the Buddhist population supports the use of extreme violence to solve the problems. It can furthermore be assumed that because of the better (economic) opportunities and the absence of cultural suppression, grievances are not present (Klein, 2005).

2.2.3 Conflict actors: perceptions and expectations

The various actors in the conflict have been largely laid out. Intergroup relations need however more clarification. The relation between the people and the state are cause for grave concern; the state's actions have sent the message that people can not depend or rely on the state's bodies. While the relationship has always been tense since the incorporation of Patani in Thailand, peaceful coexistence has been possible for decades (Chantana, 2009). The state had relative legitimacy in the region because of policies respecting local cultural identity, decentralized governance and a relatively open and equal democratic political space (NRC, 2009: 56). The situation has however changed significantly since Thaksin became prime-minister of Thailand in 2001 and politics regarding the southern border provinces changed. Thaksin introduced hard line policies to suppress the insurgency and changed bureaucratic systems that decreased the public participation of the local population (McCargo,

2007). Violence increased strongly since the beginning of 2004 from both the side of the Thai state and the insurgency (NRC, 2006: 9).

The repeated use of violence and the frequent human right violations and lack of protection from soldiers have deteriorated the relationship between the army and the local population. For the local population negative perceptions are so strong that they even perceive the state as the cause to the insurgency; Klein (2005) researched perceptions of locals in the South regarding the conflict and 86% of the Muslim respondents perceived misconduct of the government and failure to understand the local people to be the most important cause of the conflict. Furthermore, the presence of the large number of security forces in the region is opposed by almost half of the population according to recent research by Srisompob (2009b). The same research however also concluded that people have some confidence and positive perspectives towards the current government under Abhisit in general, but at the same time expect little of its capability to resolve the unrest (Srisompob, 2009b).

From the state's perspective, violence aimed at the security forces and government officials directly damaged the legitimacy and authority of the state and therefore created negative perceptions towards the population (NRC, 2006: 10). Also, because the insurgents remain anonymous and are infiltrated in the general public, security forces have no certainty on whom to search for and are therefore distrusting towards the people. The lack of understanding of the local culture also creates suspicion (Rungrawee, 2009; Pimonpan, 2009).

The interaction between the insurgency movements and the state has been reactive over time. While more peaceful times were characterized by acceptance of local culture and reconciliation, in periods of stronger assimilation efforts by the state, violence flared up. Since the upsurge in 2004, the number of deaths and injured has been higher than ever before. While both sides apply violence, each also tries to gain support from the local population. In several occasions both the insurgents and the authorities tend to blame each other for specific violent incidents. This is done in order to put the other side in a bad perspective in the hope that the local population supports the respective side (McCargo, 2008). The insurgency has furthermore been targeting government officials, including security forces and local people working with or for the state. Apart from spreading fear, it complicates the work of the state

and limits the effectiveness in the South as few people are willing to be stationed in the South (McCargo, 2008: 179-181). At the same time however, the army is pressured to gain results in fighting the insurgency and thus has to come up with arresting insurgents. This has resulted in more random arrests and captures of innocent people (Rungrawee, 2009).

With respect to the insurgents, it has already been pointed out that only a limited portion of the population supports the insurgency. The state has tried to segment the area by a colour-coding system in which red villages are subject to high militant activity, while green ones are peaceful. The level of militancy is not fully determined in villages coded as yellow (McCargo, 2008, 103).

A stronger basis of local support however strengthens the ground of the insurgency. Therefore propaganda is made to convince local people of the insurgents' cause. They rally the people to support their cause by pointing out the mistreatment from the state and argue for resistance to the state. Through the distribution of leaflets, meetings and other actions such inciting separatist ideas are spread (Zakee, 2009b).

In insurgency the affected population is often caught in the cross-fire between the state on the one side and the insurgents on the other (Goswami, 2009). Also in the South, both the insurgents and the state are actively trying to win support from the population. The Thai state tries to gain understanding and win hearts and mind for their cause by all kinds of initiatives. At the same time, insurgents put pressure on the local population to support their cause and become involved in the movements (McCargo, 2008). However, choosing a side has consequences. Anyone from the local population who benefit from state initiatives or showed any kind of cooperation with the state often became target for the insurgents, while measures are taken by the state against people of which is suspected that they support the insurgency (Funston, 2008). This situation complicates life for many southern people; they are caught in the middle and trying to get out can have severe consequences. The pressure following from this situation makes people conscious and suspicious towards others.

2.3 Conclusion

The conflict is complex when it comes to the interrelations between the various conflict parties. In the South, the army and the insurgents stand opposite from

each other and try to gain or hold legitimacy in the region. In the past, more and less violent periods have alternated; the upsurge since 2004 is in strong contrast to the decades before in which relative peace was existent. Resulting from the current situation is that the population in the southern border provinces has become stuck in the middle; both the army and the insurgency try to gain support from the people and the population therefore experiences pressure from both sides. Giving too little support to one side can have consequences but too extensive cooperation with one side, might result in reprisals from the other. This situation complicates the life of many people on a day-to-day basis.

CHAPTER III

TRUST

In order to examine trust building aspects of development initiatives in the southern conflict, it is necessary to gain a deeper insight of the concept of trust and gain theoretical understanding of processes related to trust and distrust. Furthermore the role of trust in conflict and the southern conflict in particular provide insight in what trust building can mean for resolution. Following the framework on trust repair processes provided by Lewicki & Tomlinson (2003b), this chapter starts with taking a step back and provides a conceptual overview of trust in general as well as trust building and rebuilding processes. Subsequently the role of trust in conflict and peace building is discussed in general and in relation to the southern border provinces.

3.1 Trust: Conceptual overview

3.1.1 Trust, distrust, mistrust

Trust is a core requirement for all relationships characterized by peaceful and effective management, including good intergroup relations (Kelman, 2005; Tam et al., 2009). A cross-disciplinary definition of trust of Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer (1998) is: *"Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."* Trust is thus not a behavioral but a psychological condition that might result from behavior. However, trust is observable on a behavioral level (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006). Trust can develop interpersonally but also on other levels of social interaction; like groups, organizations and institutions (Rousseau et al, 1998).

Social interactions rely on trust when there is interdependence between people and a certain amount of risk regarding the other's intents. Both are necessary conditions for trust to arise (Rousseau et al., 2003).

When discussing trust, distrust, mistrust and untrust need attention too. Although closely related to each other there are some differences. Distrust describes the belief that the trustee will intentionally behave against the truster in a certain situation; the truster is not trusted in the first place. Distrust has a functional aspect to it; it limits exposure and makes people more risk averse which can be of importance in high risk situations. Distrust provides a measure. So in order to safely reduce distrust, risk has to be reduced simultaneously (Marsh & Dibben, 2005).

Mistrust on the other hand entails misplaced trust, so a positive evaluation of the truster by the trustee which is subsequently betrayed by the trustee. Untrust finally takes place when the truster has little belief that the trustee will act in the best interest of both in a specific situation. It is a positive trust but it is of insufficient level to cooperate (Marsh & Dibben, 2005).

Trust and distrust are closely related to personal relationships. Human relationships are subject to attitudes, beliefs, and feelings and trust is an important aspect in this range (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). Relationships in themselves are multifaceted and depend on the interaction with the other party. They furthermore change according to context; the more settings the more complex a relationship becomes. Change in the nature of the relationship thus takes place over time. Trust and distrust within relationships develop along those evolutions and settings and the level of trust and distrust depends on available information, the history of social interactions and personal traits (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003c). However it is important to notice that trust or distrust can already exist before the initiation of an interpersonal relation. Image and reputation of a group are often reflected upon individuals and that can influence interpersonal trust regarding members of that group without direct acquaintance (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002).

Figure 4: Separate dimensions of trust and distrust

Note: Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998

The relationship between trust and distrust has been studied frequently. While former notions of trust built on a uni-dimensional construct in which trust and distrust were opposites, recently the notion of two separate dimensions has been developed. In this context trust and distrust are seen as separate but linked dimensions (see figure 4). The difference in emotional and behavioral reactions between the two has been core to this notion but also the discussed multifaceted character of relations makes it possible that one can trust in some context while distrust in others; trust and distrust can thus coexist (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b; Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998). When combining the dimensions of trust and distrust a matrix can be formed to describe social relations. Each combination represents a different level of trust and distrust but it can roughly be classified in four categories of low trust/low distrust, high trust/low distrust, low trust/high distrust and high trust and high distrust (see figure 5). Each category in the trust-distrust matrix is characterized by specific expectations and perceptions which form or challenge the relationship. The level of trust and distrust can change depending on changing aspects of the relationship through for example interaction, dialogue, changing circumstances etc (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998).

Figure 5: Integrating dimensions of trust and distrust into social realities

High trust
Characterized by:
  Hope
  Faith
  Confidence
  Assurance
  Initiative
	High value congruence
	
	Interdependence promoted
	
	Opportunities pursued
	
	New initiatives
		Trust but verify
		
		Relationships highly segmented and bounded
		
		Opportunities pursued and down-side risks/vulnerabilities continually monitored

Low trust
Characterized by:
  No hope
  No faith
  No confidence
  Passivity
  Hesitance
	Casual acquaintances
	
	Limited interdependence
	
	Bounded, arms-length transactions
	
	Professional courtesy
		Undesirable eventualities expected and feared
		
		Harmful motives assumed
		
		Interdependence managed
		
		Preemption: best offence is a good defense

2 4
1 3

Low distrust
Characterized by:
  No fear
  Absence of skepticism
  Absence of cynicism
  Low monitoring
  No vigilance

High distrust
Characterized by:
  Fear
  Skepticism
  Cynicism
  Wariness
  Vigilance

Note: Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003

3.1.2 Trust development and restoration

Trust is thus subject to influence and change. With respect to the development of trust Williams (2001) described it as "*Trust development is portrayed most often as an individual's experiential process of learning about the trustworthiness of others by interacting with them over time*". The process of building trust works along stages in which its character can change but overall grows in strength and resilience. It is furthermore a bilateral process that necessitates effort and commitment from both sides (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003a). According to a transformational approach to trust, trust grows with a positive relationship history because of increased knowledge and predictability and declines when expectations are not confirmed (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006). The two main stages or levels of trust are: calculus-

based (CBT) and identification-based trust (IBT). The first is largely cognitively driven grounded in judgements of the other's predictability and reliability. A cost-benefit calculation indicates the level of CBT; reputation and behavioural consistency are important building blocks. IBT is more emotionally driven grounded in perceptions of interpersonal care and concern and comes when deeper understanding has been build through frequent interaction. IBT is perceived as very high level trust (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003a).

Besides building trust, declining trust takes place when expectations are not met. Trust violations occur when a person's positive expectations are disconfirmed and generally result in lower trust and increased suspicion. The intensity of the impact on the relation depends on the specific violation; very severe ones can result in complete destruction of trust (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). Simultaneously distrust is developed which has further negative consequences on the relationship. Distrust hinders parties in engaging in interactions which are necessary to take away distrust. In that sense distrust thus has a self-perpetuating character (Kelman, 2005). The seriousness of the particular violation depends on whether it was intentional (should have been distrust) or not (should have been untrust). The first one is likely to have greater effect. Severe violations can result in very quick deterioration of trust (Marsh & Dibben, 2005).

Building trust can be a lengthy process but rebuilding trust or the address of distrust is even more difficult and time consuming. Rebuilding trust after violations is a complicated process; reducing distrust is a slow and gradual process and has to be based on evidence that the relationship is changing. The process should be gradual, follow the logic of successive approximations and involve a consistent set of trustworthy actions (Williams, 2001; Schweitzer, Hershey & Bradlow, 2004; Kelman, 2005). Thus to move the level of distrust, actions are needed. A visualization of a trust restoration process is presented in figure 6. This model involves a victimized and a violating party between which restoration of violated trust works through a repair process. Most important is the activities that are undertaken to influence trust. When done in a successful manner, the activities have potential to restore trust in the relationship. However, if the activities do not restore trust, a further dissolution of the relationship can take place (see figure 6) (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003).

Figure 6: Trust repair process

Note: Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003

Adams (2005) described a trust calibration process which is helpful in explaining how trust restoring activities could reduce distrust (see figure 7). First of all a certain overall evaluation of the trust regarding the other(s) influences the process. In the case of the army from the people's point of view, this will generally be negative. Following are the decision to trust or distrust the other party in a specific situation, the expectations of the outcome and the real outcome. When the negative expectations are confirmed, distrust will likely increase. However when outcomes are evaluated as positive, distrust is reduced if the outcomes are attributed to the other party (Adams, 2005). This thus holds that the outcomes of the initiatives have to exceed or disconfirm the generally negative expectations of the people involved to result in reduced distrust. The effort and contribution of the other party in the initiative has to be clear and convincing though in order to attribute the positive outcome to the actor and actually improve the relationship. This model also explains that unsuccessful initiatives can strengthen the distrust. The negative expectations are matched by the outcome and can thus increase distrust.

Figure 7: Calibration of trust and distrust

Note: Adams, 2005

3.1.3 Interpersonal vs. intergroup trust

After having shortly touched upon trust on different levels of social interaction, this aspect requires more explanation in the light of this research in order to understand the dynamics of interpersonal and intergroup trust. Socially, people tend

to relate to groups through group membership and form perceptions of in-group and out-group characteristics, which play part in intergroup relations. Measures important to intergroup relations are out-group attitudes, perceptions and trust (Hewstone et al., 2005).

Govier & Verwoerd (2002) published a comprehensive article on intergroup trust. In understanding how intergroup trust is formed, they theorized about the attribution of the attitudes of trust and distrust to groups. They discussed two interpretations of group trust. The first is distributive; if most people in one group have a positive attitude and perception towards most people of a second group, one can say there is group trust. Secondly non-distributive or collective; in this case the trust of the group depends on the leadership behavior. When the leaders trust the other group, it is said that group trust exists.

Besides, it is important to acknowledge that individuals are influenced by group opinions and attitudes because of collective memory and tradition, and interaction and sharing of experiences. But simultaneously group opinions depend on those of individuals. Thus the group influences individuals and vice-versa. Even though they cannot be considered equal with regard to the development and perception on trust, it is a mistake to see them as distinct (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). Furthermore, group reputation and image can influence trust and distrust regarding individuals. Intergroup trust can simplify new interpersonal relations while untrustworthy reputation based on information gained from the in-group or based on group image is likely to result in a negative initial trust or initial distrust (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006).

An important theory relating to intergroup trust building is one on the relation between intergroup contact and out-group trust by Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns (2009). The *contact hypothesis* proposes that bringing together individuals from opposing groups "under optimal conditions" or positive interaction between members of different groups can reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations. Increasing out-group trust can be done through both direct and extended intergroup contact. As a result of increased out-group trust behavior can get more positive tendencies (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, 2009). Also Turner, Voci, Hewstone & Vonofakou (2008) found that intergroup contact can improve intergroup attitudes

and extended contact can reduce out-group anxiety, bias and prejudice. In these instances, individuals with out-group contacts and positive encounters with out-group people, have the potential to affect in-group attitudes towards that out-group. Others finding out about positive intergroup encounters from in-group member reduces negative expectations and fears about interaction with the out-group. The out-group members are moreover included in the in-group. The reduction of these fears results in a decrease of intergroup prejudice and more trust. The effects of intergroup contacts carry thus farther than the people directly involved (Turner, Voci, Hewstone & Vonofakou, 2008). Contact theory does not only apply to racial and ethnic groups but is valid to other types of groups as well (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

3.2 The roles of trust in conflict and peace building

3.2.1 Distrust as a cause for conflict

Many studies on conflict and conflict resolution lay emphasis on the importance of relationships. *"The social psychological study of conflict stresses the vital role of human social interactions in triggering perpetuating and resolving conflict"* (Coleman, 2004: 207). Coleman (2004) describes how destructive relations and negative perceptions, expectations and behavioral responses of the conflicting parties can lock people in a vicious hostile circle. Damaged relations form an obstacle to constructive engagement and distrust is often an important aspect in such damaged relations. Distrust is thus core to the initiation and continuation of many intractable conflicts (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). In intergroup conflicts, there is even the risk of polarization. Polarization entails the situation in which the complexity of a conflict is reduced to a simple conflict between two parties with two opposing 'poles'. In practice, simplification often takes place in intense situations and polarization then has the consequences that people involved are forced to choose a side for one or the other party (Galtung, 1996). This process often goes hand in hand with stereotyping and delegitimization of the out-group and can even result in dehumanization of the enemy (Bar-Tal, 1993). *"Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration."* (Maiese, 2003: 1). The opposite group is then perceived as a threat to

well-being or values, which makes it easier and more justifiable to behave violently against out-group members. The result of processes like polarization, stereotyping, delegitimization and dehumanization is further alienation and an increase of psychological distance between the groups (Bar-Tal, 1993; Maiese, 2003).

Nevertheless trust is associated with cooperation, information sharing and problem solving and is therefore often seen as key to conflict resolution (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). Building trust in the long run thus provides opportunities and can even be a necessity for peace processes (Kelman, 2005). Williams (2001) also acknowledged the importance of the development of mutual trust between enemies in order to arrive to peace and cooperation in the respective relationship. The problem is however that enemies are often afraid to extend trust to the other party because of past and expected betrayal and negative effects (Kelman, 2005). In a situation of distrust every gesture is likely to be negatively interpreted and hinders all forms of social interaction (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002).

3.2.2 Trust in resolutions

The social psychological paradigm sees change to related psychological processes as core to alternating the course of conflict. While difficult, damaged relations can be restored in order to resolve conflict. Misunderstanding, distrust and stereotyping can be broken down by targeting people and communities in the right way (Coleman, 2004). Building mutual trust is essential in efforts to resolve conflict and transform hostile relations in which distrust is a given (Kelman, 2005). Regarding the process of rebuilding trust in a conflict situation, it is important that the adversaries perform acts that reflect the aim to change the damaged relation into peaceful relations. This includes unilateral acts of good will (Bar-Tal, 1993). Also reestablishing cooperation and working on common goals can enhance relations because of the reduced salience of group boundaries. Working together forms a subgroup of in- and out-group members and positive attitudes are fostered (Yilmaz, 2006).

Reconciliation is a strategy to improve mutual relations in (post) conflict situations. According to Govier & Verwoerd (2002) building or rebuilding trust is

central to reconciliation. Reconciliation is the coming together and development of trust between parties which therefore become capable of managing the relationship, cooperate, coexist peacefully and manage future conflict (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). Rebuilding trust can thus be seen as the psychological aspect of reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2000). Reconciliation asks for two processes to reverse escalation, along the two dimensions of trust and distrust. One, an atmosphere of trust has to be restored or cultivated and second the levels of distrust have to be managed (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). Reconciliation is supposed to take place on micro and macro level as well as on intermediate levels. On lower, interpersonal levels it typically involves local and face-to-face interaction while on higher levels more global interactions between groups or institutions are concerned (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). What kind and degree of trust has to be established to make the relationship workable varies for situations and levels of reconciliation. Most importantly it depends on the type of relation is aimed for and the extent of interaction and dependence; nonviolent coexistence requires different levels than close cooperation on a daily basis (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). Another example is that the workable level of trust in a state system depends on the level of autonomy.

3.2.3 Trust for counter-insurgency

In the situation of an insurgency related conflict, trust has a more specific role. Insurgents can only succeed in a conflict against a government when the local population supports them. Crucial aspects of successful counterinsurgency campaigns is thus the building of good government-civilian relations and the development of trust to limit the fertile environment for the insurgency to grow (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). However governance unresponsive to the needs of the people can result in popular dissatisfaction which hinders intelligence-gathering and increases opportunities for propaganda by the insurgents (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). Addressing development issues in the respective region is thus a strategy to take away support from insurgents. Improved living conditions complicate recruitment for the insurgency movements (Cragin & Chalk, 2003). A specific approach for counterinsurgency is outlined by Goswami (2009: 69) based on her experience with Indian insurgency strategies. She argues: "*in internal conflict situations, authentic*

trust building and nurturing by state forces breaks the cycle of cordial hypocrisy maintained by the affected population towards the state forces mainly arising out of fear and a desire for 'self-preservation'. For this strategy of 'trust and nurture', intelligence gathering and population reassurance are the key variables; for both trust is crucial. The nurture aspect has several main factors which according to Goswami (2009) are democratic political structure based on rule of law and constitutional rights, measured military methods of restrained and proportionate action, special counter-insurgency forces specifically trained, excellent understanding of local values and culture and integrative nation-building with inclusive institutional frameworks. These actions should result in the development of the necessary conditions (nurture) to build trust. An aspect coming out of trust between the population and the state is the improvement of intelligence gathering, necessary to more effectively fight the insurgency (Goswami, 2009).

3.2.4 Southern border provinces of Thailand

When taking a more focused look on the conflict South Thailand, several effects of trust play a role. NRC (2006) has acknowledged the fact that the damaged relation between the population and the state facilitates the insurgency. The NRC (2006: 16) formulated it as: *"The current violence driven by such a small group of people would not be possible if the majority of the public had confidence and trust in the state, cooperated with state officials".* Because distrust characterizes the perception towards the state and the army, local people are not eager to support the state. The insurgency movements have therefore more possibilities to find support. Distrust also complicates cooperation and the lack of cooperation between the state and the local people creates obstacles to improve the situation. Justice is for example a big issue in the South but in order to improve the situation, cooperation is necessary. State officials often encounter unwillingness to cooperate of the public which creates further inefficiencies in the justice process (NRC, 2006: 18). Currently the militants are able to create power by penetrating at village level. If they continue to successfully operate this way, they will eventually have the capacity to take away all power and trust thereby creating the foundations for a civil war (DSW, 2009a)

The government and the army have come to the belief that the conflict cannot be solved by force; gaining the hearts and minds of the people and the fight over information are perceived to be the keys to success. Creating good perceptions of the government among the populations is thus necessary (Rungrawee, 2009). The state has acknowledged the importance of rebuilding trust in order to counter the insurgency and try to work on improving the relationship and regain the trust of the people. Development and civilian affairs are seen as important issues to work on in the context of winning hearts and minds of the southern population. The NRC (2006: 74) also identified development as an important issue to solve the conflict, along with political measures. Besides the legitimacy and enhanced cooperation that the state will gain from improved trust, it could also improve the intelligence for the military which is still limited at the moment. At the moment poor intelligence is both cause and result of the lack of trust (ICG, 2009). Building trust is thus likely to have direct effect on information and knowledge sharing and would thus mean improved intelligence in the counter-insurgency operations (Goswami, 2009). This can subsequently facilitate a more precise suppression of the insurgency.

3.3 Analytical framework for trust restoration

The previous analysis of literature related to trust building and restoration and the relation to the conflict in South Thailand has provided a more comprehensive background to the analytical framework discussed in chapter I. It explains some processes and theoretical implications underlying the relations and the impact of trust restoring activities like the development initiatives of the army. An overview of the theoretical processes and possible outcomes is given in table 1.

3.3.1 Interpersonal trust restoration

The trust restoring activities provide space for several processes of trust building and restoration. First of all, interpersonal perceptions can be influenced. The direct interaction in development programs would account for the possibility of developing interpersonal relationships in a new setting and interpersonal trust. The direct interaction familiarizes people with each other which creates a bond and breaks

down group boundaries. Whether that actually happens depends on the kind of interaction and whether the participants can see the people involved as individuals. Furthermore, before the interaction takes place, people involved are likely to have expectations regarding the intentions of the army. When these expectations are negative, there is an opportunity to disconfirm them and thereby decrease distrust. Furthermore a certain consistency in disconfirming negative expectation, i.e. in a displaying consistent trustworthy behavior, predictability increases which relates to trust building.

In case of successful initiation of such processes transformations of existing levels of trust and distrust can take place; levels might be influence a shift along the dimensions and therefore change attitudes, perceptions and expectations. So trust related perceptions might decrease while trust related perceptions increase. Expectations of the army's intentions with the program could also become more positive.

3.3.2 Intergroup effects

Because of the close link between individual and group perception, both are relevant in the study. Because of the character of the case, interpersonal changes are most influential. However, group perceptions are of importance in influencing the interpersonal trust and because of the impact that the activities might have on intergroup trust. It has been explained that interpersonal and intergroup attitudes are closely related to each other and mutually influence each other; the interpersonal trust could thus be contributing to intergroup trust. The trust would then be extended to the wider community through extended contact because of experience sharing and positive messages regarding the army. Indirect contact has potential to change group attitudes as shortly discussed. It depends on the perception of the people of what the out-group is, where the trust will be extended to. In first place it is most likely to relate to the army as a group but potentially the reference group might be security forces in general or even the state. In contradiction, the process of group dissemination could also work the other way around. The existing distrust in the community can also dissolve the built interpersonal trust.

It is anyhow important that any positive attitudes of participants towards the trust restoring activities can be addressed to the army so that trust can also be directed to that party. Salient links between the program and the army are thus necessary to attribute positive attitudes to the wider group. Other aspects can hinder the dissemination as well like the intervention of insurgency actions or the fear of the participants to share their stories. The final effect will thus depend on what aspect is strongest in the social interactions in the community. If individuals' trust can have an impact on the community the outcome would be that intergroup perceptions and expectations modify and that the army's reputation changes.

3.3.3 Long term impact

The last aspect of the analytical framework refers to future implications. While in first instance the trust restoration is established for the short term, effects might influence longer term outcomes. However some factors can increase the duration and strength of the trust. The trust, either interpersonal or intergroup, to become long term, depends largely on the consistency of other actions and behavior (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). New violations of expectations can increase distrust again. On the other hand, persistence of predictable trustworthy behavior strengthens the development of trust. Trustworthy and consistent messages have to be given off also outside the specific activity. Finally the extent of nurture, so delivering upon commitment, is important and thus requires successful programs to create a base for trust on the longer term. The process of long term trust is however lengthy to begin with and will further be influenced by the strength of the in-group beliefs about the army and the state (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003a). In case this happens, overall perceptions towards the army can improve. If perceptions of positive intentions gain the upper hand, people can become more open to other programs and cooperation and potentially become more comfortable with providing intelligence to counter the insurgency.

Table 1: Framework for trust restoration activities		
Trust aspects	**Conditions and processes**	**Possible outcomes**
Interpersonal	- Direct interaction and initiation of interpersonal relationships - Individuation/personalization - Reducing the salience of group boundaries - Calibration of (dis)trust: disconfirming negative expectations - Consistency in trustworthy behavior → increasing predictability	- Change in feelings and perceptions related to trust: hope, faith, confidence, assurance, initiative - Change in feelings and perception related to distrust: fear, skepticism, cynicism, wariness, vigilance - Change in expectation/perception of intentions
Intergroup	- Salience of party's responsibility of outcomes to influence perceptions of army - Trust dissemination through extended contact - Influence of in-group attitudes on the individual	- Change in intergroup perceptions and out-group reputation
Long term	- Consistency with other actions outside particular activity - Persistence of predictability of trustworthy behavior - Extent of nurture for trust (success of activity)	- Change in overall perception of (army) intentions - Improving cooperation → openness to other programs - Change in counterinsurgency → Improved intelligence

3.4 Conclusion

Trust is a crucial aspect for many forms of social interactions and relationships between people, groups and institutions. Even though building trust is a lengthy process, restoring trust and reducing distrust is perceived to be even more difficult. Nevertheless, both are essential in addressing conflict, especially in cases of insurgency. In the southern border provinces of Thailand, distrust has resulted in easier recruitment for the insurgency movement and more difficult cooperation and support of the local people to the state. Restoring the trust is crucial to counter the insurgency and to work towards resolution of the conflict. The framework to examine trust restoring activities points out various processes that can take place regarding the activities and how an impact could be created on interpersonal and intergroup trust. Furthermore, outcomes of changes have been predicted to be changing perceptions and feelings of trust and distrust regarding army officers and the army in general. The following chapter takes a closer look at the trust violations that have taken place which led to the distrust.

CHAPTER IV

ASSESSMENT OF TRUST IN THE SOUTHERN CONFLICT

Initially, the southern population had a reasonable trust in the army, particularly when compared to the police. However, this trust was betrayed in various ways. The increase of distrust is generally related to the degree of the violation, the number of past violations, and the perception that the offender intended to commit the violation; whether the violation is perceived as intentional (distrust) or not intended (untrust). The first one is likely to have greater effect (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). A variety of such trust violations have happened between the army and the local people. Because the army is strongly connected and related to the Thai state or government, some of the state actions have impacted trust in the army as well. In order to understand the current trust relations it is necessary to take a closer look at the past of interaction between the army and partially the state, with the southern population. This chapter thus discusses the trust violations that have taken place which have damaged the relationship. Violations have been of various types; related to violence, injustice and suppression of culture. Each of these types is addressed below followed by an evaluation of the result of these violations. This increases the understanding of the relationship that has to be restored by the development initiatives.

4.1 History of suppression: before 2004

Violations of trust go back decades. From the beginning of the annexation of Patani to Thailand in 1909 alienation existed between the southern population and the Thai state because of differences in ethnicity, culture, language and religion. Suppression, efforts for assimilation and lack of respect for the local identity negatively impacted the relationship between the southern people and the state. The Thai state perceives itself as a unitary state with ethnic homogeneity. In society there has also been a strong and rigid perception of 'Thainess', which is not shared by the population in the South. In mid 20th century it was believed that national security

required unity among all people and therefore begun to unify and assimilate various groups (Mark & Somkiat, 2009). Separatist initiatives grew and declined over time.

The conflict was of low intensity in the 1980s and 1990s. The politics of the then governing Democrats have been perceived to be a positive influence on the relative peacefulness of this period. Part of the policies was the establishment of the Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 (CPM 43) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) in the early 1980s. CPM 43 is part of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) which gave citizens and the police more influence in security. SBPAC undertook development projects and public relations initiatives, increased local participation and formed an important channel of communication. Both organisations, even though not always functioning perfectly in the locals' interest, contributed to calming the local conflict. Involvement and a more significant say of the population in local issues apparently countered the grievances (Funston, 2008). Furthermore, policies were shifted towards being more supportive for cultural pluralism. Assimilation efforts were decreased and instead integration and localism became more important. The Muslim population became accommodated into the mainstream and better understanding and more responsiveness were created by government leaders. At the same time, Malay Muslims were increasingly represented in media and local and national politics. In general, the political solution thus became more dominant than military ones which was well received by the population (Yusuf, 2006; McCargo, 2007; Funston, 2008). Overall, the set of initiatives, the relative consistency in policies and the relatively positive attitudes towards the population contributed to building trust between the state bodies and the Malay Muslim population. The urge for separatism or autonomy decreased thereby and peaceful coexistence was possible in these days (McCargo, 2007; Funston, 2008).

Nevertheless earlier situations in the past had left a mark. In 1989 former commander of the Fourth Regional Army studied Buddhist and Muslim relations and found in his study that the relationships between officials and civilians in the south were negative due to mistrust and misunderstanding (Chaiwat, 2009). The historical violations might partly be too long ago to have a direct impact on the recent relationship. However, the history has had an impact on the collective memory of the parties and therefore the current relationship between the army and the local

population is likely to be subject to the past. The collective memory of that past partly underlies the current animosity and mistrust between the groups (Bar-Tal, 1993).

4.2 2004 - present

After this turbulent but relatively peaceful history, things changed in the beginning of the 21st century. In 2004, violence increased and the relationship worsened. Several types of trust violations took place which can be categorized in violence, injustice and cultural suppression.

4.2.1 Trust and arbitrary use of violence

The first of the types of trust violations also seems to be a key factor in the resurgence of the violence; the abuse of power by the state and the arbitrary use of power. In January 2004, at the start of the most serious episode of unrest, hundred attackers invaded an army camp in Narathiwat, seized weapons and killed four Buddhist soldiers. At the same time 20 schools were set on fire. In reaction to this event and a series of violent incidents in the following months, the government installed martial law and sent extra police forces to the region. (Yusuf, 2006; McCargo, 2007).

Two of the most infamous incidents are the Takbai and Krue Se incidents. On April 28 2004, about one hundred only lightly armed men were killed after attacking security posts in three provinces. At the same time, the Krue Se Mosque incident took place. The Pattani mosque was attacked by security forces after a group of militants had hidden in the mosque. Grenades were thrown into the mosque by the army and back by the militants. Subsequently soldiers stormed the mosque and killed 32 lightly armed men. The justification of this attack has been widely debated and whether or not it was justified, the action of attacking a sacred religion place alienated the Malay-Muslim community. Moreover it provided the insurgents a huge medium to dehumanize the state (McCargo, 2007; McCargo, 2008).

The Takbai incident which took place in October 2004, is known for the arbitrary violence used by the security forces. During a peaceful demonstration outside a police station in Takbai, Narathiwat the army violently herded together over

a thousand men and shot several men dead. Subsequently a thousand others were transported to military camps being pilled up in trucks. During this transport 78 more Muslims died because of suffocation (Yusuf, 2006; McCargo, 2007; McCargo, 2008).

After the Takbai incident army officers tried to rebuild trust by for example visiting mosques frequently, others hoped that the memories would fade. However, months after this incident, military-community relations were still severely undermined: reportedly villagers would literally run away at the sight of army units (McCargo, 2008). Also apart from these major incidents, violence has been excessively used in the region to crack down on the insurgents but often involved and affected innocent people. A strategy with a lot of impact is the cordon-and-search operations in which a large area is surrounded and alleged suspects are arrested. Not only have these operations often been combined with violence, many innocent people were affected as well and left many people with the feeling of being treated unfairly (Rungrawee, 2009; Sarosi & Janjira, 2009). Frequent reports of torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings have been a problem as well. Being arrested is not only associated with possible arbitrary actions, but also fear for maltreatment (Rungrawee, 2009). Finally, sexual harassment has been a major grievance among the population. Allegations of the raping of women by security forces and rumors about sexual behavior of soldiers have caused considerable tension (McCargo, 2008: 104-105). Overall these various measures have thus alienated the local population. This has also subsequently facilitated recruitment of young, discontent Muslims by rebel groups (Petty, 2009)

The history of violence has created the perception that the Thai security forces are not capable of dealing with the situation and are likely to use arbitrary violence. Local people perceive violence to be intentionally used against the suspects. A demonstration of the distrust can be found in examples of violent incidents. The recent attack in June 2009 on the Al-Furquan mosque in Narathiwat, in which a group of gunmen fired shots on the crowd praying inside the mosque, is one of them. In that incident eleven men died. Many local people questioned the cause of the incidents and blamed it on the authorities. Despite that officials publicly denied involvement of state forces and the lack of evidence or clear motives, distrust is so high that people provided an alternative explanation in which security forces are responsible. The

official claim is thus doubted and ideas have been formed that security forces undertake such actions to be able to blame the insurgents. Whether or not it is true, with this believe the incident has become another confirmation for distrust (DSW, 2009b; Zakee, 2009b).

4.2.2 Trust and injustice

The second aspect of the trust violations is the lack of injustice and human rights violations that have taken place. The Thai security forces have been accused of human rights violations by various groups and organizations. In general there have been repeated failures by state authorities to act in a manner that respects human rights (DSW, 2009a). As discussed, there has been evidence of extrajudicial killings, torture and other unlawful acts by security officials (Rungrawee, 2009). Apart from the direct effects of these actions, impunity regarding the perpetrators worsens the grievances. The emergency decree and the martial law that are currently still effective in the region give extra power to the security forces and facilitate the ease of committing human rights violations. Under martial law, searches can be conducted without warrants and suspects can be detained without charges for 7 days. The provisions under the emergency decree cause outrage among the local population for unfair treatment by security forces. Under the emergency decree introduced in July 2005 further controversial measures are held, among which the permission of detaining suspects without charge, the banning of media publications that threatened security and legal immunity for any action undertaken by government officials (Ukrist, 2007; Rungrawee, 2009). The emergency decree in itself also causes problems in violating basic rights of the accused: they are denied access to lawyers or visits from relatives. In other cases, relatives are failed to be informed causing uncertainty and fear (Rungrawee, 2009). Tangible problems include launching criminal proceeding on insufficient evidence, coercion to give testimony, unlawful searches, arrest of children and youths, treatment of suspects without respect for religion and the failure of returning evidence (NRC, 2006: 18). Innocent citizens have thus been arrested or have undergone treatment in which they were assumed to be insurgents; most left with the feeling to be treated unfairly. Despite possible innocence these and other people could come on a blacklist of militant suspects.

Being removed from the blacklist has proven to be very complicated and repeated badgering of those people has been common (McCargo, 2008: 106; Rungrawee, 2009). Innocent people have been arrested regularly. Statistics of the Police Forward Command in Yala showed that between 2004 and August 2008 of the 4,147 cases submitted by the police to the prosecutor, of only 325 cases charge was continued. Furthermore, 68% of the 125 cases handed down by the Court were found guilty; the other 32% were acquitted (Pornpen, 2008). Justice is furthermore not delivered to the people. More than 400 cases have been brought against the state by villagers. However, in not one of these cases has a state official been sued (DSW, 2009a). The current court process about the Takbai incident has not resulted in the appointment of responsible people; no state officials or security forces were held accountable for what had happened, a disappointment for many locals who were longing for justice (DSW, 2009b).

Army officials claim that certain actions are necessary to guarantee security and fight the insurgency but are nevertheless perceived by the local population as repressing (DSW, 2009a). Who is right is unclear, but it again reflects the issue of distrust.

Overall, many citizens have experienced that the state's history of prioritizing its own interests and security over human rights, so many people fear arrests and detention and the possible consequences coming from it. Furthermore, the sentiment among the Muslim population of not receiving justice from the state is deep-rooted, having developed with the history of the area. Resultantly, many locals hold strong grievances towards authorities for the human rights abuses and the lack of justice (NRC, 2006: 19; DSW, 2009b).

4.2.3 Trust and cultural insensitivity

Finally, cultural suppression and the related lack of understanding is an issue. Offenses with relation to the culture of the local population have negatively impacted trust. Army officers deployed in the South are frequently rotated or brought in from other parts of the country and have short term stays. This has resulted in both lack of understanding of the situation and culture as well that any development of interpersonal trust gets interrupted. Most deployed soldiers are Buddhist Thai and are

thus not familiar with the local way of life and with their behavior they violate the people's customs in an offensive way. Daily interaction has been characterized by cultural misunderstanding. Such repeating incidents exacerbate existing issues and further the sense of religious, ethnic and cultural alienation (Rungrawee, 2009; Pimonpan, 2009). Simultaneously the different culture, way of life and surroundings also created suspicion for the newly deployed troops. New soldiers coming in, directly have to face the negative and hostile attitudes of the local people towards the army and that makes cooperation more difficult (Pimonpan, 2009).

An example of culturally offensive behavior was that the reparation of the Krue Se mosque after the attack was done by Thai soldiers. It was not only insensitive to religion as work on a mosque would have to be done by Muslims, the Thai state also tried to turn the mosque into a tourist attraction for income generation. However as it is an important religious site, this was not appreciated (Tan-Mullins, 2007). Ten commandments have been set up for soldiers working in the region as a guideline to address these problems and build good relations. Most relate to polite, respectful behavior towards the locals. Despite these rules, compliance has not been consistent (Rungrawee, 2009). Because of the strong identity and religious believes of the local population, the discussed culturally insensitive behavior has been considered very violating.

4.3 Evaluation of the trust violations

Based on these issues between the authorities and the local population and the trust violations over time, a negative trust spiral has developed between the army and the people (Hoffman & Taw, 1992). Less trust and more distrust have led to suspicion with the result that subsequent actions are more easily interpreted as untrustworthy thereby further decreasing trust. Initiatives to be more responsive and understanding to the situation have been complicated by the legacy of mistrust and suspicion (ICG, 2009). Whether or not the actions were legitimized, the distrust and suspicion made the local people interpret all actions negatively. The fact that over time more and more security forces were dispatched has not helped in decreasing the feeling of threat (Rungrawee, 2009). Currently many locals, almost 50% in a recent poll, oppose the large numbers of security forces in the region and to their perception withdrawing

security forces from the region would be an important step towards peace (Srisompob, 2009b).

Neither the state nor the army has been able to curtail the violence in the process or provide sufficient protection and security to the local people. Continuation of violence will result in an even larger wedge between the government and the general public, and further aggravate relations in the region (Zakee, 2009a). At the same time if the government does not fall back to using violence, more people from the region will cooperate with the authorities (DSW, 2009b).

A further important contribution to the existing distrust is the propaganda of insurgency movements. They make use of and exploit the trust violations by the insurgency as propaganda against the state (Rungrawee, 2009). They rally the people to support their cause by pointing out the mistreatment from the state and argue for resistance to the state. Blaming authorities for violent incidents has been a strategy of the militants which further increases distrust and misperceptions (McCargo, 2008: 102 & 109). Through the distribution of leaflets, meetings and other actions such inciting separatist ideas are spread (Zakee, 2009b). What happens is that an enemy image of state officials, either governmental, army or police, is created which, when intensified can result in dehumanization. Either way the negative stereotype following from it leads to fear, distrust and alienation with the population and are usually persistent to change and can intensify the conflict. The contrast between good and bad is accentuated and can result in polarization and members are more and more perceived as part of the opposite group and less as individuals which takes away the human aspect of the officials (Bar-Tal, 1993; Maiese, 2003). This following distrust leads to less cooperation, which in itself complicates the work, like intelligence and attempts to reconcile and therefore creates disappointments again. Also in this sense, a self-enforcing process of distrust is present (ICG, 2009).

Stereotyping influenced by group membership, direct experience and indirect experience resulted in the current distrust and low trust between the army and the local population. Individuals might not have experienced similar situations directly; the incidents are taken up in collective social memory and thereby spread throughout the population. The further exploitation of these feelings and incidents by insurgents

by constructing narratives about discrimination and violations strengthens the negative perceptions (Goswami, 2009).

In terms of the aspects of the trust framework both interpersonal and intergroup distrust are present. Over time people have experienced in personal interaction that expectations of the behaviour and intentions of the army are not met. People were hopeful when the army came to the South to take the lead in the counterinsurgency; however as the violence only worsened and the state did not appear capable of addressing the problem, trust decreased. First of all, the disconfirmation of the positive expectations, following the theory of trust calibration (Adams, 2005) reduced trust and even activated distrust in the cases where the army was held directly responsible for the negative outcomes. Subsequently the overall evaluation of the army's trustworthiness decreased and then confirmations of negative expectations has strengthened the growing distrust (Adams, 2005) Furthermore, the experiences and attitudes have spread throughout the society by social interaction, increasing and strengthening the distrust. Also polarization has taken place, resulting in a social process in which people place individuals in a group of which the contrast between good and bad is accentuated and members are more and more perceived as part of the opposite group and less as individuals which takes away the human aspect of the officials. The state is generally perceived a bad, enemy-like group for which no trust exists (Maiese, 2003). Several researches have pointed out the negative perceptions and the existing distrust regarding the army. A recent survey to probe the levels of trust, demonstrated that trust in soldiers and police forces are lowest of all agencies and organizations in the South. Local politicians, senators and parliament members are just slightly more trusted (Srisompob, 2009c).

Currently the local people distrust the army and thus assume bad intentions and have negative expectations before anything happens. Moreover, the existing distrust makes it more likely that the evaluation of the outcome is either negative or that positive outcomes are not attributed to the army, which is necessary to reduce distrust. The fact that behaviour leading to these attitudes has been going on for decades, confirms that distrust has become long term; a study in 1989 found in that the relationships between Buddhist and Muslims officials and civilians in the south were negative due to mistrust and misunderstanding (Chaiwat, 2009). For the trust-

distrust matrix this means that the current relationship between the army and the local population can be classified as one of low trust and high distrust. It entails that the population sees no reason for confidence or faith in the army. Instead they assume harmful motives and fear for undesirable effects of eventualities. There is thus ample reason for wariness and watchfulness. The result is a negative social reality in which fear, negative expectations, a defensive attitude and paranoia exist (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998).

Apart from the past and present trust violating circumstances, the future is important too. The future could bring improvements in the conflict situation and the interaction between the army and the local population. Less violence, more understanding and improved human rights situations would be ways to improve attitudes from the population. Even an outlook on such changes could be a first step in improving the circumstances. A decreasing intensity of the conflict started in mid-2007 with decreasing number of violent incidents. 2008 was even the least violent year since 2004 (Srisompob, 2009c). Also the new installment of the Abhisit-government was received relatively positive by the current population and PM Abhisit has been more responsive to the conflict in the South (Srisompob, 2009b). Unfortunately, so far the government has not been able to address the conflict situation. Political strategies have hardly changed over time and the martial law and the emergency decree continue to be effective in the southern border provinces (DSW, 2009c). Moreover since the beginning of 2009 there has been an upsurge of violence again (Srisompob, 2009c). This means that there are no clear clues for the southern population to expect changes in the way they are being treated; there are no clear clues that it is reasonable to diminish distrust.

4.4 Conclusion

It can thus be summarized that trust violations have accumulated over a long period of time, most intensely over the last 5 years, and are characterized by disproportionate use of violence in a number of cases, human rights violations and the lack of justice and suppression of culture and identity which together with the propaganda of the insurgency movements have created suspicion and distrust. Both

interpersonal and intergroup distrust is strong and trust is overall low resulting in a negative social reality.

Despite the trust violations and the severely damaged relations, the situation is not hopeless. Examples from India have shown that even after times of disproportionate use of violence, human rights violations and strongly alienated population, the army has been able to change attitudes, create a positive shift and rebuild relations based on trust (Goswami, 2009). There might thus also be opportunities for the Thai army to do the same.

CHAPTER V

YALANNANBARU AS TRUST RESTORING ACTIVITY

This chapter zooms in on the Yalannanbaru program as a means for trust building in the southern border provinces. As discussed, the relationship between the state and the southern population has been severely damaged and therefore the Thai state has initiated and implemented development programs in order to build trust and address the conflict. The army is an important actor. The aim is to stimulate economic and social development and thereby win over hearts and minds of the local population. Yalannanbaru is one of these development initiatives, run by the army under ISOC and SBPAC and serves as a case study to assess the potential for trust building of development initiatives. The chapter starts with a description of the program and then discusses aspects related to interpersonal and intergroup trust building and subsequently the sustainability of the possibly built trust.

5.1 Description of Yalannanbaru

5.1.1 Aims and goals

As discussed, a wide range of development initiatives is being implemented in the southern border provinces. Yalannanbaru is part of Strategy 1 of SBPAC which deals with legitimisation of the state and increasing state confidence. It also involves the protection and administration of justice and the protection of risk groups. 113 projects have been developed under this strategy. For the years 2009-2011, 180 million bath of the total budget of 185.1 billion baths is allocated to Yalannanbaru (SBPAC, 2009).

Yalannanbaru means New Road in local Malay language. The idea behind it is that the participating youth have the chance to decide to take a new road in their lives; away from drugs and towards a good life. As explained by Colonel Suwan, the Yalannanbaru program is set up to attain a set of goals. The first direct aim is to re-educate the youth in the southern border provinces that are using drugs or are in the

risk group for becoming a user. They are taught about drugs and other ways of life in order to give them capacity to deal with drugs in normal life. The intention is to change the attitude of the participants and learn them about religion, to respect their parents, to respect themselves and to avoid drugs. By religious teachings the youth is supposed to become more devoted Muslim and therefore refuse drugs (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009). A second aim is to prevent youth from becoming involved in the insurgency. The reasoning according to Colonel Suwan is that the militant movements recruit easy targets. The youth participating in Yalannanbaru are generally uneducated, unemployed and poor and especially when using drugs, they are easily convinced to support the insurgency. By participating in Yalannanbaru, the youth stops using drugs, is empowered and they should therefore be able to resist such attempts (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009). Yalannanbaru is at times also provided as an alternative to being arrested for drugs use. It gives youth the opportunity to show goodwill to address their behavior and thereby get a chance to avoid becoming a suspect (Trainer 2, personal communication, July 20 2009)

Thirdly, the project is supposed to change the overall attitude of the participants towards the army and officials in general and thereby stimulate further cooperation in other situations. It aims to build trust between the involved officers and the participants which would maintain after the camp. "*The insurgents have taught the youth bad things about us and therefore they don't accept soldiers. The youth is exploited and they need help to get out of this*". According to Colonel Suwan this trust built during the camp will be spread throughout the community by the positive stories related to the program and thus create changes in attitudes of the wider local population towards the army. Especially because the youth are targeted, it should have a lasting effect (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009 & July 20 2009).

5.1.2 Initiation

A serious concern about drugs use in the South especially among youth has been present in the local southern society for several years (Mark & Somkiat, 2009). Many families seem to experience problems from youth using a variety of drugs. Under the Muslim youth, lighter types like marijuana and codeine are popular but also the infamous drug khratom or 4x100 is often used. This is a natural drugs often mixed with liquids and can therefore be used relatively unnoticeably. (Srisompob, personal communication, June 10 2009). Also statistics have shown that drugs are indeed a significant problem in the southern provinces (Srisompob & Panyasak, 2007). The program has been developed in 2006 initially by the strategic planning department of the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB). There was the need to address the problem but with a softer strategy against drugs than during the war on drugs; the intention was to actually solve the problem for the people instead of a hard-line approach against users and dealers. Colonel Suwan at the time worked in the drugs unit of ISOC and became responsible for the Yalannanbaru program along with several military officers working with him. The program is under supervision of ISOC 4th Region and the ONCB (Office of Narcotics Control Board) (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, personal communication, July 23 2009). The implementation of the project is done by local army taskforces, but in Songkhla by the border patrol police. A pilot camp was held in Saiburi in 2006. After that appeared successful, the program was implemented throughout the southern border provinces from 2007 (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25 2009). Public relations activities have been implemented in order to familiarize people with the Yalannanbaru program and still continue.

The program was copied from a similar program implemented in Isarn. To make the program suitable for the southern border provinces several adaptations were done to fit the local culture. Several local and religious people have been involved to assist in that. First of all the name, Yalannanbaru was chosen as it is a word in the local language. Furthermore, religion, mainly the Islam, is an important aspect of the re-education program and most teachings are based on the Muslim belief. The concept of a camp for youth is a common thing in the local culture especially for religious

teachings and is thus according to local culture. Several local (religious) people are still employed to continuously track cultural sensitivity. One of the interviewed trainers is a local person, not working with the army. For Yalannanbaru he provides feedback, contributes to the religious aspects of the program and assists in building community relations and observing potential participants (Trainer 1, personal communication, August 7 2009).

At the moment of the field research, the camp visited in Pattani was the 196th camp since the start of Yalannanbaru. According to Colonel Suwan (personal communication, July 20 2009), about 12.000 youth have participated so far. The number of youth participating in a camp is between 60 and 90. There are six different locations for the camp across the southern border provinces, including one in Songkhla (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009).

5.1.3 Target groups

The target group of the program is youth from the southern border provinces. According to Colonel Suwan, out of the 1.8 mln people in the provinces, about 300.000 are in the age category of 14-25. Only ⅓ of them is educated or employed; the other 200.000 are more inclined to use drugs and are therefore the main target group of Yalannanbaru (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009). According to estimations of the ONCB, about 40.000 people in the southern border provinces are drugs addicts (Srisompob Jitprisomsri, personal communication, July 23 2009). The overall target group is divided into 4 subgroups:

1. Youth not using drugs, but at risk to start using. This group can participate in Yalannanbaru for prevention.
2. Youth that use drugs sometimes; the first main group. Smoking cigarettes is included in using drugs.
3. Youth using regularly or daily but only lighter types of drugs; the second main group.
4. Youth being addicted to hard drugs. This group does not participate but can get help from rehabilitation programs at health institutes.

Colonel Suwan aims to have another 10.000 youth participate in the camp so that a significant percentage of the youth using drugs has been re-educated. Participants are generally between 14-25 years old, but in some cases older men (up to 40 years) are invited to participate if they are thought to benefit from the program. Girls cannot participate; they generally do not use drugs and '*the community in the South is not yet accepting of girls participating in programs like this*' (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 20 2009).

5.1.4 Selection process

The process of selecting the participants is done on a community level and is in cooperation with village headmen and locally stationed army officers. The village headmen and other local community leaders are informed about the program. They know and understand the people and are familiar with youth and their problems. They can identify who is involved in drugs or might be at risk of becoming involved in drugs and thus select youth and invite them to participate. If necessary, the village headman explains the program to the youth and the family and tries to create interest for participation. Sometimes the family helps to persuade the youth to participate. It is said that participation is voluntarily so youth are free to decline the invitation (Village headman, personal communication, July 21 2009).

5.1.5 Design of the re-education camp

The 7-day 6-night camp takes place in or close to army bases. Army officers are involved throughout the program. Most importantly, they are the trainers and teachers in the camp. The group is furthermore divided in sub-groups of 8-15 participants and each sub-group has one army officer as leader. The sub-groups are formed based on the region where they live and are thus composed of participants of different age and with different backgrounds. Only the Buddhist participants are grouped together. During the 7 days the youth stays in the camp and participates in activities from morning till bed time. Smoking or using drugs is not allowed; neither can the participants use their phone. The entire program is in Thai language. Discussing experiences related to the conflict is not part of the program; "*it is not the*

place to share these kind of things" (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25 2009)

Most days have a similar schedule. Most of the time is spent on class room activities. The day starts with some meditation which is repeated during the day. Lessons are mainly on drugs education and religion. In addition to talks from the teachers, movie clips and songs are used. Two songs are the camp songs and include a small dance. A first important lesson explains that at the age of 14-18 everyone has the chance to consciously choose their life path; living a good life leading to paradise or a bad life. In the Yalannanbaru camp, everyone has the chance to rethink their decision and make a change if necessary. It is furthermore explained that to reach paradise, one has to stay pure and using drugs does not fit in such a lifestyle. Lessons on drugs explain negative effects and teach how to stop the vicious circle by using one's own power to say no. Lessons on religion teach about the beginning of life and the role of a god in the creation of life. It also explains that all people, both Buddhists and Muslim, aim for the same goal in life; paradise. While the paths or explanations on earth might be different, in the end everyone is equal. The youth is encouraged to identify the similarities across religions (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009).

Apart from classes, there is a daily exercise activity. Also, because religion is an important aspect of the program, Muslim participants pray five times a day in a prayer room. The Buddhist participants have free time during the prayers. Throughout the week, the participants are increasingly taught structure and discipline. Finally, the entire group sings the national anthem every evening. Eating is done collectively and only halal food is served.

The 7-day camp starts on a Monday on which the participants are taken to the camp by soldiers and arrive around 8.30am. The first day involves registration of the participants including taking photos for identification, the camp rules are explained, the participants get the chance to settle in their accommodation and luggage is checked. The youth also get the phone numbers of the army officers to be able to reach them after the camp. The rest of the day mainly involves ice breaking activities. On the third or fourth day the participants are encouraged to share their stories on

drug use. They work in groups to prepare a presentation and discuss their experiences in class presentations. On the last days, parents come to the camp in the afternoon. Apart from some information on drugs, the main aspect of this visit is that the students confess their past mistakes, ask for forgiveness from their parents and promise better behavior in the future (Lieutenant Suntorn, personal communication, July 20). Parents are asked to come in front of the room and the respective children kneel to ask for forgiveness. The head of the camp holds a speech and most participants as well as the parents get emotional. After that, each participant receives a certificate or a Yalannanbaru card which testifies of their participation. In the future, the youth can show their card to army officers to demonstrate that they have participated and therefore better understand the army (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 20 2009). At the end of the afternoon the participants and the family are brought back to their villages by soldiers.

The camps are open to anyone who wants to visit; community leaders and family members have regularly visited the camp but the frequency has decreased overtime (Lieutenant Suntorn, personal communication, July 20 2009.

5.1.6 Follow-up programming

While the 7-day re-education camp is the core aspect of the program, more activities are involved in the overall program (see figure 9). These activities are intentioned to continue learning, to provide continuous support in drugs prevention and to help the youth to not fall back into old patterns. After participating in the Yalannanbaru re-education camp, the youth are stimulated to set up or join a local Yalannanbaru club in their village. In these clubs the participants have regular meetings and continue their learnings about drugs. Funding to these clubs is provided by the army and most involve some agricultural projects as well, in which the participants learn about agriculture and self-sufficiency and work the land. There are currently about 500 clubs. The clubs are also intentioned for the soldiers to keep track of the behaviour and occupation of the former participants and to have a medium to interaction and to understand the thinking and culture of the local people (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25 2009).

In addition to the club, a variety of programs and trainings are offered to the Yalannanbaru alumni; everyone is supposed to participate in programs and generally the first follow-up activity is within a few months after the re-education camp. There are regular inter-village sports activities and initiatives to involve family into Yalannanbaru. Furthermore, for the leaders of the clubs there is a leadership-camp of several days, which can be followed by trainings on religion and how to involve the community. During Ramadan a program is provided to teach about religion. Moreover, vocational and educational trainings help youth without education or work to find ways for sustainable income. The final overall goal is conceptualized as for each person to be able to live good and raising money to go on Hajj to Mecca (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25, 2009; Document on program structure, Yalannanbaru Office).

Figure 8: Program structure Yalannanbaru

Note: Yalannanbaru Office, 2009

5.1.7 Results of Yalannanbaru

Yalannanbaru tries to provide a solution or support for the existing problem of drug use among youth in the southern border provinces and thus tries to respond to a serious local need. Srisompob Jitpiromsri has studied the results of the drugs re-

education. His survey found that about 70% of the participants stop using drugs after Yalannanbaru. This is a significant percentage; he therefore says that the program can be evaluated as successful, at least with respect to the first aim of the program. Yalannanbaru seems to provide an answer to the problem for many of the participating youth.

5.2 Interpersonal trust building

5.2.1 Attitudes prior to participation

Part of the aims of Yalannanbaru is thus to improve the relation between the army officers of Yalannanbaru and the participating youth by building trust. As it here involves the relation between individuals, it is considered interpersonal trust. This first aspect of the framework for analysis is discussed first to evaluate the impact of Yalannanbaru on interpersonal trust.

To start with an evaluation of the pre-participation attitudes, reference can be made to chapter III. As discussed, individual and group attitudes are closely related (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002). Barker (2003) argued that "*group fears often translate into individual fears as group extinction is often associated with individual extinction*". Taking into account the strength of existing distrust in society regarding the army, the participants would logically feel anxiety for participating in an army-run youth camp. This assumption was confirmed in the interviews. Most of the former and current participants explained in the interviews that they had negative feelings and attitudes towards participating in Yalannanbaru. They described their feelings as being scared, anxious, nervous and under pressure when coming to the camp. When asking what their fears related to, two main arguments were used: firstly some were scared because of their involvement or use of drugs. Others were scared to be arrested or mistreated by the army. These youth thus had assumptions that the army would have negative intentions; i.e. they distrusted the army (Participants, personal communication, July 20 2009; July 22 2009 & July 26 2009). Also on a community level negative perceptions dominated regarding Yalannanbaru. The village headman explained that in his village people resisted to cooperate (Village headman, personal communication, July 21 2009). It took the Yalannanbaru staff and him several months

of PR and talking to convince people of good intentions and the use of the program and subsequently to get the first group of people to participate. Also Colonel Suwan recognizes and acknowledges the initial fear and distrust of the youth regarding the army and security officers (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 20, 2009).

It was said that participation is voluntary for the youth and the village headman commented that some invited youth did not show up without consequences (village headman, personal communication, July 21 2009). However, giving the situation in the South and the pressure to not become suspicious in the eyes of the army, participation might not be as voluntarily as argued. Moreover, one participant explained that he had been told to participate in a program one day before, but he was not informed about the exact program (Participant, personal communication, July 22 2009). Therefore, his participation was not voluntarily, but he argued that he had probably participated voluntarily if had known about the program before.

From observation furthermore appeared that on the first day the youth did not show great fear or stress but many seemed tense and not at ease. They did participate but did not get fully involved in the more active activities. The participants held a reserved attitude towards the army officials and there was little more interaction than the necessary.

Overall, pre-participation attitudes and expectations confirm the existence of distrust regarding Yalannanbaru as an army project. Fear, suspicion, a defensive attitude and an expectation of bad intentions are consistent with the negative social reality of the trust-distrust matrix.

5.2.2 Main findings on interpersonal trust

Overall findings from the field study have been that an increase in trust and a decrease in distrust related behavior have taken place. During the camp visits it was observed whether the youth displayed trusting behavior; i.e. acting in less negative ways toward out-group members, as described in chapter I, thus whether behavior towards the army officers became more positive over time. It was found that the behavior of the participating youth indeed became more trusting in the course of the camp. Several aspects depict this. After a few days the youth seemed to have opened

up; more natural interaction took place. In the course of the camp, they became more enthusiastic and participated more actively in the activities, ranging from classes, songs, performances, group work and sports. Many of the youth seemed to have fun and also interacted positively with each other. Casual chats between the army officers and participants took place. On the last day most interaction between the army and the youth had become friendly and relaxed. The youth approached the army officials on own initiative and some were joking together. At saying goodbye most participants went over to the army officials to say thanks and goodbye in a friendly and relaxed way. Another indication of interpersonal trust development in the course of the Yalannanbaru camp is continuing interaction afterwards. Trainers reported that after the end of the camp, many of the youth call to discuss issues with the trainers. The topics are mainly related to work or drugs issues. With respect to other problems, for example regarding the violence or intelligence, the youth and army mention that information is not shared (Lieutenant Suntorn & Trainer 2, personal communication, July 20 2009). Also former participants claim they sometimes contact the Yalannanbaru officers to discuss issues mainly related to daily life and work (Former participants, personal communication, July 21 2009). Srisompob Jitpiromsri (Personal communication, July 23 2009) even argued that some kids have very strong and close relations with some officers. In some of those cases incidental examples can be given of former participants providing intelligence to the Yalannanbaru officers.

With respect to attitudes towards the program, the participants and former participants all argued that it is a good program and that they have benefited greatly from participating (Former participants, personal communication, July 21 2009 & July 25 2009). Several participants mentioned that they enjoyed the camp and said that they had learned a lot about the disadvantages of using drugs and about living a good life and how to interact non-violently with other people. Several mentioned that they had made new friends and one participant actually did not want to go home because he had enjoyed the camp so much. Most importantly, the youth claimed that while they were scared at first, they could now relax and were not afraid anymore (Participants, personal communication, July 26 2009). While not all youth were

displaying trusting behavior to the same extend, overall behavior displayed increased interpersonal trust.

Some caution has to be held towards the replies in some of the interviews. During the camp, interviews could only be held in the presence of trainers; they were not given privacy. Moreover, the use of the Malay language was not allowed. This testifies a distrusting attitude of the trainers towards the participants and interviewers and an aim for supervising or even controlling information that is given regarding the program.

5.2.3 Theoretical explanatory processes

To look into the processes during the actual program and explain for the changes in behavior and attitudes observed during the camp and as explained during interviews, one of the main ideas that can be built on to understand trust building as a result of army-run development projects is the effects on interpersonal trust. Referring back to the framework of chapter III, the aspects of interpersonal trust aspects are relevant (see table 2).

First of all, direct contacts and interaction create space for trust building. Trust and connectedness arise from proximal experiences (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, 2009). The participants and Yalannanbaru officers did not know each other beforehand so the new interaction provides opportunity for initiation of new relationships. Interpersonal contact affects group boundaries in the sense that it diminishes them or even breaks them down, because with interaction people become part of a shared third group in addition to the determined group boundaries and people from a same group are more likely to trust each other (Williams, 2001; Yilmaz, 2006). Yalannanbaru enhances these two aspects by putting the youth and the army people together, working towards drugs prevention. They form a group related to Yalannanbaru and work together intensively for a week. Working and living together results in a sort of interdependence which is necessary to build trust according to Kelman (2005). It is however important to note that interdependence in itself cannot transform a distrustful relationship; based on intergroup relations, the new interpersonal relations started off with a level of distrust (Kelman, 2005).

Table 2: Framework for interpersonal trust restoration activities		
Trust aspects	**Conditions and processes**	**Possible outcomes**
Interpersonal	- Direct interaction and initiation of interpersonal relationships - Individuation/personalization - Reducing the salience of group boundaries - Calibration of (dis)trust: disconfirming negative expectations - Consistency in trustworthy behavior → increasing predictability	- Change in feelings and perceptions related to trust: hope, faith, confidence, assurance, initiative - Change in feelings and perception related to distrust: fear, skepticism, cynicism, wariness, vigilance - Change in expectation/perception of intentions

The program furthermore explicitly pursues the aspect of placing the youth and the army in the same religious in-group. The teachings on religion in which Buddhism and the Islam are conceptualized as both being a religion preparing people for paradise (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 11 2009). In that sense Buddhist and Muslims are thus actually pursuing the same goal which results in a connection across the groups or even the creation of a third group in which the youth can relate better to Buddhists. In combination with the direct interaction, the participants can include the out-group members, namely the trainers, into the self.

A further aspect is that individuation can take place; people are seen as individuals again because of close interaction instead of as purely a member of the out-group (Maiese, 2003). In this sense, people involved in Yalannanbaru are placed in a setting of extensive interaction which subsequently leads to seeing other people as human beings, resulting in appreciating for the individuals they are instead of the out-group they belong to. The establishment of such personalization and personal relationships reverses dehumanization (Maiese, 2003). Such contact thus increases perceptions of out-group variability and as a result changes attitudes (Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns & Voci, 2004).

Adams' (2005) process explaining trust and distrust calibration can describe some processes as well. As explained, when negative expectations and assumption are not confirmed by the outcomes of interaction with the other group but actual positive outcomes arise; first steps of distrust reduction are made. In the case of Yalannanbaru the participants expected an unpleasant treatment by the army of being arrested or other negative actions. However, instead they participated in a program that has been perceived as fun, not harmful, even useful (Participants, personal communication, July 26 2009). Moreover, because the contribution of the trainers is very clear, the participants can attribute the responsibility for the positive violation of their expectations to the trainers; this attribution is a final necessary aspect (Adams, 2005). The initial assumptions of wrong intentions of the army are thus proven to be false during the camp, which makes distrust decrease and possibly even build trust. Throughout the program the participants experienced that the army officers in Yalannanbaru thus actually had positive intentions and their consistently trustworthy behavior confirmed potential for developing trust.

Additionally, as indicated, several participants continued interaction with the army officers after finishing the camp, which indicates more interdependence and less resistance to interact. However, regarding the strong distrust beforehand, complete dissolution is unlikely. So then to be able to deal with such distrust in a personal relation, it is necessary to construct boundaries that limit the degree of interdependence and vulnerability inherent in the relation. (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003c). In the case of Yalannanbaru it was reported by both trainers and youth that after the end of the camp, the youth do call to discuss issues with the trainers. The topics are mainly related to work or drugs issues. With respect to other problems, for example regarding the violence or intelligence, the youth and army mention that information is not shared. There is thus a limit in degree of vulnerability and interdependence (Trainers and former participants, personal communication, July 20 2009 & July 21 2009).

An interesting aspect was the presence of several youth in the camp not participating in the trainings but performed small tasks. It was explained by a trainer that these were youth that participated in earlier camps but came back to stay at the

army base (Trainer 2, personal communication, July 22 2009). Interviews with four of these youth made clear that they had participated several months before but they returned to the camp on own initiative or because of their parents' request. All four confessed that before they were heavy drugs users and two had been in prison. They decided to come back because of threats at their village. Getting back in touch with their friends could have a bad influence on them. They all argued that it is better for them to stay in the Yalannanbaru camp than to go back to their village. Here they earn 500 bath per week and are in a safe environment. During these conversations, the threat was argued to be using drugs again (Former participants, personal communication, July 22 2009). However the former participants made clear that they were willing to explain more about their situation if they could do it in Malay language. The army officers did however not allow talking in Malay. Their situations and motivations for staying and working in the army base might thus be more complicated. Kriya Langputeh and the temporary trainer argued that former participants sometimes encounter suspicion or hostile attitudes of their community when returning home (Kriya Langputeh, personal communication, July 28 2009; Trainer 1, personal communication, August 7 2009). Drawing from insights about the situation in which the population is stuck in the middle between the state and the insurgents, local people take a risk in cooperating with the army. Apart from risking becoming a target for the insurgents, also community members can condemn their actions. From the interviews appears that is also the case for Yalannanbaru. The community members sometimes suspect the participating youth to be working for the army or having been brainwashed. Because this does not fit in with in-group norms, hostility occurs in formerly positive relations among village members. This hostility might have triggered or forced the youth to find a safer place, which for those youth would then be the army base (Kriya Langputeh, personal communication, July 28 2009; Trainer 1, personal communication, August 7 2009). At the same time, other participants might thus logically resist becoming to close to the army officers in order to balance their in-group relations. Such resistance to fully cooperate hinders trust building as it is supposed to be a bilateral process requiring the commitment of both parties (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003c).

After the 7-day re-education camp, on regular basis the participants go back for training and become involved in a Yalannanbaru club which receives funding and visits of Yalannanbaru trainers in relation to the follow-up programming. Because trust building is a process, not a one-time event, trust grows if cooperation is extended and trust declines when cooperation is not reciprocated (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006). The continuing interaction is thus necessary to sustain or further develop trust. At the same time however only one violation of trust can prompt distrust again. Consistent and predictable behavior is thus essential as it demonstrates renewed trustworthiness (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns, 2009). It is therefore important that the army's performance in the follow-up program is also competent and that deception and trust violations do not take place. While one village headman argued that the follow up activities seem to be good and strengthen relations, Colonel Suwan explained that the activities have to be further developed and improved in order to satisfy needs (Village headman, personal communication, July 21 2009; Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25 2009). A crucial condition of the follow-up program is that it responds to needs and disconfirms negative or meets positive expectations of the youth.

The quality of the follow up program is thus important in two ways. First repeated interactions and activities are necessary to continue sending messages of trustworthiness and thereby further the trust restoration process. And second the follow-up program provides further support to the youth in staying away from drugs and improving their lives. It thereby strengthens the success of the program and subsequently the trust coming from that aspect.

A problem with respect to the need for consistent and continuous trustworthy behavior can be that the army personnel involved in Yalannanbaru still have to perform security activities as well. As Srisompob Jitpiromsri (personal communication, July 23 2009) has argued, this sends contradicting messages to the people. One day a soldier can come in the community to talk about Yalannanbaru and support the club, while possibly the next day the same person arrests a villager. In this sense, trust can be negatively influenced by this aspect of inconsistent messages sent by contradicting behavior. Colonel Suwan therefore wants to separate security forces

working on civilian affairs from forces on security positions. The overlap, he argues, can hurt the capacity for trust building and effectiveness in civilian affairs (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 25 2009).

Overall it can thus be said that Yalannanbaru has to some extent reduced distrust and has built interpersonal trust between the participating youth and the army officers involved in the program because of the interaction and cooperation and success of the program. The design of the program, with frequent interaction for a common goal and space to get to know army officers personally results in individuation and the establishment of new personal relationships. The new setting and context for interaction increases complexity of relations that was initially based on intergroup attitudes and perceptions. A new relational history of social interactions can be formed and for Yalannanbaru this has mainly given evidence of trustworthiness.

Furthermore, the perceived success of the program disconfirms the negative expectations held by the participants and in combination with the clear effort and contribution of the army in helping the youth, distrust is reduced. Finally, youth display more trusting behavior during and after the camp so it can be concluded that some interpersonal trust has increased. However because the existing distrust has been very strong and the program is only one week, it is not likely that distrust has been decreased to a minimal level and that a high level of trust has been developed. Trust and distrust thus seem to coexist in the relationship.

Noteworthy is that there are indications that the building of interpersonal trust with army officers causes problems in the community and this hinders the commitment of the youth to the trust building process. With respect to the trust-distrust matrix it can be said that for the specific interpersonal relations of the participants towards the Yalannanbaru officers has shifted towards more trusting and less distrusting but only to a limited extent. The conditions and processes lined out in the framework have not all been recognized in the case study. The follow-up programming ensures continuing interaction that is necessary to further build trust or decrease distrust. Quality of these trainings and consistency is however important to prevent new violations of trust.

5.3 Intergroup trust building

In this paragraph an evaluation is done whether there is potential for Yalannanbaru to develop trust in the wider setting of intergroup rather than interpersonal trust. Several meso- or macrolevels can be identified on which intergroup processes can have an influence:

- trust of the project participant in the army as an institution

- trust of the community regarding the Yalannanbaru army officers

- trust of the community in the army as an institution

- trust of the population in the southern border provinces in the army as an institution

5.3.1 Main findings on intergroup trust

Resulting from the interviews is that apart from the army officers involved in the Yalannanbaru program, most interviewees asked about intergroup changes claim that Yalannanbaru can not build intergroup trust. Srisompob Jitpiromsri (personal communication, July 23 2009) argues that he sees little possibility for the interpersonal trust to extend to influence intergroup trust; neither with respect to the participants influencing the community nor for the trust towards Yalannanbaru officers to be extended to the army in general. Distrust is very strong and has existed for a long time. He argues that making this next step is thus very hard and the capacity of the army is just not sufficient to set and comply with the necessary conditions. Also Duncan McCargo (personal communication, July 27 2009) remarked that fear and suspicion are very deep entrenched in the local population. He thinks that for Yalannanbaru to make an impact on people not directly involved, simultaneous changes in the conflict process have to take place. Finally the local trainer explained that he has not witnessed any impact of Yalannanbaru on the wider community; attitudes towards the army have not changed. He also mentioned that while some personal relations may have been built, the attitude of the participating youth towards the army in general has not changed either (Trainer 2, personal communication, August 7 2009). Nevertheless, other trainers and Colonel Suwan are convinced that

the trust built through the program is extended throughout the community and towards the army as a group.

When former participants were asked about their perception towards the army, one former participant mentioned that Yalannanbaru has helped him to better understand people from the army (Former participant, personal communication, July 25 2009). He extended his learnings thus to the army as a group. From understanding, trust can be built so this understanding might make him more open to interaction with the army in general (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003a). Unfortunately, he perceived that the army does not understand him better after participating in Yalannanbaru. Other former participants argued that they trust the army in general more. These answers are unfortunately little reliable because of the presence of security forces and the suggestive remarks made by them before this question (Former participants, personal communication, July 22 & July 25 2009).

All family members involved in the research are positive about the program. They appreciate the support of the army with this problem and think that the participants learn valuable lessons (Family members, personal communication, July 26 2009). The parents have become friendlier with the particular army officials that have become familiar faces (Srisompob Jitprisomsri, personal communication, July 23 2009). According to one interviewed village headman, families do get a better relation with the security forces because of Yalannanbaru and the follow-up activities (Village headman, personal communication, July 21 2009). One parents and the village headman even argued that they would like to see more youth participating in the camp because they find it a basically good program to educate and prepare youth for daily life (Village headman and family, personal communication, July 21 2009). Overall the perception of the indirectly involved people towards the program is thus evaluated as positive.

Within the communities, attitudes towards the Yalannanbaru program have developed. Information shared by former participants has increased the knowledge about Yalannanbaru in the community and new participants are less reluctant to get involved in Yalannanbaru. Also parents more easily send their parents to the camp (Trainer 1, personal communication, August 7 2009)

5.3.2 Theoretical explanatory processes: direct contact

Again a reference to the framework can be made, which explains that the out-group has to be salient throughout the activity to make references possible. Also the interaction between personal attitudes and group attitudes are important and can influence the final impact (see table 3).

Table 3: Framework for intergroup trust restoration activities

Trust aspects	Conditions and processes	Possible outcomes
Intergroup	- Salience of army responsibility for outcomes to influence perceptions of army - Trust dissemination through extended contact - Influence of in-group attitudes on the individual	- Change in intergroup perceptions and out-group reputation

Referring to the development of trust towards the army as a whole after direct contact with army officers in Yalannanbaru, out-group salience is important. In order to generalize trust towards the out-group through interpersonal contact, the interpersonal contact has to have an intergroup-feel. I.e. the link with the out-group has to be present. So when intergroup contact is supposed to reduce anxiety and increase positive orientations towards an out-group in general out-group membership has to be clear; categories of group membership should thus be salient during interaction. Simultaneously there is however the risk of reinforcing negative out-group perceptions when group membership is (too) salient, especially when status differences are large (Hewstone et al., 2005). For Yalannanbaru this holds that besides the interpersonal trust building aspect discussed in the previous paragraph, the army officials should be identifiable as such, but to an extend that it does not create strong negative associations. During the camp visits, most trainers did not wear military uniforms. Colonel Suwan (personal communication, July 20 2009) explained that this

was done because of the fear it could revoke in the youth. Those trainers are thus not directly identifiable as members of the army. However, regarding the fact that the camp in Pattani is held at an army base with soldiers in uniform and other army-linked aspects present in and around the classes, sufficient clues are present for the youth to stay aware of the army-aspect of the camp. However, it has not become clear whether the level was right for the participants to change their attitudes towards the army as a whole.

With respect to the family members of the participants, even though they are not directly participating, they are quite intensely involved in the program. The close family members directly experience the effect of the program on their children or family member. It is argued that behavior of the participants changed after Yalannanbaru and that they have improved their lives (Srisompob Jitpiromsri, personal communication, July 22 2009; Kriya Langputeh, personal communication, July 28 2009). Some family members also visit the camp on the last day to pick up their children. This is a very intense experience as the children ask for forgiveness to their parents and promise not to use drugs anymore. Emotions are strong and many people, including participants, parents and trainers cry. Family members thus often experience the change and the success of the program, get confidence in the Yalannanbaru project and might therefore change their attitude. These close observations and in some ways direct interaction have resulted in some changes in attitudes towards the army officers involved in Yalannanbaru. It however does not seem that family members have developed a different attitude towards army officers in general.

5.3.3 Theoretical explanatory processes: extended contact

When comparing direct contact with extended contact as a way for out-group trust development, direct contact has a stronger influence than extended contact. Direct contact is therefore of much higher importance in building trust especially in a situation of high segregation (Tam et al., 2009). Furthermore, when it comes to wider intergroup trust an aspect of likely interference is the strength of existing negative perceptions in the local society. In the previous chapters it has become apparent that

the distrust between the local population and the army is very strong and deep because severe trust violations have taken place over several years and past injustice by the state has not been addressed. Also in the present, violations still take place and the insurgents still seem effective in spreading propaganda. These aspects go against developing out-group trust. And this is problematic as negative information generally weighs more heavily in human judgment than positive information (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). Behavior displaying untrustworthiness, or indirect information about it, is thus more powerful than positive trustworthy behavior and this forms a complexity in making a real change. There are possibilities but only when distrust disconfirming evidence is compelling and significant and when such trustworthy behavior becomes the standard and occurs frequently. In that case, perceptions of other in-group members may result in lower distrust and possibly higher trust (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). However distrust forms powerful frames on subsequent events in a way that the existing distrust creates suspicion regarding the army such that every military action is viewed with doubt. Even good intentions and good-faith efforts to restore trust are likely to be interpreted as negative which makes it difficult to actually display trustworthiness convincingly (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns, 2009). One trainer of Yalannanbaru acknowledges the difficulty of really making a change in the people's perceptions (Trainer 2, personnel communication, July 20 2009). So now that strong distrust has been aroused regarding the army, it is resistant to restoration and indirect efforts are not likely to be strong enough to make a real change.

So with the existing distrust and the difficulty to overcome suspicion without direct positive experiences, intergroup trust building seems unlikely. On the other hand, information sharing by former participants to non-participants has increased the knowledge about Yalannanbaru in the community. Turner, Voci, Hewstone & Vonofakou (2008) argued that out-group anxiety should be reduced by information about positive intergroup encounters from in-group members. Extended contact can be an intervening process, in which out-group attitudes are improved and thereby prepare people for future intergroup contact. So being exposed to extended contact prior to direct contact can be helpful in challenging destructive prejudices (Turner,

Voci, Hewstone & Vonofakou, 2008). Former participants claim that they talk positively about Yalannanbaru with friends. The increased knowledge about Yalannanbaru indeed seems to have reduced out-group anxiety to a certain extend. In the first months of Yalannanbaru it was very difficult for the army and the village headmen to have youth participate voluntarily. Now that the program has become better known and information and experiences are spread throughout the community, there is less resistance according for cooperation (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, July 20 2009; Srisompob Jitpiromsri, personnel communication, July 22). Intergroup anxiety has thus been reduced.

Another limiting factor for extended contact processes and information sharing is that people are cautious about talking too much or too positively about the Yalannanbaru because it can create suspicion with community members; too much support makes people question whether the participants have been indoctrinated by the army. So people can not openly talk about positive experiences and this limits impact of extended contact (Kriya Langputeh, personal communication, July 28 2009; Trainer 1, personal communication, August 7 2009). However, despite increased familiarity with the program and reduced anxiety, youth are still fearful in the beginning (Participants, personnel communication, July 22 2009). Moreover, the reduced anxiety only seems to relate to Yalannanbaru as a program and not as an army-initiative so anxiety towards the army in general is not affected (Trainer 1, personnel communication, August 7 2009).

Overall it can thus be said that the impact of Yalannanbaru on building intergroup trust is very limited. Family members of participants have changed their attitude towards the army officers involved in Yalannanbaru. However, when trust is related to officers outside Yalannanbaru, no signs of change have been found. It seems that the out-group can only be extended to Yalannanbaru, regarding the more trusting perceptions towards the program after distribution of information through extended contact. The intention was however to influence the perceptions regarding the army as a whole and neither for the people directly involved nor for the community in general, this seems to have been the case. In that sense, the potential of Yalannanbaru to represent the army seems limited. Most importantly, the strength of

distrust hinders trust building. Because of the severe negativity of the current trust relation, extended contact might not be strong enough to bring change throughout the community. In order to make some difference, direct contact is necessary; people have to experience themselves that the army can deliver on commitments which is only valid to the specific people directly involved. Extended contact might leave a trace of changing attitudes but does not seem strong enough to make a difference.

5.4 Implications for the overall trust relation

The final aspect of trust building is the extent to which the trust can evolve in the long run. In order to make a change, developed trust should be lasting over time. Here is discussed how and whether Yalannanbaru's trust building relates to long term developments. With respect to the framework, consistency and predictability of the trustworthiness are important as well as nurture for trust in order to change overall perception regarding army intentions (see table 4).

Table 4: Framework for long term trust restoration activities		
Trust aspects	**Conditions and processes**	**Possible outcomes**
Long term	- Extent of nurture for trust (success of activity) - Consistency with other actions outside particular activity - Persistence of predictability of trustworthy behavior	- Change in overall perception of (army) intentions - Improving cooperation → openness to other programs - Change in counterinsurgency → Improved intelligence

5.4.1 Impact of Yalannanbaru on army-community relation

Restoring trust is obviously a complicated process. Schweitzer, Hershey and Bradlow (2004) explained that trust violations in which deception occurs are even harder to be countered. The army officers involved in Yalannanbaru evaluate their program as being able to achieving that intergroup trust between the army and the

local population. However, the results from this research do not confirm these expectations. Overall it can be said that Yalannanbaru has had potential to build trust, however this is so far limited to interpersonal trust. The participants of Yalannanbaru trust the army officers after the re-education camp, but only to a certain extent. When considering the development of intergroup trust it appears that for Yalannanbaru creating intergroup trust is a too ambitious goal for this project. Furthermore, while the main focus has been on trust from the population in the army, trust has to be mutual to be really effective. While not really addressed in this thesis, the fact that (former) participants are not allowed to talk freely about Yalannanbaru already demonstrates that trust of the army officers in the participants is lacking.

In relation to a higher level evaluation of the program, the nurture aspect of Goswami's trust and nurture theory is applicable. As explained by Goswami (2009) in the India-context, for building trust in a counterinsurgency approach it is crucial to deliver results in order to create the right circumstances to build trust. More specifically, nurture in this context entails providing the necessary conditions for building trust and the most important thing to achieve for the army and the state to demonstrate the ability to deliver on commitments (Goswami, 2009). Because of the relative success of the program, it can be said that the army here does deliver on commitments, which is important for the people directly involved and has facilitated trust building between the participants and family with the Yalannanbaru officers. However for the people not directly involved, the nurture aspect is not clear and thus does not impact their perceptions.

It is furthermore important to not see the project in isolation. As it is embedded in a wider context other forces further influence the process of trust building. For the army to really build trust through development initiatives not only Yalannanbaru has to send the right message and be effective, also other development projects have to display the army's ability to commit. Contradicting messages from army forces can even be a threat to interpersonal trust. Overall performance of the army is thus important in building trust.

When referring back to the note that Srisompob Jitpiromsri made about Yalannanbaru being one of the few effective development initiatives, some aspects

stand out. An important aspect in which Yalannanbaru differs from many other development initiatives is that it responds to a real and serious problem in the society in the southern border provinces and has potential to make a change and deliver results to the people involved. The fact that Yalannanbaru has been developed from a real need in the society thus contributes to the message it sends to the public. However where YB addresses a real need, many initiatives do not (Duncan McCargo, personal communication, July 27 2009). For those the need for the projects and the benefits for the population are not clear. However especially that is important to show the ability to deliver, i.e. the nurture aspect, which is crucial to build trust and that realization has to be developed in the army. On the other hand, in the case that other army development initiatives become more responsive to local needs and become effective, they might start to reinforce each other in sending messages of trustworthiness and nurture. This is however easier said than done.

So far it has become clear that the self-fulfilling prophecy that distrust is and has become in the southern border provinces, which makes that people interpret even well-intentioned moves as additional evidence of the need to distrust, highly limits the potential to restore trust (Lewicki & Tomlinson, 2003b). But to change a hostile system of relations, groups must begin a process of positive reciprocity. Something has to initiate this process and contact might be the means to this end. Explaining the improvement of the relation can be done by going back to the matrix combining trust and distrust (Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998) in which the current relationship was described as one of high distrust and low trust, resulting in paranoia, defensive attitude and negative expectations. Only lowering distrust would already be advancement compared to the current situation of high distrust and low trust. While faith and confidence would still hardly exist, at least fear and skepticism would decrease when distrust is lowered and this would provide further opportunities for building trust. Only small steps at a time can diminish motivations that support conflict and the desire for cooperation and peace could then slowly increase (Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns, 2009). Through the initiation of new relationships that start from a history of positive social interaction, Yalannanbaru might be one such small step or as argued by Srisompob Jitpiromsri (personal communication, July

23 2009) "*a first stone to build a bridge that can connect the local population and the army in the future*". Yalannanbaru might in that sense thus have potential to make a small crack in the existing frame of distrust.

5.4.2 Yalannanbaru in the wider conflict and resolution

In the previous chapters, it has been discussed that lack of trust and strong distrust have a significant role in sustaining conflict in general as well as in South Thailand in particular. The lack of trust hinders cooperation, complicates counter-insurgency by intelligence gathering or taking away support from the insurgency, eases insurgency recruitment and furthers hostile attitudes towards the army and the state. Working on trust thus is a necessary condition to work towards resolution. The aim of Yalannanbaru to initiate this and try to restore trust in the southern border provinces is thus related to the conflict situation and resolution.

First of all, another aim of Yalannanbaru related to the conflict is preventing youth from getting involved in the violence. A Yalannanbaru representative in the community argued that 80% of the insurgents use drugs (Khun Somchai, personal communication, July 21 2009). Further philosophy of Colonel Suwan is that the insurgents recruit easy targets and unemployed, uneducated, poor youth which use drugs are thought of to be such easy targets (Colonel Suwan, personal communication, June 12 2009). So by stopping youth from using drugs, Yalannanbaru can prevent youth from joining the insurgents and thus counter the insurgency. This is however in contrast to what has been reported about insurgent recruitment by research. Several sources report that insurgents do not like to get involved with drug users as they are unpredictable and unreliable. Instead they mainly recruit stable, religious, educated people. It is often said that insurgents are usually the nice, friendly people of which no-one would expect them to do something like that (Srisompob & Panyasak, 2007; McCargo, 2008: 147-149; ICG, 2009). In this sense, the philosophy of Yalannanbaru regarding the relation between drugs re-education and insurgency recruitment does not seem to hold in reality and therefore drug prevention is not really related to weakening the insurgents' base for recruitment. However, the restored trust

between the youth and the army officers could possibly prevent those particular persons in other ways from becoming involved in the violence.

With respect to intelligence that is supposed to improve according to trust building, Yalannanbaru demonstrates that it is still difficult to achieve this level of trust. Yalannanbaru has not been able to contribute to this aspect of the counterinsurgency strategy. As reported, the youth do trust the army officers to such an extent that they communicate and inform them, but this is mainly related to daily issues. Hardly any information related to the violence or insurgency is provided, so intelligence gathering does not improve because of the project. An important influence is likely to be the threat from the side of the insurgents; providing information to the army can result in reprisals.

Despite its high expectations and aims, Yalannanbaru is only one small variable in the overall set of development initiatives. Moreover, trust building in itself is only one variable in the entire conflict situation. It is not a single solution to resolve the conflict in the southern border provinces. In order to really make a change and reach into the hearts and minds of the people, root causes have to be addressed (Chalathip, 2009). Therefore effectiveness of the state in improving the situation in the southern border provinces is necessary. When the state's overall behavior in and responsiveness to the South improve in the long run, and distrust thus might decrease because of changing circumstances or changes, the impact of Yalannanbaru is likely to increase. Potentially the extended contact becomes more effective in impacting the wider population's attitudes because of the weakening forces working against the trust building processes. Until that time however, little can be expected.

Though in order to work together to resolve the conflict, both parties have to alleviate their defensiveness and trust restoration can be a process to replace distrust and suspicion. Increased out-group trust should result in positive behavioral tendencies. Benevolence and cooperation can be the result (Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns, 2009). So even though big impacts are not likely, the potential trust following from the program could improve the cooperation in addressing the conflict. A first step towards a better relation can be made in Yalannanbaru. To conclude with a positive perspective on that, one teacher of Yalannanbaru explained that even though

programs like Yalannanbaru are not a direct cure for resolving the conflict, it can provide '*cleaning around the wound in order to facilitate healing* (Trainer 2, personal communication, July 20 2009).

5.5 Conclusion

Apart from addressing the drugs problem among youth in the southern border provinces, Yalannanbaru has the aim to rebuild trust between the army and the southern population. Direct interaction, the disconfirmation of negative expectations and reducing group salience have resulted in an initial increase in trust and decrease in distrust on an interpersonal level between the participating youth and the involved army officers. Extension of the trust to the army in general or throughout the communities has been hindered by the strength of the existing trust. In the long run, Yalannanbaru is largely dependent on other dynamics in the region, despite its commitment to address a real local need. The need for an overall trustworthy performance of the army complicates the contribution of Yalannanbaru in improving trust relations. However, Yalannanbaru can potentially function as an initial small step towards addressing the trust issue.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter refers back to the initial problem statement of this research and provides answers to the research questions posed in chapter I. The research has involved a trial to introduce trust elements to capture resolution through development initiatives in the southern border provinces of Thailand. In order to come to an examination of trust building through army development initiatives, the Yalannanbaru program in particular has been studied. It has been tried to see whether Yalannanbaru has been or can be a factor that influences the level of trust or distrust and thus has potential to move the relationship along the trust and distrust dimensions and create a different category of trust relationship between the local population and the army. The research has been based on a literature and secondary data study and a qualitative part involving a single-case study based on observation, interviews with key informants and theoretical explanations. Each of the research questions is addressed below.

6.1 Background of distrust

The first question of the research questions has been formulated as: *What is the background of the distrust in the relationship between the army and the local population in relation to the conflict?*

Ever since the Thai state assumed power over Patani, this region of Thailand has been subject to insurgency and violence. After periods of relative peaceful coexistence, violence has strongly increased since the beginning of the 21st century. Security forces and insurgency movements have been trying to fight over legitimacy over the provinces. With respect to the local population, it has resulted in a further deteriorating relationship with the state. The army played a significant role in the conflict because it has been given the responsibility over the situation in the South. Subsequently, trust violations have accumulated over a long period of time. The main aspects to which the violations relate are arbitrary use of violence, human rights violations and the lack of justice and cultural insensitivity. While these in themselves

diminish trust and create distrust, other processes have intensified the impact. The negative perceptions have been diffused throughout the society through indirect contact and the violations have been taken up in the collective memory. The situation has led to a negative trust spiral in which even trustworthy behavior by the army can be interpreted as violating because of the existing suspicion. Moreover, the insurgency movements have made use of incidents for propaganda against the state and the army which has further strengthened the suspicion and distrust among the local population. Finally it has to be said that the local population has become stuck in between the insurgency and the state. Apart from the violations from the army, reality has learned them not to trust either of the sides too strongly because of the consequences that might arise from it from the other side. Unfortunately, little change has occurred nowadays with respect to the violations or the trust in the relationship between the army and the local population. Neither the future gives the people indications to change their attitudes or perceptions, which makes it more likely for the people to hold on to their distrust regarding the army.

The current hostile relation between the southern population and the state prolongs the conflict. The state has acknowledged that the distrust hinders resolution and limits the army's capacity to address the insurgency. Therefore, the state aims to win back the hearts and minds of the people and thus restore the trust in the state and the army. One of the strategies to win hearts and minds is through development initiatives along the philosophy of 'Understand, reach out and develop' run by the army. Despite the trust violations and the severely damaged relations, the situation is not hopeless. Examples from India have shown that even after times of disproportionate use of violence, human rights violations and a strongly alienated population, the Indian army has been able to change attitudes, create a positive shift and rebuilt relations based on trust (Goswami, 2009). There might thus be opportunities for the Thai army to do the same by trust restoring activities like the development initiatives.

6.2 Trust building process and conditions

The second question of the research is: *What are processes and necessary conditions to build trust between parties in a conflict situation through development initiatives?*

From the analyses of trust building in general and through Yalannanbaru, several processes and conditions have been identified that stimulate trust building through development initiatives. First of all development initiatives are often subject to close interaction between the army and the local population and this direct contact under the right circumstances can lead to trust building. Direct interaction is also related to individuation in which the members of a hostile out-group are seen as individuals again and to reduction of the salience of group boundaries which provides opportunities to find common goals. An important process is that of the calibration of trust and distrust. Based on previous experiences in a relationship, actors have certain expectations towards outcomes of interaction with another actor. In the situation of distrust, these are generally negative. However, when the outcomes of development initiatives or cooperation related to initiatives do not confirm these negative expectations but are actually evaluated as positive, distrust can reduce. Similarly, when positive expectations are confirmed, trust can grow. Consistency in trustworthy behaviour is furthermore necessary to create predictability of the out-group which is required for trust building.

On a more intergroup level, extended contact can influence trust perceptions of people not directly involved in the development initiatives. Also, both the direct and extended contact can affect attitudes towards an out-group, the army, in general if the salience of the out-group is clear enough. In any case, direct interaction is stronger in influencing perceptions than extended contact, because existing in-group attitudes are likely to influence individuals' attitudes despite information from other group members.

For these processes of trust building to take place, several conditions have to be present. First of all, the specific project has to be able to deliver on commitments and thus has to be successful in the eyes of the participating population. If expectations are not met, distrust might grow. A problem with many development

projects is that the commitments are often not in response to local needs or turn out to be unsuccessful which brings the danger of further strengthening distrust. Bottom-up development and good understanding of local needs are necessary to effectively deliver on real needs and thereby create potential for trust building.

For trust restoring development initiatives to change perceptions of the community towards the army in general, existing distrust is a strong limiting factor. Negative information is more influential than positive information. Negative reports on the army from the wider community, news or insurgency propaganda can thus offset positive accounts from people involved in successful development projects. Furthermore, the negative trust spiral creates suspicion towards any interaction with the army and therefore makes it likely for people to misinterpret trustworthy interaction as untrustworthy. Strong distrust makes it thus harder for trust building processes to affect the relationship. Finally, consistency in and continuation of interactions is an important condition for trust processes to develop and to become effective.

6.3 Trust building aspects in Yalannanbaru

The third question posed is: *What positive or negative trust building aspects can be identified in the Yalannanbaru project?*

From this study can be concluded that in the case of Yalannanbaru some potential to change attitudes related to trust and distrust is present. Yalannanbaru has built trust between the army and the local population on certain aspects. Most importantly, Yalannanbaru has demonstrated that it is possible to start building interpersonal relationships between army officers and youth involved in the program through interaction and support for the drugs problems and these new relational contexts give way to trust building. Not only do the youth and experts evaluate the program positively, also direct results are positive with most youth staying away from drugs. Initial negative expectations like fearing for the intentions of the army with the program are being disconfirmed, which thereby decreases distrust. As a result, feelings related distrust like fear, suspicion and vigilance have become less strong in the direct relationship between the youth and the Yalannanbaru officers. Simultaneously, trusting behavior showing confidence in interaction has increased.

However, the trust has not been extended throughout the entire relationship; limits are held with respect to the kind of interaction and information sharing. Trust and distrust coexist. The processes and conditions that have caused the relative success in interpersonal trust building are:

- The direct interaction and relationship building with the related potential for individuation and reduction of group boundaries
- The success of the program regarding the direct aims and the benefits resulting from it for the community which disconfirms negative expectations
- Consistency in follow-up activities which confirms trustworthiness
- The response of the program towards a real problem among the youth

The trust building does however not meet up with the aims of the army to built trust between the army and the population on a higher level. Apart from trust from the direct family of participants, the development of trust stays largely limited to interpersonal trust and does not extend to intergroup trust, neither towards the army in general, nor within the wider community. The problems with extending it towards intergroup trust are:

- The strength of the distrust and the difficulty of restoring trust: the reinforcing negative spiral of distrust has appeared to be very hard to break.
- The risk of reprisals from community members of insurgents when trusting behavior towards the army becomes too strong or too obvious.
- The difficulty of creating consistency among actions and activities outside Yalannanbaru thus of the army and the state in general. Threats or risks to the successes are that the involved soldiers also perform other activities at the village level, which might be regarded contradictory behavior. The combination of security activities and civilian affairs seem to clash and therefore might negatively affect the build trust.

6.4 Short and long term impact of Yalannanbaru

The final research question was: *What are the likely short and long term impacts of Yalannanbaru on the relation between the army and the population?*

Overall, the impact of Yalannanbaru on the relationship between the army and the local population thus seems limited in the short run. Apart from some developed interpersonal trust, the wider community is not likely to be impacted by the program, despite its success in addressing a real issue in the southern society. On the other hand, as far as the participants are able to manage their community level relations effectively, the program does not seem to hurt or further aggravate the relations or the conflict situation either.

Long term implications are largely dependent on the evolution of the conflict itself. Because the impact of Yalannanbaru depends on the strength of the distrust and the consistency among army activities and consistency in trustworthy behaviour, circumstances have to change. If the army and the state are able to decrease the trust violations against the population, become more responsive to the local population and better deliver on commitments in general, distrust will decrease. In that case, the potential for Yalannanbaru to further impact trust building increases. Projects like Yalannanbaru can mainly help curing the situation when the real causes are addressed in other ways.

Thus, as long as the present does not change and the behavior of state forces continues to confirm the need for distrust, development initiatives by the army can not significantly contribute to improving the trust relations with the local population. A necessary condition for development initiatives as trust restoration activity is thus an overall sufficient functioning of the state in the southern border provinces. Currently, outlooks for such a situation are limited. Even though resolving the southern conflict has returned on the agenda for the current government, little change has taken place. And if the future can not be expected to be more positive, the local population will have little incentive to put trust into the state or Thai security forces. This implies that as long as the overall conflict situation does not improve, spending more national budget on development initiatives will not easily result in winning over more hearts and minds.

So until root causes of the conflict are addressed and the current situation gets better, Yalannanbaru can most positively be seen as a potential small initial step in improvement of the trust relationship.

6.5 Final remarks

This study has taken the existence of army run development initiatives as a given and aimed to find the impacts of their existence on trust and the conflict. However, development initiatives of the army are in itself a disputable given.

From certain observations during the research it seemed that the army officers involved in the programs distrust the participants as well as other local people involved in Yalannanbaru. The fact that interviews were mostly held on supervision of army officers and the prohibition to interview the participants in the local Malay dialect, demonstrates that there is an intention to control information and to restrict the freedom to talk. Each is a display of a lack of trust. So while one of the aims of the program is to develop trust of the participants in the army, the army officers' trust in the participants seems to lack and does not seem to be addressed. However, functional and healthy relations require trust from both parties involved. This paradox raises questions about the underlying intentions and the real dedication to improve relations with the local population.

The concern over the perception of changing local mindsets by the army's project is considered another signal of a high degree of distrust. Since the context of southern border provinces is under the atmosphere of ethno-political conflict, questions concerning the nationalist sensitivity are valid. While it has not been studied in-depth and has not been a topic during the interviews, it seemed that there has been an aim to change the mindset of the participants. The national anthem is part of the daily program and all participants are supposed to participate in singing. The central language in the camp is Thai; the local Malay language is not acknowledged. Also the teaching on the similarities between Buddhism and the Islam try to converge the thinking. Furthermore, the first day at the camp involves providing personal information and taking photos for ID. Observations during the field research have also given the impression that continued interaction related to Yalannanbaru has additional intentions besides drugs prevention and trust building. It was informally mentioned by

one of the local army officers that the Yalannanbaru club gives army officers the opportunity to monitor the whereabouts of former participants. All together the program thus also seems to provide a way to track behavior and occupations of the (former) participants and for general gathering of intelligence.

Finally, because of these observations, but also because of the direct involvement of the army in the conflict, it should be questioned whether the army should carry out development in the first place. One might argue that the aim of Yalannanbaru in helping youth to understand the effects of drugs and to learn about ways to live a meaningful life describes a helpful and right thing to do. Reality is however that an important aim behind the program is winning over hearts and minds. During the research it has been heard repeatedly that the local people want other things to be solved first and that the army cannot be effective in development because of the circumstances and its involvement in the conflict. From this study it can be said that the trust building potential of a program like Yalannanbaru is limited at the moment. At the same time, the existing vicious circle of distrust might be a more compelling reason to not have development done by the army. Cooperation is difficult because of the distrust which limits the potential of success of the development work. Also the contradicting role of the army in both security and civilian affairs hinders trust building but also development cooperation. Above all, the findings of this study, despite confirming some elements of interpersonal trust building in the project, do not support the promising prospect of the overall trust building endeavor, and there is a high risk of inconsistency in the role of the army in conflict resolutions. These arguments thus seem to point in the direction that the army is not the best institution for initiating development in the southern border provinces. It has been argued that civilian organizations should take care of social issues and development instead. As a (more) neutral institution such organizations can initiate development more successfully because they are not as much hindered by the existing distrust as the army. Resources for development would therefore be spent more efficiently and socio-economic conditions could be more effectively addressed.

6.6 Suggestions for future research

This research has been a trial, an experimental research to introduce trust building elements in conflict resolution and development initiatives in relation to the conflict in southern Thailand. Some initial conclusions in relation to Yalannanbaru's impact on trust in the conflict have been made, however in the future more research should be directed on this topic to address the lack of knowledge and to increasingly understand the impact of army development initiatives in general on the army-population relationship.

A first strand of research should expand the range and type of studied development initiatives. This study had to deal with the limitation of studying one case example, while the variety of initiatives asks for a more comprehensive range of cases. Varying settings and target groups might result in different trust building outcomes which are relevant for the conflict dynamics and resolution. Different intraregional settings might give further clues about situational influences. The conflict intensity varies within the provinces and thus provides opportunities to look into various conflict settings. Because it has been argued that the effectiveness of programs depends on the conflict environment, studying diverse intraregional settings can provide further proof for this claim.

Future research should also direct attention to trust dynamics at the intergroup level. The effects of intergroup contact and extended contact have not become completely clear yet. More understanding should be generated on how trust attitudes are extended throughout communities, what interfering and limiting factors are and which conditions are required. As argued, trust is not a one-time event but a process so for these studies it is important to allow for wider time intervals. Not only can the trust development then be monitored over time, also forces countering trust development can be identified.

Another important knowledge gap is related to the reverse aspect of the relationship that is of trust or distrust of the army in the local population and participants in development initiatives. Initial observations have demonstrated that even though the army aims for building trust, attitudes towards locals largely display

distrust. Mutual trust is however necessary to effectively address the damaged relations so developing knowledge regarding this issue is necessary.

Finally there should be more focus on the effectiveness and success of army run development work. It appears from the study that success is a crucial aspect for development initiatives to disconfirm negative expectations and contribute to the reduction of distrust. At the same time, the existing distrust turns out to be a problematic aspect for development cooperation. This paradox requires a better understanding of the effect on the conflict dynamics.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviewees	Function/role	Place	Date
Srisompob Jitpiromsri	Professor Prince of Songkhla University Pattani	PSU-campus CS Pattani Hotel	June 10 2009 July 22 2009
Kriya Langputeh	Professor Yala Islamic University	Pattani-town	July 28 2009
Duncan McCargo	Professor University of Leeds	Betong	July 27 2009
Colonel Suwan	Officer in charge of Yalannanbary	YB camp, Yala YB camp, Pattani	June 12 2009 July 25 2009 July 20 2009
Lieutenant Suntorn	Chief of trainers Yalannanbaru camp Pattani	YB camp, Pattani	July 20 2009 July 22 2009
Trainer 1	Local, temporarily employed with YB	Email (Narathiwat)	August 7 2009
Trainer 2	Trainer from Isarn at Yalannanbaru Pattani	YB camp, Pattani	July 20 2009
Khun Somchai	Local Security force involved in Yalannanbaru	Moo-Sang 2 Luanlan village, Songkhla	July 21 2009
Village headmen	Village headman of Luanlan village	Luanlan village, Songkhla	July 21 2009
Youth: group of 5	Participants	YB camp, Pattani	July 22 2009
Youth: group of 3	Participants	YB camp, Pattani	July 26 2009
Youth: group of 4	Former participants	YB camp, Pattani	July 22 2009
Anonymous	Former participant	YB camp, Yala	July 25 2009
Anonymous	Former participant	Waan Gra-Aan in Thepa	July 21 2009
Anonymous	Former participant	Baan Kra-aan, Songkhla	July 21 2009
Khun Saima	Parent of participant	YB camp, Pattani	July 26 2009
Khun Suwammi	Parent of participant	YB camp, Pattani	July 26 2009
Khun Jeksoh	Wife of participant	YB camp, Pattani	July 26 2009
Anonymous	Mother of former participant	Waan Gra-Aan, Thepa, Songkhla	July 21 2009

BIOGRAPHY

Martine van Es graduated from Tilburg University in Business Studies in 2005 and continued her studies by pursuing a Master degree in Strategic Management from RSM Erasmus University. With this background Martine gained some professional experience in strategic consulting and business research in a variety of settings. Even though the international aspect of the studies and professional experiences she pursued fitted in with her interest, the social aspect was missing. In order to reorient, she decided to enroll in the Master of Arts in International Development Studies program at Chulalongkorn University. A scholarship was provided to her by the Dutch VSB-fund to support her studies. During her studies Martine has had the chance to enrich her knowledge about the southern conflict and learn about the issues the local population has to encounter on a daily basis by working together with Pornpen Khongkachonkiet of Cross Cultural Foundation. After graduation she hopes to further widen her experience in the field of conflict and peace building.