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


ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



ภาคผนวก

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



ภาคผนวก ก. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective governments:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; and

Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

Declare:

That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatories and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic.

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear to-day's date.

The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding Powers.

The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic.

The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Done at Geneva in a single copy, the seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five.

States Parties to Geneva Protocol 1925

State	Signature	Ratif./Acc.	Reserve
Afghanistan		09.12.1986.	
Albania		20.12.1989.	
Algeria		27.01.1992.	27.01.1992.
Angola		08.11.1990.	08.11.1990.
Antigua and Barbuda		27.04.1989.	
Argentina		12.05.1969.	
Australia		24.05.1930	
Austria	17.06.1925	09.05.1928	
Bahrain		09.12.1988.	09.12.1988.
Bangladesh		20.05.1989.	20.05.1989.
Barbados		16.07.1976.	
Belgium	17.06.1925	04.12.1928	
Benin		09.12.1986.	

Bhutan		19.02.1979.	
Bolivia		13.08.1985.	
Brazil	17.06.1925	28.08.1970.	
Bulgaria	17.06.1925	07.03.1934	
Burkina Faso		03.03.1971.	
Cambodia		15.03.1983.	15.03.1983.
Cameroon		20.07.1989.	
Canada	17.06.1925	06.05.1930	
Cape Verde		15.10.1991.	
Central African Republic		31.07.1970.	
Chile	17.06.1925	02.07.1935	
China		13.07.1952.	13.07.1952.
Côte d'Ivoire		27.07.1970.	
Cuba		24.06.1966.	
Cyprus		12.12.1966.	
Czech Republic	17.06.1925	16.08.1938	
Denmark	17.06.1925	05.05.1930	

Dominican Republic		08.12.1970.	
Ecuador		16.09.1970.	
Egypt	17.06.1925	06.12.1928	
Equatorial Guinea		20.05.1989.	
Estonia	17.06.1925	28.08.1931	28.08.1931
Ethiopia	17.06.1925	07.10.1935	
Fiji		21.03.1973.	21.03.1973.
Finland	17.06.1925	26.06.1929	
France	17.06.1925	10.05.1926	
Gambia		05.11.1966.	
Germany	17.06.1925	25.04.1929	
Ghana		03.05.1967.	
Greece	17.06.1925	30.05.1931	
Grenada		03.01.1989.	
Guatemala		03.05.1983.	
Guinea-Bissau		20.05.1989.	
Holy See		18.10.1966.	

Hungary		11.10.1952.	
Iceland		02.11.1967.	
India		09.04.1930	09.04.1930
Indonesia		21.01.1971.	
Iran (Islamic Rep.of)		05.11.1929	
Iraq		08.09.1931	08.09.1931
Ireland		29.08.1930	
Israel		20.02.1969.	20.02.1969.
Italy	17.06.1925	03.04.1928	
Jamaica		28.07.1970.	
Japan	17.06.1925	21.05.1970.	
Jordan		20.01.1977.	20.01.1977.
Kenya		06.07.1970.	
Korea (Dem.People's Rep.)		04.01.1989.	04.01.1989.
Korea (Republic of)		04.01.1989.	04.01.1989.
Kuwait		15.12.1971.	15.12.1971.
Lao People's Dem.Rep.		20.05.1989.	

Latvia	17.06.1925	03.06.1931	
Lebanon		17.04.1969.	
Lesotho		10.03.1972.	
Liberia		17.06.1927	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		29.12.1971.	29.12.1971.
Liechtenstein		06.09.1991.	
Lithuania	17.06.1925	15.06.1933	
Luxembourg	17.06.1925	01.09.1936	
Madagascar		02.08.1967.	
Malawi		14.09.1970.	
Malaysia		10.12.1970.	
Maldives		27.12.1966.	
Malta		21.09.1964.	
Mauritius		12.03.1968.	
Mexico		28.05.1932	
Monaco		06.01.1967.	
Mongolia		06.12.1968.	

Morocco		13.10.1970.	
Nepal		09.05.1969.	
Netherlands	17.06.1925	31.10.1930	
New Zealand		24.05.1930	
Nicaragua	17.06.1925	05.10.1990.	
Niger		05.04.1967.	
Nigeria		15.10.1968.	15.10.1968.
Norway	17.06.1925	27.07.1932	
Pakistan		15.04.1960.	15.04.1960.
Panama		04.12.1970.	
Papua New Guinea		02.09.1980.	02.09.1980.
Paraguay		22.10.1933	
Peru		13.08.1985.	
Philippines		08.06.1973.	
Poland	17.06.1925	04.02.1929	
Portugal	17.06.1925	01.07.1930	01.07.1930
Qatar		18.10.1976.	

Romania	17.06.1925	23.08.1929	
Russian Federation		05.04.1928	05.04.1928
Rwanda		11.05.1964.	
Saint Kitts and Nevis		27.04.1989.	
Saint Lucia		21.12.1988.	
Saint Vincent Grenadines		24.03.1999	
Saudi Arabia		27.01.1971.	
Senegal		15.06.1977.	
Serbia and Montenegro	17.06.1925	12.04.1929	12.04.1929
Sierra Leone		20.03.1967.	
Slovakia	17.06.1925	16.08.1938	
Solomon Islands		01.06.1981.	01.06.1981.
South Africa		24.05.1930	24.05.1930
Spain	17.06.1925	22.08.1929	
Sri Lanka		20.01.1954.	
Sudan		17.12.1980.	
Swaziland		23.07.1991.	

Sweden	17.06.1925	25.04.1930	
Switzerland	17.06.1925	12.07.1932	
Syrian Arab Republic		17.12.1968.	17.12.1968.
Tanzania (United Rep.of)		22.04.1963.	
Thailand	17.06.1925	06.06.1931	
Togo		05.04.1971.	
Tonga		19.07.1971.	
Trinidad and Tobago		31.08.1962.	
Tunisia		12.07.1967.	
Turkey	17.06.1925	05.10.1929	
Uganda		24.05.1965.	
Ukraine		07.08.2003	
United Kingdom	17.06.1925	09.04.1930	09.04.1930
United States of America	17.06.1925	10.04.1975.	10.04.1975.
Uruguay	17.06.1925	12.04.1977.	
Venezuela	17.06.1925	08.02.1928	
Viet Nam		15.12.1980.	15.12.1980.

Yemen		17.03.1971.	17.03.1971
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List of notes and reservations submitted by States Parties to the Geneva Protocol.

Algeria

The Algerian Government will be bound by the Protocol only with regard to States which have ratified or have adhered to it and will cease to be bound by the said Protocol with regard to any State whose armed forces or whose allies' armed forces do not respect the provisions of the Protocol.

Angola

In acceding to the Protocol of 17 June 1925, the People's Republic of Angola declares that the latter is binding only on those States which have signed and ratified or which have definitively acceded to the Protocol. In acceding to the Protocol of 17 June 1925, the People's Republic of Angola declares that the latter would cease to be binding on all enemy States whose armed forces or whose allies, *de jure* or *de facto* do not respect the prohibitions which are the object of the said Protocol.

Australia

Subject to the reservations that His Majesty is bound by the said Protocol only towards those Powers and States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto, and that His Majesty shall cease to be bound by the Protocol towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, do not respect the Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary Government dated 27 October 1986, the Government of Australia stated the following:

"Whereas on the twenty-second day of January One thousand nine hundred and thirty, the Government of Australia acceded, for and on behalf of Australia and subject to a reservation, to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on the seventeenth day of June One thousand nine hundred and twenty-five;

The Government of Australia having reconsidered its reservation now hereby *withdraws* the same for and on behalf of Australia."

Bahrain

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the State of Bahrain as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto;

The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the State of Bahrain in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol;

The accession of the State of Bahrain to the said Protocol, signed on June 17, 1925, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.

Bangladesh

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of Bangladesh as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto;

The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of Bangladesh in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Belarus

On 2 March 1970 the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic stated that "it recognizes itself to be a Party" to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (United Nations document A/8052, Annex,III).

Belgium

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the Belgian government as regards States which have signed or ratified it or which may accede to it. (2) The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the Belgian government in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note: In a communication to the depositary Government dated 14 February 1997, Belgium declared that it had decided to withdraw the reservations made at the time of ratification.

Bulgaria

The said Protocol is only binding on the Bulgarian government as regards States which

have signed or ratified it or which may accede to it. The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the Bulgarian government in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary Government dated 2 October 1991, Bulgaria stated the following: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria presents its compliments to the Embassy of France in Sofia and has the honour to inform it that on 13 September 1991, the Great National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted a law considering the withdrawal of the reservation made by Bulgaria on ratifying the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925".

Cambodia

In a verbal note of 30 September 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia declared that the Royal Government of Cambodia considered itself bound by the Protocol of 17 June 1925, to which the coalition Government of Democratic Cambodia had acceded on 15 March 1983.

This accession had been considered invalid by Australia, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, Hungaria, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, Soviet Union and Viet nam.

Canada

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those States which have both signed and ratified it, or have finally acceded thereto. (2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any State at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or whose allies *de jure* or in fact fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary Government dated 20 August 1991, Canada stated the following: "The Government of Canada modifies the reservations made by Canada to the Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,

by withdrawing the reservations made by Canada to the Protocol with respect to bacteriological methods."down in the Protocol.

Further, in a note of 19 October 1999 the government of Canada declared the complete withdrawal of its reservations to the Geneva Protocol.

Chile

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the Chilean government as regards States which have signed and ratified it or which may definitely accede to it. (2) The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the Chilean government in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary Government dated 11 September 1991, Chile stated the following: "I have the honour to inform you, in conformity with article 22 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of the decision by the Government of Chile to withdraw the reservation it formulated on ratifying the Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, adopted at Geneva on 17 June 1925."

China

On 13 July 1952, the People's Republic of China issued a statement recognizing as binding upon it the accession to the Protocol in the name of China. The People's Republic of China considers itself bound by the Protocol on condition of reciprocity on the part of all the other contracting and acceding powers.

Czech Republic

The Czechoslovak Republic shall *ipso facto* cease to be bound by this Protocol towards any State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

On 8 November 1990, the depositary Government informed the States parties of the following communication from Czechoslovakia:

"The instrument of ratification contained a reservation stating that the Czechoslovak Republic would *ipso facto* cease to be bound by the said Protocol in regard to all States

whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Having examined the said reservation, and knowing that the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic consents thereto, we hereby withdraw it."

On 22 September 1993, the Czech Republic declared that it considered itself bound by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

Fiji

In a declaration of succession of 26 January 1973 addressed to the depositary government, the government of Fiji confirmed that the provisions of the Protocol were applicable to it by virtue of the ratification by the United Kingdom. The Protocol is only binding on Fiji as regards States which have both signed and ratified it and which will have finally acceded thereto. The Protocol shall cease to be binding on Fiji in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or the armed forces of whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of the Protocol.

France

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the government of the French Republic as regards States which have signed or ratified it or which may accede to it. (2) The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the government of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

On 25 November 1996, the French Government declared the withdrawal of its reservations. Such withdrawal took effect on 12 December 1996.

India

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those States which have both signed and ratified it, or have finally acceded thereto. (2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Iraq

On condition that the Iraq government shall be bound by the provisions of the Protocol

only towards those States which have both signed and ratified it or have acceded thereto, and that it shall not be bound by the Protocol towards any State at enmity with Iraq whose armed forces, or the forces of whose allies, do not respect the provisions of the Protocol.

Ireland

The government of the Irish Free State does not intend to assume, by this accession, any obligation except towards the States having signed and ratified this Protocol or which shall have finally acceded thereto, and should the armed forces or the allies of an enemy State fail to respect the said Protocol, the government of the Irish Free State would cease to be bound by the said Protocol in regard to such State.

Note:

In a note of 7 February 1972, received by the depositary government on 10 February 1972, the government of Ireland declared that it had decided to withdraw the above reservations made at the time of accession to the Protocol.

Israel

The said Protocol is only binding on the State of Israel as regards States which have signed and ratified or acceded to it. The said Protocol shall cease *ipso facto* to be binding on the State of Israel as regards any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, or the regular or irregular forces, or groups or individuals operating from its territory, fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.

Jordan

The accession by Jordan to the Protocol does not in any way imply recognition of Israel, and does not oblige Jordan to conclude with Israel any arrangement under the Protocol. Jordan undertakes to respect the obligations contained in the Protocol with regard to States which have undertaken similar commitments. It is not bound by the Protocol as regards States whose armed forces, regular or irregular, do not respect the provisions of the Protocol.

Korea (North)

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol

or have acceded thereto. The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Korea (South)

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of the Republic of Korea as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto. The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of the Republic of Korea in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Kuwait

The accession by the State of Kuwait to this Protocol does not in any way imply recognition of Israel, or the establishment of relations with the latter on the basis of the present Protocol. In case of breach of the prohibition mentioned in this Protocol by any of the Parties, the State of Kuwait will not be bound, with regard to the Party committing the breach, to apply the provisions of this Protocol.

Libya

The accession to the Protocol does not imply recognition or the establishment of any relations with Israel. The present Protocol is binding on the Libyan Arab Republic only as regards States which are effectively bound by it and will cease to be binding on the Libyan Arab Republic as regards States whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.

Mongolia

In the case of violation of this prohibition by any State in relation to the People's Republic of Mongolia, or its allies, the government of the People's Republic of Mongolia shall not consider itself bound by the obligation of the Protocol towards that State.

Note: On 15 May 1990, Mongolia informed the depositary Government of the following:

"I have the honour to bring to your attention the fact that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has decided to withdraw the reservation which it made at the time of its accession to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

As from this date, the Mongolian Government will respect all the clauses of this Protocol without any reservation."

Netherlands

Including the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao. On 25 November 1975 Surinam became a sovereign state.

As regards the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, this Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the Royal Netherlands government with regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

On 17 July 1995, the depositary Government received a notification from the Government of the Netherlands that it was withdrawing the reservation that it had expressed upon ratification of the Protocol on 13 October 1930. The notification stated precisely that the withdrawal of reservation concerned the Kingdom in Europe, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

New Zealand

Subject to the reservations that His Majesty is bound by the said Protocol only towards those Powers and States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto, and that His Majesty shall cease to be bound by the Protocol towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, do not respect the Protocol.

Note:

On 6 January 1989, New Zealand informed the depositary Government of the following: "On accession to the Protocol the Government of New Zealand declared that its accession was subject to two reservations: that New Zealand if bound by the Protocol only towards those States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto, and that New Zealand shall cease to be bound by the Protocol towards any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, do

not respect the Protocol.

I have the honour to inform you of the decision of the Government of New Zealand to withdraw these reservations to the Protocol as from the date of deposit of this letter."

Nigeria

The Protocol is only binding on Nigeria as regards States which are effectively bound by it and shall cease to be binding on Nigeria as regards States whose armed forces or whose allies' armed forces fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of the Protocol.

Pakistan

By a note of 13 April 1960, Pakistan informed the depositary Government that it was a party to the Protocol by virtue of Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

Papua New Guinea

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of Papua New Guinea as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto. The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of Papua New Guinea in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Paraguay

22 October 1933 is the date of receipt of the instrument of accession. The date of the notification by the French government "for the purpose of regularization" is 13 January 1969.

Portugal

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on the government of the Portuguese Republic as regards States which have signed and ratified it or which may accede to it. (2) The said Protocol shall *ipso facto* cease to be binding on the government of the Portuguese Republic in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.

Romania

(1) The said Protocol only binds the Romanian government in relation to States which have signed and ratified or which have definitely acceded to the Protocol. (2) The said

Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Romanian government in regard to all enemy States whose armed forces or whose allies *de jure* or in fact do not respect the restrictions which are the object of this Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary Government dated 16 July 1991, Romania stated the following:

"The Embassy of Romania in France presents its compliments to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Office of Legal Affairs, and has the honour to inform it that by act No.39 of 1 June 1991, the Romanian Parliament approved the withdrawal of the reservations formulated by Romania to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded at Geneva on 17 June 1925."

Russia

(1) The said Protocol only binds the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in relation to the States which have signed and ratified or which have definitely acceded to the Protocol. (2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies *de jure* or in fact do not respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.

Note:

On 15 January 2001 the Russian Federation informed the French government, which is the depositary of the Geneva Protocol, that it had withdrawn its reservations. Following approval by the State Duma (27 October 2000) and the Federation Council (24 November 2000), the Russian Federation promulgated Federal Law No. 143-FZ on 6 December which authorized the withdrawal of the reservations.

Slovakia

The Czechoslovak Republic shall *ipso facto* cease to be bound by this Protocol towards any State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

On 8 November 1990, the depositary Government informed the States parties of the

following communication from Czechoslovakia:

"The instrument of ratification contained a reservation stating that the Czechoslovak Republic would *ipso facto* cease to be bound by the said Protocol in regard to all States whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Having examined the said reservation, and knowing that the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic consents thereto, we hereby withdraw it."

On 22 September 1993, Slovakia declared that it considered itself bound by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

South Africa

Subject to the reservations that His Majesty is bound by the said Protocol only towards those Powers and States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto, and that His Majesty shall cease to be bound by the Protocol towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, do not respect the Protocol.

Note:

On 8 July 1996, the depositary Government received a notification from the Government of South Africa that it was withdrawing its reservation. Such withdrawal took effect on 20 October 1996.

Spain

Declares as binding *ipso facto*, without special agreement with respect to any other Member or State accepting and observing the same obligation, that is to say, on condition of reciprocity, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

Note:

On 23 December 1992, the Spanish Government informed the depositary Government that it had decided to withdraw the reservation entered on 17 June 1925. Such withdrawal took effect on 28 December 1992.

Syria

The accession by the Syrian Arab Republic to this Protocol and the ratification of the Protocol by its government does not in any case imply recognition of Israel, or lead to the establishment of relations with the latter concerning the provisions laid down in this Protocol.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The British Plenipotentiary declared when signing: "My signature does not bind India or any British Dominion which is a separate Member of the League of Nations and does not separately sign or adhere to the Protocol."

(1) The said Protocol is only binding on His Britannic Majesty as regards those Powers and States which have both signed and ratified the Protocol or have finally acceded thereto. (2) The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His Britannic Majesty towards any Power at enmity with Him whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Note:

In a communication to the depositary government dated 8 November 1991, the United Kingdom withdrew part (2) of its original reservation when it comes to the use of agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972.

United States

The protocol shall cease to binding on the government of the United States with respect to the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices, in regard to any enemy State if such State or any of its allies fails to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Viet Nam

The said Protocol is only binding on the Government of Viet Nam as regards those States which have signed and ratified the Protocol or have acceded thereto; The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the Government of Viet Nam in regard to any


enemy State whose armed forces, or the armed forces of whose Allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.

Yugoslavia

The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on the government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in regard to any enemy State whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the prohibitions which are the object of this Protocol.



ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



ภาคผนวก ข. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

Entered into force on 26 March 1975

Depositaries: U.K., U.S. and Soviet governments.

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

- (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of this Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and Cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit or each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

State Parties & Signatories to BTWC

State	Signature	Ratif./Acc.	Reserve
Afghanistan	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
Albania		11.08.1992.	
Algeria	22.07.2001	22.07.2001	
Antigua and Barbuda		29.01.2003	
Argentina	03.08.1972.	05.12.1979.	
Armenia		07.06.1994.	
Australia	10.04.1972.	05.10.1977.	10.08.1973
Austria	10.04.1972.	10.08.1973.	
Bahamas		26.11.1986.	
Bahrain		28.10.1988.	28.10.1988
Bangladesh		13.03.1985.	
Barbados	16.02.1973.	16.02.1973.	
Belarus	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
Belgium	10.04.1972.	15.03.1979.	
Belize		20.10.1986.	
Benin	10.04.1972.	25.04.1975.	

Bhutan		08.06.1978.	
Bolivia	10.04.1972.		30.10.1975.
Bosnia-Herzegovina			15.08.1994.
Botswana	10.04.1972.		05.02.1992.
Brazil	10.04.1972.		27.02.1973.
Brunei Darussalam			31.01.1991.
Bulgaria	10.04.1972.		02.08.1972.
Burkina Faso			17.04.1991.
Cambodia	10.04.1972.		09.03.1983.
Canada	10.04.1972.		18.09.1972.
Cape Verde			20.10.1977.
Chile	10.04.1972.		22.04.1980.
China		15.11.1984.	15.11.1984
Colombia	10.04.1972.		19.12.1983.
Congo			23.10.1978.
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	10.04.1972.		16.09.1975.
Costa Rica	10.04.1972.		17.12.1973.

Croatia		08.10.1991.	
Cuba	12.04.1972.	21.04.1976.	
Cyprus	10.04.1972.	06.11.1973.	
Czech Republic		05.04.1993.	24.03.1993
Denmark	10.04.1972.	01.03.1973.	
Dominica		08.11.1978	
Dominican Republic	10.04.1972.	23.02.1973.	
East Timor		07.05.2003	
Ecuador	14.06.1972.	12.03.1975.	
El Salvador	10.04.1972.	31.12.1991.	
Equatorial Guinea		16.01.1989.	
Estonia		21.06.1993.	
Ethiopia	10.04.1972.	26.05.1975.	
Fiji	22.02.1973.	01.10.1973.	
Finland	10.04.1972.	04.02.1974.	
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		14.03.1997	
		27.09.1984.	

France			
Gambia	08.08.1972.	21.11.1991	
Georgia		22.05.1996	
Germany	10.04.1972.	07.04.1983.	
Ghana	10.04.1972.	06.06.1975.	
Greece	10.04.1972.	10.12.1975.	
Grenada		22.10.1986.	
Guatemala	09.05.1971.	19.09.1973.	
Guinea-Bissau		20.08.1976.	
Holy See		04.01.2002	
Honduras	10.04.1972.	14.03.1979.	
Hungary	10.04.1972.	27.12.1972.	
Iceland	10.04.1972.	15.02.1973.	
India	15.01.1973.	15.07.1974.	
Indonesia	21.06.1972.	19.02.1992.	
Iran (Islamic Rep.of)	16.11.1972.	22.08.1973.	
Iraq	11.05.1972.	19.06.1991	15.07.1974
	10.04.1972.	27.10.1972.	

Ireland			
Italy	10.04.1972.	30.05.1975.	
Jamaica		13.08.1975.	
Japan	10.04.1972.	18.06.1982.	
Jordan	17.04.1972.	27.06.1975.	
Kenya		07.01.1976.	
Korea (Dem.People's Rep.)		13.03.1987.	
Korea (Republic of)	10.04.1972.	25.06.1987.	
Kuwait	27.04.1972.	26.07.1972.	26.07.1972.
Lao People's Dem.Rep.	10.04.1972.	25.04.1973.	
Latvia		06.02.1997	
Lebanon	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
Lesotho	10.04.1972.	06.09.1977.	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		19.01.1982.	
Liechtenstein		06.06.1991.	
Lithuania		10.02.1998	
Luxembourg	10.04.1972.	23.03.1976.	
	10.04.1972.	06.10.1991.	26.09.1991

Malaysia		
Maldives		02.08.1993
Mali	10.04.1972.	25.11.2002
Malta	11.09.1972.	07.04.1975.
Mauritius	10.04.1972.	11.01.1973.
Mexico	10.04.1972.	08.04.1974.
Monaco		30.04.1999
Mongolia	10.04.1972.	14.09.1972.
Morocco	02.05.1972.	21.03.2002
Netherlands	10.04.1972.	22.06.1981.
New Zealand	10.04.1972.	18.12.1972.
Nicaragua	10.04.1972.	07.08.1975.
Niger	21.04.1972.	23.06.1972.
Nigeria	10.07.1972.	09.07.1973.
Norway	10.04.1972.	01.08.1973.
Oman		31.03.1992.
Pakistan	10.04.1972.	03.10.1974.
		03.02.2003

Palau			
Panama	02.05.1972.	20.03.1974.	
Papua New Guinea		27.10.1980.	
Paraguay		09.06.1976.	
Peru	10.04.1972.	05.06.1985.	
Philippines	10.04.1972.	21.05.1973.	
Poland	10.04.1972.	25.01.1973.	
Portugal	29.06.1972.	15.05.1975.	
Qatar	14.11.1972.	17.04.1975.	
Romania	10.04.1972.	26.07.1979.	
Russian Federation	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	26.03.1975
Rwanda	10.04.1972.	20.05.1975.	
Saint Kitts and Nevis		02.04.1991.	
Saint Lucia		26.11.1986.	
Saint Vincent Grenadines		13.05.1999	
San Marino	21.03.1973.	11.03.1975.	
Sao Tome and Principe		24.08.1979.	
	12.04.1972.	24.05.1972.	

Saudi Arabia			
Senegal	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
Serbia and Montenegro		13.06.2001	
Seychelles		11.10.1979.	
Sierra Leone	24.11.1972.	29.06.1976.	
Singapore	19.06.1972.	02.12.1975.	
Slovakia		17.05.1993.	17.05.1993
Slovenia		07.04.1992.	
Solomon Islands		17.06.1981.	
South Africa	10.04.1972.	03.11.1975.	
Spain	10.04.1972.	20.06.1979.	
Sri Lanka	10.04.1972.	18.11.1986.	
Sudan		17.10.2003	
Suriname		06.01.1993.	
Swaziland		18.06.1991.	04.05.1976
Sweden	27.02.1975.	05.02.1976.	
Switzerland	10.04.1972.	04.05.1976.	
	17.01.1973.	28.05.1975.	

Thailand			
Togo	10.04.1972.	10.11.1976.	
Tonga		28.09.1976.	
Tunisia	10.04.1972.	06.06.1973.	
Turkey	10.04.1972.	04.11.1974.	
Turkmenistan		11.01.1996	
Uganda		12.05.1992.	
Ukraine	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
United Kingdom	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	27.04.1972
United States of America	10.04.1972.	26.03.1975.	
Uruguay		06.04.1981.	
Uzbekistan		11.01.1996	
Vanuatu		12.10.1990	
Venezuela	10.04.1972.	18.10.1978.	
Viet Nam		20.06.1980.	
Yemen	10.05.1972.	01.06.1979.	
Zimbabwe		05.11.1990.	

List of notes and reservations submitted by States Parties to the BTWC

Austria

Reservation (translation):

'Considering the obligations resulting from its status as a permanently neutral state, the Republic of Austria declares a reservation to the effect that its co-operation within the framework of this Convention cannot exceed the limits determined by the status of permanent neutrality and membership with the United Nations. This reservation refers in particular to Article VII of this Convention as well as to any similar provision replacing or supplementing this Article.'

Bahrain

Reservation

'The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.'

China

Statement:

'1. The basic spirit of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons conforms to China's consistent position and is conducive to the efforts of the world's peace-loving countries and peoples in fighting against aggression and maintaining world peace.

China once was one of the victims of biological (bacteriological) weapons. China has not produced or possessed such weapons and will never do so in future. However, the Chinese Government considers that the Convention has its defects. For instance, it fails to provide in explicit terms for the 'prohibition of the use of' biological weapons and the concrete and effective measures for supervision and verification; it lacks forceful measures of sanctions in the procedure of complaint against instances of violation of the Convention. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that these defects maybe made up or corrected at an appropriate time.

2. It is also the hope of the Chinese Government that a convention on complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons will soon be concluded.

3. The signature and ratification of the Convention by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 10 April 1972 and 9 February 1973 are illegal and null and void.'

Czech Republic

In a Note dated 24 March 1993, received on 5 April 1993 the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic notified the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the following:

'Upon the instruction of the Government of the Czech Republic and referring to the Declaration of the Czech National Council to All Parliaments and Nations of the World of 17 December 1992, I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following: In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e. the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multilateral international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. From among the treaties deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland this applies also to the following:

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at London, Washington and Moscow on 10 April 1972.'

India

Statement on signature:

'India has stood for the elimination of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. However, in view of the situation that developed in regard to the discussions concerning biological and chemical weapons, it became possible to reach agreement at the present moment on a Convention on the elimination of biological and toxin weapons only. Negotiations would need to be continued for the elimination of chemical weapons also. It has been recognised that, both in regard to the Convention on biological and toxin weapons and in respect of future negotiations concerning chemical weapons, the

Geneva Protocol of 1925 should be safeguarded and the inseparable link between prohibition of biological and chemical weapons should be maintained.

India's position on the Convention on biological and toxin weapons has been outlined in the statements of the representative of India before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the First Committee of the General Assembly.

The Government of India would like to reiterate in particular its understanding that the objective of the Convention is to eliminate biological and toxin weapons, thereby excluding completely the possibility of their use, and that the exemption in regard to biological agents or toxins, which would be permitted for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes would not, in any way, create a loophole in regard to the production or retention of biological and toxin weapons. Also, any assistance which might be furnished under the terms of the Convention would be of medical or humanitarian nature and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

India's support of the Convention on biological and toxin weapons is based on these main considerations. It is India's earnest hope that the Convention will be adhered to by all States, including all the major Powers, at a very early date.' This statement was reiterated on ratification.

Ireland

Declaration:

'The accession on 29th August 1930 of the Government of the Irish Free State to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925, was subject to the reservations that they did not intend to assume by this accession any obligation except towards States which had signed and ratified this Protocol or which would have finally acceded thereto, and that in the event of the armed forces of any enemy State or of any ally of such State failing to respect the said Protocol, the Government of the Irish Free State would cease to be bound by the said Protocol towards any such State.

The Government of Ireland recognise that the value of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin

Weapons and on their Destruction which has been signed on their behalf today, could be undermined if reservations made by Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol were allowed to stand as the prohibition of possession is incompatible with the right to retaliate. As this Convention purports to strengthen the Geneva Protocol, there should be an absolute and universal prohibition of the use of the weapons in question. The Government of Ireland, accordingly, have notified the depository Government for the 1925 Geneva Protocol of their withdrawal of their reservations to the Protocol. The withdrawal of these reservations applies to chemical as well as to bacteriological (biological) and toxin agents of warfare.'

Kuwait

Understanding:

'In ratifying the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, 1972, the Government of the State of Kuwait takes the view that its ratification does not in any way imply its recognition of Israel, nor does it oblige it to apply the provisions of the aforementioned Convention in respect of the said country.'

In tendering this 'Understanding' the Government of the State of Kuwait reaffirms its position its accepting the obligations it has undertaken to assume by virtue of its ratification of the said Convention. It also confirms that the last clause of the 'Understanding' does not prejudice the said indivisible obligations.

Malaysia

Reservation:

'Malaysia's ratification of this Convention does not in any way constitute recognition of the States of Israel and South Africa nor does it consider itself duty bound by Article VII to provide assistance to those two States.'

Mexico

Statement (translation):

On signing the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the Government of Mexico wishes to record that it:

- 1) Continues to be convinced that the same reasons which made it advisable to prohibit biological and chemical weapons jointly in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 exist now to strive to pursue identical methods with respect to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of the said weapons, as well as their elimination from the arsenals of all States.
- 2) Considers that the fact that the Convention now open for signature applies solely to biological and toxin weapons should be understood, as Resolution 2826 (XXVI) of the United Nations General Assembly, to which the Convention is annexed, explicitly indicates, to be merely a first step - the only one which it has proved possible to take for the time being - towards an agreement prohibiting also the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.
- 3) Makes a note of the fact that the Convention contains an express commitment to continue negotiations in good faith with the aim of arriving at any early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction.
- 4) Makes a note, furthermore, that the General Assembly, through its Resolution 2827 (XXVI), has requested the Conference of the Disarmament Committee to continue, as a high priority item, negotiations aimed at promptly reaching the agreement relative to chemical weapons which is being sought; and that, in Resolution 2827 B (XXVI), the General Assembly has urged all States to commit themselves, while the said agreement is being reached, to abstain from all additional development, production and stockpiling of those chemical substances capable of being used as weapons which, on account of their degree of toxicity, have the highest lethal effect and are not useable for peaceful purposes.
- 5) Is convinced that the success of the Convention relative to biological weapons will depend, in the last resort, on the manner in which the commitments under reference are honoured.

Slovakia

In a Note dated 17 May 1993, received on 17 May 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic notified the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the following:

'In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Slovak Republic as one of the successor States to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1st January 1993, i.e. the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multilateral international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

From among the treaties deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland this applies to the following:

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.'

United Kingdom

In a statement dated 27 April 1972, communicated to all States recognised by the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government recalled their view that if a regime is not recognised as the Government of a State, neither signature nor the deposit of any instrument by it, nor notification of any of those acts will bring about recognition of that regime by any other State.

On depositing their instrument of ratification the Government of the United Kingdom made the following declaration: '..that the provisions of the Convention shall not apply in regard to Southern Rhodesia unless and until the Government of the United Kingdom informs the other Depositary Governments that it is in a position to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Convention in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.'

ประวัติผู้เขียนวิทยานิพนธ์

นายพงษ์ธร เศรษฐสุวรรณ เกิดวันที่ 14 สิงหาคม พ.ศ. 2517 ที่กรุงเทพมหานคร สำเร็จการศึกษาระดับมัธยมปลายจากโรงเรียนกรุงเทพคริสเตียนวิทยาลัย สำเร็จการศึกษาระดับปริญญาตรีวิทยาศาสตรบัณฑิต คณะนิติศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยอัสสัมชัญในปีการศึกษา 2539 สำเร็จการศึกษาระดับบัณฑิตยศาสตร์จากสำนักอบรมกฎหมายแห่งเนติบัณฑิตยสภา สมัยที่ 51 และเข้าศึกษาต่อในหลักสูตรนิติศาสตรมหาบัณฑิตที่จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย เมื่อ พ.ศ. 2543



ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย