CHAPTER 4

A DEFENSE OF HARTSHORNE'S PANENTHEISM

It seems to the researcher that before we try to defend the concept of God, we should try to defend the existence of God first. Since the concept of God deals with divine attributes or properties, we would consider the divine concept after our consideration of his existence.

Basically speaking, among the three schools dealing with the existence of God, the researcher appreciates scepticism in the sense that it corresponds with Wittgenstein's saying: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (Wittgenstein, 1992:189). It seems to the researcher that sceptics are people who always "play safe." In other words, they are really honest empiricists who never try to go beyond what they can conclude. So we may appoint them "referees" to judge: Between our theistic argument and that of atheism which one is more impressive?

Historically speaking, Hartshorne dealed with the concept of God first. This implies that he assumes God's existence. The question that can be immediately raised here is: Why, then, does he need to prove the existence of God? Hartshorne, the researcher believes, has to prove God's existence because he needs to make a clear distinction between his panentheism and Spinoza's pantheism, otherwise people may think that he is only a pantheist. The following quotation may be a good example of misunderstanding about Hartshorne's position.

> The philosopher Charles Hartshorne, who is generally recognized as the most influential defender of the ontological argument in the twentieth century, is a pantheist in ... his ontology, and he believes that "something exists" is a logically necessary truth. For Hartshorne, the phrase, "God exists necessarily" means that the non-existence of the Universe is a logical contradiction. (His critics, e.g. Hick, seem unaware of this, and base their refutation of his arguments on another, more traditional concept of deity.) (Barrow & Tipler, 1986:108).

The researcher intends to defend Hartshorne on God; therefore, he needs to defend the second form of ontological argument as best he can. So let us turn to Hick's criticism first.

1. A Defense of the Second Form of the Ontological Argument

As we have seen in the last chapter, Hick has drawn a distinction between logical and ontological necessity. On the one hand, that which is logically necessary is true analytically and its contradictory is logically impossible. On the other hand, ontological necessity refers to eternal ontic independence, i.e., the capacity to exist without being subject to any conditioning factors. Hick argues that St.Anselm understood his argument in terms of ontological necessity while Hartshorne pronounces his argument in terms of logical necessity. As he puts it in the book The Many - Faced Argument:

> Now it is, I think, as certain as a historical judgment can be that Anselm did not use the concept of logical necessity which Hartshorne is himself professedly using, in which N "means analytic or L-true,

> true by necessity of the terms employed." For this is a distinctively modern understanding of necessity. Further, Anselm states explicitly what he means by "a being which cannot be conceived not to exist," and the kind of necessity which he there describes is not logical but ontological (Hick, 1968: 350).

And later in his book Arguments For the Existence of God, Hick continues: "... and it is therefore suprising that Hartshorne, who frequently chides the scholarly world for not bothering to read Anselm so entirely have misstated Anselm's basic principle" (Hick, 1970:96).

The researcher thinks that Hick is mistaken here. He is right when he said that Hartshorne understood his argument in terms of logical necessity, but wrong when he maintained that St.Anselm understood his argument in terms of ontological necessity. If St.Anselm's argument could not be understood in terms of logical necessity because "logical necessity" is considered as modern understanding of necessity, it could not be understood in terms of ontological necessity either, for "ontological necessity" is also modern interpretation of necessity which is challenged by Hume. It is true that medieval philosophers distinguished between a necessary Being and contingent things, but they never made a distinction between "logical necessity" and "ontological necessity." St.Anselm himself never used or pronounced "ontological necessity" in his Proslogions. Accordingly, no matter we consider St.Anselm's argument in terms of logical or ontological necessity, our considerations are always based on modern interpertation. In fact, it is the modern empiricist belief that there is a demarcation between logical and ontological necessity which is based on the

bifurcation between language and the world.* But such a bifurcation has been still highly controversial among contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language. Thus Ford is correct when he says: "In fact, it turns out that there is no direct way in which the distinction between logical and ontological necessity can be formalized" (Ford, 1973: 91).

It is true that St.Anselm drew a distinciton between existence in understanding and existence in reality (Anselm, 1963: 27). But from this it does not follow that he made a distinction between logical and ontological necessity and considered his argument in terms of ontological necessity. Hence to consider the ontological argument in terms of ontological necessity is not from St.Anselm, but from Hick himself. What is sure about St.Anselm's second form is that for St.Anselm God's necessary existence is so self-evident that to deny it means to make a contradiction. "God exists necessarily" is similar to "A triangle is triangular" in that to deny them means to make

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*An attempt to draw a distinction between the structure of language and that of the world is fully developed by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Here is a representation of the two parallel structtures:

Language	⟷	World
|		|
propositions	⟷	facts
|		|
elementary propositions	⟷	states of affairs
|		|
names	⟷	objects

See A.C. Grayling. 1988. Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28-62.

contradictions. Hence for St. Anselm the feeling he has when hearing someone say "God does not exist necessarily" is not different in kind from the feeling he has when hearing somebody say "A triangle is not triangular."

The researcher thinks that Hartshorne has not "misstated Anselm's basic principle" as Hick has accused him of having so. Hartshorne would like to give credit to St.Anselm as the first person who discovered the principle. If he had not done so, he could have been considered as a plagiarist. Thus the only point that Hartshorne has to defend is how his proposition 1 can be considered as analytic truth. Now let us turn to Hartshorne's argument in ordinary language again:

1. That God exists strictly implies that he exists necessarily.
2. It is axiomatic that either God exists necessarily or it is not true that he exists necessarily.
3. By Becker's Postulate, that it is not true that God exists necesarily strictly implies that it is necessarily not ture that he exists necessarily.
4. Hence, from (2) and (3) it follows that either God exists necessarily or it is necessarily not true that he exists necesarily.
5. By modal form of modus tollens, it can be deduced from (1) that that it is necessarily not true that God exists necessarily strictly implies that it is necessary that he does not exist.
6. Hence, from (4) and (5) it follows that either God exists necessarily or it is necessary that he does not exist.
7. But it is not necessary that God does not exist.
8. Therefore, from (6) and (7) it follows that God exists necessarily.

9. By a modal axiom, that God exists necessarily strictly implies that God exists.
10. Therefore, from (8) and (9) it follows that God exists.

In defending the analyticity of his argument, Hartshorne claims that "Nq" interpreted as "It is logically true (necessary) that God exists," is the proper logical rendering of "God exists necessarily." Hartshorne agrees that only analytic statements are necessary. In other words, he accepts that all necessary statements are analytic. For Hartshorne all metaphysical statements are necessary since they deal with what is common and necessary to all possible states of affairs (Hartshorne's DR,1976: XV); therefore, they are analytic. Hartshorne argues:

> Are metaphysical judgments analytic? I reply that, assuming suitable meaning postulates, they can be made that. If it be objected that scientific hypotheses, too, become analytic with suitable meaning postulates, the reply is that only observation prevents science, so taken, from describing an empty universe, whereas it is the task of metaphysics to find meaning postulates which describe the necessarily non-empty universe, or the common aspects of all possible states of affairs (Hartshorne, 1963: 207-8).

In order to understand the analyticity of propositions clearly, let us consider Swinburne's criterion. According to Swinburne, a proposition is analytic if and only if it is coherent and its negation is incoherent while a propostion is synthetic if and only if its negation is still coherent (Swinburne, 1993:15). Examples may be given as follows:

Analytic
All squares have four equal sides. (coherent)
Some squares do not have four equal sides. (incoherent)
Synthetic
All crows are black. (coherent)
Some crows are not black. (coherent)

We can use this criterion to check the case of the second form, and we would find that:

God includes necessary existence. (coherent)
God does not include necessary existence. (incoherent)

The objection may be that if God's existence is purely analytic, then it would seem that God is nothing but merely empty abstraction. This objection may work well with St.Anselm's classical theism, but not with Hartshorne's panentheism. Here Hartshorne draws a distinction between a necessary abstract aspect of God and his contingent concrete actuality., Hartshorne argues:

> Let us call the concrete state of a thing its actuality. Then my proposition is, actuality is always more than bare existence. Existence is that the defined abstract nature is somehow concretely actualized; but how it is actualiazed, in what particular state, with what particular content not deducible from the abstract definition, constitutes the actuality. Of course, then, it would be contradictory to deduce this content by any proof (Hartshorne, 1968: 329).

Thus from the ontological argument we cannot deduce God's concrete actuality since "the concrete is richer than the abstract, and the more cannot follow by necessity from the less," but we can infer from the conclusion that the property of divine perfection must somehow necessarily be concretely actualized, and that no state of affairs could exist in which this actualization of perfection did not take place. Hence, even though St.Anselm rightly contended that existence is deducible from the definintion of God, he overlooked the immeasurable gulf between bare existence and actuality. "Actuality can never be deduced, not even in the divine case" (Hartshorne, 1968: 329). For Hartshorne the ontological proof intends to maintain that bare existence is logically deducible from the definition of God, so it could be understood in terms of logical necessity. From this it follows that Hick's argument against Hartshorne's formulization is just a failure. Ford is right when he says:

> Thus the unconditionedness of God's existence is a highly abstract property which can be adequately expressed by the logical necessity of our systematic principles. Since Hick's argument depended upon God being ontologically but not logically necessary, that objection fails (Ford,1973: 93).

If Hartshorne's proposition 1, according to Hick, can be considered in terms of logical necessity, then the whole angument could proceed by valid steps to its conclusion. Some philosopher thinks that perhaps the name "the ontological argument" makes people confused, so he suggests to change the name. Further, in terms of modern logic, whereas St.Anselm's argument may be considered as predicate logic, Hartshorne's formulization may be considered as propositional logic. Adams suggests:

> Hartshorne calls his argument a "modal argument" for the existence of God... I think it is better not to call these arguments "ontological" because ... they need not depend on any assumptions at all about the relation of existence to predication. They do not presuppose that things which do not really exist can have predicates. They do not presuppose that existence, or existence in reality, is a predicate, nor even that necessary existence is a predicate. For their structure does not depend on predicate logic at all, but only on modal and nonmodal propositional logic. Obviously it is a great advantage to Anselm to be able to dispense with those controversial assumptions about predication (Adams, 1971: 44-45).

Adams' suggestion seems to be compatible with Purtill's consideration. In his regard of Hartshorne's argument, Purtill has demonstrated the following general theorem to be valid for any modal system of moderate strength: "If p strictly implies necessary p, then possible p strictly implies p."* St.Anselm's principle is an application of the antecedent clause of this theorem to divine perfection: if God exists, then he exists necessarily. What is required to demonstrate God's existence is to establish the possibility of divine existence. As Ford puts it:

> ... the ontological argument can never stand by itself to demonstrate the existence of a perfect being, apart from demonstrating the appropriateness of that metaphysics by which we affirm the possibility of such divine existence. As Duns Scotus recognized centuries ago,

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*See the proof in Richard L. Purtill. 1971. Logic for Philosophers. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, pp. 256-257.

> the ontological argument must be supplemented by some sort of cosmological prologue demonstrating that possibility (Ford, 1973:97).

But as we have seen, it is hard for an atheist like Nagel to accept the possibility of divine existence as established by the cosmolgical argument. Then how could we reply to atheistic criticism? One immediate answer to it, we may say, is that atheists are confused between scientific explanation and religious interpretation of nature. Religious interpretation and scientific explanation are of different kind, so we should not reduce religious interpretation to scientific explanation. Gilson points out that:

> Scientific problems are all related to the knowledge of what given things actually are. An ideal scientific explanation of the world would be an exhaustive rational explanation of what the world actually is; but why nature exists is not a scientific problem, because its answer is not susceptible of empirical verification. The notion of God, on the contrary, always appears to us in history as an answer to some existential problem, that is, as the why of a certain existence (Gilson, 1969:119).

In other words, whereas science seeks certain causation, religion seeks the cause of certain causation. While scientists try to explain cosmic order in terms of gravitation, magnetism, and strong and weak interaction, religion tries to find the final or first ground of these forces. Thus in this sense God or religion is not superfluous as the atheists think. Then by using the principle "ex nihilo nihil fit": "for every state of affairs there must necessarily be a ground" in our

investigation* we may finally reach a conclusion that God as a final ground is possible. If God's necessary existence is possible by the cosmological argument, then we are justified in accepting proposition 7. Then assuming that Hartshorne's ontological argument is valid,** is it compelling or impressive?

To answer the above question, we need to consult our "referee", namely, the sceptic. The sceptic might turn to the atheists and ask them whether they can use Hartshorne's argument to prove the non-existence of God. The atheists do not hesitate to say yes because they can use "p" to stand for "God does not exist." The atheists realize that Purtill's theorem is general enough to allow "p" to be defined in terms of God's non-existence as well. As Ford puts it: "If God does not exist, by St. Anselm's principle his existence would be impossible, since no contingent condition could bring him into being. Then it follows that the possible non-existence of God excludes his existence" (Ford, 1973:93-94). If both theists and atheists can equally use logical proof for and against the existence of God, the "game" would end in a draw. Neither could convince the sceptic to take side with them. Both theists and atheists, the researcher thinks, usally end their arguments with appeal to faith and appeal to ignorance respectively.

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*For full details, see H.G. Hubbeling. 1991. "Hartshorne and the Ontological Argument." In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.). The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. La Salle: Open Court, pp.367-371.

**Unlike Hick, some analytic theists, such as J.L. Mackie and Richard Swinburne, do not think that there are any deductively valid arguments from premises to either the existence of God or the nonexistence of God.

Then, in the sight of logicians, is Hartshorne's argument valid? Before answering this question, let us consider Hubbeling's three questions first. First, which logical system does Hartshorne use? It is true that Hartshorne never identifies his system. Moreover, he seems to use the notions "possible" and "necessary" as context-free. As Martin puts it: "The notions "possible" and "necessary" are of course extremely troublesome ones, and Hartshorne makes the most of them. Whitehead was much clearer in construing the necessary in terms of universality, more particularly, in terms of the universality of what he took to be necessary metaphysical principles. Necessity and possibility are thus context-relative notions, on such a rendering. Hartshorne, however, seems to use these notion ... as context-free..." (Martin, 1984:54). However, from his definition of metaphysics and his acceptance of the postulate: "modal status is always necessary," we may assume that he uses S5.

Second, since the temporal interpretaiton of the modalities is incompatible with S5, so what should Hartshorne do? Here Hubbeling is mistaken. Like Alston, he interprets that Hartshorne understands eternity as everlastingness. This is not correct because Hartshorne, like Greek philosophers and others, still understands and uses eternity as timelessness. God, for Hartshorne, is dipolar. Whereas his concrete aspect is temporal, his abstract aspect is eternal. Hartshorne makes a distinction between "objective eternity" and "objective immortality." He uses both of them in his philosophy. Since his second form of the ontological argument deals with the abstract aspect of God and this aspect is eternal, his argument deals with eternal truths, namely, timeless truths. In his response to Martin, Hartshorne firmly says:

> One distinction that I make, and Martin does not see the importance of, is between eternity and everlastingness, or immortality. Objective

> immortality is one thing, objective eternity is another ... Martin weighs the merits of his "all truths are timeless" ... he ignores the moderate or less extreme view that some (namely, truths about extremely universal and abstract, eternal and necessary things, including the essential structure of time as such) are timeless, and others (those about less universal and abstract, also noneternal and contingent things) are time-bound ... (Hartshorne, 1984:67-68).

Third, since the second problem has been already solved, Hartshorne does not need to make choices between the temporal interpretation of the modalities and S5. Now suppose that Hartshorne adopts S5, is his argument valid? The answer is probably negative if what Hubbeling has said is correct. If it is ture that "in intuitive logic the law of excluded middle: either p or non-p is not valid," then proposition 2 will trouble Hartshorne. Hartshorne solves this problem by proposing his short new version as follows:

1. It is not necessary that God does not exist.
2. By Anselm's Principle, necessarily, either God does not exist or he exists necessarily.
3. It can be inferred from (2) that either God does not exist necessarily or it is necessary that he exists necessarily.
4. It can be inferred from (3) that either God does not exists necessarily or he exists necessarily.
5. Hence, from (1) and (4) it follows that God exists necessarily.
6. Therefore, it can be inferred from (5) that God exists.

Then does Hartshorne's new version have no problem? The answer is probably negative again. Why not? Because proposition 3 is valid only in S5, not in

other systems (Hubbeling, 1991:372). This problem happens to S5 as a whole. Semantically, S5 is the best among the three main systems, but axiomatically, it is not. As Swat points out: "Considering from the axioms of each system, we can clearly see that system T is more conceivable and consistent to our intuition than the other two. It contains no unclear axioms while S4 and S5 contain the phrases "necessarily necessary" and "necessarily possible" which are too unclear to be acceptable" (Swat, 1980:62). Accordingly, though Hartshorne's argument, we may say, may be valid in S5, it loses its validity in a stricter system. However, Hartshorne seems well realize that his argument is not compelling. As he puts it: "Since the final appeal is to intuition, I no longer speak of "theistic proofs," but only of theistic arguments. I believe they are rational, but not coercive, methods of influencing belief. No one can be coerced into trust in God. No trust is sincere if it is not trust also in one's own intuitions (Hartshorne, 1984:669).

Davies says: "... the ontological argument ... seems unsuccessful ... Why is this so? Basically because definitions can take one only so far; because we can say what we mean by something without its having to be true that what we are talking about really exists. Maybe a sucessful ontological argument for God's existence will one day be forth coming; but that remains to be seen" (Davies, 1982:37). Is Davies' view is correct? The researcher does not think so. Even though Hartshorne's argument may be valid in a humble way, it is still superior to all other versions of the ontological argument. Why is it so? Because the panentheistic God is dipolar. Let us see how Hartshorne's argument is superior to others.

Kant's objection to the ontological argument is still not obsolete. We will use it as our criterion to judge certain versions of the ontological proof. Kant maintains that existence is not a real predicate. He says:

> Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, "God is omnipotent," contains two concepts each of which has its object - God and omnipotence. The small word "is" adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say "God is," or "There is God," we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only, posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept (Kant, 1970:132).

What Kant means by "X exists" is "X has an instance" or "X is exemplified." When we say that something exists we are not giving any information about its qualities or propertics. For example, when we say that the Chao Phraya River exists we are not talking about its nature, but we are saying that the concept "the Chao Phraya River" has an instance to be found in the actual world.

In the case of God, Kant assumes that all other traditional arguments for God's existence presupposes the validity of the ontological argument. This means that if the ontological argument is invalid, then all other arguments are also invalid. For Kant, it is not possible to deduce real existence from its definition. The

ontological argument does so; therefore, it is invalid. In order to see the difference clearly between the ontological proof which is a priori and the others which are a posteriori, let us look at the following table.

Kind of Proof	Procedure of Inference
a priori	From a concept to real existence
a posteriori	From an effect to a cause

How do the other arguments depend upon the ontological argument? Let us see the cosmological argument as an example. According to Kant, the cosmological argument runs as follows (Kant, 1970:135):

> If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist.
> Now I, at least, exist.
> Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists.

Kant points out: "The minor premise contains an experience, the major premise the inference from there being any experience at all to the existence of the necessary" (Kant, 1970:135). Then in the footnote he explains more: "This inference is too well known to require a detailed statement. It depends on the supposedly transcendental law of natural causality: that everything contingent has a cause, which, if itself contingent, most likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes ends with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it would have no completeness" (Kant, 1970:135).

We could see that the consequent of the major premise: "an absolutely necessary being must also exist" is a priori and therefore is dependent on the

validity of the ontological argument. According to Kant, the ontological argument is invalid because it is impossible for us to deduce real existence from a concept or definition. If the ontological argument is invalid, so are the cosmological and physico-theological ones. Since the cosmological argument depends on the validity of the ontological argument, has Hartshorne got into a vicious circle for his use of the cosmological conclusion as a fundamental hypothesis? Before we see how successfully Hartshorne could solve this problem, let us turn to classical theists first. Classical theists, no matter they are St. Anselm, Descartes, Malcolm, Plantinga and still others, the researcher believes, seem to be unable to refute Kant's criticism as long as their God is monopolar. All classical theists who hold the ontological argument seem to face a dilemma. If by "a priori proposition" they mean that a proposition whose truth or falsity can be checked without "looking at the world," the first form of St. Anselm's argument seems incompatible with the group. We can check this by Swinburne's criterion. Let us see the following propositions.

My mother is a woman. (coherent)
My mother is not a woman. (incoherent)
God exists (or God is). (coherent)
God does not exist (or God is not). (coherent)

Malcolm, like Hartshorne, rejects the first form and accepts the second one which sounds better as follows:

God includes necessary existence. (coherent)
God does not include necessary existence. (incoherent)

But what Malcolm means by "necessary existence" is different from the sense used by Hartshorne. Let us consider his proof as follows (Malcolm, 1970: 453-4):

1. If God, a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, does not exist then He cannot come into existence.
2. For if He did He would either have been caused to come into existence or have happened to come into existence, and in either case He would be a limited being, which by our conception of Him He is not.
3. Since He cannot come into existence, if He does not exist His existence is impossible.
4. If He does exist He cannot have come into existence, nor can He cease to exist, for nothing could cause Him to cease to exist nor could it just happen that He ceased to exist.
5. So if God exists His existence is necessary.
6. Thus God's existence is either impossible or necessary.
7. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd.
8. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists.

The problem that makes Malcolm's argument fail is equivocation. He uses the notion "impossible" in two senses. What he means by "impossible" in (3) is "as a matter of fact unable to come about" whereas "impossible" in (6) is "unable to be thought without contradiction" (Davies, 1982:34). The researcher thinks that the problem of equivocation is not only with "impossible" but also with "necessary." Whereas "necessary" in (5) is used as "ontologically or factually necessary," "necessary" in (6) is used as "logically necessary."

In his book The Nature of Necessity Plantinga deals with some versions of the ontological argument "from the perspective of what ... we have learned about possible worlds" (Plantinga, 1974:197). Plantinga formulates the Hartshorne - Malcolm version in the two following propositions (Plantinga, 1974:213).

1. There is a world, W, in which there exists a being with maximal greatness, and
2. A being has maximal greatness in a world only if it exists in every world.

The researcher thinks that the above formulation is unacceptable to Hartshorne because (1) implies that God is not supreme in the panentheistic sense. According to Hartshorne, no world includes God, but it is God who includes the world-not only this actual world but also all possible worlds. Brian Davies briefly summarizes Plantinga's own argument as follows (Davies, 1982:36).

1. There is a possible world containing a being with maximal greatness.
2. Any being with maximal greatness has the property of maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
4. There is therefore a possible world where there is a being who has maximal excellence.
5. If there is a possible world where a being has maximal excellence then that being has maximal excellence in every possible world.
6. There is a possible world.
7. Therefore God exists.

If we use Kant's objection to the ontological argument as our criterion to make a judgment, we would find that (4) makes Plantinga get into trouble most. (4) implies an inference from possibility to actuality, or in other words, from a definition to real existence. Davies argues:

> Let us agree that our world is a possible world. Let us also agree that a being with maximal excellence is possible and that it is therefore possible that such a being exists in every possible world. But it does not follow that there is actually any being with maximal excellence. What follows is that maximal excellence is possible. But what is merely possible does not have any real existence (Davies, 1982:37).

Plantinga gets into trouble not only with (4), but also with (3). But let us wait and see until the next section how omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection trouble classical theism as a whole.

Thus classical theists who hold the a priori proof seem to face a dilemma. If they try to proceed from a concept of God to his real existence, they would be terminated with impossibility. But if they try to proceed from a concept of God to a concept of necessary existence, they would be inevitably terminated with merely an abstraction. No classical theists choose the second way, so they inevitably embrace impossibility. Since the ontological argument is invalid in this sense, the other arguments which depend on it are also invalid.

These problems would not happen to Hartshorne, for the panentheistic God is dipolar. Whereas the classical theists do not accept an inference from a concept of God to a concept of necessary existence, Hartshorne does because he is not afraid to accept merely an abstraction.

Hartshorne agrees that Kant's refutation may cause difficulties to the first form of the ontological argument, but not the second one. In a defense of Anselmian argument, Hartshorne argues:

> I agree with Kant that actuality is never a conceptualizable aspect of a conceived thing, but ... "necessary existence" must be conceptually determinate, just as is "contingency."... Necessary existence is different in principle from ordinary existence. Common to both is "actualized somehow," i.e., in some suitable concrete state of actuality; however, whereas with ordinary species or individuals, only a certain class of possible experiences or states of affairs would exhibit suitable concretizations of the thing in question, with necessary existence, any experience or state of affairs would do this (Hartshorne, 1968: 313).

When the ontological argument is valid, it does not affect the other a posteriori proofs. The a posteriori proofs, as already mentioned, proceed from an effect to a cause. Let us consider the following procedures.

1. Proceeding from natural effects to natural causes.
2. Proceeding from natural effects to a transcendent cause.

While atheists accept only (1), theists could accept both (1) and (2). The difference between Hartshorne and classical theists is basically their expectation. From a posteriori proofs, all classical theists fully expect to reach the real existence of God, but Hartshorne simply expects to reach the logical possibility of God's existence. For Hartshorne, by "logical possibility" he means "conceivable without contradiction." From this he could proceed from

the cosmic order to the logical possibility of God's existence. In this way, he could use both the ontological argument and the a posteriori proofs to prove for the abstract aspect of God without falling into a circulus vitiosus.

What to keep in mind when reading Hartshorne is that the panentheistic God is a dipolar God. To understand the dipolar God, we need to make a distinction between an abstract pole and a concrete pole. In analogy, to understand "What is certain is uncertainty" or "Uncertainty is certain," we need to understand both certainty and uncertainty. Similarly, to understand the panentheistic God, we need to understand both a "certain" pole and an "uncertain" pole. Either of the two poles is not sufficient to be God, but both are.

2. A Defense of the Panentheistic Concept of God

The researcher intends to divide a defense here into two main parts: first, to argue against counter-arguments, and second, to maintain the advantages that Hartshorne's view has over its rivals. As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are certain criticisms from classical theism and pantheism. The central question which causes the classical theist, the pantheist and Hartshorne to be in disagreement is whether God is or is not independent of the universe of entities other than himself (Sia,1985: 85). The researcher thinks that the classical theist is mistaken that God is not affected by human actions, that he is totally impassible, or that he is not somehow saddened by human failings or enriched by his encounter with good people (Baltazar,1973: 159). Surely Hartshorne has a certain admiration for Spinoza and the pantheist in that they delivered the first significant wound to classical theism, from which it has not recovered, and indeed from which it cannot recover (Dombrowski, 1994:

132). However, this does not mean that Hartshorne and the pantheist are close friends. Even though Hartshorne and the pantheist agree on this point, it does not mean that their doctrines are identical. If they were identical, the pantheist would not argue that the abstract pole of God is meaninglessly superfluous. Indeed, Hartshorne's panentheism or neoclassical theism is just as far from Spinoza and pantheism as it is from classical theism. According to pantheism, God is no more transcendent, but immanent, or in other words, God and the world are identical. Up to the present no Christians have ever pronounced themselves advocates of pantheism, for pantheism ultimately makes God impersonal. If God is not a person,then he is not God as revealed in the Scriptures. Since God is no more than nature or substance, the argument for his existence can serve well for the existence of materialist matter. If for Spinoza self-causation (causa sui) is identical with necessary existence, we may summarize the argument as follows (Garrett, 1979: 204):

1. If a thing does not exist necessarily, then its nonexistence is conceivable.
2. If the nonexistence of a thing is conceivable, then its essence does not involve existence.
3. God is defined as a substance.
4. The essence of a substance involves existence.
5. Therefore, God exists necessarily.

The materialist can use the same form of argument to prove the existence of matter as follows:

1. If a thing does not exist necessarily, then its nonexistence is conceivable.

2. If the nonexistence of a thing is conceivable, then its essence does not involve existence.
3. Matter is defined as a substance.
4. The essence of a substance involves existence.
5. Therefore, Matter exists necessarily.

From this it follows that not only the Christians would not accept pantheism, but also the materialists. While the Christians do not agree with pantheism since the pantheist God is not God of the Scriptures, the materialists do not adopt it because the word "God" for them is just "meaningless and confusing." It seems to the researcher that it is hard to find someone in our time to defend pantheism. Any idea leading to pantheism is usually ignored by classical theism. The classical theist may ask the following questions when confronting with some views about God:

> Is this not tantamount to saying that God is the fullness of contingency and change? Is it not to deny that God is the Immutable, the Unchanging? Is it not the identification of God with Matter, and since matter is the highest form of contingency, transiency, and mutability, would not God then be equated with pure potency? Would not making God temporal like material creation destroy God's transcendence and his otherness and lead us into pantheism? (Baltazar, 1973: 148).

Classical theism would not agree with any view leading to pantheism. So there are only two alternatives for classical theism to react to pantheism: to object to it or to ignore it. Most (if not all) of the classical theists choose to ignore it since for them the pantheistic God is not God at all. For those who choose to object to pantheism, they may argue that pantheism makes miracles impossible,

since God cannot violate the order he has decreed. Some may object that pantheism usually leads to a denial of human freedom (Dombrowski, 1994: 132). They would argue that for pantheism if God is both thought and extension, then everything will have both its reason and its cause. And throughout nature there would be a parallel between thought and extension. This means either that for every physical event there is a corresponding mental event or, more likely, that anything whatever can be appropriately interpreted in two ways. As an intelligible whole, each thing has its reason. As an extended plenum each thing has its cause. Consequently, since it could not have been otherwise, each thing is the result of its causes or its reasons. From this it follows that human freedom is impossible. On this problem Hartshorne himself is not reluctant to express his opinion:

> A great merit of Whitehead ... is to have fully generalized the aspect of freedom or creativity inherent in the idea of God, so that it becomes inseparable from concrete actuality as such. God has divine freedom, man has human freedom, atoms have atomic freedom... it is purely arbitrary to stop with man and suppose the rest of creation to be simply without freedom... Whitehead takes creativity as essentially process, even in God (Hartshorne, 1973: 134).

However, our main concern here is to defend panentheism from the pantheist's criticism that an abstract pole of God is meaninglessly superfluous. The Hartshornian would argue that the abstract pole of God is not meaninglessly superfluous but meaningfully necessary. The world alone is not sufficient to be God as a person - God of the Scriptures. The abstract pole is the individual essence of deity, and this pole is what makes God God. Hartshorne argues:

> Is surrelativism a pantheistic doctrine? Not if this means a doctrine which denies the personality of deity; nor yet if it means that deity is identical with a mere collection of entities, as such, even the cosmic collection. The total actual state of deity-now, as surreltive to the present universe, has nothing outside itself, and in that sense is the All. But the individual essence of deity (what makes God God, or the divine divine) is utterly independent of this All, since any other possible all and there are infinite posibilities of different totalities) would have been compatible with this essence. The divine personal essence in this fashion infinitely transcends the de facto totality, and every moment a partly new totality contains and embodies the essence (Hartshorne's DR,1976: 88-89).

From this it follows that : "... most theologians have seen that Spinozism is not an acceptable interpretation of the God of religion" (Hartshorne's WVR,1981: 14). Hartshorne's argument against pantheism can be strongly supported by classical theism. The researcher agrees with Baltazar who tries to "knock out" the pantheist down to the ground:

> It is no solution to deny transcendence in order to emphasize immanence as is done in the myth of the eternal return. The obvious words in Scripture that salvation is beyond this world and that Christ's kingdom is not of this world cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the Scriptures also say that the kingkom of God is within you; that God is Emmanuel, i.e., God-with-us. The Incarnation as the presence of God among men is the central fact of the Christian faith. Thus, the New Heaven is also the New Earth. It would be false to this data to uphold immanence at the expense of transcendence (Baltazar, 1973: 146).

Now let us turn to the classical theist's arguments against panentheism or neoclassical theism. Let us consider Alston's contrasts first. However, there are quite a few points that the researcher sees differently from Alston. Contrasts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 are adapted. The following is the adjusted table.

Classical attributes	Neoclassical attributes
1. Absoluteness. God is completely independent of any given creature.	1. Both absoluteness and relativity. The abstract aspect of God is absolute, but the concrete aspect is relative. The concrete aspect includes the abstract and not vice versa.
2. No distinction between existence and actuality. God's existence is pure actuality.	2. Distinction between existence and actuality. Actuality is always more than bare existence. That the abstract nature is somehow concretely actualized is existence. How it is actualized is actuality.
3. A necessary being. God's existence is totally necessary.	3. An eminent process. God's existence is necessary, but God's actuality is contingent.
4. Absolute simplicity. God is a person.	4. Complexity. God is a compound person (an abstract pole plus a concrete pole which includes everything).
5. Creation ex nihilo. God could have refrained from creating the world.	5. God includes the world. God is not before but with the world; therefore, always God and the

	world have been in interaction.
6. Omnipotence. God has the power to do anything he wills to do.	6. Supreme power. God's power is unsurpassable power over all entities. God's power is absolutely maximal, but still one power among others.
7. Abstraction. God is essentially bodiless. He is monopolar.	7. Both abstraction and concreteness. God is dipolar. He has an abstract pole and a concrete pole.
8. Nontemporality. God is timeless. He does not live through a series of temporal moments.	8. Both eternity and temporality. God's actuality everlastingly lives through temporal succession, but his existence is timelessly necessary.
9. Immutability. God cannot change since there is no temporal succession in his being.	9. Both immutability and mutability. The abstract aspect of God is unchanging, but the concrete aspect is changing.
10. Absolute perfection. God is eternally that than which no more perfect can be conceived.	10. Both absolute perfection and relative perfectibility. God's ethical perfection is absolute and hence immutable, but God's aesthetic perfectibility is relative and hence evergrowing.

Regarding contrast 1, we would find that if the classical theist's thesis that God be completely independent of the world and any given creature is true, then God would not be really the highest form of reality, i.e., not really supreme

since the total separation between God and the world entails something superior to God and the world - something which contains or includes both of them. In other words, if the relation of God to the world really fell outside God, then this relation would necessarily fall within some further entity which included or embraced both God and the world and the relations between them. Hence, according to Hartshorne, we must accept that God-creature relation is internal to God, otherwise we would have to admit that there is something greater or more inclusive than God (Dombrowski, 1994: 135). Hartshorne argues: "To include relations is to include their terms. Hence to know all is to include all. Thus we must agree with modern absolutism and orthodox Hinduism that the supreme being must be all inclusive" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 76). The classical theist seems to confront with a dilemma: if God is totally independent of the world, then he is not supreme, but if God is internally related to the world, then he is not absolute in the classical sense. Since the classical theists "identified the God of religion with what philosophers sometimes call "the absolute," meaning by "absolute" totally independent of all else, entirely without change, and a sum of all possible perfections" (Hartshorne's WVR, 1981: 12), they would never admit that God is internally related to the world. Hence they certainly accept the thesis that God is totally independent of the world. If so, they in no way avoid admitting that their God is not supreme. The result here is beyond their expectation. In the last chapter the classical theists argue that the panentheistic God is not supreme because he has a concrete aspect of contingent actuality. But now it turns out that it is their God who is not supreme because he is absolutely independent of the world. Having a concrete aspect, on the one hand, does not preclude the panentheistic God from being supreme because he remains unsurpassable by any entity except himself. Being absolutely independent of the world, on the other hand, does prevent the

classical God from being supreme since the total separation between God and the world implies some greater entity which includes both of them.

Regarding contrasts 2-4, we would find that the central thesis, unacceptable to classical theism, is that God's actuality is contingent or dependent on something uncertain in the future. This thesis would finally lead to the problem of omniscience which is considered by the classical theist as one of the two main disadvantages of the panentheistic God. As we have already seen, the classical theist argues that the concrete aspect of God would destroy not only his pure actuality and total necessity, but also his omniseience in the orthodox sense. Now let us consider omniscience more profoundly. It would be generally agreed that "omniscient" means "all-knowing" and that to call God omniscient is to say that he is all-knowing. But those who have called God omniscient have had different views about what it means for God to be all-knowing. There are three distinct understandings of "God is omniscient" (Davies, 1982: 86) :

(1) God timelessly knows all that was, is, and will be true.
(2) God now knows all that was, is, and will be true.
(3) God now knows only what was and is true, and all that will be true in so far as it is determined by what is already the case.

(1) depends on the view that God is timeless. It maintains that what God knows is all that was, is true, and will be true; and it adds that God knows all this timelessly. The classical theist adopts (1) and always tries to defend it. An objection to the conception of omniscience may be that if God is omniscient then human freedom is impossible. The argument runs as follows (Davies, 1982: 86):

1. If God is omniscient, he knows all that will be true in the future.
2. If someone knows that-P, it follows that -P.
3. If God knows that some future event will come to pass, it cannot be true that the event will not come to pass.
4. If it is true that some future event cannot but come to pass, then the event is necessary.
5. If a human action is free, it cannot be necessary.
6. Therefore, if God is omniscient, there can be no future, free human actions.

The classical theist like Davies argues that when dealing with necessity we need to make a distinction between necessity de dicto (logical necessity) and necessity de re (ontlogical necessity). We are dealing with necessity de dicto if we are dealing with a proposition that is logically true, e.g. "If Socrates is dying, he is dying.' On the other hand, we are dealing with necessity de re, if we have a statement like "Socrates is dying necessarily." This is a statement about Socrates and it means that nothing could prevent Socrates from dying. Those who think that "God is omniscient" and "There are some future, free actions" are incompatible want to summarize that if God is omniscient, then future free actions are necessary. But this can mean either (1) '"If God knows that Socrates will die tomorrow, then Socrates will die tomorrow" is necessarily true,' or (2) '"God knows that Socrates will die tomorrow" entails that Socrates will necessarily die tomorrow. Davies and the classical theist hold that (1) is true, but (2) is not. "If Socrates is dying, he is dying" is necessary. But this does not mean that Socrates always dies necessarily or that nothing could prevent Socrates from dying. Hence Davies concludes: "So there is no contradiction in holding that God can know of a free action in advance. And

this is one reason why there is no contradiction between divine omniscience and human freedom" (Davies, 1982: 89).

If the objection to the classical view of the compatibility between divine omniscience and human freedom does not work, then let us turn to another objection. In his book Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes Hartshorne considers omniscience as the third mistake (Hartshorne, 1984: 3). Hartshorne, as he always does with all other analyses, divides views of omniscience into three: (A) God is knowing in all aspects, (B) God is knowing in some aspects, and (C) God is knowing in no aspects. (A) and (C), obviously opposite to each other, are the extreme possible versions of the assertion of omniscience. (A) is considered as the classical view which holds the idea of the highest conceivable or divine knowledge, which correctly surveys events throughtout time and in this sense is "free from error or ignorance." (C) is the opposite extreme which denies that there is any highest conceivable form of knowledge, (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984:38). Hartshorne points out that classical theism which holds (A) argues that "since God is unchangeably perfect, whatever happens must be eternally known to God. Our tomorrow's deeds, not yet decided upon by us, are yet always or eternally present to God, for whom there is no open future. Otherwise..., God would be 'ignorant', imperfect in knowledge, waiting to observe what we may do" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984:3). Hartshorne remarks that for classical theists perfect and unchanging knowledge, free from ignorance or increase, are the key terms, but these terms, he argues, are based on their misunderstanding of God's nature. Hartshorne says:

> It is interesting that the idea of an unchangeable omniscience covering every detail of the world's history is not to be found definitely stated

> in ancient Greek philosophy (unless in Stoicism, which denied human freedom) and is rejected by Aristotle. It is not clearly affirmed in the Bible. It is inconspicuous in the philosophies of India, China and Japan. Like the idea of omnipotence, it is largely an invention of Western thought of the Dark or Middle Ages. It still goes unchallenged in much current religious thought. But many courageous and competent thinkers have rejected it, including Schelling and Whitehead (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984:3-4).

Further objection to the classical view of omniscience may be that divine omniscience and timelessness are incompatible. We could argue that divine omniscience involves foreknowledge. But it is obviously false if we hold that "God is omniscient" means that God timelessly knows all that was, is, and will be true. For on this view of omniscience there can be no divine foreknowledge. Since God is timeless, there are no events which are past from his point of view, and none which is contemporary, and none which is to come. If God knows an event he can know it only by reference to his location in time, a location which, being timeless, he does not have.* Hence omniscience and timelessness are incompatible.

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*Since God is timeless, how can he be related to the spatio-temporal world? It is hard to see a timeless God can relate himself to spatio-temporal creatures. The researcher agrees with Dr. Wit that it is difficult for classical theism to resolve this problem satisfactorily. See Wit Witsadhavet, 1993. Philosophy: Man, the World and the Meaning of Life (in Thai). 11th ed. Bangkok: Aksorncharoenthat Press, pp 30-33.

If the classical theist's position, which holds that (1) God timelessly knows all that was, is and will be true, is refuted, then there are two alternatives left : either (2) God now knows all that was, is, and will be true, or (3) God now knows only what was and what is true, and all that will be true in so far as it is determined by what is already the case. But (2) for some theists will lead to the notion of "eternal now" which seems explicitly contradictory and unintelligible. Others simply admit that (2) is left unanswerable, as Wainwright puts it: "Perhaps God's knowlege of future contingents is ... groundless. The answer to "How does God know the future?" may be "He just does"" (Wainwright 1988: 24). Therefore, only (3) is left for us, and (3) is compatible with Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of divine knowledge. Hartshorne argues :

> ... there is a highest conceivable or divine knowledge , free from error or ignorance; however, since events in time do not form a totality fixed once for all, but are endlessly growing accumulation of additional actualities, to view all time in a changeless fashion would be an erroneous view and not at all the highest conceivable or divine form of knowledge... God does not already or eternally know what we do tomorrow, for, until we decide, there are no such entities as our tomorrow's decisions (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 38-39).

It is hard for classical theists to agree with Hartshorne. If God does not already know what we do tomorrow, why should we call him God? The simplest answer to this question is "why not?" The panentheistic God still knows and feels what we are thinking, feeling and planning now. No people could hide or conceal their present thought, feelings and plans from him no matter those matters are good or evil. Supposing that an agent X is planning now that he will have his hair cut next Thursday. The panentheistic God knows

that an agent X is planning now that he will have his hair cut next Thursday, but he does not already know that on Thursday an agent X really has his hair cut because an agent X's actual decision - making does not happen yet. However, since the panentheistic God always knows what we are thinking, feeling and planning now, he can bless us and provide us with his divine grace or providence. If the classical theist does not accept this, she will face a dilemma. As we have already seen, if she chooses (1) which holds that God timelessly knows all that was, is, and will be true, she will meet the result that omniscience and timelessness are incompatible. On the contrary, if she adopts (2) which holds that God now knows all that was, is, and will be true, she will eventually face the problem that "eternal now" is unintelligible.

Regarding contrast 5, we have not much to say since many classical theists themselves admit that creation ex nihilo has still been the subject of much controversy up to the present. So let us turn to contrast 6: omnipotence. The classical theist considers the problem of omnipotence as the other main disadvantage of the panentheistic view. As we have already seen, the classical theist holds the thesis that in order to be God, namely, supreme and worthy of worship, God must have unlimited power, i.e, power to do any thing he wills to do.

If God's omnipotence or all-powerfulness does not necessarily entail totalitarianism, then how the Hartshornian could refute divine omnipotence in the classical sense. The problem which delivered the fatal wound to the classical view of divine omnipotence, especially in the sight of all atheists, is the problem of evil. As a challenge to classical theism, the problem of evil has traditionally been posed in the form of a dilemma: if God is perfectly loving, God must wish to abolish all evils; and if God is all-powerful, God must be

able to abolish all evils. But evils exist; therefore, God cannot be both omnipotent and perfectly loving (Hick, 1990: 39-40). The researcher believes that the classical theists have got into trouble with the problem of evil up to the present time. If by "God is omnipotent" the classical theists mean "whatever God chooses to do, he succeeds in doing" (Swinburne, 1994: 129), they are forced to admit "God must be responsible for all evils." Hartshorne says: "Had God "all the power there is," he must be responsible for all that happens" (Hartshorne, 1963: 331). Hartshorne thinks that the classical definition of omnipotence can be misleading in that it can be taken to mean that God can do anything that can be done. He argues :

> The divine excellence is a uniquely excellent way of interacting with others, of being active and passive in relation to them. We can do things to God by deciding over our own being, with necessary help from God, as settings limits to the disorder inherent in freedom, and as inspiring us to take our place in the cosmic order as best we can. God loves us as we partly make ourselves to be, not simply as we are divinely made to be. To say that a lover is uninfluenced by a partly self-made loved one is nonsense or contradiction.* Omnipotence was often taken in a way that amounts to that contradiction (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 45).

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*According to Aristotle, in all cases, S knows Y implies S is influenced by Y. In the case of God, it is not true that God is influenced by Y; therefore, it is not true that God knows Y. But according to St. Thomas and classical theists, in all cases except God, S knows Y implies S is influenced by Y, but in application to God, they reverse the relation, i.e., Y is influenced by S. This is what Hartshorne considers nonsense or contradiction.

It is obvious, for not only atheists but also all people, that the world contains a great deal of evil. But for classical theists this fact does not affect God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence. Both Augustine and Aquinas maintained that evil is negative and we can define evil as a privation of goodness (Davies, 1993:89). For both philosophers and other classical theists God created his creation and found it good. All God's creation is nothing but good, and hence what we call evil must be other than what God created. For example, God created us as creatures with eyes. It is good to be a creature with eyes. But blindness is evil. Blindness is not something positive but a privation of goodness. (Hick, 1990:42) The question that can be immediately raised here is: Why did God allow such kind of evil? Many classical theists are not reluctant to answer that ambiguity, evil and suffering are necessary conditions for morality. Without ambiguity, evil and suffering morality would have no significance.

The researcher thinks that Hartshorne would have no problem with the classical theist justification of evil and morality since both evil and morality presuppose freedom. The only problem that Hartshorne has with classical theism here is omnipotence in the classical sense. Hartshorne is not confused between omnipotence and totalitarianism as the classical theists accuse. On the contrary, Hartshorne is very clear that if we define omnipotence in the classical sense, we are unavoidably forced to accept that God must be responsible for all evils.

Regarding contrast 7, we find that the classical theist's interpretation and analogy are misleading. The interpretation that the world for Hartshorne is the body of God sounds Cartesian-minded. Hartshorne never pronounces, though he used to make an analogy that God is to the world as our

consciousness is to our bodies, that the world or creation is a body, and that God is a mind or soul. On the contrary, he considers both God and the world in a term of feeling or experience. What he maintains is the dipolar God who has both abstract and concrete poles. Similarly, for Hartshorne divine inclusiveness is never described as being like the inclusion of marbles in a box, but it is described as being like the inclusion of living cells within a living body. Thus Dombrowski is right when he says : "... Alston ... inaccurately thinks of divine inclusiveness in Hartshorne as physical containment, on the model of marbles in a box, or in idealistic terms wherein theorems are contained in a set of axioms" (Dombrowski, 1994: 145).

Regarding contrasts 8-10, we find that the main thing in Hartshorne's view that is unacceptable to classical theism is the concrete aspect of God. Since the concrete aspect of God is temporal, this is sufficient to make God relative, potential, contingent, corporeal and mutable. The concrete aspect puts limitations to God. If God is limited, then he does not deserve to be God at all. Considering God's perfection, we would find that the central problem between the Hartshornian and the classical theist is from their different views of eternity. The claim that there is a God involves the claim that there exists a supreme person eternally. But there are two different ways of understanding this: that he is everlasting, i.e., exists at every moment of time or that he is timeless, i.e., he exists outside time (Swinburne, 1994: 137). While the Hartshornian accepts both the former and the latter, the classical theist accepts only the latter. Hartshorne realizes well that if God is totally timeless, then he will not know or love us. Hence, to be able to know or love us, God has to include time in his nature. Hartshorne uses the conception of "unsurpassibility " or "eminence" to clear away all theological mistakes. He says "Eminence is not the same as absoluteness, or "perfection" in the platonic sense. Eminent

means exalted beyond possible rivalry; God must be unsurpassable by any other conceivable reality" (Hartshorne, 1973: 120). Accordingly, for Hartshorne, God is, at any moment, more perfect than any other individual, but he is surpassable by himself at a later stage of development in terms of his knowledge. Thus there is nothing wrong with the thesis that God grows or changes if and only if this does not mean that God decays. Hartshorne argues :

> Thus there is no reason why perfect knowledge could not change, grow in content, provided it changed only as its objects changed, and added as new items to its knowledge only things that were not in being, not there to know, previously (Hartshorne, 1963: 327).

Historically speaking, classical theism is not static. Classical theists can become either conservative or progressive. They become conservative if they only revise or adjust their status quo doctrines. On the other hand, they would become progressive if they try to liberate their fundamental doctrines. It seems to the researcher that what makes a classical theist remain the classical theist is the negation of divine temporality and limitation. Therefore, it is very difficult for many classical theists to adopt the panentheistic God. For if they do so, they would be no more classical theists.

However, according to all theists, no matter they are classical theists, pantheists or panentheists, for a God to be God, they all agree, he needs to accomplish both theological and religious requirements: supreme and worthy of worship. What makes them fundamentally different is their different views on "supreme" and "worthy of worship." According to classical theism, God is supreme and worthy of worship if and only if he is the highest person of no limitation who is timeless and perfectly good. Since the panentheistic God,

according to classical theism, fails to fulfill these attributes, he cannot be God at all.

Classical theists, the researcher thinks, are mistaken. As we have already seen, it is the classical God who cannot be supreme since if he is absolutely independent of the world then there must be something superior than them. The panentheistic God, though temporal in one aspect, can be supreme and worthy of worship. The panentheistic God changes or increases only his knowledge, but not his power and goodness. The panentheistic God is still all-powerful. He can even destroy the world if he wills to do so. In principle, God has only one limitation. Even though God can destroy the world, he cannot make it disappear into nothingness since he did not make creation ex nihilo.

In application of the notion of unsurpassibility to divine attributes, Hartshorne can resolve all the difficulties faced by classical theism. So by "divine omnipotence" Hartshorne means "supreme power," and by "divine omniscience" he means "supreme knowledge." Since these new interpretations could resolve all traditional problems, why should the classical theist consider them as disadvantages ?

3. Panentheism's Four Points of Advantage

So far we have argued against criticisms of Hartshorne's neoclassical theism or panentheism. Now it is time to consider advantages panentheism has over its rivals. The researcher believes that panentheism has at least four main advantages over its rivals.

First, Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God seems to be compatible with modern physics which holds a view of the world very similar to the views held by Eastern mystics. According to Eastern mystics - no matter they are Hindus, Buddhists or Taoists - all entities and events perceived by the senses are interdependent and are nothing but different aspects or modes of the same ultimate reality (Capra, 1983: 24). Whereas the classical physicist or the Newtonian has seen the world as a multitude of separate objects and events, the modern physicist "has come to see the world as a system of inseparable, interacting and ever-moving components with the observer being an integral part of this system" (Capra, 1983: 25). In other words, whereas the classical physicist has seen the world as "mechanic," the modern physicist has seen it as "organic" (Capra, 1983: 24). Correspondingly, whereas the classical theist has seen God as a ruler who directs the world from above, the Hartshornian views "God as the Fellow-Traveler" who promises to be with his creatures forever (Aquino, 1994: 6). In other words, whereas the classical theist views God as "absolutely independent," Hartshorne views God as "social" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 25). Hartshorne, unlike the classical theist, holds that God is not outside reality since God as social includes the world which has reciprocal interaction with him, but simultineously, unlike the pantheist, he does not identify God with the world since there is so much that is evil and unholy in the world. The panentheistic concept of God seems to be compatible with the concept of God appearing in Brihad-aranyaka Upanishad (3.7.15):

He who, dwelling in all things,
Yet is other than all things,
Whom all things do not know,
Whose body all things are,
Who controls all things from within-

He is your Soul, the Inner Controller,
The Immortal.

Surprisingly, Hartshorne's panentheism and Capra's Tao of physics seem to go hand in hand. Both doctrines argue against Greek atomism and Newtonian mechanism. Both Hartshorne and Capra do not agree with the Greek atomists who drew a clear line between spirit and matter, picturing matter as being made of several "basic building blocks." For the Greek atomists the basic building blocks or atoms are purely passive and intrinsically dead particles moving in the void (Capra, 1983: 21) while for Hartshorne atoms are "living" entities which have freedom or creativity like all other sentient creatures. Thus Hartshorne is not reluctant to comment:

> There is another lesson to be drawn from Greek atomism. This is that the Greek bias in favor of being as more basic than becoming expressed itself not only in Parmenides' denial of real change, in Plato's exaltation of his eternal forms, or Aristotle's doctrine of the Unmoved Mover (or his denial of evolution) but equally in the origins of materialism. Only Heraclitus among the Greeks saw what countless Buddhists in Asia saw (though the Mahayana branch of Buddhism seriously compromised the insight), the primacy of becoming. And Greek thinkers could not quite assimilate becoming into their total view, though Plato and Aristotle tried to do that very thing (Hartshorne's IOGT, 1983: 19).

Hartshorne has developed panpsychism and panentheism through the adoption of becoming or process. In a process view, experience is always of experience. As he puts it:

> Process is experiencing, mostly in nonhuman forms, but including the eminent form. Experiencing always has data or things experienced. In a process view, concrete data can only be other processes, other experiences. Experience is always of experience or "feeling of feeling." I held some such view long before I knew about Whitehead (Hartshorne, 1973: 130).

God as an eminent experience or process includes all other experiences or processes. The relation between God and his creatures is, hence, genuinely internal. The way God as social includes the world and all creatures is like the way the living body includes its living cells. God and his creatures interact with each other the same way as the living body has interaction with its living cells. That is the reason why Hartshorne considers God as Creator-Creature. This view is compatible with the view of modern physics which parallels to the views of Eastern mystics. As Capra puts it:

> In modern physics, the universe is thus experienced as a dynamic, inseparable whole which always includes the observer in an essential way. In this experience, the traditional concepts of space and time, of isolated objects, and of cause and effect, lose their meaning. Such an experience, however, is very similar to that of the Eastern mystics. The similarity becomes apparent in quantum and relativity theory, and becomes even stronger in the "quantum-relativistic" models of subatomic physics where both these theories combine to produce the most striking parallels to Eastern mysticism (Capra, 1983: 81).

Second, when comparing with its rivals, Hartshorne's panentheism conforms to the most rigorous logical analysis. It seems to the researcher that

Hartshorne's concept of God is the result of a long evolution of human understanding of God. As already mentioned, Hartshorne has been deeply influenced by Whitehead. If it is the case that Whitehead has come so far on the concept of deity, then Hartshorne has come further. In order to see how far the evolution of the divine concept has come through Whitehead, let us consider Hartshorne's remarks as follows :

> Whitehead... knew fairly well what the Church Fathers had had to say on the subject; he was also acquainted with Plato's and Aristotle's ideas of deity, and the views of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, and Bradley. He had some knowledge of Hindu, Buddhist, and Chinese religious thought. As a son of a Church of England clergyman (and brother of a bishop) he doubtless knew what "God" usually meant to churchgoers and was familiar with the Scriptures. He had done some reading in the anthropology of religion ... Thus he was to a considerable extent on his own in working out an alternative to the standard metaphysical concept of deity as it had prevailed for about 18 centuries, to some extent since Aristotle (Hartshorne's WVR,1981:11).

Hartshorne has come further than Whitehead in that it is Hartshorne who made the full elaboration of a philosophical theology and resolved some unresolved problems in Whitehead's theism.* Both Whitehead and Hartshorne view classical theism and pantheism as the two extremes. Both of them realize that the two extremes finally confront with unresolvable difficulties. Whereas the classical theist faces the problem of God's supremacy, the pantheist with the

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*See Charles Hartshorne & Creighton Peden. (1981). Whitehead's View of Reality. New York : The Pilgrim Press, pp. 21-24.

problem of God's personality. Hartshorne, hence, suggests the law of polarity, which he says he has taken over from Morris Cohen (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:2). According to this law, "ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of (ultimate categories such as) simplicity, being, actuality and the like, each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality and related categories" (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:2). This law maintains that the two poles stand or fall together. Neither pole is to be denied or regarded as unreal. If either pole is real, the contrast itself is also real. (Sia, 1985:46). However, the two poles are asymmetrical: what is concrete includes what is abstract, and not vice versa. Consequently, metaphysical categories as exemplified by concrete realities are always to be found in pairs. No concrete individual is merely simple, it is also complex. There is no such thing just as an effect. The same entity is, in another aspect, also a cause. No concrete entity can be merely considered as necessary, for in a different context it can be also considered as contingent (Sia, 1985: 46). In application of this law to God Hartshorne can describe God in dual terms such as "relative-absolute", "contingent-necessary", "effect-cause", "chageable-unchangeable", "time-eternity." The law of polarity or the principle of dual transcendence places God not on either side of the metaphysical contraries but on both sides. This law makes Hartshorne's logical analysis the most rigorous when comparing with those of the classical theist and the pantheist. Whereas the other two schools regard only one pole of the contraries as superior to its correlative, and neglect the inferior pole, the Hartshornian regards both poles as real. In terms of Hegelian logic Hartshorne's panentheism may be considered as synthesis whereas classical theism and pantheism may be considered as thesis and antithesis respectively. But this must not make us misunderstand for Hartshorne's principle of dual transcendence is not identical to Hegel's

dialectical logic. As Hubbeling puts it: "The relation between the two contrasts is not that of a conjunction, but that of an inclusion: not A and B, but A in B" (Hubbeling, 1991:359). In terms of Peircean categories, to which Hartshorne may prefer, Hartshorne's panentheism may be regarded as Thirdness (generality) while classical theism and pantheism as Firstness (quality) and Secondness (reaction) respectively. To see this clearly, we may put their views into a schema as follows:

Firstness : God as the absolute (Classical theism)
Secondness : God as the relative (Pantheism)
Thirdness : God as the absolute in the relative (Panentheism)

Hartshorne's principle of dual transcendence, in some sense, seems compatible with Taoist logic which holds that the two poles are interdependent.*

Third, Hartshorne's panentheism conforms to the new metaphysics of time. It is not exaggerated to assume that the Christian tradition is the outcome of Jerusalem and Athens. Most (if not all) Christian thinkers agree that we have a supernatural knowledge revealed by God, though they are not at all of one accord in the contribution of natural knowledge (Miller, 1972: 119). In terms of natural knowledge, the notion of time is no exception. It was some early Greek philosophers who established the dichotomy between change and permanence and identified change with time and permanence with timelessness. This view of time also established the distinction between substances as permanent and accidents as contingent and changeable (Baltazar,1973:147).

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*See Arthur Waley. 1987. The Way and Its Power. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 143-144.

The classical theist views time as the Greeks did. According to Greek philosophy time was seen as negative. It was not thought of as evolutionary or productive. "Rather, things are destroyed in time, which is therefore negative" (Baltazar,1973:149). Plato viewed time as unreal because it is just a "moving image of eternity."* For Plato things in time are mere shadows or copies of the eternal ideas or forms which are empty of contingency and change. For Aristotle time can be regarded as a numbering process associated with our perception of "before" and "after" in motion and change.** Aristotle realized that the relation between time and change is a reciprocal one: without change time could not be recognized, whereas without time change could not occur (Whitrow,1988:42). In Plotinus' metaphysics, the sensible world is derived by a fall from the One, and time is nothing but the measure of this degradation (Baltazar,1973:149). Even though there was no uninque Greek idea of time, the Greeks viewed time as negative. Since time was viewed as essentially negative and contingent, it would be contrary to the nature of God. Hence God's eternity would have to be thought of as the absence from time or timelessness not as endless time (Baltazar,1973:150). Similarly, for classical theism " God is eternal" always means "God is timeless." Hartshorne agrees with this notion of eternity. But he distinguishes between eternity and immortality. Whereas eternity is identical to timelessness, immortality is the same as everlastingness. In contrast to the Greek view of time, Hartshorne, like other modern thinkers, regards time as positive and evolutionary. He uses the modern notion of time with God's concrete aspect. Since time is positive

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*See Plato. 1983. Timaeus and Critias, 37 d. Trans. by Desmond Lee. Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., p.51.

**See Aristotle. Physics IV.222b. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Trans. by Richard Mckeon. New York: Random House.

and evolutionary, "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is less concrete than our God now" (Hartshorne,1973: 133). For Hartshorne whereas pastness is determinate actual reality, future events are indeternate potential reality. "The future is the as-yet-uncreated, the partly unsettled or indefinite, that concerning which choices are decisions still to be made, and even now in part are being made. Of course, therefore, the future lacks the full reality or definiteness of the past" (Hartshorne,1967: 251). But this does not mean that there is nothing at all determinate about it. There must be some determinateness, or else there will be chaos. The determinateness of the future is caused by "will-be's" and "will-not- be's." The nearer the future is to us the more determinate it appears. "That is the reason why at times the future can be predicted, since there are laws which ... can be observed as having occurred in the past yet have application to the future" (Sia, 1985: 63-64). Hartshorne maintains that time unites determinate, actual past reality with indeterminate, potential future reality. Thus it would appear that the past is indestructible or immortal. In appliacation of this notion of time to God, it follows that God knows more at any one moment than at the preceding moment. That is the reason why he says that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is less concrete than our God now.

Unhappy with Hartshorne's application of the new notion of time to God, the classical theist would argue against it. Even though contemporary classical theists realize that: "Because the thought pattern of modern man is historical and evolutionary a relevant theology today must adopt the evolutionary pattern of thought" (Baltazar, 1973: 145), they certainly do not hesitate to argue:

> The process philosophers and theologians of the Whiteheadean tradition... speak of the temporality of God... To speak thus is closer

> to the view of the Scriptures than is the Hellenic view of God's atemporality. Unfortunately, these thinkers equate temporality with finitude, growth, and contingency, so that God is said to grow... Consequently, in predicating temporality of God, they are forced to hold that God grows and is contingent, while at the same time holding his ontological priority as the infinite and the absolute (Baltazar, 1973: 153-154).

What the classical theist is afraid is God's growth since the divine growth implies his non-absoluteness in the classical sense. But this is a misunderstanding. For Hartshorne even though God is changing in some aspects, he is still absolute. We must not forget that God for Hartshorne is dipolar. While his concrete pole is relative, i.e., changing and related to his creatures, his abstract pole is absolute. By absoluteness Hartshorne means immutability and independence. There are some aspects in God which do not change. First, God's superiority is immutable. He remains superior to all other creatures , no matter what. And since God is not only actually but also logically superior, his superiority is one in principle (Sia, 1985: 42). Second, God's capacity to be affected by his creatures does not preclude him from having attributes which are unaffected. In this sense he is completely independent of all other creatures (Sia, 1985: 42). Hence, when Hartshorne says " God grows," what he means is merely:

> God can increase in value simply by acquiring new content in the awareness with which he enjoys the new world-states as they come into being. He is not stronger or better or holier, but only richer in experienced content. The gain is aesthetic, not ethical or in power (Hartshorne, 1973: 119).

Fourth, Hartshorne's panentheism can guarantee and preserve the values upon which religion insists. The values upon which religion insists are divine love and goodness. Hartshorne believes that both classical theism and pantheism cannot guarantee and preserve these values. It seems obvious that pantheism fails to preserve these values at the outset since the pantheist God is regarded as impersonal. In other words, the pantheistic God is not the God of religion at all. As Ellwood puts it:

> Better, according to impersonalists, to understand God as pure being and consciousness without the hindrance of personality - let the Absolute be like an unstained mirror, out of which all things rise and fall, itself untouched by their vicissitudes (Ellwood, 1978: 153).

But God in the Judaeo- Christian - Islamic tradition is personal. Therefore, the personal monotheist "can speak of God as having a sense of purpose, as loving, as being the eternal friend" (Ellwood, 1978, p.153). The personal monotheistic view of God is closer to the view of the Scripture which holds "God is love," (I John 4:8) than the pantheistic view is. Both Hartshorne and the classical theist are personal monotheists, so they both agree that God is personal. But, as we have already seen there is a significant difference between their views of God. While the classical theist holds that God is a person (Swinburne 1994: 126), Hartshorne maintains that God is but a social person or compound individual. Since Hartshorne and the classical theist see God differently, they see divine love differently. Since the classical theist views God as absolute in all aspects, she has to make a distinction between earthly love and heavenly love. God's love is heavenly love which is "like the sun's way of doing good which benefits the myriad forms of life on earth but receives no benefits from the good it produces." But this, the researcher thinks, is quite a

misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, even though the sun is considered as the center of the solar system, it both affects and is affected by the earth and all other planets which are its subordinates. It happens the same to God. If God is absolute in all aspects as the classical theist thinks, he will never be able to love his creatures since "to love" means "to be influenced by." So even though God is supreme like the sun, he is influenced by his creatures if he loves them. For Hartshorne love is "defined as social awareness" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 36). He understands love as adequate awareness of the value of others. Thus God's love is essentallly social. Hartshorne says :

> The dilemma appears final: either value is social, and then its perfection cannot be wholly within the power of any one being, even God; or it is not social at all, and then the saying "God is love" is an error (Hartshorne, 1963: 327).

For classical theism it is certain that God's love is not social, i.e., not be influenced by his creatures. From this it follows that God's love is not love at all. To see this clearly, we may put the argument into a syllogism as follows:

> All love is social.
> God's love (for classical theism) is not social.
> Therefore, God's love (for classical theism) is not love at all.

Now let us turn to the other value, namely, God's goodness. According to Hick, in the New Testament God's goodness, love, and grace are all nearly synonymous, and the most typical of the three terms is love (Hick, 1990:11). Here the researcher separates divine goodness from love in order to discuss the problem of evil clearly. Regarding the problem of evil, the

researcher feels that both classical theism and pantheism cannot guarantee and preserve God's goodness. It is the problem of evil which has created insoluble difficulties for all theists except process thinkers. This problem has been an important tool for atheists to argue against the existence of God. Since it is obvious that evils, both moral and natural, exist, the atheists conclude that God does not exist. Both theists and atheists accept the existence of evils. However, the difference between them is that for theists the proposition "God exists" is compatible with the proposition "Evil exists," but not for atheists. The problem of evil may be used to argue against pantheism in the form of syllogism as follows :

The world contains a great deal of evil.
God is the world.
Therefore, God contains a great deal of evil.

If God contains a great deal of evil, then he is not perfectly good. If God is not perfectly good, then he is not worthy of worship. It is true that the world contains a great deal of evil. From this it would finally lead to the conclusion that the pantheistic God is not worthy of worship. Similarly, the problem of evil may be used to challenge classical theism as follows:

If God is perfectly good, God must wish to abolish all evils.
But evils exitst.
Therefore, God is not perfectly good.

If God is not perfectly good, then he is not worthy of worship. It is true that evils exist. Hence from this it follows that the classical God is not worthy of worship.

The researcher thinks that in so far as God is regarded as absolute in all aspects and creates the world out of nothing, the above argument does not seem to be refuted. Classical theism always considers God as absolute in all aspects who creates the world out of nothing. Therefore, it seems difficult for classical theists to refute the above argument.

Some people think that the problem of evil could also challenge Hartshorne's panentheism. They may argue, as we have already seen, as follows:

> If God includes the world, then he includes imperfect entities.
> If God includes imperfect entities, then he is imperfect.
> If God is imperfect, then he is not worthy of worship.
> God includes imperfect entities.
> Therefore, he is imperfect and so not worthy of worship.

The above argument sounds correct, but indeed it does not. The proposition "If God includes imperfect entities, then he is imperfect" is not true. If "God includes the world" means the same thing as "God is the world," then the proposition will be true. For if God is the world and the world is imperfect, then we can deduce that God is imperfect. But "God includes the world" is not identical with "God is the world." Therefore, we cannot deduce that God is imperfect. For Hartshorne "God includes the world" means "God exceeds the world", as he puts it :

> One important reason for not giving up the notion that God literally contains the universe is derived from the theory of value. If A contains the value of B and also some additional value, then the value

of A exceeds that of B. This is perhaps the only assumption that makes "better" self-evident (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 90).

According to Hartshorne, "God includes the world" does not mean "God creates the world out of nothing." Hartshorne believes that God is "not before but with" the world. Like God, all creatures even atoms have freedom or creativity. If evils happen, then it is their responsibilities, not God's. Thus freedom is considered as the root of all evil and all good. Hartshorne argues :

> The root of evil, suffering, misfortune, wickedness, is the same as the root of all good, joy, happiness, and that is freedom, decision making. If, by a combination of good management and good luck, X and Y harmonize in their decisions, the AB they bring about may be good and happy; if not, not. To attribute all good to good luck, or all to good management, is equally erroneous. Life is not and cannot be other than a mixture of the two. God's good management is the explanation of there being a cosmic order that limits the scope of freedom and hence of chance-limits, but does not reduce to zero. With too much freedom, with nothing like laws of nature (which, some of us believe, are divinely decided and sustained), there could be only meaningless chaos; with too little, there could be only such good as there may be in atoms and molecules by themselves, apart from all higher forms. With no creaturely freedom at all, there could not even be that, but at most God alone, making divine decisions-about what? It is the existence of many decision makers that produces everything, whether good or ill. It is the existence of God that makes it possible for the innumerable decisions to add up to a coherent and basically

> good world where opportunities justify the risks. Without freedom, no risks -and no opportunities (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 18).

As already mentioned before, evil, suffering and ambiguity can be justified as necessary conditions for morality to be significant. The definition of evil as a privation of goodness, as proposed by St. Augustine, is acceptable to not only classical theists, but also pantheists and panentheists. It seems to the researcher that among theists, no matter they are classical theists, pantheists or panetheists, the problem of evil has never diminished their belief in God's existence. All theists or believers have a common contention that God's existence is compatible with the presence of evil. Thus the theists or believers usually sympathize with one another on the problem of evil. But this never happens to atheists. Both theists and atheists are competing rivals who never sympathize with each other. Whereas the theists hold a "conjunction" of God and evil, the atheists hold an "either-or" between the two. Surely, the atheists reject the existence of God and accept the presence of evil. And as we have just seen, the atheists can challenge or even refute divine goodness according to pantheism and classical theism by the problem of evil. Thus among the three schools only Hartshorne's panentheism can guarantee and preserve divine love and divine goodness from the attack of the problem of evil. In summary, Hartshorne's panentheism has advantages over pantheism and classical theism no matter whether we make our judgment from physics, logic, metaphysics or philosophy of religion.