CHAPTER 2

HARTSHORNE'S PANENTHEISM

Charles Hartshorne, who is the follower of the writings of Whitehead and the author of many books, is the most distinguished philosopher today of process theology (Hick, 1970: 336). He was born on June 5, 1897, in Kittanning, Pennsylvania. He received the A.B. at Haverford College in 1917, his M.A. and His Ph.D. at Harvard in 1921 and 1923 respectively. He also studied two years at the University of Freiburg and one year at the University of Marburg in Germany where he became directly familiar with Husserl's phenomenology. He began teaching at Harvard University in 1925 and after three years joined the faculty of the University of Chicago where he taught for the next 27 years, until 1955. He became a full professor at the University of Chicago in 1948. In 1956 he was appointed as professor of philosophy at Emory University in Atlanta and taught there from 1956 to 1962. The following year he joined the faculty at the University of Texas at Austin, where he became the Ashbel Smith Professor of Philosophy in 1963. He taught at the University of Texas until his retirement. Professor Hartshorne was a Fulbright visiting professor in Germany, India, Australia, and Japan and gave the Terry Lectures (Yale, 1947) and the Dudleian Lectures (Harvard, 1966). The high respect people have for him is shown through the fact that he was elected as president of several professional organizations: the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, the Charles Peirce Society, the American Metaphysical Society, the Southern Society of Philosophy and Religion, and the Southern Society of Philosophy and Psychology.

According to Reck, we may divide Hartshorne's thought into three main aspects: the affective continuum, panpsychism, and panentheism (Reck, 1968:294). This research centers on the third aspect. However, before discussing it, let us briefly explore the first two aspects as a preliminary survey or background.

1. Background

Hartshorne does not agree with materialists who consider atoms as ultimate independent elements which are lifeless, timeless, unchanging and hence without growth or evolution (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:15). For Hartshorne the materialist view, which is fostered by Newtonian physics, appears not only in the physical sciences but also in the psychological sciences. He thinks that as long as psychologists especially behaviorists regard sensations as ultimate independent data which are separated on the one hand from the internal neural processes of the sentient organism and on the other hand from the external physical stimuli, they are following the absolute atomism of materialists. For Hartshorne, however, the absolute atomism of materialism as fostered by Newtonian physics has been obsolete as a result of the recent revolutions in physics. He argues that if atomistic materialism is rejected in physics, behaviorism must be rejected in psychology too. To replace behaviorism, Hartshorne suggests the theory of the affective

continuum.*   According to this theory, sensations are developed from an affective continuum. Sensations are drops of experience which are identical to what Whitehead calls "actual entities" or "actual occasions" (Whitehead, 1978:73). "To understand what sensation is, we should not try to abstract from all particular sensations and see what is left. Nothing would be left. What we should do is to look for the continuity... among sensations by which we can pass insensibly from one to another, as from red to yellow through orange-in fact from any color sensation to any other" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975: 115). Actual entities or sensations atomize the affective continuum, and this continuum is in itself simply the potentiality for division. The continuum is of

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*Certainly, Hartshorne here is deeply influenced by Whitehead who rejected classical physics which holds that: (1) the physical world is made up of atoms which are in an absolute empty space and endure through an absolute time;   (2) each of these particles is so independent that it could be what it is even if there were no other particles;   (3) each of these particles has a unique position in space and time;   (4) each instantaneous position is uniquely determined by the previous position of all the particles in the same system. It may be that what impressed Whitehead is contemporary physics which adopts: (a) the shift from continuity to division in atomic physics; (b) the shift from deterministic laws to probability ones in the same area; (c) the collapse of the category difference between space and time in relativity theory. For Whitehead what is fundamental is process, rather than things that endure process. And this process is "a process of feelings." For further details, see William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, eds. 1964. Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, pp.113-120.; and see A.N. Whitehead. 1978. Process and Reality. New York: The Free Press, pp.61-82 and pp.209-215.

previous experience or feeling. In other words, previous experience is a necessary condition to make the continuum proceed. As Whitehead puts it: "With the becoming of any actual entity what was previously potential in the space-time continuum is now the primary real phase in something actual" (Whitehead, 1978:67). According to Hartshorne, the theory of the affective continuum is characterized by five fundamental conceptions: mathematical continuity, aesthetic meaning or affective tone, the fundamentally social character of experience, biological adaptiveness, and evolution from a common origin (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:6).

First, it is the application of mathematical continuity to sensation. According to Whitehead, while mathematical philosophy regards points not as ultimate or fundamental elements but rather as ideal limits of the continuum, contemporary physics regards particles not as ultimate or fundamental elements but rather as wave-packets of the spatio-temporal continuum (Reck, 1968:296). Similarly, Hartshorne, points out that psychology should also regard sensations not as its ultimate elements but rather as discriminable aspects of the continuum. As he puts it: "The real world is full of discontinuities (e.g., the quantum). But these discontinuities are measurable as greater or less because we see them against a background of continuity, such as the continuity of space, time, color qualities" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:134).

Second, it is the primacy of aesthetic feeling or affection which is in accord with Whitehead's 'feeling - value.' (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:7). Sensations are viewed as a subclass of affection. In other words, sensory qualities are species whereas affection or feeling is the genus. (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:179) Hartshorne says: "The proposition that sensation is what feeling becomes when externally localized in phenomenal space implies a

process of objectification..." (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:135). Thus "For panpsychism, physical facts are only the relational aspect of psychic facts" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:264).

Third, it involves the emphasis upon the fundamentally social character of experience. For Hartshorne the affective continuum is identical to process or experiencing. He says "Process is experiencing... Experiencing always has data or things experienced. In a process view, concrete data can only be other processes, other experiences. Experience is always of experience or 'feeling of feeling'" (Hartshorne, 1973:130). Thus experience is always fundamentally social, i.e., experience of experience or "feeling of feeling". Hartshorne, then, defines: "Feeling is the "matter" of aesthetic, moral and intellectual form-giving; and all form-giving as directly experienced is aesthetic, moral, or intellectual" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:173). In Whiteheadian terms, the social character of the affective continuum refers in two ways: prehension and objective immortality. While prehension points out that experience always depend on other experiences, objective immortality (everlastingness) shows that all experiences are determined to be data for following experiences. Prehension is not fully determined by the previous experiences. Even though the previous experiences are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions for prehension. There is always a creative synthesis of a new element and an old element. For Hartshorne, like Whitehead, to be is always to be free and to be related (Stokes, 1973:70).

Fourth, it involves biological adaptation. For Hartshorne sensations of pleasure and pain play an important role to adapt the organism to its environment. This does not mean that the role of other sensations, such as sensations of color, has no significance though (Reck, 1968:298). But what to

keep in mind is that mutual adaptation among the creatures is not sufficient to explain the world. Hartshorne says: "...the evolutionary scheme presupposes an aspect of order in the world which it does not explain. To adapt to mere disorder is meaningless; and so the basic orderliness of the world cannot be explained by mutual adaptation among the creatures. That there are laws of nature is providential. Any cosmic order is infinitely better than none, for mere chaos is indistinguishable from nothing at all. But the only positive explanation is not, I hold, fully intelligible without God. And since God means supreme freedom dealing with lesser freedom, there must be a pervasive element of chance in nature" (Hartshorne's OOTM, 1984: 71).

Fifth, it involves evolution from a common origin. For Hartshorne sensations evolve from the affective continuum which is considered as the common origin. In other words affection is fundamental to all emergent evolution. As the puts it: "The first appearance of a given quality at a certain stage in evolution is not a pure 'emergence' (though it has an emergent aspect) of the quality, unrelated to the previous state of nature... A primitive quality of sensation may be conceived ... as a true development, or differentiation, rather than as a sheer displacement of the old and irruption of the new" (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:8). Hartshorne's evolution of sensory qualities from a common

quality is indebted to Peirce's category of Firstness.* According to Hartshorne, less determinate feelings become more determinate sensory qualities through a process of objectification (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934: 208).

As an antimaterialist, Hartshorne argues for panpsychism as the second main aspect of his thought. In its simplest form panpsychism holds that "all the pronounced units of nature are living" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975: 166). Hartshorne believes that "all activity is creative". Furthermore, discussing the problem of whether "all activity is also sentient and purposive," he analyzes three ways of conceiving the matter: (1) Some activity is sentient and purposive, and some is not; (2) no activity is sentient and purposive: (3) all activity is so. (1) and (2) are regarded as dualism (common-sense view) and materialism respectively and both are rejected by Hartshorne. He rejects (2) because it "is so plainly untrue that it is hardly necessary to discuss it" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:165). He rejects (1) because common sense knowledge is superficial and based on ignorance rather than understanding. As he puts it:

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*Peirce developed three categories which he thought to be relevant to all philosophical analyses. He called these categories Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness and identified them with quality, reaction and generality. He criticized that past philosophies were often inadequate because they developed their point of view stressing only one or two of the categories. He believed that the true great systems of philosophy must stress all three. Peirce believed in the theory of objective idealism which holds that the world is mental in a suitable sense and that it evolves over time into laws of regularity. See William L. Reese. 1980. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press Inc., pp.419-421. And see Bryan Magee. 1987. The Great Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.280-288.

That stones do not feel or make plans is common sense to the extent that our practical dealings with such entities furnish no evidence that they have these powers. We are able to use material things while looking upon them as unfeeling and aimless. Surely this is strange if they really are quite otherwise! And yet, according to science, common-sense knowledge of the inanimate things in nature is in all cases without exception extremely superficial-indeed, is always knowledge not of individual constituents of nature at all, but of crowds, swarms, aggregates, in which individual charateristics are lost in average effects of summations. The rock, for instance, is simply crystals, and these in turn are relatively loose organizations of atoms. The only individuals with which we have practical dealings are the living things of biology; and it is by no means common sense to deny feeling to most of these. Plants, indeed, may be so regarded, but a plant is also much less of a unit than an animal. The plant cells have more unity than the whole plant; and if we ask whether these cells possess feeling, we put a question with which common sense has nothing to do, since the very knowledge that cells exist is due to science, not to practical everyday experience... A corpse is, I should agree, a dead thing; only I should point out that it contains a great many live things, and that we do not know it contains anything else. As an individual whole it is not alive, but all its parts may nonetheless be living - or at any rate sentient - individuals (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:165-6).

Having rejected (1) and (2), Hartshorne is simply left with (3). He calls it panpsychism, and later he prefers to call it psychicalism.

Panpsychism neglects the concept of dead, static matter in Newtonian physics and develops its concept from biology. The discovery that the individual organism is composed of living cells becomes the principle which holds that all physical objects at the macroscopic level are regarded as aggregates of sentient microscopic monads.' The theory of monads was originally developed by Leibniz.* Hartshorne agrees with the idea that within the organism a cell is not only a living but also a sentient organism. He says: "Panpsychism holds that... in fact a man dimly feels his parents as they were before his birth, and his embryonic cells felt the first stirrings of his feelings" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975: 236). To refute the objection to panpsychism, Hartshorne argues:

> Let us then take seriously the view that a cell is not only a living but a sentient organism. It has no nervous system, you may object, therefore it has no consciousness and no sentience. It has no stomach, I reply, therefore it cannot digest food; no lungs, therefore it cannot absorb oxygen; no afferent and motor nerves, therefore it cannot respond and adapt itself to its enviroment; no reproductive organs, therefore it cannot multiply its kind, etc. If these inferences are not valid, and they cannot be, since their permisses are true and their conclusions false to the facts, then neither is the former reasoning supporting the dependence of sentience upon a nervous system

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*It seems to the researcher that apart from Whitehead and Peirce, Leibniz, who considered all entities as subjects or individuals - not as objects, had also a great influence, at least through Whitehead, on the thought of Hartshorne even though Hartshorne did not mention his name on the list of those who influenced him.

coercive. Lack of explicit organ does not spell lack of function, but primitive form of the function (Hartshorne's PPS, 1934:244).

Moreover, the ascription of sentience to cell within the organism suggests us to consider the simplest physical entities such as electrons centers of feeling* (Reck, 1968: 299). The fact that such entities are simple when being compared with higher animals does not prevent them from possessing feeling and purpose. It merely means a different degree of complexity among various types of mind and feeling. Thus the difference between a man's mind and an animal's mind is just the matter of degree of complexity. Hartshorne says: "...panpsychism...does not insist that "mind" has no degrees...Quite the contrary, panpsychism insists always upon the graduated or relative character of mentality. It not only admits but emphasizes that a dog's mind is less of a mind than a man's, and that of a moron less than that of a genius. And it points out that this diminution of mentality need not stop at the dog, or the frog, or even the amoeba' (Hartshorne's, BH, 1975: 169).

It seems to the researcher that Whitehead's reformed subjectivist principle which regards macroscopic entities as consisting of microscopic subjects, on the one hand, leads Hartshorne to become both a metaphysical idealist and an epistemological realist. Hartshorne says: "I am an idealist. So was Peirce, who said so, and Whitehead, who did not say so but who did affirm what he called "reformed subjectivism" (Hartshorne, 1984:12). But Hartshorne's metaphysical idealism is identical to neither absolute idealism nor

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* Hartshorne's view here is strongly supported by some comtemporary thinker. See Danah Zohar. 1990. The Quantum Self. Glassgow: Flamingo Paperbacks,pp. 33-34.

subjective idealism. According to absolute idealism, the "reality is so unitary that relations and a plurality of related terms are appearances not the reality" (Hartshorne, 1984:12). Absolute idealism will eventually leads to extreme monism which is unacceptable to Hartshorne. Then, according to subjective or epistemological idealists, idealism means "that when we experience something, have it as immediate intuitive datum, it is nothing but a quality of our own mental state (Berkeley's or Locke's idea or Hume's impression)" (Hartshorne, 1984:12). Subjective or epistemological idealism will finally leads to solipsism which Hartshorne considers as metaphysically absurd and nonsensical. For Hartshorne, that all events are feelings will be considered as metaphisical idealism. But feelings are fundamentally social, namely, "feeling of feeling". "To have something actual or concrete as given is to feel its feelings" (Hartshorne, 1984:14). This means that an organism feels the simpler feelings of the particular sentient subjects or cells that make up the organism and these cells in turn feel the feelings of the yet simpler subjects. In his response to Eugene H. Peters, Hartshorne says:

> I follow Whitehead in generalizing this to include even events in the body as experienced. The neural disturbance that we feel as pain has just happened when we first experience it. Pain is not naturally taken as simply nonpsychical. The intuitively right description in my judgment, is that pain is our participation in a bodily suffering that is first cellular and becomes ours by our act of participating in, sympathizing with, this bodily distress (Hartshorne, 1984:13).

If metaphysical idealism is described as above, then how is epistemological realism possible? How can Hartshorne know the independent reality? How can he clarify the following remarks?

What is given to us does qualify our mental state, but it is never merely such a quality. It has first of all its own status, independently of us as at the given moment, and it then becomes a constituent of our mental state as aware of (prehending) it. An independent reality is that we intuit, and the intuiting makes us dependent on it, not vice versa (Hartshorne, 1984:12).

Hartshorne says: "We can generalize beyond human experience only by generalizing 'experience' itself beyond the human variety" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975:121). Hartshorne suggests that we need to transcend ourselves to know the independent reality. He says: "Realism, as process rationalism interprets it, is the self-transcendence of subjects in arriving at, and adding to, an independent preexistent world ... The transcendence of the subject to reach independent objects is either social, sympathetic, or it is a leap in the dark. This is my deepest conviction, the hunch on which I feel happy to gamble" (Hartshorne, 1984:14). When epistemological realism is combined with metaphysical idealism, the combination becomes panpsychism. This combination helps solve the problems that other kinds of idealism face.*
"Epistemological realism is entirely compatible with metaphysical idealism ... Epistemological realism not only does not contradict metaphysical idealism, it

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*According to the doctrines of idealism as founded by Berkeley, Kant and Hegel, physical objects are merely "ideas" in the minds of high-grade individuals, such as God or man. On the contrary, panpsychism maintains that "even the least of physical individuals is itself a subject of a low type, and that thus physical objects are only other subjects, quite as real as the subjects to which they are objects." See Charles Hartshorne. 1975. Beyond Humanism. Gloucester: Peter Smith, pp.176-7.

greatly strengthens the case for it. It removes a host of paradoxes that idealism would otherwise involve" (Hartshorne, 1984:13). It seems to the researcher that for Hartshorne panpsychism is the unity of metaphysical idealism and epistemological realism. In other words, panpsychism is the unity of idealistic metaphysics* and realistic epistemology. The researcher believes that this attempt is one of the great contributions Hartshorne made to philosophy.

Whitehead's reformed subjectivist principle, on the other hand, leads Hartshorne to the theory of the "compound individual." As we have already seen, the reformed subjectivist principle considers all physical macroscopic objects as societies of sentient microscopic subjects. This principle, which is based on the organic theory, helps solve the traditional problems between the one and the many, the world and its constituents, and, furthermore, God and his creatures Historically, there have been a lot of arguments between pluralists and monists. Whereas monism holds the theses that there is only one thing, or that there is only one kind of thing, pluralism holds that there are many things, or kinds of things (Hamlyn, 1984:109). According Hartshorne, both monism and pluralism are unsatisfactory because they could not solve the traditional problems. Only the theory of the compound individual can satisfactorily solve those problems. Only this theory can provide the unity of the one and the many. He says: "Only the theory of the "compound individual," the individual consisting of individuals which to some extent, but not absolutely, are subordinated to the whole, can satisfactorily interpret the facts of modern

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*For further details about Hartshorne's metaphysics, see George Allan. December 1986. "The Metaphysical Axioms and Ethics of Charles Hartshorne". Review of Metaphysics, 40:271-304, and see Santiago Sia. 1985. God in Process Thought. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp.19-32.

science or satisfactorily solve the old philosophical problems of the one and the many, or of the mind and the body, or of the universe (or God) and its constituents. The psychic or infinite variables and the compound individual- which is only the infinite psychic variable referred to by St.Paul when he said, "We are members one of another" are the keys to the scale of beings" (Hartshorne's BH, 1975: 123). The transition from the idea of the compound individual to the idea of God is fast and direct because God, according to Hartshorne, is the maximal compound individual.

2. The Concept of God

Hartshorne realizes that theology demands at least that God is supreme, whereas religion adds more that God must be a being worthy of worship. As he puts it: 'To discuss God is, by almost universal usage, to discuss some manner of "supreme" or "highest" or "best" individual (or superindividual) being. As a minimal definition, God is an entity somehow, superior to other entities' (Hartshorne, 1963: 323). However, in order to be adequate, theology must defend a concept of God which is able to preserve the values which religion emphasizes. Hartshorne says: "By religious value I mean the power to express and enhance reverence or worship on a high ethical and cultural level" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 1). Thus theology must express and enhance reverence or worship on a high ethical and cultural level, and this task of theology can be accomplished by philosophy. Hartshorne believes that only his panentheism or neoclassical theism gives a theological concept of deity which can guarantee or preserve the desired religious values.

Philosophers and theologians who discuss the concept of God are usually those who believe in God's existence. Thus instead of asking

themselves or trying to answer the question whether God exists, they try to deal with other questions which come after their belief in God. Traditionally, there are five major questions concerning the concept of God: "Is God eternal? Is he temporal? Is he conscious? Does he know the world? Does he include the world?" (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:16). The affirmative answers to these questions may be symbolized as follows:

E	Eternal - in some (or, if T is omitted, in all) aspects of his reality devoid of change, whether as birth, death, increase, or decrease
T	Temporal - in some (or, if E is omitted, in all) aspects capable of change, at least in the form of increase of some kind
C	Conscious, self-aware
K	Knowing the world or universe, omniscient
W	World-inclusive, having all things as consitituents

Source: Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:16

Hartshorne says: "If all the five factors are asserted together, ETCKW, they define the doctrine we call "panentheism" (also "surrelativism")" (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:16). Thus we can see that Hartshorne's panentheism answers the above questions as follows: (1) Yes, God is eternal in the sense that some aspects of his reality are immutable. First, God's superiority is immutable. No matter what happens, all entities are always inferior to God. Second, though some aspects of his reality are affected by his creatures, others are not. "In this he is completely independent of any given creature" (Sia, 1985: 42). (2) Yes, God is temporal in the sense that some aspects of his reality are changeable. Whereas all his creatures may change by increasing or decreasing in value, God

can only increase. God can and everlastingly does surpass himself and all other creatures. He cannot become inferior to any other creature, even to himself. (Sia, 1985:40). What God increases is his knowledge (Sia, 1985:40). God can increase his knowledge and his "aesthetic" perfectibility because "in the process view there is no final totality of definite events, but a new totality each moment" (Hartshorne, 1973:136). (3) Yes, God is conscious in that he is the maximal compound individual who has the highest degree of awareness (Hartshorne's BH,1975:172). (4) Yes, God knows the world or cosmos in the sense that he knows everything there is to know, but he knows and will know actualities as actual and potentialities as potential. Omniscience means "clear, certain, adequate knowledge whose content is all that is as it is" (Sia, 1985:68). (5) Yes, God includes the world in the sense that he is world-inclusive, having all entities as his constituents. In other words, God exceeds the world and both have always been in interaction. Answering all the five questions positively, Hartshorne could define God as "The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, knowing and including the world." (Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:17). In order to see how Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God is different from its traditional rivals, let us take a quick glance at the following table:

ETCKW	The Supreme as Eternal - Temporal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World. Panentheism. Plato, Sri Jiva, Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, Igbal, Radhakrishnan
EC	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, not knowing or including the world. Aristotelian theism

ECK	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Classical Theism. Philo, Augustine, Anselm, al-Ghazzali, Aquinas, Leibniz
E	The Supreme as the Eternal beyond consciousness and Knowledge-Emanationism. Plotinus
ECKW	The Supreme as Eternal Consciousness, Knowing and including the World (so far as "real"). Classical Pantheism. Sankara, Spinoza, Royce
ETCK	The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Cousciousness, Knowing but not including the world. Temporalistic theism. Socinus, Lequier
ETCK (W)	The Supreme as Eternal-Temporal Consciousness, particularly exclusive of the World. Limited panentheism. James, Ehrenfels, Brightman
T (C) (K)	The Supreme as wholly Temporal or emerging Consciousness. Alexander, Ames, Cattell
T	The Supreme as Temporal and nonconscious: Wieman

Source: Hartshorne's PSG, 1953:17

Regarding the relation between God and the world, the researcher would deal with only three schools from the above table: classical theism pantheism and panentheism. There are at least three assumptions which are commonly acceptable to the three schools altogether:

1. The existence of God

2. The existence of the world and its constituents

3. The relationship between God and the world

All three schools are completely in accord with God's necessary existence in spite of different senses.* The pair of metaphysical categories which distinctly separates the three schools from one another is "absolute-relative." To see the differences clearly, please look at the following table.

| God's Reality / Schools	Absolute	Relative
Classical Theism	✓	
Pantheism		✓
Panentheism	✓	✓

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*For Hartshorne, as a panentheist, God exists necessarily in the sense that his existence is of a non-competitive sort, that is, nothing can exist instead of God. God's existence is not a possibility competing with other possibilities. For the pantheist like Spinoza God exists necessarily in the sense that God is the cause of his own existence (causa sui). For classical theism there are quite a few opinions. For example, for Aquinas God exists necessarily in the sense that God as pure form must exist or could not not exist. For Hick God exists necessarily in the sense that his existence does not depend on anything else. For Swinburne God exists necessarily in the senses that (1) God does not depend for his existence on himself or on anything else; (2) God exists eternally and imperishably; and (3) God exists at all moments of time since "any time at which any agent acted would be too late to bring about the non-existence of God." See Richard Swinburne. 1993. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.272-8.

According to classical theism, God is absolute in the sense that he is completely independent of the world. Though the world and all creatures are created by God, God and the world are totally separated. In other words, we can say that God excludes the world. The total exclusion of this kind may be shown in the form of a schema as follows:

However, for the classical theist though God, who is a spirit, totally excludes the world, he "is a person without a body, who exists everywhere, that is, is omnipresent" (Swinburne, 1993:99). Moreover, though God causes everything to exist, he is absolutely free in that he is never influenced by any other creature, nor is by his own action at the previous time. As Swinburne puts it: "God is perfectly free in that nothing... acts from without on him to determine or in any way influence how he will act; nor does he act at one period of time so as causally to influence how he himself will act at another" (Swinburne, 1994: 128).

Pantheism, on the contrary, identifies God with the total system of all changing things and consequently denies his absolute, transcendent, or independent nature. For pantheists God includes the world in the sense that God and the world are one and the same. The following schema may make this clear.

Since God and the world are identical, God is no more absolute and transcendent but relative and immanent. God, though he still can be regarded as a cause or reason, is related to all changing things in that all changing things or modes derive from him by necessity. For pantheists God, the world, and nature are just different names for one and the same substance. All other entities including human beings are just modes or accidents of the divine substance. As Spinoza says: "When I say that I mean by substance that which is conceived through and in itself; and that I mean by modification or accident that which is in something else, and is conceived through that wherein it is, evidently it follows that substance is by nature prior to its accidents. For without the former the later can neither be nor be conceived."*

For Hartshorne both classical theism and pantheism are unsatisfactory because both schools consider God in monopolar terms. Regarding God in monopolar terms, the classical theist and the pantheist are forced to accept only one pole of contrary attributes and disregard the other. While the classical theist considers God as abstract, absolute and transcendent, the pantheist considers him as concrete, relative and immanent. According to Hartshorne, both classical theism and pantheism could not arrive at the most comprehensive concept of God. Unlike classical theism and pantheism, his panentheism or neoclassical theism can include both poles of contrary metaphysical categories. Panentheism can include "absolute-relative", "transcendent-immanent" and "abstract-concrete" within God's nature. To compare panentheism with the other two, let us take a look at the following schema.

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*See Roger Scruton. 1986. Spinoza. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35-52.

Accord to panentheism, God includes the world, not in the sense that God and the world are identical, but in the sense that God exceeds or is greater than the world. For Hartshorne only his panentheism can solve all the problems that confront classical theism and pantheism. Considering God's absoluteness, we may divide it into three views: (1) God is absolute in all aspects; (2) God is absolute in some aspects; and (3) God is absolute in no aspects. While (1) and (3) are extreme, (2) is not. (1) and (3) are the views of classical theism and pantheism respectively. (2) is the Hartshornian view. Hartshorne rejects classical theism and pantheism because they both lead to unsolvable problems. Classical theism, on the one hand, fails to describe the relation between God and the world consistently. Hartshorne argues that "If, then, God is wholly absolute,... it follows that God does not know or love or will us, his creatures" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976:16). Since to know or to love means to be influenced, if God loves the world, then he is influenced by the world. If God is influenced by the world, then he is not totally absolute. But for classical theism God is totally absolute; therefore, he is not influenced by the world. Then it follows that God does not know or love the world. Hence if God knows or loves us, then he is not totally absolute as the classical theist understands. On the other hand, pantheism fails to grasp the aspect of God which is absolute in the sense that some of his attributes are not influenced by or independent of all other creatures, for example, his power and his goodness. Hartshorne says: "The error of most pantheists have been to denied the externality of concrete

existence to the essence of deity. They have not realized that the inclusive actuality of God, which includes all de facto actuality, is as truly contingent and capable of additions as the least actuality it includes" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976:89). Hartshorne, then, develops his panentheistic concept of God. His thesis is that God has two aspects, one abstract and the other concrete, and that divine perfection applies to both but in ways appropriate to each. Hartshorne summarizes:

> If "pantheism" is a historically and etymologically appropriate term for the view that deity is the all of relative or interdependent items, with nothing wholly independent or in any clear sense nonrelative, then "panentheism" is an appropriate term for the view that deity is in some real aspect distinguishable from and independent of any and all relative items, and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative items. Traditional theism or deism makes God solely independent or noninclusive. Thus there are logically the three views: (1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects inseparable from the sum or system of dependent things or effects; (2) He is both this system and something independent of it; (3) He is not the system, but is in all aspects independent. The second view is panentheism. The first view includes any doctrine which, like Spinoza's, asserts that there is a premise from which all acts are implied conclusions... Panentheism agrees with traditional theism on the important point that the divine individuality, that without which God would not be God, must be logically independent, that is, must not involve any particular world (Hartshorne's DR, 1976:89-90).

In order to understand Hartshorne's panentheism clearly, we may compare it with some theory in the history of physical optics. In analogy, classical theism may be assumed to parallel Newton's Opticks which taught that light was material corpuscles. On the other hand, pantheism may be assumed to parallel a paradigm that derived ultimately from the optical writings of Young and Fresnel in the early nineteenth century which taught that light was transverse wave motion. While the first two schools seize upon one set of contrastive attributes and disregard the other, Hartshorne's panentheism, paralleling quantum physics which holds that light is photons that exhibit some characteristics of waves and some of particles,* is the synthesis of the two sets of contrastive attributes. In his own words, Hartshorne says:

> As the long argument between those who said that light was corpuscular and those who said it was a set of waves seems, in our time, to have ended with the admission that it is both, in each case with qualifications; so the longer argument between those who said, "There is nothing higher than relative being (and thus either there is no God or he is relative)," and those who said, "There is a highest being who is absolute," is perhaps to be ended by showing a way in which both statements may consistently be made (Hartshorne's DR, 1948:x).

Thus Hartshorne's panentheistic concept of God is the most comprehensive among its rivals. The absolute aspect and the concrete aspect

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*See Thomas S, Kuhn. 1970. The structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The Universitiy of Chicago Press, pp.11-12.

make God become dipolar. For Hartshorne surrelativism and panentheism are the same doctrine with only a difference of emphasis (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: 90). "The main thesis, called Surrelativism, also Panentheism, is that the "the relative" or changeable, that which depends upon and varies with varying relationships, includes within itself and in value exceeds the nonrelative, immutable, independent, or "absolute," as the concrete includes and exceeds the abstract" (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: ix). From this doctrine, 'It follows that God, as supremely excellent and concrete, must be conceived not as wholly absolute or immutable, but rather as supremely-relative, "surrelative," although, or because of this superior relativity, containing an abstract character or essence in respect to which, he is indeed strictly absolute and immutable' (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: ix).

The researcher thinks that Hartshorne's law of diporality is so central that to defend it means to defend panentheism itself. And this law is considered one of the most distinctive contributions Hartshorne ever made to philosophy. As Allan puts it: "Hartshorne's axiom of dipolar divinity is surely his most distinctive, and most controversial, contribution to philosophy. He follows Whitehead's lead, but has elaborated the notion and its implications on ways that carry him far beyond the brief obiter dicta of his sometime mentor. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God, his first book-length presentation of the matter, has rightly become a classic in the philosophy of religion" (Allan, 1986:293). The law of dipolarity paves the way for panentheism to overcome the dilemma confronted by both classical theism and pantheism. In panentheism God is immanent in and includes the world of changing, dependent entities, and is simultaneously an absolute, independent pole which transcends the world.

3. The Existence of God

Since Hartshorne adopts an abstract aspect of God which transcends the world, he has to defend it against some criticisms. It seems to the researcher that the "game" here is changed. Dealing with the concept of God is different from dealing with his existence. Discussion about the concept of God, on the one hand, is the "game" played among classical theists, pantheists and panentheists who hold at least three common assumptions: the existence of God, the existence of the world, and the relation between God and the world. Discussion about the existence of God, on the other hand, is the "game" played among scepticism, atheism and theism which accept at least three common assumptions as follows:

1. The existence of the world and its constituents
2. The presence of evils
3. The cognitive meaningfulness of God-talk*

Among the theses of the three schools, the researcher thinks, that of scepticism, which says that God may or may not exist, is the least problematic or the most intelligent in that it is the suspension of judgment. The sceptic suspension of judgment will ultimately lead us to preserve silence. On the contrary, the other

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*Traditionally, the logical positivists maintain that God-talk is cognitively meaningless, so they go further than the atheists do. Whereas the atheists are usually satisfied with the thesis that God does not exist, the logical positivists will not accept such a meaningless thesis. However, this is the matter of philosophy of language, or more specific, philosophy of religious language which is not within the scope of this research.

two theses, namely, those of theism and atheism, are more problematic and controversial because they make their judgment on the existence of God. Whereas the atheists assert that God does not exist, theists confirm his existence. Hartshorne is a theist; therefore, he needs to confirm the existence of God. In this chapter the researcher only interprets his argument for God's existence. Any distinctive criticism is postponed until next chapter. As we have already learned, Hartshorne is not only a theist but also a neoclassical theist. We may say that Hartshorne is to classical theism as Kant is to rationalism. Hartshorne has not come to abolish classical theism but to complete it. Hartshorne seems, the researcher believes, to realize well that it is a mission of all theists to defend the existence of God no matter how difficult it is. Whereas the classical theist, or more specific, the Thomist, prefers the cosmological and other traditional arguments to the ontological argument, Hartshorne prefers the latter. In the demonstration of the existence of God Hartshorne has used the ontological argument which was discovered by St. Anselm. He tries to defend God's existence by this kind of argument in his books The Logic of Perfection and Anselm's Discovery. As he puts it:

> In a recent work, The Logic of Perfection (Open Court, 1962), I try to show how the relativistic conception of the absoluteness, perfection, or infinity of deity makes it possible to defend the ontological argument for God's existence against the standard criticisms. In Anselm's Discovery... I complete this line of inquiry, so far as it is in my power to do so (Hartshorne's DR, 1976: vii).

Though Hartshorne tries to prove by the ontological argument, this does not mean that he ignores other arguments. On the contrary, he tries to

make use of all traditional proofs of God's existence* within the context of panentheism. For Hartshorne while the ontological proof is a priori, the other proofs are a posteriori. He says: "All the proofs except the ontological may be interpreted as showing that the idea of God, taken as true, is required for the interpretation of some fundamental aspect of life or existence" (Hartshorne, 1970: 164). A proposition is a priori if and only if it can be known to be true only by considering what it says and without "looking at the world" to see whether it is true (Swinburne, 1993: 262). On the contrary, a propostion is a posteriori if and only if it can be known to be true merely by "looking at the world" to see whether it is true (Swinburne, 1993:21). From this it follows that the validity of the ontological proof, which is a priori, can be checked without "looking at the world" while the other proofs, which are a posteriori, require us to check their strengths only by "looking at the world." Hartshorne uses both a priori and a posteriori criteria in his argument for God's existence. Surely, Hartshorne is a metaphysician who believes that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is analytic. For Hartshorne all metaphysical propositions are necessary; therefore, they are analytic. Like many philosophers, unlike Swinburne, Hartshorne thinks that all analytic propositions are a priori, and

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*Hartshorne listed six traditional arguments for the existence of God: ontological, cosmological, design, epistemic or idealistic, moral, and aesthetic. See Charles Hartshorne. April 1970. Six Theistic Proofs. The Monist, Vol.54, No.2, pp. 159-180.

conversely.* From this it follows that, for Hartshorne, all metaphysical truths, like purely logical and mathematical truths, can be known a priori as eternal. As he says: "I have long emphasized that metaphysical truths (supposing we can find them) are necessary and that the necessary is eternal. Hence all metaphysical truths are eternal; they do not become true but timelessly are true. Mathematical truths I suppose to be included; and I contrast them with metaphysical only in their being noncategorical, if-then necessities, not direct necessities, of existence. Of course logical possibilities are tenseless, if they are purely logical" (Hartshorne, 1984: 69). We should be clear here that Hartshorne makes a distinction between eternal and immortal truths. Whereas all metaphysical, purely logical, and mathematical truths are eternal, all other truths are immortal. He says: "One distinction that I make... is between eternity and everlastingness, or immortality. Objective immortality is one thing,

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*Dr.Mark Tamthai, on the one hand, makes a distinction clearly between a priori analytic and a posteriori propositions through the following schema:

	a posteriori	a priori
analytic		logic
synthetic	sciences	mathematics?

See Mark Tamthai. 1989. "Philosophy of Mathematics" in Sukhothaidhammathirat University's Text: Unit 4. Mathematical Essence and Methodology (in Thai). Bangkok: Sukhothaidhammathirat University press, pp.2-23. Richard Swinburne, on the other hand, thinks that not all analytic propositions are a priori, and conversely. See Richard Swinburne. 1993. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.14-22 and pp.261-2.

objective eternity is another. Properly and adequately stated, all truths except mathematical, purely logical, or metaphysical ones are immortal or everlasting, but not eternal; they do come into being. Once there they cannot go out of being." (Hartshorne, 1984:67-8). Since the ontological argument deals with metaphysical truths, it deals with "what is common and necessary" to all possible worlds including the actual one. In <u>The Logic of Perfection</u>, Hartshorne translates the ontological argument into ten modal proofs for God's existence. The first proof or formulation, given in a ten-step modal sorites, is the most important one which is of interest among critics. The renewal of the ontological argument in symbolic logic exhibits Hartshorne's neoclassical thought which makes a distinction between existence and actuality. The credit should be given to him more than to any other philosopher in the English-speaking world on account of the fact that he is the philosopher who has turned many contemporary philosophers' attention to the ontogical argument (Hick, 1970:93).

Hartshorne rejects the first form of St. Anselm's ontological argument but accepts the second one.*   In the second form of the ontological argument St. Anselm, Hartshorne thinks, maintained that "Perfection exists" is a necessary statement. In other words, the second form holds that God's essence includes necessary existence. Hartshorne interprets that St. Anselm, in his

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*St. Anselm offered two forms of the ontological argument. The first form is in Proslogion II and the second in Proslogion III. The first form says: God is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." The second form is that it is greater to have necessary existence than not to have it; and that that than which nothing greater can be conceived accordingly has necessary existence and therefore necessarily exists.

second form, did not assume that perfection is existence, but that perfection is necessary existence. St. Anselm's second form of the argument runs as follows: Since if perfection exists it could not exist contingently,* its existence is either inconceivable or necessary. Hartshorne's ontological argument in the form of symbolic logic can be found in an appendix I. The following is his argument in ordinary language.

1. That God exists strictly implies that he exists necessarily.

2. It is axiomatic that either God exists necessarily or it is not true that he exists necessarily.

3. By Becker's Postulate, that it is not true that God exists necesarily strictly implies that it is necessarily not ture that he exists necessarily.

4. Hence, from (2) and (3) it follows that either God exists necessarily or it is necessarily not true that he exists necesarily.

5. By modal form of modus tollens, it can be deduced from (1) that that it is necessarily not true that God exists necessarily strictly implies that it is necessary that he does not exist.

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*According to St. Anselm, anything that can be conceived must be conceived of as existing in one of the four following ways: (1) It contingently exists. That is , like the book here or the cat in the kitchen, it exists but might not. Or (2) it contingently does not exist. That is, like my private island, it might exist but in fact does not. Or (3) its existence is impossible. Like the round square, it cannot even be conceived to exist or, finally, (4) its existence is necessary. That is, if it is conceived at all, it has to be conceived as existing. See Gene Reeve. Spring 1992. "Talking about God: A Process Perspective." Dialogue & Alliance, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.61-68.

6. Hence, from (4) and (5) it follows that either God exists necessarily or it is necessary that he does not exist.

7. But it is not necessary that God does not exist.

8. Therefore, from (6) and (7) it follows that God exists necessarily.

9. By a modal axiom, that God exists necessarily strictly implies that God exists.

10. Therefore, from (8) and (9) it follows that God exists.

In his article "Process Philosophy and Our Knowledge of God" Lewis Ford reduces Hartshorne's argument to six steps. The logical symbolism is given in an appendix II. The following is his simplified version in ordinary language.

1. A perfect being could not exist contingently; hence the assertion that it exists could not be contingently but only necessarily true ("Anselm's Principle").

2. Hence, either it is necessarily true that a perfect being exists, or it is impossible.

3. But the existence of a perfect being is not impossible (intuitive postulate, or conclusion from other theistic arguments).

4. Therefore it is necessarily true that a perfect being exists (6, 7, disjunctive syllogism).

5. Whatever is necessarily true is true (modal axiom).

6. Therefore (it is true that), a perfect being exists (8, 9, modus ponens).

Hartshorne himself, in his letter to Hubbeling, simplifies his own argument. His logical symbolism can be found in an appendix III. We may translate it into ordinary language as follows:

1. It is not necessary that God does not exist.

2. By Anselm's Principle, necessarily, either God does not exist or he exists necessarily.

3. It can be inferred from (2) that either God does not exist necessarily or it is necessary that he exists necessarily.

4. It can be inferred from (3) that either God does not exists necessarily or he exists necessarily.

5. Hence, from (1) and (4) it follows that God exists necessarily.

6. Therefore, it can be inferred from (5) that God exists.

From the three versions of Hartshorne's ontological proof, we can see his two central fundamental presuppositions: (A) That God exists strictly implies that he exists necessarily (step 1 in his full version); and (B) It is not necessary that God does not exist (step 7). Hartshorne confirms that he got (A) from St. Anselm and (B) from other theistic arguments. While (A) is considered as a priori principle, (B) is regarded as a posteriori. The combination between (A) and (B) in the proof shows Hartshorne's genius in combining between a priori and a posteriori principles. This indicates that Hartshorne never ignores a posteriori proofs even though he tries to prove God's existence (his abstract aspect) in terms of the ontological argument. Whereas "perfection" is the center of the ontological argument, "purpose," "order," "design," "motion," "causality," and "contingency" are central in other

a posteriori proofs.*   However, for the sake of convenience, the researcher will take only "order" to be the center of all a posteriori arguments. The problem to be raised here is whether (A) and (B) do really help Hartshorne succeed in his proof. This question, hewever, will not be inquired into until the following chapters.

Hartshorne mentions nowhere in his works whether his modal logic belongs to system T, S4 or S5.**   But from his intention, it is clear that what

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*One example of this kind of argument may be given as follows: There are efficient causes in the world. We may explain a given event by mentioning its cause; but then the cause itself in turn must be explained. The task of explanation will never have been completed so long as our references are to intermediate causes.   Therefore, there must be included in our explanation reference to the first cause. Ans this cause we call God.

**System T, S4 and S5 are distinct, and , as C.I. Lewis points out, "each later system in the series requires some potulate which is independent of its predecessor system in the series" (Lewis, 1959:508). System PM has four axioms, namely, A1-A4. System T adds A5 and A6 to System PM. S4 has all axioms like System T but adds one more axiom, i.e., A7. Similarly, S5 has all axioms like S4 but adds A8 more. Here are all eight axioms.

A 1. $(\sim(p \vee p) \vee p)$ ≡ A 1′. $((p \vee p) \to p)$
A 2. $(\sim q \vee (p \vee q)$ ≡ A 2′. $(q \to (p \vee q))$
A 3. $(\sim(p \vee q) \vee (q \vee p)$ ≡ A 3′. $((p \vee q) \to (q \vee p))$
A 4. $(\sim(\sim q \vee r) \vee ((\sim(p \vee q) \vee (p \vee r)))$ ≡ A4′. $(q \to r) \to ((p \vee q) \to (p \vee r))$
A 5. $\sim Lp \vee p$ ≡ A 5′. $Lp \to p$
A 6. $\sim(L(\sim p \vee q)) \vee (\sim Lp \vee Lq)$ ≡ A 6′. $L(p \to q) \to (Lp \to Lq)$
A 7. $\sim Lp \vee LLp$ ≡ A 7′. $Lp \to LLp$
A 8. $\sim Mp \vee LMp$ ≡ A 8′. $Mp \to LMp$

For further details, see Swat Suwansankha. 1980. Philosophical Problems in Modal Logic. An MA thesis (in Thai): Chulalongkorn University, pp.4-26.

he means by "metaphysical necessity" has the same status as "logical and mathematical necessity" in the sense that all metaphysical, logical and mathematical propositions, if valid, are timelessly true in all possible worlds including the actual one. By "possible worlds" Hartshorne means states of affairs which are neither nonsensical nor self-contradictory (Harshorne, 1948: XV). Since Hartshorne defines "necessity" and "possibility" in the same senses as S5 does, we may interpret that his modal logic corresponds to S5.

As we have already learned, God for Hartshorne is dipolar: the concrete aspect and the abstract one. We do not need to prove for God's concrete aspect as we do not need to prove for the existence of the world. His doctrine is called "panentheism" which means everything is in God. It is different from "pantheism" which means everything is God. Hartshorne says: "I do hold with Plato that God is to the cosmos as our consciousness is to our bodies." (Hartshorne, 1984: 75). Hence, he needs to prove for the existence of God's abstract aspect which transcends the world. And he does prove by using St. Anselm's ontological argument. However, Hartshorne points out that even though St. Anselm's discovery is great, it is not final. According to Hartshorne, St. Anselm, like most of his critics, failed to make a distinction between necessary existence and contingent actuality. Going beyond the traditional distinction between essence and existence, Hartshorne draws a distinction between necessary existence and contingent actuality, namely between the fact that a being is and how it is. Hartshorne says:

> Anselm discovered, and really discovered, the modal uniqueness of God. What he overlooked, and nearly all his critics equally fail to see, is that, there must be a real duality in God, as in no other being,

between necessary existence and contingent actuality (Hartshorne's AD, 1991: 134).

The difference between Hartshorne and St. Anselm is apparently distinct. While St. Anselm argues for the existence of a monopolar God, Hartshorne argues for the existence of an abstract aspect of a dipolar God. There is no need to prove for the existence of God's concrete aspect as there is no need to prove for the existence of the world. The concrete aspect of God is identical to his actuality which changes in every moment because there are always new actual entities to know (Griffin, 1997: 141). Hartshorne suggests:

> Philosophers should, at long last, give due heed to the manifest difference between <u>existence</u>, the mere abstract truth that an abstraction is somehow concretely embodied, and the <u>actuality</u>, the how, of the embodiment. The ignoring of this duality in nearly all discussions of the ontological problem is a marvelous instance of how even centuries of prolonged controversy... can still leave a point unnoticed by anyone (Hartshorne's AD, 1991: 131-2).

We can say without exaggeration that Hartshorne's making a distinction between necessary existence and contingent actuality is his another great contribution to philosophy. Apart from the adoption of St. Anselm's second form of the ontological argument, Hartshorne has also adopted St. Anselm's first form, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," in terms of "unsurpassability."