

Comparison of “Kim Dae-jung's Policy and Lee Myung-bak's Policy”
Towards North Korea

Miss Samaiphone Thepsombandith



บทคัดย่อและแฟ้มข้อมูลฉบับเต็มของวิทยานิพนธ์ตั้งแต่ปีการศึกษา 2554 ที่ให้บริการในคลังปัญญาจุฬาฯ (CUIR)
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การเปรียบเทียบระหว่างนโยบายของ คิมแดจุง และ อิมย็องบัคที่มีต่อเกาหลีเหนือ



วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

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งานวิจัยนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อศึกษาความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างนโยบายจากสองรัฐบาลของเกาหลีใต้ นั่นคือ นโยบายรัฐบาลของคิมแดจุงและนโยบายรัฐบาลของอิมย็องบัคที่มีต่อเกาหลีเหนือ เพื่อหาความเหมือนและความต่างของทั้งสอง และเพื่อหาปัจจัยหลักที่ส่งผลให้เกิดนโยบายดังกล่าวขึ้น งานวิจัยนี้เป็นงานวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยมาจากการเก็บรวบรวมข้อมูลทุติยภูมิ จากแหล่งการณื บทความสัมพันธ์ของเกาหลีเหนือกับเกาหลีใต้ หนังสือ งานวิจัย วารสาร ข้อมูลจากอินเทอร์เน็ต และ ข้อมูลที่สามารถเชื่อถือได้เกี่ยวข้องกับนโยบายอาทิตย์ส่องแสง (Sunshine Policy) ของประธานาธิบดีคิมและนโยบาย Vision 3000 Denuclearization and Openness ของประธานาธิบดี อี

ผลการวิจัยแสดงให้เห็นว่า (1) นโยบายของประธานาธิบดีคิม แดจุงและนโยบายของประธานาธิบดีอิมย็องบัคมีความเหมือนกันด้านเป้าหมาย ที่ต้องการจะพัฒนาความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างเกาหลีและช่วยประเทศเกาหลีเหนือ นอกจากนี้ยังช่วยประเทศเกาหลีเหนือสร้างสายสัมพันธ์กับโลกภายนอกโดยการเปิดประเทศ ส่วนความแตกต่างของสองนโยบายคือ วิธีการเข้าหาของประเทศเกาหลีใต้ต่อประเทศเกาหลีเหนือ ในขณะที่ประธานาธิบดีคิมใช้นโยบายแบบนุ่มนวล ประธานาธิบดีอึกลับใช้นโยบายที่แข็งกร้าว (2) ส่วนปัจจัยหลักที่มีอิทธิพลมากที่สุดซึ่งทำให้การสร้างทั้งสองนโยบายมีความแตกต่างคือ ลักษณะของผู้นำ โดยขึ้นอยู่กับว่าผู้นำที่กำลังดำรงตำแหน่งอยู่นั้นมีลักษณะอย่างไร อย่างไรก็ตาม ยังมีปัจจัยภายนอกอื่นๆ ด้วยที่ทำให้ผู้นำตัดสินใจกำหนดนโยบายเช่นนั้น เช่น สถานการณ์ที่เป็นอยู่ในขณะนั้น ดังนั้น เราจึงสามารถสรุปได้ว่า ความแตกต่างทางลักษณะของผู้นำทำให้เกิดความแตกต่างทางการกำหนด และดำเนินนโยบาย

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This research aimed to study the relationship between the two policies from two different administrations, that of Kim Dae-jung policy and Lee Myung-bak policy towards North Korea, to identify their similarities and differences as well as to determine which factors influenced the two policies to be formulated. The research was a qualitative research which was done by collecting secondary data from the leaders' speeches, including inter-Korean issues, books, research, journals, internet resources, and reliable information mainly related to the Sunshine policy of President Kim and the Vision 3000 Denuclearization and Openness policy of President Lee.

The research results showed that (1) President Kim's and President Lee's policies were similar in purpose to develop inter-Korean relations and assist North Korea. Moreover, both policies helped North Korea building up relations with outsider by opening its country. The differences were the ways in which the South Korean leaders approached the North. While President Kim Dae-jung applied a soft-line policy, President Lee Myung-bak applied a hard-line policy; (2) the major factor that influenced the two different policies' formulation was the leader characteristics of the leader. However, there were also external factors - major powers' policy that pushed leader to decide in that way. Thus, it could be said the difference of leader characteristic caused different policy formulation and implementation.

Field of Study: Korean Studies

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Rationale

Historically, Korea was once united as one country and it was called Korean Peninsula. But after Second World War, on September 8, 1945 the Korean Peninsula was divided as a trusteeship country into two occupation zones at the thirty-eighth parallel under a condition that it would remain a trusteeship country until it could restore its independence and establish its provisional government.

This was not originally intended to be a long-lasting partition, but Cold War politics resulted in the establishment of two separate governments in the two zones in 1948: The Republic of Korea (known as South Korea) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (known as North Korea). Rising tensions prevented cooperation. Moreover, not only was the Korean Peninsula, but Germany was also divided into two zones in the same way - the Federal Republic of Germany (known as West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (known as East Germany) with the Berlin Wall being the center of the division. As the Cold War ended, the result was different for the Koreas and Germany; in Germany, the two separated once again reunited as one country; but in Korea, there was no reunification.

After the division, the desire of many Koreans for a peaceful unification ended when the Korean War broke out in 1950. The Korean War technically has not yet ended under the Armistice Agreement which was signed on July 27, 1953 there was no peace treaty. Nevertheless, this agreement is recognized as a temporary method to end the war (T. Park, 2012). Furthermore, the lack of real practical preparation for reunification seems to be reflected in both the longevity of

separation and the nature of relations between the two Koreas. It has been a very long time since the Korean peninsula was divided and it seems to be ever less possible that the two countries could ever again be one.

The Korean peninsula has been separated into two Koreas for over six decades and the tense relations between the two continue with vastly different struggles. However, Korean reunification under a single government has been stated as a future goal between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The process was officially started by the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future after various diplomatic meetings during Kim Dae-jung administration.

According to key points in the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration, the two Koreas shall:

- ✓ Cooperate to resolve Korean unification independent of external intervention.
- ✓ Recognize the commonality between South Korea's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a low-level federation and pursue national unification along this line.
- ✓ Resolve humanitarian issues by holding reunions of separated families and seek a humanitarian resolution to the matter of long-held unconverted political prisoners.
- ✓ Further consolidate mutual trust and promote a balanced development of both economies through the expansion of bilateral economic cooperation.
- ✓ Hold government-level dialogue for an immediate implementation of the hitherto agreed points (MOU, 2000).

Ever since the nation has been divided, the South Korean government has made every effort to prevent North Korea from making provocations against the South, attempting to overcome divisions and achieve national unification. However, reunification still remains a very long-term goal to achieve. It is slightly in different formed due to the details of North Korea's unification policy having changed over time under the influence of such factors as the international political environment and the dynamics of inter-Korean relations.

The North-South summit meeting in June 2000, was a historical incident to determine the pace and extend the détente on the Korean peninsula. President Kim Dae-jung proposed a strategy towards North Korea by backing a negotiation stage called an engagement policy or "Sunshine Policy" as he had pledged at his inauguration in February 1998.

This was the first time that South Korea was ruled by the progressive administration led; by President Kim Dae-jung. However, ten years later, the ruling party returned to a conservative administration, ruled by President Lee Myung-bak. The significantly noticeable point which the policy towards the North, which was very different between the two administrations (H. N. Kim, 2008).

For many decades, the South Korean government has had difficulties in cooperating with North Korea, for each transfer of authority has caused more differences ways towards North Korea. Nevertheless, the feeling of envisioning a shared and unified future of the two Koreas has remained to relieve tensed relations. Therefore, the Ministry of Unification was established in 1998 in South Korea after Kim Dae-jung was elected the President of South Korea (Hong, 2011). Under his administration, was the first time South Korea sought to form a peaceful coexistence with the North under two different states after the long conflicts. This was called

engagement policy or could be called Sunshine. His administration was intent on reconciliation rather than absorption of the North. Moreover, he was the first president to visit Pyongyang, North Korea to meet President Kim Jong-il in 2000. Thus, President Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in the same year for these efforts. It was also the first time that both sides had an open-door policy and held bilateral party talks peacefully.

However, Lee Myung-bak won the presidential election in 2007, and his ideology slightly changed the approach to North Korea by confronting and reversing to a hard-line policy rather than attempting to reconcile as President Kim Dae-jung had done. He declared the Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness (Hong, 2011). He proposed that cooperation and relations between the two countries be developed if the North abolished nuclear weapons, and built diplomatic relations with outsiders and reached a GDP of 3,000 dollars. His administration was similar to a give and take strategy. Moreover, he also proposed a Reunification Tax policy which he emphasized would make the reunification more realistic.

These two policies followed the same path in principle but were very significantly different in approach. This may be because they were from different administrative parties: Kim Dae-jung was from the progressive party while Lee Myung-bak was from the conservative side. Thus, these two administrations were used as a case study in comparison. However, there has not yet been major work analyzing why their approach was so different towards the North. Thus, these two policies would make a good comparison study.

1.2 Research Questions

In this study, four major research questions are addressed:

Question (1) How were the policies of their two ministrations created?

Question (2) How were they different and similar?

Question (3) Did any internal factors, especially, individual leader characteristics, or external factors such as the role of major power play a role in these two policies?

1.3 Research Hypothesis

In order to guide latter efforts in the research process, from the study, it is hypothesized that individual leader characteristics played major role in shaping Kim's and Lee's policies towards North Korea.

1.4 Research Objectives

This study intended to compare and contrast the two policies of South Korea towards North Korea from these two administrations. Therefore, the objectives of the study were:

(1) To examine the differences and similarities of Kim's and Lee's policies towards North Korea.

(2) To examine major factors that influenced Kim's and Lee's policies towards North Korea.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

The theoretical framework of the study derived from the foreign policy analysis theory.

There are several levels of analysis and methodological experimentation that are provided by many scholars in order to find the cause of the foreign policy decision. However, in this paper, only a few theories are used to address the inquiries (Hudson, 2007).

1.5.1 Related Theories:

1.5.1.1 Definition

Foreign policy has been acknowledged as being as old as the perception of state's mutual interaction since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). States have emerged since then as sovereign actors required to interact mutually for gaining peace. The concept of the Westphalian state system has persisted through today as a study of international relations.

However, **foreign policy analysis** or **FPA** is the process and results of human decision making which relates to foreign entities. It may not be made by a simply single decision or indecision, but with a particular situation. FPA is based on factors that influence foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy decision makers.

According to foreignpolicyanalysis.org, as a field of study, **foreign policy analysis** is characterized by its actor-specific focus. In the simplest terms, it is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy decision-making in either a comparative or case-specific manner. The underlying and often implicit argument theorizes that human beings, acting as a group or within a group, compose and cause change in international politics.

Marijke Breuning (2007) gives the definition of foreign policy analysis as the desire to understand the interactions of countries and it assumes individual decision makers, in groups or alone as individuals, make foreign policy decisions. It also assumes that the foreign policies are usually settled by a complex interplay or multiple factors.

The perception of foreign policy maker contains various variables such as beliefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, nationality, and self-conceptions. It is a very complex and intricately related set of information and patterns. Each one has micro-possibilities in a given society to shape the societal context in which the decision-maker operates.

1.5.1.2 Individual decision-making – the Political Psychology of Leader

Do leaders matter to foreign policy analysis? Can leader shape foreign policy? Surely, not every foreign policy decision is made by a leader's distinctive personal characteristics and perceptions but somehow; the leader may put more of an emphasis on a particular foreign policy. Thus, it is quite important to examine a leader's characteristics.

It is clearly a high priority for political psychologists and foreign policy analysts to understand a leader's mental model. The following hypotheses serve to examine leader characteristics:

First, a key action may be a regime type. Different regimes type may constrain levels on leader controls of policy differently. However, the regime type may not preclude a leader to influence policy.

A related context may be a leader's interest in foreign policy. Leaders who are interested in discussion issues because of prior experience or memory are likely

to apply their personality on foreign policy. In contrast, if they have no interest in foreign policy issues, they may delegate an authority to deal with such matters.

Third, the highest government leader, may persistently handle crisis situations regardless of their general level of interest in foreign affairs. However, at this stage, the leaders may have a predisposition in check in order to avoid making unnecessary mistakes.

A fourth variable, a leader's personal characteristics will be called to take part in decision-making in an ambiguous or uncertain situation when there is a sparse or contradictory situation and advisors are unable to figure out a viable solution. The leader may be exercised his or her judgment to settle a basis for foreign policy decision-making. These types of situations are those involving long-range planning where approaching particular problems or sweeping strategic doctrines are decided for an uncertain and unpredictable future.

The degree to which a leader has had diplomatic training (Margaret Hermann, 1984) is the fifth variable. Hermann argues that untrained leaders, especially who are insensitive to the international context, are likely to depend more on their personal worldview in any foreign policy response which it is different from the leaders who have had prior training; they have learned to lower their personal characteristics to the situation at hand.

A sixth condition considers a particular leader who has expertise in a particular issue. He may leave a personal imprint decision on the policy eventually chosen, even if he is not the top leader. The acknowledgment of the deference to the experts must be investigated in order to identify which leaders bear further examination in any particular case.

Seventh, a style of leadership needs to be concentrated on. Does the leader prefer to lay his hand on the intelligence himself? Or does he prefer to appoint information processing and decision making to others? These two conditions have both pros and cons, but clearly the hands-on style of leadership give much more of a remarkable effect on the decision-making of the leader's personality.

Finally, the last variable is to examine the top leader in group settings. In all groups, whether small or large, particular individuals may play a given role on a fairly consistent basis. For example, one person may play the devil's advocate role while another is as a loyal mind-guard.

1.5.1.3 Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy Making

A leader always encounters domestic restrictions on foreign policy making. Policy options must respond appropriately to the situation as well as be acceptable at home. In evaluating policy options, a decision maker must not only consider how effective and appropriate a response to the situation is, but also consider whether the options will be accepted by the domestic citizens. This depends on the country and their fundamental government structure relationship between the executive and legislative branches. It may include the ability of the executive to convince the legislature, as well as have a full understanding of the domestic constituencies outside of government.

(a) Political System Enclosing

The political system is one of the main cores that influence how foreign policy will be released. A coalition is needed relies on the electoral system or the rules that govern the elections of countries with a parliamentary government. Whether the government consists of a coalition government or a cabinet dominated

by only a single party, it has consequences on the type of government and it influences the political decision making process.

(b) Domestic Constituencies Influencing

There are several forms of influences which can come from domestic pressures. Influence is exerted explicitly by interest groups, the media, and public opinion, but it is hard to gauge to what degree these domestic constituencies effect foreign policy. On the other hand, the pressures of domestic constituencies restrict decision makers, but they also try to suppress these attitudes.

(c) Culture and national identity

Many scholars may overlook the effects of culture and national identity of a country which are related to foreign policy. This factor is concerned over own identity, it is about whom we are dealing with and; who has played important roles, whether bad, good, or indifferent. The concept of political culture and the notion of a country is well set up to resonate citizens' voice due to their differences in their world view.

National identity is political and is constantly being shaped and reshaped every moment by society. The engines of national identity are discourse and interaction within our society. Simultaneously, cultural issues will be raised from a continual process of social discourse together with the national identity which can not exist without reference to the culture.

1.4.1.4 International Constraints on Foreign Policy Making

International constraint is a macro level of analysis which moves closer to more conventional traditions of International Relations. National attributes are likely to include elements that are considered to be the power of the nation-state: geography, demographic, national resources, etc.

For the international system, it has mentioned through globalization. The new types of interdependence and economic dependence, and even capabilities have been introduced in this stage. The system level of analysis is likely to look at the nature of the system composed of all states. It does not examine only states or dyadic relationships between nation-states, but it also examines as the following:

(a) Size and Power

For decision makers of various countries, the capacities and geographic circumstances give them a prior understanding of a variety of different circumstances that they will face. Large countries that have larger territories have the advantage of having a lot over natural resources. On the other hand, the leader of states with smaller territories, as well their population and economies should realize their greater restrictions as they navigate the international environment. Larger nations generally also have greater; military capacities.

Thus, leaders should evaluate the relative capacities of their own and other states because these serve as a guide to the role of a state in the realm of international politics. A state's capacities shape its role in the world arena.

(b) State Classification

The classification of states as great, middle, or small powers is more imprecise than the concept of the size which lack specificity. However, it is difficult to distinguish between small and middle, or middle and great, powers. Despite the difficulties, the different foreign policy among states is the result.

In conclusion, from the FPA theories above, there are many factors that play a role in the foreign policy formulation and implementation. However, this research project seeks to apply the leadership characteristic as a main core under the

constraints from both domestic and international to analyze the cause of Kim's and Lee's policies towards North Korea regarding Korean reunification.


Although, there are many ways to study roles of leader in foreign policy such as: leadership styles, personality and public persona, cognitive consistency, belief system, etc.; the study will address how individual leader employs their experiences, beliefs, personality and knowledge to their roles as decision makers in foreign policy making. Moreover, it will emphasize a consistency of the leader decision under different environments or constraints from external and internal; to see how the leaders will ensure that external and internal influences do not effect to their decision in formulating and implementing policies.

The leadership trait analysis will be adopted and develop as the conceptual framework which bases primarily on three dimensions: attitude toward constraints, openness to new information and motivation. But only the first component of the analysis will be focused namely the beliefs in one's own ability to control events or leader perception of control over situations. The stronger belief and determination of the leader tend to link with the consistency of the foreign policy, no matter how strong of the constraints are (Breuning, 2007).

In short, although there are several factors influencing foreign policy-making, it is the leader who makes the ultimate decision. Thus, the study will focus on the leaders' decision which is based on their individual characteristics.

Therefore, the foreign policy analysis theory would be formed as a conceptual framework as below:

Figure 1 A Conceptual Framework



1.6 Research Methodology and Scope

This research mainly used descriptive and analytical method drawing on primary source such as leaders' speeches and secondary data from inter-Korean issues, books, research, journals, internet resources, and information that are related to Korean reunification policies.

1.7 Expected Benefits

Korean reunification is not a new issue for either the South or the North of Korea. It has been a sensitive issue to discuss for many decades. At the present time, they both seem to be satisfied with the current situation of having two Koreas, not as one as in the past. However, on the political stage, it is still a main issue to consider or at least to maintain good relations or to develop it to be better between the both. In order to pave the way to the goal, an understanding of an approach towards ones will be helped.

Thus, this study will hopefully provide understanding which applying or approaching is more appropriated; or conducting to the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas and which one had a better chance to achieve the ultimate goal of reunification.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This thesis consists of five chapters as following:

The first chapter provides a background, rationale and objectives as well as research questions, hypothesis, conceptual framework, scope, research methodology, limitations, expected benefits, and the organization of the study.

The second chapter presents information of relevant previous studies in the literature review.

The third chapter explains how these President Kim Dae-jung's and President Lee Myung-bak's policies were created and their purposes.

The fourth chapter analyses the internal and external factors that influence the policies towards North Korea.

The last chapter presents the conclusion which aim to address the above research questions and the suggestions for the further research.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are many researchers who have written about the Kim Dae-jung administration which focus on only the Sunshine Policy itself or the Lee Myung-bak administration towards North Korea as well as comparing the two administrations briefly. However, there has not been any research examining how these two proposed anything fundamentally different towards the North, especially regarding Korean reunification.

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 Perspective of Sunshine Policy

In the year 1997, Kim Dae-jung was elected to presidential office. This election was to mark the first peaceful and democratic power transfer from the ruling to the opposition party in Korean history.

According to Selig S. Harrison (2002), in *The Kim Dae-jung Government, the Sunshine Policy, and the North-South Summit*, the Sunshine policy was a serious gamble which hoped to see military tensions at the thirty-eighth parallel automatically ease as North-South economic cooperation proceeded. Thus, it would be unnecessary to initiate immediate action on sensitive arms control issues, such as a mutual force pull back. He argued that the future of North-South relations would be risky unless the Sunshine policy addressed not only the economic issues which were President Kim's primary focus but also directly addressed security concerns.

Therefore, Harrison suggested that economic cooperation should go side by side with the cooperation of the United States. His prospective was that the United States would be a key player to bring the Korean War to a formal end by conducting

a peace treaty with the North to replace the Armistice Agreement involving the United States, North Korea and South Korea as a new trilateral peace structure.

Moreover, B.C. Koh (2002) also considered Kim Dae-jung's foreign policy achievements but mainly focused more on Korea's foreign relations outside the peninsula which was analyzed in *Beyond the Peninsula: South Korea's Foreign Policy under Kim Dae-jung*, Koh argued that both Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il had two things in common: they remained at an honorary status in their respective countries and they led better with their external policies than their internal policies. Koh praised Kim on how he could do his work with external policy. The key achievement was the Inter-Korean Summit of June 2000 which could open a new era of reconciliation and cooperation between the two enemies on the peninsula. But Koh also argued that this would not be possible without three other foreign policy achievements: assembling relations with the United States and Japan, strengthening ties with China and Russia, and promoting multilateral diplomacy.

Nevertheless, Koh argued that Kim also faced serious setback and suffered two regressions. The first one occurred in his March 2001 summit meeting with President George W. Bush. Koh believed it was one of the worst experiences for President Kim in summit diplomacy. The second, a minor one, involved an argument that broke out over the joint statement with Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin on missile defense. Koh argued that the setbacks were not imperatively Kim's fault, rather the timing of the Kim-Bush summit was failed because it was premature; Kim was hurried to the United States before Bush settled his foreign team to prepare for the summit.

Others; such as Chung-in Moon (2002), disagreed with Koh's valuation. He argued that the summit was not a failure. He insisted that it was important for the

United States to early have a summit with South Korea in order to deliver a strong message to North Korea that the bilateral alliance was strong. For South Korean, too, the summit could indirectly send an important message prior Japanese leader's visit to the U.S. to show the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance which was stronger than the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Furthermore, Linda Jackson (1999) analyzed the Kim Dae-jung administration by using *Swiri* fever to highlight the issue of Korean reunification. "Swiri" was a slick Hollywood-style spy thriller made in February 1999, which centered around the complex issue of Korean reunification. The name of the film referred to a native fish found only in Korean fresh-water streams. The director described how the waters from both North and South Korea flow freely together, and how the fish could be found in either water without knowing which side they belonged to. It was the first major-release film that directly addressed the still-problematic issue of Korean reunification.

In her paper, she focused on how realistic a confederation of two Korea nations was with two systems and two governments as Kim envisioned, the possibility of North Korea collapsing, and outsiders' influence, especially the United States and Korea's neighbors – China, Japan and Russia. Linda summarized that within external powers, the surrounding nations did not want North Korea to collapse; in contrast, each tried to maintain in one way or another and none of surrounding nations were enthusiastic about a unified Korea. She mentioned that North Korea was enigma and its system was in terminal crisis mode, thus, with more influence from the South, it increased the difficulty in justifying the existence of two Koreas. What she got from the film *Swiri* was to point out that despite the South Korean government's declaration, not unification to identify that the act of taking over the North could not change the Pyongyang people's mindset. Thus, she

concluded that if the thirty-eighth parallel boundary suddenly ceased as the Berlin wall had, both South Korean citizens and the government would fail to prepare South Korea for the sacrifices that the ultimate absorption of North Korea would take, and took in account the unrealistic unification formula of Kim Dae-jung that awaited the peaceful coexistence of two Korean states with ideologically opposing systems.

However, from the point of view of Sung Chul Yang (2003), a former ambassador from South Korea to the U.S., Kim's Sunshine policy would be an expedient trigger to form peace on the Korean Peninsula by establishing component relationships which involved inter-Korean, North Korean-U.S., and North Korean-Japan in close consultation and coordination. Furthermore, the two Koreas could learn from the German experience and the European integration process that is currently organized as the European Union (EU) in the form of building a national economic community so that it could carry on the ultimate goal of political unification.

2.1.2 Perspective of Vision 3000 Plan

According to Tong Kim (2007), a research professor, Lee Myung-bak's foreign policy platform in what was called the "MB Doctrine", was characterized by three priorities: resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, strengthening of the Korea-U.S. alliance, and conditional assistance to the North upon denuclearization. He mentioned that for North Korea, Lee preferred a thorough and flexible approach to draw out the successful implementation which meant: "thorough" to the principle of intolerance to North Korea's nuclear program and "flexible" in response in nuclear negotiation.

Hong Nack Kim (2008) also concluded the five main points in his study: *The Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korea Policy and the Prospects for Inter-Korean*

Relations: First, North Korea wanted the Lee administration to continue the Sunshine Policy to engage with the North, while the Lee government had no intention of continuing the policy that failed to prevent North Korea's nuclear program. Lee would not offer economic assistance to North Korea unless it abandoned its nuclear weapons program. Second, Lee's government resisted the North's pressure rather than accept its demand to honor and implement the previous two inter-Korean summit agreements during the period of Kim Dae-jung's inauguration in order to be sure that Seoul could negotiate with Pyongyang on the opportunity to implement economic cooperation projects.

However, it would depend on how faithful North Korea implemented the agreements on denuclearization which were made at the six party talks in Beijing. Third, Kim mentioned that time was on South Korea side because North Korea's economy remained in serious trouble and it needed badly to negotiate with the South. Forth, he argued that the future of South Korea's economic aid to North Korea was obviously related to the denuclearization of the North, for it was a main point for the recommencement of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Moreover, North Korea had to accept the United States drafted protocol on verification of the North's declared nuclear programs and facilities to remove it from the list of state-sponsored terrorism countries. However, North Korea implied that unless it got the quid pro quo from the U.S., Japan and other powers involved in the six party talks, it was likely that the relationship between South and North Korea would take a considerable amount of time. Lastly, the cooperation and relationship might be difficult to expect any major breakthroughs on the nuclear issue and cross border relations until a moderate new leader or leadership group emerged in North Korea due to Kim Jong-il administration, as many military leaders were known to be inflexible on the reunification issue.

Furthermore, Jung-ho Bae (2010), in his paper: *Myung-bak Lee Administration's North Korea Policy and the Inter-Korean Relations*, said that to achieve this purpose, Lee tried to make a productive policy by pursuing (1) pragmatism rather than ideology; (2) balance of inter-Korea relations and international cooperation; (3) accomplishment of North Korea's denuclearization; and (4) settlement of long-pending inter-Korean issues through genuine inter-Korean dialogue.

Bae proposed some policy tasks for South Korea to take towards its North Korea Policy: first, forming and improving an implementation program for the Grand Bargain to denuclearize North Korea, rather than non-proliferation, should be discussed in the U.S.-North Korea talks, both in bilateral and multilateral talks to block the North's path to becoming a nuclear power state and must put the talks into practice. Second, initiating and preparing the era of the Korean Peninsula reunification along with North Korea's regime transformation which included its reform and openness. Last, Grand Strategic Initiative of the Korean peninsula would be done in which inter-Korean relations and international cooperation was appropriately integrated. This asset must be formed in a way to persuade North Korea to accept and obtain support from the international community during this changing period.

Suh Jae Jean (2009) conducted a study on *Lee Myung-bak government's North Korean policy which was based on a historical and theoretical foundation*. Suh mentioned the objective of the Lee policy through his study that the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue was at the top of three prior policy targets. It was because the North nuclear issue became a last long obstacle for inter-Korean relations. For instance, the products made in the Gaeseong industrial region were prohibited from being exported to the United States or other international markets,

moreover, the nuclear program issues prevented North Korea from joining the international community and being a part of regular participant in the global society. It was believed that boosting inter-Korean economic cooperation would activate denuclearization, opening the country up, and furthering economic development.

In his study, he suggested that the Vision 3000 thru Denuclearization and Openness Plan of Lee would be a policy that could lead and support North Korea to enter into the international community. It would help its economic development that would guide both Koreas to enjoying mutual benefits and common prosperity.

Moreover, Joon Seok Hong (Fall 2011) proposed that reuniting South and North Korea would be achieved through economic cost while the political and economic realities that the ruling leaders in both Koreas needed to confront and sufficiently prepare for with sentiments consisting of desire for peace and unity on the Korean Peninsula.

Hong highlighted the overall tough policy toward North Korea of Lee's "Denuclearization, Openness, and 3000" Plan that set to provide economic assistance to North Korea with the cooperation of the international community in order to raise North Korea's per capita GDP to \$3,000 within 10 years and included a reunification tax proposal. Moreover, he suggested that the reunification tax would point out the deeper and inevitable inquiries of whether reunification was possible, and if so, in which form. He believed Lee's idea would remind Koreans on both sides to think about reunification and how to prepare for it.

Young-geun Kim (2011), conducted a research much differently from others. He evaluated the decision-making and operating process of South Korea policies towards North Korea and security schemes which focused on the time after the Kim Dae-jung inauguration through the Kim administration, in the view of reciprocity;

moreover, he also examined the implications for the future South Korea-United States alliance. Therefore, he concluded that the South Korean government should urgently form a priority towards achievable policy measures rather than assign excessive pressure or unrealistic demands on North Korea.

Thus, from the above-mentioned, we could see only the papers focusing on general information of Kim's and Lee's policies towards North Korea. There was not any unequivocally evidence of the two policies or the environments or factors which shaped the two policies differently by applying any theory to clarifying systemically. Thus, this study is to conduct a research to examine the cause of the policies to see what things or environments shape the different perspective from which to see these two policies.



CHAPTER III

KOREAN REUNIFICATION POLICY

This chapter deals with policy and approach differences between Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak. In order to study the different approaches between Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak regarding Korean reunification toward North Korea, the study mainly focuses on the two policies of Kim and Lee:

Kim Dae-jung's policy was to: actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea, through the Sunshine Policy that was intended to create conditions of economic assistance and cooperation for reunification, rather than sanctions and military threats.

Lee Myung-bak's Policy of Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity was used: as a tool for implementation of the Vision 3000 thru Denuclearization and Openness plan. It was called a give and take deal.

Moreover, to analyze effectively, the personal lives of the leaders are used as the fundamental factor to answering the research questions.

3.1 Policy and Approach under Kim Dae-jung's Administration

3.1.1 President Kim's Personal History

President Kim Dae-jung was born to a middle-class farmer. He graduated from a public high school in 1943 and started working as a clerk in a Japanese-owned shipping company which he took over company in 1945, eventually becoming a wealthy businessman. He was once captured by the communists and was nearly executed to death during the Korean War (1950-1953) but he managed to escape and decided to enter politics as an active pro-democracy activist in the 1950s and

became an opposition voice to the policies of President Syngman Rhee when Rhee Administration began to become increasingly dictatorial.

Kim first got a seat on the National Assembly in 1961 after several attempts but the election was voided because of a military coup d'état of Major General Park Chung-hee which occurred just three days after he was elected. Then he was elected again as a junior leader within his own party's Assembly in 1963. His role was as spokesman for the Democratic Party in 1965 and later became the chairman of the party's Policy Planning Committee the following year.

In 1969, Kim was widely known for his vision and courage as he addressed against an outdoor rally. Thus, he was chosen to be a presidential candidate of the New Democratic Party in 1971 to promote a welfare-oriented mass economy and was of guaranteed Korean security by the four powers with strong regional interests - the U.S, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Kim also advocated easing tensions with the North and promised to restore democracy by ending Park's rule but ultimately lost to Park (Baker, 2014) . Later, after President Park formed the Yushin Constitution to ban all political activities and extend his president life through the National Assembly. Kim Dae-jung strenuously opposed Park's regime publicly in the U.S. and Japan and advocated Korean democracy. In August 1973, Kim was kidnapped and nearly killed by agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) from a Tokyo hotel but luckily, he was released after swift and strong reactions from the U.S. and Japan.

In 1976, Kim participated in the democratization. Subsequently, he was banned from politics and sentenced to prison for five years which was reduced to house arrest in 1978. After President Park was assassinated in 1979, Kim had his political rights restored but when Chun Doo-hwan, a group of soldiers seized power,

Kim was arrested again and sentenced to death in 1980. However, he was given exile and permitted to relocate to the United States. While living abroad, he worked as a visiting professor to the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and authored some opinions in leading western newspapers that criticized the South Korean government. On March 30, 1983, Kim presented a speech on human rights and democracy at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia and earned a Doctorate of Laws degree from the institution. Two years later, he returned home.

Kim then was again put under house arrest but his return raised a nationwide pro-democracy movement. In 1987, he carried on his role as one of the principal leaders of the opposition for the presidential election; however, he was defeated again in this time as well as in 1992. Eventually, in December 1997, Kim was elected the eighth President of the Republic of Korea; he became the first opposition leader to win election to his country's presidency in Korea's modern history.

President Kim received the Nobel Prize for peace reservation in 2000 for his efforts to restore democracy in South Korea and to improve relations with North Korea. He was called the "Nelson Mandela of Asia" for his Sunshine Policy towards North Korea (NobelFoundation, 2000).

President Kim was the first progressive leftist South Korean President. In South Korea, leftists were considered to be those who sought for democratization of Korean politics and peaceful coexistence with North Korea through reconciliation and dialogue, and ultimately peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. Kim Dae-jung who opened a new era of inter-Korean relations and South Korean foreign relations (Liou, 2005).

Judging from Kim's afore mentioned brief bibliography, gives a glimpse of how hard his life was. He encountered obstacles all the way through to step into his

Presidential position but he never stopped pursuing his ideology to seek democracy and build up relations with North Korea. The difficulties he met, made him believe in his own goal to be a peacemaker – a peaceful desirer which was particularly shown in his Sunshine policy.

3.1.2 Sunshine Policy

As noted, Kim Dae-jung served as the South Korean president during 1998-2003. He was the representative of progressive administrations. During his administration, he played very important roles in making policies regarding Korean reunification. His famous policy toward the North was an engagement policy which was called Sunshine policy. His policy was known for its non-absorption and reconciliation emphasis.

In his inauguration address, President Kim clearly addressed that he would improve inter-Korean relations by promoting reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas as well as establishing peace between them. His speech reflected the fundamental direction of his administration's North Korea policy. At this point, rather than to hasten in achieving national unification immediately, the government would initially concentrate in transforming the political structure on the Korean Peninsula from the Cold War confrontation into reconciliation and cooperation.

The Sunshine policy was named after the North Wind and the Sun, one of Aesop's fables. In the fable, the sun and the wind competed to remove a man's coat. The wind blew strongly, but the man clutched his coat and kept it on. The sun shone warmly, and the man voluntarily took off his coat to enjoy the fine weather. Thus, this fable fitted well to the main aim of the policy; it was to soften North Korea's attitudes towards the South by encouraging interaction and economic assistance (Lim, 2012).

The reconciliation and cooperation policy of President Kim was based on realistic conditions for North Korea. The government believed that although the North Korean system proved to be a setback and its improvement was impossible without reform, it would not collapse anytime soon. Thus, the most practical way to safeguard peace on the peninsula, develop inter-Korean relations and head toward unification would be to prepare and provide a beneficial environment for North and South relations to graduate by itself, whilst affirming steady management of national unification (Lim, 2001).

3.1.2.1 Purpose of Sunshine Policy

President Kim appeared as a very modern supporter of democracy and had kind hearted intentions to the North. During his tenure, he set out two major goals. (1) Domestically, he vowed to reform and restructure the financial, cooperate, labor and public sectors to prepare South Korea for the new global economy while (2) externally, he wanted to remove the last vestige of the Cold War from the Korean peninsula by compromising with North Korea and forming a peace regime that would ensure stability and prosperity for new generation.

The purpose of the Sunshine policy was to restrain burdens by helping Pyongyang alleviate its economic problems through cooperation. President Kim believed that the North-South economic links would help to soften their antagonism and expedite economic reform in the North.

President Kim determined three principles; based: South Korea would not endure armed provocation; South Korea had no intention to absorb North Korea; and South Korea would intensely pursue peaceful cooperation and interact with North Korea. Furthermore, he formed his unification formula into a three stage approach. The first stage would be a confederation of the two Koreas that would be granted

with each government by treating its respective system at least ten years. The second stage would see a Federation of two Koreas. A single federal government would be in charge of foreign relations and defense while regional independent governments in the North and South would administrate each region's internal affairs. The final stage would complete unification by a centralized government or several independent regional governments, as the United States and Germany. However, the federal stage and complete unification were somehow equivocal. President Kim admitted that by simply approaching the second stage, one could consider that de facto unification would be achieved (Jakobson, 1999).

President Kim's policy differed from previous Korean administration in numerous significant ways: first, to undertake the peaceful coexistence and pave the way toward unification, the Sunshine policy convinced private and non-governmental economic, cultural and humanitarian to contact with North Korea. He believed that this policy would prove how the Korean people could only change their behaviors through people-to-people relations. Therefore, the policy allowed an increase in North Korean publications, television programs, and films into South Korea. It ushered in a new stage of inter-Korean relations. Second, Kim's intention was to separate economics from the government which he pledged to support private businesses and other governmental organizations in order to make contact with North Korea regarding possible difficulties between the two governments or provocation from the North. Nevertheless, the government did not confine economic ties or grassroots-level affiliations when incidents happened between the two, such as when a North Korean submarine entered South Korean waters in 1998. It was similar to past events which caused the South government to suspend its promise to engage with the North; and lastly, President Kim insisted that in order to improve inter-Korean relations he encouraged the US and Japan to improve their strained

relationships with North Korea as well. This was different from the previous administrations which opposed direct contact between Washington and Pyongyang or Tokyo. He pledged not to link the inter-Korean relations with the ties between the North and others (Jakobson, 1999).

During the first visit of President Kim to the United States in June, 1998, Kim and US President William Jefferson Bill Clinton met and declared a reaffirmation of three policies: (1) the importance of a strong defense alliance; (2) the Clinton administration's confidence in Kim's attempt to reform the Korean economy, investment and liberalize trade, strengthen the banking system, and implement the IMF program; and (3) American support for Kim's engagement policy toward North Korea (Koh, 2002).

Later after the 2001 George W. Bush became President, President Kim Dae-jung had a summit with which resulted in four essential points: (1) they reconfirmed the Alliance and full partnership between the United States and the Republic of Korea; (2) President Bush conveyed support for the South and President Kim's leading role in the North-South peace process and for the forthcoming second inter-Korean summit; (3) both presidents promised to abide by the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework; and (4) President Bush reassured U.S. assistance for South Korea's reconciliation and cooperation policy toward the North. Thus, they also agreed to maintain the importance of close consultations and coordination toward North Korea, both bilaterally and trilaterally with Japan. Coincidentally, the Korea-U.S.-Japan senior level bilateral and trilateral consultant meeting was held in March 2001. Furthermore, President Kim's formula of comprehensive reciprocity centered on North Korea must agree to three things: first, faithful implementation of the Agreed Framework; second, abandonment of missile development and exports; and finally, no hostile provocations towards South Korea. Under these conditions, if North Korea

could carry them out, then three items would be received in return: (1) North Korea's security would be guaranteed; (2) proper economic assistance; and (3) support for its involvement in the international community (C. Y. Sung, 2003).

Under the previous administration for the past years, South Korea's policy toward North Korea was often a negative and passive peace-keeping equivalent to maintaining the status quo. But Kim Dae-jung's government tried to assign a peace process by pursuing the policy of reconciliation and cooperation toward North Korea. The keys were functional division, peace and mutual prosperity, flexible reciprocity, piecemeal gradualism, and solidarity with allies. He utilized a favorable international environment and South Korea's relative strength vis-à-vis North Korea to overtake a positive and active peace-making policy. President Kim always acknowledged that among the partition countries of the Second World War, only Korea remained a divided nation; however, the reunified process was improved after he enunciated this new policy. He believed that Korean people could draw lessons from the German experience and European integration which he drew four conclusions from (C. Y. Sung, 2003):

First, the Sunshine policy responded to North Korea's weaknesses in the economic and humanitarian area, rather than to its strengths on military fronts. It was essential to help the North with its chronic energy, food, and hard currency shortages due to its systemic defects. Second, dialogue and deterrence were two factors which the Sunshine policy focused on: While South Korea maintained a strong defense attitude grounded on military alliance with the United States and close U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination, the South attempted to set an environment in which the North would feel safe to open up and seek reforms. The neutral premise of this policy was that North Korea would not collapse anytime soon and the transformation toward a market economy was inevitable unless it changed, its

aggressive doctrine and the threat against the South. Third, the Sunshine policy firstly centered on the tasks and problems that both sides simply sorted out to overcome, while placing aside unmanageable issues for future consideration and resolution. Fourth, the Sunshine policy also boosted peace and mutual prosperity instead of encouraging mutual antagonism and dispute; and finally, the Sunshine policy stimulated allies and friends to enthusiastically engage with North Korea. North Korea has increased its diplomatic relations with other countries since the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung government.

3.1.2.2 Process of Sunshine Policy

Kim Dae-jung's administration steadily attempted to enhance reconciliation and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula while completely suppressing Pyongyang from a provocation.

Therefore, there were two announcements which President Kim made: first was his plan was to build a South-North economic community and second was a declaration in Berlin on the Inter-Koreas; which later became the inter-Korean relations summit (Lim, 2001).

- January 3, 2000; the announcement of plans to build a South-North economic community was delivered when President Kim Dae-jung gave his New Year Address. He emphasized the main task of the government's North Korea policy which was the promotion of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation to end the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. In addition, he declared that South Korea would provide humanitarian aid to North Korea and promoted economic exchanges with mutual benefits and co-prosperity. He also proposed a discussion between government research institutions from both Koreas to form a South-North economic community. The proposal for the economic community was targeted at creating a

new framework for inter-Korean relations through the expansion of the scope and depth of cooperation between the two Koreas in various economic areas, including trade and investment.

- March 9, 2000; The Berlin Declaration was announced while President Kim delivered his speech at Free University in Berlin on, a Declaration on Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation for Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (commonly known as the Berlin Declaration). The declaration covered a wide range of Korean issues: provision of economic aid, peace establishment, resolution of separated families issues and resumption of inter-governmental dialogue.

The Berlin declaration was of great historical significance because it introduced a turning point in inter-Korean relations by drawing the North to hold an inter-Korean summit.

For peaceful reunification of the nation, the historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 - 15, 2000 was created, by President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In order to promote mutual understandings, develop South-North relations and realizing peaceful reunification; the two leaders declared as follows:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.

2. For the achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.

3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.

4. The South and the North have agreed to exhibit mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in civics, culture, sports, health, the environment and all other fields.

5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreements expeditiously (USIP, 2000) .

The Sunshine policy of President Kim, could be called an effective tool to use as a link to cooperate with North Korea. It could open a new era between the Koreas which almost led to the ultimate goal of reunification. President Kim applied the right strategy in the right situation in order to craft with North Korea. The soft-line approach could at least bring out a peaceful moment over the Korean Peninsula which was hard to accomplish since the separation.

3.2 Policy and Approach under Lee Myung-bak Administration

3.2.1 President Lee's Personal History

Lee Myung-Bak was born in wartime Japan and was the fifth of seven children. After the Second World War ended in 1945, his family returned to Korea and settled in his father's hometown. In order to help his family, Lee sold rice snacks during the day and attended night school by receiving a scholarship. A year after

graduation, he enrolled at Korea University and paid his tuition fee with his earnings as a garbage collector.

During his third year in college, Lee was elected president of the student council. In the same year in 1964, He was imprisoned for participating in protests against the Korea-Japan relationship normalization against President Park Chung-hee's Seoul-Tokyo Talks. He was sentenced to probation for five years for his student activism by the government and imprisoned for three years, which limited him from some of the larger firms, but actually served a little less than three months at the prison. In 1965, Lee worked at the Hyundai Construction Company and advanced quickly through the executive ranks. In 1992, he resigned as CEO and decided to enter politics.

He began his political life by joining the Democratic Liberal Party and was elected as a member of the fourteenth Korean National Assembly. Upon his election, he declared that he shifted from business to politics because he watched Mikhail Gorbachev change the world climate and started to think whether there was anything he could do. In 1995, he ran for Mayor of Seoul but failed. Later in 2002, Lee reran for mayor of Seoul and this time was successfully. During his term, his most noteworthy projects were the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon stream which now flows through the heart of Seoul and functions as a public amusement destination, the establishment of Seoul Forest, the opening of Seoul Forest Park, and developed a grassy field in front of Seoul City Hall which was transformed from a concrete traffic circle to a lawn where people could gather, it was praised by Asia Times as a green oasis in 2006 (Chosunilbo, 2007) .Thus, a year later, Lee was chosen as a “Hero of the Environment” by Time magazine, along with former U.S. vice president, Al Gore (Walsh, 2007).

In May, 2007, Lee officially announced his intention to propose the nomination of the Grand National Party (GNP) as a presidential candidate. Three months later, he beat Park Geun-hye in the GNP's primary to be appointed as the party's nominee for the 2007 Presidential election. During this time, he was plagued by countless scandal allegations. Lee was suspected in profiting from an expensive land purchase but there was no evidence or proof. A few days before the presidential election in December 2007, Lee declared that he would donate all of his assets to society and he was able to get high approval rating.

Declaring a departure from his former views on North Korea, Lee announced a plan to engage with North Korea through investment. He vowed to establish a consultative body with the North to discuss furthering economic ties to seek a Korean Economic Community agreement to form the legal and systemic framework that emerged from the negotiations in a formal way of dissociating humanitarian aid from nuclear talks with North Korea. His foreign policy preliminary was called the MB Doctrine which supported engaging with North Korea and strengthening the US-Korean alliance.

During the presidential campaign, President Lee presented himself as a centrist alternative to conservative and progressive extremes. His victory was perceived as a rejection of both conservative and progressive ideology. President Lee kept his image as a pragmatist rather than as a conservative. People assumed that his policies, particularly toward North Korea, would not differ from those of the previous President (Klingner, 2008).

President Lee would maintain South Korea's engagement policy but with conditions on humanitarian, political, and economic benefits on the pace of North Korea denuclearization. This was a noticeable change from Kim Daejung's approach

of unconditional and asymmetric arrangement of benefits without demanding any returned economic or diplomatic concession from North Korea.

In December 2007, Lee won the presidential election and was inaugurated on February 25, 2008, pledging to boost the economy, tighten relations with the United States and deal with North Korea. Particularly, Lee declared that he would pursue a global diplomacy campaign and search for further cooperative exchanges with regional neighbors Japan, China, and Russia. Moreover, he promised to tightly build up South Korea–United States relations and implement a tougher policy towards North Korea, through the MB Doctrine.

In order to carry out his agenda, President Lee decided to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) together with the support from its alliance with the United States. This was an attempt to block the possibility of North Korea exporting nuclear and conventional weapons technology. President Lee saw North Korea's nuclear program as a local threat to South Korea. He was concerned over North Korea's nuclear ambitions that it was directed at South Korean security rather than on the damage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Klingner, 2008). This would be a result of strengthening the U.S-South Korea relation as well as abolish nuclear weapons from North Korea.

Moreover, President Lee went forward with peacekeeping operations (PKOs) of the United Nations (UN) which South Korea joined in 1993 to contribute to important global security issues and promote international recognition of a global Korea. It also benefited the economy.

A look at President Lee's background shows that his ideology was mainly focused on developing the economy rather than focusing on other area. Thus,

President Lee applied his idea into his policy toward North Korea, which was called the Vision 3000.

3.2.2 Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness Plan

During 2008-2011, Lee Myung-bak was voted South Korean president. He was from a member of conservative administrations. He called himself as a pragmatist by forming the power on a platform of pragmatism and promises of economy recovery.

The inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in 2008 implied a major change in inter-Korean relations. Before taking tenure, Lee indicated that he would take a “pragmatic” approach and he pushed South Koreans to consider practical preparations for final reunification, but he maintained an overall tough policy toward North Korea. To emphasize his idea, President Lee announced the “New Peace Initiative for the Korean Peninsula” in his celebration speech for National Independence in August, 2009 which he explained that “only when North Korea abandons its nuclear ambitions, will there be any follow-through on the international cooperation that can provide breakthrough improvement to the North Korean economy” (Curtis, 1996).

The Lee Administration was guided by a clear set of principles in pursuing an interrelated North Korea policy. In line with those principles, the government worked to improve normal inter-Korean relations based on mutual respect and cooperation, to imply the fundamental for peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, and to accomplish peaceful unification. The government started off by resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue, which threatened its relations with the North, while seeking mutually beneficial cooperation projects. It also worked to improve human rights conditions in the North and to resolve the issues of separated families, South Korean

prisoners of war and abductees, and other humanitarian concerns from the perspective of universal values.

However, North Korea kept carrying out its nuclear development program. The second nuclear test was in May 2009. The North launched long-range missiles in April and December 2012. It also continued its armed threats against the South by sinking the Cheonan warship in March 2010 and shielding Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year, while also launching a dishonorable attack against the South Korean President and making bold threats among others. The ROK government persuaded the North to show its sincerity by giving up its nuclear weapons, taking responsibility for its reckless behaviors, and promising to restrain a recurrence of similar incidents. Meanwhile, it cooperated with the international community in taking necessary actions to resolve the nuclear and long-range missile issues.

President Lee has encouraged South Koreans to think of practical preparations for final reunification which he believed would be possible. Lee's "Denuclearization, Openness, and 3000" preliminary from 2007 stated that South Korea would provide economic assistance to North Korea with the cooperation of the international community in order to raise North Korea's per capita GDP to \$3,000 within 10 years. The aid would inspire North Korea's to give up its nuclear weapons and help relieve the economic burden of final reunification.

Moreover, President Lee proposed a reunification tax to financially help the country pay for reunification with North Korea during a speech marking the 65th anniversary of Korean independence (August 15, 2010). President Lee stated his belief that reunification will definitely come and emphasized that the time has come to start discussing realistic policies to prepare for that day such as a reunification tax. Under his tax proposal, some people were criticized while others were surprised; it

gave his administration a tough stance on North Korea. However, the reunification tax highlighted the deeper and inevitable inquiries of whether reunification was possible, and if so, in which form. Lee's idea reminded Koreans on both sides to think about reunification and how to prepare for it.

3.2.2.1 Purpose of Vision 3000 Plan

Lee Myung-bak placed a very strict role on North Korea in inter-Korean relations. It was distinguishable by discontinuing the former governments' Sunshine policy from Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun's administration into the internal process. In order to replace the new movement, President Lee delivered several remarks to lessen North-South Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration, such as when he said that "we would not expand Kaesong Industrial Complex without resolving the nuclear issue". This speech resulted in an intensively unstable relationship between the North and the South (Y.-G. Kim, 2011).

In March 2008, a series of violent measures were made by the North, including ordering dislodgement to South Korean authorities on the construction site of a separated families reunion center at Mt. Kumgang, shooting missiles on the west coast, and retrieved the officials of inter-Korean economic cooperation from Kaesong Industrial Complex. Moreover, President Lee once said "We don't believe that rice, fertilizer, dollar-making business like Mount Kumgang tours or Kaesong Industrial Complex would work." From Lee's administration, he applied conservative practices. President Lee put on the strict reciprocity application in the North Korea policy. The government once claimed that they would apply reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea under one condition that North Korea abolished all weapons and programs on nuclear issue. Furthermore, South Korean economic support and various cooperation projects to the North might eventually rely on the no-separated economy from politics. It appeared in President Lee's main North Korean policy the

Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness, which meant nuclear-free, open market, and economic aid for North Korea to achieve a Gross National Product of 3000 US dollars; it was a hard-line policy of strict reciprocity. This policy clearly stated that if North Korea did not implement denuclearization since they took a premise in Vision 3000, there would not be any economic aid to the country. This would also be called conditional reciprocity or a Grand Bargain (Y.-G. Kim, 2011).

To address North Korean reform and opening in coordination with the nuclear issue, Lee established a negotiation policy of mutual benefits and common prosperity in inter-Korea. It acknowledged in three stages: (1) smoothly employ the interlude period of policy change in the South, and to form mutually beneficial and co-prosperous inter-Korean relations; (2) to complete the vision GNP \$3000 in ten years; and (3) to determinedly accomplish unification through the inter-Korean peace and economy communities. President Lee vowed that the principle of strict reciprocity, transparency and verification would be a pavement for his policy toward North Korea and he would imply a much more limited to approach in engaging with the North (Y.-G. Kim, 2011).

3.2.2.2 Process of Vision 3000 Plan

According to President Lee's objective, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue was at the top of three prior policy targets. It was because the North nuclear issue became a last long obstacle for inter-Korean relations. For instance, the products made in the Kaesong industrial region were unable to be exported to the U.S. or other international markets; moreover, it prevented North Korea from joining the international community and being a part of regular participant in the global society. The previous South Korean government considered that boosting inter-Korean economic cooperation would activate denuclearization, opening, and economic development (Suh, 2004).

The vision 3000 viewed denuclearization and opening up not as a final stage, but it was more an initial and support process. Second, the opening of a social country would mean entering into the capitalist world market. In order to be complete, they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States which would bring the country into the global society, and make it a regular participant on the global stage and allow it to trade in the global market.

Thus, it would be necessary for Pyongyang to have a normal diplomatic relationship with Washington as well as Tokyo. To do so, North Korea must firstly become a normal state meeting expectation of the international community. Last, a 3,000 dollars per capita GNP would be a goal for North Korea to drive an independent economy and for a middle-class to emerge within its society (Suh, 2009).

Therefore, the goal would be reached when three main tracks were achieved:

(1) The parallelism of denuclearization and inter-Korean development;

(2) The preparation of many domestic conditions would be necessary to earn the international community's and foreign investors' trust by the improvement of the investment climate the denuclearization and opening up would bring; and

(3) To link the five development programs – (a) the promotion of North Korean export companies; (b) the fostering of the industrial work force; (c) the financing of the international cooperation funds; (d) the building of a highway to link the entire Korean peninsula to the continent; and (e) assistance to provide North Koreans with their fundamental human rights. This was in line with President Lee's election campaign promises. In order to achieve this plan, North Korea must improve its political structure, domestic environment, as well as external and internal conditions. Additionally, it must change the negative impressions from the

international community. It might be hard to achieve at first, but when the change occurred, the possibility for rapid growth would be widely increased (Suh, 2009).

In June 2009, President Lee had a joint press conference with U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington, where they presented their alliance vision. They shared their commitment to accomplish denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and reaffirmed the endurance of their alliance as well as America's commitment to the defense of South Korea. Moreover, they also discussed the measure to take with partners in the region e.g. Russia and China in order to state clearly to North Korea that it would not find security or respect through illegal weapons and threats which the two sides were committed to pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons (CFR, 2009).

Furthermore in New York in September 2009, President Lee also stressed his plan to solve the North's nuclear issue and that North Korea's surrendering of their nuclear program was the only path to develop its society. He referred to this as "a denuclearization first, support second" strategy (J.-H. Bae, 2010).

In 2010, President Lee proposed a three-stage unification plan to visualize the establishment of three communities at the 65th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule as follows (Yu, 2013) :

The first stage was the appointment of a Peace Community to assure peace and security on the peninsula and the appointment of an Economic Community would be followed for transforming the North Korean economy thru extensive exchange and cooperation schemes. The last stage would be the appointment of a National Community which was grounded on the principles of dignity, freedom, and human rights. President Lee also addressed the need for a unification to prepare for unification.

In 2011, the South Korean government accomplished the three communities road maps as well as looked at fund-raising ideas. During the last half of 2011 and through 2012, there were several research studies centering on major: strategies for national health care, appointment of a social safety net during the process of integration, inter-Korean community and unification proposal, and strategies to address South-North statistical variances prior to unification.

In March 2012, President Lee and President Obama met again for a joint press conference in Seoul to discuss North Korea's nuclear and missile development, among other security issues. They agreed to continue to enhance and strengthen their combined defense capabilities and respond to any threats or provocations from North Korea. Additionally, if North Korea gave up their nuclear and missile current movement to instead choose peaceful path and cooperation, the two countries, South Korean and the U.S. would work together, with the international community to help North Korean lives improve and provide assistance in order to aid North Korea to open a new and better era (WhiteHouse, 2012) .

Moreover, the South Korean government conducted a survey to select the topics and ten research studies were eventually selected, majored in revitalization of future oriented inter-Korean economic cooperation. In the research project, the government also dedicated itself to study in healthcare, statistics, and laws to allow North Korea to work on collaborating in a wide range fields (Yu, 2013).

To conclude the chapter, the provided information firstly proved how the relation between the leaders' history, background and policy implementation toward North Korea, and the beliefs of the leaders could positively effect their ideas of implementing policies.

Second, the similarities and differences of the two policies were shown in this chapter as well. The main purpose of the two policies was to rebuild its relations with North Korea, believing that cooperation would finally lead to the final reunification of the Koreas. However, the approach of two leaders was significantly different. President Kim applied a soft approach while President Lee chose a hard-line one.



CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING NORTH KOREA POLICY

This chapter discusses how internal and external factor shaping the two administration's North Korea policies and approaches.

4.1 Kim Dae-jung Administration

4.1.1 External Factor

During the Cold War period, China had the most important bilateral relations with North Korea. Their relationship was based on ideological bonds. China treated North Korea as the only legitimate country on the peninsula and did not have any contacts with South Korea, until the early 1980s. Post-Cold War, China used its Communist collapsed conditions to advance relations with South Korea (Sutter, 2007). Trade began in an indirect way and was then developed into direct but non-governmental trade. Later, the increased South Korea-China trade made China to become the third largest trade partner of South Korea (after the U.S. and Japan). This increased exchange positioned China to separate its politics from economics toward South Korea and finally established the formal diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 (Xiuyu, 2005).

Unlike Russia, after the Cold War ended, China faced a crisis and started to decrease aid to North Korea and officially normalized relations with South Korea. They could pursue a dual Korea policy, cultivating strong economic ties with South Korea while maintaining good political relations with North Korea. The diplomatic normalization signaled a great change in China's foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula. As summarized by Samuel (1997): China: "shifted from the familiar one-Korea policy to a one-Korea de jure, two-Koreas de facto policy and then to a two-

Koreas de facto and de jure policy”. The change pointed out that economic consideration became the fundamental factor in China’s decision, while ideological considerations greatly devalued (Sutter, 2007).

Russia; for many decades; firmly supported only North Korea on the peninsula. But Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign policy was reformed in the late 1980s and; the policy toward the Koreas underwent major changes by initially boosting military aid and reducing support such as food and energy to zero by the end of his term. They, then surprisingly approached South Korea to help their declining economy. Thus, after the Soviet break-up in 1991, the first post-communist president, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, continued a pro-South Korean line and strictly limited their ties with North Korea (Moltz, 2003).

In early 1992, Russia provided a solid basis for peaceful policies which was the basis for the new foreign policy that would place their national interests above international interests that had previously been the basis of Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, the 1993 foreign policy concept was changed over the Korean peninsula. They supported the goal of a peaceful Korean unification to reduce regional instability on Russia's borders which fully tied with South Korea and contained over North Korea to prevent it from developing nuclear arms. In order to reduce the tension that was caused by the potential of nuclear weapons in the two Koreas, Russia called an international conference to announce the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone. In October 1994, Russia approved a U.S.-DPRK agreement on ending North Korean nuclear proliferation while pointing out that Russian reactors must be supplied to North Korea under the agreement. But Russia was criticized to supply South Korean reactors instead. In August 1995, Russia sent a new draft as a friendly relations treaty to North Korea that excluded a serious provision calling for mutual military aid in the case of attack. In April 1996, a Russian government

delegation went to North Korea to discuss that proposal and to convince them to end bellicose moves along its border with South Korea (Curtis, 1996).

North Korea, which was able to get political and economic benefits from the USSR and China, were two Communist countries who had same ideology. They were faced with crisis when the Berlin wall collapsed and the change of China's and Russia's policies towards Korean Peninsula, North Korea was hit by three major problems since then:

(1) North Korean economic assistance was mainly received from the USSR and China which was an important factor to drive its economic growth. Thus, it was affected by the USSR collapsing soon after the Berlin wall fell in 1991. North Korea was no longer supported by the USSR, which was engaged in reconstructing and reforming its own country. Furthermore, the change of the USSR policy caused their relations to become unstable and lack trust. Then China became the substitute to provide some assistance and supplied food and oil, most of it reportedly at concessionary prices. But after China faced inflation in 1994, it reduced its exports to North Korea to focus more on its own domestic political and economic problems and to enter the emerging global community (Deane, 2002). Therefore, the inflexibility in the political and economic systems of North Korea caused the country to be ill-prepared for a changing world;

(2) Moreover, North Korea also suffered from numerous big and a series of natural disasters since in the mid-1990s which caused food shortage all over the country;

(3) After South Korea started to normalize its relations with outsiders, including North Korean partners; the USSR (1991) and China (1992), North Korea began to feel insecure with their relationships.

Therefore, these three problems that North Korea faced caused one of the worst economic crises in North Korea's history and the situations forced them to start thinking about what they needed to seek for new assistance with another countries in order to maintain their country.

In 1985, North Korea joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state, and later in 1990, North and South Korean talks begun but resulted in a 1992 Denuclearization Statement. However, in early 1993 U.S. intelligence photos led to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to request making a special inspection of the North's nuclear facilities, which prompted North Korea to withdraw from the NPT under the 1993 announcement. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 825 from May 1993 encouraged North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1992 North-South Denuclearization Statement. The UNSC also encouraged all member states to urge North Korea to respond to this resolution and to facilitate a solution of the nuclear issue (Lauren, 2007)

The Clinton administration, labeled North Korea a “state of concern” to improve their relations (C. M. J. Yang, 2002) and he allowed trade in commercial and consumer goods, and eased investment restrictions along with financial transactions and travel. As a result, North Korea agreed to suspend their missile testing while negotiations were in progress, with the key issues of the production and sales of missiles, particularly long range missiles (Sutter, 2007)

Later in 1994, the Agreed Framework and the business-like meeting between the U.S-DPRK officials were a result of North Korea deciding to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with the United States and IAEA verification efforts, and in January 1995 the U.S. eased economic sanctions against North Korea by creating the

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which led to North Korea receiving two light-water reactors of the same type they were offered by Russia in the 1980s in order to build trust with North Korea. However, the result of the cooperation did not go well because North Korea was hard to deal with and the U.S. could not fulfill its commitments of lifting sanctions against them nor took any steps toward diplomatic recognition, intensive negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea continued through the end of the Clinton era (Feffer, 2003).

From the circumstance of China, Russia and the U.S., it can be concluded that their policies pressured North Korea to rethink starting negotiations and cooperate with other countries; it was allowed South Korea, particularly President Kim to continue his ideal to strengthen and pursue his Sunshine policy as well as to assure that he came in the right way.

4.1.2 Internal Factor

In the summer of 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis hit East Asia and South Korea was one of the countries that were hardest hit by this crisis. The crisis was commonly referred to as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The crisis started in Thailand with the collapse of its currency, the Baht, and then spread throughout the region. Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea were most affected by the crisis.

Before the Asian financial crisis, South Korea already met a series of bankruptcies of large Chaebols (재벌), South Korean conglomerates, that had been heavily borrowed in previous years to finance their investment projects in early 1997 (Bartholete, 1998). The crisis forced South Korea to accept a tough bailout package from the IMF which led to increase unemployment and South Korea urged its citizens to donate their gold to the state treasury (Fackler, 2011).

President Kim pledged that he would lead South Korea to overcome this national crisis and take a new leap forward which he promised to promote democracy and a market economy by reforming the political and economic system of the country. President Kim agreed to accomplish a series of earnest economic restriction, restructure public enterprises which included the reform of the banking, financial, corporate sectors among others. But the Kim administration would meet difficulties from the launch in pushing the reform measures that required legislative enactment through the Assembly (Young, 2005).

The crisis provided grounds for Kim Dae-jung to build relations with North Korea in order to develop their relations and to resolve the problem for both countries that perfectly supported his ideal with his Sunshine policy. North Korea encountered economic recession and pressure from their alliances as well as on going conflict from the U.S. and South Korea. This caused the two Koreas to agree to form a summit to establish economic operation. Moreover, South Korea and North Korea would benefit from this cooperation in order to solve the problems and it could lead the way to reunification as well.

4.2 Lee Myung-bak Administration

4.2.1 External Factor

In a changing world of globalization, every country turned to be more and more involved in international affairs and wanted to be a responsible major power in the international system. One of the main issues which people tried to build on together was security, particularly with the North Korean nuclear issue.

U.S. President George W. Bush, criticized the previous Clinton administration, saying that after six years of engagement, North Korea did not reduce its military

once; thus he announced a full review of the U.S. policy toward North Korea. Moreover, President Bush confessed his personal dislike for President Kim Jong-il by characterizing him as a dictator in his Senate confirmation hearing in 2001. The Bush administration believed the proper counterpart to military containment was hard-line negotiating tactics. They settled three primary strategies toward North Korea: military containment, economic isolation and political regime change; while working hard to shoehorn South Korea into a new regional security system. In 2002, President Bush declared his State of the Union speech that North Korea belonged to an axis of evil, along with Iraq and Iran which presented North Korea as a threat to the U.S. (Feffer, 2003).



Moreover, the U.S. administration saw the close relations between China-North Korea as an interest to U.S. policymakers because China played a crucial role in the success of U.S. efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to enforce economic sanctions, to prevent nuclear proliferation, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that crossed into China receive humane treatment. For these reasons, U.S. officials expressed hope that China would follow the American way of thinking and started to apply greater pressure on North Korea (Dick and Mark, 2010).

After the election of U.S. President Bush in 2001, the international environment changed in North Korea. President Bush administration declined South Korea's Sunshine Policy and former negotiations with North Korea. Moreover, North Korea was treated as a rogue state by the U.S. (Jager, 2013). Soon North Korea met renewed external pressure over its nuclear policy which reduced its international economic assistance opportunity. Moreover, since the mid-2000s, North Korea faced famine again after a series of flooding from 2006-2007. It suffered severe crisis plagued with death and starvation. The reduction in food aid worsened the problem.

In 2008, the famine problem continued to trouble North Korea, although less so than as in the mid to late 1990s. This caused North Korea to meet economic recession again.

Therefore, it decided to double its efforts to carry on nuclear weapons and in October 2006, North Korea announced its first nuclear weapons test (Burns, Robert; Gearan, Anne, 2006). North Korea believed that they must respond to the Bush administration's hard-line approach by forming a hard-line approach in return as they officials cited the Korean proverb: if your fists are weak, you can use them only to wipe your tears (Feffer, 2003).

In China, during the nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, emphasized that supporting a nuclear-free peninsula issue was a bilateral dispute between only North Korea and the U.S. and it had to be resolved through bilateral negotiation. In fact, China took a cautious and even inactive position and did not play an important role to calm down the nuclear crisis in that time. During the current nuclear crisis which began in the 2000s, China changed its perspective to have a deep understanding of its seriousness (Xiuyu, 2005). A nuclear North Korea ran strongly counter to Chinese interests. China feared that North Korea with nuclear weapons could set off a regional arms race with South Korea, Japan, and worst of all, Taiwan, all of which would acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, it might lead to the threat of missile defense which would force China to greatly increase its small nuclear arsenal while China would better to focus its efforts on military modernization (Savage, 2003). China stated that a nation's security was not self-security but a mutual security shared with neighboring countries and international community. Moreover, the Korean nuclear solution issue through multilateral dialogue would be an opportunity for Chinese diplomacy in the new century to lay a foundation for further multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia (Xiuyu, 2005).

Under the Bush administration's visible aim in pursuing an international approach to force North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and to break the regime with punitive sanctions, Russia believed it deserved to play a better role in this aspect, for its role as a border state as well as a country that had full diplomatic relations with the two Koreas and also had a seat in the United Nations Security Council. Russia did not hesitate to proclaim its views on the issues, which mostly did not coincide with the U.S. Moscow favored negotiations and a slow reduction in tensions, eventually might lead to U.S.-DPRK diplomatic normalization, as well as security guarantees to both sides by outside and neighboring powers, economic aid and the reintroduction of U.N. inspectors. This new breed of Russian politics had no motives that supported continuation of North Korean's communist regime. These suggest Russia was active in playing a positive role in settlement, particularly if it is engaged on the ground floor to alleviate the North Korean nuclear crisis. (Moltz, 2003).

The rise of the nuclear issue made President Lee feel his right to pursue his own pavement to continue his movement on the idea of Vision 3000, mainly on denuclearizing North Korea's weapons.

4.2.2 Internal Factor

2007 was the peak year of globalization. Almost every country went global inter-cooperation as well as for South Korea, not only to expand their markets and cooperation but also to resolve the Global Financial Crisis that the United States housing bubble (Coy, 2014).

The idea of a global strategy was first adopted as an official policy of the national government in 1993 by the Kim Young-sum administration, it has been called Segyewha (세계화) or globalization in English. One of the groundwork factors of South Korea's global strategy was to embrace international responsibilities

and positively raised to resolve global challenges, and one of the most noticeable example was peacekeeping activities which included the South Korea joint United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in 1993 (Hwang, 2012).

In President Lee's inauguration address, he settled the beginnings of a vision for Korea to respond to the international community's commitment for global diplomacy and the global movement for peace and development which would offer South Korea's opportunities to improve new relationships and raise South Korea's profile and weight on the international stage (Snyder, 2009).

The factors from North Korea nuclear weapon increase, the crisis and the groundwork of South Korea were fitted at the time that it needed to be apply to the situation to increasingly oppose North Korea nuclear weapon activities. Furthermore, it allowed President Lee to keep forward his ideal to go global and firmly abolish the nuclear out of North Korea. It supported him to lead the country on a bold and ambitious path that envisioned dramatically altering South Korea's international role.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

5.1 Conclusion

In South Korea, the idea of reunification has been considered as a core policy toward North Korea. It was proved by the establishment of Ministry of Unification in 1998 after Kim Dae-jung was elected President in 1997. President Kim was the first South Korean president who formed peaceful coexistence with North Korea after the long conflict. It was also the first time for both sides to have an open door policy and bilateral talks since the division under President Kim's Sunshine Policy. However, the atmosphere in the Korean peninsula had changed since the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in 2007. President Lee reversed to form a confrontation policy rather than one of reconciliation as President Kim toward North Korea, by declaring the Vision 3000 through Denuclearization and Openness. Under his policy, North Korea would get assistance if they abolished nuclear projects and opened their country to the outside world.

Consequently, three questions have been raised: first, how were President Kim's and President Lee's policies created; second, how were they different yet similar; and lastly, did internal factors, especially; individual characteristics or external factor such as: the influence of powerful countries that play a major role in these two policies. To answer the research questions, the foreign policy analysis theory of Valerie M. Hudson (2005, 2007) was adopted as the conceptual framework to explain the cause of the two policies' formulation and implementation.

From the comparison of the two policies in regard the two different leaders – Kim Dae-jung and Lee Myung-bak toward North Korea, it could be seen that they

were similar as well as different. Their similarity was their purpose or it could be called their principles, which were shown in the previous chapter that their ultimate goal was to reunify the two Koreas as well as to cooperate with North Korea in the economic field. However, even if they had the same goal toward North Korea, the differences between the two administrations in which was the way that they applied their approach to North Korea through the action they approached the North. While President Kim tried to apply a soft-line strategy by reconciling and negotiating, President Lee tried to apply a hard-line policy by giving North Korea a condition in order to move on their cooperation instead.

Under President Kim's administration, his Sunshine Policy was mainly to move towards reconciliation and cooperation without absorbing or having any conditions towards North Korea. The purpose was to improve inter-Korean relations peacefully by negotiating and compromising to get a general agreement. South Korea would help North Korea without being forced, mainly in cooperation in economic matter, and encourage North Korea to see the importance of building relations with neighboring countries and stepping into the international level. Countries such as the United States, Japan and South Korea would be of central assistance. In Kim's opinion, the proper way to rebuild relations better the two Koreas was not through a hard-line approach but with understanding and cooperation to gain both sides' satisfaction.

President Lee's administration; wanted to help improve North Korean lives and inter-Korean relations, similar to President Kim's purpose, as well as to reach a final reunification. The difference was that every assistance, supporting and improving between the two countries had to go under a condition that South Korea would help in every aspect if North Korea stopped the nuclear weapon projects or abolished all activities related to nuclear projects and opened the country to

cooperate with its neighbors and others. For, President Lee believed that everything would be better and everyone would be there to assist North Korea if their nuclear projects were abolished.

Moreover, the study found that the major factor that influencing policy formulation toward North Korea, whether from President Kim Dae-jung or President Lee Myung-bak, depended on the presidents' characteristics, including: their personalities, thoughts and beliefs had a great influence regarding their foreign policy formulation, particularly the policy related to North Korea. Regarding President Kim characteristics, his ideology was non-radical. He believed negotiation was the best way to solve problems without making any violence. While President Lee's characteristic was opposite, he had a vision that South Korea had better focusing on its own interest above all.

However, the domestic factors and other powerful countries also lead these two leaders to formulate those policies. Under the Kim administration, the Asian Financial crisis and the series of bankruptcies of large Korean conglomerates gave him an opportunity to easily support his ideology; as well as the pressure from major countries such as the U.S. and the changes of North Korea's alliances policies – China and Russia on the peninsula caused North Korea to turn to think of cooperating with South Korea. Thereby, confirming his view that cooperating with North Korea was the right approach.

During President Lee's administration, leaders of most countries had to cope with globalization including President Lee. It was the time people realized how terrible the nuclear weapons would be. Thus, they tried to build enhance the cooperation in denuclearization, especially focused on North Korea's nuclear project. For President Lee, who wished to improve relations with the U.S. and promote the

country's interests by going global. This factor led him to implement his Vision 3000 towards North Korea in order to achieve the goal.

In summary, this research confirms with the hypothesis that individual characteristics played the major role in shaping Kim's and Lee's policy toward North Korea, particularly leadership characteristics. Even though there were influences from external source such as major countries and their respective, policies; Perhaps the most important factor is the individual characteristics which serves as a final decision policymaker.

5.2 Suggestions

The South Korean government has tried to maintain their relations with North Korea in order to reach an ultimate reunification. However, a different tool is applied by each transfer of authority when cooperating with North Korea which has resulted in different response from North Korea as well. Thus, the leader's characteristics were shown to be a major role in formulating policy, particularly with ones related to inter-Korean relations. In my opinion, to possibly achieve a final reunification, South Korean leaders should apply softer-line policies rather than harder ones. The obvious thing could be seen under President Kim who played soft toward Korea was a new turning point of the two Koreas relations. The tension on the peninsula decreased and cooperation increased. Thus, I would say that playing softer approach would be more appropriate in order to reach the ultimate goal of reunification or at least to maintain good peaceful relations with North Korea rather than adopting hard-line approach which could cause more conflict and tension without achieving the eventual reunification.

5.3 Research Limitation and Suggestion for Further Research

This study is about President Kim Dae-jung's policy and President Lee Myung-bak's policy toward North Korea which mainly focuses on its similarities and differences regarding their policy implementation as well as focuses on how individual leader characteristics and other major countries' policy factors influenced to the two policies' formulation and implementation of President Kim and President Lee. There should be further research on other factors such as: how or whether governmental structure and media in South Korea could influence South Korea's policy formulation and implementation toward North Korea.



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APPENDIX

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