

Indonesia's Role in Humanitarian Crisis in Rakhine State of Myanmar (2012- 2017)



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บทบาทของอินโดนีเซียในการช่วยเหลือด้านมนุษยธรรมให้แก่รัฐยะไข่แห่งสหภาพเมียนมาร์ (2012-2017)



วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต
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
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วิชยานิพนธ์เล่มนี้ เริ่มต้นด้วยปัญหาว่าทำไมอินโดนีเซียจึงถือว่าวิกฤตทางมนุษยธรรมในรัฐยะไข่ในเมียนมาร์เป็นประเด็นที่มีความสำคัญมาก และต้องได้รับความสนใจอย่างจริงจังในรูปของการดำเนินการทางการทูตเชิงอ่อน และการให้ความช่วยเหลือทางด้านมนุษยธรรมเพื่อแก้วิกฤตดังกล่าว อินโดนีเซียมีหนทางเลือกที่เหมาะสมในการใช้นโยบายการทูตเชิงอ่อนในรูปของการตอบสนองทั้งด้านทวิภาคีและพหุภาคี ตลอดจนการให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านมนุษยธรรมในวิกฤตที่เกิดขึ้นในรัฐยะไข่ การอภิปรายในเชิงทฤษฎีของงานชิ้นนี้ใช้ทฤษฎีของวิลเลียม ดี. คอปลิน ว่าด้วยปัจจัยที่หลากหลายที่มีอิทธิพลต่อกระบวนการกำหนดนโยบายต่างประเทศและใช้ทฤษฎีที่ว่าด้วยการกระทำทางมนุษยธรรมในลักษณะของรูปแบบของอำนาจทางการทูตเชิงอ่อนในการแก้ปัญหาวิกฤตด้านมนุษยธรรมในการกำหนดนโยบายของอินโดนีเซียเพื่อแก้ปัญหาวิกฤตในรัฐยะไข่ ปรากฏมีปัจจัยมากมายที่มีอิทธิพลต่อนโยบาย ประการแรก เป็นเรื่องบริบทภายในประเทศบวกกับจริยธรรมทางสังคมและการมีบทบาทสูงขึ้นของความเป็นปึกแผ่นของประชากรที่เป็นคนมุสลิมเป็นส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศ ด้านบริบทสากล ระบุถึงสถานภาพของอินโดนีเซียที่เป็นหุ้นส่วนทวิภาคีที่ดีของเมียนมาร์และสถานะที่เป็นผู้นำอาเซียนอยู่หลายๆ และประการที่สาม บริบททางความมั่นคงที่ระบุถึงผลประโยชน์ในอันที่จะต้องปกป้องความมั่นคงแห่งชาติ

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Humanitarian Assistance, Indonesia, Rakhine State Crisis, Soft Power Diplomacy

Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika : Indonesia's Role in Humanitarian Crisis in Rakhine State of Myanmar (2012- 2017). ADVISOR: Assoc. Prof. Withaya Sucharithanarugse, Ph.D.

This thesis begins with the question of why does Indonesia consider the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State of Myanmar as a very important issue and needs to be taken seriously by conducting soft power diplomacy and humanitarian assistance to address the crisis? Indonesia has the rational choice of conducting soft diplomacy in the form of bilateral and multilateral responses, as well as providing humanitarian assistance in the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. Theoretical discussion of this paper is carried out on the theory by William D Coplin on various factors that influence the process of foreign policy making and also the theory of humanitarian actions as a form of soft power diplomacy in addressing humanitarian crises. In the policy making of Indonesia in responses to Rakhine state crisis, there were several factors that influenced the policy. First the domestic context, with the social ethic and the rise of solidarity of Indonesian civil society driven by the country's majority Muslim populations. International context, with the position of Indonesia as a good bilateral partner of Myanmar and its position as 'de facto' ASEAN leaders. And third, security context with the interest to protect national security.

By considering various context, Indonesia put forward soft power diplomacy as rational choices. In accordance with the theory of soft diplomacy, a country need to co-opt the other party rather than coerces to achieve the goal of the diplomacy. By using this concept, conflict resolution is not carried out with an approach that leads to military power, embargo, or criticism, but rather in a more persuasive way, such as bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and providing inclusive humanitarian assistance. The study also recommends further research on 'humanitarian diplomacy' and the role of non-state actors, especially religious civil society in international relations.

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Honor, Passion, and Pride

Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika



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Chapter I

Introduction

A. Background

Rakhine State located in the western part of Myanmar has long been a hotspot for humanitarian crisis issues. As a border area, Rakhine State becomes a multi-ethnic region inhabited by several ethnics originating from different roots. One of the many ethnic groups in the Rakhine States is the Rohingya people. There were an estimated 1 million Rohingyas living in Myanmar before the 2016-17 crisis¹. However, due to the ongoing crisis in the area, hundreds of thousands were displaced and had to leave their homes to flee to neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh. The United Nations (UN) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) even issued a statement that the Rohingyas were one of the most persecuted minorities in the world. They state that the crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar is an ethnic cleansing effort in which the 1982 laws "effectively deny to the Rohingya the possibility of acquiring a nationality." Despite being able to trace Rohingya history to the 8th century, Myanmar law does not recognize the ethnic minorities as one of the "national indigenous races" and they are also restricted from freedom of movement, state education, and civil service jobs.² Not only that, the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State with the persecution of Muslim majority Rohingyas also involved military crackdown from the government against the Rohingyas. Amnesty International

¹ Syed S Mahmood et al., "The Rohingya People of Myanmar: Health, Human Rights, and Identity," *The Lancet* 389, no. 10081 (2017): 1841-50.

² Matthew Smith, "*All You Can Do Is Pray: Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State*" (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

noted that the Rohingyas had faced military crackdowns in 1978, 1991-1992, 2012, 2015 and 2016-2017.³

From the many incidents that occurred in this crisis, the incident in 2012 was the point where the crisis has received widespread international attention. The BBC's news agency noted that the June 2012 conflict was the first and the largest since 1992. In the conflict there were widespread riots and clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims, largely thought to be Rohingya Muslims, left 200 dead and displaced thousand. It was the rape and murder of a young Buddhist woman which sparked off that deadly chain of events. Not only that, this conflict also triggered subsequent conflicts between 2013 and 2014 where friction between Buddhist Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims caused riots and some casualties.⁴

The series of conflicts eventually peaked in 2017. Violence broke out in Rakhine state since August 25, 2017. Initially, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militant group attacked dozens of police and killed 12 officers. The attack triggered military actions against many villages inhabited by ethnic Rohingyas in Rakhine. More than 300 people were killed during military operations. The Myanmar Army claimed that hundreds of the dead were the members of the ARSA militant group. But survivors of the Rohingya alleged that military operations in Rakhine were brutal actions for killing innocent civilians. The Rakhine crisis also caused more than 600,000 civilians fleeing to Bangladesh to escape violence.⁵

³Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland, "10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future," *MSF-Holland, March 5* (2002).

⁴BBC, "Why Is There Communal Violence in Myanmar?," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788>.

⁵Tom Allard and Nurul Islam, "I Can't Take This Any More:' Rohingya Muslims Flee Myanmar in New Surge," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/i-cant-take-this-any-more-rohingya-muslims-flee-myanmar-in-new-surge-idUSKBN1CE05E>.

This event triggered various responses from the international community. Countries around the world simultaneously denounced the acts that took place and regarded it as a crime against humanity. For example, some US parliament members urged the government of Donald Trump to respond strongly to the Rakhine State's crisis. US parliamentarians also suggested revoking the Nobel prize of Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to do more and help to establish better situation in the state. Ed Royce from the Republican Party declared, "those responsible for this atrocity must be brought to justice. She (Aung San Suu Kyi) and military generals should be put on trial". US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Patrick Murphy, at the US House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Oct. 5, 2017 stated, "sanctions against Myanmar and US aid cuts need to be taken to pressure the Burmese government to stop attacks on Rohingya Muslim minorities."⁶

In addition to the attention of international world, one of the countries that pay particular attention to the development of crisis handling in Rakhine State is Indonesia. In this case, Indonesia mobilized massive assistance both politically and logistically to assist in the handling of humanitarian crises occurring in the Rakhine State. As of September 16, 2017, Indonesia has sent 54 tons of humanitarian aid in the form of 30 tons of rice, 14,000 blankets, 2,004 ready-to-eat food packages, 20 large tent units, 10 units of flexible water tanks, 900 packets of clothing, and one ton of sugar⁷. What is interesting is that the assistance is not only coming from the Indonesian government formally but also from many Non- Governmental

⁶ Muhaimin, "Rohingya Crisis, Us Officials Say Sanctions Need to Be Dropped to Myanmar," <https://international.sindonews.com/read/1245869/42/krisis-rohingya-pejabat-as-sebut-sanksi-perlu-dijatuhkan-ke-myanmar-1507232889>.

⁷ Rina Ayu, "8th Times Delivery, 74 Tons Indonesian Aid to Rohingya Arrives in Bangladesh," <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/09/18/8-kali-pengiriman-74-ton-bantuan-indonesia-untuk-rohingya-tiba-di-bangladesh>.

Organizations (NGOs) comprising religious and social organizations such as *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, as well as Indonesian civilians in general who contributed to provide logistical supports and providing assistances in the form of socio-political supports to the crisis that occurred in Rakhine State. From here arises a pretty interesting question, why is Indonesia so concerned in responding to the issues that occurred in Rakhine State of Myanmar? As a country with the largest Muslim population in ASEAN and also in the world, it is very interesting to see the role of Indonesia in addressing the crisis that occurred in ASEAN member countries, let alone the fact that Indonesia is more preferable to approach through soft diplomacy and humanitarian action in handling this case rather than conducting political action and economic sanctions against Myanmar.

B. Research Question

1. Why does Indonesia consider the Rakhine State humanitarian crisis as an important issue that must be handled well and why do they conduct humanitarian action in Rakhine State crisis (2012 – 2017)?

2. How do ethical and political dimensions influence Indonesian humanitarian actions in Rakhine State?

C. Objective

1. To explain the motives of Indonesia in giving humanitarian assistance in Rakhine Crisis
2. To study the role of Indonesia in the humanitarian action in the handling of the crisis in Rakhine State
3. To explain ethics and political factors that influence Indonesian Humanitarian Action in Rakhine State

D. Theoretical Framework

William D Coplin⁸ in his book entitled *Introduction to International Politics* explains that a country will definitely decide its foreign policy based on what is in its national interest. There are several aspects that we need to know first before understanding the decision made by a country on an issue. According to Coplin, in order to understand why a country behaves in line with their areas of interest, we must also understand why or what is behind their leaders making decisions. It would be a mistake to assume that foreign policy makers act in a vacuum state. On the contrary, any given foreign policy can be seen as the result of three categories of considerations that affect the foreign policy of the decision-making countries. The first is domestic politics in the policy decision-making process of the country. The second is the economic and military capacity of the state. The third is the international context of the particular position in which the country finds its identity, especially regarding its relationship with other countries in a system.

Three categories of considerations that affect a country's foreign policy:

1. Domestic political situation

In this case, Indonesia's domestic political conditions in which there is an increase in the activities of Islamic movement, especially after the 2014 presidential election and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, making Muslim solidarity in Indonesia stronger. Solidarity is not only applicable to Muslims in Indonesia but also raises concern for Muslims around the world including Rohingya ethnic who was executed in Rakhine State. This movement then puts pressure on the Indonesian government to make foreign policy to express the solidarity of Muslims in Indonesia by providing humanitarian assistance to Myanmar.

⁸William D Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics* (New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1980).

2. Condition of economy and security

The point is that a country must have the ability and willingness to create the necessary capabilities to support its foreign policy. In this case, Indonesia sees that economic and military capability to support a particular foreign policy such as military intervention is not enough. Indonesia also does not feel the need to provide assistance in the form of military intervention because it will greatly affect the domestic economy and security because military intervention requires enormous resources. For that Indonesia chose to provide assistance in the form of humanitarian assistance rather than military intervention to humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. Military intervention is deemed unnecessary by the Indonesian government because it will greatly affect regional stability and will affect the economic condition. So to give more attention without the need for military intervention and economic sanction Indonesia actively chose humanitarian aid to humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State.

3. International context

The third is the international context. The international environment for Indonesia, viewed from all sides, strongly supports Indonesia to be more concerned and take special action to the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine State. Indonesia as the largest country in ASEAN regarded as "Big Brother" by other countries in Southeast Asia is required to play an active role in maintaining peace and stability of the region including paying more attention to humanitarian cases that occurred in Rakhine State. As an ASEAN member country, Indonesia is required to maintain stability as a fellow ASEAN country by upholding ASEAN Way and non-intervention principle. In addition, Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is required to campaign for justice and human rights for Muslims worldwide on the case of humanity in this Rakhine State crisis.

Later on, the rational choice of diplomacy carried out by Indonesia after considering the domestic context, international context, and economy and security context will be explained by Joseph Nye's theory of soft power diplomacy. Nye explains that soft power is the ability of a country to persuade others to do what it wants without force or coercion. Through soft power, a country need to co-opt the other party rather than coerces them to getting others to want the outcomes that expected by the party that conducts soft power. In his argument he states that a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In a number of cases concerning value cultivation such as democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities, Nye argued that the approach through soft power would be far more effective because the values are deeply seductive⁹.

Humanitarian Diplomacy is the fundamental part of Indonesia's rational choice of soft power diplomacy in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. It is explained by Régnier as efforts to persuade decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. This application of humanitarian diplomacy can be done by arranging the presence of humanitarian organizations in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives.¹⁰

⁹ Joseph S Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (Public affairs, 2004).

¹⁰ Philippe Régnier, "The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identification of a Community of Practice and Prospects for International Recognition," *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (2011): 1211-37.

E. Hypothesis

“The domestic and international political conditions of Indonesia plus the upsurge of Islamic movement and the obligations as the leading ASEAN member country encourage Indonesia to provide humanitarian assistance to the crisis that occurs in Rakhine State of Myanmar.”



F. Literature Review

Yukiko Nishikawa in her book: *Japan's Changing Role in Humanitarian Action: Case Study in East Timor*¹¹ discusses various considerations and humanitarian activities of Japan in the 1980s, especially in Timor Leste. Yukiko Nishikawa argued that ethical reason from the Japanese people to Timor Leste greatly affected the provision of such assistance. This ethical reason emerges from the political history in which East Timor was occupied by Japan in World War II. The second important argument of this review literature is the social changes that have occurred within Japan over the past two decades which referred to as internationalization encouraged Japan to provide Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor. The discussion is done with historical, geographical and political perspectives to illustrate the various strategic and political considerations affecting Japanese aid abroad. Yukiko's study is useful for this thesis, especially in terms of historical, geographical and political perspectives to illustrate the various strategic and political considerations affecting Indonesian humanitarian aid abroad, especially the Rakhine State issue. It is also useful to examine on the side where the humanitarian action of Indonesia abroad has undergone changes along with various factors causing the change. From this comparison, we can determine whether Indonesia's humanitarian action abroad, especially for Rohingya in 2017, has undergone a change compared to the model of providing aid abroad in previous years. One of the factors causing the change is the strengthening of the role of various non-state groups, especially those based on religion, in decision-making considerations and implementation of foreign political decisions in the field of humanitarian assistance.

¹¹ Yukiko Nishikawa, *Japan's Changing Role in Humanitarian Crises* (Routledge, 2005).

Didier Fassin in his book *Humanitarian Reason, a Moral History of Present*¹² argues that moral sentiments have become an essential force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and legitimize its practices, particularly where these discourses and practices are focused on the disadvantaged and the dominated, whether at home (the poor, the immigrants, the homeless) or farther away (the victims of famine, epidemics, or war). The “moral sentiments” are meant the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and make us want to remedy them. These “moral sentiments” are what that raise the sympathy of Indonesian society (the majority of Muslims) to the Rohingya Muslims who are the victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State of Myanmar. Next, Fassin gave rise to the term "humanitarian government" to designate the deployment of moral sentiments in contemporary politics. The term is described as the set of procedures established and actions are conducted in order to manage, regulate, and support the existence of human beings: government includes but exceeds the intervention of the state. This is where the people of Indonesia need the role of Indonesian Government and the NGOs as a "humanitarian government" to channel their sympathies in accordance with the laws and regulations.

Kenny van der Loos in his thesis entitled *Indonesia's Policy towards an ASEAN Pariah: Striking a Balance between Democratic Values and Constructive Engagement*¹³ argues that Indonesian democratic identity especially in post-Soeharto era has manifested itself in its policy towards Myanmar. In Megawati's era, Indonesia's focus on encouraging democratization in Myanmar was to encourage the release of political prisoners such as Aung San Suu Kyi. The policy was then

¹² Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Univ of California Press, 2011).

¹³ Kenny William Anthony van der Loos, "Indonesia's Policy Towards an Asean Pariah: Striking a Balance between Democratic Values and Constructive Engagement" (Universiteit Leiden, 2014).

expanded in the next era, especially in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono where Indonesia pushed for national reconciliation and democratization.

While the content of policy changed, the preference of cooperation over confrontation remained a constant factor. Although Indonesia was straightforward about its democratic intentions, it was not willing to put its relationship with Myanmar on the line. Therefore, constructive engagement was the preferred strategy. By constructively engaging with the local authorities and seeking support from other ASEAN countries, as well as the international community at large, it was hoped to convince the junta from the benefits of democratization. At various points in time, Indonesian officials critiqued the junta over the lack of progress made, but never consider taking sanctions. Indonesia itself put forward a multilateral approach where Indonesia tries to constructively engaging with the local authorities and seeking support from other countries, especially in the realm of ASEAN in encouraging democratization process in Myanmar including the handling of human rights cases of Rohingya. What is interesting is Loos in his thesis also finds the difference between Indonesia's attitudes at the regional level (ASEAN) and the wider international level (UN). Not on a single occasion did Indonesia vote in favour of a resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar. Instead it defended non-interference, a leading principle of ASEAN and one of the components of the free and active principle. Given the content of the resolutions, votes in favour of them could have had negative consequences for Indonesia's ability to influence the junta through constructive engagement. Therefore, to understand Indonesia's humanitarian assistance to the crisis in Rakhine state, it is important to analyse Indonesia's role in the regional arena especially the role of Indonesia in the ASEAN organization and how Indonesia engages in constructive engagement to gather attention and support in a multilateral way to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State.



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G. Scope of the Research

1. This thesis will focus on the humanitarian aid conducted by Indonesia in the Humanitarian Crisis in Rakhine State Myanmar. This includes the factors that influence the decision making process and the role of Indonesia in giving aid to the issue.
2. This research takes the range of time from 2012 when there were Rakhine State riots, a series of conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar until 2017 when the conflict re-escalated and more than 600.000 people fled to Bangladesh to avoid the conflict
3. This thesis will be limited to the role of Indonesian Government, Indonesian Non-Governmental Organizations including human right and religious based organizations (*Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, etc*) and the role of Indonesian civilians' authorities towards the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State.

H. Research Methodology and Data Collection:

1. Research Method

The author conducts a deductive analysis method with the study of theory and literature related to the Indonesian foreign policy, humanitarian assistance, and the soft power in the form of humanitarian diplomacy of Indonesia. The author combines the survey analysis, qualitative methods, as well as descriptive methods in collecting the data. The author will focus on the literature review in the form of books and articles that relate to the provision of humanitarian aid and the factors that influence the decision. The second data collection is done with direct experience of the author including field trip to Myanmar and Indonesia to conduct interviews related to Indonesia's role in Rakhine State Crisis.

2. Data Collection

For the primary data, the author will conduct direct observation to Indonesia and Myanmar to see the dimensions that influence the role of Indonesia in the humanitarian aid to Rakhine crisis. Then the writer will be conducting interviews with parties related to the provision of humanitarian aid and the factors that influence the decision.

I. Content of the Research

This research is formed in five chapters that explain the role of Indonesia in the provision of humanitarian aid in Rakhine State Humanitarian Crisis and the factors that influence the decision.

Part I contains the background, research question, objective of the research, theoretical framework, hypothesis, literature review, scope of the research, and the research methodology.

Part II discusses the ethical aspects underlying the foreign policy and diplomacy of Indonesia. These involve the Ethics of State which includes the ideological foundation: *Pancasila* the second precept, "Just and Civilized Humanity"; Constitutional foundation: The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, "Participate in perpetual peace and social justice"; and operational basis: Active and Free Foreign Policy (Bung Hatta 2 September 1945: Rowing between Two Reefs)

Part III discusses the Myanmar's political dynamics, Rakhine State issues, and Indonesia's active role in providing humanitarian aid

Part IV analyses the various interests and considerations of Indonesian diplomacy consisting of the domestic context (the role of state and community ethics, the dynamics of politics after the 2014 presidential election, and the post-Governor of DKI Jakarta 2017 election) the international context (solidarity of Islamic countries joined in OIC, non-intervention principle, ASEAN Way and strengthening civil role in Myanmar politics). This section also analyses the criticisms of Indonesian policy, which among others says that Indonesia is too soft on Myanmar and that Indonesia has no clear foreign policy objectives. This section also takes

ontological discussion of the crisis in Rakhine State by comparing with what has been studied before.

Part V contains the conclusion of this research.



Chapter II

Ethical aspects underlying the foreign policy and diplomacy of Indonesia

Ethical aspects are very important and influential in making foreign policy of a country. Ethics means the application of morals to human conduct. It has always been a contested topic, but when linking the term to 'foreign policy,' one enters a conceptual and practical minefield. In the era of the cold war where the theory of realism is still widely respected by international relations actors, most people would agree with Morgenthau's statement that "the actions of states are determined not by moral and legal principles but on the consideration of interests and powers". But with the end of the Cold War, the world of international relations saw a shift in the consideration of foreign policy formulation of a country. In this contemporary era, issues such as the promotion of human rights and the use of force with respect to humanitarian intervention, become important issues related to ethical reasoning which will then influence the formulation of a country's foreign policy especially in the era after cold war where renewed interest in ethical considerations are believed to be the driving force behind foreign policy.¹⁴

The importance of the ethical foundation is also applied in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy. In the formulation of foreign policy, ethical reason becomes one of the important considerations, especially when the ethical foundation is in line with the national interest contained in the foundations of the national ideology, constitution, and also social ethics that apply in the society. Basically, Indonesian foreign policy interests in international relations act as a representation of the national will to the international world. Every sovereign state in the world always has a collective will. Foreign policy has an obligation in international relations to be able to explain and represent what is the collective will or national will to be known, understandable,

¹⁴ Paul Williams, "Ethics in Foreign Policy: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (2002): 1.

and not misunderstood by other states. For Indonesia itself the wills are listed in the ideological foundation of the nation in the form of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution which serves as a structural foundation, as well as the operational foundation, it includes the *Garis Besar Haluan Negara* or State Policy Outline, presidential decree, and foreign ministerial policy. This is then sustained by the social foundation arising from the collective willingness of Indonesian civil society.

In the case of Indonesia's foreign policy formulation to address the humanitarian crisis that occurred in the international world, including the humanitarian crises in Rakhine State of Myanmar, these foundations also serve as the ethical foundation which then underlies the formation of Indonesian foreign policy. On the ideological foundation of Pancasila for example, the second precept clearly mentions "a just and civilized humanity". Then on the structural foundation of the 1945 Constitution, its preamble clearly mentions that Indonesia "will participate actively in maintaining world peace". Indonesia also has an operational foundation in the "Active and Free" Foreign Policy which requires Indonesia to actively participate in solving such problems in the international world. These foundations in particular contain ethical values that will be crucial in the formulation of Indonesian foreign policy in addressing the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State. The foundation is then supported by social ethics that emerged from the willingness of civil society in Indonesia. Indonesian society that is dominated by Muslims majority certainly makes Muslim related social ethics becoming very influential, let alone social perspective in Indonesia that relates the case that occurred in Rakhine with the interests of Muslims.

In this chapter we will discuss one by one what ethics that become the foundation and influence the formulation of Indonesia's foreign policy in addressing the humanitarian crisis in general and the case that occurred in Rakhine State in particular. The author divides the two ethical grounds on the basis of the origin of the ethical foundation. The first is the ethics of state derived

from the ideology, constitution, and written policy of the country itself. The second is social ethics derived from civil society. By understanding this ethical foundation, we can analyze the motive and the process of the humanitarian aid by Indonesia to the humanitarian crisis that happened in Rakhine State of Myanmar.

A. Ethics of State

(i). The second precept of Pancasila, "Just and Civilized Humanity"

In essence, Pancasila (the five principles) is a national agreement in a joint effort to build a life together on the basis of respect for human dignity and its entire dimension. There are two positions of Pancasila adopted by Indonesia as a state, namely Pancasila as an ideology and Pancasila as the basic foundation of the state. Pancasila as an ideology means it serves as the ideals of the nation that is formed based on deep philosophical thinking of the people. What is interesting here is the ideology of Pancasila is evolutive, which means Pancasila as an ideal is a dynamic ideology that can follow the development of the era. Pancasila is also dialectical, which means that Pancasila ideology does not reject interaction and communication with other thinking. Pancasila does not reject new interpretations and realities. Pancasila provides the freedom for the community to adapt with the life of the global community, but the freedom itself must remain in accordance with the ideology of Pancasila.¹⁵ Therefore, although it has been formed since before the independence of Indonesia, Pancasila remains appropriate to become the ideological reference for the Indonesian people in dealing with contemporary issues including addressing the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State.

Pancasila as the basis of state means it has a role as a foundation that has constitutional juridical power. Pancasila is the basic philosophy of the state, so that all aspects of state must be

¹⁵ Nindyo Pramono and Sularto, *Law of Bankruptcy and Justice Pancasila - the Philosophy of Law Study on Bankruptcy of Limited Liability Company in Indonesia* (Penerbit Andi, 2017).

adjusted with Pancasila, including the formation of state's foreign policy responding to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State.¹⁶

As the foundation of the state, Pancasila must be able to provide a clear guidance for all of nation and state's life. Pancasila as the basic principles and guidelines of life of the Indonesian nation implies that besides being a legal guideline it is also a moral guideline. Other than being a moral foundation in the life order of citizens, Pancasila is also the moral foundation for the state in the state system.

From the five precepts listed in Pancasila, the second precept is the most important ethical foundation in upholding human rights, both on domestic issues and international issues, including addressing the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine State. Firstly, because this precept implies that the Indonesian nation considers itself a part of the human race in the world. Therefore, the nation of Indonesia must develop respectful attitude and cooperate with other nations (in cooperation with fellow human beings). The second principle of Pancasila, Just and Civilized Humanity, means true humanity that respects and promotes the freedom, dignity and rights of others, treats them fairly and appropriately. The essential element of humanity is in social justice in a society and the State, which is organized by justice and morals so that justice can be obtained easily and quickly by all without any discrimination. Such an attitude is also extended to all people of all nations.

The second precept requires the State of Indonesia as a sovereign state that upholds humanity to maintain the confidence and persistence to welcome globalization in a just and civilized spirit of humanity. In the midst of crisis and globalization challenges, Indonesia must be able to take a national position on international relations, empathy for the suffering, and promote humanitarian values in the conflict in society. This vision of Pancasila needs to be supported by all

¹⁶ **Ibid.**

parties so that humanitarian ideals can be realized in reality, not only in Indonesia, but also in international relations in general¹⁷.

(ii) The Preamble of 1945 Constitution

The second ethical foundation which also serves as the structural foundation underlying Indonesia's international relations in general and Indonesia's role in humanitarian assistance in the Rakhine State Crisis in particular is the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The Preamble contains the moral responsibility of the nation of Indonesia, as a nation that once also had felt the oppression of the colonial nation, to uphold the freedom for all nations in the world. In the first paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, it says "Whereas freedom is the inalienable right for all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice" meaning that Indonesia has the moral responsibility to abolish all kind of colonialism, oppression, and the violation of human right.

Based on the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, it is also explained that one of the goals of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is to participate in implementing a world order based on the freedom of perpetual peace and social justice.¹⁸ The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution sets the duty and obligation for the nation and the government of Indonesia to always fight against every form of colonialism and support the independence of every nation. The reason for the Indonesians to oppose colonialism and any form of oppression is because colonization is contrary to humanity and justice. This means any matter or nature which is contradictory or incompatible with humanity and justice must also be consciously opposed by the Indonesian nation. That position is what

¹⁷ Yudi Latif, *The Plenary State: The Historicity, Rationality, and Actuality of Pancasila* (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2011).

¹⁸ "The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia."

underlies and controls the foreign policy of Indonesia. Indonesian assistance to eradicate international conflicts, uphold human rights, and eradicate injustice in the international world, including humanitarian assistance in Rakhine State, is a form of application of Indonesia's commitment as a country peacekeeper according to the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Indonesia's foreign policy must be based on the spirit of participating in maintaining order and world peace.

(iii) Indonesian Foreign Policy of "Active and Free"

The existence of the ideal foundation in the form of Pancasila and the structural foundation of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia's foreign policy is complemented by the operational basis in the form of Active and Free Foreign Policy. The cornerstones of the principle of active and free foreign policy are the Pancasila and the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution itself. The Active and Free principle of foreign policy began to be implemented after the formation of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. Originally, the order was formed after the completion of World War II divided the world into two blocks, the Western bloc and the Communist bloc, based on ideological differences. By sticking to the principle of active and free from the foreign policy, the national interest was more liberal to be striven for without Indonesia having to side with one of the two existing blocks. According to Hatta, the founding father and the first vice president of Indonesia, "Free" politics means that Indonesia is not in the two blocks and chooses its own way to address international issues. The term "Active" means an effort to work harder to keep the peace and reduce the tensions of the two blocks.¹⁹

¹⁹ Reni Windiani, "Indonesian Foreign Relationships in Regional Autonomy Era. Study Evaluation Relationship of Sister Province of Central Java with the State of Queensland Australia Period Year 2000-2007," *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 2, no. 1 (2013):76-98

In this present era, the meaning of Free and Active has evolved, especially after the end of the cold war and now facing the era of globalization. The end of the Cold War (Ideological War) changed the pattern of relations between countries. Relations between countries are no longer polarized into two camps. Ideology is no longer a benchmark in relations between countries. The decline in the role of ideology in the inter-state political arena leads to an era of international relations patterns that put forward the cooperation that brings the countries to an increasingly interdependent condition. Globalization also changes the actors in the international relations and result in increasingly complex relations between countries.²⁰

Domestically, the fundamental change of political and social constellation affecting Indonesia's foreign policy occurred in 1998 when there was a change of era from the New Order era to the Reformation era. Indonesia is required to be able to escape the shadow as a human right violator state that embedded during the New Order period. The principle and direction of Indonesian foreign policy that is free and active must still be the main foundation. Overseas active politics literally has a basic meaning as a free and unbound condition, yet remains active in the context of international relations, both at the regional and international levels.

As already discussed earlier, it appears that the state of the economy in the country, the international situation and the personality of leaders and ideologies (the value system) it embraces, will greatly affect the development as well as foreign political changes, including Indonesia's foreign policy in the future. In line with the current globalization which will continue in the future, issues in global politics will be more diverse and involve many actors with their own interests. The issue of human rights, environment, democracy, energy security, labour security, border, financial system, and global trade will be major issues in the contemporary international world. This is where

²⁰ Ibid.

Indonesia has the moral responsibility to participate actively and freely to participate in resolving the issue. Indonesia's foreign policy view should be able to turn challenges into opportunities, one of which is the challenge of becoming a leader in the field of humanitarian diplomacy.²¹ As stated by the government of President Joko Widodo in the National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) III in the 2015-2019 periods, the promotion of democracy and human rights become one of the main priorities of Indonesia's Active and Free foreign policy.²² The promotion of democracy, human rights and the environment is not only a part of the Indonesian nation's concern for peace and guarantee of the protection of individual rights in various parts of the world. Further, promotion of democracy, human rights and the environment is one part of efforts to realize the mandate of the constitution for Indonesia to participate creating lasting peace and social justice. Contributions in resolving current global issues is expected to create an international environment conducive to the national interest and enhance Indonesia's leadership in various arenas of international cooperation

B. Social Ethics

In addition to ethics of state as ethical aspects underlying the foreign policy and diplomacy of Indonesia, social ethics also play a major role in underlying the foreign policy and diplomacy of Indonesia. This is because Indonesia's foreign policy is a representation of the social will and the interest of the civil society of the nation itself so that the common goods prevailing in society must be taken into account as the foundation of ethics. Social ethics involves rigorous, careful reflection on the ways that moral ideas and practices are embodied in collective contexts. It asks about the

²¹ Adriana Elisabeth et al., *Grand Design: Indonesian Foreign Policy (2015-2025)* (Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2016).

²² Direktorat Politik dan Komunikasi Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional, "Realizing a Free and Active Foreign Policy Based on National Interest as a Maritime Country", ed. Bappenas, Background Study Penyusunan RPJMN III 2015-2019 Sub-Bidang Politik Luar Negeri (Jakarta 2015).

shape of a good society, the relationship between individual and social values, and the ways that institutions and practices contribute to social goods. Social ethics is not an option, it is the only option when by ethical judgment one means to refer to decisions, whether individual or collective, affecting real (as opposed to ideal) common goods.²³

Social ethics arises from the goodwill of the civil society in addressing a matter. Therefore, social ethics is very influential on how civil society sees the social situation that occurs including how to determine the attitude to the particular case such as the humanitarian crisis that occurs in Rakhine State of Myanmar. The fact that Indonesia has a civil society dominated by Muslims makes the values of Islamic ethics to be quite influential in the social ethics of Indonesian society, especially in addressing the humanitarian crisis where Muslims are widely positioned as the victims of the crisis. But this does not limit the social ethics derived from other values outside of Islam, especially in the case of human rights that contain universal values. In this section, it will discuss the social ethics underlying the foreign policy and diplomacy of Indonesia especially in addressing humanitarian crises that occurs in Rakhine State of Myanmar.

(i). Spirit of international solidarity and the solidarity of Ummah

Social ethics that first appears in addressing the humanitarian crisis that occurs in Rakhine State of course can be explained with the theory of solidarity. Solidarity is a unity of a group or a class that produces or is based on unity of interests, objectives, standards, and sympathies. Solidarity form varies between societies. In simple society it may be based on kinship and shared values. In more complex societies there are various theories as to what are the contributions of a sense of social solidarity.

²³ Charles Lemert, "Social Ethics?," *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 27, no. 2 (1997): 277-87.

Strictly speaking, solidarity is not really universal. To bring a sense of solidarity, there must be a common value that is upheld by the collective society to bring and establish the sense of solidarity. By definition it applies to the attitude we feel towards some restricted group of people. The group may be local in the geographical sense but may equally cross national boundaries. Solidarity characterizes an attitude towards other individuals who are mostly strangers yet have in common some particular traits, goals, group interests, collective fate.²⁴

In the case of the Rakhine State, the concept of solidarity that arises is international solidarity among international community that includes Indonesian civil society. The international solidarity shares the common good ideas of the international community. Rudi Muhammad in his report to the Human Rights Council A/HRC/15/32, July 2010 concluded that international solidarity is a precondition to human dignity, the basis of all human rights, and a human-centered approach to development, and has a bridge-building function across all divides and distinctions. It encompasses the values of social justice and equity; goodwill among peoples and nations, and integrity of the international community; sovereignty and sovereign equality of all states, and friendly relations among them. The idea of international solidarity calls for unity in diversity among all peoples, irrespective of all distinctions.²⁵

The solidarity of the Indonesian people to the crisis in Rakhine State is one of the forms of commitment of the Indonesian people as one part of the international community to uphold the universal goodwill of the collective international community.

²⁴ David Heyd, "Solidarity: A Local, Partial and Reflective Emotion," *Diametros*, no. 43 (2015): 55-64.

²⁵ Shyami Puvimanasinghe, "International Solidarity in an Interdependent World," *Realizing the right to Development* (2013): 179-94.

But of course the concept of international solidarity has not been able to fully explain why the Indonesian community is so aware of the particular humanitarian cases such as that occurs in Rakhine State. This is reinforced by Rorty's²⁶ argument that an appeal to 'one of us human being' (such as the values contained in international solidarity) will never possess the same force as an appeal to the 'us' that refers to a smaller and more local group. He also adds that the moral obligation to one's fellow human beings derived from the fact that they are considered to be 'one of us', the 'us' referring to the membership of a specific group.²⁷ Here then we need another concept that can explain the social ethics which become the foundation of Indonesian civil society's concern for the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State.

In addition to international solidarity, another concept that can explain the concern of Indonesian civil society especially Muslims to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State is solidarity of the *Ummah*. The term *Ummah* appearing in the Quran refers to human community in a religious sense, to ethnic, linguistic, or religious bodies of people who are objects of the divine plan of salvation.²⁸ As emphasized earlier that to create a sense of solidarity there must have the same values that are upheld, the solidarity of the *Ummah* values based on the same faith, agreement on understanding, and advocacy to Islam as a religion that is approved by Allah the mighty becoming the basis in the establishment of solidarity. In the teachings of Islam, Muslim solidarity is specifically referred to as *ukhuwa Islamiya*. *Ukhuwa* comes from the Arabic word with the basic word *akhu* which means brother. *Ukhuwa* is one of Islamic teachings on the concept of brotherhood. The word *ukhuwah* is often coupled with the word *Islamiyah*, becoming *ukhuwah*

²⁶ Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

²⁷ Lawrence Wilde, *Global Solidarity* (Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

²⁸ Frederick Mathewson Denny, "The Meaning of 'Ummah' in the Qur'ān," *History of Religions* 15, no. 1 (1975): 34-70.

Islamiyah that literally means 'Islamic Brotherhood'. The word makes it clear that the brotherhood is built on the principle of Islam. Even in particular, *Ukhuwah Islamiya* is mentioned in the verse contained in the Qur'an as the holy book of Muslims. The basic teachings of *ukhuwah* are sourced from Surah Al-Hujurat verse 10 that states " Truly the believers are brothers, therefore reconcile between your two brothers and fear Allah to have mercy." Faith as fellow Muslims brings about the necessity of the essential brotherhood among the faithful, that is, the relationship of brotherhood that cannot be measured by the relationship of love, both psychologically and physically. The predominantly Muslim civil society of Indonesia will create an extraordinary spirit of solidarity. The equation of fate as Muslims and the spirit of brotherhood in *Ukhuwa Islamiya* bring solidarity to the spiritual Muslims who are widely positioned as victims in the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State. Muslims in Indonesia feel they have a great moral responsibility to free their "brothers" from suffering.

(ii). Sedekah and Dharma

The spirit of solidarity that emerged from civil society in Indonesia was then applied factually with the provision of humanitarian assistance. In granting humanitarian assistance from Indonesia in the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine State, there are two of the social ethics underlying the granting of such assistance. The first one is *Sedekah*. It is a part of generosity in the context of Muslim society as a form of love for the blessings of Allah that have been given to him so that a servant willingly set aside some of his property for the benefit of religion both in order to help others and the struggle of Islamic *da'wah*. According to Indonesian Dictionary *Sedekah* is a charity to the poor and based on loving-kindness to others, salvation, giving something to the poor or those who are entitled to receive it in accordance with the ability of the giver (charity).²⁹ *Sedekah* or alms are not

²⁹ Tim Penyusun Kamus Pusat Pembinaan, "Indonesian Official Dictionary," (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1989).

limited to places and classes; anyone is entitled to get alms. But basically there are two main groups who are most entitled to get *sedekah*. The first one is fellow Muslims who need helps. The second one, alms can be given to anyone, regardless of religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, social status, and life. *Sedekah* is given to anyone who needs a helping hand, both material and spiritual.³⁰

For civil society in Indonesia, providing humanitarian assistance to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State is the implementation of the concept of *sedekah* itself. This is not limited to Muslims either. As a nation that embraces the ideology of Pancasila based on the Almighty God, all Indonesians feel they have a moral duty as fellow human beings to implement the same concept as the *sedekah*. Buddhism and Hinduism, for example, recognize the concept of Dharma, a concept of central importance in Indian philosophy and religion.³¹ The root of the word dharma is "dhri", which means "to support, hold, or bear". It is the thing that regulates the course of change by not participating in change, but that principle which remains constant.³² In Buddhism in particular *Dharma* refers to the teaching of the Buddha, which also covers the meaning of truth, law, order, and duty.³³

These concepts of social ethics that encourage the people to give something in order to help the one who suffering are the basis for the provision of assistance by Indonesian civil society, especially materially, which is then facilitated by the Indonesian government as a policy maker and NGOs as a fund manager from the community. The concept of *sedekah* and Dharma which

³⁰ Fandi Fuad Mirza, "The Influence of Sedekah Behavior on Business Development (Case Study of Moslem Moslem Based Micro Business Community (Kum3) at Kjks Bmt an-Najah Wiradesa)" (IAIN Walisongo, 2013).

³¹ Arti Dhand, "The Dharma of Ethics, the Ethics of Dharma: Quizzing the Ideals of Hinduism," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 30, no. 3 (2002): 347-72.

³² Steven Rosen, *Essential Hinduism* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006).

³³ Alejandro Chavez-Segura, "Hijacking the" Buddhadharmas": Violence and War in Buddhist Societies," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (2014): 105-11.

emphasizes helping humanity to free other human beings from their suffering becomes very important especially for Muslims and Buddhists in Indonesia as the parties most related to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State where Muslims and Buddhists in the region became the main parties affected by the humanitarian crisis. Even interesting here with the conflict is that Muslims and Buddhists in Indonesia harmoniously establish a solidarity action to raise funds and support to help solve humanitarian problems that occurred in Rakhine State.³⁴

(iii). Social Jihad

One more ethical concept that can explain and underlie Indonesia's role is the desire to engage in social *jihad*. As already discussed earlier, Indonesian civil society, dominated by Muslims, provides a platform for Islamic values to play a significant role in shaping the perspective of Indonesian society. The existence of a humanitarian crisis such as the one in Rakhine State (which is closely associated with Muslims in particular) raises the wishes of civil society to do what it calls social *jihad*. For most people, the word *jihad* is often identified with a variety of activities related to elements of violence. In fact, the meaning of Jihad itself is broader than just war and violences. Of the many *Shari'ah* or Islamic law that are listed in the Qur'an, one that must be executed by every people of Muhammad is *jihad fi sabilillah*.³⁵ Jihad is an act with the purpose of glorifying the name of Allah the Almighty God. Most people often identify that with the "holy war" in order to expand the Muslim territory, as in the works of western scientists such as Andrean Reland in 1718, Obbrink 1901, and Wesnick in 1930 in *The Handbook of Early Muhammad Tradition*, that interpret

³⁴ Heyder Affan, "Indonesian Buddhists Are the Largest Contributor to Rs Development in Rakhine," BBC NEWS, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-41268105>.

³⁵ Thoriqul Aziz and Ahmad Zainal Abidin, "Moderate Interpretation of Jihad Concept in the Perspective of M. Quraish Shihab," *Kontemplasi: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin* 5, no. 2 (2017): 461-84.

jihad with " war "³⁶. It must be admitted that one form of jihad is a physical struggle (war), but there is greater jihad than a physical battle. Jihad can be interpreted by looking at the situation and conditions of its name. This is done by considering that the interpretation of jihad is expected to address the social problems that exist in each era.³⁷ Muslims' desire to do something for their religion in the jihad corridor made the existence of a humanitarian crisis such as happened in Rakhine State where Muslims become one of the main victims is considered as one way for Muslims in Indonesia to channel their desire to do *jihad*. Surely the form of Jihad should be adapted to social conditions in the present. It is unlikely that Jihad is a jihad that puts forward violence, because if it is done it will not be appropriate in accordance with the present social conditions.

For some groups of people who still adhere to radical Islamic ideology, many international crises related to the condition of the fellow Muslims including the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State are seen as a very big opportunity to do the " holy war" . In their ideology, such crises and conflict related with the interest of fellow Muslims still have to be resolved with *Jihad* in the form of war and other activities related to violence. One particular example was the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), one of the biggest right- wing radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia who have the idea to recruit the *jihad* forces to be deployed to Rakhine State. As quoted by *the Australian* the FPI spokesman Slamet Maarif said, "We want to help in any way we can. We are even prepared to wage jihad there if need to be. That is why one of the main requirements for our recruits is the willingness to die as a martyr, ".³⁸

³⁶ Arent Jan Wensinck, *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition. Alphabetically Arranged* (Brill Archive, 1971).

³⁷ Aziz and Abidin.

³⁸ Amanda Hodge and Nivell Rayda, "Indonesian Islamists Recruiting Volunteers for Rohingya Jihad," *The Australian*, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesian->

But that kind of jihad is not considered the right way by most of Indonesians. The second group is the mainstream Indonesian Muslims society who interpret *jihad* as not only in the form of physical jihad (war), but in the greater interpretation which is jihad against the passions (*jihad akbar*). This group are among others the majority of Islamic Organization in Indonesia such as Muhammadiyah, NU, MUI, and the majority of civil society. Included in this interpretation of this jihad are combating ignorance, poverty, injustice, corruption, greed, power-hungry, extravagant behavior, undisciplined, and other negative behaviors.³⁹ The *Ulama'* (Islamic scholars) in Indonesia are more directing that social jihad is the most appropriate form to fight in the way of Allah when looking at the current socioeconomic and political conditions of Indonesia. Chairman of the Library and Information Council of Muhammadiyah Region of Yogyakarta Special Region (MPI PWM DIY) Dr. H Robby Abror MHum states that social *jihad* is a good or ethical action that dare to make changes in a better direction with the spirit of social based on the teachings of the Qur'an and Muhammad. In industrial society, jihad in the way of Allah is not interpreted by the sword or fighting against the unbelievers, but exerting our best ability to make changes with our best efforts merely to get the pleasure of Allah Almighty.⁴⁰ The desire to do something in God's way is the ethical foundation for civil society in Indonesia to do something in accordance with the meaning of Jihad. Humanitarian aid is one form of Jihad application in the modern world in accordance with the socioeconomic and political conditions of today's society.

islamists-recruiting-volunteers-for-rohingya-jihad/news-story/f9cd04129233827d4f2ba9f17664d844.

³⁹ Zakiya Darajat, "Dynamic Jihad: Tracing the Concepts and Practices of Jihad in Islamic History," *Ijtihad: Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam dan Kemanusiaan* 16, no. 1 (2016): 1-25.

⁴⁰ Ribas, "Without Social Jihad, the State Development Will Crash," *Suara Muhammadiyah*, <http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2017/09/01/tanpa-jihad-sosial-kemajuan-negeri-akan-runtuh/>.

Chapter III

Myanmar's political dynamics, Rakhine State issues, and Indonesia's active role in providing humanitarian aid

Today the international world is faced with various issues including the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State of Myanmar. The humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State contains a toxic mixture of historical centre-periphery tensions which includes serious inter-communal and inter-religious conflict with minority communities, aggravated by extreme poverty and under-development⁴¹. The crisis then grew over time and involved so many parties, not only Myanmar's government and civil society itself, but also the international community that received much impact from the enlargement of this humanitarian crisis so that it not only became a domestic issue, but it has been considered to be a regional and even international issue. The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar itself involves a large number of parties including the Myanmar government, the civil society of Myanmar, the Rakhine state community especially the Rohingyas as the highlight of this humanitarian crisis, and the international community that plays an active role in providing support and assistance to help the humanitarian case.

As discussed earlier, with the ethic of state of Indonesia and the social ethic that emerged from the willingness of the civil society, Indonesia became one of the international actors who have a role in providing humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state crisis. In analysing Indonesia's role in humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine Crisis of Myanmar, it is important to analyse the factors that cause the humanitarian crisis including the political dynamic of Myanmar that will certainly influence the development of the crisis, the development of Myanmar civil society, and the most important thing is the history and the escalation of Rakhine state crisis in particular. In this chapter

⁴¹ International Crisis Group, "Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State," in *Crisis Group Asia Report N261* (Brussels 2014).

we will also discuss the involvement of each party in the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine State. The first party to be discussed is the government and civil society of Myanmar itself as a party that directly involved in the occurrence of this humanitarian crisis. Myanmar's political dynamic that became the background of the humanitarian crisis led an early discussion in this chapter. The political dynamic and the role of civil society will be a major influence to the history and the escalation of the Rakhine state crisis that will be discussed later in this chapter. In the last part of this chapter, we will discuss the role of international community in general and further focus on Indonesia's role in particular as a state that has been actively providing humanitarian assistance to address the Rakhine State crisis.

A. Political Dynamics of Myanmar

(i). The era before and post-Independence of Myanmar

To understand Myanmar's political dynamic that will affect the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine state, we must recall the history at least until before the independence of the country. There were two major events that related to the modern day crisis that occurred in Arakan or Rakhine state of Myanmar. The first major event is the re-conquest of Arakan in 1430 by Min Saw Mon, the exiled King of Mrauk-U Kingdom that ruled the west coast of Arakan region with the help of the Sultan of Bengal and later eliciting first major Muslim settlements in Arakan.⁴² The second one is the major migration of Indian and Bengalis during British colonial era in the 19th and 20th centuries to fulfill the shortage of labor that bring hundreds of thousands Muslims population to Burma⁴³.

Prior to the arrival of the British Imperial power, civilizations in the territory of Myanmar have become an important part of Southeast Asian history. The historical era of society in the

⁴² Thant Myint-U, *The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

⁴³ Jacques P Leider, "Rohingya: The Name, the Movement, the Quest for Identity," *Nation Building in Myanmar* 255 (2014): 204-55.

Myanmar region has begun since the emergence of Pyu city-state civilization in the second century AD. The people who inhabit the area according to historians are Tibeto-Burman speaking people who migrate from the Yunnan region.⁴⁴ Its strategic location which lies between the two great civilizations of the world at that time of India and China makes this area an important trade route. This is what shaped the human culture of this region. The culture brought by the trade process had a major influence in the civilization of the local people, especially the culture of India which brought Buddhism as the enduring influence on later Burmese culture and political organization.⁴⁵

Civilizations in this region grew quite rapidly so that in the 9th century AD at least several city-states had sprouted across the land, the Pyu in the central dry zone, the Mon along the southern coastline, and the Arakanese along the western littoral. At the end of the 9th century AD, the Bamar (Burmese) people (who will become the forerunners of ethnic majority in modern Myanmar) began to settle in Bagan / Pagan territory and established a great empire in the Irrawaddy River valley. The Pagan Empire gradually annexed the city-state and the civilizations that surrounded it. In the 12th and 13th centuries, the Pagan Empire and the Khmer Empire were two main powers in the mainland of Southeast Asia. Since then, the language of Burma, including the Theravada culture and Buddhism had slowly become dominant in this area.⁴⁶

This kingdom finally collapsed after the Mongol invasions in 1287. The collapse of this kingdom then followed by 250 years of political fragmentation that lasted well into the 16th century. One of the things that should be highlighted here is that the collapse of the Pagan kingdom provides an opportunity for the establishment of new independent states in the region. One of them is Mrauk-U Kingdom, an independent coastal kingdom of Arakan which existed for over 350

⁴⁴ Daniel Hall, *Burma* (Read Books Ltd, 2013).

⁴⁵ Myint-U.

⁴⁶ Htin Aung, *A History of Burma* (Columbia University Press, 1967).

years. It was based in the city of Mrauk-U, near the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal. Early evidence of Bengali Muslim settlements in Arakan can be dated back to the time of Min Saw Mon (1430-34) reign in the Kingdom of Mrauk U. After 24 years of exile in Bengal, he regained control of the Arakanese throne in 1430 with the military assistance of the Bengal Sultanate. The Bengalis who came with him formed their own settlements in the region and became the first major Muslim settlement in this area. Not only that, Muslim influence would strongly grow in this area in the year ahead⁴⁷.

In the 16th century the effort to unite Myanmar in a single power began to be carried out by Taungoo dynasty. This Dynasty succeeded in making widespread conquests to the mainland region of Southeast Asia including the Shan states, Lan Na, Manipur, Mong Mao, the Ayutthaya Kingdom, Lan Xang and southern Arakan. But after the death of King Bayinnaung who led the conquest the kingdom again collapsed at the end of the 16th century. What is interesting is at the end of the 16th century this Dynasty regrouped and defeated the Portuguese in 1613 and Siam in 1614. It restored a smaller, more manageable kingdom, encompassing Lower Myanmar, Upper Myanmar, Shan states, Lan Na and upper Tenasserim. Dynasty lasted until the 18th century AD before being finally conquered by Hanthawaddy forces ending the 266-year-old Toungoo Dynasty. But Hanthawaddy's own power did not last long. The war with Konbaung dynasty became the end of Hanthawaddy's power and the beginning of Konbaung's dynasty which later unified Myanmar until the arrival of British Colonial Power.⁴⁸

The Konbaung Dynasty then conquered Arakan and started the four decades of Burmese rule (1784-1824). It was at this time that we first discovered the persecution of Arakanese people

⁴⁷ Aye Chan, "The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rakhine) State of Burma (Myanmar)," *SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research* 3, no. 2 (2005): 396-420.

⁴⁸ Myint-U.

by the people of Bama (Burma). Because of ruthless oppression, many Arakanese fled to British Bengal to seek refuge. According to a record of the British East India Company, there were 35,000 Arakanese who had fled to Chittagong District in British India to seek protection in 1799. Thousands of people were executed and a considerable portion of people from Rakhine population was sent to central Burma by the Bama people, leaving Arakan a scarcely populated area by the time the British occupied it.⁴⁹

The Konbaung Dynasty era ended after the defeat in the Anglo- British war in 1824. Over the next 60 years, with all the efforts of diplomacy, raids, treaties and compromises, finally British took over most of Burma. The British era was very important to the social, economic, cultural and administrative changes of the country. Burma became a separately administered colony of Great Britain in 1937. Ba Maw, an active political leader, was appointed as the prime minister of Burma. This is where the massive campaign for Burmese self- rule and independence begins. During World War II Burma became a major battleground especially with the arrival of Japan. In 1940 before the Japanese devastated the country, Aung San founded Burma Independence Army in Japan. At this time Japan promised independence to Burma. A Burmese Executive Administration headed by Ba Maw was established by the Japanese in August 1942. The Burmese Independence Army, which later changed its name to the Burma National Army, and the Arakan National Army fought with the Japanese from 1942 to 1944 but switched allegiance to the Allied side in 1945.⁵⁰

After the end of the war, the Panglong Agreement became an important milestone in Burma's political dynamic. This agreement was reached from the negotiations initiated by Aung San with ethnic leaders in Myanmar. This agreement basically guarantees the independence of

⁴⁹ Chan.

⁵⁰ Micheal Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500-2000* (McFarland & Co Inc Pub, 2002).

Myanmar as a unified state. In 1947, Aung San was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council of Myanmar. But the action of Aung San did not last long because in 1947 he was assassinated by his political rival.⁵¹

Burma declared independence on January 4, 1948. Burma became the Independence republic, which has the official name of the Union of Burma. Sao Shwe Thaik was appointed as its first President and U Nu as its first Prime Minister. After independence, Burma became a country with a bicameral parliament consist of Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Nationalities. In 1951-1952, 1956, and 1960, they held multi-party elections. In this period Burma managed to overcome various political upheavals among the insurgency of the communists. But the political upheaval in this country continued, especially with the breakdown of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) into two factions, one led by Thakins Nu and Tin, the other by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein.⁵² U Nu's role as a central figure in the politics of Myanmar in the early days of independence slowly began to be weak along with the increasingly strong influence of the military in the politics of Myanmar. In 1962 the military led by General Ne Win took control of Burma through a coup d'état and since then the government has been under direct or indirect control by the military.

(ii). Praetorianism of Myanmar

The political coup conducted by the Myanmar Military in 1962 saw this country enter the praetorian state era at least until the first decade of the 2000s. Praetorianism is marked by the increasing role of the military (or even total control) in all aspects, politically, socially and economically. It occurs when the civilian government comes to a standstill in its pursuit of

⁵¹ Gustaaf Houtman, *Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy* (Ilaa, 1999).

⁵² Sein Win, *The Split Story: An Account of Recent Political Upheaval in Burma: With Emphasis on Afpfl* (The Guardian, 1959).

nationalist and modernist goals. Praetorianism often appears in states which are in the early and middle stage of modernization and political mobilization. It is connected with professionals of the political and socioeconomic structures, political parties, parliaments, a centralized administrative bureaucracy, national authority, middle classes, and a national ideology.⁵³

The role of the military in Myanmar's politics had begun long before the military coup in 1962. Since its struggle for independence, the military played role to achieve the independent and it was under the Burmese Independent Army that Myanmar got its independence. They claimed to be the founders of the Union of Burma, and claimed that it had prevented the country from disintegrating. Under General Ne Win, the country was shaped into a socialist state under the army led party called Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). In 1962 until 1972 Myanmar was in the era of direct military rule. Immediately after the coup d'etat, Ne Win quickly rescinded the declaration of Buddhism as the state religion. The democratic institutions were dismantled and concentrated in the hands of Revolutionary Council under General Ne Win, which comprised of the group of senior officers. In theory Myanmar remained a federal state, but in practice the military junta treated the country as a unitary state.⁵⁴

In the time of direct dictatorship, Ne Win and the military were declared as the supreme authority. The constitution was suspended, all political parties and efforts to form political parties were banned, freedom of association and organization were exterminated, even protests were brutally suppressed. The government withdrew all involvement in international affairs and isolated Myanmar from the outside world. Visas to foreign visitors were restricted for twenty-four hours and restricted to Rangoon. Diplomats were required to seek official permission to move outside the

⁵³ Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969): 382-404.

⁵⁴ Konsam Shakila Devi, "Myanmar under the Military Rule 1962-1988," *International Research Journal of Social Sciences* 3, no. 10 (2014): 46-50.

capital. Foreign agencies were also expelled from the country. It is certainly very ironic to remember at the same time U Thant, one of Myanmar's senior diplomats, served as the secretary general of the UN (something quite interesting because in the end U-Thant was considered as the enemy of the state and culminated in the U Thant Funeral Crisis).⁵⁵

Economically, the government carried out nationalization (or in this case called Burmanization) on a large scale against foreign companies, banking sectors, oil wells, foreign trade, the insurance sector, shipping, wholesale trade, etc. Businesses run by Chinese and Indians were returned to the Burmese indigenous people. This generally destroyed the economy of Burma in general. In 1967 the government had an intention to liberalize politics; one of the actions was the release of a few hundred political prisoners including U Nu. By 1967, the country faced with widespread shortage of rice, cooking oil and other basic commodities leading to rise of the black marketing and corruption⁵⁶.

In the early 1970s, the government issued intentions to draft a new constitution and that the election would be held according to the new constitution and authority would be transferred to the elected civilian government after the election. The government had kept its promise by returning the government to civilian hands. But this was only a political manoeuvre. Ne Win and his cronies who had retired from the military were the ones who then occupied the "civil position". During the year from 1962-1988, three national elections were held in 1974, 1978 and in 1981. But even though there was a civilian rule in Myanmar, it was just for the name and the military still continued to rule⁵⁷.

⁵⁵ Myint-U.

⁵⁶ Devi.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The military government of Myanmar changed the democratic landscape in Myanmar including the enforcement of human rights in particular. Myanmar's international relations can be said to be stagnant. The government isolated the country from the foreign as well as regional affairs, resisted all elements of external influence, and continued to emphasize independence and non-alignment. External links were cut, banks, business and economy were nationalized, foreign practices and cultural institutions were banned, diplomatic activities were curtailed. This, of course, complicates the international control of what was happening in Myanmar, including the enforcement of human rights.⁵⁸

The culmination of all the chaos took place in 1988 when the pro-democracy mass carried out a large-scale demonstration known as "8888 uprising" to denounce government policy especially in the economic sector and human rights abuses⁵⁹. This forced the military government to take decisive action by killing thousands of demonstrators. The turmoil across the country was exploited by General Saw Maung to stage a coup followed by the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLOCR) which then applied the martial law to reinforce the direct control of the military to the political unrest. The government through SLOCR then changed the country's official name from the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar" in 1989 and prepared the country to hold the People's Assembly elections.

One of the highlights of this protest was the emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi, the youngest daughter of Myanmar's founding father Aung San, as a national icon and civil rights fighter. Following the uprising, she and several retired army officials who criticized the military junta founded the National League of Democracy (NLD) inspired by Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent philosophy and

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Federico Ferrara, "Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes's Dilemma During a Rangoon Summer," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 3 (2003): 302-25.

Buddhist concepts to confront the political force controlled by the military junta⁶⁰. In the following years, Aung San Suu Kyi will be known to be Burma and the World's hope in fighting for civil rights, especially in the enforcement of human rights

Despite the support of the majority of the people and 80 percent of the vote in open elections held in 1990, the NLD's victory in the elections was not recognized by the military government. The Junta refused to hand over the power and even made Aung San Suu Kyi a house arrest. This triggered response from the international community. Even when Aung San Suu Kyi was given a Nobel Prize, her sons Alexander and Kim accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on her behalf.⁶¹The military government continued its leadership. Through the SLORC until 1997, the Government continued its isolationist policy despite pressures from the international community.

1997 was an important year for Myanmar's political dynamic. The country was officially admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the SLORC renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). This was followed by a series of bright spots with the release of 300 NLD members from prison in 1998. But this did not last long. In the 2000s the military re-launched a series of violations that injured human rights. Opposition politicians have been arrested again and the military junta has again pressured on both opposition and ethnic minorities, at least until 2011.

One of the events that attracted international attention was the handling of Cyclone Nargis that occurred in 2008. This natural disaster is considered the worst natural disaster in the Burma history. This disaster was estimated to have about 200,000 people casualties either dead or missing,

⁶⁰ Houtman.

⁶¹ Jane Eldridge Miller, *Who's Who in Contemporary Women's Writing* (Psychology Press, 2002).

and estimated property losses reached more than 10 billion dollars.⁶² The military government's isolationist policy of Myanmar was widely accused by the public in general of hampering the handling of the disaster. The difficult entry because of bureaucratic and administrative problems became the main problem of the aid deliveries both through the UN, NGOs, and another country. Although in the end the Military Junta allowed incoming aid, but many considered it was too late and made thousands of people unable to be rescued immediately.⁶³ This event was an important note in the handling of disaster related to Myanmar in the future.

(iii). Democratic Reform and the re-growth of civilian role in post-election of Myanmar

The civilians received fresh air after the election and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010. In November 2010, the main military-backed party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), claims resounding victory in first election for 20 years. Opposition groups allege widespread fraud and the election were condemned as a sham. The Junta said the election marked the transition from military rule to a civilian democracy. As a form of commitment from the military Junta, the government launched the so-called 2011-2015 Myanmar political reforms. After being appointed president in early 2011, President U Thein Sein announced far-reaching political, administrative, and economic reforms.⁶⁴

President U Thein Sein himself reasoned that the main factor behind the political reform was his experience visiting the Irrawaddy Delta after a devastating Cyclone Nargis hit the area in May 2008. Seeing that people in the Irrawaddy Delta were not expecting state authorities to help

⁶² Deseret News, "Official: U.N. Planes Land in Myanmar with Aid after Cyclone," <https://www.deseretnews.com/article/695277601/Official-UN-planes-land-in-Myanmar-with-aid-after-cyclone.html?pg=all>.

⁶³ Rachel Stevenson, "United Nations to Resume Burma Aid Flights," *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/09/cyclonenargis.burma4>.

⁶⁴ Marco Bunte and Jörn Dosch, "Myanmar: Political Reforms and the Recalibration of External Relations," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 34, no. 2 (2015): 3-19.

them led to an "understanding that things cannot go on the way they were ". Yet even though the personal experience had become one of the key factors behind the reform, there were other external factors to the background of the reform. The first was Myanmar's economic reliance on China and the military's (nationalist) fear of China's growing influence made economic and social reforms imperative and triggered decisions to seek reengagement with the West. The second was the need to open up so that the sanctions imposed by the isolationist policies did not inhibit foreign investment and can encourage the development of business sectors that would help the economic growth of the people. For the opposition, this reformation policy was seen as a mere scam by the military government to secure their position from the pressure of the younger military officers and secure their power after retirement from the military.⁶⁵

There were several important steps taken by the military government in this political reform. The first was reconciliation with the NLD and the release of political prisoners. For the government, reconciliation with the NLD was a key to restoring the confidence of the international world that had impact on improving external relations. The second was the effort to relax press censorship in the country. Censorship in both print and online media was reduced by the dissolution of the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division. But the relaxing press censorship was still a debate. It was because this policy was proved to be a double-edged sword for Myanmar's transition. Widespread content on the internet about xenophobic, nationalistic anti-Muslim sentiment became major issues after this policy was taken. It was for Buddhist-nationalist discourse and the agitation of an ultra-nationalist movement that preached intolerance and violence against the country's Muslim community.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

In this political reform, the Myanmar government also provided more space for civil society. President U Thein Sein signed the new Law on Freedom of Assembly in December 2011 which stated that they allowed peaceful demonstrations under very tight conditions, for example particular union or organizations had to ask the authorities for permission five days in advance. In addition, the government also issued a new law for the labor organization that allowed for the formation of unions and granted the right to strike.⁶⁷

The last and most perceived step to be the greatest challenge for political reform in Myanmar was the process of reconciliation and peace initiative between the central government and certain ethnic groups. Relations between the government and the ethnic groups have been deteriorating even more drastically since 2009, as the military government attempted to force ethnic-minority armies to convert into the Border Guard Forces under the control of the Burmese army. U Thein Sein declared he would make peace a priority and promised to hold talks without prior conditions. In the next two years, he managed to sign the peace agreements with several ethnic armed groups. But this still left a great job for the government. After the military reclaiming the power, division between the ethnic minorities on the periphery and the Ethnic-Burman majority that predominates in the center of the country would take on a new urgency. Unsettled ethnic conflicts and fragile ceasefire agreements were possibly the most likely source of friction between the army and the government as well as the future civilian government.⁶⁸

The political reforms led to the general election that was held in 2015. In the election the National League for Democracy won supremacy of seats in the national parliament. This victory was quite a success and managed to get 86 percent of the seats in the Assembly of the Union (235

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Min Zin and Brian Joseph, "The Democrats' Opportunity," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 4 (2012): 104-19.

in the House of Representatives and 135 in the House of Nationalities). This election was considered to be a fresh breeze for the development of democratization in Myanmar. The public estimated that the NLD as the winner of the election would implement political and economic reforms, including amending and / or repealing laws that restricted human rights or civil liberties.⁶⁹

The new government, led by the NLD, immediately confronted several important issues to be solved in building a new Myanmar. Relationship with the military was the first problem to be overcome as they were the biggest opposition bloc in the assembly. It was feared that the military members of the Parliament would continue to have an effective veto power over any constitutional amendments, thereby making it difficult for the NLD-led government to alter Burma's governance structure. Under the constitution, the Burmese military operated with almost complete autonomy from the Union Parliament and the President. The NLD-led government might experience problems in securing explicit or tacit support from the Burmese military for implementing its policy goals and objectives as a consequence of the rule. One of the most feared things was the attempt to move forward the peace process because the military might choose to continue its military operations against some of the ethnic militias. Aung San Suu Kyi said the peace process would be the first priority of the new NLD-led government, once it has assumed power.

This conflict was exacerbated by the widespread inter-ethnic and religious tensions in Myanmar. Ethnic and religious tensions inside Burma have increased, periodically flaring into civil unrest and overt violence against certain ethnic and religious minorities and ethnic Rohingya being the most suffering party to this conflict. This conflict was enflamed by the rhetoric of the Buddhist organization, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion, or, as it is more commonly

⁶⁹ Michael F Martin, "Burma's 2015 Parliamentary Elections: Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service* 44436 (2016).

known, Ma Ba Tha, an acronym based on the organization's name in Burmese. National campaigns were established to protect and preserve the practice of Theravada Buddhism in Burma from an alleged threat from Islam. The organization was veiled to promote violence against Muslims and encouraged the expulsion of Rohingnya from the Rakhine state as one of its Ma Ba Tha Organization's successful lobby with the Union Parliament and President Thein Sein to pass and approve four laws collectively known as the "race and religion protection laws" which were deemed to curtail rights of Muslims in Burma.

The Rohingya Muslim issue was perceived as a problem that was quite difficult to solve by the NLD-led government. The new Union Parliament will have fewer members from ethnic political parties than the outgoing Union Parliament, and no Muslim members (the outgoing Union Parliament has three self-identified Muslims). This will be even more difficult with the Arakan National Party (ANP), mainly consisted of Buddhist Arakanese, won a majority of seats in the Rakhine State Parliament. The absence of Muslim representatives in the legislature raised the concerns of various parties to the development.

The challenge of upholding human rights and addressing the internally displaced persons (IDP) caused by the conflict and the crisis was one of the demands of the new government. Under the Thein Sein government, access to provide humanitarian assistance to many of Burma's IDPs has been limited for various reasons. One of the crises which occurred in 2014 saw several international relief organizations operating in Rakhine State being attacked by largely Rakhine mobs objecting to what they perceived as preferential treatment and aid being provided to displaced Rohingya. The Thein Sein government at that time responded to the attacks by expelling Doctors

without Borders (also known as Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF) from Rakhine State. Several other relief agencies closed their operations in Rakhine State after the expulsion of MSF⁷⁰

Major pressure will certainly be adopted by the international community to NLD government to increase the provision of humanitarian assistance to Burma's IDPs, but the existence of Burmese military and the existence of the pro-Rakhine Arakan National Party (ANP) as the largest party in the State Parliament is likely to resist efforts to provide aid to the Rohingya, as well. The NLD government here is stuck in a difficult choice. Skepticism is emerging from the international community. They expected no drastic changes in government policies to Muslims. Though the NLD leaders made no campaign promises to end discrimination against Muslims, analysts said, they did not go out of their way to attack them. U Win Htein, a senior party leader said that they had some of the more important immediate priorities. When asked questions about Rohingya, he answered with similar language with the current military-backed government, saying that they were largely illegal immigrants who must be "returned" to Bangladesh. In an interview with the New York Times he said that would deal with the matter based on law and order and human rights but would also have to deal with the Bangladesh government because according to him almost all of them came from Bangladesh⁷¹. The NLD led government trapped in a difficult dilemma in addressing the issue of Human Rights and national reconciliation in Myanmar. On the one hand they must keep their popularity in front of majority ethnic- Burmese people; on the other hand, they are required to uphold the ethical aspect of humanity and the pressure of the international community on

⁷⁰ Kyaw Kyaw Aung, Min Thein Aung, and Kyaw Zaw Win, "Mobs Attack Offices of UN, Aid Groups in Myanmar's Rakhine State," Radio Free Asia, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/flag-03272014173432.html>.

⁷¹ Austin Ramzy, "After Myanmar Election, Few Signs of a Better Life for Muslims," The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/world/asia/myanmar-election-rohingya-muslims.html>.

humanitarian assistance. Therefore, it would be interesting to see the role of the NLD government in the future, especially in dealing with humanitarian problems that occurred in Myanmar.

(iv). Human Right Abuses in Myanmar

The issue of human rights is a very important issue that must be addressed by Myanmar. As something formed at the intersection of legal, moral, and social aspects, human rights must be enforced in accordance with those rules⁷². The failure of government and civil society in Myanmar to provide the basic of human rights is in the international spotlight. Failure to enforce rules set out in the constitution, failure to clarify the position of morality, and to build a conducive civil society have been an important note for the Myanmar government for so long especially in several particular issues such as the Rakhine State crisis.

Violations of human rights became commonplace especially in the implementation of the military government policy of Myanmar. Human rights violations in the country can be categorised into three major types, namely those inflicted on the proponents of democracy, the ethnic minorities and the common man⁷³. Freedom House in its report entitled *The Freedom in the World 2011* noted that the military junta has supplied most basic rights and committed human rights abuses with impunity⁷⁴. Report prepared by the Burma Rights Movement for Action (BURMA)⁷⁵ said the decades long experience of human rights abuses was deeply rooted in the militarization which has characterized the country since 1962. This militarization has exasperated ethnic tensions, which

⁷² HR Purnama et al., eds., *An Introduction to Human Rights in Southeast Asia* (Creative Common, 2015).

⁷³ Jatswan S Sidhu, "Human Rights Violations in Myanmar and the Military Junta's Defensive Human Rights Diplomacy," *Journal of International Studies* 6 (2010): 1-14.

⁷⁴ Freedom House, "Burma," in *Freedom in the World 2011* (2011).

⁷⁵ Burma Rights Movement for Action (B.U.R.M.A) "Human Rights Abuses in Burma and Possible Solutions," (1993).

has, in turn, created a civil war in which human rights abuses would never abate unless the war itself was finally brought to an end.

There are two causes of human rights violations that occurred in Myanmar. The first is due to militarization. This causes civil society to lose the right to gather, act and argue. The military also initiated political suppression against all types of anti-military/ government activists including rightist, leftist and nationalist throughout the country. All forms of protest and demonstrations were ended when the military gunned down strikers in the streets. Underground activities continued to be the only way people could express their dislike for the continuing militarization which affected every moment of their lives.⁷⁶

The second cause and the most devastating one is the ethnic conflicts and civil war. This issue increased rapidly due to the government's refusal to take seriously the demands of the ethnic minorities to exercise authority over their own lands and to be allowed to protect their traditional languages and cultures. The failure of the civilian government to consolidate these ethnic groups for talks to find a solution to this problem and divisive issue was exacerbated by the commencement of the Myanmar military junta in 1962. Efforts made by the government so far to alleviate conflict are not carried out through dialogue to bridge the desires and rights of the minority, but only on the process of uniting the country as one single state at the expense of minority rights.⁷⁷ One of the main examples is in the Arakan State where the local minority of Muslim population, known as Rohingyas, is suffering severely from the military's systematic suppression policy.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Although it has happened since at least military government took power in 1962, international pressure on human rights abuses in Myanmar began to be felt in 1988. This was mainly triggered by the peaceful pro-democracy protests which were brutally suppressed in that year. Human rights issues in Myanmar were then figured prominently in the foreign policy agenda of the United States, Australia, Canada and the European states. These countries not only launched bilateral pressure, but also tried to bring this human rights issue into the multilateral sphere both through the United Nations and ASEAN.⁷⁸

This human rights issue still persists to the contemporary era. Authoritarian military rule for a very long period of time has systematically weakened Myanmar's judiciary and compromised the independence of its legal system. This becomes a challenge for the new elected NLD-led government that is demanded by many parties to eradicate human rights issues. Most of the population has been consistently denied access to the courts and effective remedies as a result of unfair and discriminatory laws, as well as poor court decisions. This is then exacerbated by the long history of security forces involvement itself as the perpetrators of human rights violations including the persecutions against the ethnic minorities across the country. By law and in practice, the security forces have blocked and remained capable of blocking independent and impartial investigations, allowing impunity for human rights violations.⁷⁹

It should be noted that Myanmar as a country also has human rights obligation either domestic or international human rights obligations. The Myanmar Constitution, for example, in Chapter 8 provides fundamental citizen rights and duties. But this still creates a gap for violating Human Right. For example, according to Article 351 equal rights are only those which are

⁷⁸ Sidhu, 1-14.

⁷⁹ International Commission of Jurists, "Implementable Action Plans to the New Parliament and Government," (2016).

"prescribed by law". Article 352 also mentions no discrimination for or against any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, based on race, birth, religion, and sex. Then the question is where is the position of ethnic minorities such as Rohingya where the 1982 Citizenship Law deprives the Rohingya of citizenship in Myanmar?⁸⁰ It is very debatable because according to the 1982 citizenship law they are not protected by the constitution because they do not belong to the "prescribed by law" category.

In terms of international obligations, Myanmar's international human rights obligations flow from the UN Charter, human rights treaties, and general and customary international law. To date Myanmar has become party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict; the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD); and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). But what needs to be noted is that Myanmar has not been part of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (on a communication procedure); Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming for the abolition of the death penalty; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment; the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture; the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the International Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW (on a

⁸⁰ Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, "Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law and Rohingya " (London: Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, 2014).

communication procedure), the Optional Protocol to the CRPD (on a communication procedure); the third Optional Protocol to the CRC (on a communication procedure); and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This then becomes a major homework for the NLD-led government to quickly determine their position, especially after they have declared that they have the plans to accede to the covenant and is reportedly taking steps toward doing so⁸¹.

The enforcement of human rights in Myanmar remains a major obligation to NLD-led government, which is considered a bearer of light for democracy and civil society in a country which for decades has been in the power of the military junta. Obviously this will not be easy because the existing laws, whether derived from the constitution or from other sources of law still leave many loopholes for violations and violators of human rights. The existing law (which is actually written and is a legacy of the Military Junta) sometimes becomes an obstacle in human rights enforcement. For example, the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar confers upon the military the right to independently administer all affairs of the armed forces so that the National Courts have no jurisdiction over the military and the military is accountable only to itself, including in instances of human rights violations. The existence of this kind of law would greatly hamper the enforcement of human rights in this country. Not to mention the added quality of law enforcement agencies which are still in question because during this time they often get intimidated and influenced by the military and other parties. Although now Myanmar has the enforcement of the law, it cannot be done optimally because of the fact they still get intimidation from external parties like the military so they are still afraid to solve certain cases.

⁸¹ The International Commission of Jurists, "Achieving Justice for Gross: Human Rights Violations in Myanmar," in *ICJ Global Redress and Accountability Initiative* (2018).

In many cases of human rights such as those in Rakhine State, truth in reporting and the public disclosure of facts are compromised when investigations touch highly contentious religious and race issues. Due to political considerations or the lack of sufficiently broad and practical mandates, inquiries commissioned by the President have not recommended prosecution, even where crimes were verified. No perpetrators of rights violations have been subject to prosecution as an outcome of such an inquiry.⁸²

The issue of human rights enforcement will continue to be a highlight not only in the country but in the international world. This is because due to violations that continue to occur until this present day. One of the most coveted human rights cases is the Rakhine state crisis which is predominantly perpetrated by security forces against Rohingya Muslims. The case of Rakhine State reflects the impacts of systematic impunity over many years and the compilation of all human rights enforcement issues including lack of accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations; lack of access to effective remedies and reparations for victims; and ongoing challenges with the independence and accountability of justice actors.

B. The Escalation of Rakhine Issue

Today, Myanmar returns to international attention in case of human rights violations which develop into a humanitarian crisis. The humanitarian crisis of the Rakhine state has received great international attention after the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority in Myanmar who inhabited the area, having been driven from their villages; hundreds of thousands of them have been herded into squalid camps. Not only do they get physical violence or mental distress, but their voting rights are also repealed, their children are shut out of local schools. They are subjected to mob violence with impunity. A new law seeks to limit how many babies they may have. This is why they are

⁸² Ibid.

forced to leave their homes and become refugees in many countries to gain international attention. Thousands of Rohingyas have crowded into leaky boats and risked their lives to cross the Andaman Sea, seeking refuge in Thailand or Indonesia. Since the late 1970s more than one million Rohingya have fled Myanmar due to brutal military action.⁸³

Some experts stated what the government of Myanmar has done to the ethnic Rohingya was a form of genocide and ethnic cleansing. They have often been described as the "world's most persecuted minority". The Rohingyas have faced persecution at the hands of Myanmar military since the country's independence in the late 1940s. Effectively denied citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship law, they were rendered stateless, barred from citizenship and basic human rights such as the right to protection.⁸⁴

The Rohingya issue which later caused a humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State cannot be understood only by looking at contemporary circumstances when the latest data in 2017 showed that over 625,000 were forced to flee their territory in Rakhine State to the Bangladesh border, and hundreds of thousands more were still subjected to persecution by the Government and even civil society in Myanmar⁸⁵. In fact, there are wide varieties of socio-cultural, political, and even economic backgrounds that must be understood in order to analyze what happens and how to provide humanitarian assistance to address the situation.

The first thing to understand is that there are at least two major opinions that become the debate on the origin of the ethnic factors. For the wider Burma society which includes the military

⁸³ The Economist, "The Rohingyas Apartheid on the Andaman Sea," The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/06/13/apartheid-on-the-andaman-sea>.

⁸⁴ Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK.

⁸⁵ Damir Sagolj, "Rohingya Widows Find Safe Haven in Bangladesh Camp," The Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-widows/rohingya-widows-find-safe-haven-in-bangladesh-camp-idUSKBN1E136I>.

and even civil society dominated by Buddhist-majority Burmese, the Rohingyas are "illegal immigrants" because although Muslim Rohingyas have lived in the area for hundreds of years, their numbers increased significantly during the colonial era, when the British rulers of what was then called Burma encouraged more "Bengalis" to immigrate as workers to boost the economy for the colonial government. The society which still holds the spirit of anti-colonialism assumes that the Rohingyas are the remnants of the colonial heritage that must be immediately eradicated from the earth of Myanmar. As already discussed earlier, when Myanmar's military regime started to lift autocratic controls as a form of political reform in 2011, free speech empowered preachers of anti-Muslim hatred. The army and police, who can crush the unrest when they choose to, stood by in 2012 when at least 200 people-most of them Rohingyas-were killed in communal violence involving Buddhist Rakhine thugs. The non-acceptance of ethnic Rohingyas even by their own civil society certainly gives more legitimacy to the military junta who has becoming the main actor of persecution against this ethnicity since decades earlier. It can even be said that this Rakhine State case is an important bridge for the reconciliation of the Myanmar Military and civil society that have been at odds, since now they can finally agree to confront the ethnic Rohingya as their "common enemy".

For some other people, the Rohingyas are not only a relic of British Colonial Power. The term Rohingya itself is extremely politically charged and only used after the 1960s. But Rohingya political leaders have argued that the Rohingyas are an ethnically distinct indigenous group and are descendants of Muslims who arrived in Arakan in the seventh century. U Kyaw Min, a Rohingya politician who was elected but not permitted to take up his seat in 1990 elections stated that the SLORC Government had admitted in its 1997 publication that Islam spread to the Arakan since the 8th century and developed roots elsewhere in Burma. They believe that they are the original

occupants of Arakan and they are being denied their birthright to self- determination and being driven out of their homeland. But for majority of Non- Muslim Burmese people including the Government, the Military, Burmese Civil Society, and also the Buddhist Arakanese they believe that the Rohingya are Bengalis from Chittagong and deserving nothing more than the status of common migrants.⁸⁶

In addition to the Rohingyas, we must also understand that in Rakhine State itself there are still some other ethnic groups inhabiting the area. One of them is the Buddhist Arakanese and is recognized as one of the eight main races by the government of Myanmar. In the pre-independence period, they experienced pressure and persecution from Bamar people, especially during the conquest in 1784. But over time, due to cultural and religious similarities with the majority Bamar people, they can run a good relationship, although on the one hand they feel that Bamar- dominated military junta is attempted to assimilate the Arakanese into the Bamar culture. Arakanese have not been documented to have actively taken part in the oppression of the Rohingyas but many of them have given support to the Bamars in the name of defending their homeland from Islamization and illegal immigrations.⁸⁷

The seizure of historical claims of who is entitled to be considered the original inhabitants of Arakan has made the situation highly complex and emotive in the future, with everyone involved including the Rohingyas, the Arakanese, and the Majority Bamars. But to understand the escalation of Rakhine State Crisis in general we must recall the history until the early arrival of Muslims in the area since the 9th century. But at least there are some big events that can explain the origin of the spirits and why they become victims of persecution which later became a humanitarian crisis in

⁸⁶ Bilveer Singh, *Myanmar's Rohingyas: Challenges Confronting a Persecuted Minority and Implications for National and Regional Security* (Gadjah Mada University Press, 2017).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

the modern era. The first is the Mrauk-U period (1430-1784) and later the British Colonial Period era.

(i). History of Rakhine Issue

The area of the Rakhine (Arakan) State was once an independent Buddhist kingdom before it was conquered by the Burmese in 1784.⁸⁸ The Rohingyas and the Arakanese are engaged in a bitter debate over historical authenticity and thus, both sides denounce everything the other side presented. The main dispute between the Rohingyas and the Arakanese is over the history of Arakan, which heavily frames the current situation. The Buddhist Rakhine reminisce about the glory of the kingdom of Arakan as a historical bulwark against Islam. Prior to AD 957 Arakan was said to be inhabited by a Dravidian or Indian race ruled by Hindu and Buddhist dynasties. However in 957 AD a Mongolian invasion was recorded to have dethroned the ruling Indic Vesali dynasty and brought “Mongolian” kings to power that Collis described the invasion as the rise of the Arakanese.⁸⁹

On the other hand, some Rohingya scholars claimed that in 680 AD Muhammad Hanifa landed with his army in a place called Arab- Shah Para near modern day Maungdaw after the War of Karbala. Muhammad Hanifa defeated the local ruler who were a queen at that time, married her, and created a mass convert of the local to Islam. For the Rohinhyas, they believed that it was the original nucleus of the Rohingyas⁹⁰. Then there were some historical records that mentioned the arrival of the Arabs both in the mission of exploration and trade in the 8th century AD. They set up colonies within Burma. The local non-Muslims converted in mass number and the Muslim

⁸⁸ Chan.

⁸⁹ Maurice S Collis and San Shwe Bu, "Arakan's Place in the Civilisation of the Bay," *Journal of Burma Research Society 50th Anniversary Publications*, no. 2 (1925).

⁹⁰ Singh.

community mushroomed within a short time. Islam was mentioned to eradicate the caste system in Arakan.⁹¹

From some of the debates on the history of the Rakhine state, both the Rohingyas and the Arakanese agreed that the great influence of Islam entered Rakhine State during era of the Mrauk-U Kingdom which was the last Arakanese Kingdom that was established in 1430 by Min Saw Mun although in the end they were still debating about the shape of the kingdom and who the king was. The last Arakanese Kingdom was established by Min Saw Mun in 1430. He was forced to flee to Bengal after the Burmese invasion in 1484. In Bengal he received significant help and regained the throne with the military assistance of the Sultan of Bengal, after twenty-four years of exile in Bengal. His Bengali retainers were allowed to settle down in the outskirts of Mrauk-U⁹².

This is where the debate again surfaced and complicated the interpretations of Arakan's history. Historical evidence showed that the Buddhist Arakanese kings assumed Muslim titles and minted coins some of which showed the Persian inscription and bore the Islamic declaration of faith⁹³. In spite of all these debates, the wider circle agrees that in the era of Mrauk-U kingdom Arakan gained considerable Islamic influence. Despite having different perceptions, they existed in harmony in the independence of Arakan kingdom. The court and society drew many inspirations from Islamic culture but remained Buddhist.

This changed in 1784 when Burmese Konbaung Kingdom conquered Arakan. As already discussed earlier, the Burmese Empire executed thousands of men and deported a considerable portion of the Arakanese population to central Burma. This marked the first time that majority

⁹¹ Mohammed Ashraf Alam, "A Short Historical Background of Arakan," (1999).

⁹² Chan.

⁹³ Singh.

Bamar people intervened, and persecution in Arakan occurred. They ruled Arakan till 1826 when it was ceded to the East India Company as reparation after the First Anglo- Burmese war (1824-1826). Later it was incorporated into the province of British Burma, a part of British Indian Empire in 1886⁹⁴.

The British rule in Burma was very influential on the development of Arakan. The British policy was to encourage the Bengali inhabitants from the adjacent areas to migrate into fertile valleys in Arakan as agriculturalists. As the British East India Company extended the administration of Bengal to Arakan, there was no international boundary between the two countries and no restriction was imposed on the emigration. From the published population census, there was a drastic increase of the Mohammedans (the term for Muslim Bengali population) in the Arakan region from 1871-1911. During this period, the Mohammedan originally numbered around 58,255 in 1871, increased dramatically to 178,647 in 1911. The heyday of the migration was in the second half of the nineteenth century after the opening of the Suez Canal because the British colonialists needed more labor to produce rice which was in growing demand in the international market.⁹⁵

In general, until the Second World War the Buddhist majority and Muslim minority enjoyed mostly good relations in Arakan although in 1930s there were several minor riots between Buddhists and Muslims in Yangon and several major cities⁹⁶. At the time of the Second World War, the situation became tense after the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942. This was because the difference in which the Arakanese, like other Buddhist, was supporting the Japanese invaders, while the Muslims and other non-Buddhist sided with the retreating British⁹⁷.

⁹⁴ Chan.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Bertil Lintner, "Bangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation," *Faultlines- New Delhi* 14 (2003): 1-28.

This circumstance then sparked the 1942 Arakan Massacre when the Pro British Muslim guerrillas were accused of receiving sponsorship from the Commander-in-Chief of forces in Delhi, Wavell, to establish "V-Force" which armed local Rohingya in northern Arakan to create a buffer zone from Japanese invasion when the British retreated⁹⁸. The Rohingya were promised a Muslim national area in northwestern Arakan. In their own part, the Arakanese received arms and were instigated by forward units of Aung San's disorderly Burma Independence Army. Both sides accused each other of who triggered the massacre. Rohingya claimed 100,000 Muslims were killed by the Buddhist, while on the other side the Burmese and the Arakanese denied such claims and made counterclaims that it was the Muslims who massacred the Arakan Buddhists⁹⁹. One thing for sure was that this event was clearly remembered by both the Rohingyas and the Muslims as one of the bloodiest communal riots in Southeast Asian history.¹⁰⁰

After Myanmar gained independence in 1948 and Arakan became a part of the independent state, there was an uprising by the *Mujahids* in the north-western area of the state due to discrimination and lack of political representation of Muslims. The rebellion acts were conducted by the Mujahedeen forces in Arakan region, but can be mitigated by the Burmese military through various operations such as Operation Mayu and Operation Monsoon conducted around the 1950s.¹⁰¹ In 1960, U Nu's AFPL Government established the Mayu Frontier Region, a military administration zone. Rohingya saw this as a move to achieve statehood and indigenous ethnic status. This was able to reduce the mutiny of the *Mujahid* who agreed on ceasefire in the area.

⁹⁸ Chan.

⁹⁹ Singh.

¹⁰⁰ Lintner.

¹⁰¹ Yebaw Thit Maung, *Civil Insurgency in Burma* (Yangon: Ministry of Information, 1989).

Things changed drastically when Ne Win military government took power in 1962. The relationship between Myanmar's government and ethnic minorities has worsened. Ne Win's campaign for the "Burmese Way to Socialism" particularly called for the nationalization of the private enterprises in 1964. But the campaign had a broader value of nationalizing and Burmanisation of all aspects of the country. In the two years following the decision to nationalize the retail trade, some 100,000 Indians and some 12,000 Pakistanis left Burma for their homeland¹⁰².

During the era of this military administration, the Rohingyas fought a lot of resistance through organizations that had a political goal as a separatist movement to resist pressure from the central government, and to struggle for the independence of the Rohingyas. Since the independence, there were actually some organizations that had the same goals, such as the Muslim Liberation Organization of Burma in 1946, Mujahedeen founded in 1947, but their actions can be defeated by the army of Myanmar. This movement was again increased after the military took full control and several organizations were formed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s such as Rohingya Independence Force in 1963, Rohingya Liberation Party 1974, Rohingya Solidarity Organization 1980, and Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front in 1986¹⁰³. The separatist violent actions that took place often triggered brutal counter-attacks from the Military Junta resulting in humanitarian crises at Rakhine States.

In 1978 the Military government initiated "Operation King Dragon" which intended to register the inhabitants of the Rakhine State, alongside the suppression of the Muslim insurgency. Many Rohingyas were detained as authorities clamped down for their actions. For security reasons, hundreds of thousands of Muslim villagers had to be resettled. An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas fled the ensuing violence to Bangladesh. After the operation, the movement of the Rohingyas was

¹⁰² Chan.

¹⁰³ Singh.

strictly monitored and regulated by the government with the Burmese frontier force consisting of army, interior ministry, immigration personnel and militia troops, administering the regions where the Rohingyas lived in large numbers¹⁰⁴. It was reported that the Burmese army had forcibly evicted the refugee and alleged widespread army brutality, rape and murder. After the exodus event, the majority of Rohingyas were repatriated back to Myanmar under the UN supervision. Those who remained in Bangladesh stayed in refugee camps, but were not granted refugee status that denied them from receiving humanitarian aid.

In 1982, the government of Burma passed the New Citizenship Law of 1982 that created a distinction between ethnic nationalities and foreign citizens. The passage of the new law sealed the fate of the majority of Muslims in Myanmar (especially Rakhine), as it refused to recognise them as citizens of the country unless they provided documentation that proved that their families settled in the country prior to 1948¹⁰⁵. With this law, the Rohingya were not listed as one of the country's 135 "national races" entitled to Burmese citizenship, effectively making some 800,000 Rohingya in Burma stateless. By excluding them on the list of citizens, they are indirectly not considered by the constitution as a citizen entitled to the protection of human rights. This makes them increasingly vulnerable to the various kinds of human rights violations that occurred, both by the military and civil society of Myanmar itself.

In 1991 until 1992, the Military government of Myanmar conducted an operation called Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation or *Operation Pyi Thaya*. Similar with the previous operation, the main goal of the government in this operation was to expel so-called "foreigners" from the area of north-western Arakan. In this operation major exodus once more occurred with more than 250,000 Rohingya refugees fled from forced labor, rape and religious persecution at the hands of

¹⁰⁴ Carl Skutsch, *Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities* (Routledge, 2013).

¹⁰⁵ Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK.

the Burmese Army. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the crisis was focused on repatriation and refugee handling as the impact of the conflicts. Bangladesh who objected to the growing number of refugees and the unclear citizenship status from the Myanmar government made the UNHCR-assisted repatriation process difficult. This was becoming increasingly complex because Bangladesh was not, and is still not, a signatory to either the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol¹⁰⁶.

Many Rohingya refugees become the object of human right violations, not only in Rakhine or Bangladesh but all across the globe. In 1997-1998, a series of events surrounding the repatriation led to disturbances in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. They forcibly expelled over three hundred Rohingya across the Naf River into Burma. Refugees were beaten by police and many of those responsible for the disturbances were arrested. In Arakan state, the Burmese government continued to demand forced labor from Rohingya villagers, arbitrarily confiscated their property, and restricted their movement¹⁰⁷. The Rohingyas also became victims of human trafficking, either as manual laborers on fishing boats and even commercial sex workers¹⁰⁸. Lintner even reported that many extremists group were recruiting the Rohingyas as cannon fodder for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere¹⁰⁹.

In the 2000s several cases involving Rohingyas and their status as refugees ripped through the world. Chris Lewa from Arakan Project reported that the illegal migration case of Rohingyas had been relying for decades on smugglers and forged documents, alongside financial support from relatives in destination countries. There had been Rohingyas heading towards Malaysia via Thailand,

¹⁰⁶ Human Right Watch, "Burma," (Human Right Watch, 2000).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ BBC News, "The Rohingya Children Trafficked for Sex," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43469043>.

¹⁰⁹ Lintner.

but that the numbers drastically increased after 2006. On 25 November 2007, a trawler and two ferry boats carrying some 240 Rohingyas being smuggled to Malaysia sank in the Bay of Bengal. On 3 March 2008, the Sri Lankan Navy rescued 71 passengers, most of them Rohingya, from a boat that had drifted for 22 days in the Indian Ocean with a broken engine. The NGO estimated that around 8000 Rohingyas migrated towards Thailand and Malaysia between October 2006- 2008. The inhumane treatment they got in refugee camps, especially in Bangladesh was considered to be the main cause of the migration¹¹⁰. Many of those who arrived at the destination became victims of further human rights violations. Those who reached the destination were promptly rounded up and arrested by the local authorities as illegal immigrant. At that time, the Rohingyas finally gained international media and governmental attention. The Rohingya issue as the “new boat people of Asia” became important topics that were discussed for Southeast Asian countries on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Thailand in late February 2009. Raymond Hall, UNHCR regional coordinator for Asia, summed it up when he said that in terms of "generalized and systemic oppression of the most basic rights, the suffering of the Rohingya is about as bad as it gets"¹¹¹.

(ii). Rakhine Crisis 2012- 2016

During 2012 until 2016 the Rakhine State returned to become a hot spot where there were conflicts between the Rohingyas, the Buddhist-Arakanese, as well as the government. This time the conflict became more complex. Myanmar President Thein Sein's statement that he would be happy to see the Rohingyas leave Myanmar if other country was willing to accept them showed that the Myanmar government did not intend to protect them from human rights violations¹¹². The rise of

¹¹⁰ Chris Lewa, "Asia's New Boat People," *Forced Migration Review* 30 (2008).

¹¹¹ Human Right Watch, "Perilous Plight Burma's Rohingya Take to the Seas," Human Right Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/26/perilous-plight/burmas-rohingya-take-seas>.

¹¹² Democratic Voice of Burma, "Un Rejects Thein Sein's Potential Rohingya Plan," DVB.

the Buddhist Group's hardliner led by radical monk became the driving force of persecution against the Rohingya Muslim group. One thing that was also quite important was the development of technology and media, including social media to make the hatred spread during the conflict quickly to all levels of society.

The bloody conflict was once more started in 2012. In that year series of conflicts primarily between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar again occurred. This conflict began in May 2012 when Thida Htwe, a Buddhist-Arakanese woman, was raped. The locals claimed that the culprit was Rohingya Muslims. The police arrested three suspects and sent them to Yanbye township jail. The angry Buddhist community then intercepted a bus that was allegedly carrying the perpetrators of the rape. The community was outraged after pamphlets containing information about this murder and rape. 10 Muslim passengers, who were not actually Rohingyas, from central Myanmar were lynched and the bus burned. The Burmese-language state newspaper issued an article stating that the victims of the Taungup lynching were identified as Muslim Kalars (a phrase containing racial slur)¹¹³.

On June 8, over 1,000 Rohingya rioters protested in Maungdaw after Friday prayers. They attacked government buildings and properties owned by ethnic Rakhine. The next day, the riots extended to the provincial capital of Sittwe. Army battalion and Naval vessel deployed in Maungdaw. On June 10, President Thein Sein declared a state of emergency in Rakhine State. In this conflict there was mutual accusation between the governments backed by the media alleging that the Rohingyas started the riot. However, Rohingya groups claimed that Burmese security forces instigated the riots by allegedly preventing Rohingyas from joining a prayer ceremony at a Maungdaw Mosque and the security forces opened fire into the crowd. As of 28 June, casualty

¹¹³ Singh.

figures were updated to 80 deaths and estimated 90,000 people were displaced and taking refuge in temporary camps according to official reports. In this conflict the government even arrested 10 UN UNHCR workers and charged them to be "stimulating" the riots.¹¹⁴

In October 2012 a major riot broke out and became the first serious outburst of violence since June, when a state of emergency was declared in Rakhine. More than 22,000 people have been displaced by violence in Burma's Rakhine state, mostly from the Muslim Rohingya minority according to the Government. More than 4,600 houses have been burnt. The government of Burma acknowledged more than 80 people killed and whole villages destroyed in violence between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingyas.¹¹⁵

The riots were followed by waves of riots between the Muslims and the subsequent Buddhists, not only in Rakhine State, but scattered throughout Myanmar and even abroad when the two sides met. In March 2013 an argument in a gold shop in Meiktila central Myanmar led to violence between Buddhists and Muslims which left more than 40 people dead and entire neighbourhoods razed. On 5 April 2013, Muslim and Buddhist inmates at an immigration detention centre in Indonesia rioted along the lines of the conflict in their home country leading to death of 8 Buddhists and 15 injuries of Rohingyas¹¹⁶. In August 2013 rioters burnt Muslim-owned houses and shops in the central town of Kanbalu after police refused to hand over a Muslim man accused of raping a Buddhist woman. In January 2014, the UN said that more than 40 Rohingya men, women and children were killed in Rakhine state in violence that flared after accusations that Rohingyas killed a Rakhine policeman. In June 2014, two people were killed and five hurt in Mandalay,

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ BBC News, "Burma Violence: 20,000 Displaced in Rakhine State," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20114326>.

¹¹⁶ AL Jazeera, "Rival Myanmar Groups Clash in Indonesia Jail," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/04/201345120937667.html>.

Myanmar's second biggest city, following a rumour that spread on social media that a Buddhist woman had been raped by one or more Muslim men¹¹⁷.

There were several factors that cause the occurrence and widespread unrest that occurred around the year 2012 - 2016. In addition to internal factors such as events that trigger conflicts such as rape, criminal acts, and armed action from the military, there are some important external factors in spreading unrest. One of the things that have been blamed for fuelling widespread unrest was the government's policy to relax press censorship in the country.¹¹⁸ Given the policy, online media including social media were filled with content that contained material that disseminated content from both parties. These contents were also filled by many hoaxes that created misunderstandings. Official government pages have fed the story that the military's violent crackdown on the Rohingya was justified, despite it actually being disproportionate and indiscriminate¹¹⁹.

One party that used social media to spread their ideology of hatred was Ashin Wirathu, an enormously influential hard-line monk who turned to Facebook after he was banned from public preaching for a year by the government. Wirathu likened Muslims to mad dogs and posted pictures of dead bodies he claimed were Buddhists killed by Muslims, while never acknowledging brutality faced by the Rohingyas¹²⁰. Reduced censorship from the government was exploited by Wirathu

¹¹⁷ BBC News, "Why Is There Communal Violence in Myanmar?," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18395788>.

¹¹⁸ Bünthe and Dosch.

¹¹⁹ Tej Parikh, "Social Media Exhibits Its Disruptive Power in Myanmar," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/social-media-exhibits-its-disruptive-power-in-myanmar/>.

¹²⁰ Annie Gowen and Max Bearak, "Fake News on Facebook Fans the Flames of Hate against the Rohingya in Burma," The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fake-news-on-facebook-fans-the-flames-of-hate-against-the-rohingya-in-burma/2017/12/07/2c1fe830-ca1f-11e7-b506-8a10ed11ecf5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a5b5d163fac1.

to expand his anti-Muslim campaign that began in the early 2000s. In 2012 he led a rally of monks in Mandalay in September to defend President Thein Sein's controversial plan to send the Rohingya to a third country. One month later, more violence broke out in Rakhine state. The main activities undertaken by Wirathu included leading a nationalist "969" campaign, encouraging Buddhists to "buy Buddhist and shop Buddhist" (the number refers to his nine attributes, the six attributes of his teaching and the nine attributes of the Buddhist order), seemingly with the intention of creating an apartheid state. Time magazine even dubbed the "The Face of Buddhist Terror" on June 20, 2013 to describe Wirathu's acts. But it was precisely defended by the Myanmar government that accused the foreign media of slandering the Buddhist religion and harming the national reconciliation process by accusing the outspoken cleric of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. Describing him as a "son of Buddha", the president defended Wirathu as a "noble person" committed to peace¹²¹.

From here, we can see that the Buddhist community of Myanmar and the government synergize in making Muslims a common enemy, making this conflict continue to evolve without any meaningful settlement. The greatest impact of the conflict between 2014 and 2016 is the increasing number of refugees leaving Myanmar. From the UNHCR report, 2016 was the fifth consecutive year of large-scale movements of Rohingya refugees from Rakhine state in Myanmar to other countries by land or sea, bringing the estimated total since 2012 to 168,500 as a result of violence and desperation. Following violence in northern Rakhine state, Myanmar, in October and November 2016, as many as 43,000 Rohingya refugees were estimated to have crossed from

¹²¹ Hanna Hindstrom, "Burma President Backs Anti-Muslim 'Hate Preacher' Wirathu," Democracy Voice Burma, <http://www.dvb.no/news/politics-news/burma-president-backs-anti-muslim-%E2%80%98hate-preacher%E2%80%99-wirathu/28955>.

northern Rakhine state into the Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh on foot and by boat across the Naf River by 31 December 2016¹²².

(iii). Rakhine Crisis 2017

Since the major riots occurred in 2012 which caused a large wave of refugees and humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, there has been no significant settlement of this problem. The Rohingyas, Buddhist Rakhine, and the Myanmar government have not been able to find a middle ground that can resolve the humanitarian crisis that occurred. So it is not surprising that in the following years the opportunity for major riots is still wide open. As of 2017, a major conflict between the conflicting parties once again happened in Rakhine State which again worsened the humanitarian crisis. The massive riots that occurred in 2017 began on August 25 when the Myanmar Military and local Buddhist extremists from the Arakan ethnic community began attacking the Rohingya and committing atrocities against them in the country's north-west Rakhine state. In this conflict military and Buddhist extremists carried out various acts of violence and human rights violations such as carrying out massacres and arson against the Rohingya villages, as well as sexual violence against women and children¹²³.

The military and Rakhine Buddhists claimed that the violence was a retaliation from a series of acts of violence previously carried out by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) a Rohingya insurgent group in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, which was responsible for several attacks and violence directed at the Myanmar security apparatus and the Arakanese Buddhist community from the end of 2016 to the beginning of 2017. From the end of 2016 to 2017 various

¹²² UNHCR, "Mixed Movements in South-East Asia 2016," (UNHCR Regional Office for South-East Asia April 2017, 2017).

¹²³ Al Jazeera, "Deadly Clashes Erupt in Myanmar's Restive Rakhine State," Al Jazeera and News Agency, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/deadly-clashes-erupt-myanmar-restive-rakhine-state-170825055848004.html>.

media, both local media and foreign media, reported that there had been a number of violent incidents that caused casualties on the Myanmar Security Forces. For example, the BBC reported in October 2016, the group claimed responsibility for attacks on Burmese border posts along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, which left 9 border officers and 4 soldiers dead¹²⁴. In June and July 2017 the media again reported that there was a backlash between the military and ARSA. As a form of resistance and clearing operation on 22 June 2017 three insurgents have been killed by security forces in a raid on an insurgent camp supposedly belonging to ARSA. In July, the government again accused ARSA of carrying out several cases of kidnapping and murder, although this was later denied by ARSA itself. These various forms of riots and conflicts were later accused of triggering major riots in August 2017.

International Crisis Group reports that ARSA itself was a group founded in 2013 under the name *Harakah al-Yaqin*. Since then ARSA has carried out several recruitment actions with the main aim of "stop the mistreatment of the Rohingya people"¹²⁵. The Myanmar government itself through Myanmar's Anti-Terrorism Central Committee has declared ARSA a terrorist group according to the country's counter-terrorism law.

The ongoing conflict between the Military, Buddhists, ARSA and Rohingyas exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and increases the number of human rights violations in Rakhine State. The first and most frequent violations were cases of massacres and killings carried out both by ARSA against the Buddhists, and vice versa from the military and Buddhist extremists who carried out the massacre of the Rohingya. Some international media reports that in the first month of the conflict, an estimated 6700 people were killed and even the latest data released by Médecins Sans

¹²⁴ BBC News, "Myanmar Policemen Killed in Rakhine Border Attack," BBC, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37601928>.

¹²⁵ Paul Millar, "Sizing up the Shadowy Leader of the Rakhine State Insurgency," Southeast Asia Globe, <http://sea-globe.com/rakhine-state-insurgency-ata-ullah/>.

Frontières (MSF) or Doctors without Borders reported 10,000 people were killed until December 2017¹²⁶. The killings and massacres were further aggravated by arson and looting of villages in Rakhine State. Human Rights Watch reported that from August to December 2017 there had been burning and looting of 357 villages by the Military¹²⁷.

The next human rights violations are sexual violence and rape committed by the Military against women and children. The official UN reported that this act of sexual violence was carried out in a structured manner by the Myanmar government which also involved the Myanmar Border Guard Police and the Buddhist militia as well as the military's ethnic cleansing campaign. In addition, the government also restricted access to information and the visits to international bodies to the Rakhine state since the conflict on 25 August. Even the Myanmar government had held back the Reuters journalists who had been covering the refugee stories and they were charged and imprisoned by the 1923 colonial law related to secrecy¹²⁸.

Based on a report from Human Rights Watch, all forms of violence and human rights violations that occurred in Rakhine State during the 2017 period were part of clearance operation with the aim of driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from Myanmar. The Myanmar government carried out various strategies in the operation. The strategies are as follows: 1) arrest and arbitrarily detain male Rohingyas between the age of 15-40 years; 2) arrest and arbitrarily detain Rohingya opinion-makers, leaders and cultural and religious personalities; 3) initiate acts to deprive

¹²⁶James Benett, "Rohingya Death Toll Likely above 10,000, Msf Says Amid Exodus," ABC News, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-12-14/rohingya-death-toll-in-the-thousands-says-msf/9260552>.

¹²⁷VOA News, "Hrw: New Rohingya Villages Destroyed in Myanmar," VOA News, <https://www.voanews.com/a/hrw-new-rohingya-villages-destroyed-in-myanmar/4168511.html>.

¹²⁸Thu Thu Aung and Yimou Lee, "Reuters Reporters Arrested under Myanmar Secrets Act Denied Bail," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-journalists/reuters-reporters-arrested-under-myanmar-secrets-act-denied-bail-idUSKBN1FK3C2>.

Rohingya villagers of access to food, livelihoods and other means of conducting daily activities and life; 4) commit repeated acts of humiliation and violence prior to, during, and after 25 August, to drive out Rohingya villagers en masse through incitement to hatred, violence and killings, including by declaring the Rohingyas as Bengalis and illegal settlers in Myanmar; 5) instil deep and widespread fear and trauma – physical, emotional and psychological, in the Rohingya victims via acts of brutality, namely killings, disappearances, torture, and rape and other forms of sexual violence¹²⁹.

The biggest impact due to human rights violations in Rakhine State is the increase in refugee waves and the number of displaced persons in Rakhine State. The apparently well-organized, coordinated, and systematic nature of the attacks carried out by the Myanmar security forces against the entire Rohingya caused a lot of the number of displaced person ranging from 650,000 to 700,000 people to flee from the occurring conflict.¹³⁰ UNICEF even reported that 60 percent of them were children who needed humanitarian assistance immediately¹³¹.

The conflict that occurred in Rakhine State that caused a humanitarian crisis still occurs until the end of 2017 and has not yet found a bright spot in the settlement effort. The conflict between armed groups and Myanmar Military is still happening and many predict that the settlement between the conflicting parties will not be found anytime soon. The pressure from the international community on the investigation of human rights violations and the taking of decisive action against the Myanmar government is still coming. But the most important thing is the need

¹²⁹ OHCHR, "Mission Report of Ohchr Rapid Response Mission to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh " (United Nation Human Rights Office of the High Commisioner, 2017).

¹³⁰ ISCG, "Situation Report: Rohingya Refugee Crisis," (Cox's Bazaar: Inter Sector Coordination Group, 2018).

¹³¹ UNICEF, "Rohingya Crisis," UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/bangladesh_100945.html.

for humanitarian assistance to help the welfare of the affected victims of the humanitarian crisis that occurred.

C. The role of international community and various criticisms and pressure on Myanmar

The humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State invited various responses from the international community. The response came from both the region and the international community at large, which not only involved the state but also from civil society and NGOs. In general, the international community consisting of various United Nations agencies, International Criminal Court officials, human rights groups, journalists, and governments see that the Burmese military has been conducting ethnic cleansing and genocide against Rohingya ethnicity¹³². Therefore, they demanded that the relevant parties should immediately take strategic steps to stop all forms of human rights violations that occurred, so that the humanitarian crisis did not enlarge and disrupt regional and international security.

Some researchers indicate that there has been a structured genocide in the case of a humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. They note that in the humanitarian crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar there has been a violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention which defines genocide as any of the following acts committed including killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately infusing on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole, in part, transferring children of the group to another group with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. As the Genocide Convention recognizes, genocide is a crime

¹³² Associated Press, "U.N. Genocide Advisor: Myanmar Waged 'Scorched-Earth Campaign' against the Rohingya," Los Angeles Times, <http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-myanmar-rohingyas-20180313-story.html>.

contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world. Therefore, it is not surprising that when the humanitarian crisis occurred in Rakhine state, the condemnation of international communities will continue to emerge¹³³.

(i). Diplomatic criticism

The strongest response to humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state emerged from Bangladesh as the most affected country with the influx of the refugees, countries in Southeast Asian Region particularly the member of ASEAN, the UN, United States, and Islamic countries which are also members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). This response did not only come recently when the escalation occurred and Rohingya crisis became a hot issue to be discussed in the international world thanks to the wide exposure of various mainstream media. For countries like Bangladesh that has been affected by the influx of refugees since the first time this conflict took place, the response to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state has been given at least since the end of the 70s when a large wave of humanitarian crisis victims began to enter its border. Although initially the Bangladesh government provided refugee status for these people, however due to the dire economic situation in the country itself, it began negotiating with the Myanmar authorities for the repatriation of these people. In 1992 the first memorandum over the repatriation of the Rohingya was signed by Bangladesh and Myanmar Government. As a result of international criticism, another memorandum of understanding was signed in May 1993, between Bangladesh, Myanmar and the UNHCR, to allow the involvement of the latter in the process.¹³⁴

¹³³ Alina Lindblom et al., "Persecution of Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide Occurring in Myanmar's Rakhine State?," (2015), <https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/fortifyrights.pdf>.

¹³⁴ Jatswan S Sidhu and Syeeda Naushin Parnini, "International Responses to Human Rights Violations in Myanmar: The Case of the Rohingya," *Journal of International Studies* 7 (2011): 119-34.

Besides Bangladesh, the country that actively reacts to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state are countries in the Southeast Asian region, especially those directly affected by this crisis such as Thailand and Malaysia. Thailand, for example, since 1962 has hosted a wide range of Myanmar's ethnic minorities namely the Kayins (Karens), Shans and Mons, not to mention the presence of a large number of Myanmar dissidents in Thailand. With the escalation of humanitarian conflicts in Rakhine state that occurred for several periods, this is feared to increase the number of refugees and will disrupt their national interest. It is estimated that Thailand is currently hosting some 150,000 refugees from Myanmar, which also include the Rohingya¹³⁵ Thailand has long been a hub for human trafficking networks transporting Rohingya refugees and Bangladeshi migrants to Malaysia and other destination countries. In 2015, the “discovery” of trafficking camps and mass graves in southern Thailand precipitated a crackdown by Thai and Malaysian authorities. As the result, traffickers abandoned boats of refugees and migrants at sea, often without adequate water, food or fuel. With various refugee cases highlighting Thailand's treatment of it (by enforcing a "push-back" policy first implemented by prior Thai administrations), Thailand does not want to be caught in a dilemma in the case of human rights enforcement against refugees and maintains their national interest. Therefore, they have forcibly returned refugees and asylum seekers to countries based on the request of foreign governments.¹³⁶

As with Thailand, countries like Malaysia also feels the same thing as Thailand as a country that is directly affected by the wave of Rohingya refugees. In March 1992, the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, issued a strongly-worded statement when he was quoted saying

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Audrey Gaughran, "Rohingya Fleeing Myanmar Face Difficulties in Thailand," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/rohingya-fleeing-myanmar-face-difficulties-in-thailand/>.

that the issue may disrupt regional stability¹³⁷. For Malaysia, this issue is not only seen for the sake of maintaining their national interest, but social ethics as a Muslim majority country is very influential on the emergence of a strong response to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state that is closely related to the life of Rohingya Muslims.

These countries react through several different corridors, either by directly reacting to Myanmar on a bilateral basis, or by bringing it to a broader sphere such as through ASEAN organization¹³⁸. But the move to bring the conflict to the ASEAN realm is often criticized by the wider international community. As an organization that consists of countries in the Southeast Asia region, ASEAN is required to play a deeper role in addressing the humanitarian crisis that occurs in its territory. But in fact there are a lot of criticisms during this Rohingya case that the crisis only became a small part of the discussion that was carried out in general. Even Myanmar was accepted as a member of ASEAN in 1997 despite having not been able to solve the human rights problem that occurred in Rakhine state. Although the discussion had appeared in several events such as the 14th ASEAN Summit in 2009 when the plight of the Rohingya boat people caught international attention and the regional community. But in general, the issue was never made to the regional organization's formal agenda, although initially, leaders from Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand did agree to discuss the issue. The principle of non-interference that is upheld by ASEAN as an organization is considered to be a major obstacle to more playing a role in resolving this case.¹³⁹

In addition to the countries in the Southeast Asia region, the Rakhine state issue also invited strong responses from the international world as widely as the United States and even the

¹³⁷ Sidhu and Parnini.

¹³⁸ Andrew M Deutz, "United States Human Rights Policy Towards Burma, 1988-91," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13, no. 2 (1991): 164.

¹³⁹ Sidhu and Parnini.

European Union. As a country that is so vocal about the issue of human rights in the world, the United States has strongly reacted to human rights violations in Myanmar in general and the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state in particular at least since 1988. United States has imposed the most extensive sanctions against the Myanmar regime, which ranged from a ban on all new investments into the country to target financial sanctions against the top members of the Myanmar regime with the aim of encouraging Myanmar to improve its human rights records and carry out the democratization process. For the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, the US has provided humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya refugees at least since 1991. The United States has at least given US \$ 23 million to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), while US\$1.28 million was allotted to various non-governmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance to these refugees. Strong criticism of the Myanmar government has also been given specifically in addressing this particular issue. Congressman Christopher Smith introduced a resolution in the United States House of Representatives calling on the Myanmar junta to grant "full and equal citizenship" to the Rohingya immediately to provide people to education, as well as remove all restrictions on them. Besides that, US was also included in sixteen countries that have thus far supported the establishment¹⁴⁰ of a United Nations Commission for Inquiry and War Crimes against Humanity to investigate human rights violations in Myanmar.

As with the US, the European Union also reacted by putting embargo on Myanmar and suspended the defense cooperation since 1991. In addition, the EU specifically also provided humanitarian assistance to deal with the crisis that occurred through the European Commission's

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO) by providing US \$ 54 million to the UNHCR for the purpose of humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya¹⁴¹.

When the humanitarian crisis has become a global issue, one party that will come and give responses is the UN. As an international organization, the United Nations has been involved in the human rights situation in Myanmar since 1990 when the first resolution calling on the Myanmar junta to improve its human rights record was issued by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Since then, the discussion on Myanmar has always been a routine agenda at the UN. The UN itself has the UNCHR or the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (presently known as the United Nations Human Rights Council or HRC) which involved directly in the Rohingya issue since 1992 when the agency, together with some other international humanitarian organizations, created a broad relief operations in some 20 camps along the Teknaf-Cox's Bazaar Road in Bangladesh. However, at that time due to political conditions, UNHCR was only allowed limited involvement in handling cases, especially in the repatriation process agreed between the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh. A special agreement with the Myanmar government itself was only agreed in 1993 which then the UNHCR was allowed full access to all parts of the state by 1994. After that the UNHCR started a mass registration exercise for the Rohingya in Bangladesh with some 176,000 registers in the repatriation process. Until now, UNHCR is still actively distributing humanitarian assistance to victims of the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. But one thing that becomes a major constraint is the non-cooperative attitude of the country authorities, coupled with its non-granting of full access to UNHCR's representatives in the Rakhine State that hampered the process of providing humanitarian assistance¹⁴².

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

As a humanitarian crisis related to the life of Rohingya Muslims, a strong response was also given by the international Muslim community. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as the body that represents the Muslim world is the forum for the Muslim community to give strong responses toward the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the OIC has monitored human rights violations and adopted a resolution criticizing the Myanmar junta for its human rights violations against Muslims in the country, and especially the Rohingya. Since that time, the OIC routinely issued an annual statement condemning human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and called on the international community to be involved in the issue. In 2010, the OIC proposed the formation of the Arakan Rohingya Union (ARU) as a body to coordinate and implement the Rohingya to put up front in their struggle for better human rights. In 2011 the OIC hosted the first meeting for ARU in Jeddah for various Rohingya groups abroad and urged these groups to unite and coordinate their efforts.¹⁴³

Apart from countries and bodies that have a direct relationship with the humanitarian crisis case that occurred in Rakhine state, various responses also came from the civil society. As long as the crisis in Rakhine state has not been resolved, the spirit of international solidarity and universality of human rights values will continue to encourage all people to react to demand a solution to the crisis.

Responses from the international community began to come sporadically since the conflict escalation occurred in 2012. A day after President Thein Sein declared a state of emergency in the state after deadly clashes between Buddhists and ethnic Rohingya Muslims, OIC Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu expressed grave concern over and condemnation of violence against Rohingyas in Rakhine state. Still in the same month, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Navi Pillay expressed concern over reports of human rights violations committed by security forces in Rakhine state against Muslims, particularly Rohingyas, and called for a prompt, independent investigation. He called on national leaders to speak out against discrimination, the exclusion of minorities and racist attitudes. President Thein Sein told the UN High Commissioner for Refugees that the government would take responsibility for its own ethnic nationalities, but it was “not at all possible to recognize the illegal border-crossing Rohingyas who are not our ethnicity.” He said the Rohingya posed a threat to national security and that they should be resettled in any third country that is “willing to take them.”¹⁴⁴

In August 2012, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, concluded six-day visit to Myanmar, reporting that the country “continues to grapple with serious human rights challenges,” particularly in Rakhine state. He called for an independent investigation to the allegations of human rights abuses and excessive use of force by security and police in response to the June violence. This was then followed up with a meeting of the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki- Moon, with President Thein Sein to discuss the situations in Kachin and Rakhine states. In October, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan reported that the government of Myanmar had rejected an offer by ASEAN to open tripartite talks between ASEAN, the UN, and the quelling the violence in Rakhine state¹⁴⁵.

In 2013 responses from the international community continued to emerge along with the emergence of continued conflicts. The responses came not only from international organizations

¹⁴⁴ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, “Timeline of International Response to the Situation of the Rohingya and Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma/Myanmar,” in *2012- 2016* (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2016).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

such as the UN and ASEAN, but also bilaterally by countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Government of Malaysia urged Myanmar to take stronger action to prevent the persecution of Muslims and Government of Indonesia urged Myanmar to address the citizenship status of Rohingya Muslims so they had access to the same legal rights as the rest of other citizen. Besides that, OIC continued to give further attention by sending delegates to Rakhine state to investigate the situation of Rohingyas and met with representatives of Buddhists and Muslims communities. They were welcomed by over 3,000 protestors led by Buddhist Monk in demonstrations against the delegation's arrival¹⁴⁶.

In 2014, we can see an increase in bilateral responses from several countries to humanitarian issues that occurred in Rakhine state, in addition to reports and regular condemnations carried out by NGOs and UN. Japan announced a \$ 96 million package to be used over the next five years for development of infrastructure to improve living standards in war-torn ethnic areas of Myanmar. Norway suspended a restriction on its sovereign wealth fund from buying bonds issued in Myanmar. And one of the important response was US President Obama telling the press during the East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Taw that the US “would like to see a new plan that will allow the Rohingya to become citizens through a normal process without having to do that type of self-identification.”

In 2015, as Myanmar saw a very important step in their development towards their democratization process when they held the first general elections since 1990 and Aung San Suu Kyi’s won the election. This event invited various responses of optimism from the international community, especially in the hope of resolving human rights cases that occurred. Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Francois Hollande specifically called Aung San Suu Kyi directly for the victory.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

United Nations through United Nations Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee welcomed the recent elections in Myanmar as "a new chapter in the country 'history" and reaffirmed its commitment to work with all parties to improve the human rights situation for all in Myanmar¹⁴⁷. But in practice this election itself was not free from human rights violations, even those related to Rohingya ethnicity and the crisis in Rakhine state. Ahead to the election, Parliament barred temporary registration certificate (as a sign of citizenship for Rohingya) holders from serving as members of political parties, and in early 2015, the president unexpectedly announced that temporary registration certificates would be cancelled¹⁴⁸. This troubling denial of political rights, along with the dismal humanitarian situation, remained a major concern for the international community throughout the period of observation.

(ii) International response on the 2017 Rakhine State crisis: movements to revoke Aung San Suu Kyi's honorary title as a human rights fighter and humanitarian assistance given by international community.

The crisis in 2017 was the one that invited many responses from the international community, both from the state government bilaterally, civil society, and from NGOs. This was triggered by massive coverage from various kinds of international mainstream media which then increased awareness of international communities on the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state.¹⁴⁹

Major international body such as the UN even stated that Myanmar's actions as a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing"¹⁵⁰. Countries in the world such as the United States carefully give

¹⁴⁷ OHCHR, "There Is No Turning Back in Myanmar," Says Un Human Rights Expert after Elections," United Nations Human Rights, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16758&LangID=E>.

¹⁴⁸ The Carter Center, "Observing Myanmar's 2015 General Elections," in *Election Report* (The Carter Center, 2015).

¹⁴⁹ Rahmawati Hussein from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center, interview by Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika, 2018.

¹⁵⁰ Stephanie Nebehay and Simon Lewis, "U.N. Brands Myanmar Violence a 'Textbook' Example of Ethnic Cleansing," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar->

strong statements towards the crisis, such as condemning the "terrible savagery" against the Rohingya. The biggest response comes from Islamic countries which have condemned the Myanmar government for its alleged abuses of the Rohingya and other Muslims. In September 2017, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president of Turkey, told members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that "Muslim countries in particular, should fight together by using every means available to stop that cruelty."¹⁵¹ In fact, some parties have called for the need for military intervention in handling this case, for example by 12 Nobel laureates and 15 other eminent global citizens that urged the UN Security Council to intervene immediately to end the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine state.¹⁵²

One of the main focuses of the response given by the international community is pressuring Aung San Suu Kyi to condemn atrocities and addresses human-rights issues. As the de facto leader of Myanmar's civilian government since the 2015 election and also as recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Aung San Suu Kyi was given high expectations from the international community to be able to play a role in resolving the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. But in practice these expectations have not been fulfilled properly and even she was now facing allegations that she has failed to speak out over violence against the Rohingyas. She avoided journalists and press conferences, but when forced, said the military in Rakhine was operating according to the "rule of law". The international pressure against her has continued to mount since

rohingya/u-n-brands-myanmar-violence-a-textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing-idUSKCN1BMoQF.

¹⁵¹ The Guardian, "Erdoğan Accuses Myanmar of 'Genocide' as Thousands of Rohingya Flee to Bangladesh," The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/02/erdogan-accuses-myanmar-of-genocide-against-rohingya>.

¹⁵² The Daily Star, "Intervene Now, Take Action Later: 12 Nobel Laureates, 15 Other Eminent Citizens Call Upon Unsc in Open Letter," The Daily Star, <https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/mayanmar-rohingya-refugee-crisis-intervene-now-take-action-end-crisis-1461796>.

then. Her failure to denounce the military or address allegations of ethnic cleansing has been criticised by world leaders and groups such as Amnesty International. In December, the UN human rights chief, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, did not rule out genocide charges against Ms Suu Kyi and criticised her for failing to use the term "Rohingya"¹⁵³ Even student activists in the UK were working to strip Aung San Suu Kyi of honours bestowed on her during the course of her career as a democracy activist including revoking the Nobel Prize she had received¹⁵⁴.

Aung San Suu Kyi's position which is quite central as a symbol of democracy in Myanmar is regarded as the only hope for the international community in resolving the humanitarian crisis problem in Rakhine state; at least it can facilitate access to humanitarian aid from the international world that is truly needed by victims of the humanitarian crisis immediately.¹⁵⁵ Humanitarian assistance is the thing most needed by victims of the humanitarian crisis as the most concrete contribution that the international community can make to help the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state due to the impossibility of further action such as military intervention as it is feared that it can disrupt regional security and stability.

Humanitarian assistance as a form of response from the international community has been given at least since the early 1990s when the conflict took place in Rakhine state. However, at that time the provision of humanitarian assistance was still very limited through United Nations agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Refugee Agency

¹⁵³ BBC News, "How Aung San Suu Kyi Sees the Rohingya Crisis," BBC <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42824778>.

¹⁵⁴ Anealla Safdar and Shafik Mandhai, "Aung San Suu Kyi Honours Revoked Amid Rohingya Backlash," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/aung-san-suu-kyi-honours-revoked-rohingya-backlash-171119052610172.html>.

¹⁵⁵ John Zaw, "Suu Kyi Agrees to Humanitarian Assistance for Rakhine," USCA News, <https://www.ucanews.com/news/suu-kyi-agrees-to-humanitarian-assistance-for-rakhine/77946>.

(UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP). As a form of fundamental expression of the universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative, the increasing awareness of the global community will increase the desire and participation of the community in providing humanitarian assistance aimed at saving lives, alleviating the suffering and maintaining and protecting human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies. Today humanitarian action is framed in an overall international approach that brings together the United Nations, the Red Cross/Crescent movement, humanitarian NGOs and others, in support of local responses to humanitarian crises such as what happened in Rakhine state of Myanmar.¹⁵⁶

The crisis that occurred in 2017 increased the participation of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to help victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. Large donor countries in the international world such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and European Commission immediately responded in the form of humanitarian assistance to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state, both directly and through the UN. United States for example has provided humanitarian assistance to the crisis in Burma and Bangladesh to more than \$ 163 million since August 2017 and total humanitarian assistance for people in and from Burma to more than \$ 255 million since the start of 2017¹⁵⁷. The European Commission has also released €40 million in humanitarian aid to provide life-saving support to vulnerable Rohingya civilians, host communities in Bangladesh, and across Myanmar's Rakhine State¹⁵⁸. Japan with UN agencies and

¹⁵⁶ EUPHRA, "The State of Art of Humanitarian Action a Quick Guide on the Current Situation of Humanitarian Relief, Its Origins, Stakeholders and Future," (European Universities on Professionalization on Humanitarian Action, 2013).

¹⁵⁷ Office of the Spokesperson, "Ongoing U.S. Humanitarian Assistance for the Rakhine State Crisis," news release, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/281130.htm>.

¹⁵⁸ European Commission, "Rohingya Crisis: €40 Million in Humanitarian Aid for Bangladesh and Myanmar," news release, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3994_en.htm.

the Government of Myanmar had signed agreements totaling US\$ 20 million to implement a number of humanitarian and development projects benefitting people of all communities in Rakhine State.¹⁵⁹

Apart from these donor countries, Muslim countries are also becoming the most active parties in providing humanitarian assistance. Turkey, for example, had delivered more than \$ 70 million in humanitarian aid to the Rohingya Muslims¹⁶⁰. Moreover, Muslim countries that are also members of ASEAN such as Malaysia for example has sent humanitarian assistance amounting to about USD \$ 1.1 million. The 500 tonnes of donations from Malaysia included instant noodles, hygiene kits and bottles of mineral water¹⁶¹. In addition, Indonesia has specifically sent assistance for humanitarian cases which amounts to ± 20 tons consisting of shelter tent, portable water tanks, fast food, special food for pregnant women and toddlers, medicines and sarongs.

What is interesting about the process of delivering humanitarian assistance is the increasing participation of NGOs in providing humanitarian assistance in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. The involvement of organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors without Borders (MSF), Burma Task Force USA, Muslim Aid, The Fund for Global Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch in granting humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state shows the increasing participation of international actors in handling cases like this. This mission is dispatching international volunteers

¹⁵⁹Thompson Chau, "Tokyo's Rakhine Aid Emphasises "Humanitarian-Development Nexus"," Myanmar Times, <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/tokyos-rakhine-aid-emphasises-humanitarian-development-nexus.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Hurriyet Daily News, "Turkey Sent Humanitarian Aid Worth \$70m to Rohingya People, Turkish Fm Says," <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/turkey-sent-humanitarian-aid-worth-70m-to-rohingya-people-turkish-fm-says-117485>.

¹⁶¹ VOA News, "Malaysian Aid for Myanmar's Rohingya Arrives at Yangon Dock," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/malaysian-aid-myanmar-rohingya-arrives-yangon-dock/3717308.html>.

to areas of conflict in order to protect human rights defenders under threat of violence. In general, NGOs participate in intervention as moderate actors and specialized groups of experts by mobilizing human, financial and material resources; carrying out projects and programs; and offering expertise and advice¹⁶².

However, in reality it is not that easy to provide humanitarian assistance, especially for cases that occurred in Rakhine state. The government controls and restricts international humanitarian assistance through limiting organizations being able to achieve MoUs without defined criteria and a complex process of travel authorizations. The role of ethnic and ethnic armed groups became major burdens in the provision of humanitarian assistance and basic services and the role varied a lot between areas¹⁶³. In the case of Rakhine state, for example, the government and the military of Myanmar were blocking all United Nations aid agencies from delivering vital supplies of food, water and medicine to thousands of desperate civilians at the height of the conflict that occurred late August to early September 2017. Not only assistance from the UN, but sixteen major non-governmental organisations including Oxfam and Save the Children that the government has restricted access to the conflict area¹⁶⁴. Although there are still many challenges, the immediate form of responses, especially humanitarian assistance to victims of the crisis in Rakhine state, must be continued so that the key goals of encouraging and supporting the particular nation state to fulfill their responsibilities and protect their citizens can be achieved well.

¹⁶² Fulvio Attinà and Daniela Irrera, "Ngos' Roles in Humanitarian Interventions and Peace Support Operations," in *Multilateral Security and Esdp Operations* (Routledge, 2016), 89-104.

¹⁶³ SIDA, "Myanmar Crisis (Including Bangladesh) Humanitarian Crises Analysis 2017," (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2017).

¹⁶⁴ Oliver Holmes, "Myanmar Blocks All Un Aid to Civilians at Heart of Rohingya Crisis," *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/myanmar-blocks-all-un-aid-to-civilians-at-heart-of-rohingya-crisis>.

D. Indonesia's active role

As fellow ASEAN countries, one of the most active countries in giving responses to humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state is Indonesia. After major riots occurred in 2017, Indonesia actively reacted in the form of bilateral and multilateral responses, as well as providing humanitarian assistance in the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. On this occasion, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi was sent to Myanmar to urge the government to halt deadly violence against Rohingya Muslims¹⁶⁵. The Indonesian government also immediately handed over 20 tons of humanitarian aid to Rakhine state refugees scattered in several regions, and in contrast to other parties who also provided assistance, the assistance was received with pleasure and even openly appreciated by the Myanmar government because of the sincerity of Indonesian government¹⁶⁶.

In general, Indonesia puts forward two policy spectrums in addressing humanitarian crisis that occur in Rakhine state, namely diplomacy and humanitarian assistance. The diplomacy spectrum promotes dialogue with the Myanmar government to find the best solution to address the conditions in Rakhine. The humanitarian assistance spectrum takes precedence to mitigate the humanitarian crises. Diplomacy carried out by Indonesia is expected to create conducive atmosphere through a positive response by the Myanmar government. It is expected with the diplomacy effort of Indonesian government, the Myanmar government is willing to open the access for humanitarian assistance from the international community, especially humanitarian assistance

¹⁶⁵ Al Jazeera, "Indonesia Fm to Urge Myanmar to Halt Rohingya Violence," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/indonesia-fm-urge-myanmar-halt-rohingya-violence-170903160924784.html>.

¹⁶⁶ Fabian Januarius Kuwado, "Indonesian Aid for Rohingya Arrives in Myanmar," Kompas, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/09/22/07391491/bantuan-indonesia-untuk-rohingya-tiba-di-myanmar>.

from Indonesia to Rakhine state, so other problems such as repatriation of refugees and construction of durable peace in crisis affected areas can be addressed immediately¹⁶⁷.

(i). Multilateral and Bilateral Diplomatic Role

Indonesia's responses to the immediate problem of the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state began in 2009. During the visit of Prime Minister Thein Sein to Indonesia, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at that time gave concern to the status of Rohingya refugees entering Indonesia as a result of the humanitarian crisis that occurred for years in Rakhine state. Bilateral cooperation was also pursued to solve the problem of Rohingya refugees entering Indonesia, as well as cooperation involving the UN Refugee Agency and the International Organization for Migration. In the discussion, Indonesia has promised to extend the humanitarian assistance to 400 Rohingya that stranded in Aceh, until a final solution was found¹⁶⁸.

After the 2012 major riots in Rakhine, Indonesia again gave a bilateral response with the statement of the foreign minister Marty Natalegawa at that time stating that Indonesia was against the discriminatory treatment of anyone anywhere. He said that Indonesia cannot tolerate the action and were asking the Myanmar government to manage this issue as Myanmar moved forward toward democratization. He also stated that he would bring the issue to the OIC summit in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on 14 and 15 August 2012¹⁶⁹. Concern on the issue in Rakhine state was then delivered directly by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2013 during his visit to Myanmar to meet President Thein Sein. During the visit, he urged Myanmar's leaders to address Buddhist-led violence

¹⁶⁷ Niwa Dwitama, "Diplomacy, Not Intervention, Realizing Peace in Rakhine," *Masyarakat ASEAN* 2018.

¹⁶⁸ Loos.

¹⁶⁹ William Boot, "Indonesia Monitoring Rohingya Situation," *The Irrawaddy*, <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/asia/indonesia-monitoring-rohingya-situation.html>.

against Muslims that could cause problems for Muslims population in the region¹⁷⁰. The concern was also accompanied by Indonesian pressure to address the citizenship status of Rohingya Muslims so they could have access to the same legal rights as "the rest of their countrymen." Multilateral pressure was also taken by Indonesia in 2013 through the OIC Contact Group on Rohingya Minority Muslims where at the ministerial meeting in Jeddah, the forum was condemning the spread of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, including atrocities committed against Rohingyas, and calling upon the government to ensure Buddhist extremists to end the use of force and violence¹⁷¹.

Post 2014 until 2017, despite the change of government in Indonesia with the election of Joko Widodo as the new president, Indonesia's attention and role in alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state has not diminished. This is also accompanied by an increasing number of refugees who enter the Indonesian region and also pressure from within and outside the country that expect Indonesia to play a bigger role to address this crisis. In 2016, Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla conveyed deep concern with regard to Rohingya migration to his country. He also stated that even though the Rohingya issue was Myanmar's domestic problem, Indonesia would give suggestions and advices to address the situation¹⁷². Indonesia was the first country to respond to the riots in October 2016. The response was also followed up directly with the visit of Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi to Myanmar to meet Aung San Suu Kyi as the de facto leader of the Myanmar government. On this occasion Retno and Suu Kyi openly discussed the developments in

¹⁷⁰ Jason Szep and John O'Callaghan, "Indonesian President Urges Myanmar to Address Muslim Violence," Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-myanmar/indonesian-president-urges-myanmar-to-address-muslim-violence-idUSBRE93M04Z20130423>.

¹⁷¹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

¹⁷² Gautam Sen, "A Joint India-Indonesia Intervention on the Rohingya Issue," Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/joint-india-indonesia-intervention-rohingya-issue_gsen_151216.

Rakhine state. The Indonesian foreign minister emphasized how important it was for security and stability to be achieved so that efforts in inclusive development could continue in Rakhine state¹⁷³.

After the humanitarian crisis in the form of a major riot which happened again in 2017 in Rakhine state, Indonesia once again became the most active country in reacting with the direct visit of Indonesian foreign minister for urgent talks with Myanmar regarding the latest developments in Rakhine state¹⁷⁴. The Indonesian foreign minister immediately conducted marathon diplomacy to Singapore, Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, Bangkok and Dhaka to meet officials in the countries to request humanitarian assistance and help resolve the crisis in Rakhine state. One thing that needs to be highlighted by the Indonesian foreign minister's diplomacy effort is the "4 + 1 proposal" as an effort to solve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The 4 + 1 proposal contains 4 points, namely restoring security stability, refraining from using violence, protecting the community regardless of ethnicity and religion, and providing access to humanitarian assistance. While the "+1" element is the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State report led by Kofi Annan¹⁷⁵.

Indonesia also continues to provide its diplomatic role at the global level by continuing to call on the international community to contribute to problem solving processes in Rakhine. This was conveyed by the Indonesian foreign minister at an interlocutory meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Contact Group on Rohingya during the 72nd General Assembly of the UN

¹⁷³ Tama Salim, "Indonesia Raises Rohingya Concerns with Suu Kyi", The Jakarta Post, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/08/indonesia-raises-rohingya-concerns-with-suu-kyi-retno.html>.

¹⁷⁴ Aisha Ismail and Elliot Dolan-Evans, "The International Community's Response to the Rohingya Crisis," Australian Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/international-community-response-rohingya/>.

¹⁷⁵ Dwitama, 42-45.

meeting in New York. Furthermore, in line with Indonesia's 4 + 1 formula, the UN Secretary General also stressed the three steps that the Myanmar government needed to take immediately, namely ending military operations, opening access to humanitarian assistance, and returning Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to Myanmar¹⁷⁶. The role of Indonesian diplomacy both bilaterally and multilaterally has also been conveyed and specifically appreciated by the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. The UN itself, through its secretary general, requested that Indonesia continued to work to resolve the conflict that befell Rohingya citizens in Rakhine State. The request was conveyed via telephone lines directly between the Indonesian foreign minister and the UN Secretary General on September 1, 2017¹⁷⁷. In all its diplomatic actions, Indonesia emphasizes efforts to deal with the crisis as soon as possible and the development of inclusive and sustainable peace in overcoming the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar.

(ii). Humanitarian Assistance

In addition to bilateral and multilateral diplomacy responses, one of the highlights of Indonesia's role in handling the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar is the provision of humanitarian assistance to those affected by the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. After the crisis that occurred in 2017, Indonesia acted as the first humanitarian responder by sending eight aircraft containing humanitarian assistance directly to Rakhine state or through Cox's Bazaar where the Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh. The assistance included ready-to-eat food, food for toddlers and pregnant women, tents, water tanks, sarong and medicines. Indonesia also established school development projects in Rakhine, two schools in Minbya Township and one each in Maungdaw Township and Buthidaung Township as Indonesia's commitment to build sustainable peace in

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Rizki Akbar Hasan, "5 Indonesian Action to Helps Overcome Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar," *Liputan6*, <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3080648/5-aksi-indonesia-bantu-atasi-krisis-rohingya-di-myanmar>.

Rakhine state of Myanmar¹⁷⁸. In addition, the step that has been widely appreciated by the international community was the construction of hospitals in Myaung Bwe, Rakhine State, Myanmar as a form of Indonesian society's contribution to the people of Rakhine. The construction of this hospital cost 1.8 million US dollars. The expense was provided by the Indonesian Government in collaboration with the Indonesian people including Indonesian Red Cross, various NGOs and the private sector¹⁷⁹.

What is interesting about Indonesia's humanitarian assistance to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state is the involvement of not only the government, but all elements of society. In fact, it also includes the Indonesian civil society at large and Indonesian NGOs. In addition to intergovernmental efforts, Indonesia also formed the *Aliansi kemanusiaan Indonesia untuk Myanmar* (AKIM) or Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar. The alliance consists of eleven humanitarian organizations, including Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, PKPU, Dompot Dhuafa, Rumah Zakat, Dompot Perduli Ummat – Daarut Tauhiid, LAZIS Wahdah, Laznas LMI, Aksi Cepat Tanggap, Lazis Dewan Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia, and Social Trust Fund – UIN Jakarta. This alliance has synergized with the Myanmar government and international organizations to form the Humanitarian Assistance for Sustainable Community in Myanmar (HASCO) program which focuses on capacity building cooperation, improvement of experts, settlement situations and recovery services. AKIM also helped raise broader supports to the construction of educational facilities, establish markets, and conduct training for medical and health personnel. The role of the alliance

¹⁷⁸ Dwitama.

¹⁷⁹ Kompas.com, "Indonesia Starts Building Hospitals in Rakhine, Myanmar," Kompas, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/11/20/15285611/indonesia-mulai-bangun-rumah-sakit-di-rakhine-myanmar>.

shows the importance of synergy between the government and NGOs in accordance with recommendations issued by the Advisory Commission on Rakhine state¹⁸⁰.

Not only encouraging and providing humanitarian assistance from the people of Indonesia, the Indonesian government also encourages ASEAN's active role at the regional level in providing humanitarian assistance to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. On October 14, 2017 ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, or AHA Center, distributed aid in the form of 80 tonnes of relief items for displaced communities in Rakhine State through Yangon, Myanmar. The items consisted of family tents, family kits, personal hygiene kits, kitchen sets, aluminium boats, and generators, among others. The relief items were shipped in two batches, with the first plane arriving on Friday the 13th October, and the second plane arriving on Sunday the 15th October 2017¹⁸¹.

The provision of assistance to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state is not a new thing for Indonesia. Since the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia has gradually provided assistance to the ongoing crisis in Rakhine. At that time after the 2012 riots, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed Jusuf Kalla to be Special Envoy and appointed Indonesian Red Cross as the coordinating agency to distribute US \$ 1 million in aid. Indonesia also provided assistance to the Government of Myanmar through the sharing of expertise method by facilitating the visit of Myanmar delegates to Aceh, and contributing to the advancement of Myanmar's

¹⁸⁰ Dwitama.

¹⁸¹ AHA Centre, "One Asean One Response for Displaced Communities in Rakhine State, Myanmar," news release, 2017, <https://ahacentre.org/press-release/one-asean-one-response-for-displaced-communities-in-rakhine-state-myanmar/>.

economy by sending Indonesian state owned company to invest in Myanmar, as well as forming *the Blue Books on Indonesia-Myanmar Capacity Building Partnership*¹⁸².

What needs to be highlighted in the provision of humanitarian assistance from Indonesia to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state is that Indonesia has never discriminated the recipients of the humanitarian aid. All parties affected by the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, both Rohingya and Buddhist-Rakhine communities, are entitled to receive humanitarian assistance from Indonesia. In the construction of schools in Rakhine, for example, Indonesia established half of the schools in Muslim Rohingya residential areas and the other half in Rakhine Buddhist residential areas. In general, Indonesia has never considered that the humanitarian conflict in Rakhine only targeted one particular party, but Indonesia considered that this crisis was caused by widespread conflict which then took its toll on all parties. This is what makes Indonesia get easy access from the Myanmar government in distributing humanitarian aid to Rakhine state when other countries and many international NGOs are restricted in access, especially in the period after the major riots in August 2017. In addition, the relationship between Indonesia and Myanmar, and the trust of the Myanmar government that Indonesia does not have a hidden agenda in providing humanitarian assistance is considered to be the key to easy access for Indonesia to provide humanitarian assistance to the Rakhine state of Myanmar¹⁸³.

¹⁸² Fatma Arya Ardani, "Indonesia's Policy in Helping Conflict Settlement between Ethnic Rohingya and Ethnic Rakhine in Myanmar (Study of the Personality of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono)," *Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 2 (2015): 22-28.

¹⁸³ Yasfitha Febriany Murthias, interview by Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika, 2018, Yangon.

Chapter IV

Analyses the Various Interests and Considerations of Indonesian Diplomacy

The role of Indonesia as one of the most active countries in addressing the Rakhine state crisis is the focus of this thesis. There are many factors that influence the various interests and considerations of Indonesian diplomacy and foreign policy in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. As a sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international relations, there are various factors both internal factors and external factors that will influence the policy making¹⁸⁴. The policy was designed with the aim of achieving complex domestic and international agendas. Regarding this topic, Coplin explains that any given foreign policy can be seen as a result of three categories of considerations that affect the foreign policy of the decision-making countries. The first is domestic politics in the policy decision making process of the country. The second is the economic and military capacity of the state. The third is the international context of the particular position in which the country finds its identity, especially regarding its relationship with other countries in a system¹⁸⁵.

Indonesia is in a strategic position to play an important role in the Rakhine state crisis. Domestically, Indonesia has an ethics of state that is in line with Indonesia's role in the crisis in Rakhine state. Not only that, the the ethical values that developed in Indonesian society broadly demanded that Indonesia could play a bigger role in international issues such as those in Rakhine state. Indonesia's position as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world also gives influence both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the ethical values that grew out of civil society dominated by the Islamic population were very influential in Indonesia's attitudes and policies in the crisis in Rakhine state. Internationally, other countries, especially Islamic countries,

¹⁸⁴ C. Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).

¹⁸⁵ Coplin.

have high expectations for Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world to play a major role in the handling of the crisis in Rakhine state because this case is closely related to the life of many Muslim Rohingya as one of the main victim of this crisis.

Another international consideration is Indonesia's position that is generally accepted as the de-facto leader of ASEAN that is expected to play a great role in addressing humanitarian cases in the Southeast Asia region so that the crisis does not affect regional stability. Then the history of very well established bilateral relations between the governments of Indonesia and Myanmar so far has also become one of the important considerations in the role of Indonesia in Rakhine state crisis.

Various considerations already mentioned will be discussed in depth one by one in this chapter, both domestic factors and international considerations. From here it is hoped that we can analyze the roles taken by Indonesia so far, and the extent to which Indonesia will be able to play a role in the future. However, before starting the discussion of the policy and role of Indonesia in the Rakhine crisis, we must understand that the concept of acceptability is one of the important factors in achieving policies. The government has to consider domestic sentiments as well as the international situation. One example is when there is a conflict between domestic and international interest, the government will probably emphasize to domestic interest, or surpass the situation altogether.¹⁸⁶ Therefore in this chapter we will also discuss how far and how much Indonesia can play a role in handling this case, including discussing Indonesia's national interest that must be protected.

From here we expect to find the reason why Indonesia puts forward two policy spectrums in addressing humanitarian crisis that occurs in Rakhine state, (soft) diplomacy and humanitarian

¹⁸⁶ Barbara Farnham, "Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004): 441-63.

assistance rather than other options such as military intervention and economic sanction. This chapter will also present the role of civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations that illustrate the broad participation of Indonesian people in handling humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state as a case study.

A. Domestic Political Conditions

Domestic political conditions are one of the most influential factor for Indonesia's foreign policy in the Rakhine state crisis. K.J. Holsti defines, foreign policy as the analysis of decisions of a state toward the external environment and the domestic conditions under which these actions are formulated¹⁸⁷. Furthermore, Mark R. Amstutz, defines foreign policy as the explicit and implicit actions of the governmental officials designed to promote national interests beyond a country's territorial boundaries¹⁸⁸. From that definition we must see that Indonesia's foreign policy including the policies taken in the Rakhine crisis case are the manifestations of the desires and values adopted by all Indonesian people in domestic situation to be represented in the form of foreign policy to promote the national interest beyond the national boundaries.

With the development of the process of democratization in the country, especially in the post-New Order era, the importance of public opinion in the process of policy formulation is increasingly developed, including in the field of foreign policy. Foreign policy can no longer be regarded as the exclusive domain of policy-making elites. As a democratic country, Indonesia's foreign policy must also reflect broad public aspirations.

As a democratic country with a high degree of accountability, domestic political influence is very large because the public will truly oversee and encourage the government to take foreign

¹⁸⁷ Kalevi J Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309.

¹⁸⁸ Mark R Amstutz, *International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

policy that can channel ethical values from the community itself.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, Indonesia's foreign policy must be able to accommodate all influential stakeholders in the country, such as the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), community leaders, religious leaders, business people, community organizations and civil society in Indonesia broadly to realize the creation of a united power in the country as domestic power.

In the strategic policies related to Indonesia's foreign policy, the President of the Republic of Indonesia specifically includes the roles, aspirations and interests of the people, as well as enhancing the global role of Indonesia as a selective regional middle power with the value of democracy and moderate Islam as a country that upholds world peace, as the main agenda of Indonesia's foreign policy. Therefore, in the domestic political condition discussion related to Indonesia's role in Rakhine crisis, we will focus on the role of community aspirations and the ethical values contained in the society; democratic values; moderate Islamic values as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world; and values as a country that upholds and promotes the world peace.

(i). The role of state and community ethics

The ethical aspect is a key factor that encourages Indonesia to play a bigger role in Rakhine state crisis. Ethical aspects, both in the form of ethics of state and community ethics whose values are adopted and developed in the community, create a moral commitment for the Indonesian people as a dignified nation to contribute to solving the humanitarian problems that occur in this world. Secondly, these ethical values attach Indonesia to the identity as a peacemaker state

¹⁸⁹ Kornel B Dura, "Internal Determinants of Foreign Policy Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union and the United States, 1945-1948," (1995).

mandated by the ideological and constitutional foundation of the state itself, as well as the interest of the Indonesian people in general¹⁹⁰.

The first we will discuss here is the moral commitment of the Indonesian people as fellow human beings and as part of the international community. From several interviews conducted by the author on several sources related to Indonesian foreign policy in Rakhine state, both from government¹⁹¹, practitioners¹⁹², and academicians¹⁹³, they all agreed that the main motive of Indonesia's role in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state was a moral commitment based on humanitarian reasons. As fellow human beings, the Indonesian people feel they have an obligation to confront human suffering as felt by victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state.

But of course the great moral commitment of the Indonesian Nation does not only arise from the similarities between human being. The moral commitment is specifically contained in the ethics of state and social ethics derived from the values adopted by the Indonesian nation in general as discussed in the initial chapter of this thesis. From the ethics of state, this moral commitment is particularly mandated in Pancasila as the ideal foundation and 1945 Constitution as the constitutional foundation of Indonesia. In the Pancasila as the ideal foundation of the Indonesian people it is clearly stated that just and civilized humanity is one the main ideals of the Indonesian nation itself. This is supported in the Preamble of 1945 Constitution which states that independence is the right of all nations and therefore, the colonialism and subjections in the world must be abolished because it is not in accordance with humanity and justice. Through Indonesian foreign policy which adheres to the principle of "free and active", the Indonesian people want to achieve the national interest to realize a just and civilized humanity beyond the national

¹⁹⁰ Mohamad Rosyidin, interview by Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika, 2018, Semarang.

¹⁹¹ Yasfitha Febriany Murthias, *ibid.*, Yangon.

¹⁹² Rahmawati Hussein from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center, *ibid.*

¹⁹³ Mohamad Rosyidin, *ibid.*, Semarang.

boundaries. Indonesia's role in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state is a concrete manifestation of the moral commitment of the Indonesian people. President Jokowi at the moment of the delivery of humanitarian assistance from Indonesia for the Rakhine State community specifically mentioned that the assistance was a form of concern for fellow human beings so that peace and harmony could be created in Rakhine State¹⁹⁴.

The role of the Indonesia in Rakhine state crisis became an opportunity to prove that the second principle of Pancasila has truly been carried out by all Indonesians. After the escalation of the crisis that occurred in 2017, national figures in Indonesia cited the Pancasila to invite the Indonesian people to pay attention to the crisis in Rakhine state. Like the Chairperson of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly, Zulkifli Hassan, who stated that in accordance with Pancasila, Indonesia must defend the Rohingya as victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. Pancasila rejects all forms of human oppression against other humans, therefore defending the Rohingya is mandated by Pancasila as the nation's ideology¹⁹⁵.

The ethic of state is fully supported by social ethics arising from the values contained in the community. Solidarity is the most fundamental social ethic in explaining the desire of the community to take a role in the Rakhine state crisis. Solidarity as a social ethic is ingrained in the social life of the Indonesian people in general. Therefore, when the crisis occurred in Rakhine state, the Indonesian people wanted to implement the concept of solidarity that they uphold in their daily life to a wider arena beyond the national boundaries, because in fact the Indonesian people

¹⁹⁴ Ray Jordan, "Jokowi: We Show Our Concern for Rohingya without Any Noise " Detik News, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3382992/jokowi-kepedulian-untuk-rohingya-kita-tunjukkan-tanpa-kegaduhan>.

¹⁹⁵ Ferdinan, "Chairperson of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly: We Uphold Pancasila, We Defend Rohingya," Detiknews, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3625727/ketua-mpr-kita-pancasila-kita-bela-rohingya>.

believe that humans are not alone in this world but surrounded by their communities, and the surrounding universe.

The values of the ethics of state and social ethics embraced by the nation then creates Indonesia's identity and commitment as a world peacekeeping country. This commitment has specifically been mandated in the fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1945 Constitution which states Indonesia's commitment to participate in carrying out world order based on independence, lasting peace and social justice. This commitment has been demonstrated in various Indonesian actions, especially by providing humanitarian assistance to various conflict areas in the world. In this contemporary situation, this commitment was directly stated by President Joko Widodo himself when delivering a remarks at the Opening of the 30th Congress and Commemoration of the 71st Anniversary of the Islamic Student Association (HMI) which was held at the auditorium of Pattimura University, Ambon. Indonesian President Joko Widodo claimed that in his current leadership Indonesia had contributed a lot to world peace. This was evidenced by various visits and President's support for the eradication of humanitarian conflicts and crises that have occurred such as in Palestine, Afghanistan, and also the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine State¹⁹⁶.

This solidarity also arises from several factors of identity, especially from the link between the identity of the Indonesian social community towards the Rakhine state crisis. The first is the connection between Muslims and Buddhists in Indonesia to the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state after seeing the fact that the Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine were the main victims of the crisis. The connection between Muslims and Buddhists invites them to practice the values of *sedekah* and Dharma to help victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. For Muslims, this connection

¹⁹⁶ Erric Permana, "Indonesia Contributes a Lot to World Peace," Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/id/headline-hari/indonesia-banyak-berkontribusi-pada-perdamaian-dunia/1062554>.

arised from social ethics in the form of *Ukhuwa Islamiyah* as the sense of brotherhood of Muslims towards other Muslims. Muslims in Indonesia saw that they needed to help alleviate the suffering of Rohingya Muslims as the victims of the humanitarian crisis.

For Buddhists, in addition to the fact that Rakhine Buddhists were also victims in the crisis, they also feel that they have a moral responsibility because Buddhists in Myanmar were accused of being one of the responsible parties in the crisis escalation in Rakhine state of Myanmar. In this case Buddhists in Indonesia have a moral commitment to show Indonesian people in particular and the world community in general that acts of violence allegedly committed by Buddhists in Myanmar cannot represent the Buddha's teachings as a whole. They wanted to show that the Buddhist community in general, especially the Buddhist community in Indonesia, has a commitment to maintain world peace. In the moment after the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine in 2017, Bhiksu Dutavira Mahasthavira, one of the Indonesian Buddhist figures, revealed that Buddhists in Indonesia have a deep sense of concern for the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state and invited all Buddhists to do something as a form of solidarity for the crisis such as providing humanitarian assistance. He also emphasized that the events in Myanmar cannot be attributed to Buddhists in Indonesia. This is because according to him there are no teachings of Buddhism that allow his people to carry out violence against others.¹⁹⁷

The moral commitment of the Buddhists is not only shown in contemporary moments after the 2017 escalation. In 2015 when the refugee crisis from Rakhine state occurred, Indonesian Buddhist Representatives Organization (Walubi) invited Indonesian Buddhists to help Rohingya refugees in Indonesia. This solidarity is based on human values taught by Buddhism. On this

¹⁹⁷ Kristian Erdianto, "Indonesian Buddhists Promote Help for Rohingya," Kompas, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/09/03/20232391.tokoh-agama-buddha-indonesia-serukan-bantuan-untuk-rohingya>.

occasion, Walubi emphasized that Buddhism in Indonesia is not related to the radical teachings of Ashin Wirathu who spread hatred towards Rohingya in Myanmar. Indonesian Walubi Chair Arief Harsono guaranteed Indonesian Buddhists would not be affected by sentiments from Myanmar. Walubi invited the Indonesian people, including Buddhists to understand that Rohingya problems caused by Myanmar was because Myanmar did not recognize Rohingya as citizens, and not merely a matter of faith¹⁹⁸.

The moral commitment was then applied concretely as Dharma values that emerged from the social ethics of Buddhist society in Indonesia with humanitarian assistance sent by Buddhists to help victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. So far, Buddhists in Indonesia have donated US \$ 1 million or around Rp10 billion to finance the construction of hospitals in the Mrauk-U region, Rakhine State of Myanmar. The size of the aid made Indonesian Buddhists as the biggest donors in the construction of the hospital. In particular, the construction of the hospital is expected to 'bridge' the two conflicting groups, namely the Rakhine ethnic group who embrace Buddhism and the Rohingya ethnic who are generally Muslim¹⁹⁹.

From that explanations we can find that ethical factors, both ethic of state which are derived from ideal, constitutional, and operational basis of Indonesia, as well as social community ethics originating from prevailing values in Indonesian society, are the main factors driving Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. The ethics of state and the social ethics create moral commitment of Indonesian society towards the suffering of the victims of Rakhine state crisis. This ethic arises from domestic conditions and the social life of the Indonesian people in general. This ethical factor then gave rise to a sense of linkage from the Indonesian people to the suffering experienced by victims of the humanitarian crisis so that Indonesia decided to take a role in the

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Affan.

addressing humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. This linkage created a sense of solidarity that arises from the social values possessed by the Indonesian Nation such as the value of universal human solidarity embraced by all levels of Indonesian society, as well as special solidarity which arises from the connection of identity as perceived by Buddhists in Indonesia, as well as Muslims as the majority in the Indonesian society.



(ii) Indonesia's Muslim civil society and political dynamics after 2014 Presidential Election and political dynamics pre and post-Governor Election of DKI Jakarta 2017

Identity factor becomes one of the important things in fostering a sense of solidarity which then encourages Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. As we already discussed about Rorty's argument that the solidarity that come from the identity as fellow human being will never possess the same force as an appeal to solidarity that refers to a smaller and more local group, there is another matter besides the solidarity as fellow human beings that encourage the role of Indonesia in the crisis. In fact this argument also states that the moral obligation to one's fellow human beings derives from the fact that they are considered to be 'one of us', with the 'us' referring to the membership of a specific group²⁰⁰.

In the case of Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis, there are several identities that can refer to the specific group mentioned by the argument. We can take, for example, from the domestic conditions of identity as Buddhists which later led to solidarity from the Buddhists in Indonesia to help fellow Buddhists who were victims of the humanitarian crisis. There are also regional and international identities such as the fact that Indonesia and Myanmar are fellow ASEAN countries which we will discuss later in the next chapter in this thesis. But it cannot be denied, the identity as a Muslim-majority country is the most important factor that supports Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar.

As the political participation of the people increases, the participation of Muslim community in Indonesia becomes a domestic factor that cannot be ignored by the government that represents a country with a majority population of Muslims, and as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. The position of Islamic movements as a means of articulating

²⁰⁰ Rorty.

public sentiment is an important factor for foreign policy. The participation of Islamic-based mass organizations, both in the process of foreign policy and in supporting the implementation of diplomacy, is always needed, and needs to be encouraged to strengthen domestic support.

Although Indonesia is not an Islamic country, Indonesia has an enormous Muslim population that makes this country as the home of the largest Muslim population in the world. In this contemporary era, the enormous size of the Muslim community provides a great opportunity for ethical values that emerge from the values held by the Muslim community to give a big influence in the design of various kinds of policies in general, including Indonesian foreign policy.

However, the fact that Indonesia is not a country that clearly states its identity as an Islamic state and does not make the Koran and Hadith as the source of its laws, often makes the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy limited to certain degree; especially in the era before President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Some foreign policies that are physically seen to serve the interest of Islamic values were only aimed to reconcile domestic political interests and the external interests of the ruling regime²⁰¹.

In the New Order era, the Islamic community in Indonesia was suppressed by the Suharto Islamic depoliticism policy, where Muslims could develop their cultural and religious dimensions without entering the political arena. This political limitation caused the absence of a strong political party, organization or Islamic institution that united all Indonesian Muslims²⁰².

The role of the Muslim community in Indonesia began to develop after the collapse of the Suharto regime. This was also accompanied by the development of radical Muslim groups which emerged from dissatisfaction with the government's failure to uphold the law and resolve

²⁰¹ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Domestic Weakness and the Dilemma of Dual Identity* (Routledge, 2004).

²⁰² Ibid.

ethno-religious conflicts and corruption that were rampant during previous eras. At the same time, the collapse of the New Order regime made the role of democracy in Indonesia increasingly widespread, thus encouraging policy makers to be more sensitive to public opinion and bottom-up community pressures. This also encourages the formation of greater political participation in the community - in this case, political participation is no longer limited to community participation in elections, but extends to influencing the direction of government policy²⁰³.

This is where the pressures, especially from the Islamic community, begin to appear so that the government needs to pay attention to the interests of Islam in both domestic and foreign policy. One case study that can be seen is when Abdurrahman Wahid's regime which tried to open and establish economic cooperation between Indonesia and Israel was strongly criticized by various elements of society, Islamic organizations and the Indonesian parliament. This criticism led to the failure of the cooperation plan. There are also cases of blasphemy with the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad by several individuals in Denmark. Related to this, the government through Hassan Wirajuda, the foreign minister at the time, summoned the Danish Ambassador and asked the country to take corrective steps to ease the anger of Muslims, especially Muslims in Indonesia²⁰⁴.

The role of Islam in the process of democracy and policy-making has increasingly developed in the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a consequence of the growing role of democracy and the rise of Islamic politics after the New Order era. In this era, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tried to campaign for Indonesia as a moderate and democratic Islam. The campaign was also aimed to counter radicalism in the country, especially after 9/11. Indonesia was also committed to playing an active role in Islamic issues in international relations. There was also

²⁰³ Miriam Budiardjo, *Participation and Political Party* (Penerbit PT Gramedia, 1981).

²⁰⁴ Sukma.

a bigger objective as Indonesia is trying to bridge Western countries and Islamic world. The government held several dialogues to campaign for moderate Islam and straighten out the international misunderstanding of Islam. All of these things are expected to improve the image of Indonesia and Islam in the eyes of the international community²⁰⁵.

The desire to bridge the interests of the Muslim community as well as Indonesia's interests in the international world is clearly visible from various statements of government officials in the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's speech in a discussion with the Indonesian Council on Public Affairs (ICPA) stated that Indonesia was the fourth most populous nation in the world and the home to the world's largest Muslim population as well as the world's third largest democracy. He was committed that Indonesia would become a country where democracy, Islam and modernity went hand-in-hand²⁰⁶.

When the conflict in Rakhine state erupted, this provoked the anger of the Indonesian people and various domestic social political groups, although this conflict did not affect the social life of the Indonesian people directly. Massive news coverage and asymmetrical opinion formation in both local and international mass media that tended to cover the attempt to slaughter ethnic Rohingya Muslims were the main cause of the massive responses of the Muslim community in Indonesia to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state²⁰⁷. The high intensity of media coverage and the use of provocative words or sentences such as 'Muslim genocide', 'massacre of Muslims in Myanmar', 'Rohingya ethnic cleansing' were accepted by Indonesians, who are predominantly Muslim, as violence against Muslims and collectively transformed the public opinion. While the news about the Indonesian Government's inaction as a representation of the

²⁰⁵ Ahmad Fuad Fanani, *Sby and the Place of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Flinders University of South Australia, School of International Studies., 2012).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Rahmawati Hussein from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center.

country with the largest Islamic population in the world, ultimately prompted the Indonesian people to urge their governments to take appropriate positions in accordance with the interest of Islamic community²⁰⁸.

Opinions formed in the eyes of the Indonesian Muslim community were then responded to by various actions with the aim of demonstrating solidarity, as well as encouraging the government to fulfill the interests of the Muslim community by immediately taking effective steps to resolve the conflict and protect the ethnic Rohingya Muslims. The actions taken by the Indonesian Muslim community were carried out independently by civil society, as well as initiated by mass organizations with a religious background. They carried out demonstrations on the streets and carried out fundraising, even some parties made jihadist recruitment efforts to be sent to help Rohingya²⁰⁹

In various actions carried out to show the sense of solidarity towards the crisis that occurred in Rakhine, we can see the important role of religious based organizations. The organization has various forms and ideologies, and has members who come from various elements of society. As the responses to the escalation of the crisis in 2012, Indonesian Muslim organizations comprising of DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia), FUI (Forum Umat Islam), Jamaah Muslim Hizbullah, FPI (Front Pembela Islam), JAT (Jamaah Anshar Tauhid), Hilal Ahmar Society, MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), and MER-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Committee) gathered on July 2, 2012, and officially issued a joint statement condemning the Government of Myanmar.²¹⁰ Student

²⁰⁸ Novandre Satria and Ahmad Jamaan, "Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy: The Role of Indonesia in Conflict in Rakhine, Myanmar," *Transnasional* 5, no. 01 (2014): 936-57.

²⁰⁹ Hodge and Rayda.

²¹⁰ Akhmad bin Abdul Rahman and Mohamad Zaidi Baihaqie, "The Influence of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy: Case Study on Rohingya Conflict," *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura* 17, no. 1 (2017): 96-120.

organizations such as the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (KAMMI) Semarang rallied to give speeches and unfurled posters containing condemnation against Myanmar government, and demanded ASEAN's concern for this tragedy.. At the same time the students also encouraged the government to immediately urge ASEAN Secretary-General to remove Myanmar as a member and also urge the government to immediately provide logistical assistance and medical personnel to Rohingya ethnic groups²¹¹. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, an Islamic organization with a large number of members, in addition to carrying out more organized actions in several regions in Indonesia, also published 4 items of claims in their position statements which generally contained condemnation and pressure on the government. Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) as Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body that comprises many Indonesian Muslim groups also condemned the Myanmar government and urged the Indonesian government to take strategic steps to stop violence against Rohingya Muslims and denounced the Myanmar president's statement regarding the Rohingya Ethnic citizenship status that was considered inappropriate²¹².

The role of mass organizations in mobilizing actions and opinions from Muslims from Indonesian civil society in general is very important, including among others in facing this Rakhine case. Religious organizations have a substantial impact on human attitudes and behavior, exerting a social force that affects the lives of the community²¹³. For the community itself, affiliation with a religious organization may thus be the product of tradition or habituation, perhaps related to personal struggle, or may serve as a way of understanding one's own place in life and society. In this latter capacity, it helps the individual to deal with conflicts and enhances the illusion of control over one's life.

²¹¹ Suatmadji, "Kammi Semarang Holds Action on Rohingya Solidarity," Poskota, <http://poskotanews.com/2012/08/01/kammi-semarang-gelar-aksi-solidaritas-rohingya/>.

²¹² Satria and Jamaan.

²¹³ Kenneth E Boulding, *Three Faces of Power* (Sage, 1990).

In relation to policy making, religious organizations can influence not only religious beliefs, understanding, and norms, but also decisions in the political arena. It is because citizens are more likely to follow the preferences of their religious organization and attributes. Especially when the religious organization is part of politics and the policy design process itself. In various cases in the world, including in Indonesia, religious organization often form political party and political parties are often affiliated with religious organization.²¹⁴

The Islamic political party in parliament also gave a strong reaction to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine. Representatives of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an Indonesian Islamic party which was originally influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood movement of Egypt,²¹⁵ who sit in the Indonesian Parliament seats, suggested that Indonesia need to send an official delegation as soon as possible to play an active role in gathering information and maximizing settlement efforts. In addition, they were also condemning the act of Myanmar Government, advocating for political asylum, and asking the Indonesian president to help Rohingya Muslims fight for their humanitarian and political rights, and recognizing their religious identity. Islamic political parties such as PKS, PPP, PKB, and PAN also took part in mobilizing their constituents to show solidarity and sympathy towards their brother Muslims in Myanmar.²¹⁶

From the various responses initiated by religious organizations, two religious organizations whose roles and responses were most anticipated in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar were Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. Both organizations are the organizations with the largest number of followers and influence in Indonesia with NU estimated to have 90

²¹⁴ Eunsook Jung, "Islamic Organizations and Electoral Politics in Indonesia: The Case of Muhammadiyah," *South East Asia Research* 22, no. 1 (2014): 73-86.

²¹⁵ Ridho Al-Hamdi, "Moving Towards a Normalised Path: Political Islam in Contemporary Indonesia," *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan* 8, no. 1 (2017): 53-62.

²¹⁶ Rahman and Baihaqie.

million followers²¹⁷ and Muhammadiyah with at least 40-50 million followers across Indonesia, so their perspective will influence the perspectives of civil society Muslims in Indonesia as well as the government's steps in policy making. Both organizations were urging the government to provide support to Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and immediately sent a letter of protest to the Myanmar government regarding the conflict. The Muhammadiyah general chairman at that time expressed Indonesia's irresolute position on the issue, describing Yudhoyono administration as too soft.²¹⁸

In addition to urging the government to pay more attention to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, the role of these two organizations is also very important to ward off fears of rising ideology and radicalism in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The Nahdlatul Ulama described by western media as a progressive, liberal and pluralistic Islamic movement²¹⁹ has an important role to counter radicalism that develops in Indonesian society which was quite visible in the response of the Islamic community after the crisis escalation in Rakhine state. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah although tends to be more conservative and emphasizes its followers to purify their faith to true Islam, yet highly upholds the people's sense of moral responsibility so as not to justify all forms of radicalism. In the role of Indonesia in Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar, the government really expects the role of these two organizations to shape the mindset of the community, become a partner for discussion in the formation of policies that can fulfil the interest of the Muslim community, and furthermore it will also play a role as a partner in providing humanitarian assistance to the crisis.

²¹⁷ Ranjan Ghosh, *Making Sense of the Secular: Critical Perspectives from Europe to Asia*, vol. 24 (Routledge, 2012).

²¹⁸ Rahman and Baihaqie.

²¹⁹ Joe Cochrane, "From Indonesia, a Muslim Challenge to the Ideology of the Islamic State," *The New York Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html?_r=0.

As discussed earlier, the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state triggered many responses from the Muslim community in Indonesia, both individually and by various religious organizations with various ideologies. From the various responses given, many Islamic organizations also have radical ideals that responded to the crisis with radical actions. Even some of these actions were initiated by figures who were indicated to be part of an international terrorist network such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Some actions for example, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defenders Front, an Islamic hard liner organization that embraces ultra conservative ideology and has an aim to implement sharia law in Indonesia, has carried out several radical actions in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. In Makassar, for example, they pelted a temple that was considered a Buddhist place of worship as a form of protest against what Buddhists in Myanmar did to Rohingya Muslims. In front of the pagoda, Abdul Rahman, the action leader, made a speech and threatened to damage the temple if Rohingya Muslims continued to be suppressed. After that, without being commanded, several people pelted stones at the Buddhist temple. In other parts of Indonesia precisely in East Java, FPI opened recruitment of jihad volunteers to help Rohingya in Myanmar. Some radical Islamic groups such as those led by Abu Bakar Bashir also gave a strong and radical response. Abu Bakar Bashir, who was serving a 15-year jail term for terrorism offenses, called upon Indonesia's 'mujahideen', (fighters of holy war) to destroy Myanmar as they have destroyed the Soviet Union communist by throwing it out of Afghanistan. Just hours after the threat was reported on radical site Voice of al-Islam on Thursday, two men were arrested carrying pipe bombs on their way to the Myanmar embassy in central Jakarta²²⁰.

²²⁰ Michael Bachelard, "Bashir Threatens Jihad on Myanmar Buddhists," Sydney Morning Herald, <https://www.smh.com.au/world/bashir-threatens-jihad-on-myanmar-buddhists-20130503-2iyfw.html>.

Seeing the enthusiasm of the Indonesian public responses to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state, this certainly put great pressures to the government to respond and taken policies that can met the interests of Muslims in Indonesia. In addition to these considerations, the government also had an interest in maintaining social and political stability in the country.

When the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine happened again in 2016 and 2017, Indonesia had a new president, Joko Widodo and a new foreign minister, Retno Marsudi. Even though the regime has changed, Indonesia's interest in representing moderate Islam still become an important strategy in this new regime. In particular, Joko Widodo included multilateralism; the power of democracy and moderate Islam; G-20 cooperation; transnational crimes and issues; and world peace in Indonesia's foreign policy strategic agenda.

But at the same time, public pressure, especially from among Muslims in Indonesia, also increased. After the 2014 election, the pressure of the Muslim community in Indonesia on President Joko Widodo was even greater because President Joko Widodo who came from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) was considered to have issued a lot of policies that could not fulfil the interests of Muslims. In the general election that took place in 2014, the majority of the Islamic community and some Islamic political parties with conservative ideologies such as PKS were more likely to be close to the opposition.

When the escalation occurred at the end of 2016, the political situation in Indonesia was again in turbulent, especially in the lead up to the Jakarta Election in 2017 where one of the candidates, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian and was still serving as the incumbent Governor of DKI Jakarta, was accused of blasphemy and provoked strong reactions from various Muslims throughout Indonesia. This then led to "212 Action" an Islamist coalition then at the height of its powers was mobilizing mass demonstrations in late 2016 called "Actions to Defend Islam" to bring

down Basuki and drag him to court. According to political observers, this action was the culmination of the political frustration of Muslims towards the leadership of Joko Widodo who was considered unable to fulfill the interests of Muslims²²¹.

The increasing euphoria of Islamic solidarity movement after the event of “Actions to Defend Islam” on 12 December 2016 coincided with the escalation of Rakhine state crisis in the end of 2016 and early to mid-2017. Islamic coalitions which are the alumni of “212 Action” then carried out several new actions focused on the interests of demanding the government to fulfill the interests of Muslims by giving a strong response to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine. The Islamic coalition responded to the violence in Myanmar by staging a series of solidarity demonstrations across the country. They called the demonstrations “Actions to Defend the Rohingya” (*Aksi Bela Rohingya*). The first rally was held in front of Myanmar embassy in Jakarta on 6 September 2017, with an estimated 5,000 protesters. Some participants burned Myanmar flags and effigies of Wirathu as the representation of the condemnation against the militant Buddhist monk. Some of them even clashed with the police for trying to break through barbed wire. They demanded that the Myanmar ambassador be expelled from Indonesia and for the government to break diplomatic ties with Myanmar.

The action was then followed by "Action 169" on September 16, 2017 with figures who had a lot of role in previous "Action 212" became important initiator of the action. However, this action was widely criticized by the domestic community because it was considered to have a greater political content rather to deliver the main substance of the action to defend the Rohingya itself. In this action political parties and opposition political figures voiced their opinions, criticizing Joko Widodo's administration for failing to voice the interests of Muslims including the interest of

²²¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Indonesia and Rohingya Crisis," in *IPAC Report* (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

Rohingya Muslims. Even Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi's likely opponent in the 2019 presidential elections, who was accompanied by Amien Rais the head of PAN, and Sohibul Imam the head of PKS, linking poverty in Indonesia with Rohingya persecution²²².

In response to the crisis escalation in 2017, we also found a number of actions carried out by Islamic hardliners who urged the government to act more concretely in helping to resolve the crisis in Rakhine state. In fact, they openly issued statements if the government did not immediately send troops to Rakhine, they themselves would go there to carry out jihad. FPI acting secretary general Ustadz Sobri Lubis argued that if the Indonesia military were not going to intervene in Rakhine, then it should at least provide FPI members with military training and arms so they could go to help fellow Muslims²²³.

But not all matters that were done by the people who were members of Islamic coalition or Islamic hardliners contained negative charges. In fact, even though they provided hard responses and tended to be radical towards Rakhine state crisis and Indonesian government policy in responding to the crisis, positively and actively they also sent various kinds of humanitarian assistance to help victims of the humanitarian crisis. For example, PKS as an conservative Islamic political party and one of the main opposition of Joko Widodo Government, began fund raising as part of its Rohingya solidarity rallies in late August and September and channelled its donations through Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesia Council for Islamic Propagation, DDII) and Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (PKPU)²²⁴. The "169 Action" rally which many accused of being politically

²²² Ibnu Hariyanto, "Prabowo: Delivery of Aid to Rohingya Is Just a Government Imaging Effort," Detiknews, <https://news.detik.com/berita/3645867/prabowo-kirim-bantuan-ke-rohingya-itu-pencitraan>.

²²³ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

²²⁴ Tempo, "Pks Donated Rp3,8 Billion for Rohingya," Tempo, <https://nasional.tempco.co/read/909635/pks-sumbang-rp38-miliar-untuk-rohingya>.

charged, on the other hand managed to raise Rp.3.8 billion (US \$ 276,082) which was then channeled through various NGOs to help victims of the Rakhine state crisis. Even hardliner Islamic organizations actively raised funds to help victims of the crisis. As for example FPI via its humanitarian wing called Hilal Merah Indonesia (HILMI) claimed to have been involved in humanitarian work in Cox's Bazar, using at least Rp. 2 billion (US \$ 145,306) in donations. They also claimed to have directly sent their members to the Bangladesh-Myanmar "to assess the situation and distribute relief packages at refugee camps in Cox's Bazar"²²⁵.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the 2017 crisis, two Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama as the two biggest religious organizations in Indonesia also put great pressure on the government to act immediately in response to the humanitarian crisis. The more conservative Muhammadiyah called on the Indonesian government to evaluate its quiet diplomacy toward Myanmar which had patently not succeeded in stopping the genocide, called the ASEAN to freeze the membership of Myanmar, and called for Aung San Suu Kyi's Nobel Prize to be revoked and urged the International Criminal Court to prosecute those responsible for genocide. Further they also called on the government "to consider the possibility of setting aside an area to temporarily take in Rohingya refugees as was done a few decades ago for refugees from the Vietnam War on Pulau Galang."²²⁶. Although on several occasions they also took to the streets through various acts of solidarity (including some of their figures who involved the "212" movement), their actions tended to be more politically free than actions carried out by Islamic coalition driven by opposition Islamic political parties or the hardliner groups.

On the other hand, Nahdlatul Ulama, which tended to be more liberal, focused their response by trying to ensure that Indonesia 's Buddhists did not become a proxy for anger over

²²⁵ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

²²⁶ Ibid.

Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya. But they also expressed their disappointment with the Myanmar government and Aung San Suu Kyi for failing to stop the conflict, even though in essence they put more emphasis on urging Indonesian government to act as a mediator to resolve the crisis²²⁷.

With so much pressure from domestic socio-political conditions, especially pressure from the Indonesian Muslim community, the government must inevitably carry out policies that can fulfill the interest of the Muslim community. For this reason, the government took a response by issuing a policy that could fulfil the interests of Muslims, thus able to maintain domestic social and political stability. As argued by Neck that the head of government in any kind of political system is motivated by two similar goals in establishing the policy including foreign policy: retain political power while also build and maintain policy coalitions²²⁸.

(iii). Protecting National Interest and National Security

In addition to ethical factors and identity as a country with a Muslim majority, there are also supporting factors that drive Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis. These supporting factors are closely related to Indonesia's interests in maintaining national and regional security stability, especially with fears of an increase in radicalism as a retaliation of radical groups against responsible parties for the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine; and the increasing wave of refugees entering the territory of the Republic of Indonesia due to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state.

The need to secure national interest is a driving force, as well as a barrier to how far Indonesia can take a role in helping to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. This of course considers

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

the concept of acceptability in how far the domestic society will accept the act of the government of a particular foreign policy, so that if there is a conflict between domestic and international interest the government will emphasize domestic interest, or go over the situation altogether²²⁹. Therefore, if some of Indonesia's policies in the Rakhine crisis are felt disruptive to national interest, the government must limit how far they can play a role.

The first to be discussed here is Indonesia's effort to counteract fears of increased radicalism related directly or indirectly to the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. Globally, there were concerns that global terror set to exploit the violence in Myanmar's Rakhine, as regional and international terror groups were coalescing around the plight of the Rohingya, calling for a jihad to defend them²³⁰. Without exception, various radical groups in Indonesia were concerned to exploit the Rohingya issue as their justification to conduct their radical actions. We can see in the various responses that emerged from the Muslim community in Indonesia, radical Islamic groups became one of the parties who gave the loudest response to the crisis. In addition to recruiting Jihad forces, some hardliner groups in Indonesia also targeted objects related to Myanmar such as embassies, objects related to Buddhists such as places of worship and historical relics, as main targets of their protest.

Since the escalation of the humanitarian crisis occurred in 2012, a report from the Institute for Policy Analysis Report noted that there were several cases which showed an increase in radicalism after the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state²³¹. This began in 2012 when Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, former Jemaah Islamiyah Amir and head of a more militant organization called

²²⁹ Farnham.

²³⁰ Amy Chew, "Global Terror Groups Set to Exploit Violence in Myanmar's Rakhine: Analysts," Channel News Asia, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/global-terror-groups-set-to-exploit-violence-in-myanmar-5-9267176>.

²³¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

Jamaah Ansharul Tauhid (JAT), sent a letter from prison to the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta citing the three Quranic verses to the violent legitimacy of jihad against Myanmar because of its inability to protect Muslim citizens. In 2013, three members of the Darul Islam terrorist faction were stopped by the police en route to the Myanmar embassy where they were planning to plant the pipe bombs. Still in the same year two would-be bombs went off at the Buddhist temple of Ekayana in Jakarta, planted by a cell linked to the Mujahideen of West Java, a Darul Islam splinter. In 2015, an extremist named Ibadur Rahman was arrested for having a bombing plan at a police post, a church and a Chinese temple. In 2016 two pro-ISIS terrorists were arrested for trying to plant bombs at the DPR building and the Myanmar embassy.

In addition to actions that had direct links to the international terrorist network, several actions carried out by hard-line Islamist groups such as FPI and some other Muslims were also feared to disturb national security. They both spontaneously and systematically made symbols associated with Myanmar and the Buddhists as targets of their actions, such as embassies, places of worship, to the extent that there were fears they would carry persecution of Buddhists in Indonesia. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front in 2012 vandalised a Buddhist temple during a Rohingya solidarity rally in Makassar. Even in 2017 after the escalation took place in August, several hardliner Islamic organizations targeted Borobudur Temple in Central Java as the largest Buddhist monument in the world as a place for them to hold an action. Although this action was carried out in an orderly manner, many parties considered that this action was misdirected and was considered to disturb the wider community²³².

²³² BBC News, "The Action of Islamic Organizations near Borobudur: "Rohingya Magnets Can Be Stronger Than the Ahok Case", "BBC News Indonesia, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-41170631>.

The attacks perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017 sparked fears of wide-scale radicalisation within the Rohingya community as well in the international community after Islamist political actors across the Islamic world hailing the Rohingya cause. Concerns about the occurrence of radical retaliatory actions were also felt by authorities in Indonesia. It was because the possible retaliatory attacks by the country's violent extremist fringe or extremist outreach to ARSA in the interests of sending mujahidin to help fight. It can be seen from various event such as Malaysian authorities arrested two suspected ISIS supporters, a Malaysian and an Indonesian, who planned on stabbing Buddhist monks in retaliation to the violence against the Rohingyas in Myanmar. Although until now there had been no strong evidence that Indonesian jihadists proven to have taken real action in Myanmar, these concerns continued to emerge with many Indonesians going to the camps in Cox's Bazar, some Indonesian extremists will eventually make contact with ARSA militants²³³.

To deal with this radicalism issue, the Indonesian government needs to show the intention and realization to have a role in addressing the Rakhine crisis. With the role of Indonesia, the government can avoid the justification of extremist groups and jihadists who threatened if the government cannot do something to save fellow Muslims, they themselves would carry out actions they deem necessary, including through extremist actions and violent jihad. In addition, the Indonesian government has the obligation to provide do and don't guide to its people about what could be done to help victims of the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state, including giving examples that acts of radicalism and violence were not the right action in order to help resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state.

²³³ Nyshka Chandran, "Terror Groups May Take Advantage of Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/13/myanmar-rohingya-crisis-islamic-terror-groups-may-take-advantage.html>.

Besides the issue of radicalism and terrorism, the issue of refugee as a result of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar also became the main focus in maintaining national security of Indonesia. The wave of Rohingya refugees had become a global issue since the first time the escalation occurred. The refugees also became victims of human trafficking, human rights violations, and even exploitation by terrorist organizations. Indonesian location between two continents as well as between two oceans made Indonesia a strategic route used by refugees to reach the destination country. Actually, Indonesia is not the main destination for refugees from the Asian continent. However, due to its location, Indonesia has become a stopover country for cross-border refugees, especially those from the Indo-Chinese mainland before they continue their journey to the destination country such as Australia.

According to Mohammad Rosyidin, a political observer from Diponegoro University in Indonesia, with so many cases involving the existence of Rohingya refugees in Indonesia, the Indonesian government also has its own motives by helping the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state in the hope that this crisis can be resolved immediately in its origin place of Rakhine. With the resolved crisis it was expected the wave of refugees would stop coming to Indonesia and would not disturb the stability of national security²³⁴. The Indonesian government through Indonesian Embassy officials in Yangon revealed that indeed through the role of Indonesia in Rakhine state of Myanmar, there was hope that one day the refugee problem could be overcome. However, based on current conditions of both on Myanmar side and Indonesia itself this would be far from being reached²³⁵. The problem here is that Indonesia still does not have strict legal regulations regarding the handling and determination of refugee status without clear documents. In addition, Indonesia

²³⁴ Rosyidin.

²³⁵ Yasfitha Febriany Murthias, *ibid.*, Yangon.

has also not ratified the 1951 Vienna Convention and its 1967 Protocol which discussed the status of refugees. Therefore, Indonesia does not have the authority or obligation to conduct an international action against cross-border refugees such as Rohingya refugees who enter Indonesian territory²³⁶.

Despite pressure from the community for Indonesia to help more in the refugees issue, even there were demands that the government should give citizenship to Rohingya refugees, but Indonesia could not immediately decide to help without proper regulations²³⁷. With the rapid flow of Rohingya refugees who came to Indonesia, it was not impossible to cause instability in the domestic situation of Indonesia itself. With the increasingly uncontrolled Rohingya refugees in Indonesia, and with their unclear status, if not handled properly then it will gradually have an impact or problem that will harm the Indonesian nation both in terms of social, economic, political, cultural and security. The presence of Rohingya refugees themselves can have a negative impact on the demographic of Indonesian population as well as socio-economics which will indirectly affect the increasing level of crime in Indonesia²³⁸. This is where this national interest becomes the limit of how far Indonesia can help the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar,

According to Philippe Bourbeau²³⁹ in handling refugee issues, a country must at least pay attention to three indicators, namely legal, policy statement, and saliency. Legal here refers to

²³⁶ Hardi Alunaza and M Kholit Juani, "Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia Melalui Sekuritisasi Migrasi Pengungsi Rohingya Di Aceh Tahun 2012-2015," *Indonesian Perspective* 2, no. 1 (2017).

²³⁷ Riva Dessthania Suastha, "Government Urged to Give Status of Indonesian Citizens to Rohingya Refugees," CNN Indonesia, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20170903103621-106-239097/pemerintah-didesak-beri-status-wni-kepada-pengungsi-rohingya>.

²³⁸ Alunaza and Juani.

²³⁹ Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order* (Taylor & Francis, 2011).

each country must have its own legal rules related to migration, whether it is about the purpose, procedure of a foreigner who wants to enter the country, as well as actions that will be taken by a country if there is a security threat from immigrants. In dealing with Rohingya refugee cases Indonesia still uses the existing legal regulations by adjusting the applicable legal regulations with the process of handling refugees while waiting for new regulations to be made more thoroughly on refugees. Until now, Indonesia continues to strive for presidential regulations that will cover the migration issues as well as asylum seekers.

The second indicator is a policy statement indicator. A migration process is often related to the security of a country. This is due to every migration activity that tends to always cause problems regarding security. This problem will eventually become a threat to the country. But on the other hand the government must also consider the ethical factors as well as the values that develop in the community that influence policy formation. Therefore, the consideration of policy formation must be taken into account. In the matter of this policy, Indonesia finally took a policy to accommodate Rohingya refugees on humanitarian reason. This is in accordance with the basis of the Indonesian state 'fair and civilized humanity'. In handling Rohingya refugees, Indonesia temporarily accommodates, protects, and provides basic needs for refugees while awaiting a clear decision on the policies that the Indonesian Government will take in the future. To support this policy, Indonesia has a new institution in the form of an immigration detention house under the Director General of Immigration. With the existence of these institutions, the Indonesian government can protect refugees until a further solution is found²⁴⁰.

The third indicator that must be considered is saliency, which relates to how strong the relationship between migration and security is in a country's policy. For Indonesia itself, the saliency

²⁴⁰ Alunaza and Juani.

problem has not been prioritized to the maximum. But seeing the current trend with the many waves of refugees entering Indonesia, the government has to prioritize this issue by trying to clarify their status by cooperating with UNHCR, ASEAN, IOM and several other NGO organizations so that this problem can be resolved quickly.

But with various considerations; as well as socio-political and institutional barriers, Indonesia still gave a lot of contribution to help the refugee problems. Indonesia made humanitarian reasons as the main motive in dealing with these refugees. This was then supported by existing laws and institutions that were adapted to the prevailing conditions, as well as the support of the Indonesian people themselves. Indonesia's concern for Rohingya refugees was also demonstrated by the various real efforts that she had done. One of them was the collaboration between the Government of Indonesia and international organizations to provide assistance related to the Rohingya refugee crisis which showed a strong commitment to maintaining the stability of the country's security based on world peace.

The big wave of Rohingya refugees started to enter Indonesia after the escalation that occurred in 2012, following various small waves that had entered in previous years. Through several stages from 2012 to 2015, they came by using very simple fishing boats and with limited food supplies. After arrivals in Indonesia, Rohingya were stranded in several regions in Indonesia, either because of being stranded and then arrested, or deliberately surrendering to Indonesian Immigration whose territory is geographically close to Malaysia or Myanmar, such as in Aceh, Medan, Tanjung Pinang, Batam (Riau Islands), and there were also those found and captured in Kupang, Serang and Banyuwangi. Many of those came directly to Indonesia, as well as from third countries such as Malaysia and intended to move to Indonesia on the grounds that they could not get

education in the origin country and hoped to get a better life and hoped to become Indonesian citizens by marrying Indonesian women²⁴¹.

Indonesia got a lot of pressure from inside and outside the country to be able to play a role in accepting these refugees. But the Indonesian government had many important considerations to address the wave of refugees with social and security considerations as the main factor, not to mention the government must provide and fulfill the basic needs of the refugees while in Indonesia which was certainly not a small matter. For this reason, the Indonesian government allocated Rp. 2.3 billion fund for Rohingya refugees from the National Budget.

From these several considerations, finally in 2015, at a meeting in Putrajaya Malaysia discussing Rohingya refugees in which Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand participated; Indonesia and Malaysia expressed their willingness to accept Rohingya refugees and agreed to build temporary shelter for one year. Indonesia also urged other countries to participate in helping Rohingya refugees, because the problem of Rohingya refugees has become a regional problem²⁴².

When the crisis escalation occurred again in 2016-2017, fears of a rising wave of refugees entering Indonesia re-emerged. However, Indonesia remained at the initial policy that Indonesia could only temporarily accommodate and provide basic facilities needed by refugees while in the territory of Indonesia. The Indonesian government would not grant asylum status to the Rohingyas but allowed them to stay temporarily with the assistance of UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Indonesia only assisted the victims on humanitarian reasons by accommodating them until the problem of refugees became lighter and they can be repatriated

²⁴¹ Winner Nabilla Jatyputri, "Application of Non-Discrimination Principles for Rohingya Refugees in Indonesia" (Universitas Airlangga, 2015).

²⁴² Lay Yang Moy and Ardli Johan Kusuma, "Indonesia's Background in Accepting the Rohingya Refugees in 2015," *Gobal Insight Journal* 1, no. 1 (2016): 60-75.

or taken by the UNHCR and IOM. Indonesia provided a time limit for the Rohingya refugees who were living in detention centers throughout Indonesia for 10 years. After the determined holding period ended, Indonesia would be irresponsible and would not provide further protection to the refugees. Indonesia, which had not ratified the agreement on refugees by IOM, had not been able to fully provide assistance and adequate protection for Rohingya refugees. But Indonesia did not seem to ratify the agreement anytime soon, considering the security and national interest factors. With Indonesia ratifying the agreement on the refugees, it was feared that more Rohingya refugees would come to Indonesia in a very big waves that would disturb the national security.



B. International Political Conditions

The international context is the next important factor that influences and encourages Indonesia's role in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar. In accordance with the theoretical framework proposed by Coplin, the combination of the characteristic of international context and state relationship determine how the state reacts toward some international issues. He also adds that International condition is a product of foreign policy of states in the past, present, or even future that might be or be anticipated²⁴³. In the area of foreign policy, because it is difficult to act effectively internationally if policies lack domestic acceptability, political decision-makers assess domestic sentiment along with the international situation. Barbara Farnham²⁴⁴ argues that to produce effective policies, rational political decision-makers try to balance the domestic and international imperatives and they will consult internationally, as well as domestic public opinion.

From this argument we can see that Indonesia must consider several international contexts which include the existing international pressure, as well as the public opinion that is formed, before determining policies or roles in a particular case. In the case of Rakhine state crisis, the international environment strongly supported Indonesia to be more concerned and took special action to the humanitarian crisis at Rakhine State. Firstly, as a good bilateral partner, Indonesia certainly wanted to maintain this good relationship with Myanmar. Indonesia as the largest country and the de facto leader of ASEAN is required to play an active role in maintaining peace and stability of the region including paying more attention to humanitarian cases that occurred in Rakhine State. As an ASEAN member country, Indonesia is required to maintain stability as a fellow ASEAN country by upholding ASEAN Way and non-intervention principle. In addition, Indonesia as

²⁴³ Coplin.

²⁴⁴ Farnham.

the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is required to campaign for justice and human rights for Muslims worldwide as well as in the case of humanity in this Rakhine State crisis.

Indonesia was showing her intention to meet the international obligations especially the humanitarian related obligations as well as the obligation as a good bilateral partner of Myanmar, as a Muslim majority country, and as the de facto leader of ASEAN. The action of Indonesia was intended to create better image of Indonesia in international community as world's peacekeeping country. Therefore, it was expected that the international community, especially Myanmar, would trust Indonesia as a reliable partner in international relation.



(i). Indonesia and Myanmar bilateral relation

The first and the most important international context that encourages and influences the role of Indonesia in addressing Rakhine state crisis is the good bilateral relation between Indonesia and Myanmar. Good relations between neighbouring countries are needed to strengthen cooperation and prevent conflict. This is also experienced by Indonesia and Myanmar where the two countries have a long history of state relations, both in the bilateral and regional spheres.

Indonesia and Myanmar are both geographically and historically close, as well as having long established cooperation in all fields. However, in the course of its cooperation, it did not always run harmoniously because there were problems interfering the stability of the relationship, including in addressing Rakhine state crisis. In responding to this issue, Indonesia and Myanmar continued to coordinate to resolve these various problems so as not to interfere with the relationship between the two countries. If the good relations between the two countries were disrupted, the Indonesia and Myanmar bilateral relations can be hampered such as diplomatic relations, impediments to investment in both countries which can lead to a decline in economic income, and ultimately it was feared that there would be tension between Indonesia and Myanmar. Under these circumstances, Indonesia must begin to carry out various actions that could be taken to maintain its good relations with Myanmar. Indonesia itself is unlikely to want to be trapped in disaffected situation with Myanmar as a fellow country in Southeast Asia which has a historical relationship in the development of the Indonesian state. To address this, Indonesia must think of efforts to maintain good relations with Myanmar so as not to disturb the harmony of relations between the two countries.

The good relations between these two countries have been intertwined for a long time and have created a sense of solidarity in accordance with the ethic of state and social ethic of Indonesia itself. Indonesia and Myanmar are two countries in the Southeast Asia region that have very good bilateral relations. The good relations between these two countries can even be drawn from history to post-World War II. Myanmar, which at that time was still fighting for independence, became one of the most active countries in supporting Indonesia's struggle for independence. Burma as one part of the British colonial rule, showed its support by condemning Dutch military aggression in the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, India in 1947. During the Dutch military aggression against Indonesia in 1949, Myanmar allowed Indonesian aircraft, Dakota RI-001 "Seulawah" to land at Rangoon's Mingaladon Airport on January 26, 1949. The aircraft could not return to Indonesia after routine maintenance in Calcutta due to Dutch military aggression in Indonesia. Eventually the aircraft was accommodated by Myanmar and even had time to be rented by Union of Burma Airways²⁴⁵.

After Myanmar's independence in 1948 and the recognition of Indonesia's independence by the international community in 1949, diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Myanmar began with the establishment of "Indonesian House" in Yangon in 1949 which later became Indonesian Embassy in 1950. In the Soekarno era, the relations between Indonesia and Myanmar led by President U Nu became more intimate with Myanmar becoming one of the initiators of the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 and the main supporter of the struggle for the West Irian against the Netherlands in 1962²⁴⁶.

²⁴⁵ Murthias.

²⁴⁶ The Jakarta Post, "Asian-African Conference Timeline," The Jakarta Post, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/23/asian-african-conference-timeline.html>.

The relations between the two countries had been slightly hampered by the political transition in Myanmar in 1962 due to a military coup conducted by General Ne Win. The relations between the two countries remained intertwined even though they are not too intensive. The mutual visits of leaders of the two countries were strong evidence of the relationship between the two nations (and the country was still so close). President Soeharto conducted several visits to Myanmar on 26 November 1972, 26-29 August 1974, and 21-23 February 1997. On the other hand, General Ne Win visited Indonesia on 11-14 June 1973 and 8-13 June 1974 and made a personal visit at the invitation of President Soeharto. Meanwhile, Than Shwe also visited on 5-8 June 1995, November 1996 and April 2005.²⁴⁷ It was from this good relationship that Indonesia became one of the countries that actively persuaded Myanmar to join ASEAN so that the country was accepted as a member in 1997.

Not only about social and political relations, Indonesia and Myanmar also had good relations in the economic field, especially in the field of international trade. The history of trade relations could be reviewed from 1966, when there was an exchange of rice from Myanmar and spices from Indonesia. This trade relationship was increasingly intense, especially after the democratization and opening up process, Myanmar realized the abundant potential of its natural resources in various sectors whose development had not been maximized, such as mining, fisheries, manufacturing, agriculture, telecommunications, and others. After political reform in Myanmar, an increase in the value of Indonesia's investment in Myanmar began to be seen, this was based on data on the value of Indonesian investment in Myanmar in 2011 and 2013. Indonesia's investment

²⁴⁷ Indonesian Embassy Yangon, "Ri-Myanmar Relations of All Time," Foreign Ministry of Indonesia, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/yangon/id/berita-agenda/berita-perwakilan/Pages/Hubungan-RI-Myanmar-Sepanjang-Masa.aspx>.

value in Myanmar as of the end of 2011 was US \$ 241.3 million, while in at the end of 2013 Indonesia succeeded in investing with a total value of US \$ 600 million²⁴⁸.

Today, when humanitarian crisis occurs in Myanmar, Indonesia as a good bilateral partner in the ASEAN region certainly cannot remain silent without giving any response. Therefore, Indonesia actively plays a role to help solve the humanitarian crisis problem that occurred in the Rakhine state of Myanmar both providing bilateral and multilateral action. The action was later manifested in real terms by providing humanitarian assistance directly to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar. With political assets in the form of good relations with Myanmar, Indonesia should continue to contribute more through its diplomacy at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. For this reason, a comprehensive, inclusive and long-term orientation solution is needed from Indonesia to realize a durable peace in Rakhine state of Myanmar.

With this crisis in Rakhine, Myanmar Ambassador in Indonesia Mr. Aung Htoo stated that this actually made bilateral relations between Indonesia and Myanmar even tighter. The relations between the two countries were increasingly tight because they both focus on conflict resolution in Rakhine. With the intensity of the visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi to Myanmar to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine, the two countries agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation and intensify communication related to the Rakhine state crisis problem.

A good bilateral relationship between the two countries also benefits both parties, especially in the process of resolving the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The first was the ease of access for Indonesia to channel humanitarian assistance to Rakhine state, including Indonesian-

²⁴⁸ Ruth Mona Patricia, Sukma Sushanti, and Ni Wayan Rainy Priadarsini, "Efforts to Improve Indonesia Investments in Myanmar through Economic Diplomacy in Post Democratization of Myanmar (2011- 2013)" (Universitas Udayana, 2015).

based NGOs, because that Indonesia considered sincerely providing assistance in resolving crises in Rakhine state on the basis of international humanity and solidarity without any hidden interest. For Myanmar itself, this good relationship gave them massive assistance and support in resolving the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. This was because Myanmar besides getting direct assistance in the form of material and experts from Indonesia, they also got a qualified dialogue partner in solving this kind of problem because of Indonesia's track record that had also faced similar humanitarian crises.

Even in an effort to deal with the humanitarian crisis after the 2017 conflict escalation, Myanmar specifically invited Indonesia to invest in Rakhine state as a form of Indonesia's greater contribution to the recovery of the humanitarian crisis which had worsened and destroyed the socio-economic life in the Rakhine region. Myanmar National Security Adviser U Thaung Tun in a meeting with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi in Jakarta asked Indonesia to carry out economic activities such as investment. This was considered quite important because economic activities could guarantee the sustainability of the people who lived there, and it was hoped that this could be the first step in achieving durable peace in the region. Economic development was seen as one way that could guarantee and ensure the sustainable and inclusive recovery of the humanitarian crisis, especially following the process of repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Rakhine, so that later when they were repatriated, they had economic activities as their means of survival²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁹ Riva Dessthania Suastha, "Myanmar Requests Indonesia to Invest in Rakhine," CNN Indonesia, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20180808140859-106-320529/myanmar-minta-indonesia-berinvestasi-di-rakhine?>

(ii). Solidarity of Islamic member countries of OIC

The second international context that influences the Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar is the solidarity of Muslim countries especially among the member of Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Identity as a Muslim not only creates a sense of solidarity for the Muslim community in Indonesia, but also creates a sense of solidarity for all Muslims throughout the world. In various international media reports, the sense of solidarity that arose among Muslims was expressed in various actions, including demonstrations, fundraising, and official condemnation from related countries in the international community.

To get a stronger voice, many of these countries expressed their condemnation through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, an organization formed as a result of the solidarity of Muslims in facing global problems. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was formed after leaders of a number of Islamic countries held a Conference in Rabat, Morocco, on September 22-25, 1969, and agreed on the Rabat Declaration which affirmed the belief in the religion of Islam, respect for the Charter of the United Nations and human rights. The establishment of the OIC was originally driven by the concerns of Islamic countries over various problems faced by Muslims, especially after the Zionist element burned parts of the Holy Mosque of Al-Aqsa on August 21, 1969. The establishment of the OIC was aimed at increasing Islamic solidarity among member countries, coordinated cooperation between member states, supported international peace and security, and protected Islamic holy sites and helped fight for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state²⁵⁰.

²⁵⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, "Oic - Organisation of Islamic Cooperation," Foreign Ministry of Indonesia, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/kebijakan/kerjasama-multilateral/Pages/Organisasi-Kerja-Sama-Islam.aspx>.

In the background of the establishment of this organization, the ethical values of the Islamic community, which are also embraced by the majority of Indonesian people, namely *ukhuwah Islamiyah* or Islamic brotherhood as one of the example of Islamic teaching, were very influential on the establishment of the organization. In the first conference that took place in Rabat in 1969, the resolution was passed stating that Muslim government would consult with a view to promoting among themselves close cooperation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam²⁵¹.

Although it is not an Islamic state, Indonesia as a country with a majority of Muslims has a very important role in the development of the cooperation and solidarity of Muslim countries in the world in dealing with global issues. Membership and active role of Indonesia in the OIC began when the largest Islamic organization in the world was established on September 25, 1969, because Indonesia was one of 24 countries that attended the First Summit in Rabat, Morocco which was the beginning of the establishment of the OIC. However, the status of Indonesia, which was not officially an Islamic state, had made Indonesia's role in this organization experiencing ups and downs. Indonesia began to play an 'active' role in the OIC in the 1990s, when President Soeharto first attended the 6th Summit of the OIC held in Senegal, December 1991. Presidency Soeharto's presence was the first step to change Indonesia's foreign policy to participate more active at OIC. Since that time, Indonesia has actively provided support and concrete actions to resolve problems in the Islamic world, mainly with this country has expressed support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and an invitation to the international community to jointly provide the assistance needed to improve the lives of the Palestinian people²⁵².

²⁵¹ James Ciment and Kenneth Hill, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II* (Routledge, 2012).

²⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.

In the 21st century, Indonesia has a special agenda in taking a role in the international Islamic world including in its role at OIC. The main agenda is to show a polite and moderate image of Islam. Indonesia wants to show that all the problems that exist and related to the Islamic world can be resolved democratically by peaceful approach without the need for violence. Indonesia is trying to promote the resolution of conflicts faced by Muslims with the process of creating constructive interreligious dialogue and culture in order to minimize the emergence of a false understanding of Islam, as well as introducing Islam as a religion that prioritizes tolerance in responding to current global challenges.

When the humanitarian conflict in Rakhine state occurred, this invited a strong reaction from the international Islamic world, including the member countries of OIC because Muslims considered that the Rohingya issue was one of the contemporary problems faced by Muslims. Indonesia itself saw the opportunity to make the OIC as a non-UN multilateral organization that could make a real contribution to Indonesia's interests in the international arena, including in the role of Indonesia in Rakhine state crisis. Indonesia also continued to support all countries, particularly the member-countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to engage in a constructive approach and to invite the OIC to put forward real assistance to help the entire population of Rakhine State and to assist all parties in Myanmar to solve the root causes of the situations experienced by the Rohingyas. Indonesia urged the OIC to accept Indonesian strategy proposals in solving Rohingya problems through the "4 + 1" approaches which promoted the creation of stability without violence and the importance of immediate access to humanitarian assistance. Indonesian proposals were finally accepted and contained in the document of "OIC Chairman's Summary Report of the Meeting of Heads of State and Government on the Rohingya Muslim Community in Myanmar" ratified by the OIC members on the sidelines meeting

of the first OIC Summit on Science, Technology and Innovation, in Astana, Kazakhstan, 10-11 September 2017²⁵³.

Indonesia's experience in overcoming conflicts related to the Islamic world both in the domestic and international spheres became Indonesia's main asset in facing the demands of OIC members to assist in the settlement. In the domestic sphere, Indonesia had succeeded in overcoming conflicts involving Muslims in the Poso issue in Sulawesi and the Aceh issue. Internationally, the concrete role of Indonesia was seen when in 1993 Indonesia received the mandate as chairman of the Committee of Six that mandated by Islamic Conference of Foreign Minister, which was tasked with facilitating peace negotiations between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government²⁵⁴.

In this contemporary era, when the conflict that was considered as an issue in the Islamic world again occurred as a result of the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, the Islamic world had great hopes for Indonesia to play a greater role, both directly and through Indonesia's membership in the OIC. In this case Indonesia as a Muslim majority country in Southeast Asia, as well as various Indonesian experiences facing similar problems that occur in the Islamic world made Islamic countries in the world gave more confidences to Indonesia to be able to play a major role in resolving the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. This opportunity was not wasted by Indonesia to take a more role in Rakhine crisis, while promoting democracy and moderate Islam as Indonesia's main agenda in the Muslim world.

²⁵³ "Indonesia Urges Oic, Cooperation for a Solution to the Myanmar Problem," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/Indonesia-Urges-OIC,-Cooperation-for-a-Solution-to-the-Myanmar-Problem.aspx>.

²⁵⁴ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World: Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (NIAS Press, 2007).

(iii). ASEAN Way and Non- Interference Principle

Another international context that is very influential on the role of Indonesia is the status of Indonesia as an ASEAN member. Not only that, Indonesia has long been considered to be the 'natural born leader' or 'first among equals' within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With such strategic position, Indonesia is gaining huge pressure both at home and abroad. Indonesia's important role as the de facto leader of ASEAN has been felt since the establishment of the organization in 1967. Indonesia's restraint, plus its substantial contribution to the regional cooperation, earned the country the respect and recognition of other members as a pioneer 'or' first among equals. The role of Indonesia in the organization is also quite important for the foreign policy of Indonesia itself where the government wants to portray Indonesia as a constructive neighbour.²⁵⁵

In the aftermath of the economic and political crisis in Indonesia in 1998, Indonesia's leadership in the ASEAN arena was questioned by many international circles, especially after Soeharto's resignation as an important figure in the development of ASEAN. However, after the success of the reformation process, the consolidation of stability, economic growth, and the development of democratic values, Indonesia is once again emerging as an active leader in ASEAN.

Therefore, when there were problems that were considered to disturb regional stability such as the Rakhine state crisis, Indonesia's leadership among ASEAN countries was again tested. Many parties demanded that ASEAN could provide strict sanctions against Myanmar which was considered a violator of human rights. Pressure from within the ASEAN community as well as from international communities required Indonesia in particular and ASEAN in general to take the

²⁵⁵ Christopher B Roberts and Erlina Widyaningsih, "Indonesian Leadership in Asean: Mediation, Agency and Extra-Regional Diplomacy," in *Indonesia's Ascent* (Springer, 2015).

necessary decisive steps such as economic sanctions, military intervention, and the issuance of ASEAN membership of Myanmar.

Criticism targeted the ASEAN forum which was considered to turn a blind eye to human rights violations and disruption of regional security that occurred in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. In fact, regional security and human rights are important instrument in the life of ASEAN and ASEAN communities as the organization itself. In the ASEAN Declaration which marks the establishment of ASEAN, regional peace is one of the important points agreed to be promoted by the member countries²⁵⁶. In addition, this point was also strengthened in the ASEAN Charter agreed by the leaders of ASEAN countries as a constituent instrument of ASEAN in 2007 that turned ASEAN into a legal entity and aimed to create a single free-trade area for the region encompassing 500 million people. In the ASEAN charter, ASEAN countries agreed to promote regional peace and identity, peaceful settlements of disputes through dialogue and consultation, and the renunciation of aggression²⁵⁷.

As an ASEAN step to deal with international relations in the contemporary era, the ASEAN Charter also includes human rights protection as an important point agreed by member countries where they chose to uphold international law with respect to human rights, social justice and multilateral trade. The agreement on the protection of human rights was then followed up with the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in October 2009 as a consultative body of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote and protect human rights, and regional co-operation on human rights in the member

²⁵⁶ ASEAN Secretariat, "The Asean Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)," (August, 1967).

²⁵⁷ "The Asean Charter," (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008).

states. In the follow up, the commission had drafted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration which was later agreed upon by ASEAN countries in 2012²⁵⁸.

But even though it had various agreements agreed upon by all its members and already had a commission that specifically oversaw human rights enforcement, ASEAN was considered still unable to solve various regional security problems as well as human rights violations, especially issues related to political domestic affairs such as humanitarian crises. in Rakhine state of Myanmar. One thing considered to be an obstacle was the principle of non-interference that has been agreed upon by ASEAN countries since the establishment of the organization.

The principle of non-interference is the original core foundation upon which regional relations between ASEAN member-states are determined. In this principle the member-states are determined to prevent external interference in order to ensure domestic and regional stability. Already stated in the Bangkok Declaration 1967, it was further reinforced in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN of February 27, 1976 in article 2 (c). This principle has the purposes to respect the sovereignty, good relations of cooperation, as well as maintaining authority over the domestic affairs of respective countries. This principle, provides full comfort to the ASEAN member countries to collaborate without worrying of the foreign intervention related to the internal affairs of each country.

But in practice, the concept of non-interference initiated by ASEAN turned out to face with a complicated dilemma. This concept was considered too normative and could not solve the problem concretely. This is because when there was an internal problem in a country, although it can impact conditions of another country or region, other countries will not and should not interference in that country and as such that the resolution of the problem cannot be done

²⁵⁸ Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, "The Asean Human Rights Declaration 2012," *Human Rights Law Review* 13, no. 3 (2013): 557-79.

optimally. Non-interference is a hope rather than a promise, with the region's history rife with cross-border actions propagating the interests of specific socio-political structures among member states²⁵⁹

This also happened in the case of human rights violations and regional stability problems due to the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. The Rohingya situation in Myanmar was considered a domestic humanitarian crisis with larger implications for the ASEAN and the world. As the diaspora of this persecuted ethnicity found its way to shores all around the region, its impacts had shown a harsh spotlight on the shortcomings of the association's core founding principles of non-interference²⁶⁰. The concept of non-interference upheld by ASEAN countries made ASEAN as a regional organization not having a binding system needed to push Myanmar to stop such violations of human rights.

With the concept of non-interference, ASEAN member states including Indonesia choose to approach the ASEAN way to resolve the Rohingya crisis. ASEAN Way is a set of diplomatic norms shared by the members that promotes constructive engagement in solving regional problems. It embraces 'soft regionalism', as well as 'consensus in intra-mural decision making. Acharya²⁶¹ explains that ASEAN Way is usually described as a decision-making process that features a high degree of consultation and consensus. In its application ASEAN way takes a lot of ethical values possessed by the ASEAN community such as deliberation and consensus as well as to signify a

²⁵⁹ Lee Jones, "Asean's Unchanged Melody? The Theory and Practice of Non-Interference in Southeast Asia," *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 4 (2010): 479-502.

²⁶⁰ The ASEAN Post Team, "Non-Interference and the Rohingya Crisis," *The ASEAN Post*, <https://theaseanpost.com/article/non-interference-and-rohingya-crisis>.

²⁶¹ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: Asean and the Problem of Regional Order* (Routledge, 2014).

uniquely "Asian approach to addressing issues," which distinguishes it from rather confrontational one in the West²⁶².

Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN means that it has generally subscribed to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member countries²⁶³. As a de facto leader of ASEAN, Indonesia must certainly be a leading example in the application of the ASEAN Way in resolving conflicts. From this we can explain the reasons for Indonesia and ASEAN to take constructive engagement that puts forward soft diplomacy and dialogue in helping to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state rather than taking hard steps in the form of confrontation and military intervention as suggested by many parties. Especially for Indonesia, it also has an interest in maintaining its relevance as a de facto leader of ASEAN who still upholds the agreed norms, because if Indonesia as a de facto leader alone cannot implement these norms, then other members will lose confidence in the agreed norms.

After the escalation of Rakhine crisis, what ASEAN could do was to increase the intensity of constructive engagement so that it could encourage Myanmar to implement its commitment to uphold human rights and maintain regional stability. By putting pressure through constructive engagement, ASEAN including Indonesia hopes to help resolve the conflict in Rakhine state by upholding the norms agreed upon by ASEAN leaders without worrying about creating a security disturbance that will affect regional stability and harmonization between ASEAN member countries.

C. Various Critics of Indonesian Policy

With a variety of domestic and international context considerations affecting Indonesia's foreign policy, the approach in the form of soft diplomacy by prioritizing constructive engagement and

²⁶² Taku Tamaki, "Making Sense of Asean Way: A Constructivist Approach" (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Political Science Association, 2006).

²⁶³ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

upholding the concept of non-interference was considered the most appropriate choice by the Indonesian government in helping to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The approach taken by Indonesia so far has been successful with regard to Indonesia as the only country that was still trusted by Myanmar as a strategic partner in helping resolve cases in Rohingya, which was marked by the acceptance of Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi by Aung San Suu Kyi who served as State Counselor, on 4 September 2017, shortly after the August 2017 crisis occurred²⁶⁴.

Indonesia's position as the only country trusted by Myanmar did not make Indonesia free from criticism in its role in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. With this position, in the midst of the difficulty of expecting the role of ASEAN and other world organizations to get involved in resolving the Rohingya crisis, big expectations from both domestic and international are borne by Indonesia. This made the public spotlight on the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis even greater, so that it was followed with increasing criticism of the role both domestically and abroad.

Criticism from abroad came in line with criticism of the inability of countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine in the ASEAN corridor. ASEAN countries that always prioritize non-interference are considered too soft towards Myanmar so that this problem cannot be resolved immediately. Human rights institutions in the world such as Amnesty International which saw that ASEAN was failing to take a stand as one of its member states carried out a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing because ASEAN's only response to the crisis so far (after the escalation of the 2017 crisis) had been a bland statement and failing to even mention the word "Rohingya". Southeast Asian leaders were considered to end a three-day summit in Manila on November 15 without seriously talking about the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. The ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) in its critics said the failure of ASEAN leaders to confront

²⁶⁴ Heyder Affan, "Rohingya Crisis, Why Is Asean Unable to Play a Role?," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-41160293>.

the root causes of the ongoing crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine State constituted a blow to the regional bloc's credibility²⁶⁵. In the conference Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, which comprise ASEAN, had agreed not to say or do anything unless they were in a consensus, as well as to never interfere in one another's domestic affairs²⁶⁶.

The biggest criticism directed at Indonesian policies came from within the country. This criticism arose a lot from Islamic coalitions driven by conservative figures who wanted the Joko Widodo government to pay more attention to the interest of the Islamic community. They expected Indonesia to take more assertive actions, such as imposing sanctions on Myanmar and expelling Myanmar's ambassadors from Indonesia.

Even further, criticism of the Indonesian government was also used by the opposition to vilify Joko Widodo's government regime politically. Domestically, for example Fadli Zon, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives who was a representative of the opposition group, criticized the performance of the Joko Widodo government in helping to resolve the crisis experienced by ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar. Fadli considered the government too slow in addressing the Rohingya crisis and considered the government failing to represent the leading countries in ASEAN and Muslim majority countries. He then added that Indonesia's role was too

²⁶⁵ ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, "Asean's Failure to Address Drivers of Rohingya Crisis Undermines Credibility, Regional Lawmakers Warn," ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, <https://aseanmp.org/2017/11/15/aseans-failure-to-address-drivers-of-rohingya-crisis-undermines-credibility-regional-lawmakers-warn/>.

²⁶⁶ JC Gotinga, "Asean Summit Silence on Rohingya 'an Absolute Travesty'," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/asean-summit-silence-rohingya-absolute-travesty-171114211156144.html>.

casual and made no difference from other countries²⁶⁷. Meanwhile on another occasion, Prabowo, the opposition presidential candidate who will oppose Joko Widodo in the 2019 elections, considered the humanitarian assistance provided by Indonesia to Rohingya ethnic groups in Rakhine State was merely a form of political imaging of President Joko Widodo. This statement was conveyed by Prabowo during his speech in the "Action of the Rohingya Defense" on September 16, 2017 which was organized by the Islamic coalition. However, the criticism is much regretted by the public because he links domestic economic conditions with Indonesian humanitarian assistance. Therefore, many consider that this criticism is too much of a political element rather than a constructive criticism²⁶⁸.

Despite various criticisms, the steps of diplomacy and constructive engagement were still maintained by Indonesia in its role in Rakhine state crisis. This was evident from the diplomatic steps that were still being carried out and coupled with ongoing humanitarian assistance as a form of Indonesian efforts to create durable peace in Rakhine state. In this section we will further discuss Indonesia's reasons for promoting diplomacy and constructive engagement as a rational choice rather than various other options such as economic sanctions and military intervention. Furthermore, we will also discuss the relevance of Indonesian diplomacy with the domestic context and international context discussed earlier, as well as the relevance of these steps with the goal of Indonesian foreign policy needed to achieve in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar.

(i). Diplomacy as a rational choice

In giving its role in helping to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar, Indonesia put forward soft power diplomacy as rational choices. This was achieved by considering

²⁶⁷ Gibran Maulana Ibrahim, "Fadli Zon Continues to Criticize the Government About the Rohingya Crisis," Detiknews, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3629698/fadli-zon-terus-kritik-pemerintah-soal-krisis-rohingya>.

²⁶⁸ Hariyanto.

various domestic contexts and international contexts that affect Indonesia's own policies. In the context of the Rakhine state crisis, by using this concept, conflict resolution was not carried out with an approach that leads to military power, embargo, or criticism. But rather in a more persuasive way, such as providing inclusive humanitarian assistance and opening communication with all parties. Such a step was expected to make a more positive contribution in efforts to resolve the Rohingya conflict.

In this contemporary era, the practice of this concept of diplomacy is at the center of this emerging phenomenon. Soft power and power of ideas have become the sticks and stones of the modern state.²⁶⁹ Joseph Nye explains that power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want. According to Nye, there are several ways one can achieve the outcome, either you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. Through soft power, a country need to co-opts the other party rather than coerces them to getting others to want the outcomes you want. In his argument he stated that a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. In a number of cases concerning value cultivation such as democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities, Nye argued that the approach through soft power would be far more effective because the values are deeply seductive²⁷⁰.

²⁶⁹ Ivan Willis Rasmussen, "Towards a Theory of Public Diplomacy: A Quantitative Study of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Fletcher School (Tufts University)* 4 (2009).

²⁷⁰ Nye.

Through Nye's explanation, we can analyze Indonesian foreign policy rationality in choosing to use soft power to play a role in addressing Rakhine state crisis. In this matter, Indonesia chooses to co-opt with Myanmar in completing this Rakhine state crisis. Through various diplomatic and constructive engagement efforts conducted by Indonesia, the Myanmar government, civil society in Rakhine, the international community, and also civil society in Indonesia itself can admire the values of Indonesian foreign policy interest by emulating its example and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness in order to jointly solve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine.

Apart from that, in handling the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state of Myanmar, Indonesia also have the inculcation of values in the form of human rights enforcement and democratization. When referring to Nye's argument, we can conclude that what was done by Indonesia was an attempt to instil these values in the Myanmar government and civil society in Rakhine state, so that when the humanitarian crisis could be overcome, the durable peace in Rakhine state can be achieved. Therefore, Indonesia rationally puts forward soft power diplomacy in the hope that these values will be able to be understood and applied in real terms by the parties concerned, because if Indonesia relied on coercive efforts, what could happen was a compulsion rather than settlement arisen from the running application of these values.

In implementing this concept of soft power, we also do not only depend on the role of the state through its foreign policy. But in this concept, several actors can be involved in the practice of soft power diplomacy including international institutions, NGOs, businesses, members of the media, and also the global community including civil society itself. Therefore, in the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar we can also witness the increasing participation of NGOs and civil society from Indonesia itself, especially in the effort of providing humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance by governmental, non-governmental organizations, as well as

participation of civil society constituted an integral component of Indonesia's foreign policy toolkit, which derived from a value-based orientation of Indonesian ethics of state and social ethic.

Seeing from various rational considerations with the existence of domestic context and international context that affect the considerations of Indonesian diplomacy, the steps taken by Indonesia were considered as the most appropriate step in its role in the Rakhine state crisis. If viewed from the ethic of state and social ethic aspect which was the biggest consideration in Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, Indonesia's diplomacy was a form of ethic channelling without creating new problems that were feared to violate the ethic uphold by the Indonesian society itself. For example, Indonesia, which has an ethical responsibility as a world peacekeeping country and upholds lasting peace and social justice, would damage the values of peace if it had to take coercive steps in its role in the Rakhine state crisis. Then with the identity factor as a Muslim majority country, soft power diplomacy was the most rational choices for channelling the interests and social ethics of the Muslim community in Indonesia as well as portraying Indonesia as a moderate Islamic state that put forward the resolution of problems with a peaceful path without violence.

Speaking about the protection of Indonesia's national interest, especially concerning national security, public diplomacy carried out by Indonesia and NGOs as partners who provided humanitarian assistance became an alternative mechanism for concerned Muslims to engage in solidarity with their co-religionists rather than violence jihad that was feared to threaten national security²⁷¹. Economic sanction and military action were also feared to cause a growing crisis especially in the socio-economic aspects. It would worsen the waves of refugee, especially refugees

²⁷¹ Amelia Fauzia, "Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State, Myanmar: Islamic Humanitarianism, Soft Diplomacy, and the Question of Inclusive Aid," Oxford Department of International Development, <https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/blog/indonesian-aid-rakhine-state-myanmar-islamic-humanitarianism-soft-diplomacy-and-question>.

who could enter Indonesia and would disturb national security. Therefore, the use of soft power in diplomacy was considered the most rational choice so that it could channel the interest of Indonesia itself without worrying about being a backfire that could ultimately disrupts national security.

Indonesia also considered international context as an important consideration in taking diplomatic steps. First, Indonesia certainly wanted to maintain a good bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Myanmar, which had been an important asset since the independence of both countries. As Loos²⁷² wrote that although Indonesia was straightforward about its democratic intentions, it was not willing to put its relationship with Myanmar on the line. Therefore, with soft power diplomacy through constructive engagement with the Myanmar authorities and seeking support from the international community at large, it was hoped Indonesia would be able to convince the Myanmar government to address and solve the Rakhine state crisis without destroying long-standing good bilateral relation between Indonesia and Myanmar.

In relation to Indonesia's identity as a majority Muslim country in the international Muslim world and its membership in the OIC, Indonesia was seen as a role model for harmony between Islam, modernity and peaceful democracy, as well as a bridge builder of relationship between Islam and a broad international world which also consisted of non-Islamic countries. To realize these ideals, Indonesia rationally chose to use the soft power diplomacy approach so that it could show a polite and moderate image of Islam and provided concrete evidence of the harmony of Islam, democracy and modernity. Later on it was expected to be an example in problem solving mechanism in the Islamic world which were typically identified with the use of violence as means of settlement.

²⁷² Loos.

Another important international context in the consideration of Indonesian diplomacy was its status as a member of ASEAN, and its position as the de facto leader of ASEAN itself. As discussed earlier, the concept of non-interference promotes peaceful settlements of disputes through dialogue and consultation, and the renunciation of aggression as basic concept adopted and agreed upon by all ASEAN members. The application of this concept could only be achieved if Indonesia puts forward the concept of soft power diplomacy in its role in the Rakhine state crisis with cooperation rather than coercion in solving problems, because the coercion could disrupt the sovereignty and the regional stability of ASEAN. By prioritizing soft power diplomacy, Indonesia wanted to reinforce its position as a de facto leader of ASEAN by playing an active role in resolving regional problems without violating the concept of non-interference, and later this method could be replicated by other ASEAN members.

Indonesia's move to use soft power diplomacy in its role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar had been proven clearly and concretely. Although it had not been able to resolve the crisis in its entirety, at least this role had been proven to open and influence the Myanmar government to carry out the humanitarian program in the Rakhine state. Indonesia used soft power diplomacy that promotes the principle of mutual respect, without disturbing another country's domestic affairs. This was considered far more effective than the use of so-called “megaphone diplomacy” or ‘drum diplomacy’ by other actors such as Malaysian NGOs and radical Muslim organizations in their vociferous critique of the Myanmar government²⁷³.

Indonesia used the term "Sarong Diplomacy" in the implementation of its soft power diplomacy. This term was originally conveyed by Jusuf Kalla who was then chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) and is currently the Vice President of Indonesia to refer the common

²⁷³ Fauzia.

cloth culture shared by Indonesians and the Burmese who both often use sarong cloth in their daily lives. From the use of the term itself, we had been able to see the Indonesian approach through socio-cultural aspects, thus giving rise to a sense of welcome from Myanmar. The Sarong diplomacy made it possible to more effectively delivering Indonesia's messages for defending common humanitarian interests. Since the crisis escalated in Rakhine state, Indonesia always became the first country that was openly welcomed by the Myanmar Government to do humanitarian mission directly to the heart of the conflict, thanks to socio- cultural approach such as the Sarong Diplomacy²⁷⁴ .

(ii). The goal of Indonesian foreign policy

To analyze the goal of Indonesia's foreign policy in its role of Rakhine state crisis, we must first understand the goal of Indonesian foreign policy in general. In an effort to formulate its foreign policy, the Indonesian government wants to realize a pro-people diplomacy. This translated into steps to realize the nature of a down-to-earth diplomacy that oriented towards the interests of the people, and can benefit the people themselves. For this reason, policy orientation is needed as an effort for the perpetrators of diplomacy and foreign policy in translating pro-people political commitments and can represent the interests of the people at large. Foreign policy based on the teachings of international relations should reflects the domestic politics. Therefore, foreign policy is a subordination of national politics and diplomacy must be able to provide solutions, bridge differences, and also open opportunities for the interests of the people and the state of Indonesia²⁷⁵ .

²⁷⁴ Leo Jegho, "Sarong Diplomacy: from Indonesia to Rohingya in Myanmar," *Global Indonesian Voice*, <http://www.globalindonesianvoices.com/31146/sarong-diplomacy-from-indonesia-to-rohingya-in-myanmar/>.

²⁷⁵ Nur Amaliyah, "Indonesian Foreign Policy under President Jokowi's Government" (Universitas Hasanuddin, 2015).

From the understanding of the goal of Indonesian foreign policy which wants to create pro-people diplomacy, we could find that the main goal in the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis was to channel the desires and interests of the Indonesian civil society that emerge from the ethic of state, as well as the social ethic embraced by the Indonesian. Through its soft power diplomacy, Indonesia had a goal to convey her ethics, in accordance with the interests of the Indonesian people in general, to Myanmar in order to soften the hearts of the Myanmar elite to guarantee human rights and for Myanmar government to open the access for the entry of humanitarian assistance for all people in Rakhine State, including the Muslim minority (Rohingya).

As we all know, Indonesia got a lot of pressure from within the country where Indonesian people are eager to channel their solidarity and views with expectations that the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state could be resolved immediately. With the increasing importance of public opinion in the process of policy formulation, foreign policy can no longer be regarded as the exclusive domain of policy-making elites. As a democratic country, Indonesia's foreign policy must also reflect broad public aspirations. This is where the main goal of Indonesia is then to channel Indonesia's public aspirations to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state so that the crisis can be resolved in accordance with the views of the Indonesian people.

Internationally, the goal of Indonesian diplomacy embodied in Indonesia's role in the Rakhine state crisis is to enhance the global role of Indonesia as a regional middle power that promotes multilateralism, democratic forces and moderate Islam in the struggle to achieve the world peace. To achieve this goal, Indonesia wants to share knowledge in efforts to resolve conflicts with expectations that these efforts can be an example for the international world, so in the future similar conflicts will not occur in other countries because they can disrupt national and

international security stability.²⁷⁶ In this case, Indonesia had experienced crisis with almost similar background and pattern as the Rakhine state crisis, namely in Ambon in 1999, and Poso 1998-2001 where there was a humanitarian crisis after a social and religious conflict. This bitter experience was a valuable lesson for Indonesia, as well as an important asset in the form of knowledge as Indonesia's initial capital to become an agent of peace in the region and internationally.

Even with the clear goal that Indonesia wanted to channel the solidarity of the Indonesian people that emerged from the ethic of state and social ethic embraced by its people, this did not necessarily make Indonesia free from criticism. Public pressure that had so much influence on the formation of foreign policy raised the question of whether Indonesia would continue to help if public pressure started to fade or be distracted by other issues? Those who issued this criticism had the argument that Joko Widodo only wanted to carry out his pragmatic goals: to satisfy his domestic audience while at the same time boosted his international posture. This was certainly needed to boost the President's own image, notably in relation to the 2019 presidential election. For this reason, the public had broadly guided consistency, caution and perseverance in Indonesian policy to assist the Rohingya so that this did not backfire against the Indonesian government itself²⁷⁷.

D. Discussion of Indonesia's real action executed in humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State of Myanmar

To answer these criticisms, Indonesia needed to carry out concrete actions that were proven not only by condemning situations, but also by providing tangible forms of support such as providing bilateral and multilateral support, as well as humanitarian aid to victims with the aim of

²⁷⁶ Murthias.

²⁷⁷ Kornelius Purba, "Commentary: Name of Jokowi's South Asian Mission Is 'Rohingya Plus'," *The Jakarta Post*, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/01/30/commentary-name-of-jokowis-south-asian-mission-is-rohingya-plus.html>.

resolving the humanitarian crisis. As discussed in the previous chapter, the role of Indonesia can be seen in various multilateral and bilateral diplomatic roles, as well as humanitarian assistance.

In providing assistance to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, humanitarian assistance was the only real form of Indonesia's role that could be relied upon to solve the problem as a whole. This was because efforts through bilateral and multilateral pressures were considered only temporary and only adopted when public outrage was highest, but never taken when there was no pressure to do so. Likewise, multilateral pressure effort also proved to be less effective in encouraging Myanmar to grant full citizenship rights, or at the very least, the freedom of movement to the Rohingya. In this case, various pressures through ASEAN, OIC, and the United Nation, had not been proven to be able to pressure Myanmar to change its policies²⁷⁸. Besides that, the limitations of Indonesia to exercise pressure also emerged because of the fear of seriously jeopardizing its relations with the Myanmar government.

(i). Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Diplomacy

Humanitarian assistance was considered as the most tangible role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar, because although it had not been able to resolve the crisis as a whole, the benefits could be widely felt by the Rakhine community and gave a good impression to the Government of Myanmar and the people affected by the crisis. In addition, humanitarian assistance provided an opportunity not only for the Indonesian government elites, but for Indonesian society at large including NGOs to play a real role in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar.

To provide a real and sustainable role in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, Indonesia delivered humanitarian assistance in the form of goods, money, and humanitarian missions to the Rakhine state of Myanmar. Humanitarian assistance is defined as efforts to provide a need-based

²⁷⁸ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity wherever the need arises if government and local actors are overwhelmed, unable or unwilling to act²⁷⁹. Humanitarian assistance is needed in responses to man-made crises and to natural disasters. The provision of humanitarian assistance has the goal to provide assistance, relief and protection; to secure access for actions aimed at facilitating the people in need and the free flow of assistance to reach vulnerable people; and to enhance disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction by developing capacities for local actors to prevent and mitigate the impact of disasters and enabling communities to increase their resilience to emergencies. Humanitarian assistance is generally considered a fundamental expression of the universal value of solidarity between people and a moral imperative²⁸⁰.

Indonesia's role in Rakhine state crisis through humanitarian assistance was a form of the so called humanitarian diplomacy carried out by the Indonesian government, as well as Indonesian NGOs to channel the solidarity of Indonesian civil society. It was a fundamental part of soft diplomacy carried out by Indonesia. Indonesian humanitarian diplomacy in Rakhine state comprised such efforts as arranging for the presence of humanitarian organizations in Rakhine state, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives. The object of the humanitarian diplomacy action is persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders

²⁷⁹ Annika Billing, "Humanitarian Assistance an Introduction to Humanitarian Assistance and the Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Aid," *Perspectives*, no. 17 (2010): 1-22.

²⁸⁰ EUPHRA.

to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for the fundamental principles²⁸¹.’

The provision of Indonesian assistance to the Rakhine state of Myanmar was carried out through two channels. The first was through the government pathways, and the second was humanitarian diplomacy through independent pathways mobilized mainly by religious based NGOs (which later will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter).

There were two important roles carried out by the Indonesian government in the implementation of humanitarian diplomacy, especially in the provision of humanitarian assistance. The first was the direct assistance in the form of material, money, and experts from the national budget. The second was acting as the party who had the right to carry out immediate institutional matters such as in bureaucracy and administrative affairs with the Myanmar government as well as partnering with Indonesian NGOs and opening access for them to be able to convey their assistance to affected victims of the Rakhine state crisis.

In carrying out humanitarian diplomacy, the role of the Indonesian government as an institution that had the right to conduct bilateral government to government diplomacy directly with the Myanmar government was very important. In the context of their bilateral relations, the Indonesian government was needed to convince Myanmar that the assistance provided by Indonesia, both directly by the government and by NGOs, was given in a neutral manner and did not discriminate the recipients in the sense that Indonesia sent its humanitarian assistance to all affected victims of Rakhine without looking at their ethnicity and religion. This was very important to maintain Myanmar's trust so the access to assistance delivery continued to be opened.

²⁸¹ Régnier.

Administratively, the Indonesian government directly lobbied Myanmar's social ministry, which was responsible for humanitarian and social welfare issues in Rakhine state to create a partnership in providing assistance and building sustainable development in the region. In addition, the Indonesian government was also responsible for administrative matters with the Myanmar government especially in immigration issues in the form of visas for humanitarian mission officers, as well as customs duties for the relief items they bring to Rakhine state²⁸².

In its relationship with Indonesian NGOs, the Indonesian government made proposals for Indonesian NGOs, both for those who had carried out their actions and those who wanted to do humanitarian action to work together to deliver more relief assistance. The proposal was accepted by 14 Indonesian Islamic NGOs. The acceptance of the proposal facilitated greater access and support from the Indonesian. The collaboration produced the Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (*Aliansi Kemanusiaan Indonesia untuk Myanmar, AKIM*), with a total commitment of USD2,000,000 as a form of humanitarian assistance. The formation of this alliance was very important in the context of synchronizing both humanitarian aid and community development programs. In addition, the Indonesian government had responsibility to supervise the humanitarian assistance to ensure that later in the provision of assistance by the alliance of NGOs (which mostly came from Islamic NGOs) did not discriminate the recipient when carrying out humanitarian actions in Rakhine state. This effort was shown by giving the name of its alliance 'for Myanmar' (for Myanmar) that means for the nation as a whole, rather than just for Rakhine state or the Rohingya Muslim refugees. Framing it as a national engagement and a humanitarian initiative enabled the organisation to pursue its work while bypassing potentially thorny questions arising from the concerns of some Myanmar government officials.

²⁸² Murthias.

(ii). The role of non-state actors (religious civil society organization) in the humanitarian assistance.

Not only depended on government pathways, humanitarian assistance provided by Indonesia was also conducted through the active role of Indonesian NGOs. Although it cannot be separated completely from the government because it still had to go through the bureaucratic and administrative processes, the role of NGOs independently was quite important as an independent means for the Indonesian people to channel their solidarity to victims of the humanitarian crisis while encouraging the government to take strategic steps in the Rakhine state crisis.

The emergence of the role of NGOs independently arises because many organizations consider the role of government to be too slow so that many of them are trying to catch up by trying their own hand at humanitarian aid delivery. Several religious-based NGOs have provided assistance before the Indonesian government launched the AKIM as a mechanism for providing humanitarian assistance. They used several ways to minimize their dependence on the Indonesian government. The first was by collaborating with several international organizations, and the second was to send direct assistance to refugee camps at Cox's Bazaar in Bangladesh so that they could avoid contact with the Myanmar government.

Some examples were humanitarian assistance provided by several conservative Islamic organizations in Indonesia such as the masses of PKS who channelled their assistance through the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (DDII) and the Community Care Justice Post (PKPU) which then worked together with the Bangladesh's Cooperation for Humanity NGOs and Global Peace Mission, a group from Malaysia, to directly send the assistance they gathered from the action of solidarity they had been working on in Indonesia to Cox's Bazaar. Another example was the assistance provided by FPI. As Islamic conservative organizations that had long been distrustful towards the government, they through the FPI's HILMI humanitarian wing claimed to have been

involved in Cox's Bazar in humanitarian work, using at least Rp.2 billion (US \$ 145,306) in donations²⁸³.

The independent role of NGOs is explained by Stead & Smewing that NGOs are considered to provide credibility, expertise and networks that governments cannot²⁸⁴. Besides, they are also considered more effective in long-term relationship building, such as building favorable conditions, cultural diplomacy, exchanges and branding. Conceptually, the United Nations in 1945, defined NGO as organizations that were non-official and neutral in their execution of international duties. Since then, the concept has broadened and is used for social purposes which exist independently of the government system. Broadly speaking, NGOs have four basic functions: resource mobilization, public services, social governance and policy advocacy²⁸⁵.

Although there were choices to take action independently, the provision of assistance through the AKIM mechanism was considered as the most appropriate choice for some Indonesian religious based NGOs. As an alliance of eleven humanitarian institutions in Indonesia in collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the entire Indonesian community, AKIM had the accountability factor. Through AKIM, provision of assistance had a form of accountability to the community for donations that had been distributed. In addition, through a planned mechanism, assistance could be received on target to those who need it. For the implementation of assistance, the Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (AKIM) created a program aimed at helping the community in Rakhine State called the Humanitarian Assistance for Sustainable Community (HASCO). Through this program, humanitarian assistance would be

²⁸³ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.

²⁸⁴ Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing, *Public Diplomacy* (Foreign Policy Centre, 2002).

²⁸⁵ Ming Wang and Qiushi Liu, "Analyzing China's Ngo Development System," *The China Nonprofit Review* 1, no. 1 (2009): 5-35.

provided in the form of a development of education and health for the affected population, which would be given for two years with the possibility of extension of the time when needed²⁸⁶.

The establishment of the AKIM itself is a mutualism symbiosis for both NGOs and the Indonesian government. On the one hand, NGOs get access to bureaucracy and administration to be able to send their assistance. On the other hand, the government has the convenience of collecting public donations and in terms of the distribution of human rights. This is itself due to the creation of AKIM born of necessity since the Indonesian government lacked the mechanism to collect public donations and disseminate them in the form of overseas aid, but it was also an effective way of deflecting political opposition.

The religious based NGOs dominate the membership of AKIM. From this we can see that the desire of Muslims in Indonesia to actively implement the social ethic they uphold increases. It is because Islamic religious dimension motivates, channels, and intensifies the emotional and obligatory aspects of charity. Humanitarianism is one of the fundamental principles of the Muslim religion. The act of giving money or helping someone in distress is not left to the free choice of the believer, but is instead an obligation in the same way as the obligation to do the prayer. The Quranic texts and the Prophet's sayings calling for humanitarian action, defining and regulating it can be found in numerous sources. The close link between humanitarian action and religious practice guarantees wide public adherence and the perpetuity of donations and resources thanks to various religious incitements²⁸⁷.

This is where the religious non-governmental organization takes the role. As a party that has a mechanism for collecting resources from the community, they have a responsibility to

²⁸⁶ Rahmawati Hussein from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center.

²⁸⁷ Jamal Krafess, "The Influence of the Muslim Religion in Humanitarian Aid," *International Review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 858 (2005): 327-42.

channel the collected resources from the community in accordance with the rules and dimensions of their respective religions. In this case, the Islamic religious organization has a certain mass base so that they are more trusted to channel funds by a particular community group because people expect that the funds they collect can be channelled according to certain values they believe.

One of the main case studies on the importance of the role of a religious organization in the provision of humanitarian assistance is through actions carried out by Muhammadiyah. As one of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah has a big responsibility to raise funds and channel these funds as humanitarian aid from the least 40-50 million followers across Indonesia in accordance with particular religious dimensions they believe. As a Non-Governmental Organization, Muhammadiyah also has a structured humanitarian aid distribution mechanism through their LAZISMU institution, which focuses on fundraising, as well as the Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC) institution which focuses on humanitarian assistance and has a lot of experience in distributing humanitarian assistance both at home and abroad.

In the provision of assistance in Myanmar, Muhammadiyah became an example for other organizations in terms of activeness and the mechanism of assistance. This was because Muhammadiyah already had a lot of experience providing assistance both nationally and internationally. In addition to the Rakhine case, MDMC Muhammadiyah had been actively involved in providing international assistance in many humanitarian crises such as the Typhoon Haiyan natural disaster in the Philippines in 2013 and also the earthquake in Nepal in 2015. Facts that show that the recipients of aid were not only from Muslim group in the previous humanitarian crises that had been assisted by the Muhammadiyah could be a good example for the implementation of non-discriminatory policies in providing assistance in Rakhine state²⁸⁸.

²⁸⁸ Rahmawati Hussein from Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center.

For organizations such as Muhammadiyah which has a progressive mechanism for granting humanitarian assistance, the factor of Islamic political issues that become the background of a lot of support in Indonesian people's support for the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state was not a main consideration. Even when interviewed, Rahmawati Husein from MDMC who had been directly involved in humanitarian action of Muhammadiyah and AKIM in Rakhine state, was strongly rejecting the linkage of humanitarian assistance provided by Muhammadiyah with domestic political issues where the increase of Islamic movement was coincident with the crisis escalation in 2017. For them, giving religious assistance based on religious and social ethics of humanity is far more important than temporal political issues. Therefore, as long as Muhammadiyah followers and Muslims in Indonesia still uphold these ethics, they would continue to deliver assistance as a form of channeling Indonesian solidarity to humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state²⁸⁹. This was certainly very important as an example for the Indonesian government, NGOs, and other humanitarian actions to maintain consistency and sustainability in the provision of humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state.

In giving humanitarian assistance to victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, Muhammadiyah had acted long before the Indonesian government had a direct role in forming the AKIM alliance. But when later the government formed AKIM, Muhammadiyah which already had experience in distributing humanitarian assistance in various crises, especially the Rohingya crisis, also became an important part of the alliance. It was expected that Muhammadiyah could share the knowledge with other organizations.

The provision of assistance from Muhammadiyah in the crisis in Rakhine state was not only given particularly in Rakhine state, but also in several places affected by the crisis in Rakhine such as in Aceh Indonesia where many Rohingya refugees were stranded, as well as Cox's Bazaar as the

²⁸⁹ Ibid.


largest refugee shelter. In providing such assistance, Muhammadiyah always puts forward the provision of assistance in an inclusive manner, by partnering with local NGOs and empowering the affected communities, especially when giving direct assistance in Rakhine state where Muhammadiyah must accommodate both the Rohingya and Rakhine Muslims so that sustainable peace can be created in the region. Inclusive assistance is realized through periodic development in the form of markets (economics), hospitals (health) and also schools (education) from funds collected by Muhammadiyah amounting to 12.5 billion rupiahs. The effort to rebuilt a place like market can accommodate the interaction of the Rakhine community. This place was expected to be a place of reconciliation between the conflicting parties, between the Rohingya people and other ethnic groups, or also between the people and the Myanmar government to establish a sustainable peace.

As a religious organization that has the largest network of hospitals and educational facilities in Indonesia, the assistance provided by Muhammadiyah to the people affected by the crisis in Rakhine state was not only in the form of material and infrastructure, but also experts engaged in health and education. Muhammadiyah Aid itself sent three doctors and nine nurses as well as supervision personnel to help improve the conditions of the victims. The health worker has an important role in providing health services when there is a diphtheria outbreak and infection caused by a lack of sanitation in the Rohingya refugee camp located on the border of Myanmar and Bangladesh at the end of September 2017. In addition to providing health services, experts from Muhammadiyah also provide children's education with the material taught in the form of letters and numbers recognition, body parts, and memorizing short letters of the Koran in Rohingya refugee camps²⁹⁰.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

With the development of a religious based organization in Indonesia coupled with the greater desire of the community to channel solidarity that arises from social ethic, it is expected that in the future we will see more of the role of Indonesian religious organizations in the distribution of humanitarian assistance in various conflicts as exemplified by Muhammadiyah. This is very important so that later on the society, especially Muslims in Indonesia can channel their solidarity through positive actions and can further encourage the government to care about humanitarian issues.

Today when the role of NGOs in humanitarian diplomacy is increasing, this is also accompanied by their advantages in reaching aid and not in dispute with reference to donor motives, government influence, organizational limitations, and internal agendas²⁹¹. What Muhammadiyah has done in providing humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state can be an example for other organizations in carrying out humanitarian actions that are consistent, inclusive and neutral with the aim of building sustainable peace in conflict areas.



²⁹¹ Anna Fruttero and Varun Gauri, "The Strategic Choices of Ngos: Location Decisions in Rural Bangladesh," *Journal of Development Studies* 41, no. 5 (2005).

V

Conclusion**A. Summary**

The conflict between Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine and the Government of Myanmar which took place in Rakhine state had now increasingly developed into a humanitarian crisis. The conflict that originated from domestic problems had developed into regional and international crisis with so many cases including the human rights violations and the emergence of refugee waves that attracted widespread international attentions. Myanmar's failure to maintain inter-ethnic harmony became the cause of the growing conflict that has developed into a humanitarian crisis. Myanmar, which has always had a bad record of human rights enforcement, especially since the Myanmar military junta came to power, was back in the spotlight even though the government had been taken over by the civilian government. Hard response from the international community, and international organizations such as the UN, European Union and various international NGOs continued to arrive even though this had not changed the policies and treatment of the Myanmar government against Rohingya who were the main victims in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state.

One of the most active countries in giving responses to humanitarian crisis that occurred in Rakhine state is Indonesia. In addressing the Rakhine state crisis, Indonesia actively responded in the form of bilateral and multilateral responses, as well as providing humanitarian assistance in the crisis that occurred in Rakhine state. Based on the theoretical framework presented by Coplin, in the policy making of Indonesia in responses to Rakhine state crisis, there were several factors that influenced the policy, namely domestic context, international context, and also economic and security considerations

In the domestic context, ethic of state and social ethics held by Indonesia became the main factor that encouraged the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. As a

country that upholds the ethic of state as a world peacekeeping country, Indonesia certainly felt the need to play a significant role in effort to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. It was also supported by the solidarity of the Indonesian people that emerged from the social ethics of the civil society. In addition, several domestic contexts and international contexts also strongly supported Indonesia to play an important role in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. The identity of Indonesia as the largest Muslim majority country in the world also became one of the important factors for the emergence of Indonesian solidarity both domestically and internationally because the social ethic possessed by the Indonesian people came from the values of Islam as the majority religion as well as the relationship between Muslim Rohingya ethnic who were described as the main victim in the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state.

Moreover, the role of Muslim in the socio-political life of the Indonesian people which continued to increase after the New Order era also heightened the awareness of Muslim communities in Indonesia on issues related to the Islamic world. This awareness added the desire of the community to play a greater role in solving these problems. This certainly encouraged the Indonesian government to be able to channel the interests of their civil society because as a democratic country, public opinion is one of the important instruments in the formation of policies including foreign policy. What's more, the conflict escalation that occurred in Rakhine in 2017, which was then heavily blown up by the mainstream media, coincided with the increasing Islamic movement which questioned the government's ability to fulfil the interests of the Muslim community in Indonesia. In response, Indonesia adopted a policy to play an important role in the Rakhine state crisis that showed the intention to fulfil the interest of Muslim community so that it could ease the anger of Muslims in the country whose fear could endanger national security with the increase of the actions from hardliner and radical Muslims.

In an international context, even though officially not a Muslim country, Indonesia's identity as the country with the largest Muslim majority country makes international and Islamic communities to have great expectations for Indonesia to be able to resolve the humanitarian crisis where Muslim Rohingya become the main victims. The encouragement was also added to Indonesia's position as a de facto leader of ASEAN so that it was demanded to be a leader in resolving conflicts in the Southeast Asia region. Internationally, the goal of Indonesia to position itself as a middle power that upholds democracy and promotes moderate Islamic values was driving Indonesia to play a major role in the Rakhine state of Myanmar as an affirmation of its position so that its position as de facto leader of ASEAN and the desire to promote moderate Islam among the Islamic countries of OIC members was no longer in doubt.

Good bilateral relations between Indonesia and Myanmar become initial capital as well as important driving factors in the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. As a strategic partner in bilateral and multilateral relations with a long history of good relations, Indonesia had a sense of solidarity to help resolve the humanitarian crisis in fellow Southeast Asian countries. Good relations that had been established for so long had grown Myanmar's trust in Indonesia so that from Myanmar itself, they have a big expectation that Indonesia can help to resolve the conflicts. This was demonstrated by Myanmar by providing easy access to Indonesian humanitarian assistance in Rakhine state. Myanmar believed that Indonesia had a sincere motive to help and there were no ulterior motives as Myanmar feared when receiving assistance from western countries.

In responding to the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state, Indonesia was also considering the national security factor which could disrupt the national security by an increase in the activities of radical groups as well as an increasing wave of Rohingya refugees entering Indonesia as a result of the crisis. For this reason, Indonesia needed to show these radical groups that the crisis could

be resolved without the need to use violence. Despite the increasing waves of refugees who were feared to disrupt the national security of Indonesia.

By considering various domestic contexts, international contexts, and also the national security context, Indonesia put forward soft power diplomacy as rational choices. In accordance with Nye's explanation about soft diplomacy, a country needs to co-opt the other party rather than coerces them to want the outcomes you want. By using this concept, conflict resolution is not carried out with an approach that leads to military power, embargo, or criticism, but rather in a more persuasive way, such as bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and providing inclusive humanitarian assistance to the Rakhine state crisis.

Therefore, in its efforts to play a role in the Rakhine state crisis, Indonesia actively undertook soft diplomacy efforts by conducting bilateral dialogues with the Myanmar government, as well as multilaterally with the international community to find conflict resolution. Although there were many criticisms both from within and outside the country who considered that with soft diplomacy efforts Indonesia could not act decisively and that the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state could not be resolved immediately, but taking into account domestic, international, and security context soft diplomacy was considered the most appropriate to be carried out by the Indonesian government. This was by considering the concept of non-interference which was upheld by Indonesia as an ASEAN member, and the desire of Indonesia to instil ethical values from its people to be understood by Myanmar that could only be achieved by a persuasive approach through soft diplomacy.

This Indonesian diplomacy effort called Sarong Diplomacy promoted the 4 + 1 proposal containing 4 points, namely restoring security stability, refraining from using violence, protecting the community regardless of ethnicity and religion, and providing access to humanitarian assistance; and + 1 point with the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on

Rakhine State. The proposal was directed to the Myanmar government as a persuasive effort to immediately resolve the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state. This diplomatic support also contained humanitarian assistance from the Indonesian people which was channeled through the government and also several NGOs as a tangible form of solidarity of the Indonesian people themselves.

Humanitarian assistance was one of the important parts in the role of Indonesia in the Rakhine state crisis as a real form of channeling the solidarity of the Indonesian people. This humanitarian diplomacy had the aim of persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to help, at all times, vulnerable people, and with full respect for the fundamental principles. What was interesting was that in the distribution of humanitarian assistance, the Indonesian people were not only dependent on the government, but the role of religious-based NGOs was also very important in the humanitarian assistance provided by Indonesia.

Religious based NGOs were much easier in building community solidarity and had their own particular funding sources to prepare the humanitarian aid. For donors and members, the religious based NGO were seen to have credibility, expertise and networks that governments cannot provide so they have access to approach closer to civil society than from the government itself. The magnitude of the role of NGOs in channeling the solidarity of the Indonesian people through humanitarian assistance was a great encouragement for the Indonesian government to form AKIM as an alliance of Indonesian NGOs that conducted humanitarian assistance. Indonesian government realized that they still lacked the legal mechanism to collect public donations and disseminate them in the form of overseas aid, so they needed to collaborate with NGOs who had more experience in the structure of fundraising and distribution of humanitarian aid. In addition, with the formation of the AKIM, the government could show its intention to accommodate all parties because within the alliance itself there were several organizations affiliated with conservative

Islamic groups that were considered to be in opposition to the government. The government also needed to maintain the accountability of Indonesian NGOs in carrying out the provision of assistance so that the funds raised from the solidarity of the Indonesian people could be used properly for the sake of achieving sustainable peace in Rakhine state and not for matters that could endanger national interest such as to finance radicalism.

Large religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah which had a very developed fundraising structure and mechanism for channeling humanitarian assistance as a result of their experience in humanitarian action so far could encourage other organizations and the government to provide humanitarian assistance in the Rakhine state crisis. Its role that had provided assistance to victims of the Rakhine state crisis long before the Indonesian government gave encouragement to form AKIM as a form of the government's desire to help victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state in a tangible form. On the other hand, the willingness of Muhammadiyah to cooperate with the government in AKIM could be an example for other organizations that the provision of assistance is structured and prioritizes cooperation with all parties so that the main goal of channeling the solidarity of the Indonesian people to the victims of the humanitarian crisis and to help achieve sustainable peace can be achieved.

Until the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, Indonesian government could be said to be quite good at playing its role in responding to the Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. Although it had not been able to resolve the crisis as a whole, the Indonesian government, which actively conducted diplomatic actions both bilaterally and multilaterally, and actively pursued humanitarian assistance for victims of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State, was able to provide answers to pressures both from the domestic context and internal context giving big expectations to Indonesia to be able to play more role in Rakhine state crisis of Myanmar. Although it was

considered a bit late by some circles, the government's move to cooperate with religious based NGOs in the provision of humanitarian assistance was effective enough to accommodate the massive amount of solidarity of the Indonesian community and manifested in the form of humanitarian assistance.

To achieve the goal of building sustainable peace in Rakhine state, what Indonesia needed to show was the consistency, caution and perseverance of the Indonesian government in providing humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the pressure to play a significant role in the Rakhine state crisis was not as great as when the crisis escalation occurred in Rakhine in 2017. At that time, all eyes were focusing on the Rakhine issue with the massive blow-up from the media that raised the attention of all parties including the Indonesian civil society. Even though there had been a shift in the issues faced, the Indonesian Government must be able to continue its soft diplomacy efforts by making diplomatic efforts bilaterally and multilaterally to put pressure on the Myanmar Government's policy, as well as providing supervision and support for the provision of humanitarian assistance which has now been handled more by religious based NGOs in the form of AKIM. This is certainly quite necessary because if the escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state occurs again, the Government of Indonesia has a strong position when asked about responsibility for what has been done to help fellow human being who is experiencing a humanitarian crisis in Rakhine state.

B. Recommendations for Advanced Research: Humanitarian Diplomacy; Role of Non-State Actors (Religious Civil Society Organization) in the International Relations.

In this thesis, we can see that with the forces of globalization and the recent revolution in communication technology, it creates an era in which increase in the influence of public opinion on the conduct of foreign policy also become an increasingly complex challenge for foreign

ministries²⁹². With easier access to communication and information, the influence of public opinion will be greater in the formation of a policy. Especially with the increasing flow of democratization, in our time public opinion has been almost exclusively linked with the fate and progress of democracy²⁹³. The role of public opinion will be greater with the greater information they obtain and the greater their access to communicate that opinion.

With all the development of international relations, the field that in the past was only controlled by the elites represented by the government of a country, is now expanding with the emergence of new actors in international relations such as NGOs and civil society itself which can influence the formation of a country's foreign policy through the social ethic they uphold. In a country's foreign policy study, in the future we must understand various kinds of domestic and international context factors as a whole before finding a conclusion from the formation of a policy and analysis of actions carried out by certain actors.

With the rapid development of globalization, a multiplicity of new areas of global diplomatic activity has been developed alongside classic national diplomacy. In order to follow these developments, international actors create new forms of network influence and decide to engage in informal discussions. Soft power diplomacy is an option for international actors to show the form of power in order to get the desired outcomes²⁹⁴. The development of soft power is also developing along with the development of international actors involved because with the soft power diplomacy actions all actors can be involved in the process compared to hard power

²⁹² Laurence-Camille Richard, "Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Evolution," (2011).

²⁹³ Janusz Ziolkowski, "Democracy, Public Opinion, and the Media," Acta 6 (2001), <http://www.pass.va/content/dam/scienze-sociali/pdf/acta6/acta6-ziolkowski.pdf>.

diplomacy that relies on instruments such as military forces that are only controlled by the government elite.

Soft power that puts forward persuasive methods such as cooperation and dialogue is considered to be more effective in inculcating values as the main goal of diplomacy rather than coercion which seems to impose the cultivation of values. Therefore we will see various actors in the international world, both a country and other actors such as NGOs, even civil society itself to be involved in an effort to cultivate values through persuasive ways so that their values such as democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities (which are deeply seductive), be offered to different parts of populations who are attracted by different things, ideas, images, or prospects with the values offered by the perpetrators of soft power diplomacy²⁹⁵.

Humanitarian diplomacy emerges as one of the communication corridors for actors to enter into the discussion via soft diplomacy. International actors who are not limited to the nation-state use humanitarian diplomacy as an instrument to raise awareness, negotiate, and mobilize appropriate humanitarian assistance in emergencies²⁹⁶. With efforts through humanitarian diplomacy like the one carried out by the Indonesian government and the Indonesian religious based NGO in Rakhine state, it is expected that decision-makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for the fundamental principles of human rights and the intention to mitigate a particular problem.

One thing that needs to be highlighted from the findings in this thesis is that now civil society is no longer only dependent on the government in channelling their interest even on issues that were formerly only controlled by elites such as international relations. The emergence of

²⁹⁵ Angelo M Codevilla and Michael J Waller, "Political Warfare: A Set of Means for Achieving Political Ends," *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare* (2008).

²⁹⁶ Régnier.

actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations makes it easy for people to channel their interests. Especially with the existence of a religious Non-Governmental Organization which has its own mass base and is considered to have more credibility than the government by its followers. This facilitates the non-governmental organization to mobilize interest from the community which is then channelled through various actions including humanitarian assistance. Later on this action is expected to put great pressure on policy makers.

However, it must be considered that all forms of soft diplomacy including humanitarian diplomacy tend to work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes takes years to get the desired outcomes²⁹⁷. For this reason, it requires the consistency, caution and perseverance in its implementation. Especially in the case of humanitarian diplomacy, consistency to continue to help and resolve humanitarian issues that occur is necessary so that soft diplomacy can truly leave a good impression and instil the desired values as the main goal. This is because the soft diplomacy effort which is not accompanied by consistency, caution and perseverance can be a back fire by leaving a bad impression which results in refusal to invest in values as the main objective of soft diplomacy.

The completion of this thesis is expected to be a reference for Southeast Asian studies in general, especially in the formation of foreign policy from the countries in Southeast Asian region. In addition, this thesis is also expected to be a reference for the study of humanitarian assistance as an important instrument in the application of the concept of soft diplomacy in international relations. Finally, this thesis can be a reference in the study of the role of new actors in contemporary international relations which include NGOs and civil society.

²⁹⁷ Nye.



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