


Exploring the Reaction Mechanism of the EU towards the
United States



An Independent Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements

for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies


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Shuai Chen : Exploring the Reaction Mechanism of the EU towards the United States. Advisor: Asst. Prof. Bhawan Ruangsilp, Ph.D. Co-advisor: Prof. Martin Holland, Ph.D.

International disputes which involve conflicts of interests between the EU and the US have gained much traction since President Trump took office. This paper studies the reaction mechanism of the EU towards the US. It establishes a link between the study of human behaviors and international relations through constructivism before applying Maslow's hierarchy of needs to the EU. It summarizes all the EU's responses to US policies that affect its interests, thereby helping to study the EU's past foreign policies, and predict the actions that the EU will take on international affairs in the future. By analyzing the four cases—the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Deal, Nord Stream 2 and US-EU Trade War, the paper explains when the EU's demands at different tiers are negatively or positively affected by the U.S. policy, it provides a range of responses from mild compromise to tough retaliation which practiced the application of Maslow's theory to international relations.



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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

In an interview for his new book, Anthony L. Gardner, a former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union comments: “Three years of Donald Trump presidency have not been easy on Europe nor on Transatlantic relations... Trump's bad instincts, which we saw on a first term, would be multiplied several times in the second term”(Gardner, 2020). We can infer from his words that Trump has been quite a challenge for the European Union in the past 3 years. As the two blocs walked out of their honeymoon period, the EU must become better prepared to associate with the US. And it seems that the Union is no longer zealously following the US's steps in many aspects. Trump declares himself a nationalist who would act for the maximization of US's interests in his foreign policy. But the problem is his aggressive nationalism would very often challenge the interests of its key ally, the EU on many fronts.

It's interesting to know how the EU decide to react to the “Whimsical, uninformed” Donald Trump(Borger, 2019); How the EU brings together its resources to react to Mr. Trump. And perhaps we can apply Maslow's hierarchy of needs to the EU's motivation. The EU as a collection of 27 Member States, with such a collective identity, its needs(interest) may perhaps be categorized into five tiers as Maslow identified in his hierarchy of needs for an individual human being. Therefore, this paper hopes to explore the following questions:

1. How can we apply Maslow's needs to explain the relationship between EU's needs and its behaviours?
2. What reaction mechanism of the EU to the US can be drawn from the case studies?

This project aims at developing an operational method for observers to classify the EU's needs into five general categories (loosely based on Maslow's original hierarchy of needs) and to analyze international issues and events useful for arriving at a

judgment on how important they are to the EU's interests and to study the EU's reaction mechanism towards the US.

Based on the principles of constructivism, this paper will establish "collective identity", "interests" of the EU and establish a link between the EU's collective identity and interests in relation to its foreign policy. As this paper studies the EU's reaction mechanism towards the US, it will exclude the US's identity and its needs and other players' in the case-studies. Thus, the European Union's reaction constitutes the only case study and is the focus of the rest of the paper.

The EU has been an important global actor in international politics, given the changing complexity of the world under the series of crises, the trade wars, Brexit, and the current COVID-19 pandemic, it's important for third parties to identify the EU's real and most critical intentions behind each action so as to better know why the EU act the way has during an on-going crisis. It's even more important to predict what roles the EU wants to shape on the global stage.

My proposed model can be used to assess and categorize EU's behaviour that it will take at a specific time towards certain issues in the future. It provides an operational tool for any third parties that either have close ties with or interact frequently with the European Union to adjust their foreign policy towards it.

The second section of this paper will explore the Maslow's hierarchy of needs and the possibility of employing it to the European Union or a state. The third section will introduce the EU's foreign policy and its relations with the US in brief. In the fourth section, four cases concerning the EU are analyzed to explore the relationship between EU's needs and behaviours. The four cases are the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran Nuclear Deal and its series of actions towards the Nord Stream 2 and the US-EU trade war. The reason for selecting these cases is that they represent key interests for the EU - security, normative power and economic interests - and these interests(needs) can be built into the five-tiers of the EU's needs in my model which is explained in detail in the following section. These

four cases are selected in which the Union must make a choice between its needs. The section examines changes in its needs and subsequent behaviours towards those issues. The last section provides a summation of the arguments and findings of the project and provide suggestions for modifying the model and further research development. It assesses the EU's current status within the hierarchy and forecasts general trends expected in the EU's behaviour in the Post-Trump era. Based on these expected behaviours, the study finishes with recommendations for a third country's policy concerning the EU.




CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Maslow's hierarchy of needs

The attempt to classify human behaviours according to needs is not novel. The first scholar to introduce the concept of basic needs to motivate human behaviours was the renowned psychologist Abraham Maslow. His theory of human motivation and hierarchy of needs constitute the knowledge base for the rest of this paper and will be introduced here.

Figure 1: Maslow's hierarchy of needs



Source: Adapted from Maslow 1943

His motivation theory starts with the physiological needs – the so-called physiological drives (Maslow, 1943). The needs at this level are biological requirements for human survival. Maslow regards physiological needs as the most important and all other needs in the hierarchy become secondary until these needs are met. Safety needs – as soon as the individual's physiological needs are satisfied, safety and security needs will be met. People want to have a control over their lives and make their lives predictable. This tier of needs can be provided by the society. Belongness needs – after physiological and safety needs are satisfied, the third tier of human needs is social and involves feelings of belongingness. The need for interpersonal relationships motivates individual's behaviour. Esteem needs are

categorized into two categories: (i) self-esteem (dignity, achievement, mastery, independence) and (ii) self-esteem or self-respect (e.g. status, prestige). Self-actualization needs are placed at the top of the pyramid. They refer to the realization of personal potential, self-realization, seeking personal development and the best experience. Maslow (1943) described this tier as the eagerness to accomplish everything a person can do. And there are incidents that may cause an individual to move up and down the tiers of the hierarchy. Maslow recognized that the order of this pyramid is not fixed. Higher needs are less imperative than safety. As such, they are less urgent than lower ones.

He presented a correlation between human needs and behaviour. But Maslow added that motivation theory and behaviour theory are not synonymous. Motivation is only a determinant of behaviour. And behaviour is almost always motivated and determined by the biological instinct, cultural and situational context. Any motivated behaviour, be it prepared or completed, must be understood as a channel that can simultaneously express or satisfy many basic needs. Usually, an action can be driven by many motivations.

A state or a political system behaves in a certain way as well and we can also find what motivates them to act in such a way. However, we still need to find at least some justification that a state or political system's behaviour also changes according to its motivations.

2.2 Motivation of the state

Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (i) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (ii) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective rather than material; and (iii) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature [as neorealists maintain] or domestic politics [as neoliberals favour]. (Wendt, 1994, p. 385)

Firstly, this school of political scientists (Wendt.etc) emphasizes the primary actor in international relations is the state, as does Realism, but liberalism contends that non-state actors are important in international system. Secondly, unlike neorealists who define structure in material terms, constructivists stress intersubjective structure, while admitting the emergent effects of material capabilities(Wendt, 1994). Wendt *explains* that intersubjective structures comprise “the shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in international institutions and threat complexes, in terms of which states define (some of) their identities and interests”. He further adds that both cooperation and conflicts are intersubjective phenomena. Bringing up the needs, certain intersubjective meanings that states put in the changing international system can lead to the development of a state through the hierarchy. Thirdly, constructivists believe that the state has an intrinsic identity (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996). Wendt (1999) further probes into the influence of identity over actions : “persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities” are regarded as the core forces shaping the international relations. Jepperson et al. (1996) argue that “...changes in state identity affect the national security interests and policies of states.” Wendt (1994) adds that constructivism is a form of systemic theory in which identities and interests are the dependent variable. He points out that identities constitute interests and action since identities alone fail to explain action as being is not the same as wanting (Wendt, 1999). However, school of realism believe what motivates a state is the pursuit of power and security, and the school of liberalism holds that states are motivated to cooperation to gain mutual benefits with the help of international institution, and as states are more interdependent economically in the modern world, conflict is less likely to happen.

Wendt (1999) identifies four types of identity: (i) personal identity or corporate identity in the case of organizations, (ii) type identity, (iii) role identity(iiii) collective identity (which takes the relationship between” self” and “other” to its logical conclusion). He mentions that collective identity is a prerequisite for the existence of

interests and the same applies because without interests, identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction.

Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, one of the founders of constructivism argues that states much like individuals are living in a “world of our making”, where many entities such as “social facts” are created by human actions. Political scientists in this school put an emphasis on how ideas and identities are made, how they progress, and how they shape the way states understand and react to their circumstances. A common topic in constructivism is the capability of discourse to shape how political actors define themselves and their interests, thereby changing their behaviours (Behraves, 2011).

Constructivism emphasizes the employment of substantive empirical analysis as well as applying the theorization of humans as “socially embedded, communicatively constitutive and culturally empowered” beings – to international issues. Constructivists believe that the dynamic normative and epistemological interpretation of the material world decides the way the material world is shaped, and the way human actions and interactions shape it (Behraves, 2011).

Chernoff (2007) explained that the main argument of constructivism is that the international system is “socially constructed”, that is, it is “consisted of the way humans think and interact”. More importantly, the meaning of material ability with regard to power is developed on the premises of social interactions and common understandings, that is, the latter gives the former meaning (Adler, 2005).

To sum up, a state having an identity and the arguments that there is no difference between the existence of the international system and the "human conceptions" of the international system in constructivism establishes a link from behavioural science into political science and gives us the possibility to apply hierarchy of needs to states. Moreover, constructivist theories are perfectly suited to analyze how identities and interests of states can change over time, subsequently creating subtle shifts in states' behaviours and occasionally triggering far-reaching but sudden shifts in worldwide

issues (Behraves, 2011). The needs of an individual also change over time. A state is driven by its interest to act in constructivism like a person is motivated by his needs to behave in Maslow's theory. Therefore, as a model analyzing an individual's behavior motivated by needs, it can also be applied to explore the actions of a state (collective identity). But of course, the needs of a state are surely not exactly like a human being.

The European Union owns a set of institutions that make decisions and rules together, its citizens and social groups can speak out through interest groups and political parties within the institutions and it can make collective decisions to impact the society across the entire system, therefore the EU is a political system. The EU was founded on the values of "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights... These values are common to the Member States" (ARTICLE 2 TEU). It can be inferred that all its member states share those values ingrained in the EU law. ARTICLE 3 underscores the aim of the EU is to "promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples" which suggests that the EU and its member states will pursue those values when implementing their foreign policy. In terms of those values, the EU defines its identity and interests, and this identity will influence the EU's actions. Based on the analyses, we can conclude the EU has a collective identity, therefore, we can apply the Maslow's hierarchy of needs to explain the behaviours of the EU and the motivations behind them. According to constructivism, the EU is the "Self", and any other third country is the "other", in the following text the "Other" is the United States.

2.3 EU Global Strategy and EU's hierarchy of needs

At the beginning of the 2016 Global Strategy, it claimed "the purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned" (EU, 2016). It further points out that "our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before... We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are", this signifies that the EU wants to be a stronger actor and exert international influences in the world. "The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens' lives", the EU

is concerned with its internal and external security.

To sum up, the EU 's motivation for implementing the Global Strategy was for its existence, its internal and external security, external influences, and its ambition to be strong global actor. This demonstrates that the EU is an entity driven by five-level demands.

The lowest level of need for the EU is “survival” which is first based on the legitimacy of the EU. Through the EU member states' recognition of and compliance with the competence granted to the EU through the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can exercise a part of the sovereignty of the member states that have been transferred to the Union, which covers the economic and trade of most member states. Therefore, when some member states no longer support the EU to represent them, the EU's legitimacy is shaken. When the cohesion of the EU is challenged, the existence of the EU is challenged as well (Gabriel & Schmelcher, 2018). Almost all of the EU's exclusive competence is about economy(e.g. customs union, common commercial policy), which means the only the EU can exercise the power in common economic fields, in the meanwhile, the member states rest on the EU to develop the economy(e.g. single market, Euro area), therefore, economic development decides the EU's “survival”. It is currently the most important motivation for many member states to continue to support the EU. Therefore, the "survival" demand of the EU, that is, the legitimacy of the EU includes the economic development of the EU and the cohesion within the EU. The following analysis will focus on the economy, internal and external security of the EU. The EU declares that the economy as well as internal solidarity are the most powerful forces which contribute to the internal security, solving external security threats, and expand the influence of the EU. The report doesn't go into too much detail about its “survival”, but we can see that economy is its basic needs. Neither does it depict much about the EU's ambition to become a global actor.

But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled.

Our diplomatic network runs wide and deep in all corners of the globe. Economically, we are in the world's G3. We are the first trading partner and the first foreign investor for almost every country in the globe. Together we invest more in development cooperation than the rest of the world combined. It is also clear, though, that we are not making full use of this potential yet. (EU, 2016, p. 3)

Throughout the report, it seems the EU did not actually worry about its survival, and fully affirmed its own economic achievements. The EU believes that it is necessary to implement strategies to consolidate the stability, unity and prosperity within the EU, so it can gain strength to face the threats of external security in recent years and realize the export of normative power. The EU believes that the tools to realize these strategies will also achieve the EU's ambition to become a global force.

The EU in the report describes itself as an entity that has fulfilled its survival needs, economic needs, and currently ensures internal solidarity and security. Although the EU does not currently consider itself to be vulnerable to external security threats, it hopes to be prepared sufficiently and be able to apply diverse tools to face the challenges. In the report, the EU also emphasized the importance of maintaining the export of normative power to the rest of the world, which the EU should achieve more. Manners (2002) identifies EU's normative power consisting of 5 "core" norms: the centrality of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights and 4 "minor" norms: social solidarity; anti-discrimination; sustainable development; and good governance. In the strategy blueprint, the EU has a solid first-tier demand, and the second-tier demand is currently met too. The EU maintains a high level of satisfaction with the third level of demand, but due to new changes in recent years, the EU hopes to be prepared to address future pressure on this level of demand. The fourth level of demand is the goal that the EU is currently striving to achieve. The EU has done a lot of work with a clear goal and realised certain achievements, but it has not yet achieved what the EU expects. The fifth tier is just a

distant vision for the EU.

Regarding EU's external relations, the report provides only a few sentences on transatlantic relations making it difficult to explain the various reactions of the EU to the United States over the past few years.


With the US, the EU will strive for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, TTIP demonstrates the transatlantic commitment to shared values and signals our willingness to pursue an ambitious rules-based trade agenda. On the broader security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action. (EU, 2016, p. 37)

In the report, the EU claimed that the Iran Nuclear Deal is a successful template of the EU in managing the external security affairs and export of the power of rules and expressed its desire to continue to deepen its work on this agreement. With this template, the EU has shown a tendency to be more inclusive and exercise its capability in a limited way. It mentions several times inclusiveness towards different governance modes, "support such efforts, fostering inclusive governance at all levels" and multilateral talk, emphasizing "Restrictive measures, coupled with diplomacy" are the major instruments to solve disputes and "Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead" which means the EU will engage in a practical and principled way. It states that the EU cannot handle the external affairs (concerning external security, the export of normative power) alone, which suggest its limited capacity. Conversely, in concerns close to the EU's external geopolitical security, the narrative of the report is rather decisive. For example, in the disputes between Russia and Ukraine, it emphasised the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and its objection over the status of the Crimea and Ukraine. The report mentions "Managing the relationship with Russia is a key strategic challenge for the EU". But for its

neighbours, it designed very concrete policy tools to shape its relations with them. It mentions that it shall insist on its core values internally so that it can exert influence externally. It binds its core values with EU law, ethics and identity. In a word, the report outlines strategic thoughts towards both the internal and external security and the export of geopolitical influence with different degree of intensity.

Based on the previous reviews, we can develop the 5-tier of needs model of the EU as follows:

Figure 2: EU's 5-tier hierarchy of needs



Source: self-compilation

2.4 Transatlantic relations

Bond (2018) points out that historically, transatlantic relations, both politically and economically experience periodic and structural divergence through "shock-absorbers"; periodic divergence can be diluted through negotiation, and structural divergence can get more time to adjust. The problem with Trump is he is destroying such "shock-absorbers" formed by international organizations, and more and more Americans believe that a split from international organizations will make America greater (Bond, 2018). They are right - the multilateralism the EU pursues is constraining the US while strengthening the EU (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2019). As a

result, with the EU becoming more and more independent and ambitious, transatlantic relations may suffer shocks inevitably. This was not Trump's fault, such divergences have occurred in history between the two sides; Trump is no different from his predecessors in nature, yet the current divergence is more comprehensive and irreparable and Trump's governance mode makes it hard for the EU to launch effective talk with the US (Bond, 2018). The EU should be ready to anticipate the policy from the US as it won't change even if Trump is not in office and the US will continue to damage the multilateral trading regime, and Europe, without a common goal and policy instrument to transfer its economic power into global influence and with the existing internal problems, has to admit that it's not capable of being a defender of multilateralism (Bond, 2018). The EU believes that the US is a democratic regime, so their common interests will prevail over any divergence (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2019).

Now that transatlantic relations have fallen from its peak, US foreign policy surprised the EU (Bond, 2018). The US is moving its military focus to Asia, yet it requires Europeans to pay more to NATO to prove they are valuable enough to be protected by the US. However, in recent decades, due to the growing confidence and self-assurance, the voice among member states to call on Europe to protect itself is getting stronger (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2019). Europeans are losing confidence in the US dominating the world (Binnendijk, 2018). But the EU still believes that, with the support of a democratic system, it can strongly impact the US congress and public, and as a result, the transatlantic alliance won't be severely hurt by US (Bond, 2018). American views on Europe have been influenced by the President's populist comments, but generally they still support the transatlantic alliance (Bond, 2018). Despite the current statements by the US President that harm the values of the EU, clarification and effective diplomacy by US government departments have eased the tension. But it is worth noting that more and more moderate politicians are leaving the US government (Bond, 2018). Kaufmann and Lohaus (2018) argue that as a new

generation of Americans and Europeans grow up, their blood ties with each other becomes very weak. They mentioned that ethnic diversity on both sides of the Atlantic is weakening the mutual recognition of each other's culture. If this trend continues, with the seemingly unstoppable rise of populism and trade protectionism, the alliance will lose its foundation, and that is the moment when the alliance ends (Kaufmann & Lohaus, 2018).

The EU must stay alert to the destruction of multilateral relations and European cohesion by the US. The weakening of multilateral relations in the world is equal to the weakening of the EU—once the economic diplomacy consistency (to uphold multilateralism) is lost, the EU will lose its significance for survival (Kaufmann & Lohaus, 2018).

The US President's hostile attitude towards Europe is very interesting. He has threatened that if Europe doesn't increase its military spending, the US will no longer protect its allies. But in fact, only if the US withdraws military protection for Europe, can European countries really increase their military spending (Binnendijk, 2018). He also dislikes the EU's ambitions and he believes that the EU should not exist, but if the EU truly disappears, European countries will show greater political ambitions than they do now (Kaufmann & Lohaus, 2018).

Technological innovation is a new challenge to transatlantic relations, if the US cannot maintain its technological dominance, it means that Europe will compete with it, which will result in even more confrontation between the two sides (Kaufmann & Lohaus, 2018). If the US can maintain its technological dominance, Europe will follow it instead of trying to compete with it, which will promote the alliance.

Bond (2018) added that EU's China policy is also critical, cooperating with the US to formulate trade standards and compelling China to open its economy is in the common interest of the EU and US which can make the alliance stable. However, the EU cannot remain in step with the US since it damages the WTO (Bond, 2018).

CHAPTER III CASE STUDY

This section explains several actions taken by the US on some matters that have a major influence on the needs of the EU in the Trump era to explain the EU's various reactions including compromise, public criticism, and actual countermeasures to the US when its demands at different levels are threatened.

3.1 Paris Climate Agreement

As one of the main powers of the Paris Climate Agreement, the EU actively promoted the treaty to realize its own policy demands on the internal and external energy framework, and echoed the green economic development policy it promoted (Steinhauer, 2018). The EU declares that it will not negotiate free trade with countries that have not signed the Paris Agreement (Schneider-Petsinger, 2019) which reflects the EU's efforts to export its normative power by promoting this agreement. When the Agreement officially became an international treaty with legal force, it was supported by 196 countries in the world, of which 147 countries have officially signed and adopted the treaty provisions. This treaty almost meets the EU's highest level of need--pursuit of being global rule-maker in the climate change issue since the EU has been one of the leaders of this treaty with global policy influence.

In addition, from the perspective of Maslow's motivation theory, the successful expansion of the Paris Agreement covered all levels of EU needs, notably the realization of the export of the EU's normative power. When the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, the EU immediately suffered a major setback, due to the fact that it's difficult to guarantee the effectiveness of an international emissions reduction treaty from which the world's second largest emitter is absent. The US was originally the largest climate financier under the framework of the agreement, and 20% of the \$10.3 billion initial funding of the Convention's main financing instrument, Green Climate Fund (GCF), is not in place since the US stopped contributing funds (Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, 2017). The Paris Agreement reaffirmed the commitment made by developed countries at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference: raise US\$100

million per year by 2020 to help developing countries cope with the changing climate and help them bypass fossil fuel development and adopt cleaner alternative energy (Zhang, Dai, Lai, & Wang, 2017). Without the US's funding, this goal could not be achieved, thereby increasing the uncertainty of the implementation of Paris Agreement policy and greatly undermining the confidence of the acceding countries. This could reduce the ambition level of emission in the poorest countries and emerging economies that tend to use external aid as a condition for their national development (Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, 2017). Due to the negative example of the US, the power of anti-climate treaties is rising, for example, Australia is currently significantly increasing domestic emissions and has not fulfilled its commitments while developing new coal mines (Urpelainen & Van de Graaf, 2017). The Paris Agreement without US involvement was quickly reduced from an international treaty with real binding effects, and it is likely to be marginalized forever. This means that the EU's desire to become a participant in formulating global rules with the aid of the Paris Agreement, the EU's top-level need is almost destroyed.


However, the EU's response to the US withdrawal is at a very modest level. The European Commission did not condemn the withdrawal of the US more severely other than expressing regret saying the "US decision to begin its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is a disappointment but work against climate change will go on and Washington may one day want to rejoin the deal " (Emmott, 2019). Since withdrawing from the Agreement is a complicated and time-consuming process, the US government has begun to refuse to implement the agreement even before it has actually withdrawn from it (Steinhauer, 2018). This practice shows a serious contempt for and does damage to an international treaty and the members who value it. The EU is still trying to bring the US back to the negotiation table on an FTA – a strategy which doesn't adhere to its previous statement that it won't negotiate free trade with countries that have not signed the Paris Agreement, indicating that the EU has receded from its pursuit of being a global rule maker when confronted by the US. The EU is

even trying to make up for the withdrawal of the US from the Agreement. It claims that cooperation with the US on climate has not stopped because the country has not withdrawn from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Within the framework of the Paris Agreement, the EU will also continue to cooperate with US federal states and enterprises, as well as civil society organizations, so it can be considered that the US has not undermined the Paris Agreement (Ministry of the Environment, 2019). In the meanwhile, the EU has never given up efforts to call on the US government to return to the treaty. During the entire incident of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the EU only expressed regret for the country's wanton harm to the effectiveness of the treaty and unilateral decisions. It did not push for public opinion and practical confrontation but instead chose to accept and compromise and extenuating circumstance of the US by attempting at separating the withdrawal of the US government from the US itself.

In line with the EU's needs identified in this paper based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the top level of its need is indeed severely harmed by the US's unilateral action. The reason why the response given by the EU to the US withdrawal is very weak is that in the development of this event, the EU's next level of demand, the soft power export has received greater opportunities to grow. Due to its own economic need to increase emissions, it's not the first time that the US has undermined the global cooperation on addressing climate change. Before withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, there was a period of time when the US took the lead in global climate issues, and it's after the withdrawal of the US from them that the EU has tried to take over the leadership position (Steinhauer, 2018). Soon After the US announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the EU began a strategic transformation almost immediately. It issued a statement reiterating the Paris Agreement and announcing that it would develop more multilateral climate cooperation with China, Canada, and non-state partners (including US states and civil society). As the US's position in the climate cooperation framework has clearly been

reduced, the EU has become the most important driving force of the Agreement. Despite the inevitable decline in the international effectiveness of the Paris Agreement and the EU's hope to achieve its highest demand—to become the global rule-maker seems to be delayed to the indefinite future, it has the strongest voice in the global climate cooperation framework. Only after the US cedes this position will the EU have this chance. According to Maslow's theory, when the needs of each level clash with each other, the subject will choose to temporarily ignore or even abandon the higher level of demand to make sure that the more basic level of demand can be guaranteed. As in this case the EU's lower tier of demand, the export of normative power has been met very realistically, therefore, the EU demonstrates a weaker response to the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement which hinders its realization of the fifth tier demand and basically tended to compromise and cooperate with the country in a low profile.

Figure 3: The situation of EU's five-tier of needs in the Paris Agreement case



Source: self-compilation

3.2 Iran Nuclear Deal

The EU has always regarded the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement as one of its important diplomatic achievements. In the EU's global strategy, it reiterates that

the Iran nuclear agreement is an important tool for the EU (EU, 2016). The Iranian nuclear issue has always been one of the top priorities of the EU's external security policy. Iran is a neighbour of the Union and guards the strategic channel and oil supply line connecting Asia and Europe. Therefore, the stability of the Iranian region matters significantly to European energy security. Concurrently, the EU deems Iran's mastery of nuclear weapons as a huge threat to its external security. The EU opposes military intervention to solve the issue and strives to advance dialogue with Iran under the multilateral mechanism. Within the framework of the Iranian nuclear agreement, the EU proposes to use a long-term suspension of development of nuclear weapons instead of permanent termination to delay the possession of Iran's nuclear weapons in order to obtain approval from various factions in Iran (EUMA, 2007). The EU used the UN framework to invite other important forces to successfully achieve the goal of ensuring its external security through the Iran Agreement in 2015, that is, to ensure that Iran cannot quickly manufacture nuclear weapons while maintaining regional peace, proving the effectiveness of the EU's normative power to the world (Adebahr, 2020).

Through the Deal, the EU has launched a series of economic projects with Iran and plans to conduct more dialogues with Iran's neighbours to maintain the stability in the Gulf region. The withdrawal of the US from the Deal and its imposition of sanctions on Iran threaten the influence of EU normative power in the region. Iran has violated more and more limitations imposed on it by JCPOA so that the E3 (France, Britain and Germany) launched the JCPOA's dispute-resolution mechanism in January 2020 (Adebahr, 2020), which means that the entire deal is on the verge of being torn. The breach of the limitations is not a unilateral act by Iran but is triggered by the reality that the EU cannot fulfill the economic commitments made to Iran in the Deal under the sanction of the US. Under the threat of US sanctions, EU companies are unable to conduct normal business in Iran, and the trade volume between the EU and Iran has dropped sharply. At present, EU-Iran trade is at its


lowest level before nuclear talks started in 2003. From 2018 to 2019, the total trade volume between Iran and EU28 decreased by 72%. In the same period, Iran's exports to Europe fell below 1 billion € (1.1 billion US dollars), a drop of up to 93%, and European exports to Iran halved to around 4.5 billion € (48 billion US dollars)(Adebahr, 2020). In order not to offend the US sanction, the EU could not even deliver enough medical supplies to Iran through humanitarian aid channels when the Iran was hit hard by COVID-19 pandemic, while at the same time, US Apple mobile stores have sufficient supplies in the Iranian market (Adebahr, 2020). The US government claims to put Iran under extreme pressure, and the consequence is that Iran's economic downturn, turmoil, rising prices, currency devaluation, and social welfare cuts have led to large-scale demonstrations and crackdowns. U.S. policy is taking effect, reversing Iran's future in the opposite direction expected by the EU (BBC, 2019b). Washington requires its Gulf allies not to accept any negotiations to demonstrate its firm anti-Iranian position, as a result, the EU's appeal to use the dialogue mechanism to ease conflicts in the region has not been answered (Adebahr, 2020). In this issue, US policy caused serious harm to the EU's exercise of normative power. If the Iranian nuclear deal fails to maintain the stability of Iran, it's likely that the US may eventually choose to take military action against Iran. The EU will also face a deteriorating external security environment and the influx of more refugees, thereby threatening internal security.

In its hierarchy of needs, the second, third and fourth tier of needs are under pressure, among which the third tier-external security and fourth tier-export of normative power receive most pressure. The complete failure of the Iranian nuclear deal under U.S. pressure proves that the EU's policy of exporting normative power is hypocritical and impotent. Unlike the Paris Agreement, in this case, the EU seems unable to satisfy its needs on other tiers by the US's withdrawal from the deal. The Iranian nuclear deal that has lost recognition by the US is undoubtedly dominated by the EU, however the EU lacks the capacity to continue to expand its normative power

in the region which has even been weakened with the rising anti-Western national sentiment in Iran, thus illustrating the failure of its normative power. The Paris Agreement without the involvement of the US government is still exerting influence in the world including the US. Other countries and civil societies actively participate in the Agreement and are willing to accept the leadership of the EU, which greatly strengthens the power of the Agreement and benefits the EU as well. In contrast, the Iranian nuclear deal is an agreement involving a few powerful governments, covering sensitive military issues. The US not only withdrew from the agreement, but also stood on the opposite side, imposing sanctions on companies supporting the agreement. The EU cannot afford to fill the void left by the US, nor can it resist the continued destruction of the agreement by the US. The EU's response was not only to express public dissatisfaction with the US, but also to make an official declaration, accusing it harming the stability of the region (Council of the EU, 2018). The leaders of Germany and France have publicly claimed that the unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the US on Iran are unacceptable, and unilateral actions have disrupted the world order (BBC, 2018). What's more, the EU has also tried to resist the US in actual operations by exploring a so-called blocking statute and a Special Purpose Vehicle to circumvent US sanctions to protect European companies from U.S. legal interference when trading in Iran (Schwammenthal, 2018). The E3 initiated INSTEX to enable their domestic companies to complete transactions with Iran without going through US banks or using US currency despite the warning from the U.S. government that using this payment method to conduct sanctionable trade with Iran will not be tolerated by the US. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and other member states soon joined the system and prepared to expand the trading scope of the payment system (Lipin, 2019). There are also growing voices within the EU arguing that it should act immediately to counter the destruction of the EU's efforts in Iran, and to develop broader regional cooperation to offset the US's opposing forces (Adebahr, 2020).

In this case, the EU did not completely compromise when some tiers of its needs were under pressure from the US. It expressed publicly that it was not opposed to the US, but it did have a counterattack to a certain extent. The EU adopts countermeasure in a prudent way without further provoking the US to maintain Iranian nuclear deal as much as possible.

Figure 4: The situation of EU's five-tier of needs in the Iran Nuclear Deal case



Source: self-compilation

3.3 Nord Stream 2

Just as the EU generally deems its policy on Ukraine as the policy on Russia (Riddervold & Rosén, 2018), the EU's policy on the Nord Stream 2 project can also be seen as an extension of its Russian policy. After years of economic sanctions against Russia, the construction of this huge energy transmission project will exert a profound impact on the EU's Russia policy. It is worth noting that many international views argue that Russia also regards this project as a means to export its soft power to the EU (Banciu, 2016). Since the beginning of the project, the differences between the Northern and Southern EU members have been created, and many member states cannot accept the greater political risk that comes with the construction of Nord Stream 2 due to increased dependency on one gas supplier and the more technical and

financial risks in the European gas system brought by importing more liquefied natural gas (Eser, Chokani, & Abhari, 2019). The EU has been trying to coordinate the different voices of member states to realize this major project concerning EU energy security. The project complies with the three major demands of EU policy for its own energy future: safety, diversification, and sustainability. The project is designed to bypass several oil and gas routes from Russia to the EU (transiting through Poland or the Ukraine) which is full of uncertainties, allowing it to meet the EU's future energy demand (Eser et al., 2019). This is particularly in line with the economic demands of Germany, one of the core countries of the EU, to develop its own industry and therefore secure sufficient oil and gas energy in the future. With the advancement of science and technology, energy competition is related to the leading position of geo-competition, and the economies that solve the energy problem will have a stronger capacity to compete for the upper level of the global value chain and fight against rising protectionism (Scholten, Crieckemans, & Graaf, 2019). Nord Stream 2 project entails several tiers of needs of the EU.

U.S. obstruction by imposing sanctions on relevant companies interrupted the progress of this project. The US economic sanctions directly led the Swiss engineering company Allseas to quit the project, and the Russian engineering company which took over the job was also blocked by the Protecting Europe's Security Clarification Act enacted by the US. As a result, laying pipes came to a halt. The severe sanctions by the US are likely to be extended to all personnel who are still involved in the project, including all companies and individuals who have contributed to the installation of pipelaying vessels, as well as IT service companies, insurance companies and certification agencies, making it increasingly difficult for Germany to complete the project, and even the officials at local German and EU levels who support this project may be added to the sanction list (Kinkartz, 2020). This American practice is essentially a comprehensive attack on the EU economy (Kluth, 2020).


What makes this case distinct from the previous two cases is that the US action

against Nord Stream 2 poses a greater threat to the EU by tearing apart the EU and undermining the EU's attempts at settling the opposing voices among member states to the project through dialogues. Countries such as Poland in Eastern Europe have been very suspicious of Russia's export of soft power and energy control risks to the EU through this project. They are also very dissatisfied because the project bypassed its territory and directly routed into Germany, losing a large amount of transit costs they can acquire. Under the strong intervention of the US, the voice against Nord Stream 2 has heated up within the EU, exposing the inconsistency of opinions within the Union to the world. If the member states cannot speak with a common voice, the EU will lose the initiative to lead the member states. In the process of undermining the project by the US, the EU's policy to ensure energy security in the west and the economic blueprint that echoed it was thwarted and its political intentions to establish deeper ties with Russia were also impeded.

In this case, its third and fourth tier of needs are both damaged, in the meanwhile the lower two tiers of needs, namely, the pursuit of internal solidarity and economic advancement or even the EU's sovereignty, the internal security are threatened. Therefore, the EU reacted more strongly towards the US than in the previous two cases. On November 21, 2019, the EU put forward a clear stand against US sanctions: "As a matter of principle, the EU opposes the imposition of sanctions against EU companies conducting legitimate business"(BBC, 2019a). On June 25 this year, the High Representative of the EU, Joseph Borrell, in an open written letter to the US, claimed the US sanctions against European companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project unacceptable and breach international law (Iden, 2020), bringing the two sides into confrontation. The Left Party's Ernst in Germany even expect the European Commission to take further actions such as designating the EU Commissioners and German Economy Minister, Peter Altmaier go to Washington "to unambiguously communicate the German and wider European position on Nord Stream 2" and not rule out sanctions directed against US natural gas or on US policymakers (Kinkartz,

2020). At the same time, the EU is continuing to communicate with Russia to restart the construction of the project. In this case, the EU not only publicly and severely condemned the US at the highest political level, but in practice, it did not avoid the confrontation with the US through evasion and compromise as in the case of the Iran nuclear deal, but ignored the US's objection and insist on continuing to complete the Nord Stream 2 project and threaten countermeasures against the US. In its hierarchy of needs, since the basic tier of needs is threatened, the EU tends to react more strongly than when the higher tiers of needs are threatened even if there is a risk of enraging the US and making the situation worse.

Figure 5: The situation of EU's five-tier of needs in the Nord Stream 2 case




Source: self-compilation

3.4 US-EU trade war

In 2018, the United States' global-scale bilateral trade war started. On June 6, it imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum from the EU on the grounds of national security, affecting 6.4-billion € worth of EU goods. On 22 June the EU retaliated with proportionate steps impacting 2.8-billion € value on US goods. Then the US threatened to impose 20% tax on cars assembled in Europe; the EU responded by

warning that it would retaliate against nearly US\$300 billion in US exports. This trade dispute only subsided after the US lifted the European metal tax in late July. In April 2019, the US announced plans to increase taxes on 25 billion € worth of goods sourced from the EU, and the European Commission immediately indicated that it would consider taxing 20 billion € worth of goods from the US. In July, the US declared that it would retaliate against France which adopted the digital service tax which would significantly harm the interests of the US companies. The European Commission intervened in the dispute, saying that the EU should unite to target the US's retaliatory tariffs and resolve the dispute through the WTO mechanism. The US has had trade disputes with the EU more than once in history and used tariff tools to exert pressure, and the EU mainly uses three methods to counteract this: levy retaliatory tariffs, challenge the US through the WTO mechanism, and formulate economic security measures to protect the internal market (Demertzis & Fredriksson, 2018). The reason why the US uses tariff tools against the EU to cause trade disputes is mainly to reduce the trade deficit between two blocs and obtain greater economic benefits. Such actions do not hurt the top four tiers of needs of the EU, but directly affect the economic power of the EU. Easily yielding to the pressure of the US will undoubtedly weaken the economic interests of the EU and continued trade disputes may also lead to recession in the Union (Demertzis & Fredriksson, 2018). This has an impact on the EU's lowest level need, "survival". Active countermeasures have been taken to resolutely retaliate against the US, pressing it to finally reach acceptable trade rules with the EU and in this way safeguard EU's economic power. In the process of defending the most basic demands, the EU tried to show a strong cohesive force and act with a common voice to fight for the equivalent status with the US (Schneider-Petsinger, 2019).

Figure 6: The situation of EU's five-tier of needs in the Paris Agreement case



Source: Self-compilation



CHAPTER IV DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

Maslow's hierarchy presents the individual's needs and priority levels of the individual's actions based on his/her needs in a framework. When we use constructivism to review international issue, Maslow's hierarchy provides us with a mature framework to classify all aspects of the impacts of the issue and helps explain the reasonable motivations behind actions taken by international entities which have collective identities.

This paper employs the Maslow's hierarchy of needs to the EU and identifies the EU's demand hierarchy in response to the US when its demands are harmed. It seeks to provide a framework for categorizing EU behaviour as attempts to satisfy its survival, internal security, external security, export of normative power, and global-rule maker needs. The EU's responses range from: compromising, a weak response, to expressing regret and dissatisfaction in the media; an intermediate response by public criticism or emphasizing the issue at various administrative levels in the EU that it will not follow the US policy; a strong response by threatening to retaliate. In practice, a weak EU response will try to accept and cooperate with US policies to reduce harm and seek concessions, for example, in the Paris Agreement, the EU has repeatedly promoted the impression that the US is still in the Agreement, and continues to cooperate on all aspects and stay united with the US. As the response escalated, the EU used various policy tools to circumvent the pressure from the US. For example, in the Iran nuclear agreement, the EU established laws and channels to evade US economic sanctions. The strong reaction the EU adopted a policy of hedging with the US to directly reduce the impact of its policy, and even threaten with retaliation against the US to prevent further US actions. In the Nord Stream 2 project, the EU tends to give a more and more strong level response. As the issue is still ongoing, we may witness the escalation of measures from the EU in the near future.

Table 1: The EU's reaction mechanism towards the US on four issues

Events	Public propaganda campaign	Official condemnation	Retaliation (threat)
US withdrawal from Paris Agreement	Yes		
US withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal	yes	yes	
US sanction on Nord Stream 2	yes	yes	Yes
US-EU Trade war	yes	yes	yes

Source: self-compilation

By examining the response of the EU in the four cases from the Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it can be concluded that the EU gave a reaction that tended to resist when the lower tiers of demands were challenged. When the top-tier demands were under pressure, the EU tended to give in to pressure.

It is worth noting that when mapping the EU's response to the US to the tier of EU demands, the relationship to the US itself is also an important foundation for demand of the EU at all tiers. As the largest trading partner and long-term security provider of the EU, the US has the same ideology, the same political system which itself is a factor that cannot be ignored at all levels of demand of the EU, especially the needs at the lower three levels. With that in mind, by employing the Maslow's theory, we can better understand why when the top-level demand of the EU is under pressure from the US, the EU tends to circumvent and compromise, since the response of the EU is consistent with the principles of Maslow's theory. When the top-level demand conflicts with the more basic level of demand, the EU should choose to temporarily abandon the pursuit of top-level demand to ensure more basic-level demand. However, when the decision of the US has affected the lower

demand of the EU, its response will correspondingly increase.

Hopefully, the model should provide the reader with a framework to look at any situation, events around the world, or EU's long-term foreign policy targets, and forecast public support and response from the EU. It takes a lot of thought to know what level of need this international organization or others is at, and the levels of needs may adjust quickly. The correct packaging of an issue may place it at the right level of interest. Discussion of how to react to the issues should be undertaken only after identifying the correct collective interest of a certain actor. Finally, policy makers must correctly identify the appropriate resources, the appropriate objectives, develop a workable strategy, and then plan and implement the foreign policies or responses accordingly.

The limitation of the research is the macro approach in viewing the EU. Since there are many actors, different parties, interest groups in the decision-making process of the EU (3 key institutions, 7 parties in the parliaments) which all may have competing ideologies, and those may affect how the EU responds to a certain issue.

Further research can focus on how the different actors' needs in the EU fluctuate along the five tiers and finally affect the decision-making process in the Union. In addition, the cases in this article are more about the reactions of the EU upon certain issues, further research can also work on the preemptive actions that the EU may take before the major players in the world do to satisfy its needs in the five tiers.

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