# Challenges in Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force

Lt.Col. Thanaphat Diewvilai



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

An Independent Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations

Department of International Relations

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Chulalongkorn University

Academic Year 2022

Copyright of Chulalongkorn University

# ความท้าทายในการจัดตั้งกองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพอาเซียน

พ.ท.ธนภัทร์ เดี่ยววิไล

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

สารนิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญารัฐศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต
สาขาวิชาความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างประเทศ ภาควิชาความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างประเทศ
คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
ปีการศึกษา 2565
ลิขสิทธิ์ของจุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

| | |
|---|---|
| Independent Study Title | Challenges in Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force |
| By | Lt.Col. Thanaphat Diewvilai |
| Field of Study | International Relations |
| Thesis Advisor | Assistant Professor KASIRA CHEEPPENSOOK, Ph.D. |

Accepted by the FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Chulalongkorn University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Master of Arts

INDEPENDENT STUDY COMMITTEE

..... Chairman

(Assistant Professor Pongphisoot Busbarat, Ph.D.)

..... Advisor

(Assistant Professor KASIRA CHEEPPENSOOK, Ph.D.)

..... Examiner

(Assistant Professor TEEWIN SUPUTTIKUN, Ph.D.)

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

ธนภัทร์ เดี่ยววิไล : ความท้าทายในการจัดตั้งกองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพอาเซียน. ( Challenges in Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force ) อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก : ผศ. ดร.กษิร ชีพเป็นสุข

สารนิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ใช้หลัก "วัฏจักรของบรรทัดฐาน (Norm's life cycle)" ภายใต้แนวคิดพลวัตของบรรทัดฐานระหว่างประเทศ (International Norms Dynamics) เพื่อระบุหาสาเหตุ และเป็นกรอบการวิเคราะห์ความท้าทายในการจัดตั้งกองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพอาเซียน โดยมีข้อเสนอว่า การจัดตั้งกองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพอาเซียน ยังคงอยู่ในขั้นการเกิดขึ้นของบรรทัดฐาน (Norm Emergence) ยังไม่ได้รับการยอมรับอย่างกว้างขวางจากชาติสมาชิกอาเซียน จนถึงเกณฑ์ที่จะเปลี่ยนไปสู่ขั้นการกระจายตัวของบรรทัดฐาน (Norm Cascade) และขั้นการยึดถือปฏิบัติอย่างแท้จริง (Norm Internalization) ที่อาเซียนยอมรับเป็นแนวปฏิบัติ ทั้งนี้ การที่อาเซียนมี "วิถีอาเซียน (ASEAN Way)" เป็นบรรทัดฐานที่ยาวนานและทรงพลัง ได้เป็นอุปสรรคต่อการพัฒนาของบรรทัดฐานใหม่นี้ภายในกรอบอาเซียน

อย่างไรก็ตาม การจัดตั้งกองกำลังรักษาสันติภาพของอาเซียนไม่ใช่เรื่องที่เป็นไปไม่ได้ ชาติสมาชิกอาเซียนต้องร่วมกันหาความสมดุล ระหว่างการปฏิบัติตามบรรทัดฐานหลักของวิถีอาเซียน และการปรับเข้าหาข้อกำหนดในการปฏิบัติการรักษาสันติภาพของสหประชาชาติ โดยคำนึงถึงผลประโยชน์ขององค์การเหนือกว่าผลประโยชน์ของชาติสมาชิกตนเอง

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

สาขาวิชา ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างประเทศ ลายมือชื่อนิสิต .....
ปีการศึกษา 2565 ลายมือชื่อ อ.ที่ปรึกษาหลัก .....

# # 6480049324 : MAJOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

KEYWORD: ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, Norm's Life Cycle, ASEAN Norms, ASEAN Way

Thanaphat Diewvilai : Challenges in Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force . Advisor: Asst. Prof. KASIRA CHEEPPENSOOK, Ph.D.

This research consults with the "norm's life cycle" under international norm dynamics concept to identify and analyze the challenges in establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. This study argues that the emergent norm of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force has not yet reached the threshold to transition into the second stage of norm cascade where it is widely embraced by ASEAN member states; and the norm has not reached the stage of norm internalization where it is accepted within the practices of ASEAN. The presence of long-standing and powerful norms within the "ASEAN Way" hinders the advancement and full integration of this new norm within the ASEAN framework.

However, establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force is not impossible. An equilibrium between preserving the core norms of the ASEAN Way and adapting to the requirements of United Nations peacekeeping operations is necessitated to overcome these obstacles. ASEAN member states are expected to prioritize the interests of the organization over those of individual nations.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

Field of Study: International Relations Student's Signature .....

Academic Year: 2022 Advisor's Signature .....

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Independent Study would not have been possible without the advice, assistance, and encouragement of many people. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Asst. Prof. Kasira Cheeppensook, Ph.D., for providing invaluable guidance and support throughout the research process. Her insightful ideas and perspectives were instrumental in shaping this article, and I am truly grateful for her expertise, knowledge, and kindness.

Apart from that, I would like to thank my research project committees, Asst. Prof. Pongphisoot Busbarat, Ph.D., and Asst. Prof. Teewin Suputtikun, Ph.D., for providing advice and guidance that helped me complete this research paper. Thanks should also go to professors from the International Relations Department and my dear classmates from MAIR 19.

My appreciation also extends to my mother, father, and siblings who have always support and encourage me for academic pursuit. Moreover, I am so grateful that my colleagues understand my circumstances. The knowledge acquired through this postgraduate degree program will be utilized to contribute towards the development of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters and the prosperity of our nation.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge and take full responsibility for any oversights and mistakes that may have occurred in this paper. The author alone bears the responsibility for all errors.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

Thanaphat Diewvilai

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Page**

ABSTRACT (THAI) ..... iii

ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) ..... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... vi

Introduction ..... 1

Theoretical Framework on ASEAN's Diplomacy and Security Culture ..... 6

The ASEAN Way ..... 9

Concept of United Nations Peacekeeping Force ..... 17

ASEAN Cooperation on Peacekeeping ..... 19

Challenges ..... 25

Positive Trends and Opportunities ..... 29

Conclusion and Recommendations ..... 31

REFERENCES ..... 33

VITA ..... 38

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

## Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand when five countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand - signed the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration). Since its foundation, the aims and purposes of ASEAN have been to cooperate in the economic, social, cultural, and other fields; and to promote regional peace and stability through the rule of law, adhering to the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Declaration determined that the Association would be open for participation by all states in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to its aims, principles, and purposes. It proclaimed ASEAN as representing "the collective will of the nations in Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation, and through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity."[1] After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN's membership then started to expand; and it currently has 10 member countries, with Brunei Darussalam joining in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.[2] The ASEAN region has a population of more than 600 million and covers a total area of about 4.5 million square kilometers.[3]

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), signed by the five founding members of ASEAN in 1976, is the cornerstone of ASEAN's behavioral doctrine for collective decision-making aimed at overseeing inter-governmental relations and resolving intra-ASEAN conflicts, while also engage external powers in an informal and non-confrontational style.[4] The treaty emphasizes the principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Additionally, it aims to promote cooperation, friendship, and mutual respect among ASEAN member countries; and between ASEAN and its external partners.[5]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

---

[1] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Bangkok Declaration," (August 8, 1967).

[2] "About ASEAN ", 2020, accessed Dec 2, 2022, https://asean.org/about-asean.

[3] Chung-in Moon, "ASEAN," (Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2023). https://www.britannica.com/topic/ASEAN.

[4] Pek Koon Heng, "The Asean Way and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea," *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper*, no. 2014/121 (2014): 1-2.

[5] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia," (February 24, 1976).

However, ASEAN differs from the European Union (EU) in many ways. While the European Union operates under highly institutionalized and rules-based system, where member states are subject to supranational authority through common decision-making institutions, such as the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union;[6] ASEAN is an inter-governmental organization, which adopts a less institutionalized and more informal approach to regional integration. The ASEAN norm of upholding national sovereignty and "the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion," as stated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), has constrained the ASEAN Secretariat's role to that of a coordinating entity with limited political mandate or authority for the implementation of policies. Despite its creation in Jakarta in 1976, the Secretariat continues to face issues of insufficient staffing and funding, which hinders its ability to possess the bureaucratic and legal capacity necessary for independent decision-making. Accordingly, it must defer to the collective will of its member states.[7] The basic mandate of the ASEAN Secretariat is only "to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities."[8]

ASEAN member states have adopted a unique approach to political and security cooperation, known as the ASEAN Way, which is characterized by a preference for avoiding institutional over-centralization and voluntary dismissal of sovereign decision-making authority.[9] This approach comprises six core norms: (1) sovereign equality, (2) non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, (3) non-interference and non-intervention, (4) non-involvement

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[6] "Types of Institutions and Bodies," accessed Dec 10, 2022, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en.

[7] Heng, "The Asean Way and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea," 2-3; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia."

[8] "ASEAN Secretariat," 2020, accessed Dec 12, 2022, https://asean.org/the-asean-secretariat-basic-mandate-functions-and-composition/.

[9] Jürgen Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 4-5.

of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, (5) quiet diplomacy, and (6) mutual respect and tolerance.[10] The ASEAN Way has been interpreted as a means of identity building that combines modern principles of interstate relations; with traditional and culture-specific modes of socialization and decision-making. Thus, the conceptualizations of the ASEAN Way highlight its importance as a normative framework for mediating disputes, guiding interactions, and supporting a process of identity building.[11]

Moreover, the ASEAN Way serves as a Code of Conduct that not only functions as a diplomatic norm but also as an essential political process. It has been developed over time since the founding of the organization and its concepts continue to be applied to all member states.[12] Even after the implementation of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which granted ASEAN a legal personality and institutionalized the organization's activities, the ASEAN Way still plays a vital role in guiding ASEAN's decision-making and institutional framework. The Charter upholds the principles of the ASEAN Way by promoting dialogue and cooperation among member states, as well as acknowledging the need for collective action in response to regional challenges. At the same time, it also recognizes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states by respecting their political systems and cultures.[13]

However, the disagreements among member states revealed fundamental differences in their respective goals for the Charter. While five founding member states sought to create a more cohesive regional organization, newer members preferred to maintain ASEAN's role as a mediator between Southeast Asian governments. These divergent views extended to the ASEAN Way, with older members generally viewing it as a norm to facilitate cooperation and newer members primarily seeing it as a norm of non-interference. These contrasting perceptions among ASEAN

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[10] Ibid., 7.

[11] Ibid., 4.

[12] Pranee Thiparat, *ASEAN Community: Myth and Reality* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2018), 22.

[13] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *The ASEAN Charter* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January, 2008).

member states can be interpreted as a confrontation between the desire to expand more cohesive cooperation and strong commitment to the principle of non-intervention.[14]

Although the processes by which ASEAN states interact have expanded through further cooperation, the basic structure of ASEAN remains constrained by the differing capabilities and potentials of its member states. This presents that both constructivism and realism are involved in shaping the regional order in Southeast Asia.[15] As a result, the effort to create deeper cooperation raises questions about the development of the ASEAN Way, particularly regarding peace and security integration, such as the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

Most ASEAN member states currently participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, but their contribution remains at the national level. In 2022, seven out of ten ASEAN member countries are troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines are the current ASEAN member states that provide troops and police to United Nations missions.[16] This raises the question of why ASEAN has not been able to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force to support the United Nations on behalf of the organization.

While numerous studies have focused on the issue of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, there is limited research that explores its relationship with ASEAN's core norms. To fill this gap, this paper consults with the norm's "life cycle" under international norm dynamics concept to identify and analyze the challenges in establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. This study is motivated by ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture, associated with regional peacekeeping cooperation, notably in creating a collective unit of regional peacekeepers.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[14] Lee Leviter, "The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?," *Journal of International Law and Politics* 43, no. 159 (2010): 193-195.

[15] Ludovica Marchi, "Constructivism and Realism and the Crucial Nature of Security: ASEAN and Myanmar (1991-2012)," *Seoul National University Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (2020): 67-68.

[16] "Troop and Police Contributors," United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023, accessed April 26, 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

This research argues that the emergent norm of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force has not yet reached the threshold to transition into the second stage of norm cascade where it is widely embraced by ASEAN member states; and the norm has not reached the stage of norm internalization where it is accepted within the practices of ASEAN. The presence of long-standing and powerful norms within the ASEAN Way hinders the advancement and full integration of this new norm within the ASEAN framework. The study aims to analyze the six core norms of ASEAN as reflected in the ASEAN Way, and to identify the challenges in forming a contingent of ASEAN peacekeepers. Specifically, the study will highlight the limitations and impediments that arise from the organization's core norms; and will finally address the question of what needs to be overcome in order to successfully establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

This research adopts a constructivist perspective to explore how norms, ideas, and identities shape ASEAN's collective cooperation, particularly in peacekeeping matters. Through this lens, the study aims to provide clear understandings of the complex and evolving nature of ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. It analyzes ASEAN's norm entrepreneurship under the initiative of Indonesia, and the motives of a norm entrepreneur cannot be complete without reference to "altruism, empathy, and ideational commitment."[17] In the case of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, the norm may not be about empathy or altruism, but refers to the appropriate ASEAN cooperation as an ideational commitment and further normalizing ASEAN's role in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The analysis offers insights into the dynamics of regional peacekeeping cooperation and mentions the significance of shared norms and identities in achieving collective action in ASEAN.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

The research methodology involves exploring the core principles of regional cooperation in ASEAN, analyzing changes in attitudes towards peacekeeping operations collaboration, and conducting an analysis of the establishment of a regional peacekeeper contingent to identify regional cooperation characteristics. The objective is to demonstrate how reliance on the ASEAN Way approach can hinder the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The study will use

---

[17] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 898.

a qualitative approach based on document research, including primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include Joint Statements, institutional documents, working papers, and speeches related to cooperation in peacekeeping operations among ASEAN countries, while secondary sources are comprised of journal articles, reviews, and academic books.

The research will be divided into seven sections. Section 1 will explore the theoretical framework on ASEAN's diplomacy and security culture. Section 2 will outline the six-core regional institutional norms as reflected in the ASEAN Way. Section 3 will explain the concept of United Nations peacekeeping force. Section 4 will present an overview of ASEAN cooperation on peacekeeping. Section 5 will analyze the impact of the ASEAN Way in order to identify challenges encountered in establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. Section 6 will show positive trends and opportunities that exist for the establishment of a regional peacekeeping contingent, despite the challenges faced by ASEAN. Finally, Section 7 will provide the conclusion and recommendations based on the findings of the study.

## Theoretical Framework on ASEAN's Diplomacy and Security Culture

The concept of diplomatic and security culture brings together the two distinct concepts of diplomatic culture and security culture, which are not clearly defined concepts. A diplomatic culture refers to a common set of ideas and values among state representatives, while security culture involves shared ideas, norms, and practices that enhance the security of social actors, including states. A diplomatic and security culture provides a normative framework for leaders and diplomats to mediate their estrangement and insecurity.[18]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

According to Alexander Wendt, a prominent constructivist scholar, social structures in International Relations are not just based on material resources, but also on shared knowledge and practices. Social structures are objective, but their existence is dependent on the shared understanding of the people involved. The functioning and existence of social structures are fundamentally rooted in ideas which influence how individuals and groups interact, form relationships, and

[18] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 2-3.

organize themselves within society. In other words, social structures are "ideas all the way down."[19] The constructivist theory attempts to bridge this gap by separating "interest" from "identity" and emphasizes that a community is socially constructed through knowledge, norms, culture, and other cooperative associations over time.[20]

Jürgen Haacke, a constructivist scholar, assumes that states are not corporate persons but rather individuals who act as agents for the state in specific roles. Understanding the perceptions of state leaders as individuals within their social-political context is crucial to determining state behavior. State leaders, and foreign and defense officials, are primarily concerned with ensuring security, which includes not only territorial integrity and political autonomy, but also their own political survival and well-being. Political survival can be threatened by factors such as challenges to the political system or policies. In addition, the ontological insecurity of certain leaders can lead to perceptions of threats related to interstate or regime security.[21]

State and government leaders are constantly involved in the process of identity-formation, seeking to gain respect and recognition for their achievements and roles as representatives. The emergence of diplomatic and security cultures happens through mutual recognition and can act as a guide, creating expectations and influencing decision-making processes. Adherence to these norms reinforces their validity and can build trust, but the culture may be contested, leading to its downfall. It is essential to note that a diplomatic and security culture is just a single element of the larger context that affects foreign policy decisions, which include domestic developments, material needs, and changes in the international sphere.[22] That is why States should be regarded as "notional entities" rather than corporate persons with a single will and possessing qualities or attributes that apply to human personality. The behavior of a state refers to the actions of individuals who act in specific roles as agents for the state. The recent sociological perspective in International Relations stresses that the behavior of a state is influenced by the perceptions

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[19] Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 72-74.

[20] Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

[21] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 11-12.

[22] Ibid., 12-13.

of individual leaders, who are representatives of the particular social-political setting in which they operate.[23]

The concept of Constructivism proposes that the cooperation process among states can have a positive impact on their relations by internalizing regulatory norms. These norms can influence state behavior and promote a common habit of peaceful conduct. Amitav Acharya argues that the constructivist theory has renewed interest in security communities and shaped a new discourse in three areas. Firstly, security communities are constructed through interactions, socialization, norm setting, and identity building. Secondly, norms have a transformative impact on state behavior, shaping collective interests and identities. Finally, constructivism recognizes the role of ideational and cultural factors in shaping state interests, going beyond material forces.[24]

According to Martha Finnermore and Kathryn Sikking, a norm's "life cycle" includes three phases: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization. Norm entrepreneurs introduce and attempt to convince a mass of states to embrace new norms in the first stage. The transition to the second stage occurs at a "tipping point" or threshold of normative change, where a critical mass of relevant state actors become norm leaders and adopt new norms. Although scholars did not clarify the exact required number of the threshold, empirical studies suggest that norm tipping rarely occurs before one-third of the total states in the system adopt the norm. As for the last stage, norms become widely accepted and obtain a "taken-for-granted" status without public debate.[25] In the case of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, Indonesia is the norm entrepreneur who attempts to change other ASEAN member states' mindsets by promoting a collective regional force, which could both effectively address diverse crises in Southeast Asia region and efficiently promote regional contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[23] Ibid., 11.

[24] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 3rd ed., Politics in Asia Series, (London: Routledge, 2014), 3-4.

[25] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895-905.

Donald E. Weatherbee notes that the Association prioritizes mutual recognition of its identity over legal or institutional progress. Critics argue that this identity is not shared with the populations of Southeast Asian countries, and paradigms based on "collective identity" are insufficient for understanding international relations in the region. Furthermore, the inclusion of a diverse range of states in ASEAN complicates the constructivist approach. Ultimately, ASEAN identity is not considered superior to national interest in practical policy decisions.[26]

According to Ludovica Marchi, the constructivist perspective recognizes cooperation as the basis of ASEAN's policies. However, effective cooperation can only be achieved if member states share converging expectations, since cooperation requires accepting other members' absolute gains. In Southeast Asia, there are ongoing conflicts without a consensus among ASEAN states, such as the disagreement on "whether external threats to regional order exist or who they may be." Moreover, integration and cooperation promote the formation of collective identities, shared principles, values, and traditions, which are known as the ASEAN Way. According to this perspective, security dilemmas and power politics are socially constructed phenomena.[27]

## The ASEAN Way

Before exploring the challenges that ASEAN faces in establishing a regional peacekeeping force, it is important to examine the discourses on the ASEAN Way, as well as their impact on ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. Additionally, it is crucial to understand the definition of United Nations peacekeeping force. Therefore, this study will divide the literature review into two main parts: (1) the ASEAN Way, and (2) the concept of United Nations peacekeeping force.

Defining "The ASEAN Way" has proven challenging for most writers due to its diverse characteristics. There is no official definition, but three mains distinct conceptualizations of the ASEAN Way suggest its significant role of normative framework in mediating disputes, guiding

---

[26] Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy*, 21.

[27] Marchi, "Constructivism and Realism and the Crucial Nature of Security: ASEAN and Myanmar (1991-2012)," 67-69.

interactions, and shaping regional identity. The first conceptualization focuses on the ASEAN Way as an intramural approach to dispute management and confidence building; and lists five techniques of informal dispute management in the region, involving adherence to the ground rules, self-restraint, consultation and consensus (musyawarah and mufakat), third-party mediation, and agreeing to disagree. The second conceptualization explains the ASEAN Way as a unique decision-making procedure, rooted in consensus finding (musyawarah) and consultation (mufakat) influenced by the practice of Indonesian village democracy. The third conceptualization views the ASEAN Way as a process of identity building that combines conventional modern interstate principles with traditional and cultural-specific socialization and decision-making practices in the region.[28] Additionally, the ASEAN way is associated with specific social practices and culturally particular norms (socio-cultural norms) such as informality, consensus-building based on equality and tolerance consultation, and non-confrontational bargaining styles. This is seen as distinct from the European Union's regionalism, stressing the basic character of ASEAN as a cooperative, consultative but not supra-national organization.[29]

According to Jürgen Haacke, a professor in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the ASEAN Way consists of six core norms: (1) sovereign equality, (2) non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, (3) non-interference and non-intervention, (4) non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, (5) quiet diplomacy, and (6) mutual respect and tolerance. Besides that, other norms and practices linked with the ASEAN way either derive from or are interconnected with these core elements. For example, norms such as consultation, consensus, and consent have been established for a long time in the region's political processes, which can also be viewed as manifestations of the norms of sovereign equality and respect. Similarly, the preference for informal institutions is closely connected to the norm of sovereignty; and the norm of quiet diplomacy is tied to the norm of non-confrontational behavior.[30]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[28] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 3-4.

[29] Ibid., 4-5.

[30] Ibid., 7.

The notion of state sovereignty is clarified under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of State of 1933. According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) government , and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states."[31] In the context of the ASEAN Way, the norm of sovereign equality means that each member state is considered equal in terms of their political independence and territorial integrity; and that decisions are made through consultation and consensus, rather than through coercion or force. This concept was foreign to traditional rulers who aimed to avoid recognizing the superiority of others. In traditional Southeast Asia, the concept of sovereignty was based on Hindu-Buddhist cosmological principles, where rulers aimed to become universal monarchs and expand their circle of influence. In the past, hierarchical relations between political units, leading to rivalries and war, was a common instrument of statecraft in Southeast Asia.[32]

The principle of non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict is aligned with the principles of the United Nations Charter, which emphasizes the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.[33] ASEAN member states are firmly committed to resolving conflicts and disputes through peaceful means, refraining from violence or military aggression. To strengthen this commitment, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) establishes a regional dispute settlement mechanism, called a High Council. Article 14 of the Treaty states that "to settle disputes through regional process, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony."[34] As the consequence, the High Council has a primary role to recommend appropriate means of settlement, such as good offices, mediation, inquiry,

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[31] The Seventh International Conference of American States, "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of State," (Dec 26, 1933).

[32] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 17-18.

[33] "United Nations Charter, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes," 1945, accessed May 2, 2023, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6.

[34] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia."

or conciliation; to address disputes, conflicts, and potential threats to regional peace and stability. However, it has never been utilized in the history of ASEAN.[35]

The norm of non-interference is at the core of the principle of restraint.[36] Even though ASEAN has not explicitly defined what interference means, regional practice prior to the mid-1990s indicate that it was constructed as a succession of involvement in the domestic affairs of states that ranged from the mildest of political commentary to coercive military intervention.[37] Most literature on the ASEAN Way mentions the principle of non-interference in internal affairs as the core of ASEAN decision-making, which is explicitly adopted as a norm specific to ASEAN rather than a general international principle. Notably, Robin Ramcharan states that despite changes in terminologies over the years, it remains the most important doctrine in the region. A firm adherence of ASEAN to principles of sovereignty and non-interference is understood to be a result of the history of colonial intervention in the region, military intervention during the period of the Cold War, and the emergence of post-colonial states in Asia Pacific.[38] This principle is the belief that each state's domestic affairs are no one else's concern; and it is reaffirmed in all regional major agreements, including the founding Bangkok Declaration (1967), the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Preamble), and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976).[39]

Furthermore, Amitav Acharya also emphasizes by noting four key different expectations with reference to the principle of non-interference. He states that "ASEAN decision-makers should be (1) refraining from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[35] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 61-62.

[36] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 6.

[37] Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility," *The Pacific Review* 24, no. 2 (2011): 184-185.

[38] Robin Ramcharan, "ASEAN and Non-interference: A Principle Maintained," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (2000): 60-65.

[39] Bellamy and Drummond, "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility," 184.

own people, including violation of human rights, and from making the domestic political system of states and the political styles of governments a basis for deciding their membership in ASEAN; (2) criticizing the actions of states which were deemed to have breached the non-interference principle; (3) denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of a neighboring state; and (4) providing political support and material assistance to member states in their campaign against subversive and destabilizing activities. Nevertheless, none of these would be likely to apply in the context of the European Union due to the absence of shared understandings or the irrelevance of the specified context."[40]

On the other hand, the term intervention is used to describe situations where one state takes coercive actions to secure a change in the policies of another state. Such intervention must be forcible, dictatorial, or coercive, in effect to deprive the state intervened against of control over the affair in question. Accordingly, interference simple and pure is not intervention because the essence of intervention is coercion.[41] All ASEAN member states are furthermore members of the Non-Aligned Movement which strongly favor a principle of non-intervention.[42] Thus, the norm of non-interference and non-intervention emphasizes the importance of ASEAN member states refraining from interfering and intervening in the internal affairs of the others.

The norm of non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members allows ASEAN member states to independently handle and manage their own conflicts and encourages direct negotiations between the parties involved. Some scholars try to justify that non-interference is not similar to non-involvement, by pointing out that "the ASEAN doctrine of non-intervention, like its universal counterpart, has never meant non-involvement in the affair of other countries."[43] Instead, ASEAN members can attempt to influence other states'

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[40] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 5.

[41] Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, "The Principle of Non-intervention," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 22, no. 2 (2009): 347-348.

[42] Peter Albrecht and Sukanya Podder, *The Non-Aligned Movement and Post-colonial Militaries*, Danish Institute for International Studies (2020), 26.

[43] Rajshree Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," *The Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (2003): 59-60.

behavior through the established diplomatic channels, as evident from the mediation of Indonesia in the dispute over Sabah between the Philippines and Malaysia in 1968.[44] However, the enlargement of ASEAN and the emergence of new challenges today raises questions about the effectiveness of this non-involvement policy in promoting conflict resolution and the potential limitations it may have in addressing complex and protracted conflicts in the region.[45]

The norm of quiet diplomacy is associated with ASEAN preference of informality. ASEAN member states preferably avoid creating a formal arrangement and construct agreements based on mutual trust, knowledge, familiarity, and the process of non-institutionalization of cooperation.[46] The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation has formalized the approach of ASEAN cooperation and dispute resolution, whereby decision-making mechanism will be based on traditions of consultation and consensus-building, including resolution of disputes through friendly negotiations;[47] and Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter clearly state that "as a basis principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus."[48] Consequently, ASEAN member states must rely on the strength of interpersonal relationships to enforce any agreements; and the least-restrictive versions of a particular commitment are more often prevail because decision-making is based on consensus.[49] The very fact of the informality is that they often end the meeting days by playing golf or having a party together, as stated by H.E. Dato' Ajit Singh, the former Secretary-General of ASEAN.[50] The preference for informal institutions is also closely connected to the solid emphasis on the norm of sovereignty equality.[51] Additionally, informality of cooperation process could increase the comfort level among ASEAN

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[44] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 36.

[45] Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," 60-61.

[46] Leviter, "The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?," 168-170.

[47] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia."

[48] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *The ASEAN Charter*.

[49] Leviter, "The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?," 168-170.

[50] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 6.

[51] Ibid., 7.

member states so that they could avoid a serious confrontation without resort to formal measures.[52]

The principle of mutual respect and tolerance is associated with the expectation that ASEAN leaders can maintain a respectful attitude even when they disagree, or "agree to disagree without being disagreeable". It involves showing awareness of each other's positions, personal standing, and domestic and international achievements. This principle helps promoting mutual understanding and recognition of the diversity of cultures and political systems in ASEAN region; and emphasizes the importance of treating each member state as an equal partner, regardless of its size or level of development.[53] Although, it does not mean that everyone has to accept a decision, the parties to the negotiation always debate or disagree on a particular issue behind the scenes;[54] and disagreements are seldom made public.[55]

The norm of respect is associated to the norm of allowing others to "save face" and expressed through the norm of non-confrontational behavior; but it is also associated with the norm of quiet diplomacy in practice.[56] In term of tolerance, the process of ASEAN multilateral interaction involves non-confrontational bargaining styles, which are contrasted with adversarial posturing and legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations.[57] The principle of mutual respect and tolerance is crucial in ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture because "preserving face" helps avoid conflicts in the region, as senior Singaporean official Kishore Mahbubani stated, "face is important, and conflict can break out when it is lost."[58] However, ASEAN's policy of agreeing to disagree has faced criticism, with some arguing that it promotes conflict avoidance rather than conflict resolution.[59]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[52] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 67.

[53] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 7.

[54] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 68.

[55] Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," 57.

[56] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 7.

[57] Ibid., 4-5.

[58] Ibid., 7.

[59] Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," 59-61.

Many scholars argue that the ASEAN Way limits the promotion of regional cooperation and conflict resolution. Anja Jetschke and Jürgen Rüland contend that ASEAN employs cooperation rhetoric but disconnects its institutional structure from organizational activities. ASEAN has dual characteristics that contradict each other in terms of intra-ASEAN cooperation. The existing norms, emerging from social structure and political culture within ASEAN, fail to produce essential mechanisms, such as a legacy of legalism that would facilitate the establishment and enforcement of contracts and agreements, as well as a clear focus on a common interest. Consequently, it becomes challenging to create trust and accountability among member states, making them difficult to find consensus and seek shared goals[60]

Amitav Acharya further underlines that ASEAN's regionalism did not originate from power balancing or institutional establishment. Instead, it was driven by the ASEAN Way, characterized by informality, consensus, non-adversarial bargaining, and a preference for non-legalistic and non-binding approaches to problem solving.[61] As a result, ASEAN has transformed into a security community where member states shared commitments and norms, going beyond its original diplomatic role. Nevertheless, despite this progress, some new realists and liberals still prioritize material interests over ideational interests. This approach could potentially lead to new advantages and increased cooperation.[62] However, he argues that the principle of non-interference in the regional regime weakens and limits the use of new policy instruments by the organization itself.[63] Accordingly, Jürgen Rüland confirms that ASEAN member states value sovereignty higher than regional governance effectiveness. Rather than being a functional organization for

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[60] Anja Jetschke and Jürgen Rüland, "Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: the Cultural Limits of ASEAN Cooperation," ibid.22, no. 2 (May 2009): 179-181.

[61] Amitav Acharya, "The Evolution and Limitations of ASEAN Identity," in *Building ASEAN Community: Political-Security and Socio-cultural Reflections*, ed. Aileen Baviera and Larry Maramis (Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017).

[62] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 5-6.

[63] Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 263-265.

problem solving, ASEAN is usually recognized as a forum to serve institutional balancing needs. ASEAN has shallow institutionalization with non-binding, non-precise and decentralized mechanism that does not intend to violate its members' sovereignty.[64]

In summary, The ASEAN Way significantly influences ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture. ASEAN's decisions and cooperation are guided by the principles of the six core norms. However, the agreements produced are often non-binding and do not result in concrete regional action, which limits regional cooperation. This research considers that the ASEAN Way is an important element that enables ASEAN cooperation to move forward in accordance with the regional context and create the level of trust among members states. However, the ASEAN Way impacts the construction of regional cooperation. The disadvantages of the ASEAN way happen when the regional commitment has emphasized development towards the deeper regional cooperation, particularly in establishing of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

## Concept of United Nations Peacekeeping Force

To begin with, Peacekeeping is "a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of military, police, and civilian, working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace."[65] Three basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations include: Consent of the parties, Impartiality, and Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.[66]

United Nations peacekeeping operations may use forces authorized by the Security Council at the tactical level to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the

---

[64] Jürgen Rüland, "Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: "Multilateral Utility" or "Hedging Utility"?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 1 (2011): 96-99.

[65] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: DPO and DFS, 2008), 18.

[66] Ibid., 31.

Host State lacks the capacity to provide security and maintain public order.[67] In this case, United Nations peace operations will involve the expeditionary use of military personnel with an explicit mandate, whether from the United Nations or a non-United Nations entity, to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serving as an instrument to assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreement; or enforcing ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the United Nations Security Council to build stable peace.[68] The troops participating in peacekeeping operations act on behalf of the United Nations and must be impartial, using weapons only in cases of self-defense. These troops wear a "blue helmet", commonly known as United Nations force, "peacekeeping force", or "peacekeeper."[69]

However, the United Nations does not own a permanent army or police force. In each new United Nations peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat of the United Nations must request contributions of military, police and other personnel from member states who are not obligated to provide them.[70] However, there is no fixed timeline for establishing a peacekeeping operation and the duration needed to deploy a mission varies and depends on several factors. These factors include the willingness of member states to support troops and police, and the availability of financial and resources. For missions with complex mandates, difficult logistics, or significant security risks to peacekeepers, it may take several weeks or even months to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. Initially, the 90-day timeline for deploying the first elements of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is a target.[71]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

Furthermore, the establishment of a peacekeeping force is the responsibility of the Security Council, acquiring Primary Authority but not Exclusive Authority. Therefore,

---

[67] Ibid., 19.

[68] Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 165.

[69] Surachart Bamrungsuk, *The Military in Peacetime: Military Operations Other Than War and Peacekeeping Operations* (Bangkok: Square Print 93', 2000), 37.

[70] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 52.

[71] Ibid., 63.

the contribution of member states in the formation of a peacekeeping force is truly voluntary.[72] Some scholars point out the disadvantages that the current system, in which United Nations member states provide peacekeeping forces in response to Security Council resolutions, was developed in an era when peacekeepers were part of a negotiated ceasefire. This fact present inconveniences in the present era, as waiting for member states to support a peacekeeping mission does not constitute a timely and notable contribution.[73]

In summary, United Nations peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of military and police personnel with a specific mandate to prevent armed conflict and build stable peace. However, the United Nations does not have a permanent force, so the Secretariat of the United Nations must seek personnel contributions from member states for each new peacekeeping operation. Once deployed, peacekeepers assist in supporting the peace process and they are not authorized to use weapons except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

## ASEAN Cooperation on Peacekeeping

Southeast Asia's participation in peacekeeping operations dates back to some of the earliest United Nations missions, especially with the five founding members of ASEAN. Indonesia and Malaysia have been participated in United Nations missions since the 1950s, the Philippines has been involved in peacekeeping mission since 1963, and Singapore and Thailand started participating in peacekeeping missions after the end of the Cold War.[74] Several ASEAN countries also participated in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission, during 1992-1993. At that time, Cambodia had not yet become a member of ASEAN.[75]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

---

[72] Sompong Chumak, *United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations (1948-1995)* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2001), 10-11.

[73] David Curran et al., *Perspectives on Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention: Expanding Stakeholders and Regional Arrangements*, ed. Larry Roeder (New York: Springer, 2015), xi.

[74] David Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," in *International Symposium on Security Affairs 2014* (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), 112-114.

[75] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 247.

After joining ASEAN, Cambodia, Brunei, and Vietnam later dispatched their peacekeeper to United Nations peacekeeping operations.[76]

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines also participated in the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), in a multinational force under Australian command. This marked the first time that peacekeepers from one ASEAN country served in a United Nations mission led by another. Australia and Thailand provided the largest contingents, with a Thai general assuming the Deputy Force Commander position. However, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines only sent small units as a token force due to dissatisfaction with Australia's leadership role. Notably, ASEAN countries participated in East Timor as individual nations rather than as a collective effort.[77]

While some ASEAN member states have been involved in United Nations peacekeeping operations for many years, the concept of peacekeeping cooperation within ASEAN itself is relatively recent and continues to generate controversy. The concept of ASEAN regional peacekeeping cooperation was initially proposed in 1994, but it failed to gain support among member states due to the perception that ASEAN should refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of its members.[78]

Additionally, the idea of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force was initially proposed by Indonesia in 2003, during its chairmanship of ASEAN. Indonesia had found the Australian-led intervention into East Timor during 1999-2000 deeply disturbing, and that it would have been a preferable option if a collective regional force had been available, but no such capacity existed. The proposal was for the designation of an ASEAN Standby Force, which could deal with various conflicts in Southeast Asia, emphasizing the importance of ASEAN countries knowing each other well and having the option to utilize a regional force if desired.[79] This proposition was part of the goals of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) which is one of the

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[76] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 114-118.

[77] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 199.

[78] "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?," 2016, accessed Feb 4, 2023, https://asiafoundation.org/2016/02/03/is-it-time-for-a-peacekeeping-force-for-asean/.

[79] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 122.

three pillars of the ASEAN Community. However, the idea faced strong opposition, particularly from Singapore, with resistance largely credited to concerns over the norm of non-interference in members' internal affairs.[80] Vietnam, a member since 1995, also opposed the idea, partly due to its historical distrust toward multilateral organizations like the United Nations and ASEAN itself; and raised concerns about potential trespass on state sovereignty, drawing from its own experiences of fiercely defending its independence against foreign powers.[81] Southeast Asian nations had high sensitivity toward peacekeeping matters due to the nature of intervention in various intra-state instabilities. Deployment of peacekeeping forces to fellow ASEAN member states was perceived as a breach of the norm of non-interference.[82]

While the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force did not find enthusiastic support among ASEAN leaders, peacekeeping has been a subject of discussion within broader regional groups such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

In 2011, the 5th ADMM adopted a Concept Paper on the establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN) which was officially inaugurated in 2012. In contrast to peacekeeping cooperation of others regional organizations, the collaboration within the APCN is mostly implemented on sharing experiences, networks, and information among peacekeeping centers situated in the region. The APCN aims to enhance collaboration among existing and future peacekeeping centers of ASEAN member states by promoting joint planning, organizing joint training initiatives, and facilitating the exchange of experiences. The short-term goals (2012-2014) include information sharing on peacekeeping-related issues and encouraging member states to build their own peacekeeping centers. The medium-term goals (2015-2017) aim to establish a platform that sets the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of peacekeepers deployed from Southeast Asian countries, which involve developing common training programs, operational

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[80] Henning Borchers, "ASEAN's Environmental Challenges and Non-traditional Security Cooperation : Towards a Regional Peacekeeping Force?," *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2014): 6.

[81] Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?."

[82] Bellamy and Drummond, "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility," 184-189.

guidelines, and best practices manuals; as well as to initiate joint training activities. Lastly, the long-term goals (2018-2020) aim to establish a common standby arrangement to deal with regional instability, enhance interoperability among member states, and develop centers of excellence in peacekeeping.[83] Although ASEAN member states are unable to execute the plan as intended and the formation of a regional Standby Force is still far from being realistic, the APCN initiative is a remarkable step because ASEAN has limited experience in having regional peacekeeping cooperation and no organizational mechanism has successfully overcome the norm of non-interference.[84] Although this norm has been strongly criticized, arguing that it is incompatible with the modern world where borders are porous, and has been blamed for ASEAN's failure to effectively respond to crises.[85] The consolidation of non-interference as a fundamental principle in the ASEAN Declaration in 1967 and the adaptation of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 are seen as promoting peace and security in the region.[86]

In 2020, the 14th ADMM adopted a Concept Paper on the ASEAN flag to be displayed next to the national flag at the compound of ASEAN member state's military units participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The objective of displaying the ASEAN flag alongside the national flag at the compound of ASEAN member states during related missions is to demonstrate ASEAN's strong support for the United Nations efforts in promoting international peace and stability, particularly through United Nations peacekeeping operations; to symbolize the spirit of solidarity within ASEAN and ASEAN's contributions to global peace, stability, and the well-being of the people worldwide; to build a sense of community among personnel from ASEAN member states forces who participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions; and to establish ASEAN's role and reputation within the international community, especially among the host country's population, about ASEAN's unity, development and consensus in the noble

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[83] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 122-123; Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network," (2011).

[84] Sebastian von Einsiedel and Anthony Yazaki, *East Asian Perceptions of the UN and Its Role in Peace and Security*, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (May 2016), 10-11.

[85] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 7-8.

[86] von Einsiedel and Yazaki, *East Asian Perceptions of the UN and Its Role in Peace and Security*, 7.

purpose of maintaining global peace and stability. Notwithstanding, the guiding principles outlined in the Concept Paper mention clearly that the display of the ASEAN flag does not imply that ASEAN is a military alliance. It does not signify that ASEAN member states have a joint peacekeeping force or deploy under the ASEAN banner. The deployment of military personnel and substances to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and their command and control, remains national decision.[87]

In addition to ADMM, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), created in 1994, is the largest platform for security dialogue in the Indo-Pacific region with 27 members. It serves as a forum where member countries can engage in discussions on current security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace and security in the region. The ARF also holds yearly meetings of foreign ministers and organizes a series of inter-sessional meetings that address a diverse range of security issues. It has also included a semi-regular Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting to specially address matters related to peacekeeping operations since 1996.[88]

While the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), formed in 2010, is another important mechanism that operates through various Experts' Working Groups, including the Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (EWG on PKOs), which is one of the five priority groups. The EWG on PKOs, initially co-hosted by the Philippines and New Zealand, held a series of meetings between 2011 and 2013. These meetings covered several aspects, including regional capability assessments, operational challenges, legal considerations, and force generation issues. Additionally, the Philippines hosted the inaugural table-top exercise (TTX) on peacekeeping operations within the ADMM-Plus framework in February 2014. This exercise aimed to enhance preparedness and coordination in the context of peacekeeping efforts.[89]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

Yet in following years, there has been a significant shift in attitudes towards the idea of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. In 2015, during Malaysia's tenure as the ASEAN Chair,

---

[87] Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Concept Paper on the ASEAN Flag to be Displayed Next to the National Flag at the Compound of ASEAN Member State's Military Units Participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," (2020).

[88] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 122-123.

[89] Ibid., 123-124.

the concept was reintroduced and gained increased support from member countries. Despite the rejection of the proposal in the final, more member countries have come to agree that an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force would represent an innovative step forward, enabling ASEAN to fully commit to its goal of upholding regional peace and stability. Additionally, such a force would also serve as a means for ASEAN to support the United Nations in fulfilling its peacekeeping responsibilities.[90]

In recent years, there has been a growing trend among ASEAN member states to participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions, driven by various motivations. Most importantly, ASEAN member states perceive engagement in such missions as a way to enhance their respective countries' prestige on the international stage and as an opportunity to increase the professionalism and operational expertise of their military personnel. Vietnam's deployment of military engineers to Mali, for example, receives international praise and support, which further encouraging their engagement.[91] Thailand highlights its role in contributing troops as a means to strengthen its candidature for a seat on the Security Council.[92] Furthermore, the emerging challenges in the region, such as migrant crisis, terrorist attacks, subnational conflicts, and disputes in the South China Sea, have prompted a reassessment of the benefits associated with establishing a regional peacekeeping force. Some ASEAN members now believe that a multilateral regional peacekeeping force would play a crucial role in building trust among rebel groups, third parties, and individual member states, thereby making a significant contribution towards achieving peace and stability.[93]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

Although ASEAN's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations have expanded remarkably over the past decade, both in absolute terms and relative to other regions, the Southeast Asian role in peacekeeping remains modest when compared to South Asia

---

[90] Nopadon Mungkalaton, "ASEAN Peacekeeping Force and ASEAN Regional Security," *The National Defence College of Thailand Journal* 58, no. 2 (May-August 2016): 58-59.

[91] Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?."

[92] "Thailand Candidature for UNSC," 2015, accessed May 10, 2023, https://unmissionnewyork.thaiembassy.org/en/content/53893-thailand-candidature-for-unsc.

[93] Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?."

or Africa. The region's largest provider of peacekeepers, Indonesia with about 3,000 blue helmets in the field, is ranked the 8th largest provider of peacekeeper, following by Malaysia (25th), Cambodia (26th) and Thailand (45th).[94] Nonetheless, ASEAN's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations is growing today. Notably, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia are the key drivers of this growth.[95]

## Challenges

Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force encounters challenges due to the nature of ASEAN's approach to political and security cooperation, known as the ASEAN Way, which includes six core norms. These core elements not only guide the decision-making process, but also originate other long-established norms and practices in the region, such as consultation, consensus, consent, the preference for informal institutions, and quiet diplomacy.[96] These norms and practices contribute to the regional stability, but they present inconveniences when it comes to forming a regional peacekeeping contingent. When examining the obstacles of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force within the context of the ASEAN Way, Constructivism offers valuable insights into how the six core norms and other norms associated with the ASEAN Way influence ASEAN member states' perception.

To begin with, Indonesia's norm entrepreneurship of establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force attempts to socialize its neighboring countries to develop regional capabilities for conflict prevention and resolution. The proposal for a regional collective force not only has the potential to promote closer cooperation among ASEAN member states but also offers shared benefits in the long term. A regional standby force for peacekeeping could be deployed to help resolve regional and internal conflicts, similar to the African Standby Force (ASF), which already functions as a collective force in Africa.[97] Indonesia, motivated by its aspiration for regional leadership, sought to reaffirm its position among other ASEAN member states and the international community by

---

[94] United Nations, "Troop and Police Contributors."

[95] von Einsiedel and Yazaki, *East Asian Perceptions of the UN and Its Role in Peace and Security*, 10.

[96] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 7.

[97] Mungkalaton, "ASEAN Peacekeeping Force and ASEAN Regional Security," 61.

emphasizing ASEAN's responsibility as a regional organization to support the United Nations in maintaining peace and security, particularly within its own region, in order to step into the second stage of the norm's "life cycle".

Most of ASEAN member states have a shared history of colonialism. After enduring struggles for independence, they now prioritize guarding their national sovereignty and uphold the principle of non-interference. These principles are prominently reflected in various declarations and communiqués of ASEAN.[98] Peacekeeping operations, despite its principles of consent of all the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, challenge the territorial integrity and political independence of the host state due to the presence of foreign troops. This aspect alone is sufficient for ASEAN member states to feel uncomfortable about the practice of peacekeeping.

Furthermore, ASEAN member states are cautious about developing institutional structures that might trespass their autonomy and sovereignty. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN lacks an authoritative executive body. The agreements in place are non-binding and reached through consensus and consultation, which in practice limits deeper regional cooperation. This inefficiency circles back to the challenge of different interests and needs, leading to a sense of distrust among member states, and causes the rejection of the proposal of establishing an ASEAN collective force in 1994, 2003 and 2015.

In the context of the six core norms, firstly, the norm of sovereign equality reflects the importance that ASEAN member states place on their autonomy and independence. It emphasizes that all member states are equal and have the right to determine their own internal affairs.[99] As some member states may still be hesitant to allow foreign military presence or intervention within their borders which could undermine their sovereignty. Vietnam, for example, had perceived United Nations peacekeeping operations as an infringement on state sovereignty and had opposed its peacekeeping levy from 1975 until 1994.[100] Consequently, establishing an ASEAN collective force may require overcoming concerns about offense on national sovereignty.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[98] Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?."

[99] Ibid.

[100] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 116.

Secondly, ASEAN emphasizes the non-use of force and peaceful conflict resolution. However, United Nations peacekeeping operations are frequently deployed in environments that are marked by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who might actively aim to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, peacekeeping operations require the use of military force to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.[101] This already happened in Southeast Asia region such as the intervention in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993, or the deployment the Australian-led international force in East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999-2000. Therefore, establishing a regional peacekeeping force necessitates ASEAN member states to balance the commitment to this norm with the necessity of force intervention in certain situations. This could present a challenge as ASEAN member states may require shifting their identities and the recognition of this norm's value through collective efforts.

Thirdly, the norm of non-interference and non-intervention means that ASEAN member states are generally unwilling to interfere nor to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, even in cases of conflict or instability.[102] Southeast Asian countries are cautious about the possibility of expanding peacekeeping mission to include involvement in various intra-state conflicts; and this apprehension arises from the perception that peacekeeping deployment may be seen as a violation of the norm of non-interference. In 2009, Vietnam's Defence White Paper expressed concerns regarding the implementation of robust peacekeeping mandates involving interventions, citing that "United Nations peacekeeping operations must abide by the principle of respecting independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; ensure impartiality; and only be carried out with the acceptance of parties concerned."[103] There seems to be a never-ending norm clash between ASEAN cooperation in peacekeeping and the non-interference principle, due to ASEAN member states' concern on the military intervention behind peacekeeping operations. Hence, establishing a regional collective force

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[101] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 34.

[102] Haacke, *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects*, 208-209.

[103] Ministry of National Defence, "Vietnam National Defence White Paper," (Hanoi, 2009), 27.

would require reframing these norms to accommodate the idea that collective intervention should be legitimate, under certain circumstances, in order to address regional conflicts and instability.

Fourthly, ASEAN traditionally refrains from involvement in bilateral conflicts among member states, preferring a hands-off approach.[104] However, the assigned tasks of United Nations peacekeeping operations are often involved in observation, monitoring, and reporting between conflict parties; or supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms.[105] As of today, Myanmar and Laos have never yet participated in any United Nations peacekeeping missions.[106] Thus, establishing a regional peacekeeping contingent would require redefining in this normative framework and recognizing the imperatives of regional cooperation.

Fifthly, the norm of quiet diplomacy, which involves behind-the-scenes negotiations and informal dialogue, could pose challenges to the transparency and effectiveness of collective peacekeeping operations. A new generation of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations is being deployed as a component of broader international effort to assist countries in transition from conflict to suitable peace; and peacekeeping efforts require impartiality, credibility, and the ability to engage openly with multiple stakeholders such as United Nations member states, troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries, field missions, United Nations system partners, regional organizations.[107] In consequence, establishing a collective peacekeeping force would require open dialogue and clear communication in shaping collective actions and building trust among stakeholders.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

Lastly, the norm of mutual respect and tolerance, which involves non-confrontational bargaining styles, might not always be enough to effectively address diverse and complex issues.[108] Establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force requires a long procedure of preparation, such as budgetary process or military planning; and ASEAN member states may face difficulty in such operations. So, it is crucial to navigate the complex political, ethnic, and religious divisions

---

[104] Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," 60-61.

[105] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 21.

[106] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 111.

[107] United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 33-38.

[108] Jetly, "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC," 59-61.

within member states; and ensure equitable treatment and respect for all parties involved. Thus, this effort would require careful consideration and proactive measures to promote dialogue, understanding, and cooperation among diverse stakeholders.

Peacekeeping cooperation is sensitive in Southeast Asia, given that one of the core norms established since the formation of ASEAN is the principle of non-interference. The creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force, that deviates from the long-standing norms within the ASEAN Way, encounters considerable challenges. These established norms hold significant power and influence. Consequently, Indonesia's norm entrepreneurship has always been at the starting point of norm emergence, still advocating the regional peacekeeping cooperation and justifying the Association's role in regional and international affairs. To step into stage two, norm cascade, the primary mission is to argue, persuade, and ultimately convince more ASEAN member states to embrace the new norm of regional collective forces in the context of peacekeeping. It is crucial to consider the concerns and interests of the organization as a whole and to prioritize them over those of individual nations.

Advancing toward the norm cascade stage would require reconceptualizing the norms and identities within the organization and acknowledging the importance of collective action in promoting regional peace and stability. ASEAN member states may need to balance between upholding the fundamental norms of the ASEAN Way and adapting to the specific requirements of peacekeeping operations. This necessitates employing suitable approaches that respect ASEAN's core principles, while remaining relevant and adaptable to address the changing threats and evolving challenges, in both the region and the global community. This process may be extensive and involve building trust, strengthening regional cooperation, and developing effective mechanisms that align with the principles of the ASEAN Way.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

## Positive Trends and Opportunities

Initially, many ASEAN member states resisted the idea of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force due to their collective experience of colonization and the subsequent struggles for independence, which were often marked by violence and lengthy conflicts. As a result, principles such as sovereignty and non-interference were enshrined in the ASEAN Charter; and became

fundamental to many member states.[109] The perception was that ASEAN refrained from interfering in domestic affairs of its member countries. Hence, while ASEAN member states have the perception that peacekeeping operations challenge the status quo, there is a barrier to establishing a regional peacekeeping force.

However, there has been a notable change in attitudes of Southeast Asian states towards peacekeeping operations. In addition to long-term contributors like Malaysia and Indonesia, there has been a growing interest in peacekeeping on the part of three new players: Cambodia, Brunei, and Vietnam;[110] and almost all ASEAN countries have already participated in United Nations peacekeeping missions, including the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) which took place in the Southeast Asian region itself. United Nations peacekeeping operations are increasingly viewed as a means to enhance their legitimacy, gain reputational advantages, and enhance cooperation with external partners, including the United States. ASEAN member states' perception to peacekeeping will continue to grow in importance in the coming years.[111]

Additionally, ASEAN is truly a regional organization because it was first created by the will of the countries in the region itself, without the guidance or interference of external powers, and the current member states are all the countries in Southeast Asia. While many regional organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the League of Arab States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Organization of American States (OAS), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and ASEAN are the most prominent regional organizations in dealing with regional security issues, but among them, only ASEAN does not participate in discussion with the Secretariat of the United Nations on the future relationship in peacekeeping operations.[112]

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

---

[109] Bernard, "Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?."

[110] Capie, "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN," 114.

[111] Ibid., 124.

[112] Michael Barnett, "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-Keeping," *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (Oct 1995): 419-420.

As being a regional organization, ASEAN has the responsibility to play a role in maintaining regional peace and security in accordance with Chapter 8 (Regional Arrangements) of the United Nations Charter, which state that the responsibility for regional peace and security lies collectively with the member states of regional organizations. The Charter also recognizes the engagement of regional arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of local disputes, as stated in Article 52. However, enforcement by regional arrangements or agencies requires explicit authorization from the Security Council, as outlined in Article 53. Lastly, Article 54 mandates that regional arrangements or agencies always keep the Security Council informed of their activities concerning the maintenance of international peace and security.[113]

Today ASEAN member states value the prestige, status, and reputational benefits in the international arena that come with United Nations peacekeeping operations. Engaging in peacekeeping operations not only offers an opportunity to contribute towards strengthening peace and security, but also serves as a means to improve the capacities of their own forces. Moreover, the security challenges which are ever-changing and cross-national, have made ASEAN member states recognize the potential benefits in possessing a regional peacekeeping force.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper highlights that the six core norms of the ASEAN Way deter the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. The ASEAN Way is the unique regional political and security cooperation culture which helps maintain stability in the region; but it limits regional deeper cooperation such as the creation of a regional peacekeeper contingent.

Several perceptions of ASEAN member states which are reflected from the six core norms of the ASEAN Way and other practices linked to these core elements, such as the primacy of national sovereignty, the principle of non-interference, and the emphasis on consensus-based decision-making practice, are major constraints that deter ASEAN from adopting a more

[113] "United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements," 1945, accessed November 18, 2022, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8.

interventionist stance in resolving regional conflicts, specifically with regard to having a collective peacekeeping force.

Currently, most ASEAN member states actively participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations, but their contributions are still at the national level. Considering the current momentum and cooperative style of ASEAN, it is unlikely that there will be a collective deployment of Southeast Asian troop under the ASEAN flag in United Nations peacekeeping in the near future. The process of establishing ASEAN collective peacekeeping force will require considerable time and solid consideration. However, it is essential to recognize the notable shift in attitudes among ASEAN member states over the past decade and the expected future regional integration. The attitudes towards peacekeeping operations are changing remarkably and the perception of peacekeeping is growing in importance in the region.

Despite challenges influenced by the regional core norms, establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force is not impossible. There is a sense of optimism that ASEAN peacekeeping cooperation, including the creation of a regional peacekeeping contingent, remains a viable prospect. ASEAN has started to embrace peacekeeping cooperation and has become more open to deploying peacekeepers to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The APCN has a crucial role in promoting peacekeeping cooperation among ASEAN member states.

An equilibrium between preserving the core norms of the ASEAN Way and adapting to the requirements of peacekeeping operations is necessitated to overcome these obstacles. Therefore, it would require a gradual and inclusive process, taking into account the concerns and interests of the organization above the individual nation. Enhancing trust and promoting regional peacekeeping cooperation in accordance with the principles of the ASEAN Way are essential steps toward successfully establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

# REFERENCES


Acharya, Amitav. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order.* Politics in Asia Series. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2014.

———. "The Evolution and Limitations of ASEAN Identity." In *Building ASEAN Community: Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Reflections*, edited by Aileen Baviera and Larry Maramis, 25-38. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017.

———. "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism." *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 239-275.

Albrecht, Peter, and Sukanya Podder. *The Non-Aligned Movement and Post-Colonial Militaries.* Danish Institute for International Studies (2020).

"About ASEAN ", 2020, accessed Dec 2, 2022, https://asean.org/about-asean.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. *The ASEAN Charter.* Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, January, 2008.

"ASEAN Secretariat." 2020, accessed Dec 12, 2022, https://asean.org/the-asean-secretariat-basic-mandate-functions-and-composition/.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. "Bangkok Declaration." August 8, 1967.

———. "Concept Paper on the ASEAN Flag to Be Displayed Next to the National Flag at the Compound of ASEAN Member State's Military Units Participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." 2020.

———. "Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network." 2011.

———. "Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia." February 24, 1976.

Bamrungsuk, Surachart. *The Military in Peacetime*: *Military Operations Other Than War and Peacekeeping Operations.* Bangkok: Square Print 93', 2000.

Barnett, Michael. "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-Keeping." *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 4 (Oct 1995): 411-433.

Bellamy, Alex J., and Catherine Drummond. "The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-Interference and Sovereignty as Responsibility." *The Pacific Review* 24, no. 2 (2011): 179-200.

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping.* Cambridge:


จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

Polity Press, 2010.

"Is It Time for a Peacekeeping Force for ASEAN?", 2016, accessed Feb 4, 2023, https://asiafoundation.org/2016/02/03/is-it-time-for-a-peacekeeping-force-for-asean/.

Borchers, Henning "Asean's Environmental Challenges and Non-Traditional Security Cooperation : Towards a Regional Peacekeeping Force?". *Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies* 7, no. 1 (2014): 5-20.

Capie, David. "Evolving Attitudes to Peacekeeping in ASEAN." Chap. 6 In *International Symposium on Security Affairs* 2014, 111-125. Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014.

Chumak, Sompong. *United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations (*1948-1995). Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2001.

Curran, David, Trudy Fraser, Larry Roeder, and Robert Zuber. *Perspectives on Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention: Expanding Stakeholders and Regional Arrangements.* Edited by Larry Roeder. New York: Springer, 2015. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16372-7.

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

Haacke, Jürgen. *Asean's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects.* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Heng, Pek Koon. "The Asean Way and Regional Security Cooperation in the South China Sea." *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper*, no. 2014/121 (2014).

Jamnejad, Maziar, and Michael Wood. "The Principle of Non-Intervention." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 22, no. 2 (2009): 345-381.

Jetly, Rajshree. "Conflict Management Strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for Saarc." *The Pacific Review* 16, no. 1 (2003): 53-76.

Jetschke, Anja, and Jürgen Rüland. "Decoupling Rhetoric and Practice: The Cultural Limits of ASEAN Cooperation." *The Pacific Review* 22, no. 2 (May 2009): 179-203.

Leviter, Lee. "The ASEAN Charter: ASEAN Failure or Member Failure?". *Journal of International Law and Politics* 43, no. 159 (2010): 159-210.

Marchi, Ludovica. "Constructivism and Realism and the Crucial Nature of Security: ASEAN and Myanmar (1991-2012)." *Seoul National University Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 1

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

(2020): 63-81.

"Thailand Candidature for Unsc." 2015, accessed May 10, 2023, https://unmissionnewyork.thaiembassy.org/en/content/53893-thailand-candidature-for-unsc.

Ministry of National Defence. "Vietnam National Defence White Paper." 1-156. Hanoi, 2009.

Moon, Chung-in. "ASEAN." Encyclopedia Britannica, May 2023. https://www.britannica.com/topic/ASEAN.

Mungkalaton, Nopadon. "ASEAN Peacekeeping Force and ASEAN Regional Security." *The National Defence College of Thailand Journal* 58, no. 2 (May-August 2016): 52-63.

Ramcharan, Robin. "ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 1 (2000): 60-88.

Rüland, Jürgen. "Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: "Multilateral Utility" or "Hedging Utility"?". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33, no. 1 (2011): 83-112.

States, The Seventh International Conference of American. "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of State." Dec 26, 1933.

Thiparat, Pranee. *ASEAN Community: Myth and Reality.* Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2018.

"Types of Institutions and Bodies." accessed Dec 10, 2022, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutions-and-bodies/types-institutions-and-bodies_en.

"Troop and Police Contributors." United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023, accessed April 26, 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.

"United Nations Charter, Chapter Vi: Pacific Settlement of Disputes." 1945, accessed May 2, 2023, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6.

"United Nations Charter, Chapter Viii: Regional Arrangements." 1945, accessed November 18, 2022, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-8.

United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: DPO and DFS, 2008.

von Einsiedel, Sebastian , and Anthony Yazaki. *East Asian Perceptions of the UN and Its Role in Peace and Security.* Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (May 2016).

Weatherbee, Donald E. *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy.* 2nd ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY

Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81.



จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
Chulalongkorn University

# VITA

| | |
|---|---|
| **NAME** | Lt.Col. Thanaphat DIEWVILAI |
| **DATE OF BIRTH** | 5 August 1985 |
| **PLACE OF BIRTH** | Chiang Rai, Thailand |
| **INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED** | - Diplôme d'Ingénieur, Grade de Master<br>École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, France (2007-2010)<br>- Attestation de Cursus<br>École Supérieure et d'Application du Génie, France (2010-2011)<br>- Certificate in Engineer Officer Basic Course<br>Army Engineer School, Thailand (2012-2012)<br>- Diploma in Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course<br>United States Army Engineer School, USA (2014-2014)<br>- Certificate in Engineer Officer Advance Course<br>Army Engineer School, Thailand (2015-2016)<br>- Diploma in Command and General Staff Officers Course<br>Royal Thai Army Command and General Staff College, Thailand (2021-2022) |
| **HOME ADDRESS** | Peace Operations Center, Directorate of Joint Operations,<br>Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters<br>127 Chaeng Wattana Rd., Thungsonghong, Lak Si, Bangkok 10210 Thailand |
| **AWARD RECEIVED** | - Certificate of Commendation 2020, The United Nations<br>In recognition of meritorious and valuable service whilst assigned to The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan<br>- The Major Ken Webb Annual Writing Award 2022, U.S. Army<br>In recognition for exceptional writing and knowledge of the Thai-U.S. Alliance |

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย
CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY