

บรรณานุกรม

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ภาคผนวก

เพื่อความสะดวกในการอ่าน ผู้เขียนขอแบ่งออกเป็นภาคผนวก ก ข และ ค ตาม  
เนื้อหาของบทเป็นลำดับคือ อะไรคือจิต จิตรู้อะไร และ บทวิเคราะห์

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3. . . . what we call one "event" turns out to be really a process .

5. . . . even if we assume a "real" table, the particulars which are its aspects have to be collected together by their relations to each other, not to it, since it is merely inferred from them."

8. when the process of fading is completed (which happens very quickly), we arrive at the image, which is capable of being revived on subsequent occasions with very little change,

9. Suppose you ask me what I ate for breakfast this morning. Suppose further, that I have not thought about my breakfast in the meantime, and that I did not, while I was eating it, put in to words what it consisted of. In this case my recollection will be true memory, not habit memory. The process of remembering will consist of calling up images of my breakfast, which will come to me with a feeling of belief such as distinguishes memory-images from mere imagination-images.

10. The objections to the act (in the case of presentations) are

not valid against the believing in the case of beliefs , because the believing is an actual experienced feeling,not something postulated like the act.

11. I remain,therefore,entirely unconvinced that there is any such phenomenon as thinking which consists neither of images nor of words.

13. If we call up an image of a dog,we are very likely to have a vague image,which is not reprecentative of some one special dog,but of dogs in general.

14. We must suppose that the stimulus to the performance of each act is an impulsion from behind,not an attraction from the future.

17. The stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is,in my belief,neither mind,nor matter,but something more primitive than either. Both mind and matter seem to be composite,and the stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between the two,in a sense above them both,like a common ancestor.

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19. ....reading a book is a very different experience from composing one; yet, if I were a solipsist, I should have to suppose that I had composed the works of Shakespeare and Newton and Einstein, since they have entered in to my experience. Seeing how much better they are than my own books, and how much less labour they have cost me, I have been foolish to spend so much time composing with the pen rather than with the eye.

20. ....that complete metaphysical agnosticism is not compatible with the maintainance of linguistic propositions.

22. ....The whole of what we perceive without inference belongs to our private world.

23. There is..... a discoverable relation between the structure of sentences refer. I do not think the structure of non - verbal facts is wholly unknowable, and I believe that .... the properties of language may help us to understand the structure of the world.

24. ....the more correct are the inferences we can draw

from a percept as to other events( whether percepts or not )belonging to the same group,the more "objective is the perception."

25. What we really know is that,under certain conditions of temperature, the appearance we call ice is replaced by the appearance we call water.....but there is no reason except prejudice for regarding both as appearances of the same substance.

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33. It is my reason for the use of Occam's razor,since wherever that implement can shave away an entity, the inference to the entity,in question thereby loses its force.

34. Instead of looking for an impartial source,we can secure neutrality by the equal representation of all partics. Instead of supposing that there is some unknown cause, the "real" table,behind the differente sensations of those who are said to be looking at the table,we may take the whole set of these sensations ( together possibly with certain other particulars )as actually being the table.

35. ....the American realists are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind and matter are composed

of neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material. But I should say that images belong only to the mental world.... The law of gravitation, for example, is physical law, while the law of association is a psychological law.

36. I suggest, as a first approximation, that these particulars, together with such correlated others as are unperceived jointly are the table.

37. But when I speak of "appearances," I do so only for brevity: I do not mean anything that must "appear" to somebody but only that happening, whatever it may be, which is connected, at the place in question, with a given physical object .... it would be a transverse vibration in the ether.

39. I contend that the ultimate constituents of matter are atoms or electrons, but sensations, and other things similar to sensations as regards extent and duration.

40. I regard both ( primary & secondary qualities ) as subjective in the sense that neither can exist except in a region where there is an organism with sense organ and a brain.

41. .... the importance of mnemonic phenomena for psychology ... they are what transforms a biography ( in our technical sense ) into a life. It is they give the continuity of a " person " or a " mind. "

42. The most essential characteristic of mind is memory, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that memory associated with a given person survives that person's death.

43. Habit, memory and thought are all developments of mnemonic causation. It is probable, though not certain, that mnemonic causation is derivative from ordinary physical causation in nervous ( and other ) tissue .

44. ....that the patch of color may be both physical and psychological, the reason for distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation disappears, and we may say that the patch of color and our sensation in seeing it are identical.

45. But in themselves they do not differ profoundly, and there is no reason to invoke two different ways as a separate kind of knowledge disappears.

46. The events that are grouped to make a given mind are, according to my theory, the very same events that are grouped to make its brain. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that they are some of the events that make the brain.

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