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THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THONBURI KINGDOM IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE CHINESE ERA, 1727 -1782



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
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
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ช่วงระยะเวลาระหว่างกลางศตวรรษที่ ๑๘ ถึงศตวรรษที่ ๑๙ เป็นยุคแห่งการขยายตัวทางการค้าและจุดสูงสุดของการอพยพเข้ามาของชาวจีนในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ภาคพื้นดิน ปัจจัยสำคัญสำคัญที่ก่อให้เกิดปรากฏการณ์ดังกล่าว มาจากการขยายตัวทางการค้าของจีน โดยเฉพาะการค้าเอกชน อันเป็นผลสืบเนื่องมาจากการยกเลิกคำสั่งห้ามเดินทางทางทะเลของจักรพรรดิฉินในค.ศ. ๑๗๒๗ การขยายตัวทางการค้าดังกล่าวส่งผลต่อการเกิดขึ้นของหลายอาณาจักรในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ และหนึ่งในนั้นคือการเกิดขึ้นของอาณาจักรธนบุรีใน ค.ศ. ๑๗๖๗ วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้จึงมุ่งศึกษากระแสการค้าเอกชนจีนในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ ในช่วงศตวรรษที่ ๑๘ ตลอดจนวิเคราะห์การเกิดขึ้นและพัฒนาการของอาณาจักรธนบุรี

จากการศึกษาพบว่า ความเจริญทางเศรษฐกิจอันเนื่องมาจากกระแสการค้าจีนและการอพยพเข้ามาของชาวจีนในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ ส่งผลให้เกิดเมืองท่าและอาณาจักรใหม่หลายเมือง การขยายอำนาจเหนือเมืองท่าสำคัญในอ่าวไทยและลุ่มแม่น้ำเจ้าพระยา ส่งผลให้สมเด็จพระเจ้าตากสินสามารถตั้งดวงประไยชนจากการค้าทางทะเล โดยเฉพาะการค้าเอกชนที่กำลังรุ่งเรืองอยู่ ผลกำไรจากการค้าสำเนาได้กลายเป็นรายได้หลักอันนำมาซึ่งสร้างความเจริญแก่ธนบุรีในระยะเวลาอันสั้น ชาวจีนที่อพยพเข้ามาอยู่ในเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้มีบทบาทสำคัญต่อการเกิดและพัฒนาการของอาณาจักรธนบุรี

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JIRATHORN CHARTSIRI: THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THONBURI KINGDOM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHINESE ERA, 1727 - 1782. THESIS ADVISOR: ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR SUNAIT CHUTINTARANOND, Ph.D., 209 pp.

The period between the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth century was an era of dynamic commercial expansion in Southeast Asia and a peak period of Chinese migration into Southeast Asia. The major factor for this phenomenon was the expansion of the Chinese commerce after the imperial ban was lifted in 1727. Several new political and economic centers in mainland Southeast Asia were emerged from that economic movement and one of them was the Thonburi kingdom. This research aims to reexamines the history of the Thonburi period under the argument that the Thonburi kingdom emerged and gain significant economic strength from her proximity to a booming China.

This research shows that the expansion of the Chinese commerce in Southeast Asia led to the emergence of new political and economic center. King Taksin took advantage of the increasing maritime trade by seizing an important port emporium and creating a commercial network from the Chao Phraya Delta to the Gulf of Siam. The profit from the junk trade became the main revenue, which helped Thonburi expand her territory, population, and productive capacity within a relatively short period. The Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia paid important roles in the emergence and development of the Thonburi kingdom. Trade between China and Thonburi was private trade before the revival of the tributary system at the end of the Thonburi period.

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
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and importance of the research problem

The Thonburi period is the strangest history of Thai History. Even if there was a lot of evidence comparing for only 15 years but Thonburi was well-known and discussed inclusively. Attention not only was in academic circles but also dispersed to the public. However Thonburi became the most depressed period because it was dependent on conventional ideas, lacked different analysis resulting in an image of the Thonburi Kingdom that was indistinct, inexplicit and too difficult to deeply understand for continual development from the Ayudhaya and through to the Rattanakosin period. The primary factor that concealed attraction of Thonburi was King Taksin who was praised as the one of two kings for independent rehabilitation of the Thai nation but his background and life's end was mysterious and more attractive than King Naresuan who was born as an heir prince and died as a great king. Therefore Thonburi history was deflected to the King of Thonburi rather than the Kingdoms history.

King Taksin was one of the most popular and well-known Kings of Thailand. His bibliography is like a drama of luckless hero from being half-blood Thai and Teochiu Chinese ordinary man; he was patronized by Siamese noble until he became a governor and brave soldier in war. He announced his intension to rehabilitate Ayudhaya and return independence to Siam. From being a common person to step into the position of the King ended mournfully. He was executed by his closest nobleman who set himself up to be a first king of the present dynasty since he was insane. The luckless hero's life was impressive to scholars and public alike. People still discussed and doubted about his being insane. Another issue that was highly interesting for the public was fact that he was not executed (even royal annals specified evidently) but

could escape with his loyal follower's help. These stories were elaborated as imagination and used to be a political tool in each era. Because of his impressive and outstanding bibliography, a lot of King Taksin's stories were produced in historical literature, documentary even drama, movie and song, both has historical evidence and referring to spiritual communication. King Taksin became representative of the Thonburi Kingdom and his prominence hid his kingdom completely.

Perception and understanding of Thonburi history beyond King Taksin's story was limited considerably even when there was literature regarding "Thai politic during the King of Thonbur period" of Nidhi Eiamsriwongse that concerned with politics only in an overall perspective. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2543) Images of the Thonburi kingdom therefore were droughty, indistinct, and had no contact with the previous or next era including integrity with regional history like Southeast Asian history, as a result Thonburi history was disregarded unfortunately. Questions about the establishment, economical and social conditions, movement of Thonburi according to movement of region were not answered. Even Thamsook Noonond explained the cause of the quantity and variety of King Taksin's works originated from an attempt to find answers about Thonburi (แถมสุข นุ่มนนท์, 2536:57). obviously, most works were still finding King Taksin's story rather than Thonburi Kingdom's story.

As mentioned, an attempt to explain and demonstrated the Thonburi kingdom in several academic fair but most fairs still depended on a conventional understanding frame that was the limitation for study and understanding of new aspects. We might divide the idea frame into a motif for the explanation of Thonburi as follows:

1. Thonburi history was thought to be different from history of other eras.

Referring to Thonburi, unavoidable stories were communities, war and politic. The image of Thonburi became an image of a troop that was not different from large guerilla and created war in order to seize power among and within groups. This idea was a major frame that was mostly used in explanation and understanding

Thonburi history. It was a very interesting idea because while King Taksin was perceived as a hero, independence salvager and great king, reversely his kingdom perceived as community or group that was aggregated loosely only, no constancy and no other views at all.

The idea of a group or community in Thonburi was initiated by Prince Krom Phraya Damrong Rachanuphab by mentioning it in Royal writing regarding the Thai battle Burma (Thai Rop Phama). After losing Ayudhaya, Siam had a riot and Ayudhaya's dependency got freedom, a small city was humble with the large city, the ruler of a large and powerful city wanted to be the royal person and get a higher position in . There were 5 groups. Phraya Tak group was the most important group in the central area led by Sin who was called "Phraya Tak" located at Chantaburi ranging from Cambodia to Chonburi. Prince Krom Phraya Damrong Rachanuphab explained that the Royal Tak group was disadvantaged from the beginning because there was no native land to support like the Royal Pimai group led by Krom Muen Thep Pipit and no domicile as a power basis like the Royal Pitsanulok, Royal Nakornsrihammarat and Royal Phra Fang. Phraya Tak previously did not think to be powerful in Siam but set himself up to be a King after occupying Rayong, resulting in several of wars including wars with other nations.(สมเด็จพระบรมราชาธิราชที่ ๑, 2514)

The idea concerning the separation of the country into groups was distinguishable from Thonburi history and was used as a reference for further work. Another important work that originated was the community political idea frame was "Thai Politics during the King of Thonburi period of Nidhi Eiamsriwongse who that explained the characteristic of politics in the Thonburi era was communities, having King Taksin as a leader or community leader. Announcement of a recovery policy for the Ayudhaya Kingdom attracted lords and people who had already escaped to participate in his community. At the same time he had no real power in his hand. War problems throughout his reign led to several problems including manpower control problems resulting in the demolition by Phraya Chakri who was a senior lord from Ayudhaya who collected a group of lords and establish a capital city that was representative of the Ayudhaya Kingdom

To view an image of Thonburi it was only a community that had only political and war among groups. Even when Thonburi fought with other kingdoms it was never been accepted to be a kingdom. Images of political movement as a Kingdom such as a continuous trading economy, society and religion from Ayudhaya through Rattanakosin were not explained as appropriate meaning that Thonburi had a different status from Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin. Therefore Thonburi's history was eliminated from other eras as if it was only a 15 year gap or an intervening time that separated two great kingdoms during a lack of continuity of the Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin periods. Thonburi's history was viewed differently compared with the history of other eras.

2. To view Thonburi history via context of present politic

An attempt to perceive and understand history by analysis from the context of the current world was always a mistake that occurred with academic work. Also Thonburi history was another era that was analyzed via present politics including questions regarding righteousness in the enthronement of King Rama I that was used as a political tool in opposition to the Chakri dynasty for several eras. King Taksin was usually raised whenever they wanted to discredit the Chakri dynasty. An obvious example was in the year 1932, the government reformation from absolute monarchy to democracy literature of Pramin Krauthong "Rebel Prince Mhen, heir of King Tak, Grandson of King Rama I". (ปราชญ์ศรีอยุธยา, 2547)

Moreover Thonburi history was defined and explained via the context of politics and society by having a frame of liberation as a majority. Bravery of several people in history was admired under belief that their motivation came from doing for their "nation" or may be called as conducting a history frame of an era to explain another era's history in the form of nationalism history.

3. To view Thonburi history and lack of relationship with regional history

As mentioned, Thonburi history seems no continuity with Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin. Thonburi was impersonal and not mentioned that it was a kingdom that was

established after the collapse of Ayudhaya or laid the foundation for Rattanakosin. It is a fact that 15 years of Thonburi was an important period, carried on progress in society and economy that were interrupted in the late Ayudhaya because of war was disregarded as well as the strong and progressive economy of Rattanakosin.

Besides continuity with Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin history was disregarded, Thonburi was explained that nothing related to regional changes. Actually Thonburi originated as an important state in Mainland Southeast Asia. There was evidence of western people and several localities that mentioned an importance of Thonburi as a new Kingdom including role of King Taksin representative of a new leader of the Siam state. However, historical work was written that it was isolated and eliminated from the world. There was no dominant aspect for relationship with neighboring countries except for war and politics. Especially the commercial aspect, Thonburi deemed to be dominant in Southeast Asia. Results of being eliminated from regional history and lack of continuity with previous and next eras were because Thonburi's politics had no movement and progress. Three idea frames as mentioned became limitations in studying and understanding Thonburi history and progress. Actually there were several aspects that should be researched to discover the kingdom that was disregarded all the time.

15 years of Thonburi was the period that was changed and developed because Thonburi originated from the end of Ayudhaya, the great kingdom of the Chao Phraya River and took a short time to replace Ayudhaya in several areas. To study occurrence and development into strong kingdom we cannot study only 15 years of Thonburi because the separation of 15 years of Thonburi is separation by dynasty or politics. In order to understand replacement of Ayudhaya and the transmission of strong fundamentals to Rattanakosin it is needed to look back factors that originated changes including supportive factors that recovered Thonburi from a war-torn society into a consistent kingdom in economic and government. Common factors of all three kingdoms were the existence economy and trade that dispersed from Southern China starting from the early eighteenth century that the Chinese emperor relieved safety and

sea trade law. In the year 1727 regarded as an important year because the emperor of China rescinded the command of sea trade prohibition and encouraged Chinese to trade that led to an economic boom in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore laws that support immigration of Chinese to several ports were issued periodically. Trade current that the Chinese brought to Southeast Asia was dispersed exclusively and highly influenced the trading economy of several cities in 18th century including Ayudhaya, Thonburi and Rattankosin.

From the mentioned phenomenon, Thonburi still had new aspects that should be studied. This thesis focuses on studying the origin and development of the Thonburi kingdom in the context of the influence of the progress of trade from China in Southeast Asia.

1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES

As mentioned there are several academic works that try to both directly and indirectly explain and demonstrate Thonburi in several aspects that can be separated to 3 groups:

1. Questions about morality of Chakri dynasty

This literature purposes to identify the morality of the Chakri dynasty in subversion of King Taksin and established a new dynasty in Bangkok and to question about the morality of the enthronement of Phraya Chakri or Prince Prabudhayodfah Chulalok. Most literature still ask the same questions regarding the truth about the execution of King Taksin, and the displacement of Thonburi's royal family in Rattanakosin. Literature was fantasy that used spiritual communication and foretelling and academic. Both lead to questions about morality of the enthronement of the Chakri Dynasty.

"Who killed King of Thonburi" is an historical short story authored by royal major general Luang Vichitvatakarn, and was first published in the "Ploenchit

weekly" by the Ploenchit printing press, series "Vichit Literature" around 1937 stated new historical evidence regarding the regicide of King Taksin in the late Thonburi era. (หลวงวิจิตรวาทการ, 2543) Whether he was actually executed or not at the Vichaiprasit fortress, at the entrance of Bangkok Yai canal on 5th April 1782 as recorded in the royal annals or escaped to another place by switching with his relatives name Mun who was similar appearance to him and was executed instead. Real King Taksin passed away 3 years later due to ambush

Luang Vichitvatakarn referred to the source of this short story at the beginning of story that occurred after 6 months of working as a librarian at the National library where they kept old documents about late reign of King Thonburi. Mysterious events at the library caused the resignation of several watchman of library. He therefore guarded himself in order to prove the truth and one night he got the inspiration from mystery then wrote a short story in his own handwriting according to hearsay of that mystery. His work became an inspiration to create a lot of such novel of fantasy so far. Works as mentioned were both novel and documentary that referred from the real story and had same plot as "Who kill King Taksin" of Luang Vichitvatakarn such as "beyond condition person?" of Supa Sirimahanon (2543)

"Beyond condition person?" was an historical novel, authored by Supa Sirimahanon by using Si Bannkum as a penname in 1953 while being imprisoned for 60 days because she was a suspect in case of Rebel Peace. Her writing finished on 18 July 1953 but it was not published during her existence until 2002 Supa authored this story referring to an ancient book that was inherited in Soontornrohit family through Luang Supathep (To Soontornrohit) father of Chinda Sirimahanon that recorded incidents in the late reign of King Taksin that conflicted with recorded history in the royal annals but conformed to hearsay in the locality around Nakornsrihammarat. It stated that King Taksin was not executed and killed by Prince Chao Phraya Maha Kasatsuk but embarked a junk to live at the Kao Kunpanom temple, at Nakornsrihammarat. Some parts of the book referred to the short story "who kill King Thonburi" of Luang Vichitvatakarn, published in 1937.

There were a lot of such works such as "King Taksin passed away at Nakorn city" (ทศยศ กระหม่อมแก้ว, 2547), "who kill King Taksin?" (วรมัย กบิลสิงห์, 2540), "secret son of King Taksin" (ณัฐวุฒิ สุทธิสงคราม, 2509) and "fate of King Taksin Not be executed".(เล็ก พลุโต, 2551)

The volume of such fantasy work was still published periodically meant that the topic of the morality of the Chakri dynasty was still questionable but academic work there has not been many. "Rebel Prince Mhen, heir of King Tak, Grandson of King Rama I" deems to be a dominant work. It is concerned with political questions regarding the morality of the Chakri dynasty explaining the incident starting from King Taksin's reign to King Bhuddhalertlanapalai Pramin and the nativity of Prince Menh, royal son of King Taksin and his mother who was a daughter of Chao Phaya Chakri (King Bhuddhayodfahchulalok). After the Thonburi reign was overthrown, a lot of the royal family and loyal lords were executed, only young or lower positioned royal family were left. However after King Rama I passed away the Royal family were wipe out once again because of politics.

Pramin's work does not use new evidence or analyze different issue from former knowledge but he raises former issues about King Taksin and politics to explain the morality of the Chakri dynasty and the consequences to the Thonburi's royal family.

2. Systematically analysis of the structure of the Kingdom Thonburi

The most systematically analysis work about the structure of Thonburi is Thai Politics during the King of Thonburi period of Nidhi Eiamsriwongse. It states that this work creates ideas for studying Thonburi history for historians in further eras. Nidhi's work analyzes the politics of the Thonburi era systematically by demonstrating internal weakness and failure of the Ayudhaya kingdom including a shortage of soldiers from several cities leading to the collapse of the kingdom, attempts to centralize power and

the forces of King Taksin in order to break through the Burma army from Ayudhaya created him to be King, attacking several eastern city communities.

Nidhi explained that the government was autonomous. Announcements of policy of recovery of the Ayudhaya kingdom attracted aged lords and people who escaped the Burma army back to participate in Thonburi. Several community leaders created themselves to be king when Ayudhaya broke and were suppressed including decentralization of power to other regions. Nidi identified that actually, King Taksin had no power over several cities by allowing people in the community to govern.

War with Burma further effected to the herd and manpower control policy, King Taksin's administration was a community rather than an Ayudhaya royal palace, failure to control internal lords who were aged lords descending from Ayudhaya lords resulted that Chao Phya Chakri could aggregate power and replaced him. Nidhi Eiawsriwongse surveyed, analyzed and criticized evidence exclusively, carefully and systematically as possible by aiming to mainly discuss political issues. However, he identified economical and social background as well. It may state that Thai politics in the King Thonburi era is a study of the whole kingdom not King Taksin only.

3. Related or overlapping works with the Thonburi era that have not explained.

The eighteenth century is the period that several historians were interested in, changes within Southeast Asia influenced from the changes of China. Relieve of trade and sea travel laws by the Chinese emperor resulted in rapid progress of trading in southern China ports and exclusive expansion until trade current occurred that directly affected to several ports in Southeast Asia. This incident created interest as a result many writing such as the writing of Anthony Reid, Ng Chin Keong and Wang Gungwu. These writings explained the economical, social and political movement in the Southeast Asian region that related to changes in China. Works of these historians was widely accepted. Simultaneously the Thonburi, the kingdom that originated and developed in the mention period, was influenced from dispersed trading and was well-known port was not attentive as appropriate.

1.3 DATA SOURCES

The Thonburi period so far has adequate information but it was partly used to support main idea frame as mentioned. There were actually other useful and interesting information but they were utilized in order to discover new dimensions and aspects of Thonburi history. The following are some of the selected historical sources that used in this thesis.

Among the historical sources, works that were popular and referred to several times were the Chronicle.

Chronicle is a historical account of facts and events ranged in chronological order, as in a time line. Typically, equal weight is given for historically important events and local events, the purpose being the recording of events that occurred, seen from the perspective of the chronicler. This is in contrast to a narrative or history, which sets selected events in a meaningful interpretive context and excludes those the author does not see as important.

There were several records related to the Thonburi period but the most well known version of The Chronicle of Thonburi are the Royal Chronicle of the Thonburi period, the PanChanthanumas Version and The Royal Chronicle of the Thonburi period, Somdej Prabaromracha ti see (King Taksin) Version.

The collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees

The Royal Decree or Mai Rub Sung means the royal order from the king to the officials regard to the ceremonies. The collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees was the historical source that had important details that cannot be retrieved from other evidences because it was a governmental document in Thonburi and not many remained at the present. The collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees detailed several royal ceremonies, appointment of important lords, specified the number of military forces and spent money in several royal ceremonies. These details reflected economical

conditions of Thonburi about labour and income. From the command identified the greatness of several ceremonies from the early reign that conflicted with the transmitted image of poverty and war.

A letter of Pipatkosa to East India Dutch Company

A letter of Pipatkosa to East India Dutch Company (1769) was a document from the Thonburi Royal Palace to the East India Dutch Company (V.O.C) in 1769 in the name of Phra Pipatkosa to the director of the East India Dutch Company persuading the company to return and establish a trade station in Thonburi and requesting to buy firearms via a Chinese merchant in communication and transportation. This record was evidence showing trade communication between western countries and Thonburi via Chinese merchants from the beginning of reign.

This thesis is separated to 6 sections as follows:

Chapter 1 : Introduction

Principle, objectives, Hypothesis

Chapter 2 : China under the Ming and Qing dynasties

In the first part, the editor analyzed the governments of Ming and Qing dynasties in several areas especially economy and trading in order to present a context of China in each period and the policy of the royal palace also caused changes. The second part analyzed Southern China in politics, economy and trading, dominant ports in southern china to China trade in 18th – 19th century by emphasizing Amoy city that was established from extensive trade flow and highly dominant to private trade.

Chapter 3: The expansion of Chinese commerce in Southeast Asia

The first part analyzed the economy and trade between China and Southeast Asia by emphasizing junk trading of several groups of Chinese merchants. The greatest success period of trading between China and this region was The Chinese Century as Anthony Reid called it. It was between 18th – 19th century leading immigration to settle down in several areas of Southeast Asia. Flourishing economy resulted in establishment of new, consistent and strong towns and dynasties. The second part analyzed the current China trade that extended to Ayudhaya as a result of change of royal palace policy in order to support and encourage trading with China instead of western countries until it was interrupted because of Burma's blockage.

Chapter 4 : The emergence of the Thonburi kingdom

The establishment of Thonburi in the extensive China trade led by King Taksin who was of Chinese race. Primary hypothesis of editor was Thonburi merged itself to be a part of a trade network instead of Ayudhaya. Several policies of King Taksin influenced the economy and Chinese immigrants were highly dominant in the progress of Thonburi that was fundamental to Rattanakosin.

Chapter 5 : The economy during the Thonburi Period

Economic Analysis focused of the Thonburi period, especially revenues, expense, manpower and trade. Thonburi State attempted to organize the economy and government. Including legislation to control economic growth. This chapter also analyze the continuity of Siam from the late Ayudhaya period to the early Bangkok.

Chapter 6 : Conclusion

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

- 1.) To examine the Chinese trading dynamism in Southeast Asia during the 18th century
- 2.) To analyze the emergence and development of the Thonburi Kingdom in the context of the Chinese era in Southeast Asia
- 3.) To examine the role of Chinese migrants in causing the emergence and development of Thonburi

1.5 METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this study relies on an historical approach. Various types of sources are used to analyze the dissertation based on the political, economic and social development of both Thai and English. Thus, the data mainly is based on documentary material.

1.6 HYPOTHESES

The last imperial ban on private Chinese trade and travel had been revoked in 1727, led to the economic expansion and migration. The Thonburi Kingdom emerged and gained much of her economic strength from her proximity to a booming China. The effective use of Chinese migrants was also the primary factor that helped the Thonburi Kingdom emerged as the powerful center in the Southeast Asia.

1.7 DEFINITION

" The Chinese era" in this thesis was based on the term " Chinese century" of Anthony Reid, which has been used to characterize Southeast Asia between circa 1740 – 1840. In this thesis, "The Chinese era" could be explained as the era that Southeast Asia was influenced by economic growth in China. Chinese immigrants played a key

role in the economic prosperity of Southeast Asia which caused the tremendous expansion of Southeast Asian commerce in the eighteenth century.



ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER II

CHINA DURING THE FOURTEENTH-EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

To understand the expansion of economic boom in China, It is necessary to comprehend the China state development. The Ming and Qing dynasties both had different policies toward their kingdoms, especially towards Southern China.

2.1 The rise and decline of Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644)

For some scholars, The Ming period from 1368 to 1644 is one of the great eras of orderly government and social stability in human history (Fairbank, 1979: 177). And often regarded as both a high point in Chinese civilization as well as a dynasty in which early signs of capitalism emerged. The dynasty that last longer than two hundred years was founded by Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-1398), the peasant.

The Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) ruled before the establishment of the Ming Dynasty. Alongside institutionalized ethnic discrimination against Han Chinese that stirred resentment and rebellion, other explanations for the Yuan's demise included overtaxing areas hard-hit by inflation, and massive flooding of the Yellow River as a result of the abandonment of irrigation projects (Gascoigne, 2003: 150). Consequently, agriculture and the economy were in shambles and rebellion broke out among the hundreds of thousands of peasants called upon to work on repairing the dykes of the Yellow River. Zhu Yuanzhang was born in the Huai River region, northwest of Nanking. He was a penniless peasant and Buddhist monk who joined the Red Turbans in 1352, but soon gained a reputation after marrying the foster daughter of a rebel commander (Ebrey, 1990: 190-191). In 1356, Zhu's rebel force crossed the Yangtze and captured the city of Nanking, a strategic base close to the key economic area of the Yangtze delta. Zhu Yuanzhang cemented his power in the south by eliminating his arch rival and rebel leader "Chen Youliang" in the Battle of Lake Poyang

in 1363. The last Yuan emperor fled north to Shangdu. In 1368, he seized Peking but continued to use Nanking as the capital of the Ming Dynasty. Zhu declared the founding of the Ming Dynasty which means "Brilliant" and named himself "Hongwu" (Vast military power), the first emperor of Ming dynasty.

2.1.1 Administration

Hongwu made an immediate effort to rebuild state infrastructure. Nanking had been built up by Hung-wu as the imperial capital, with a city wall sixty feet high and over twenty miles around, the longest city wall in the world. However, in the reign of Yung-lo in 1421, he moved the Ming capital to Peking and leaving Nanking as the subsidiary (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 180).

Scholars still debate the actual population figures for each era in the Ming Dynasty. Timothy Brook notes that the Ming government census figures are dubious since fiscal obligations prompted many families to underreport the number of people in their households and many county officials to underreport the number of households in their jurisdiction (Brook, 1998: 30). Children were often underreported, especially female children, as shown by skewed population statistics throughout the Ming. Even adult women were underreported (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 27-28). The government attempted to revise the census figures using estimates of the expected average number of people in each household, but this did not solve the widespread problem of tax registration.

The number of people counted in the census of 1381 was 59,873,305; however, this number dropped significantly when the government found that some 3 million people were missing from the tax census of 1391 (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 267). Even though underreporting figures was made a capital crime in 1381, the need for survival pushed many to abandon the tax registration and wander from their region, where Hongwu had attempted to impose rigid immobility on the populace. The government tried to mitigate this by creating their own conservative estimate of 60,545,812 people in 1393.

According to the gazetteers of Ming China, Brook estimates that the overall population under the Chenghua Emperor (r. 1464–1487) was roughly 75 million, despite mid-Ming census figures hovering around 62 million. While prefectures across the empire in the mid-Ming period were reporting either a drop in or stagnant population size, local gazetteers reported massive amounts of incoming vagrant workers with not enough good cultivated land for them to till, so that many would become drifters, conmen, or wood-cutters that contributed to deforestation (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 94-96). Hongzhi emperor and Zhengde emperor lessened the penalties against those who had fled their home region, while the Jiajing Emperor (1521–1567) finally had officials register migrants wherever they had moved or fled in order to bring in more revenues (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 97).

Even with the reformation of Jiajing emperor, in attempt to document migrant workers and merchants, by the late Ming era the government census still did not accurately reflect the enormous growth in population. Gazetteers across the empire noted this and made their own estimations of the overall population in the Ming, some guessing that the population had doubled, tripled, or even grown fivefold since 1368.

Fairbank estimates that the population was perhaps 160 million in the late Ming Dynasty (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 128). While Brook estimates 175 million. However, a great epidemic that entered China through the northwest in 1641 ravaged the densely populated areas along the Grand Canal; a gazetteer in northern Zhejiang noted more than half the population fell ill that year and that 90% of the local populace in one area was dead by 1642.

2.1.2 Foreign Relations

In the year of his triumph, Hongwu emperor dispatched envoys to all tributary states informing them the change of dynasty and summoning their rulers to acknowledge the new Son of Heaven. The immediate purpose behind sending imperial messengers with news of the accession of the first Ming emperor was to sort out quickly

which countries wanted close relations with China and which did not, which were dependent and friendly and which were potentially hostile. (Wang, 2003: 52)

Tribute relations involved not only the performance of the "Kowtow" (three kneeling and nine prostrations), but also many other aspects of interstate relations : the exchange of envoys and conduct of diplomatic relations, repatriation and extradition of persons, regulation of Sino-foreign trade, and special Chinese efforts at self-defense through intimidating, cajoling, or subsidizing foreign tribes and rulers (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 195). In short, the fitting of foreign potentates into a hierarchy of superior and inferior, and the expression of this in ritual observances, was merely an extension to the outer world of the "Confucian" social order which the ruler of China sought to maintain at home. The Vassal king was given an official patent of appointment and a seal to use his memorials, which were to be dated by the Chinese ruler's year period. The Son of Heaven affected a paternal interest in the orderly government of the tributary state, confirming the succession of new rulers, sometimes offering a military protection against attack, usually conferring the boon of trade with China, and in any case sending down moral homilies and exhortations.

John K. Fairbank (1979: 195) described this kind of relation that

"This was not an aggressive imperialism. Rather, it was a defensive expression of culturalism: foreign rulers, if they wished contact with the Middle Kingdom, had to accept its term and acknowledge the universal supremacy of the Son of Heaven. Trade with China might be of great value. Tribute formalities were the price to be paid."

It soon became clear that the first Ming emperor was less interested in ritual submission to the Son of Heaven than in a formal acknowledgement of his new dynasty. He concentrated his effort on a relatively small sphere of influence and consistently tried to restrict the number of tribute missions by adhering to the classical ideal of one mission every three years for neighboring countries and one mission every

generation of the rest. He encouraged attention to three aspects of such relations, first, to pay respect for the Son of Heaven. On two other aspects of foreign relations, he laid down explicit policies that countries overseas were not to be attacked and tribute relations were not to be undertaken for profit and were not to be conflated with private maritime trade. (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 52)

The first Ming emperor's initiatives to seek his neighbors' acknowledgement of his legitimacy may be contrasted with his desire to limit severely all foreign contacts. The limits imposed were justified in Confucian terms, but the practical reasons were more important. Hongwu emperor believed in tight centralized control over all matter pertaining to relations beyond the borders of his empire. While his main concern was the security of his empire, he was nonetheless anxious to control all foreign trade so as to ensure that trading along sensitive frontiers would not break the law and order of his realm; therefore, the primacy of the formal relations with foreign rulers and the ban on private commerce. Wang gungwu (2003: 52) concluded that

"This policy did not mean that trading aboard was impossible, it is simply made it illegal, secret, largely unrecorded."

During the reign of Yunglo emperor, there were many important reformations. For example, his removal of the capital in 1421 from Nanking to Peking, this had symbolized the Ming preoccupation with defense against the Mongols. However, the most remarkable incident was "The Maritime Expeditions" or "The Ming Voyage" led by Admiral Zheng He. The Ming Voyages have attracted considerable scholarly interest, as much for their unexploited potential as for their importance for the history of Chinese foreign relations and diplomacy.

Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming government sponsored a series of seven naval expeditions. Zheng He was placed as the admiral in control of the huge fleet and armed forces that undertook these expeditions.

Zheng He was born in 1371 in modern-day Yunnan Province, which was at that time the last stronghold of the Yuan Dynasty in its struggle with the victorious Ming Dynasty. Like most Hui people, Zheng He was a Muslim. His religion, later, was well fitted to deal with the Islamic rulers of South Asia.

Zheng He's first voyage in 1405 – 1407, comprised 317 ships, 62 of them so-called "treasure ships".* The first fleet carried 27,870 men, including officers, soldiers, seamen, interpreters, medical orderlies, various artisans skilled in boat repair and maintenance, and numerous officials in charge of everything from rationing stores and purchasing supplies, to valuing and keeping meticulous accounts of the treasure, gifts and trade goods. All of them were under the overall command of the grand admiral Zheng He. The fleet visited at least ten countries, as far as Cochin and Calicut on the Malibar coast of southern India, where it stayed for 4 months awaiting a change in the monsoon winds before the return voyage (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 84).

The next two voyages took place in 1407-1409 and 1409-1411. Both again went to Calicut, though the third also visited Srilanka. The fourth voyage, from 1413 to 1415, went beyond India for the first time, as far as Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. It comprised 63 ships carrying 28,560 men. The fifth expedition of 1417-1419 sailed even further, down the coast of Africa as far as Malindi, just north of Mombasa. No record survives of the complement ships and men on this or the sixth expedition (1421 – 1422), which reached Aden and Somali ports of Mogadishu and Brava. On all these voyages, elements of the fleet were directed to other ports of call, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Bengal. The furthest of these subsidiary voyages was to Mecca, the most distant place to send an envoy to the Ming court. The sixth expedition was the last dispatched by the Yongle emperor. After a break of ten years, during which there was steady retraction of Chinese sea power and presence overseas. Then, in 1430, the Xuande emperor, perhaps in emulation of

* Treasure ship is the name of a type of ship that the Ming admiral Zheng He sailed in.

Yongle, ordered Zheng He, at the age of 59, to undertake one last voyage. Zheng He, on his seven voyages, successfully relocated large numbers of Chinese Muslims to Malacca, Palembang, Surabaya and other places and Malacca became the center of Islamic learning and also a large international Islamic trade center of the southern seas. This lasted from 1431 to 1433. Zheng He died in 1435 (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 84-85).

The reason the Yongle emperor launched these naval expeditions to Southeast Asia and India and later extended them further west to Arabia and East Africa had never been cleared. Wang Gungwu suggested that it was related to his usurpation and his desire for universal legitimation (Wang, 2003: 66).

The enormous tributary missions were discontinued after the death of Zheng He. His death was only one of many culminating factors which brought the missions to an end. However, the expeditions undoubtedly stimulated commerce of other countries, especially to Southeast Asia. For example, these missions were probably responsible for the introduction of Indian pepper plants to northern Sumatra, as well as the rapid growth in Southeast Asian pepper production for the China market that followed (Reid, 1993: 12). Anthony Reid noted that

"If one moment must be singled out for the beginning of the Southeast Asia's "Age of commerce," the first state trading mission under the eunuch admiral Zheng He, in 1405, is the best candidate"

In 1479, the vice president of the Ministry of War burned the court records documenting Zheng He's voyages; it was one of many events signaling China's shift to an inward foreign policy (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 138). Shipbuilding laws were implemented that restricted vessels to a small size; the concurrent decline of the

Ming navy allowed the growth of piracy along China's coasts. Japanese pirates or "wokou" and smugglers began staging raids on Chinese ships and coastal communities at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteen century, although much of the piracy was carried out by native Chinese.

Instead of mounting a counterattack, Ming authorities chose to shut down coastal facilities and starve the pirates out. All foreign trade was to be conducted by the state under the guise of formal tribute missions (Reid, 1993: 139). These policies were known as the "hai jin" laws, which enacted a strict ban on private maritime activity until the laws' formal abolishment in 1567. However, the ban on trading with Japan remained in force. This meant that the Chinese sojourning in Japan could not return to China, nor could Japanese merchants trade directly with China.

In this period government-managed overseas trade with Japan was carried out exclusively at the seaport of Ningbo, trade with Manila exclusively at Fuzhou, and trade with Batavia exclusively at Guangzhou (Ebrey, 1996: 211). Even then the Japanese were only allowed into port once every ten years and were allowed to bring a maximum of three hundred men on two ships; these laws encouraged many Chinese merchants to engage in widespread illegal trade and smuggling.

The low point in relations between Ming China and Japan occurred during the rule of the great Japanese warlord Hideyoshi, who in 1592 announced he was going to conquer China. In two campaigns that are known collectively as the Imjin War, the Japanese fought with the Korean and Ming armies. Both sides won victories in the war, which was fought almost entirely in Korea and the surrounding waters, but with Hideyoshi's death in 1598, the Japanese gave up their last Korean bases and returned to Japan. However, the victory came at an enormous cost to the Ming government's treasury: some 26,000,000 ounces of silver.

2.1.3 Economy and trade

2.1.3.1 Self-sufficient agriculture

Hongwu revived the agricultural sector to create self-sufficient communities that would not rely on commerce, which he assumed would remain only in urban areas. Yet the surplus created from this revival encouraged rural farmers to make profits by first selling their goods at thoroughfares; by the mid Ming era they began selling their goods in regional urban markets (Brook, 1998: 65-66, 112-113). As the countryside and urban areas became more connected through commerce, households in rural areas began taking on traditionally urban specializations, such as production of silk and cotton textiles. By the late Ming there was a growing concern amongst conservative Confucians that the metaphorical delicate fabric holding together the communal social order was being undermined by country rustics accepting every manner of urban life and decadence.

The rural farmer was not the only social group affected by growing commercialization of Chinese society; it also heavily influenced the landholding gentry that traditionally produced scholar-officials for civil service. The scholar-officials were traditionally held as frugal individuals who deterred themselves from arrogance in the wealth garnered from a prestigious career; they were known even to walk from their country homes into the city where they were employed (Brook, 1993: 144-145). By the time of the Zhengde Emperor (1505–1521), officials chose to be hauled around in luxurious sedan chairs and began purchasing lavish homes in affluent urban neighborhoods instead of living in the countryside. By the late Ming era, gaining wealth became the prime indicator of social prestige, even more so than gaining a scholarly degree.

2.1.3.2 Trade

Trade between North and South China was stimulated by the growth of Peking and the canal system. Trade on the Yangtze and in the South China also increased. Specialized handicraft production grew up for this enlarging market and even some larger-scale manufacturing. At Ching-te-chen the imperial kilns produced great quantities of porcelain for the palace and also for upper-class use and even

export. This porcelain was a truly superior product in the eyes of Europeans. Soochow became a national center of trade, finance, and processing industries, particularly the weaving and dyeing of silk. The nearby Sungkian region, inland from Shanghai, became a late Ming center for cotton cloth production, using raw cotton from other provinces both north and south, and sending its product back for sale there. Canton iron pans were exported widely throughout China, oversea, and Central Asia. (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 205)

This domestic commercial growth led to the setting up in the sixteenth century of numerous regional guilds with guild halls in major centers, especially Peking. These bodies were created chiefly by officials and merchants who came from a common region- a province, prefecture, county, or city- so as to have a convenient center of contact and mutual aid in a distant place, pre-eminently at the capital. (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 205)

Even though the domestic during the Ming dynasty went quite well, the maritime trade was in the other hand. As I mentioned before, The Ming court believed that foreign trade supposed to be in a tributary system. The Yuan policy of encouraging maritime trade did not appeal to the founder of the Ming dynasty. Private trade was uncontrolled and became intermingled with the tributary trade of the court. This, in view, had given rise to the unrest and instability along the coastal frontiers that he inherited with his throne.

The decision of the Ming emperor to enforce strict control over overseas travel led him to encourage public trade for the prestige and other benefits this had for the court. This posed problem both to the private traders whose movements were restricted and to the central government where Confucian officialdom was quite unprepared to commit public funds for such a trade unless it was come in appropriate ways (Wang, 2003: 34).

The Ming founder wanted to control all trade officially by placing it under the revised tributary system; the imperial view emphasized the symbolic acknowledgement of China's cosmological centrality and the legitimacy of the Ming founder's succession to the authority of the great dynasties of China.

However, China's maritime trade developed steadily in the late Ming outside the framework of the tributary system. It appears that, despite Chinese banned on private trade, shipping across the South China Sea continued to grow in the fifteenth century. This was possible first because of Ming official enforcement of the ban was weak between 1457 and the 1520s, so that merchants junks sailed annually in this period from South Fukian to the Nanyang. Secondly, the system of official tribute voyages was at its peak in the fifteenth century, call forth by the expansive initiatives of the first three Ming emperors (Reid, 1988: 15).

Missions from Southeast Asia and South Asia became fewer, while Chinese merchants who went overseas became more numerous. In short, foreign trade was no longer brought to China principally by intermediaries, like the Arabs, but was now carried by Chinese merchants who went aboard with Chinese products and on their return with foreign wares enter easily into the stream of China's coast wise junk traffic. The government did little to encourage this trade and sometimes banned it, but it continued to grow. By the time of the Ming dynasty, the private trade was predominantly Chinese and far out weighed in volume and value the official exchange of goods in tribute and gifts.

2.1.4 The fall of the Ming dynasty

During the reign of Wanli emperor and his two successors, an economic crisis developed that was centered on a sudden widespread lack of the empire's chief medium of exchange: silver. The Protestant powers of the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of England staged frequent raids and acts of piracy against the Catholic-based empires of Spain and Portugal in order to weaken their global economic power (Spence, 1999: 19). Meanwhile, Philip IV of Spain (r. 1621–1665) began cracking down on illegal smuggling of silver from Mexico and Peru across the Pacific towards China, in favor of shipping American-mined silver directly from Spain to Manila. In 1639, the new Tokugawa regime of Japan shut down most of its foreign trade with European powers, causing a halt of yet another source of silver coming into China. However, the greatest

stunt to the flow of silver came from the Americas, while Japanese silver still came into China in limited amounts. Some scholars even assert that the price of silver rose in the 17th century due to a falling demand for goods, not declining silver stocks (Spence, 1999: 28).

These events occurring at roughly the same time caused a dramatic spike in the value of silver and made paying taxes nearly impossible for most provinces. People began hoarding precious silver as there was progressively less of it, forcing the ratio of the value of copper to silver into a steep decline (Spence, 1999: 29). In the 1630s, a string of one thousand copper coins was worth an ounce of silver; by 1640 this was reduced to the value of half an ounce and by 1643 it was worth roughly one-third of an ounce. For peasants this was an economic disaster, since they paid taxes in silver while conducting local trade and selling their crops with copper coins.

In this early half of the 17th century, famines became common in northern China because of unusual dry and cold weather that shortened the growing season; these were effects of a larger ecological event now known as the Little Ice Age (Spence, 1999: 29). Famine, alongside tax increases, widespread military desertions, a declining relief system, and natural disasters such as flooding and inability of the government to properly manage irrigation and flood-control projects caused widespread loss of life and normal civility. The Ming government was starved of resources and could do very little to mitigate the effects of these calamities. Making matters worse, a widespread epidemic spread across China from Zhejiang to Henan, killing a large number of people

In 1640, masses of Chinese peasants who were starving, unable to pay their taxes, and no longer in fear of the frequently defeated Chinese army, began to form into huge bands of rebels. The Chinese military, caught between fruitless efforts to defeat the Manchu raiders from the north and huge peasant revolts in the provinces, essentially fell apart. Unpaid and unfed, the army was defeated by Li Zicheng, who seized the capital without much of a fight. Li's forces were allowed into the city when the gates were treacherously opened from within. On May 26, 1644, Beijing fell to a rebel army led by Li Zicheng; during the turmoil, the last Ming emperor hanged himself on a

tree in the imperial garden outside the Forbidden City. Li Zicheng's army was later defeated by the Manchu.

Despite the loss of Beijing and the death of the emperor, Ming power was by no means totally destroyed. Nanking, Fujian, Guangdong, Shanxi, and Yunnan were all strongholds of Ming resistance. However, there were several pretenders for the Ming throne, and their forces were divided. Each bastion of resistance was individually defeated by the Qing until 1662, when the last real hopes of a Ming revival died with the Yongli emperor, Zhu Youlang. One of the most famous Ming loyalists was Koxinga who I shall describe later in the part of the Qing dynasty.

2.2 China under the Qing dynasty during the eighteenth century

2.2.1 The rise of the Qing dynasty

The Dynasty was founded not by the Han who form the majority of the Chinese population, but the Manchus, who are today an ethnic minority of China. The Manchus are descended from Jurchens a Tungusic people who lived around the region now comprising the Russian province of Primorsky Krai and the Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin.

A remarkable tribal leader named Nurhaci (r. 1616–1626), starting with just a small tribe, rapidly gained control over all the Manchurian tribes. During the Imjin War he offered to lead his tribes in support of the Ming and Joseon army. This offer was declined, but he was granted honorific Ming titles for his gesture (Spence, 1999: 27). Recognizing the weakness of Ming authority north of their border, he took control over all of the other unrelated tribes surrounding his homeland. In 1610 he broke relations with the Ming court; in 1618 he demanded the Ming pay tribute to him to redress the seven grievances which he documented and sent to the Ming court. This was effectively a declaration of war as the Ming were not about to pay money to a former tributary.

Relocating his court from Jianzhou to Liaodong, provided Nurhaci a bigger power base in terms of labors and material resources; geographically, it also

brought him in close contact with the Mongol domains on the plains of Mongolia. Although by this time the once-united Mongol nation under Genghis Khan had long fragmented into individual and at times hostile tribes, these disunited tribes still presented a serious security threat to the Ming borders. Nurhaci's policy towards the Mongols was to seek their friendship and cooperation, thus securing the Jurchens' western front from a potential enemy. Furthermore, the Mongols proved a useful ally in the war, lending the Jurchens their traditional expertise as cavalry archers. To cement this new alliance, Nurhaci initiated a policy of inter-marriages between Jurchen and that Mongolian, while those who resisted were met with military action.

Avoiding conflict with the Ming and the Mongol tribes to the west, Nurhaci concentrated on uniting his own people. His greatest achievement was to develop new administrative institutions, especially the "banner"^{*} system, which came into being gradually after 1601. Companies of three hundred warriors were grouped at first under four banners, separated by colors. Four more were later added. Under these eight banners all the tribesmen were enrolled and thus a transition was made from tribal to bureaucratic organization. All the people, including their captured Chinese slaves or bondservants, were registered under their respective banners, taxes, and mobilized through them as administrative units of the new state. Instead of hereditary chieftains, the banners soon had appointed officers as well as clerks to keep their accounts. As the new state conquered nearby peoples and gained adherents, eight Chinese and eight Mongols banners were added, making a total of twenty-four. By 1644, there were 278 Manchu companies, 120 Mongol, and 165 Chinese, making an army of 169,000, with the Manchu forming less than half a total (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 214). This is a

* The banners differed from the Ming garrisons in that banner men were allotted land scattered in diverse places and intermixed with holdings of nonbannermen. The banners thus were not attached to one place, even though they had their own lands and got sustenance from them.

typical example of Nurhaci's many initiatives that eventually became official Qing government policy.

Some of Nurhaci's other important contributions was to develop a writing system for administrative purposes. He had his interpreter write Jurchen words in a modified Mongolian alphabet to which diacritical marks were later added beside the letters. The "Mencius" was soon available in written Manchu (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 214). Thus the new writing made possible a rapid borrowing of the Confucian ideology of the state.

Under the brilliant commander Yuan Chonghuan (1584–1630), the Ming was able to fight off the Manchus repeatedly, notably in 1626 at the Battle of Ningyuan, and in 1628. Under Yuan's command the Ming had securely fortified the Shanhai pass, thus blocking the Manchus from crossing the pass to attack Beijing. Using knowledge of European firearms that he might have acquired from his cook, Yuan was able to stave off Nurhaci's advances along the Liao River (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1979: 124). Although he was named field marshal of all the northeastern forces in 1628, he was executed in 1630 on trumped-up charges of colluding with the Manchus as they staged their raids. Succeeding generals proved unable to eliminate the Manchu threat.

Unable to attack the heart of Ming directly, the Manchu instead bided their time, developing their own artillery and gathering allies. They were able to enlist Ming government officials and generals as their strategic advisors. A large part of the Ming Army deserted to the Manchu banner. In 1632, they had conquered much of Inner Mongolia, resulting in a large scale recruitment of Mongol troops under the Manchu banner and the securing of an additional route into the Ming heartland.

In 1616, Nurhachi took the title of emperor of the Later Chin, as though to continue the Chin dynasty of 1122-1234. Nurhaci's unbroken series of military successes came to an end in January 1626 when he was dealt his first major military defeat by general Yuan Chonghuan while laying siege to the Ming city of Ningyuan. He died a few months later, and was succeeded by his eighth son Hung Taiji who emerged

after a short political struggle amongst other potential contenders as the new Khan. Although he was an experienced general and the commander of two Banners at the time of his succession, Hung Taiji's reign did not start well on the military front. The Jurchens suffered yet another defeat in 1627 at the hands of Yuan Chonghuan. As before, this defeat was the result of the superior firepower of the Ming forces' newly acquired Portuguese cannons. To redress the technological and numerical disparity, Hung Taiji, in 1634, created his own artillery corps from amongst his existing Han troops who cast their own cannons from European design with the help of captured Chinese artisans. In 1635 the Manchu's Mongolian allies were fully incorporated into a separate Banner hierarchy under direct Manchu command. Hong Taiji, then proceeded in 1636 to invade Korea for the second time. This was followed by the creation of the first (two) Han Banners in 1637 (which eventually increased to eight in 1642). Together these military reforms enabled Hung Taiji to resoundingly defeat Ming forces in a series of battles from 1640 to 1642 for the territories of Songshan and Jingzhou. This final victory resulted in the surrender of many of the Mings' most battle hardened troops and the complete permanent withdrawal of remaining Ming forces from lands north of the Great Wall.

Hung Taiji died suddenly in September 1643, without a designated heir. Because Jurchens had traditionally "elected" their leader through a council of nobles, The Qing state did not have in place a clear succession system until the reign of Emperor Kangxi. The leading contenders for power at this time were Hung Taiji's eldest son Hooge and Hung Taiji's agnate half brother Dorgon. In the ensuing political impasse between two bitter political rivals a compromise candidate in the person of Hung Taiji's five-year-old son, Fulin was installed as Emperor Shunzhi, with Dorgon as regent and de facto leader of the Manchu nation. The Manchus' nemesis the Ming Dynasty was fighting for its own survival against a long peasant rebellion and was unable to capitalize on the Qing court's political uncertainty over the succession dispute and installation of a minor as Emperor. The Ming Dynasty's internal crisis came to a head in April 1644, when the capital at modern day Beijing was sacked by a coalition of rebel forces led by Li Zicheng, a minor Ming official turned leader of the peasant revolt. The last Ming,

Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide when the city fell, marking the official end of the dynasty.

After easily taking Beijing, Li Zicheng led a coalition of rebel forces numbering 200,000 to confront Wu Sangui, the general commanding the Ming garrison at Shanhaiguan, a pivotal pass of the Great Wall of China located fifty miles northeast of Beijing, and for years its defenses were what kept the Manchus from directly raiding the Ming capital. Wu, caught between a rebel army twice his size and a foreign enemy he had fought for years, decided to cast his lot with the Manchus with whom he was familiar, and made an alliance with Dorgon, to fight the rebels. Some sources suggested that Wu's actions were influenced by news of mistreatment of his family and his concubine "Chen Yuanyuan", at the hands of the rebels when the capital fell. Regardless of the actual reasons for his decision,^{*} this alliance between Wu and his former sworn enemy was ironically made in the name of avenging the death of Emperor Chongzhen. Together, the two former enemies met and defeated Li Zicheng's rebel forces in battle on May 27, 1644. After routing Li's forces, the Manchus captured Beijing on June 6, where Emperor Shunzhi was installed as the "Son of Heaven" on October 30. By building up their military and administrative capacities, the early Manchu rulers had made themselves leading contender to the throne at Peking.

The Manchus, who had positioned themselves as political heir to the Ming Emperor by defeating Li Zicheng, completed the symbolic act of transition by holding a formal funeral for Emperor Chongzhen. However, the process of conquering the rest of China took another seventeen years of battling Ming loyalists, pretenders and

^{*} The motivation for Wu's actions, apart from obvious self-preservation, was never fully explained. Most primary sources including the Ming and Qing official court histories are understandably biased against a person who turned "traitor" to both parties.

rebels. It also involved huge loss of life, including the infamous Yangzhou massacre of 1645, when a ten-day rampage by troops in the city with the permission of Prince Dodo resulted in an estimated 800,000 deaths. The last Ming pretender, Prince Gui, sought refuge with the King of Burma, a vassal of the Ming Dynasty, but was turned over to a Qing expeditionary army commanded by Wu, who had him brought back to Yunnan province and executed in early 1662.

A Chinese paddle-wheel driven ship from a Qing Dynasty encyclopedia published in 1726. The first seven years of Shunzhi's reign were dominated by the regent prince Dorgon, who, because of his own political insecurity within the Manchu power structure, followed Hung Taiji's example of centralizing power under his own control in the name of the Emperor at the expense of other contending Manchu princes, many of whom eventually were demoted or imprisoned under one pretext or another. Although the period of his regency was relatively short, Dorgon cast a long shadow over the Qing Dynasty. Firstly the Manchus were able to enter "China Proper" only because of Dorgon's timely decision to act on Wu Sangui's appeal for military assistance. After capturing Beijing instead of sacking the city as the rebels had done before them, Dorgon insisted over the protests of other Manchu princes on making it as the capital of the Qing dynasty, and largely reappointed Ming officials to their posts. Setting the Qing capital in Beijing may seem a straightforward move in hindsight, but it was then an act of innovation because historically no major Chinese dynasty had ever "inherited" its immediate predecessor's capital. Keeping the Ming capital and bureaucracy intact helped quickly stabilize the country and greatly sped up the Manchu process of conquest. However, not all of Dorgon's policies were equally popular or easily implemented.

On December 31, 1650, Dorgon suddenly died during a hunting expedition, marking the official start of the Shunzhi Emperor's personal rule. However, because the Emperor was only twelve years old at that time, most decisions were made on his behalf by his mother, the Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang, who turned out to be a

skilled political operator. Although Dorgon's support had been essential to Shunzhi's ascent, Dorgon had through the years centralised so much power in his hands as to become a direct threat to the throne, so much so that upon his death he was extraordinarily bestowed the posthumous title of Emperor Yi, the only instance in Qing history in which a Manchu "prince of the blood" was so honored. However two months into Shunzhi's personal rule Dorgon was not only stripped of his titles, but his corpse was disinterred and mutilated to atone for multiple "crimes"—one of which was persecuting to death Shunzhi's agnate eldest brother Hooge. More importantly Dorgon's symbolic fall from grace also signalled a political purge of his family and associates at court thus reverting power back to the person of the Emperor. However, from a promising start, Shunzhi's reign was cut short by his early death in 1661 at the age of twenty-four from smallpox. He was succeeded by his third son Xuanye, who reigned as the Kangxi Emperor.

2.2.2 The Southern Ming dynasty, the Ming loyalists, and the Three Feudatories

Beijing fell in 1644 to rebels led by Li Zicheng, and the last emperor Chongzhen hanged himself on a tree. Aided by Wu Sangui, Manchurian armies easily defeated the rebels and took the city. The news of the Chongzheng emperor's suicide was met with consternation when it reached Nanjing in mid May 1644 (Struve, 1998: 641). The highest officials in Nanking soon met to deliberate about how to face the crisis (Struve, 1998: 642). Since the fate of the official heir apparent was still unknown at the time, many of them thought that it was too early to proclaim a new emperor, but most agreed that an imperial figure was necessary to rally loyalist support for the Ming in the south. In early June 1644, the court decided that the caretaker government would be centered around Zhu Yousong, Prince of Fu, who was next in line for succession after the dead emperor's sons. When he arrived in the vicinity of Nanking (he had come from his principedom in Henan), the Prince could count on the military and political support of Ma Shiying and Shi Kefa. On June 5 the Prince entered the city, the next day he

accepted the title of "Protector of the State" and on June 7 he moved into the imperial palace, where he received the insignia of his new office (Wakeman, 1985: 345). Prodded by some court officials, the Prince of Fu immediately started to consider becoming Emperor.

Fearing confrontation with Ma Shiyong and other supporters of the Prince, Shi Kefa convinced reluctant members of the court to accept the enthronement. The Prince of Fu was officially crowned as Emperor on June 19, 1644, under the protection of Ma Shiyong, who had arrived in Nanjing two days earlier with a large war fleet. It was decided that the next lunar year would be the first year of the Hongguang reign.

The Hongguang court proclaimed that its goal was "to ally with the Tartars to pacify the bandits", that is, to seek co-operation with the Qing military forces in order to annihilate rebel peasant militia led by Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong. Because Ma Shiyong was the main supporter of the current emperor, he started to monopolise the royal court's administration by reviving the functions of the remaining eunuchs. This resulted in rampant corruptions and illegal dealings. Moreover, Ma engaged in intense political bickering with Shi Kefa, who had been a staunch follower of the Donglin movement.

In 1645, Zuo Liangyu, a former warlord who now served as governor of Wuchang for the Hongguang regime, sent his troops towards Nanking with the purpose of "clearing corrupt officials from the emperor's court." Seeing that this threat targeted him, Ma Shiyong declared: "I and the emperor would rather die at the hand of the Great Qing; we will not die at the hand of Zuo Liangyu." By then, the Qing army had begun to move southwards: it had occupied Xuzhou and was preparing to cross the Huai River. Ma Shiyong nonetheless ordered Shi Kefa to direct his riverine troops against Zuo Liangyu.

This displacement of troops facilitated the Qing capture of Yangzhou (which led to the Yangzhou massacre) and the death of Shi Kefa in May 1645, and led almost directly to the annihilation of the Hongguang regime. After the Qing armies crossed the Yangzi River near Zhenjiang on June 1, the Hongguang Emperor fled Nanking. Qing armies led by Manchu Prince Dodo immediately moved toward Nanking,

which surrendered without a fight on June 8, 1645 (Wakeman, 1985: 578). A detachment of the Qing soldiers then, captured the fleeing emperor on June 15, and he was brought back to Nanking on June 18. The fallen Hongguang emperor was later transported to Beijing, where he died the following year (Struve, 1998: 644).

After Nanking fell to the Manchu armies, the Hongguang Emperor was captured, and another Ming Prince declared himself the Longwu Emperor (Mote and Twitchett, 1988: 658-660). The Longwu Emperor established his court in Fuzhou, which was controlled by Zheng Zhilong and his family, and it was with the support of their military resources and the natural defences of Fukien that the emperor was able to remain safe for a time.

The Longwu Emperor's residence in Fuzhou was destined to be brief, though. Zheng Zhilong refused to support his plans for a counter-offensive against the rapidly expanding forces of the Manchu's new Qing Dynasty. When, in the September of 1646, the Qing armies spilled through inadequately defended mountain passes into Fujian, Zheng Zhilong retreated to his coastal fortress, and the luckless emperor faced them alone. His forces were destroyed and he was captured and executed without delay.

2.2.3 Revolt of the Three Feudatories

Several Ming generals were granted wide regional powers in south and southwest China in exchange for their vital assistance in quelling the loyalist opposition that persisted there for several decades. Three of these generals turned against the Qing in the 1670s when the Manchus attempted to check their power.

For three decades after the capture of Peking, Wu Sangui helped install the Manchu dynasty while gaining great power for himself. He built up his own satrapy in Yunnan and Kweichow, developed his own monopolies, and yet milked the central Qing treasury to support his armies. Two other satrapies were built up by Liaotung Chinese generals in Canton and Fukien. For many years South China was remained under the Ming loyalists. When Wu rebelled

Geng Jingzhong, and Shang Kexi.

In 1655, the Qing government granted Wu Sangui, a man to whom they were indebted for the conquest of China, both civil and military authority over the province of Yunnan. In 1662, after the execution of Zhu Youlang, the last Ming claimant to the throne, Wu was given jurisdiction also over Guizhou. In the next decade he consolidated his power and by 1670 his influence had spread to include much of Hunan, Sichuan, Gansu and even Shaanxi. Two other powerful defected military leaders also developed similar powers: Shang Kexi in Guangdong and Geng Jingzhong in Fukien. They ruled their "feudatories" as their own domains and the Qing court had virtually no control over the provinces in the south and southwest.

By 1672 the young Kangxi Emperor had determined that the feudatories were a threat to the Manchu regime. In 1673 Shang Kexi submitted a memorial requesting permission to retire and in August of the same year a similar request arrived from Wu Sangui, designed to test the court's intentions. Kangxi went against the majority view in the Council of Princes and High Officials and accepted the request, asking them to leave their large fiefs to resettle in Manchuria. The Revolt of the Three Feudatories (also known as the San-fan War) In 1678, he went further and declared himself the emperor of a new Zhou Dynasty, with the era name of Zhaowu. He made his capital at Hengzhou

The last four years of the war saw a steady series of Qing victories. Wu Sangui died of natural causes in 1678 and his grandson Wu Shifan committed suicide in Yunnan in December 1681. Zheng Jing was defeated near Amoy in 1680, and forced to withdraw to Taiwan, dying there in 1681. Geng Jingzhong was sentenced to death by slicing and his head displayed in public. Many who surrendered in good faith in the belief that they would receive amnesty from the throne were likewise executed.

2.2.4 The Zheng Family of Fukien

Koxinga or Zheng Chenggong was a son of Zheng Zhilong, the maritime adventurer of the southern China. Zheng Zhilong came from the small village in Ch'uan-

chou prefecture. He had taken to the sea to seek his fortune through trade and piracy (Ng, 1983: 49). Zheng Zhilong studied business under his uncle in Macau at the age of 18. He later worked for Li Dan, a Chinese businessman in Nagasaki, Japan, where Zheng married Tagawa Matsu, a local woman. In 1622, when Dutch forces took over the Pescadores archipelago off the Taiwan Strait, Lee Dan sent Zheng Zhilong to Pescadores to work with the Dutch as a translator. The Dutch, wishing to control and monopolize commerce routes to Japan, collaborated with Chinese pirates; Zheng Zhilong was one of the collaborators, engaging in robberies along coastal China. After Lee died, Zheng Zhilong acquired his fleet of ships in 1623. He harassed for many years the maritime districts of Fukien and Canton (Ng, 1983: 49). Zheng's son, Zheng Chenggong, was born in Nagasaki in 1624. In the same year, due to the feudal nature of Japan during the Edo period, Zheng relocated his enterprise to Taiwan. He built ten outposts in the island's southwestern coastal region, between Tainan and Chiayi, but was evicted shortly after when the Dutch arrived on the island.

Zheng Zhilong invaded Amoy in 1626 -1627, defeated the government troops and took possession of it. The island became Zheng Zhilong's commercial and recruiting base, where he operated a large armed pirate fleet over 800 ships along the coast from Japan to Vietnam. In 1628, he decided to surrender to the Ming authorities and enjoyed official status. He was appointed by the Chinese Imperial family as "Admiral of the Coastal Seas". Zheng Zhilong's maritime enterprise became even more prosperous. With thousand of vessel and private navy under his control, Zheng Zhilong had solely controlled Fukienese maritime power and trade.

After the capture of Nanking in 1645, Zhilong accepted an offer to commander-in-chief of the Imperial forces and was ordered to defend the newly established capital in Fuzhou under the Prince of Tang. He defeated the Dutch and pirates, a combined force of more than 100,000. The spoils of this victory made him fabulously wealthy. He bought up a large amount of land, as much as 60% of Fukian, and became a very powerful landlord.

The Qing sent envoys to Zheng Zhilong, offering to make him the governor of both Fukian and Guangdong if he would surrender to them. To the apparent chagrin of his son and brothers, he agreed and handed himself over to the Qing forces in Fuzhou on November 21, 1646. Zheng Zhilong decided to defect to the Manchus leaving the passes of Zhejiang unguarded, allowing Manchu forces to capture Fuzhou. As a result of the Manchu victory, Zheng Zhilong was greatly rewarded and retired very wealthy.

This situation left Zheng Chenggong or Koxinga and his various uncles as the inheritors of Zheng Zhilong's considerable organization. Koxinga rebelled against his father's decision to surrender. He was only 23 when Koxinga began his resistance movement against the Manchus. Koxinga proved himself to be a talented leader, and in a matter of months attracted a large number of men to his cause. His initial financial difficulty in supporting his expanding army was overcome because he was able to inherit his father's large maritime assets, including the enormous merchant fleets returning from Japan and Southeast Asia, which had not yet been captured by the Manchus (Ng, 1983: 50). Koxinga used the superiority of his naval forces to launch amphibious raids on Manchu occupied territory in Fukian, and even managed to take Tong'an in Quanzhou prefecture in early 1647, but lacked the strength to hold it.

In spite of this setback, by 1650, he was strong enough to establish himself as the leader of the Zheng family. He declared his loyalty to the only remaining claimant to the throne of the Ming Dynasty, the Yongli Emperor who was then fleeing the Manchus in south-western China with a rag-tag court, but despite one fruitless attempt, Zheng was able to do nothing to aid the last Ming emperor. Instead Koxinga decided to concentrate on securing his own position on the south-east coast.

Zheng Chenggong or Koxinga enjoyed a series of military successes in 1651 and 1652 that increased the Qing government's anxiety over the threat he posed (Ng, 1983: 159). They decided to try a new strategy, exploiting the one advantage they thought they had over Zheng; his father. Zheng Zhilong wrote to his son from Beijing, presumably at the request of the Qing court and the Shunzhi Emperor, urging him to

negotiate. Whether Zheng Chenggong was sincere or whether he was just buying time to further develop his army and navy is unknowable, but he did begin a long series of negotiations with the Manchus that did not end until November, 1654. With the failure of their last mission, the Qing government gave up on the negotiations and appointed Prince Jidu to lead an assault on Koxinga's territory (Struve, 1998: 160-161).

On May 9, 1656, Jidu attacked Jinmen, an island near Amoy that Koxinga had been using to train his troops. The Manchus were decisively defeated and lost most of their fleet in the battle (Struve, 1998: 181). Koxinga had sent one of his naval commanders to capture Zhoushan island prior to Jidu's attack, and now that the Manchus were temporarily without an effective naval force in the Fukian area, Zheng was free to send a huge army to Zhoushan, which he intended to use as a staging area for his most ambitious project, an assault on the first capital of the Ming dynasty, Nanking.

In 1661, Koxinga led his troops to a landing at Lu'ermen to attack the Dutch colonists at Taiwan. On February 1, 1662 the Dutch Governor of Taiwan, Frederik Coyett, surrendered Fort Zeelandia to Koxinga. This effectively ended 38 years of Dutch rule. Koxinga then devoted himself to making Taiwan into an effective base for anti-Qing sympathizers who wanted to restore the Ming Dynasty to power.

However, at the age of 37, Koxinga died of malaria, although speculations said that he died in a sudden fit of madness when his officers refused to carry out his orders to execute his son Zheng Jing. Zheng Jing succeeded as the King of Taiwan.

Zheng Jing contested throne as the King of Taiwan with his uncle, Zheng Shixi. The dispute was resolved in Zheng Jing's favor after he successfully landed an army in Taiwan despite strong opposition by the forces of his uncle. This was followed by Zheng Shixi withdrawing his claim. With both the vast pirate fleet and the throne of Taiwan, he intended to continue his father's plans to invade the Philippines; however, he was forced to abandon this venture when faced with the threat of a Manchu-Dutch

alliance. His victory over a combined Manchu-Dutch fleet in 1664 resulted in ending the brief alliance.

For the next 19 years, he tried to provide sufficiently for the local inhabitants and reorganizing their military forces in Taiwan. Contacts with the Kangxi Emperor from the mainland by sending ambassadors were frequent. Although he continued to fight for the cause his father died for, he had largely abandoned any pretense of restoring the Ming Dynasty by the time he invaded Fukien in 1676. He occupied key cities in the province for a year before losing them back to the Manchus by the end of 1677. Invading Fukien once more, he led a force of 30,000 men to capture Haicheng as well as taking the provincial commander prisoner. In 1680, Zheng Jing was forced to order the abandonment of Amoy, Quemoy and the Pescadores islands after losing a major naval battle to Chinese Qing admiral Shi Lang. Driven off the mainland by the Manchu, he retreated to Taiwan where he fell ill and died of dissipation around 1681 or 1682. Zheng named as his successor his oldest son, Zheng Kezang; however, Zheng Kezang was quickly toppled in favor of Zheng Keshuang.

In 1683, following a naval engagement with Admiral Shi Lang, one of Koxinga's father's trusted friends, Koxinga's grandson Zheng Keshuang submitted to Qing Dynasty control.

2.2.5 The state and trade

The expansion of regional economies and the emergence of a national market in bulk commodities stimulated a shift of scale of formal economic organization, leading to the creation of larger structure that could make possible mutual trust and cooperation unrelated individuals.

In the late Ming, as market expansion provided opportunities for traders to increase the scale of their operations, the need for capital and coordination had stimulated use of share partnership.

2.2.5.1 Trade

The problem from the Ming loyalist in the southern part of China, no doubt, made the Qing dynasty had a pessimistic attitude towards the maritime trade. In response to the Zhengs resistance, The Qing court had adopted a negative maritime policy. Failing to suppress the Zheng resistance, the court decided to promulgate the first imperial edict in 1656, forbidding navigation on the sea. The court was fully aware that smuggling activities had worked to sustain the financial viability of the Zheng force. Under the new law, the provincial authorities were order to ensure that the supply of all commodities for the rebel was cut off.

When the sea prohibition law did not work out satisfactorily; the court introduced the scheme of forced inland resettlement. The Qing now resorted to a drastic policy of trying to force the population along the Chinese coast to evacuate the island and move inland a distance of ten miles or more, behind a patrolled barrier, From 1652 onwards, the Qing court began ordering populations along the entire southern coast to be forcibly relocated inland, to stop them from giving aid and comfort to the enemy through trade. Faced with an enemy in inaccessible areas along the coast, the Qing chose to take the non-state spaces of the littoral to their logical extreme by creating a sanitary cordon of walls and watchtowers between the people and the sea, so as to cut Taiwan off from its mainland sources of manpower, food, and trading silk (Fairbank and Reischauer, 1978: 217). As soon as the Kangxi emperor ascended the throne, he commanded his provincial officials to enforce the sea prohibition law seriously (Ng, 1983: 53).

However, the negative policy of the early Qing dynasty towards the maritime trade did not stop the flourishing smuggling traffic in the South China. Moreover, it resulted in a further concentration of maritime trade in Amoy, the base of Kóxinga and the Zheng family. The foreign trader from East and Southeast Asia relied on the Zheng for the supply of Chinese goods. As a result, the Zheng successfully monopolized all the profits from the maritime trade and their financial position was

further enhanced. Furthermore, the more restrictive the law was, the more lucrative the trade became. The merchants did not have much difficulty bribing the garrison soldier or the naval patrols into silence. Apparently, even such top provincial officials as governors-general and governors were accepting the bribes to turn another way.

As reported by governor-general Fan Ch'eng – mo in 1673, the smuggled items consisted mainly of materials for shipbuilding and silk and cotton cloth for export (Ng, 1983: 53). He also indicated that only those with enough capital would be in a position to engage in this type of trade.

Ng Chin Keong concluded the failure of the Qing emperor in attempted to cut out the Ming loyalist's income that

"The Qing government failed to weaken the commercial position of Amoy even when it forcefully evacuated the coastal population and told the merchants to move their business to Hai-ch'eng."
(Ng, 1982: 53)

After the maritime ban was rescinded following the conquest of Taiwan in 1684, the court established maritime customs administration in Fukien and kwangtung, and also in Chekiang and Kiangnan provinces in the succeeding year. In attempt to control the maritime trade, the Qing court established the maritime customs system, to control the coastal and foreign trade.

In 1717, the kangxi emperor imposed a new maritime restriction to safeguard the coastal security. After the new maritime restriction was introduced, the security system became more complicated. The ship and all the traveling merchants on board were required to be guaranteed by the security merchants. However, the ban, unlike the previous one, was only partial. The effect of the restriction was not as destructive as one would have imagined (Ng, 1983: 57). The domestic commercial network was allowed to function without disruption; the foreign trade was not banned totally.

In 1727, The Yung-cheng emperor accepted a recommendation of the provincial authorities to abolish the restriction. In 1754, the imperial Qing government declared for the first time that law-abiding emigrants could safely return home and have their property protected (Reid, 1997: 1-26).

Political and economic considerations governed the Qing court's attitudes towards maritime trade. With respect to the political aspect, the court was most conscious of coastal security. Maritime trade was often seen by the court as a factor related closely to coastal security. The court fully realized the political vulnerability of the maritime province of Fukien. Furthermore, the Qing court understood well the dependence of the south Fukienese population on maritime trade for their livelihood. Whenever the Fukien authorities petitioned the court for relaxation of maritime restrictions, they were confident of convincing the court that the region had to rely on seafaring trade for its livelihood. This was the basic reasoning behind the Qing court's decision to lift the maritime bans in 1684 and again in 1727 (Ng, 1983: 185).

2.3 South China

Some scholar considered South China as the Mediterranean of Asia, where great civilizations met and international trade crossed, generating unique cultures, urban forms, and architecture. Big and small vessels cruised across Southeast Asia following the monsoon or the trade winds for hundreds of years. The trading ships and immigrant boats were not only carrying people and goods, but also conveying cosmological and geometrical memories from its original lands into the new landscapes, implanting new layers in the emerging cosmopolitan settlements in coastal Southeast Asia. Some fishing villages developed into Entrepots and some would prosper into great Emporiums

2.3.1 Fukein

Fukien is a maritime province located on the southeastern periphery of China. Its mountainous terrain and the ranges encircling its borders obstructed communication by land between the province and the heartland of China, especially the rich Yangtze basin. Despite the land barriers, the coastal district of Fukien was by no means isolated from the core regions of the country because they could be conveniently linked by the sea with other maritime provinces.

For the Fukienese community itself, there were no psychological restraints against becoming involved in trading activities. The native scholars truly appreciated the importance of maritime commerce for the local population and showed great interest in maritime affairs. Fukienese scholars were themselves known to have become merchants. Moreover, the role played by the Fukienese naval officials, who were in many cases merchants themselves. They provided patronage to local merchant enterprises.

From the ninth century, Fukien had been one of the major provinces actively involved in sea trade. By the Tang dynasty, foreign merchants were numerous enough to form communities in Canton (Guangzhou). And during the first half of the tenth century, with the establishment of the independent kingdom in Guangdong and Fukien provinces, The Nan Han and the Min respectively, more foreign traders frequented their ports, notably Fuzhou and Quanzhou in addition to Canton. Although the two kingdoms lasted only fifty to sixty years, they laid the foundation of economic growth, notably the opening of new lands, population increase, and the rise of local trade and industry, which made the two province of increasing important to Song dynasty (Wang, 1958: 135).

Becoming an independent kingdom during the tenth century was a major turning point in Fukien's history. For the first time Fukien was developed for itself, not for China. The maritime trade began to flourish, and it grew even more rapidly when the Southern Song treasury after 1127 enjoyed the revenue from foreign trade collected at the Maritime Trade Commission in Quanzhou.

The development of Fukien's maritime trade was greatly facilitated by three commercial centers on the Fukien coast, Foochow, Ch'uan-chou, and Chang-chou. All of them provided retail goods and services for a surrounding tributary area or hinterland, they lay within the structure of distribution channels connecting economic centers, and they served as foci within the transport network (Skinner, 1977: 276). The economy of coastal Fukien depended to a great extent on maritime trade.

The seaport, which had the most activities, served as the center of the provincial commercial network, before the rise of Amoy, Ch'uan-chou city was the center of Fukien maritime trade from the ninth to fifteenth centuries. As early as the twelfth century, Ch'uan -chou had arisen not only as one of the most important centers in the country for foreign trade, but also one of the greatest shipbuilding centers sharing the prosperity of the maritime trade with Canton to the South and Ningpo to its north (Ng, 1983: 12). At the turn of Sixteenth century, Ch'ang-chou began to arise as the new center for overseas trade. Its development was marked by rapid growth of private trade.

More local people were engaged in trade, while tens of thousands of the rural south Fukienese sought their new livelihood in trade overseas. Around 1600, it was estimated that one half of the Fukienese population earn their living outside the home village (Ng, 1983: 12).

Ng Chin Keong described the outstanding role of the Fukeinese that

"Although the South Fukieneses were not the only seafaring people in Chinese maritime history, no Chinese from other seafaring areas were able to equal them for their popular participation, wide geographic spread and continuous efforts over the centuries. None of their counterparts from other

Chinese regions was comparable to their persistent enthusiasm and achievements." (Ng, 1983: 213)

The Fukienese found opportunities in the domestic trade, overseas commerce, and handicraft industries (Ng, 1983: 11). Fukien's commercial activities were already well established during the Sung dynasty period (Yoshinobu cited in Ng, 1983: 485-489). At that time, the Fukienese merchants were called "Hai-shang" or sea merchants because of their outstanding position in this area of trade.

The turmoil caused by both Japanese and Chinese pirates made the Ming emperor decided to ban all private foreign trade, this was applied to all borders. However, the hardest hit were probably the coastal merchant networks of Fukien and Guangdong where most of these merchant came from. The earlier success of Fukiens was due to official support under the Song and the Yuan emperors. But when Ming imperial policy changed and official help was withdrawn after 1386, they persisted outside the law and survived on their own. For 200 years, from the late fourteenth century to the second half of the sixteenth century, private trade overseas was forbidden. However, this ban did not stop private trade but made it more dangerous.

The isolationist policy of the Ming was, in fact, impossible to sustain. This in turn increased the pressure on coastal Chinese, and especially the Hokkiens, to look at the great profit to be made in overseas trade and seek ways to get round the trade bans. Moreover, the prosperity of China encouraged more foreign traders to come; more of them were upset by the pretence of being tribute-bearing missions. They sought every possible means, with the connivance of those local officials who became increasingly tempted to condone private trade, to broaden their opportunities to trade directly with ports other than the highly bureaucratic where their missions were forced to register (Wang, 2003: 95). Chinese merchants already aboard in foreign ports were more than happy to help and often served as the representatives of foreign rulers or as interpreters coming to China with their missions. Others, especially the sailors and traders who had an experienced, secretly went out to trade and settled in the small merchant communities aboard. Such as, Malacca, Bantam, Brunei, Sulu, Ryukyu

islands, and Kyushu (Wang, 2003: 95). In the late Ming, the Fukienese maritime population took advantage of the central government's increasing inability to enforce sea-going restriction. They built up their far-extended sea-bourne trade with Nanyang and with Japan.

South Fukien had three great maritime center – Ch'uan-chou, Hai-ch'eng and Amoy- vividly depict the longevity of the region's maritime history. However, this thesis will emphasize only one port, Amoy , which played the most important role during the period of this study.

2.3.2 Amoy

Amoy was the most important doorway to the extended maritime frontier of the south Fukein. The island of Amoy is about 7 miles in distance from east to west and eight miles from north to south, hidden behind the outlying island of Quemoy, Lieh-yu, Tatan, Hsing-yu and Wu-yu. The township lies on the southwestern corner of the island. The harbor of Amoy is divided into inner and outer sections. The passage between the island of Amoy and Kulangsu forms the main part of the inner harbor. Shops and warehouses stretched out around the harbor and the trading junk drew up to anchor (Ng, 1983: 45-46). Amoy was also conveniently situated for trading with many of the important cities and villages of Fukien such as Chang-chou, Hai-Ch'eng , and Ch'uan-chou.

2.3.1.1 The rise of Amoy

Some scholar believes that the rise of Amoy as important emporia of south China began in 1684, when the Qing court decided to give it the function of trading with the Philippine Islands and Ryukyu Islands (Chin, 2004: 54). We couldn't deny the prosperity of Amoy after 1683. The commercial boom provided new prospects and created a tremendous number of jobs in many related fields.

However, the emergence of Amoy can trace back long time before that. According to Ng Chin Keong "Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast 1683 – 1735", we can divide Amoy into 4 periods of development.

The first period: A Garrison Station.

During the Sung period, Amoy was called " Chia-ho-yu" (island of the auspicious grain). The island was under the administration of T'ung-an district of Ch'uan-chou prefecture. In the Yuan dynasty, the government established a garrison on it (Ng, 1983: 45).

Amoy gained military importance during the Ming period when, because of the presence of foreigners, mainly Japanese merchants, pirates, along the Chinese coast, the government renewed its attention to the offshore islands. For security reasons, an elaborate garrison system was introduced in the early Ming. Military stations were set up along the coast. There were five garrison stations in Fukein. From the mid-Ming, a customs checkpoint was set up on Amoy to oversee the vessels to and from the seaport of Hai-ch'eng.

During the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, despite its obscurity as a non-administrative town known to outsiders only for its military function, Amoy had already started building up its reputation in the Ch'uan-Chang trading community. It was one of the islands in the vicinity notorious for providing sanctuary for smugglers, both local and foreign because so few officials were stationed there. The traders, especially foreigners, who could be trapped by all kinds of administrative intricacy, preferred doing business on the more remote island.

The second period: The Zheng Rebel base.

The second period of the development of Amoy lasted from 1626 – 1680. In this period Amoy was emerged as a commercial center and rebel base, which Ng Chin Keong described that

"This period also witnessed the emergence of a Fukienese maritime empire under the leadership of the Cheng (Zheng) family." (Ng, 1983: 44-45)

Amoy was under the command of the Zheng family since 1626-1627. Zheng Zhilong was a master of Fukein coast with enormous fleets on the 1620s. He defeated government troops of Amoy and took possession of it. After that the island became his commercial and recruiting base.

Amoy became a haven for smugglers. The inland smugglers brought over there such items as fine silk and cotton cloths from Soochow and Hangchow, and even the precious things from the inner courts of Nanking and Peking, in exchange for commodities from East and Southeast Asia. In 1628, when Zhegn Zhilong decided to surrender to the Ming court, he was appointed as "The Admiral of the Coastal Seas" in return. Naval power, commercial wealth and the official position make Zheng Zhilong and his family virtual overlords of Fukien (Crozier, 1977: 12). His maritime kingdom became even more prosperous.

Beside Amoy and Quemoy, Zheng Zhilong built a walled town in An-p'ing, a city about 10 miles from Ch'uan Chou city. An-p'ing soon developed into a busy seaport and became no less prosperous than other cities. Zheng Zhilong also played the role of the patron of the Fukienese maritime population. He sold protection to the traders. There were more than thousand vessels and a private navy under his control. This was the first time that one man had solely controlled Fukienese maritime power and trade (Ng, 1983: 49).

Zheng Zhilong surrendered to the new rulers, the Qing, among the apparent chagrin of his son, Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), and his brother. Both of them held back on Amoy and declared themselves as Ming loyalist. As the new leader of the Zheng family, Koxinga amalgamated the troops on Amoy and Quemoy. Crozier pointed that

"He was in unquestioned command of the Cheng family patrimony in Fukien and his father's old base in the strategic twin islands of Amoy and Quemoy as the center for his military campaigns and growing maritime commercial empire" (Crozier, 1977: 14)

Amoy had already been Koxinga's storehouse since before his takeover. His profit from the maritime trade was deposited there; tax grain was also levied from the controlled areas on the Southeastern coast and shipped to the treasury in Amoy. Under Koxinga's command, Amoy as an entrepot, was even more prosperous than before and widespread reputation of being a treasure island.

In 1651 Amoy was attacked by the Qing governor of Fukien and the provincial military commander, while Koxinga was on the military campaign in eastern Canton. On his return shortly after, Koxinga recovered Amoy. And from his base of this island he showed his might in the following years over Fukien, Canton, and Chekiang. Koxinga collected levies from those areas under his control and all the revenues were deposited in the Amoy treasury (Yen cited in Ng, 1983: 51). The war-torn and economically dislodged people crowded on the island for the opportunities provided by its commercial activities. All these developments further strengthened the formation of an interwoven commercial network centering on the island (Ng, 1983: 51).

In 1661 Koxinga looked for the safe base, he led his force capture fort Zeelandia on the island of Taiwan from the Dutch. He established a base of operations on the island. However, Koxinga died in the following year, left the maritime empire to his son, Zheng Ching.

Under Zheng Ching, Amoy was enlarged. Weng T'ien-yu, as chief planner, carried out instructions and began in 1663 to reconstruct the township, design the market places, and build the temples. However, the reconstruction was suddenly cut short by the abrupt fall of Amoy. The Qing and Dutch fleets drove the Zheng out from the

twin islands. The Qing authorities deserted Amoy and Quemoy after the conquest and all the coastal population was removed to the mainland interior.

After Zheng ching retreated to Taiwan, Amoy became the refuge of pirates. It took six years before Zheng ching was able to re-establish his commercial base on the abandoned island of Amoy. He dispatched a company under the command of Chiang Sheng to Amoy to restore communication with the mainland. When the Revolt of the three Feudatories broke out in 1674, it provided a good opportunity for Zheng ching to revive his fortune on the Fukien coast. He reoccupied Amoy and from there, his force took possession of eight of the coastal prefectures in Canton and Fukien.

The war between the Qing dynasty and the Zheng family continued for four generation. It was ended in 1683, when Admiral Shih Lang, formerly Koxinga's subordinate, led the successful invasion conquered Taiwan. Zheng K'e- shuang's surrender ended the maritime kingdom of the Zheng family, which saw the emergence of Amoy as a trading center.

The third period: the Formative Years of the Amoy Trading Network

In 1656, the Qing emperor promulgated the first edict, forbidding navigation on the sea. Under the new law, the provincial authorities were ordered to ensure the supply of all commodities for the rebels was cut off. When the sea prohibition law did not work out well, the court announced the plan of forced inland resettlement.

However, the result was in the opposite side of what the Qing court wanted. The ban did not stop the flourishing smuggling traffic between the inland region and Amoy. Foreign traders relied on the Zheng for the supply of Chinese goods. As a result, The Zheng family advantaged from the monopolization. All the profit from maritime trade and financial was even better than earlier. The more restrictive the law was, the more lucrative the trade became. The merchant did not have much difficulty bribing the garrison soldiers or the navel patrols into silence. With their tactic, there were numerous boats smuggling goods between the various ports and Amoy (Ng, 1983: 53).

It was obvious that many wealthy merchants and officials on the coast were directly involved in this activity.

To sum up, the Qing court failed to weaken the commercial position of Amoy even when it forcefully evacuated the coastal population and told the merchants to move their business. The emergence of Amoy as a trading center began during the command of the Zheng family. During the period of Koxinga, Amoy had already become the center for the Fukienese Ocean junk. At the same time, all the foreign merchants who had business relations with the Zheng regime also called at the seaport of Amoy. During Zheng ching's retreat to Taiwan, the foreign vessels had had to divert their journeys from Amoy to Taiwan. Amoy's rapidly increasing maritime activities reflected an almost instant commercial recovery.

The fourth period: the legitimate maritime center

After 1680, commercial activities in Amoy began to normal. The inland resettlement law was abolished in early 1681. Three years later, after pacification of Taiwan, the court permission was granted to rescind the maritime ban. Once again, Amoy became the only designated port in Fukien for the junks trading with Nanyang. The maritime customs and other branches of the military and civil administration were set up there by the Qing government. These events legitimized the status of Amoy as the maritime center of Fukien.

Clearly, from 1683, Amoy had become a maritime center for the distribution of both Chinese native products and foreign goods. At the same time, it was also connecting point between the overseas and the emerging coastal trading network. Amoy was more favorably located than Canton to perform these two functions as it could gain access more easily to commodity resources and markets of the northern coastal provinces. While Amoy served as a maritime center for native merchants, Canton served as a maritime reception center for the incoming foreign ships.

One year after the ban was lifted, the ocean junks leaving for overseas were already numerous. They mostly carried limited capital and cargoes but many

illegal emigrants. In the later years, the permit to build ships and to sail overseas was therefore granted only to well –to-do applicants (Ng, 1983). However, the ocean junks continued to carry with them a large number of illegal emigrants.

Migrants and sojourners poured into the township of Amoy. There were merchants, brokers, skilled craftsmen, and shipyard worker. All came from places beyond the islands. These people came to Amoy and waited for arrangements to make the surreptitious crossing to Taiwan or to go overseas.

The increasing maritime trade after 1683 was the major factor which contributed to the growing prosperity of Amoy. By 1716, the local authorities were able to report a commercial boom which surpassed any in the past (Ng, 1983: 57). In the first hundred years of the Qing dynasty, Amoy had developed from the garrison station into a prosperous maritime center.

In 1717, the Kangxi Emperor imposed a new maritime restriction to safeguard coastal security. Nevertheless, the effect of the ban was not so destructive since it was only partial. The foreign trade was not ban totally. The trade with Japan, the Ryukyus, and Annam was to continue. More significantly, foreign ships were still allowed to call at Chinese ports. Even though it was illegal to trade with Nanyang, they managed to sail to Siam or Batavia under the pretence that they were heading for Macao or Annam.

In 1727, The Yung-cheng emperor abolished the restriction. When the maritime restriction was lifted , Amoy became the designated central port of the province in 1728. Under the new law, all the ocean junk leaving Fukien for oversea were to take Amoy as the port of re-entry as well as embarkation (Ng, 1983: 58).

The trade between Amoy and Nanyang were flourished during this period. In 1729, there were twenty-one ships leaving Amoy for the Nanyang trade when the northeast monsoon began.

The Amoy trade, no doubt, underwent further development during the early year of the Ch'ien Lung reign between 1736 and 1757. Amoy and Canton became the focal point for the Sino-Siamese maritime trade. Most of the Chinese private trade with Siam up to 1757 was conducted from Amoy (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 246).

Conclusion

Confucianism in the neo-orthodox form of the Ming and Qing periods was a major factor, not because a Confucian bureaucracy with political power really controlled every aspect of a country's development, but because the form of government it supported determined many crucial aspects of economic and technology change. Confucian attitudes may be seen to qualify all the preconditions for a flourishing maritime trade. They did not interfere at early periods, partly because they were not as dominant as they became after 1386 but also partly because maritime trade had not reach a point where its further growth would have challenged the accepted view of the Confucian state. Instead, the Confucian officials preferred to restrict the demand for foreign goods and merely allow private traders to continue to meet the needs which could not be satisfied from within. And, despite the change of circumstances accompanying western incursion into South and Southeast Asia during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, this was the policy the Chinese government maintained.

There are two other points that we should consider. First, the Chinese government concerned about the insecurity of the Chinese borders and official preoccupation with their defense. This led to the move of the Ming capital from Nanking to Peking and the abandonment of active interest in maritime trade. China's geography remains a vital factor and governments, whether Confucian or otherwise, could hardly have ignored it. Secondly, by 1386, and certainly after 1700, the Chinese economy may have passed the point of no return when its productivity is measured against the rise in population. Without major changes in agricultural, commercial, and industrial, the time had probably passed for an easy transition from an agricultural to mercantilist economy. The Confucian bureaucrats might have sensed this and wrongly concluded that salvation lay in the ideal road back to a more glorious past.

During the Qing period, the maritime trade increased so greatly that it outgrew the framework of the tributary system. The trade of Chinese merchants with

Southeast Asia had actually led the way expanding beyond the tribute system and the western merely moved into the channels they had created.

The few decades after the pacification of Taiwan and the restoration of peace and order in the Southeastern Maritime Provinces, the south Fukienese had proven their ability to adjust new environments and their creative responsiveness to challenges and opportunities.

The network that the Fukienese had developed was able to cope with the commercial needs for coastal China in the eighteenth century and was the best that the Chinese had organized up to that time. The success of the South Fukienese merchants was rested on the good connections with their fellow regional and their willingness to cooperate smoothly with the native trading communities. The great volume of trade within the extensive network provided ample opportunities for the participation of the various merchant groups from other regions. These social connections enabled the South Fukienese to penetrate local markets. When circumstances required, many of them even became assimilated within the new social environment.

The growth of the Amoy coastal network was greatly facilitated by the rapid development of frontier land in Taiwan and Taiwan's highly commercialized economy.

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CHAPTER III

SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINESE ERA

It was impossible to understand Southeast Asia history without integrating a part of Southern China. The port emporia in Southeast Asia were deeply involved with the south China junk for centuries. It is also important to consider the role of Chinese played when they took the whole of "the Nanyang"^{*} as their arena rather than individual countries within it.

3.1 China Foreign Relation: Southeast Asia

The Sino centric concept of the imperial court was always made them believed that foreign countries had no meaningful existence unless their rulers had a relationship with the emperor of China. Such factors as the country's distance from the capital, whether it was important to the empire's defense were also deemed significant. There were also technical differences, countries which sent missions through Ch'uan-chou in Fukien were distinguished from countries entering through Canton in Kwangtung, and overland mission from beyond the provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan were different again. Wang Gungwu determined that

* "Nanyang" is the Chinese name for the geographical region south of China, particularly Southeast Asia. Literally meaning "Southern Ocean", it came into common usage in self-reference to the large ethnic Chinese migrant population in Southeast Asia, to be more precise, in Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Nanyang is contrasted with Xiyang (Western Ocean), which refers to the Western world, and Dongyang (Eastern Ocean), which refers to Japan.

"The general principles of foreign relations that the Chinese court continually emphasized notwithstanding, what remained most important in determining foreign policy towards Southeast Asia were the political conditions that prevailed at different times during the dynasty." (Wang, 2003: 47)

3.1.1 The Tributary system

Tribute in Southeast Asian context was thus very different from the tribute demanded by Chinese emperors from vassal kingdoms. For the Chinese tribute denoted not the transfer of economic resources, but symbolic submission. The presents the emperor gave in return were consistently of higher value than the tribute offered, in order to demonstrate imperial magnanimity and benevolence. China pretended that it needed nothing material from barbarians, Tribute for China was thus not a means of accumulating wealth. But symbolic recognition and reinforcement of China's superior status in its own Sino centric world order (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 33).

For Southeast Asian kings, tribute paid to China did not carry the same connotation as tribute demanded from their own vassals, just because more valuable gifts were given in exchange. What was tribute for the Chinese was for the Southeast Asian rulers the polite exchange of gifts as a formality that went with mutually beneficial trade. The accompanying ceremonial established status hierarchy, but not vassalage in the Southeast Asian sense beside Vietnam. It was acceptable for envoys to show proper respect to the Chinese emperor, just as Chinese envoys paid their respects to the Southeast Asian kings, but with the exception of Vietnam, no ruler of a major Southeast Asian kingdom ever voyaged to Beijing to pay homage in person.

In short, What for the Chinese was tribute offered in submission to the Son of Heaven was, for Southeast Asian rulers, polite recognition of superior status as a prerequisite of mutually beneficial trade.

Rulers of early Southeast Asian kingdoms were ready to recognize the superior power and status of China, even though most had never it for themselves. Chinese emissaries extolled the emperor's glory, merchants brought back stories of the extent and wealth of China, and Southeast Asian envoys reported in the impressive pomp and ritual that accompanied their presentation at the Chinese court. China did not have to send its armies into Southeast Asia for regional rulers to accept China's formal demand that visiting officials prostrate themselves before the son of Heaven. Southeast Asian was drawn with the direct benefits from their relationship with China in the form of gifts from the emperor which outweighed the tribute they sent to the capital and the ability to trade during the period of the trade missions (Reid, 1999: 86). Indirectly the tributary relationship gave the states sending it a privileged access to the most important international market of the period, ensuring that other areas not so blessed could only export to China through their ports (Reid, 1999: 86).

Wang Gungwu deliberated that the immediate purpose behind sending imperial messengers to Southeast Asia with news of the first Ming emperor's accession was to sort out quickly which countries wanted close relations with China and which did not, which were dependent and friendly and which were potentially hostile (Wang, 2003: 52).

Ming record clearly reflects the court's concentration on relations with Southeast Asia up to the middle of the fifteenth century. The reign of the first emperor saw the encouragement of formal tributary relations, but also attempt to limit the extent of foreign contacts. In all these policies, the emperor was innovative and indeed laid the foundations for Chinese relations with Southeast Asian countries for the next five centuries.

Under the Ming, Imperial authority was extended to include all relations between Chinese and barbarians, including trade relations. Private overseas trade by Chinese merchants was prohibited and Chinese were forbidden to voyage aboard. The only officially sanctioned trade was by merchants from countries that acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, and then only when they accompanied actual tribute missions (Wang, 2003: 52).

More Chinese envoys traveled aboard during the early Ming than at any other time in the history of relations between China and Southeast Asia. For example, five were dispatched to Ayudhaya by emperor Hongwu and nine by emperor Yongle. They came to instruct as well as inform, to let Southeast Asian courts know exactly what was expected of them. Their demeanor was both superior and patronizing, as was the message they carried. The rituals for the reception of the Chinese envoys reflected in large part the ritual for the reception of tributary missions in China. Some Southeast Asian kingdoms went to great lengths to impress visiting Chinese envoys, for this was an opportunity for reciprocal demonstrations of royal power and wealth (Wang, 2003: 76). Great reverence would be shown to an imperial edict or letter. Even before the early Ming, however, more embassies were sent to China from Southeast Asia than were received from China. During the period of the first Three Ming emperor, 1370 -1433, large missions were sent out from China and tributary missions responded in much great numbers from a dozen Southeast Asian states and settlements.

The new Ming restrictions applying to trade reduced both its volume and value. In response, Southeast Asian principalities and some larger kingdoms attempted to increase trade by dispatching missions more frequently. For example, Srivijaya sent six missions in the space of seven years, while Siam and Champa* also markedly

* Champa sent fifty-eight missions during the first three Ming emperors, 1370 -

increased the number of tribute missions. Siam sent thirty-six missions to China in the period 1371- 1404. More than one every year on average, and twenty-two missions in the Yunglo emperor reign, 1405-1433 (Reid, 1999: 86). Anthony Reid suggested about the enthusiasm responded of Siam to the China tributary system that

"This dynamic response makes clear that Ayudhaya must already have had some advantage enabling it to mount such missions- undoubtedly including a sizeable Chinese community with literate member able to formulate the necessary tribute letters, a king sympathetic to this community and probably related to it, and a fleet of ships capable of making the journey to Canton. It undoubtedly also had trade goods, sappanwood in particular, acceptable as tribute and useful for trading in conjunction with the tribute missions."

Some private merchants attempted to disguise trade in form of bogus official missions, but Ming officials applied strict criteria for verifying the authenticity of embassies and issued warning against such ventures.

Southeast Asian rulers were not averse to the official trade regime imposed by the Ming government, for its reduced competition from private traders (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 77). Private Chinese merchants, by contrast, especially those from the coastal Fukien who had been engaged in free trade with the Nanyang over the previous two centuries, were most unhappy. They were immediately set about circumventing the new restrictions. Many resorted to smuggling, which increased dramatically, encouraging piracy in its wake. Other sought to cooperate closely with official tributary missions.

To sum up, We might conclude that Southeast Asia's seaborne trade with China took place within an ancient framework of international relations usually referred to

as the Chinese tributary system. China in theory regarded itself as the suzerain of all the states of Southeast Asia, receiving homage from each at specified intervals, at each time the vassal states presented their tribute of local products and in return received from the emperor Chinese goods of equal or greater value. The tributary system in practice was a regular system of legitimizing official trade and, at an early date, accommodated private trade on the side, first by Southeast Asian traders and later by Chinese merchants.

3.2 The China economic expansion in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has never been able to isolate itself from international economic forces. It sat athwart the great arteries of world commerce (Reid, 1999: 119). Although India was almost equally important as a trading partner for Southeast Asia, it appears that the dramatic changes in Chinese imperial policy with regard to the Nanyang trade were responsible for the most striking discontinuities in Southeast Asia's external trade. (Reid, 1993: 12)

"Commerce has always been vital to Southeast Asia. Uniquely accessible to seaborne traffic and commanding the maritime routes between China, the largest international market through most recorded history, and the population centers of India, the Middle East, and Europe, the lands below the winds naturally responded to every quickening of international maritime trade."

Trade between South China and Southeast Asia increased so rapidly that custom revenue between 1724 and 1750 rose threefold in Fukien and almost fivefold in Guangdong (Li, 2004: 3). The impact of the China trade is underlined by the fact that the number of Chinese junks visiting Southeast Asian port increased rapidly during the

period of 1750-1820. This in turn boosted royal income remarkably. Between 1740 and 1820 the Siamese crown's income from maritime trade rose from a fourth or a third to well over half (Lieberman, 2003: 35).

The reign of King Tai sa was marked by major increased in the volume of trade with China, particularly involving the exportation of Siamese rice. In other ways, such trade had gone on since the foundation of Ayudhaya and before, though it was conducted under service government restriction in China for periods in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By the latter time, much of the Siamese trade with China and Japan that earlier had been conducted by the Dutch now fell into the hands of private Chinese merchants, who also came to conduct trade in behalf of the Ayudhaya court and entered the official service of the state (Wyatt, 1982: 151-152). In particular, Tai sa's Phraklang, who had been prominent at court since the reign of king Sua, was a Chinese especially important for the role he played in integrating the local Chinese community into the economic and social life of the capital, to the point where the Phraklang ministry virtually was dominated by Chinese at all levels.

When in 1727, the Chinese government almost completely opened South China ports to shipments of rice from Siam, the trade began to boom, and all those involved with it prospered, including the Ayudhaya court and the Phraklang. It was, undoubtedly, not a coincidence that Ayudhaya court had a Chinese Phraklang during the China economic booming.

3.3 The emergence of coastal ports

The advent of the development of coastal cities in Southeast Asia was a result of rising maritime trade relations between India and China following the seasonal monsoon since the first century. At first, foreign maritime traders made brief stop-over in different places of coastal Southeast Asia to get fresh water and food supplies from the locals. During the waiting period of the changing wind, some of these traders would stay for an extend period of time. They built fortified camps to protect their goods and

dwelling compounds next to the waterfront and near the existing indigenous villages (Widodo, 2007: 63).

Ship from the north (China, Japan, and Ryukyu) sailing to the south made use of the northern monsoon between January and February, and returning home by the southern monsoon between June and August. Indian and Arab ships went eastward by the southwest monsoon between April and August, and returned by the northeast monsoon from December. During the cyclonic periods or the changing of the monsoons, these traders stayed in their camps in Southeast Asian ports and populated the markets, while waiting for their trading partners from the other parts of the world to come. These exchanges took place mostly in and around the South China Sea, Java Sea, and Melaka. Hence, since the first century, the coastal regions and their hinterlands became fertile grounds for the growth of new civilizations, new blends of urbanism and architecture, new settlements and cities.

These cities were loaded with vessels, people, and goods. Some scholars compare them as "a vessel of civilization sailing across history, from the past heading towards the future." (Widodo, 2007: 63) A Flourishing maritime trade between south China and ports on Southeast Asian coast can be seen as early as the early fifteenth century. In the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century, most international trade focused on the Cochin Chinese coast.

However, it was after 1683, when the Qing government finally conquered Taiwan and lifts its ban on maritime trade that caused the quickly emergence of the ports on the south China. Several ports played remarkable role in term of China's junk trade with Nanyang such as Suzhou, Ningbo, Amoy, Zhanglin, Guangzhou, Hainan Island and Macao (Chin, 2004).

3.4 Chinese Migrants in Southeast Asia

Long before the arrival of the Europeans in the 1600s, the Chinese dominated trade in most of the Southeast Asian region, or Nanyang. In Nanyang, the Chinese trade Diaspora turned many Southeast Asian port-cities into entrepôts, through which Chinese silk, porcelains, and other manufactured goods were exchanged. Unlike present-day trade, early trade often required that merchants physically travel from one place to another or migrate to settle temporarily. The Chinese traders, or huashang, who took a voyage overseas would temporarily stay in one place and then move onto the next to conduct their economic activities due to backward communications and transportation technologies. Consequently, circular migration from China to Nanyang became regular. Merchants and traders took their workers abroad with them to work on the trade for a short period of time and then returned home preparing for the next journey. When the Dutch and English arrived in the region in 1600, they found large and distinct Chinese resident communities in key port cities in Nanyang, such as Brunei, Malacca, Western Java, Batavia, Manila, southern Siam, Phnom Penh. Thus, pre-colonial Chinese emigration was intertwined with trade and was dominated by huashang (merchants and traders) and their seasonal workers who were mostly their own relatives or village folks. Of those who settled in the foreign land, they acted as middleman minorities, turning their areas of settlement into bustling market places and their economic activities into dominance of internal and international trade.

Wang Gungwu called this kind of Chinese trader pattern in "Patterns of Chinese Migration in Historical Perspective"(Wang, 1993: 52) "Huashang", which was the dominant pattern from early times in various parts of Southeast Asia. He described that

"The trader pattern refers to merchants and artisans (including miners and other skilled workers) who went aboard, or sent their

colleagues, agents or members of their extended families or clans aboard to work for them and set up bases at ports, mine or trading cities. When it prove successful, the business aboard, or the mining business, could expand and require more agents or young family members to join it; or new business or mine were established into a network, also requiring more agents or family members to be sent out to help the new ventures. Over a generation or two, the migrants, mostly male, would settle down, and bring up local families. But even if they themselves did not settle down, their local families did and, more often than not, remained as recognizably Chinese families to keep the business going." (Wang, 2003: 5)

The imperial Chinese state has long been ambivalent toward international migration. Sometimes it allowed migrants to go overseas but discourage their return, other times it favored out immigration with a keen interest in migrant remittances, and still other times it prohibited international migration altogether. Whether at times of prosperity or depression, the Chinese state had played a paramount role in shaping patterns of international migration and the development of the Chinese Diaspora.

In early Ming dynasty, private trade and any trade outside the tribute system was banned, making it difficult for merchants to move to and from China freely. Later on, the imperial government relaxed restrictive policies on private and localized maritime commerce but still banned overseas residence.

However, "The Mountain is high and the emperor is far away." * Chinese migrants from the South China still traveled and migrated to the Nanyang. Chinese commercial communities had already made a strong presence and flourished in Java and Sumatra. In 1567, the Ming imperial legalized informal trade, which gave rise to new Southeast Asian port-cities such as Manila, Hoi-an, Phnom Penh.

During the Qing dynasty, the government inherited the hostile attitude toward emigration and made overseas travel and residence a capital crime. Beheading was a sentence for those who violated. Trade with foreigners was restricted only to the port of Guangzhou. This policy did not stop merchants and traders, they developed innovative strategic and tactics to bypass government regulations, which were later institutionalized to facilitate migration and the formation of diasporas communities overseas.

Most of the private bans on private trade abroad were revoked in 1727.(Reid, 2004: 23) In 1754, the Qing government declared for the first time that law-abiding emigrants with valid reasons would be entitled to return home and have their property protected.(Reid, 2004: 23) The relaxation of the emigration policy led to a booming overseas junk trade that already rapidly expanded and a tremendous outflow of traders, miners, planters, shipbuilders, mariners and adventurer of all kinds. As well as in Ayudhaya, Chinese worked as shipbuilders, miners, artisans, pig-breeders, vegetable gardeners, and peddlers. (Lieberman, 2003: 93)

Many Chinese took up residence in the ports of Southeast Asia and built their ships there. Sometimes the traders based in South China had their ships built in Southeast Asia because of better and cheaper woods. Moreover, Southeast Asian urban

* An ancient Chinese word that described the attitude of the local officials and traders in Guangdong and Fukian

and commercial culture gained enormously from technical skill of emigrant Chinese. When Chinese married into the local society of Southeast Asia and adopted social norms, their skills became part of the new urban culture being built in Southeast Asia. The fact that overseas Chinese merchants still maintained relationships, familial and cultural with the South China trading communities of their ancestors gave them an unchallengeable position as middlemen between the markets of their homeland and those of Southeast Asia (Chandler, 1987: 58). Southeast Asian political elites found it convenient to permit outsiders to manage international trade. Chinese merchants were mobile, free of compulsory labor and located by government policy and their own preference in port areas.

3.5 Ayudhaya in the context of Chinese era

Ayudhaya is an international port that is wealthy and has the most prosperous trade activities in Southeast Asia. Merchants from several countries both Indian Ocean and South China Sea circulated to exchange goods. Dhiravat na Pombejra vividly concluded "cosmopolitan" of Ayudhaya that

"Ayudhaya was a leading Southeast Asian port, an entrepot and trading kingdom which dealt with merchants of many races and religions. As a result Ayudhaya became a cosmopolitan city where several communities of foreign traders, missionaries and mercenaries co existed with the already ethnically diverse (And mixed) local populations" (Dhiravat Na Pombejra, 2002: 25)

Economical factor that made Ayudhaya become wealthy was agriculture and trading especially international trading. Manop Thavornwatsakul (มานพ ทาวรวัฒน์สกุล, 2535: 154) concluded economical system of Ayudhaya that

"Agriculture creates consistent and stable
base for state while international trade brought
prosperity and wealthy to Ayudhaya society"

Trading in late Ayudhaya period was vigorous because community in Ayudhaya city extended continuously and international trade flourished even trading with western countries would not be same dominant as past century but China trade current was expanding in. Until trading in late Ayudhaya period expanded inclusively, merchants from several cities simultaneously entered to Ayudhaya for trading. Testimony of Khun Luang Watpradoosongdham was recorded that Pitsanulok people brought sirup, tobacco, beeswax, honey and several goods from northern cities to sell by ship, Nakhonratchasima people brought love water, beeswax, bird's wing, several kinds of fabric and forest products to sell by cart, Angthong, Lopburi, In, Phrom, Singh, Sankh, Supan people brought paddy by sail to sell in front of Samor temple, Kanoon temple, Kanan temple, Tak and Petchboon people brought forest products by sail to sell in front of entrance of Suan Plu canal and Pananchueng temple, Bann Laem people from Petchburi, Bann Bangtaboon, Bann Bangtalu brought seafood to sell in front of Pananchueng temple and Sawankalok people brought products from northern cities to sell in boat at riverside and Klong Yai Wat Mahathat (คำให้การขุนหลวงวัดประดู่ทรงธรรม, 2532: 55-59). Furthermore goods are also diverse such as metal ware, brass ware, silver ware, stake, wall, roof-tile, table, bed, chair, mattress, cushion, pillow, mosquito net, cradle, mat, clothing, fabrics, ornament, shoe, fishnet, basket, notebook, plantpaper and food products (คำให้การขุนหลวงวัดประดู่ทรงธรรม, 2532: 55-59).

Increment of trading and more several of products identified progressive economy and expansion of Ayudhaya. As a result of southern China trade current, demand of products increased.

Saichon Wannarat (2525: 11-14) explained that production for subsistence in new economy and society changed to be production for trading and effected to people inclusively.

However, considering expansion of trading in mentioned period identified that even production for trading increased but it did not effect to people inclusively as Saichon's comment. There was no a lot of change in social or economical structural level because advantages from trading expansion were at ruling class and foreigner like Chinese (มานพ ถาวรวัฒนัสกุล, 2535: 168). Moreover, production for trading not only started in this period but also moderately continued for period of time but not equal to period as Saichon explained. Production for trading as Saichon's reason was progression of trading in existing economical structure.

3.5.1 International Trade

Trading in King Narai period was active and made immense income to state. Most trading was trading with western countries but after King Petcharacha* was enthroned to be king, trading with some western countries was against severely especially French. King Pethracha expelled French from Ayudhaya, seized property and destroyed business of western companies. These events resulted in trading of Ayudhaya intensely because Eastern India of England Company announced to prohibit

* More information about the commerce during king Petracha period in Dhiravat na Pombejra. Ayutthaya at the end of the Seventeenth century; Was there a shift to isolation?, in: Anthony Reid (ed.), Southeast Asia in the early modern era: Trade, power, and belief, pp.250-272.(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) and Remco Raben. Ayutthaya,King Phetracha and the world. Paper presented at the conference 400 Years of Thai-Dutch Relations. (Bangkok 18-19 March, 2004)

junk of Ayudhaya to sail to any ports of India or in any territories that Eastern India of England Company occupied. As a result Ayudhaya feared to send royal ship to India Ocean because of France and England. This action resulted not only trading with western countries decreased but also animal product trading kind of elephant for 300 – 400 elephants that Ayudhaya had distributed to several ports of India was interrupted (ปาริชาติ วิลาวรรณ, 2528: 176). Enormous income from forest product trading also was impacted. Furthermore trading with China in King Pethracha decreased. None of embassy was delivered to China according to tributary trading through his reign. Main income from royal junk trade also decreased. There was only private trade but very less because most Chinese merchant preferred to trade at Pattavia.

Some internal cause that made trading in King Pethracha be lifeless is rebellion at Nakornsrihammarat and Nakornratchasima. Both areas were important areas for goods transportation and source of forest product. Suppression of rebellion took 10 years resulting in loss of workforce in production. Impact from war extremely effected trading. Another cause was his trading policy, he attempt to monopolize trading mostly like king of Prasartthong dynasty. As a result most merchants did not desire to trade in Ayudhaya because they were exploited too much then trading decreased more. However decrement of trading with foreigner in King Pethracha period could not say that it was because of anti-western countries and agitation in his kingdom because decrement of trading started from late King Narai reign having cause from external factor such as Coromandel coast war and agitation in Malay territorial water area (Raben, 2004: 12). Even trading with Holunda existed but much less. Variety of product lists also decreased because of several times of conflict between King Pethracha and Eastern India of Holunda trading Company (V.O.C). King Pethracha wanted the company to follow his requirements to show that foreigner could not convince him. Eastern India of Holunda trading Company (V.O.C) was dissatisfied liability payment of royal palace that insisted to pay as sappawood and tin instead of cash.(Raben, 2004: 178) Remaining market in King Pethracha period was forest products trading with Japan. (ปาริชาติ วิลาวรรณ, 2528: 178) Export goods were deerskin and cow skin in not

much amount. That was probably to say that importance of forest products decrease according to level of relationship with western countries. Trading of Ayudhaya therefore depressed. Even the Tiger King allowed western countries to trade but nothing could help (พรรณี อวนสกุล, 2518: 30).

Until King Taisa period, trading of Ayudhaya recovered especially trading with China. Flexibility of Chinese Royal Palace for maritime trade and immigration of population made expansion of trade in South East Asia. Another cause of trade expansion was starvation problem in Fukien County (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 75-76), China where Hok Kian Chinese lived. Internal agriculture of China was ineffective so China need to import rice from other countries to support people (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 74-83). As a result, The Emperor was forced to open country to order rice was rice procurement to feed population who lived in farther county and faced shortage problem was more worthy than rice delivery from other county to Shortage County (ความสัมพันธ์ทางการทูตระหว่างไทย-จีนพ.ศ.1825-2395, 2523). Another important thing was privilege for junk that export rice in China. The more rice imported, the more tax decreased. In year 1725, the court announced that any junk that carried rice more than 10,000 picul to China, could pay tax for only half of the normal rate, and more than 5,000 picul but less than 10,000 picul paid tax for 70% of normal rate (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 89-91). Even though royal income from rice trading was not much because rice took high load, rice export to China reduced tax for other products and received some privileges as well (สายชล วรณรัตน์, 2525: 9-10).

Rice trading with China made expansion of trading between Ayudhaya and China extremely. Ayudhaya delivered rice to China at least 65,000 picul per year and up to 100,000 picul some year (ปาริชาติ วิลาวรรณ, 2528: 24-25). While forest products that were required decreased, a few of them was carried at stern of rice junk only because forest products regarded as luxury goods for China that was facing with starvation. Forest products that was demanded by China such as Rhino's horn, nest, ivory, kingfisher's wing, peacock's hair, agar wood, gum benzoin and ditto bark core were extracted except sappawood that was used in dyeing and medicine production

(ปาริชาติ วิลาวรรณ, 2528: 24-25). The Emperor refused to receive agarwood and gum benzoin that were favorable forest products as tribute because they were wasteful and inessential (ความสัมพันธ์ทางการทูตระหว่างไทย-จีนพ.ศ.1825-2395, 2523: 35).

Even though China was the main destination for trade since the early Ayudhaya period, trading with China became extremely flourished in King Taisa period. Chinese were highly dominant in trading. In year 1714, King Taisa appointed Chinese official in his court, who came from Amoy, to be Chao Phraya Praklang. He, later introduce his countrymen into Ayudhayan administrative bureaucracy and get them appointed to important positions. Chinese women also served the queen and princesses at the royal court. (Dhiravat Na Pombejra: 2004, 336)

Trading with China extremely flourished in King Taisa period. Chinese were highly dominant in trading. In year 2257 King Taisa appointed Chinese to be Chao Phraya treasury and collaborated with Chinese merchants as partnership in sailing. King Taisa controlled trading with China both governmental and private format and demonstrated power of Chinese at that time (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 95-96). Dhiravat na Pombejra explained about position of treasury that

"The Phraklang's seal (Tra kosathibodi) was needed to validate documents ranging from ordinary export licenes to exclusive trading monopolies. Any requests or appeals to the king had to go through the Phraklang and his department" (Dhiravat Na Pombejra, 2002: 9)

A lot of junk from China sold silk and crockery in Ayudhaya and bought rice, tin and sappawood in return (Raben and Dhiravat na Pombejra, 1997: 66). At the same time trading with other countries still existed. King Taisa ordered treasury department to trade with other countries such as delivery of elephant to sell in India

(ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 (จดหมายเหตุของคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยา ตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและกรุงรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 243)

Trading in Ayudhaya progressed continuously up to King Baromkod period and was designated as "great time of country" because of not only trading with China but also trading with other countries such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Sumatra, Langka and India (วราภรณ์ ทินานนท์, 2522: 16-18). Trading with China still progressed continually from King Taisa period. As a result King Baromkod must rely on Chinese lord and Chinese merchant in trading until he hardly managed internal administration (Adisorn Muakpimai, 1995: 165).

At present only few of western merchant entered because King Baromkod attempt to control trading desperately. He expected to mostly gain benefits from trading to treasury like King Prasartthong and King Narai period (Raben and Dhiravat na Pombejra, 1997: 68-69). Trading in that period was monopoly with foreign and made immense income to state. However attempt to be monopoly of state resulted in a lot of foreign merchants especially western countries or cargo ship from China did not want to trade in Ayudhaya. The number of cargo ship began to decrease but went to other ports instead (Raben and Dhiravat na Pombejra, 1997: 66).

However trading with China in late Ayudhaya period still was maximum trading. Trading was not limited in state only, private trade increased. Besides rice trading, wood is another product that was demanded by China and became important product. A lot of Chinese merchants traveled to build ship at Ayudhaya and carried rice back for selling because king of China supported private rice trading afterward (Sarasin viraphol, 1977: 96). Private Chinese merchants were encouraged to buy rice from Ayudhaya directly (ความสัมพันธ์ทางการทูตระหว่างไทย-จีนพ.ศ.1825-2395, 2523: 38).

Entering of many private Chinese merchants and progress of internal trading resulted in extreme expansion of trading in Ayudhaya. At the same time state could not completely collect benefits because flourished trading were owned by individual. A lot of Chinese merchant and lord co invested in junk trade. Lord or master who got private junk will use Chinese to organize or lord sometimes collected dividend

from merchant from trading facilitation (สายชล วรรณรัตน์, 2525: 19). Lord and Chinese merchant supported each other for benefits. A lot of Chinese entered in governmental system and got rich from trading.

At that period Ayudhaya was full of trading atmosphere. Historical study in this period, social structure from economical expansion was analyzed differently.

3.5.2 Dominant people in trading

Dominant people in trading may be separated to 2 groups that are Prai in Ayudhaya period and foreigner who traded with Prai in Ayudhaya period. Dominant people were assumed to be woman, kid under criteria and old Prai because these people did not work monthly. They were dominant in trading from production to trading. For male, Prai may trade during no work according to Prai system. Woman was assumed to be the most dominant people. Anthony Reid mentioned trading society of Southeast Asia at that time that western people were surprised for doing business with woman both in market and large business. We could not refuse that woman was dominant in trading of Southeast Asia (Reid, 1999: 138)

Foreigner community that settled down in Ayudhaya or foreigner who traded in several periods, important community was Chinese community. Most Chinese in Ayudhaya were Hok Kian Chinese, some of them traded and some was an official in royal palace. Hok Kian community in Ayudhaya period resided and traded at 6 main areas:

1. whirl market Bang Ka Ja front of Pananchueng temple, entrance of Ku Jam canal market back of Kak mosque, entrance of Ku Mai Rong canal market and entrance of Wat derm canal market under Poon Tao Kong shrine
2. Tha Rap temple front of Rich man C's house, he was important Chinese lod in King Taisa period
3. Kanom Jin market

4. Nai Kai area where was very large area from Pratuankai canal - Hoy port – Pratuji canal

5. Samma area where was next to Nai Kai area

6. Entrance of Lakorn Chai man-made canal market where trading area of Chinese products was.

Chinese regarded as highly dominant people in economy and trading of Ayudhaya because they had freedom in trading, did not attach with monthly work and could travel in Ayudhaya without permission of government unlike other foreigners. Testimony of Khun Luang Watpradoosongdham mentioned trading in Ayudhaya that there were a lot of trading areas of Chinese such as China house at entrance of Lakorn Chai canal sold daily consumer products (คมขำ ดิวงษา, 2531: 125), Nai Kai area Road (คำให้การขุนหลวงวัดประดู่ทรงธรรม, 2532: 14) and Chinese produced goods according to several kinds of skill for selling for example China established production plant for Chinese sweetmeat and Chinese dried sweetmeat machine, Chinese carpenter made table, bed, cabinet, chair, barrel with wood band and metal band, wicker table, bed and chair (คำให้การขุนหลวงวัดประดู่ทรงธรรม, 2532: 14).

Besides Chinese, foreign traders were spread all over Ayudhaya for example Muslim having Indo-Iran race residing at Hua Laem, Hua Ror or Takien canal in Ayudhaya, sold goods on boat such as sachet powder, perfume, balm, clothing, spices and daily products (นิธิ เขียวศรีวงศ์, 2547: 16). Kak Tani community resided at Lodchong temple, professed textile and Landai mat weaving (คมขำ ดิวงษา, 2531: 135).

Progress of trade in Ayudhaya period made constancy for more than 400 years as an important port of Southeast Asia while Melaka and Singapore ports were distribution center in India and Europe. Remarkable feature of Ayudhaya port was center of local products that were produced in Malaya peninsula and interior main land therefore important goods of Ayudhaya were agricultural and forest products.

3.5.3 The Fall of Ayudhaya

Internal and external trades in late Ayudhaya period were interrupted because of war. Flourishing and modified economy must collapse. In conclusion Ayudhaya economy was depend on international trading in late Ayudhaya period. Forest product trading was depreciated together with decrement of western merchants but rice trading with China was still main income. Forest products became important export goods again in Thonburi and early Rattanakosin period. This period Ayudhaya politic bustled, lord and master separated to several groups, Chinese lords had power for a period and did junk trade individually with master therefore high class became wealthy but it did not much effect in social class. Even internal trade in late Ayudhaya was more active but it was probably from increment of population and progress of Ayudhaya resulting goods production as special skill not production for trading. Prai still had same living because changes happened in high class people only.

After the fall of Ayudhaya, economy of over 400 years flourishing kingdom was destroyed. After King Taksin announced to revive Ayudhaya again, he must restore destroyed economical condition. He selected small port like Thonburi to replace Ayudhaya and was established as a new capital city of Chao Phraya River. King Taksin followed economical policy like Ayudhaya that gained main income from international trade.

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จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE OF THE THONBURI KINGDOM

The booming China trade in Southeast Asia contributed to the economic growth in cities as mentioned in chapter 3. Although later on the trade in some areas was stopped due to wars in many areas of mainland Southeast Asia, the trade was suspended only temporarily.

The economic expansion was the factor which brought about the formation of three new flourishing kingdoms in the eighteenth century in mainland Southeast Asia. With the South China trade direction lifting a maritime ban in Southeast Asia, these kingdoms had opportunities to develop rapidly and thrive

One of the kingdoms which benefited from the economic growth was the Thonburi kingdom which later became the Rattanakosin Kingdom. The Thonburi kingdom was founded in the circumstances of a "war-torn society" because the kingdom had to undergo wartime throughout the Thonburi period due to the fall of Ayutthaya kingdom in 1767. After the fall, many problems ensued such as labour scarcity problems and economic problems.

Despite all of the difficulties preventing its development, The Thonburi kingdom did not take long to rise as one of the most thriving kingdoms in Chao Phraya Basin and in Southeast Asia.

4.1 The emergence of the Thonburi Kingdom

4.1.1 Thonburi during the Ayudhaya period

The Thonburi Kingdom is an old city since Ayudhaya period. The Thonburi Kingdom was formerly called "Bangkok city". The Thonburi Kingdom name appeared in the royal chronicles in 1483 during the Chao Sam Phraya period. Within the

Thonburi Kingdom, Prapadang was a border town fending the areas around the gulf of Siam. In the northern part of the Thonburi Kingdom was the Bangkok City community which was situated by the Chao Phraya River (กำธร กุลชล และทรงธรรม นิลกำแหง, 2525: 221-224). The royal chronicles identified the position of the city "Phra Kanon Thanaburi" in the King Maha Chakrabatr period as the name "Thonburi" (ทุมบุรี) and the position of the city " Phra Kanon Thanaburi" was recorded in the Royal Enactment during the King Prasat Thong period as the name " Thonburi" (กฎหมายอาชญาหลวง, 2481: 37)

Formerly, Thonburi city during Ayudhaya period before the reign of King Chaiya Ratchathirat, the land of Bangkok side and Thonburi side was the same land because the old Chao Phraya River flowed down into Bangkok Noi canal and went into Talingchan canal and Bangramad canal and finally into Bangkok Yai canal. It was like this until 1542 then King Chaiya Ratchathirat ordered the short cut of the Bangkok Noi canal through the Bangkok Yai canal directly. The digging up for the canals short cut caused the Chao Phraya River to change its course, enlarging the two canals bigger while narrowing the old course into the canal-sized (เน่งน้อย ศักดิ์ศรี, 2543: 12-13). Sujit Wongtet made an assumption that Thonburi city was established from the digging for the canal short cut, making the Bangkok side to be Thonburi city in order to gather its citizens for protection against enemies from Hongsawadee. At the same time, others cities were founded such as Nakhonchaisri (สุจิตต์ วงษ์เทศ, 2548: 41).

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



Figure 4.1.1: Chaopraya River before the reign of king Chairachathirat (Sujit Wongthes, 2005: 22)

Although the canal short cut divided this area into two parts by the Chao Phraya River, this area was still called "Thonburi" as usual. The order from King ChaiRatchathirat for the short cut from Bangkok Noi canal through the Bangkok Yai canal shows that this area was formerly an important large community of war tactics and trades since the early Ayudhaya period (สุจิตต์ วงษ์เทศ, 2543: 16).

period possess important products such as fruits and betel nuts (จุมพฏ ขวลิขิตานนท์, 2531: 43).




(Figure 4.1.3: Fruits tree in Siam from Du Royaume de Siam, La loubere)

Throughout the Ayudhaya period, there were many important events regarding the significance and existence of the Thonburi community especially in King Narai the Great period during which war forts were built. In 1685, French diplomatic missions consisting of Chevalier de Chaumont, the first Ambassador together with Claude de Forbin and the Jesuit, Guy Tachard paid a visit to King Narai the Great with the purpose of negotiating trade and followed up with the Jesuit's mission of persuading the Siam king to convert to Christianity (สัมพันธ์ภาพของประเทศไทยกับประเทศสยาม พ.ศ.2223 – 2450, 2544: 13). King Narai the Great gave the order to construct modern forts both at Thonburi and Lopburi. The fort at Thonburi was built first (ขจร สุขพานิช, 2523: 185). After finishing the construction, the west fort was named "Wichaiprasit Fort", located at the mouth of Bangkok Yai canal. The east fort was named "Wichaiyen Fort", stationed by Forbin who acted as the posts of grand admiral, general of all the king's armies and governor of Bangkok (Thonburi). Shortly after that, Makkasan Islamic rebellion occurred and was quashed by Forbin. Later on in the reign of King Phetracha, Thai soldiers clashed with French soldiers under the lead of General Desfarges who was stationed at the Wichaiyen fort. The results of the fight were that the fort was completely destroyed by the cannons. After the war, Wichaiyen fort was left deserted and finally demolished.

In a later time, Thonburi was still an important city and the port of Siam which was recorded in history by foreigners who travelled to Ayudhaya. Those foreigners recorded Thonburi as "Bangkok city" such as in *Du Royaume de Siam* by Simon de la Loubère depicting Thonburi that

"Bangkok city was called ' Thonburi' by Siamese but foreigners know only Bangkok city as a port" (ลาร์ลูแบร์, 2510: 11).

Plan de Bancok



(Figuer 4.1.4: Bangkok city map by La loubere)

Nicolas Gervaise recorded in details that

"Bangkok (บางกอก)) is the most important place in the Siam Kingdom without doubts because it is the only port in Siam which can defend against

enemies. The city's length is longer than the city's width. The area covers no more than 250 meters. There was a protecting wall only at the side of the main river which runs through the east and south sides of the city above the mouth of the gulf of Siam for 6 kilometers. The area where the rivers meet is the crescent moon sea which can protect against enemies. There is only one fort and 24 cannons." (นิโคลาส แชนวาล, 2505: 50-51)

Bangkok was recorded as the city which had a fort. It was the first city which foreigners must pass when they stopped at the mouth of the gulf. Foreigners had to park big vessels at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River and then lower a boat to make contact with the Thonburi governor to inform him about their embarkation then they can travel further into Siam. Travelling upwards you met KaewKwan Market, Pakred, Samkoke, Patum city, Rathakram, and up to Ayudhaya. The importance of Thonburi city was that it was the Immigration Bureau despite the fact that it was far from the sea but it could control 2 river courses in contact with Ayudhaya on both sides. The description of the Thonburi city or Bangkok city according to the foreigners' anecdotes was that Thonburi city was surrounded by walls. The Governor's Office was situated on the west side. There were V.I.P. buildings, western churches, and forts at the two river sides which were altogether called "Bangkok forts/ Thonburi Fort or Wichaiyen Fort". Between the two forts, there were big chains strips fixed in the middle of the Chao Phraya River in an attempt to protect against enemies from the sea (กำธร กุลชล และทรงสวัสดิ์ นิลกำแหง, 2525: 25).

The geographic condition of the city is useful for the economic growth because it was a port at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River. Therefore, people travelled back and forth. Also, the city controlled water courses in contact with Ayudhaya at both sides (สุรินทร์ มุขศรี, 2543: 62). The first water course was the course for large vessels travelling to and from the high sea for trade as well as it was the course connecting Ayudhaya court to the South cities from Prajuabkirikan, Chumpon down to Songkhla, Nakhonsithammarat, and Pattani. Apart from that the first course was a door to the East sea city such as Rayong and Jantaburi. The second water course was the course on the Bangluang side which connected all the water courses on the west side of Chao Phraya river as well as the main course in contact with cities at the mouth of the Mahachai river, Tajeen river, Maeklong river down to Petchburi city. This side of the areas was densely populated by the canals; therefore, it was a community of trade. Apart from that, it connected with the land course to Tenessarim, Mergui and Tavoy of the Andaman side. These factors contributed to the growth of the Thonburi community as well as cross-region commerce.

The aforementioned information all showed that Thonburi had long been a community of trade and strategies. It had been a significant town since the Mid Ayudhaya period.

ศูนย์วิทยพัทยาการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย



(Figure 4.1.5: Forts at Thonburi during the reign of King Petracha, written by French during the battle between French and Siamese during the reign of King Petchracha)

ศูนย์วิทยทรัพยากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

4.1.2 Thoburi: the new kingdom of the lower Chaophraya River

In 1766, King Taksin while being the Governor of Tak which was situated in Pichai Temple Camp outside city wall decided to break through the surrounding Burmese troops out of Ayudhaya with his own Siamese-Chinese soldiers (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2543: 132). They headed towards the East because the East coastal towns were still a safe place from the war. Also, the coastal towns like Chantaburi were convenient to travel by sea to the South or to Hatien, Cambodia. Taksin with his troops fought with groups of people along the way. At that time, there were many groups of people accumulated into forces to protect themselves. Nidhi Eiewseewong (2543: 132) described the time then that many noblemen all escaped from the city while Taksin's group held on to the political objective of re-establishing Ayudhaya. Then, Taksin marched to fight with many East towns until 7 April 1767 which was the day Ayudhaya was sacked by Burma. At that time, Taksin had not approached Chantaburi because he could not conquer Chantaburi on 14 June 1767. Taksin boarded on ships at Chantaburi and prepared his army and successfully invaded Thonburi on 5 November 1767 with his force of over five thousand men by sea. On 6 November 1767, Taksin's troops won the battle. They beat the Pho Sam ton Camp and all other camps totally. After that the royal chronicles (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัฬหภูมิกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 29-30) recorded that

"He was tired of trying to get onto the throne and would like to go to Chantaburi. Therefore, all priests, noblemen, and Thai people made a request for King Praputtachaouhua Phra barom noputangkul (Taksin) to access to the throne for the benefits of the people. He, then, stayed at the Thonburi court."

The reasons for the selection of the location of Thonburi as the new kingdom are many. In miraculous aspect, it is reasoned that when King Taksin was staying at The Song Puen Throne Hall, he dreamt that the former kings of Ayudhaya had driven him out (เสด็จอน ศุภไสยามณ, 2527: 41). Therefore, he decided to move to Thonburi. For geographical reasoning, it is explained that Thonburi was small-sized and suitable for six of his armies and the location of Thonburi city was close to the mouth of the Chao Phraya River, making it easy for trading activities. Apart from that, Ayudhaya was damaged beyond repair as well as the political explanation that King Taksin had no absolute power in the areas of Ayudhaya. Therefore, he decided to build a new capital at Thonburi instead (นิติ เขียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 156).

Considering the above reasons, the miraculous factor can be crossed out. Therefore, we could say that the selection of Thonburi as a new capital might come from many reasons. The main reasons might be that Thonburi was small and next to the river which was useful in terms of geography and strategies. Situated by the river meant it was convenient for traveling by land and sea. In addition, Thonburi city was surrounded by walls and contained fortresses. And it was not far from Ayudhaya and Chantaburi. Therefore, they could utilize the resources from both places conveniently.

There were controversial discussions as to whether King Taksin intended Thonburi to be a new kingdom or just a temporary site. The reason for this is based on the assumption that throughout the reign of King Taksin, no royal palace was built in the court. There was only a royal residence. The lack of a royal palace for ceremonial activities leads to the question of whether or not King Taksin really used Thonburi as a real kingdom in comparison with the accession to the throne of Chao Phraya Chakri who gave an order to build a royal palace for ceremonial purposes immediately after his coronation at the new kingdom on the east side of the Chao Phraya river.

In my opinion, I believe that King Taksin intended Thonburi as a new kingdom based on the evidence from the literature of Verses in Praise of the King Thonburi (Taksin) as follows;

จึงแต่งฐานที่ตั้ง	ภูมิไชย
ให้สถิตยถาวรไป	ตราบเท้า
กัลปาวสานใน	ธรณิศ
ธนบุรีนป็นเกล้า	ตริสร้างเวียงสถาน ฯ *

Though there was no stark evidence testifying when these verses by Cadet NaiSuan were composed. It was assumed that these verses were written in the mid period of King Taksin reign because these verses depicted the cities dependent on Thonburi. Therefore, I conclude that Thonburi city at that time was a permanent kingdom although no royal place was built throughout the reign of King Taksin.

The moving of kingdom by King Taksin as well as by King Rama I is not unusual at all because the moving of a kingdom was partly from the belief that if a town contains something unsuspecting or causes no prosperity to its residents, the moving of a town or kingdom is considered as another choice for the king to use. For example, King Chaivoraman VII moved his kingdom to Angkor Thom after the war with Cham and King Mindong built Mandalay as a new kingdom after the defeat of England. Therefore, it is unusual that king Taksin decided to move the capital from Ayudhaya to Thonburi with the reason that that town was not auspicious anymore.

The advantages of building a new capital at the Chao Phraya river basin area called "Thonburi" are as follows;

1. The size of Thonburi

Ayudhaya was a big city which was severely damaged and hard to restore because there were few people left from the war at that time. Thonburi would be an easier place to defend if approached by enemies because it was small, therefore,

* Meaning: King Taksin established Thonburi to be the kingdom that can last forever and built the palace for the new kingdom.

suitable for the amount of people at that time. Furthermore, the Thonburi area could be expanded out onto both side of the Chao Praya River.

2. The location of Thonburi

Thonburi was situated in the deep waters near the sea. Enemies without strong ships and strong men could barely conquer Thonburi because if Burma wanted to come to Thonburi with a big fleet, they needed to make a detour round the Malay Peninsula for a long distance first which Burma had never done before. Apart from that Thonburi was situated near the mouth of Chao Phraya River, if Thonburi lost the land battle, it could escape by sea easily to the east coast which was the former base of King Taksin's force.

Most importantly is that Thonburi was located in the area of the Chao Phraya river. Therefore, it was convenient for trade and goods transportation. In the initial phase, Thonburi needed to survive by trade especially the import of food and weapons because Thonburi was not in a ready state for any production. The import-export and exchange of goods including the attempts to get into the China trade which was influencing South East Asia at that time seemed to be the best policy. The location in the area of the Chao Phraya River made it convenient for merchants from towns to travel by sea into the Chao Phraya River and for Thonburi to travel out and send ships for trade in foreign countries. The affluent trade since the Ayudhaya period especially with China in the reign of the Ban Plu luang dynasty showed the significance of trade by sea and made it not surprising for King Taksin to establish a new capital in such a convenient area for both commerce and war.

Thonburi city was formerly a community which had prospered to a certain degree. Houses were situated along the river side. Also, it had a shopping town which could be developed as a port like Ayudhaya (จุฬิศพงศ์ จุฬารัตน์, 2547: 267). It was assumed that it had not been damaged much because Burma only took the town but did not destroy it. Therefore, Thonburi was easy to be built further. There were fortresses

designed and built by French soldiers since Ayudhaya period which was Wichaiyen fort on the right side of the river and Wichaiprasit fort on the left side. There were also lots of fruit gardens and Mud Sea which were suitable for agricultures for feeding its citizens.

4.1.3 Thonburi: the new center

Thonburi's shape was like a broken heart with Chao Phraya River running down the middle of rectangle-shaped city plan. Bangkok Noi canal was in the north and Bangkok Yai canal was in the south. Watjaeng canal was in the west and Talad canal was in the east (มานพ พงศทัต, 2535: 11). The city was divided into two parts: the west side was the palace side and the east side was communities of Chinese people. The metropolitan areas covered both river sides. Each side had three city walls.

Formerly, Thonburi had 2 forts on each side of the river and had walls and scattered communities (เน่งน้อย ตักศิลา, 2543: 13). In the reign of King Taksin, he decided to build a new capital of Thonburi by making further constructions in an attempt to establish Thonburi as a city center in the Chao Phraya basin. Accordingly, the old walls in the west became the walls of the palace. The boundary of the palace in the north stretched to Watmakoknok or Watjeang canal. The palace walls in the South started from the Wichaiyen fort along Bangluang canal. The boundary in the west was the old city walls the east walls stretched along Bangkok Noi canal.

After constructing the palace by using the former city walls, new city walls were built in 1771 (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 78)

" His Majesty the king considered that the Thonburi kingdom still had no strong city walls against enemies. Therefore, he made an order for officials to raise up the camps with Tonglang wood....."

The new city walls constructed on the west side started from the old city wall corners to the Bangwanoi temple and went round the Phraya river to the old city wall corners which were the location of the palace. City walls on the west had 3 sides like those of the east. Apart from that King Taksin also ordered the digging of a canal to make town ditches along city walls from the Wattaitalad corner to the Bangkok Noi canal in the west. For the east, the town ditches were made from the Wichaiyen fort to the Huakod sacred Shrine. In the west city wall, there were 21 entrance doors. The area within the city walls were all connected by a canal connecting the Chao Phraya to the only one canal of the town ditch (สุรินทร์ มุขศรี, 2543: 66).

4.2 The Thonburi kingdom in the context of the Chinese era

Chinese migrants and the expansion of commerce from China were play important part of the establishment of the Thonburi kingdom. King Taksin effectively used Chinese migrants to revive the economy in several ways. During 15 years, Thonburi can be divided in 3 periods.

4.2.1 The first period: from guerrilla to capital

As Reid pointed out, the effective use of Chinese migrants was a primary factor that helped Siam recover from the Burmese conquest in such a short time (Reid: 2004, 23). Phaya Tak headed toward the East after fled with his Siamese – Chinese troop from Ayudhaya was not a coincidence. From the late seventeenth century onward, many Teochiu Chinese had settled along the Southeast coast of Siam and established the trading center at Chantaburi and Trat (Sakurai, 2004: 45). Chantaburi in the mid eighteenth century was a Teo-chiu community and a major focus port for Canton junks (Reid: 2004, 23). According to the Royal Chronicle, Phaya Tak had a ready amount of Siamese – Chinese 500 soldiers with him (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 167). Along the way to Chantaburi, the groups of independent political power were surrender to his

troop or willing to pledge their loyal to him, including the group of Teochiu Chinese who were threaten the profit of their trading network by the expansion of Cantonese marine power, Hatien (Sakurai, 2004, 45). The trading network in the eastern part of the Siamese kingdom became great revenue to Phaya Tak's troop, with the great help from Teochiu Chinese; Phaya Tak built his naval army and drove out Burmese at Pho Sam Ton Camp. The accession of King Taksin as a king of Thonburi took place afterward.

4.2.2 The second period: Strength and stability

After the establishment of the Thonburi kingdom, Chinese became great support for economic expansion while king Taksin fought other political power group and states. King Taksin appointed Chinese as officials in court, provincial administration and some were in the army. Chinese settlers came to Thonburi and eastern part of Siam. The economy of Thonburi grown with foreign trade ran up by Chinese. They had already in the Southeast Asia –China trade network as traders and procurers for goods.

The flourishing of trade strengthened Thonburi to expand her territories. The prove of her strength in remarkably short time can be divided in three

4.2.2.1 The ability to defeat other political power group

Several centers of political power declared their independency since before the collapse of Ayudhaya. After the Ayudhaya fell for Burmese, Not only king Taksin who was able to set up a political power at Thonburi , they also established centers in other parts of Siam. The group of Nakorn Srt thammarat governor, the group of Pitsanulok governor (later became the same group with group of the monk name Fang), group of Pimai leaded by the Prince of the Ayudhaya dynasty. Dhiravat noted that the political power group of King Taksin was the only group that had the most support from the important Chinese traders and communities of Siam. (2004, 346)

It took three years for King Taksin to defeat other political group and Thonburi became the new power in the lower Chaopraya River. Thonburi's ability to overcame others defined the strength and the certainly of income from trade.

4.2.2.2 The ability to fight against Burmese

The Burmese never abandoned his plan to force Siam to its knees, and as soon as the king had been informed of the foundation of Thonburi as the new capital, Burmese eager to strike back to reassert their suzerainty. Burmese troop invaded Siam state for 9 times since 1767 – 1776. Even though Thonburi troop was forced to abandon some cities, especially in Azewun kee's war, the ability to fight against the powerful state like Burma proved her strength and her power as a powerful kingdom since the beginning.

4.2.2.3 The ability to expand power over the neighboring states

King Taksin attempted to seek benefit from trade and to ensure the security of kingdom led to the invasion of the neighboring states.

Hatien

Hatien was a port city which was prosperous from transit trade and a major commercial route of Cambodia and South Laos, King Taksin would like to have Hatien in his power so that it would open trade routes and goods source as well as the opportunity to interfere with Cambodia and Laos.

Putthaimat or Bantaimas, Cancao, or Hatien was another port city which played an important role in Thonburi's economy. Hatien city was special because its status was independent, under Vietnam, and under Cambodia at the same time. Hatien was established in 1700 by Mac Coo (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 2). Mac Coo built Hatien the same time as building other 7 villages to receive the migrating people from China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Mac Coo was a Cantonese migrating into Cambodia together with a number of Cantonese people. Shortly after that, he received the position of Ookya and governed Hatien city. Mac Coo built Hatien in a Chinese-village style. He made himself rich from his gambling and mining businesses. Chinese merchants, Vietnam merchants, Cambodian merchants, and Malaysian merchants

travelled into Hatien for trade and gambling (Sakurai and Kitagawa, 1999: 155). Initially, Hatien was a port city of Cambodia of which its governor received a Cambodian title. However, in 1708, Mac Cuu sent tributes to the Vietnam kingdom while he sent tributes to the Cambodia kingdom at the same time.

Being wealthy from trading and gambling houses, The Mac Family got more powerful and created their own forces. Not long after that, western merchants who traveled into Hatien recorded in 1720 that Hatien was the most flourishing port city in the Gulf of Siam. (Hamilton, 1930: 3) The peak prosperity was marked by the production of its own money for use in trading. This meant the burgeoning economic expansion requiring a money system to meet the market needs. This outstanding characteristic attracted other kingdoms including Ayudhaya to possess Hatien. In 1717, King Tai Sa sent troops to attack Hatien but it was not successful because Vietnam sent an army to help (Bussakorn Lailert, 1972: 59). As a result, Hatien was badly damaged from the war and its economy faded for a while. Although Hatien was not conquered by Ayudhaya, this incident made Hatien realize the importance of a good relationship with Ayudhaya. Therefore, Hatien sent its tributes to the Ayudhaya kingdom also (Chen, 1977: 1537-1538). In 1766, Ayudhaya had prepared to seize Hatien again. This time, Mc Thien Tuu (Son of Mac Cuu) asked Vietnam for help. However, Ayudhaya was surrounded by Burmese armies before going there. (Sakurai and Kitagawa, 1999: 173)

Mac Cuu passed away in 1735. His successor was his son, Mc Thien Tu or in Thai royal chronicles he was called "Phraya Raja Setti". Mc Thien Tu was Vietnamese. In the Nguyen Chronicle, it was recorded that Mac Thien Thu was appointed as a governor of Ha Tien in 1736. Mac Thien Thu was also given 3 ships with a dragon seal on them. The dragon seal was a symbol that the ships were exempt from duty. Apart from that, he was allowed to set up a mint to produce the coins for his own use. In addition, he set up his own forces. (Li, 1993: 131)

Yumio Sakurai and Takako Kitagawa (1999: 173) mentioned about Hatien under the government of Mac Thien Thu that Mac Thien Thu had his own forces and troops. Apart from that, Mac Thien Thu invited Chinese philosophers to help develop the Chinese culture in Hatien. The residence of Mac Thien Thu had the same practice as

that of a Chinese court. Apart from that, Mac Thien Thu sent representatives to China and Japan to develop mutual commercial relationships. These actions all seemed like Hatien was an independent state. The economic growth improved allowing Hatien to be able to govern itself. No matter the facts that Hatien was able to develop itself or the Vietnam governor supported it, its prosperity as a port city together with its independence and self-government were prominently noticeable.

Initially, Hatien was a port city of Cambodia with the governor appointed with Cambodian title. Since 1708, Mac Cuu sent tributes to the Vietnam court as well as to the Cambodian court at the same time. Despite the facts that Hatien sent tributes to both countries, Hatien still had the freedom to govern itself. Hatien gained income from opening gambling houses, mining, and being a port city in which trades were exchanged. Apart from that, Hatien had plenty of agricultural areas which were abundant and suitable for growing rice. Another reason for Hatien being bustling was because of the location of the town. To illustrate, Hatien was situated at the mouth of the Vinh and it was located by the coast which was the commercial route of Laos in conveying goods to sea as well as it was the place for goods transfer from Cambodia to the sea. In the eighteenth century, Hatien was a port city, which acted as a goods transit place for Southern Laos and Phnom Pen (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 4). Southern cities of Laos such as Jampasak, Salawan, Sanpang, Seetandon, Satungtraeng needed to transit goods through Hatien along the Maekong river. This way was more convenient than transitting goods at the other 2 port cities which were Kampot and Kampongsom because they did not have a water route connected to Phnom Pen. In addition, ships from the Gulf of Siam could travel by sea into Hatien's canal and went further along the west branch of the Maekong River to reach the hinterland of Hatien. It can be seen that Hatien provided convenient routes for merchants to travel and trade with Cambodia, Southern Lao, and the Maekong basin areas. Therefore, the occupation of Hatien would give the benefit of interference control over Cambodia, Southern Lao, and all the Maekong basin areas. (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 6). The landscape of Hatien gave an advantage for Hatien to be able to gather and collect various goods from the exchange of merchants. Most of the goods were wild stuffs from the cities in

Laos and Cambodia. Other goods were from Chinese merchants who came to trade Chinese goods with foreign goods here. Another important aspect of Hatien was that Hatien was a strategic spot for attacking Phnom Pen because it was connected to Phnom Pen by a river course. This advantage made Hatien very interesting for many kingdoms especially South Vietnam who wanted control over the Maekong river areas.

When Hatien was established, it became a commercial city in place of Phnom Pen instantly. The prosperity of this port city lured interest from many kingdoms including the Ayudhaya kingdom in the reign of King Taisa. King Taisa sent an army to destroy Cambodia and Puttaimat but was not successful because Vietnam deployed troops to help Hatien. After Ayudhaya's attack, Hatien was revived in short time. Also, Hatien started to construct roads connecting to adjacent towns for a trade network and created a close relationship with Vietnam at the same time (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 11).

Initially, Thonburi and Hatien were not in stark conflict. Hatien was an important market for King Taksin to import a large amount of rice into Thonburi to feed his citizens and army. At that time, Mac Thien Thu always reported the access to the throne of King Taksin negatively to the Chinese emperor but it was not severe enough to cause a war. Until Mac Thien Thu tried to support Prince Sri Sang, royal lineage of Ayudhaya to become the King by sending his son-in-law (Ngo Nhung To Hau) in the rice junk in 1768 with the plan to kidnap King Taksin but this was a failure. Mac Thien Thu's son-in-law was killed and this enraged Mac Thien Thu so gravely that he sent his army to surround eastern cities and attacked Chantaburi and Trad in 1769 (Chen, 1977: 1537-1538). Although the raid was not successful it caused great damage to the economy because Chantaburi and Trad were important port cities, which created incomes for Thonburi (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 14). In 1771, King Taksin finally decided to wage war against Hatien.

Regarding the explanation for the attack of Taksins army on Hatien, whether it was because of political reasons, the fact that King Taksin was of different Chinese

group from Hatien, or the personal conflict between Mo Sue Lin alias Mac Thien Thu (Mac Thien Tu) and King Taksin all seemed to be minor causes. The authentic cause might be from an economic issue. It can be seen that Hatien was economically significant. To explain, Hatien at that time was a most wealthy port city. Thai ships from Thonburi or eastern port cities such as Chantaburi, Tungyai, and Bangplaso that wanted to travel to China (an important market of Thonburi) needed to pass Hatien first. With the ban on passing Hatien in 1769, Thonburi experienced problems in sea trades immediately. In western records, the trading prosperity of Hatien or Cancao as a famous port city was also mentioned that in 1760s, Hatien was one of the three important port cities which Chinese junks from Guangdong must stop by.

In 1781, King Taksin led his army to attack Hatien. After the successful seizure, he declared that all his soldiers released the Chinese and the Vietnamese to carry on their business in Hatien and that they should not be assaulted. King Taksin also persuaded those Chinese and Vietnamese to make a living as normal (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 219). This showed us the importance of Hatien as a port city of trade which King Taksin tried to restore its trade back to normal after being stopped by the war. After that, King Taksin led his army to attack Putthaipet and finally got Cambodia in his power.

After the occupation of Hatien, King Taksin appointed Phraya Pipit, a Taechiew Chinese of nobility whom he trusted to receive the position of Phraya Raja Setti to take care of the Port Department and to govern Hatien. Partly, sending the trustworthy man there meant that King Taksin would like to reward his close official for helping him in the war. Another part was because King Taksin wanted to take control of the economic benefits in Hatien, therefore, he sent his close nobility who was excellent at commerce to take care of the trade activities there for their mutual commercial benefit.

We could say that when Thonburi took over Hatien city, its took a lot of economic effect because this city was a great sea port for trading which they could buy the stuffs from here and sell them as a transfer trading. In additional, they could be able to control the business in Southern Lao and Cambodia as well. It can assumed that in 1771, when Thonburi took controlled Hatien and Cambodia it's become a breakpoint that affect as a whole.

However, Thonburi could not get that much benefit from Hatien city because Mac thien Tuu didn't take that much time to collect some people and took back their city. King Taksin saw that it would be difficult to keep this tributary state, so he asked Praya Raja setti (Chinese) or Praya Pipitderm to take back his people. (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 87-88).

Luangprabang, Vientiane, and Champasak

Vientiane became as a tributary state of Thonburi in 1779 which at that time, Lao port was separated into 3 kingdoms which are Luangprabang in the northern part, Vientiane in the middle part, and Jumpasak on the southern part (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2525: 320). The reason that Vientiane became dependency of Thonburi is because of the inside politics in between Prachao Siribunsan and Pra Wor Pra Taa (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2541: 21). Until 1767, Pra Wor Pra Taa emigrate his family from Vientiane to the house in Nong bua lam puu (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 178). Prachao Siribunsan sent the army to fight with him and it took for 3 years. Then Pra Wor Pra Taa sent tribute to Burma and asked for army to fight with Vientiane. When the Burmese army arrived, Vientiane asked Burma for the army as well to fight with Pra Wor Pra Taa at Nong bua lam puu, Pra Taa died in battle field. Pra Wor, Tao Tid Kum, Tao KamPong, Tao Tid Pom, Tao the main of Pra Taa's child. escaped to Chao Chai Ku Mann, the king of Jam paa sak city for help. Vientiane sent the army to fight again but this time Chao Chai Ku Mann sent the army to block them and sent the excuse letter for Pra Wor. So, Prachao Siribunsan took back his army (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2541: 23).

In 1776 Praya Nang Rong, the city ruler of Nang Rong in Siam connive with Chao Oa, Chao Inn and Aub Hard of Cham Paa Sak became revolt. King Taksin asked Chao Praya Jakree to go defeat then go back to Thonburi in 1777. At that time Thonburi had a great power over southern Lao and North-eastern part.

Pra Wor has argued with Chao Chai Ku Mann so he moved his family to Bon Mod Dang in 1776 and sent the tribute to Praya NaKorn Sri Thammarat and asked to be under Thonburi. King Taksin requited and allowed Pra Wor to settle at Don Mod Dang. When Pra Chao Sriri Boon San heard about that he sent army to fight at Don Mod Dang and executed Pra Wor then went back to Vientiane (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 178). When King Taksin heard about the army, he was so angry and said that Pra Wor was his people and Praya Lan Chang didn't pay respect at all, so he should take the army to destroy Mueng Lan Chang as revenge. (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 183).

King Taksin sent Chao Praya Jakree and Chao Praya Surasink with 20,000 men to Nakorn Rachaseema. Then Chao Praya Jakree moved the troops to the north and Chao Praya Surasee went to Cambodia and raised 10,000 Cambodian to build the warship to go to Kang Lee Pee which Chao Praya Surasink got people in Lao and Cambodia for about 20,000 people to dig the small canal go around Kank Lee Pee (แก่งหลี่ผี). After that Thonburi army went to beat the four against city at the right side of Vientiane, until the warship attacked at the left side and blocked the city for about 4 months until it collapsed. King Siriboonsan escaped and took a lot of belongings and armored (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 183-184). Chao Praya Jakree told people with families moved to the west side of Mueng Pran Prao then respectfully invited The Emerald Buddha at the temple in Pra Chao Lan Chang palace to the opposite side of the land in Mueng Pran Prao then built the new temple. King Taksin called the army back to Thonburi (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 185-186). Chao Praya Jakree took a lot of stuffs, armored, elephants with people and royal family and also the emerald Buddha to Thonburi. For Vientiane, now surrender to become tributary state. The army had reached back to Thonburi in 1779. For the administration after that, Lao had a freedom to rule on

Luangprabang, Vientiane, and Champasak but still had to send the tribute. (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2541: 23)

The important of economic side in Lao to Thonburi is the labor, product, and bribe in labor way. After took a lot of people back from Vientiane war was rising the population which became the great labor for economy. For the number of Lao people that got took, father of French wrote down that it was about 30,000 prison camps that Siam got and Siam had destroyed the city. When Siamese took the prison back, they died during the way a lot (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่39 (จดหมายเหตุของคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและกรุงรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 150)

For the products and levies, It was important as well because of the area in the north- eastern part of Siam was plentiful and it was great resources for domestic products such as beeswaxes, lac, ivory, silk, snout, gold and ramie (Wilson, 1987: 8). When considered about the list of the products that would be sent for trade and tribute, it could notice that there were a lot of snout and ivory included in the list as well.

The tributary money was very less if comparing to state income. However, What King Taksin focused on were forest products for export. After expanded the territories this time, in 1781, the list of product for tribute to Chinese emperor and other products for trading had included a lot of forest products which could be the products or tributes from Laos (ณัฏฐภัทร จันทวิช, 2523: 59)

The plentiful of all these resources were great products since Ayudhaya period (Puangthong Rungsawadsub, 1995: 5), when they got the main north eastern cities and Laos would affect the economic as a whole in Thonburi. Puangthong Rungsawadsub (1995: 5) notices that Cambodia and Hatien were not only the targets to expanded trading but ruled all cities around Kong River. King Taksin got Vientiane, Luangprabang and Champasak in 1779. So he had a great power rule over Chaopraya river, Kong river and sea port in Siam gulf which could show the great development of Thonburi.

4.2.3 The Third period: the powerful kingdom

The Thonburi kingdom rose to unprecedented importance as the economic hub of mainland Southeast Asia in such a short time. The economic booming had shown in several records but the outstanding source is the collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees.

Major royal ceremonies in Thonburi period which had been recorded in The collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees included 5 grand events which were organized fully in traditional modes (ประชุมหมวยรับสั่งภาคที่ 1 สมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2523). Labors from provinces were summoned to participate in the ceremonies.

1. 1776: The Royal Cremation Ceremony for Somdet Phra Panpee LuangKromphratepamat and the Merits- Making Ceremony
2. 1776: The Royal Cremation Ceremony for Krom Khun Intarapitak and Phra Chao Nara Suriyawong
3. 1777: The Royal Cremation Ceremony for Mom Chao Seng, Phraya Sukhothai, Phraya Pichai Aisawan
4. 1779: The Emerald Buddha Celebration Ceremony
5. 1780: The Royal Cremation Ceremony for Mother of Somdet Phra Chao Lukyater Chaofasupantawong

The five royal ceremonies were held grandly especially the Merits-Making Ceremony for the remains of Somdet Phra Panpee LuangKromphratepamat which included food offerings to over 7,000 monks with 7 days & 7 nights of entertainments. After the cremation, King Taksin held merit-making activities for another 3 days and celebrations for another 4 days and 4 nights. It was possible that King Taksin organized the five ceremonies grandly because he wanted these ceremonies to serve as morale and encouragement to show his people the reunification of Thonburi kingdom like in the Ayudhaya period.

Apart from those royal ceremonies, in 1776, King Taksin ordered Chao Phraya Nakorn Sri Thammarat (Nu) to go back to govern Nakorn Sri Thammarat. King

Taksin also raised the status of Nakorn Sri Thammarat to be a dependency and promoted Chao Phraya Nakorn Sri Thammarat to be Phra Chao Nakorn Sri Thammarat, along with gifts to Nakorn Sri Thammarat governor such as Phra Supannabat gold leaf, gold case for containing Phra Supannabat and king's accessories. The collection of the Thonburi Royal Decrees recorded that

"Granting one time of installation fee, seal fee, and service fee for governor and all officials and for Chao Phraya Nakorn, altogether 41 Chang 3 Baht."
(ประชุมหมยรับสั่งภาคที่ 1 สมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2523: 17-22)

King Taksin also gave money rewards to officials reading his royal command and to officials in provinces where the royal command passed, on rank basis.

Not only grand ceremonies were held, some moderate celebrations were also organized where King Taksin would grant money, rewards, or food to nobles and civilians such as Buddhist Scriptures Case Boat Parade in 1777.

Of all five ceremonies, the greatest one was the Emerald Buddha Celebration Ceremony in 1779 which showed the stability of Thonburi as a great kingdom. Both foreigners and Thais were assigned to join the ceremony. Number of people represented the ability to control manpower of the Thonburi labor system. High cost of the Emerald Buddha celebration ceremony for seven days and seven nights also defined the financial strength of the kingdom.

จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMY DURING THE THONBURI PERIOD

As discussed earlier, Thonburi kingdom was deemed as a non-kingdom based administrative government. In addition, the leader of Thonburi was more like a community leader rather than a king. Most importantly, the economy and the trade during Thonburi period are nothing like those in neither Ayudhaya times nor Rattanakosin times. In Chapter V, the contents include the power expansion, the economy and trade all of which are the important factors for the growing kingdom, especially trading with China which became the main source of incomes in Thonburi period. Later, the factors served as a foundation for the prosperous economy during Early Rattanakosin period.

5.1 The expansion of the Thonburi kingdom

After the lifting of the maritime ban on oversea trade and travel in 1727, the booming China trade expanded its way into South East Asia. Many Chinese people explored into parts of this region to become a part of the burgeoning commerce. The commercial trend during the 18-19 century was called by Anthony Reid as "The Chinese century".

Thonburi under the lead of half-Thai, half Chinese King Taksin was also affected by the dominant influence of China. Thonburi became a part of the trade network which was thriving rapidly in South East Asia.

In order to get Thonburi to become a part of that trade network which was thriving rapidly in South East Asia, King Taksin made an effort to expand the territories of the kingdom to other towns which were economically important including port cities and towns full of resources.

5.1.1 The Eastern Expansion

Cities on the Eastern coast were the first ones which were under the governing of King Taksin (he was only Phraya Tak then). In January 1767 at the time when Ayudhaya was almost lost to Burma, Phraya Tak together with over a thousand Thai-Chinese soldiers broke out from Burmese troops from Pichai Temple and headed for the east coast (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 2) . By the end of January, they had seized Rayong. In April 1767, Ayudhaya was finally lost to Burma. However, two months after that, Phraya Tak got back to Chantaburi and Trad. This means that after only 5 months since the breaking out of Ayudhaya, Phraya Tak had made himself a very powerful leader over all cities on the east coast.

At that time, the cities on the east coast included the areas from Samutprakarn, Chonburi, Rayong, Chantaburi, down to Trad. The landscape of the country was that the front was the shore in Thai gulf. The back was the Panomdonrak mountain range. Apart from that, there were low lands and high lands. Rivers run down from the mountain ranges from the east into the Siam Gulf (ศรีศักดิ์กร วัลลิโกดม, 2545: 85). Chantaburi city was on the high land in the south of the Chantaburi River. It was situated down from the Ploywaen hills which were near the sea on the western side. It can be said that Chantaburi city was located at the foot of the Ploywaen hills which was near the river where transportation and traveling to the sea was convenient. Therefore, Chantaburi city became the center of transportation and economy (ศรีศักดิ์กร วัลลิโกดม, 2545: 47). From the ancient evidence found in the ship wrecks under the sea or on the sea coast from Chonburi to Trad, they showed that there was transportation and business communications by sea all the time since the 16th-17th century (ศรีศักดิ์กร วัลลิโกดม, 2545: 90).

During the Ayudhaya period, Chantaburi city was the city under the control of Ayudhaya. Also, Ayudhaya had 7 other tributary states which were all port cities on the Siam Gulf's east coast. Formerly, Chantaburi city was under the responsibility of SamuhaPhrakalahome (the position of minister of defense then). After 1629, Chantaburi city was under the responsibility of Phraklang (the position of minister of finance then). Apart from that, the export and trade on the coast of Chantaburi was

allowed (Adisorn Muakpimai, 1995: 167). This demonstrates how economically important Chantaburi city was.

Cities on the east coast were partly influenced by the economic expansion from the South of China since the Ayudhaya period. Many Chinese people migrated and settled down there. The trade growth brought about many port communities along the coast. For example, small communities consisting of a leader, defense forces, and weapons for protection such as Banhuathonglang community, Panthong community, and Bannaglu community. Medium-sized communities were quite strong such as Bangplasroi community. Large communities like cities were lead by governors. Before the fall of Ayudhaya, these communities such as Rayong, Chantaburi, and Trad were positioned as tributary states to Ayudhaya. Nidhi Eiwseewong gave the opinion that at that time those cities on the east coast were "natural governments". However, after the defeat of Ayudhaya to Burma, these cities rose to govern themselves and became independent. They chose their own local leader for their communities, not governed by officials from Ayudhaya anymore. (The same as other cities which broke away from Ayudhaya (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2543: 143-149) and governed themselves by a person who appointed himself as community leader. Some appointed themselves as a king) Srisak Wallipodom (2545: 92) concluded likewise that the governors of these community's leaders were merchants or local influential people whom Ayudhaya gave positions and ranks for convenient administration .

Phraya Tak's troops started to fight with factions starting from small communities because they need food, assets, and weapons. After that many people came to pledge their service to Taksin. Taksin's armies got bigger better equipped and with properties and food they could take control over big towns like Rayong whose governor acknowledged General Taksin's leadership. Finally, Taksin's troops conquered Chantaburi, the largest port city in the region.

King Taksin used cities on the east coast as the base for his forces because the east coast at that time had plenty of men, food, and assets. Also, the east coast had a fortress. The fact that the location was next to sea was suitable for creating shipping fleets. Apart from that Thonburi was an important port city which was

convenient for trade, information exchange, and for joining the trade network of Chinese merchants. Another possible reason was that this area was largely populated by Teochiu Chinese people. It was a big Teochiu Chinese community who were wealthy and influential (Sakurai and Kitagawa, 1999: 177-178). It might be possible that King Taksin needed the financial and force support from these Teochiu Chinese people.

King Taksin gathered more forces by persuading Trad governors to join him and by suppressing the junks' merchants. All Chinese junk masters were submitted to King Taksin (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 22). One of these Chinese junk masters was Tran Lien, Teochiu Chinese who later became Phraya Ahipit and an important man for King Taksin economically and militarily (Sakurai and Kitagawa, 1999: 176). King Taksin gathered ships and built more ships until he had 100 ships and 5,000 men. King Taksin led his army from Chantaburi to Chonburi to subdue Naithongyu Noklek's faction. Then, he went on to Thonburi to drive the Burmese away. It took Phraya Tak and his 5,000 men (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 22). only nine months to drive Burmese troops away and restored Ayudhaya back while Taksin had gained more and more forces at the same time.

The noticeable importance of the cities on the east coast at that time was that those cities were abundant with food, assets, and men. Therefore, it is hard to guess the real motive of Taksin as to whether King Taksin would like to help restore Ayudhaya or not or he would like to be a governor of Chantaburi which was a land of such abundance. However, considering his actions that after he drove the Burmese troops out of Poh Sam Ton camp and was crowned a king, he expressed his wish to go back to Chantaburi as recorded in the royal chronicle of Pan Chantanumat (2512: 29-30) that

"He was sad seeing many people dead and he did not want any royal properties but to return to Chantaburi. However, people requested him to stay at Thonburi to restore what was left of Ayudhaya."

At that time, King Taksin might vacillate between the hard obligations of rejuvenating the devastated Ayudhaya or just go back to Chantaburi to govern the abundant Chantaburi which gave him no burdens like Thonburi. Nevertheless, King Taksin finally decided to rebuild the new Ayudhaya at Thonburi.

The cities on the east coast were economically important fundamentally and an important market for commerce with merchants from inside and outside the country. The 2 spots were perfect for trade. The 2 spots of the trade network were

1) Important port cities in the Gulf of Siam from Bangplasroi, Bangpakong, Banglamung, Rayong, Chantaburi, to Tungyai or Trad (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 6). Furthermore, King Taksin conquered the southern cities later on so he became more powerful over the trade network in the Gulf of Siam. This spot had a perfect advantage because people could travel to and forth to trade here all year round with no need to depend on monsoon winds like other towns (ปรารภนา ศรีวิศาลศักดิ์ , 2542: 177)

2) The second spot or trade network was the trade with the coastal port towns on the Indo-China peninsula such as Kampongsom, Hatien , Saigon, and Longnai (ปรารภนา ศรีวิศาลศักดิ์, 2542: 177). Many junks had to pass by these towns. Also, this spot was on the course of Chinese trade. Therefore, Thonburi could ship goods for sale conveniently as well as it served as a resting spot for royal junks and private junks who would go to trade with China.

The geographical conditions of the cities on the east coast also made it easy for land trade because they were connected to inner Cambodia by 3 routes. The 3 routes were the route between Chantaburi and inner Cambodia, the route from Prajinburi to inner Cambodia, the route between Chantaburi, Prajinburi and Southern part of the North East of Siam. Both Cambodia and the North East of Siam were the sources of wild stuffs like Krawan and Rong (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 17). The way of goods

conveyance was to raft along the Chantaburi river to Sing cape which was the mouth of the river for about 65 kilometers (Adisorn Muakpimai, 1995: 167).

Because of the aforementioned geographical condition of the cities on the east coast like Chantaburi, Thonburi could have a place for goods procurement and goods transportation by junks to trade with China. Apart from that, the cities on the east coast also functioned as a place for ship construction and ship construction equipment (จุมพฏ ขวลิขิตานนท์, 2531: 49). It was expected that King Taksin used this place to build ships for his fleet back to Thonburi and for building ships for himself and Chinese nobility for trade (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 163). Regarding production, Chinese people in the area were experts at growing pepper which was an important export product to China. Pepper was an important product exported to China in 1771 for 3,000 Hab (basket). This showed that pepper was an export product in the Thonburi period. Later, in the Early Bangkok period, Chantaburi became the largest pepper export place (อดิศร หมวกพิมาย, 2531: 246). However, it was not because of resources and products of the locality that made the cities on the east coast like Chantaburi successful in trade. The success came from the fact that these cities were the port cities where goods from places were gathered for sale to China.

In the cities on the east coast, there were lots of Teochiu Chinese people already settled down and just coming to settle down. In the reign of King Taksin Adisorn Muakpimai, 1995: 168), these Teochiu Chinese were experts for both trade and agriculture. These Chinese people became important supporters for King Taksin such as a rich Chinese in Chonburi named "JinReung" who assisted King Taksin in trading with private businesses (Sarasin viraphol, 1977: 164). Another Chinese who was later appointed as Phraya Pichaiwari to take care of royal junks to be sold in other places (Sarasin viraphol, 1977: 164). When King Rama I ascended to the throne, he replaced the governor of Chantaburi with his own man. This showed the close relationship between the former Chantaburi's governor and King Taksin (Puangthong Rungswadisab, 1994: 17) and showed us that King Rama I saw the importance of Chantaburi as a port city creating wealth and income, therefore, he needed a person who he could trust to take care of Chantaburi.

The cities on the east coast became the most important cities in the Thonburi period because of the city ports in the trade network in the Gulf of Siam and in the South China Sea, having the role of gathering goods from various places such as Cambodia and Laos as well as serving as a place for ship construction. Although Chantaburi and other eastern coastal towns had been used economically since the Ayudhaya period but it was not until the Thonburi period that these cities were fully realized and utilized in terms of trade by Thai leaders in such a "Chinese era". Due to the obvious benefits, the important roles of Chantaburi and those eastern city ports were not diminished during the junks trade time in the Rattanakosin period.

5.1.2 The Northern Expansion

Cities on the Northern side had played an important role since Ayudhaya period especially an economic role. Their importance had two aspects which were

1) They met the people's needs for wild stuffs and minerals. The occupation over Cities on the Northern side made it easy for Taksin to take control over the natural resources especially forest products and minerals (ชาตุมเมือง โจรณี, 2534: 22). The important goods here were mainly wild goods such as teak lumber, wax, lac, Reow, Krawan, Frankincense Oil, Rosin, and minerals such as gold, silver, and copper etc.

2) Another aspect of their importance was regarding forces. The cities on the Northern side controlled lots of men who could be deployed in war and utilized as labour producing tributes. In this study the cities on the Northern side include Pitsanulok, Pichai, Sawankalok, Pichit, Kampaengpet, Tak, Nakornsawan, and Petchaboon. This research focuses mainly on Pitsanulok.

Pitsanulok was a major city which was politically and economically important since the Ayudhaya period and very prominent during the Sukhothai period. After the fall of Ayudhaya, the governor of Pitsanulok appointed himself as the King immediately. Therefore, King Taksin led his army to subdue Pitsanulok for political and

economic reasons which were to destroy the strengths of the Northern cities and to obtain labour for Thonburi.

Pitsanulok and the cities on the northern side such as Pichit, Pichai, and Sawangkaburi (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2543: 11) were not affected by the raid of Burmese armies attacking Ayudhaya because Burmese armies could not attack all the major Northern cities. If they did, they would lose lots of their soldiers before attacking Ayudhaya and that would also cause them to be delayed and arrive at Ayudhaya later than the Burmese armies which attacked from the south. The Burmese armies attacking from the south did waste much time destroying major cities because there was only Petchburi as a big town to destroy in the south. In order to reach Ayudhaya at the same time as the Burmese armies from the south, the Burmese armies attacking from the north needed to pass Pitsanulok and other northern cities and leave them intact. Therefore, Pitsanulok and other Northern cities were still strong and full of people and resources. Consequently, after the fall of Ayudhaya, King Taksin needed to hastily suppress the Pitsanulok faction first for territory expansion and in need of people and resources before Pitsanulok grew stronger and wilder. King Taksin first attacked Pitsanulok in 1768. This fight was not successful because King Taksin got injured from being shot. The Thonburi chronicle recorded (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่65 (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับพันจันทนุมาศและจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 34) that

"The enemies fired at his left leg, therefore, Thai troops needed to retreat to Thonburi".

However, the retreat to Thonburi at that time might be because King Taksin considered that Pitsanulok was too strong to beat so he waited for a better time. Later, the Pitsanulok governor passed away. This opened opportunity for Chao Pra Fang to seize Pitsanulok easily. Chao Pra Fang combined with the Pitsanulok faction at that time and became the faction controlling the major Northern cities. King Taksin saw this and realized that he had to defeat the Chao Pra Fang faction as soon as possible. He could not let them grow stronger. In 1770, King Taksin led his armies to attack the Chao

Pra Fang faction and attacked other cities along the way such as Uthai thani and Chainat (สมเด็จพระยามะยาดำรงราชานุภาพ, 2514: 47).

After a successful suppression of Chao Pra Fang faction, King Taksin continued to stay at Pitsanulok during the rainy season to organize the country's administration as well as persuade villagers who scattered to various places to return to Pitsanulok, their hometown. From the survey of the population in Northern cities, it was found out that there were totally 39,000 people. 15,000 people were from Pitsanulok. 7,000 were from Sawankalok, 9,000 people from Pichai and Swangkaburi, 5,000 from Sukhothai, and Kampeangpet and Nakhonsawan had over 3,000 people (สมเด็จพระยามะยาดำรงราชานุภาพ, 2514: 430-431). The numerous numbers of people from Northern cities were important for King Taksin because they outnumbered the population in Thonburi. Therefore, King Taksin needed to control over these cities to prevent Burma from obtaining these cities and become detrimental to Thonburi. At a later time, the people and officials from these Northern cities became a power base for Chao Phraya Surasi and Chao Phraya Chakri to overthrow the Thaksin government. To explain, regarding the appointment of the position of "Wangna" official of Somdej Krompraratchawangbaworn Satarnmongkol, many Pitsanulok officials were promoted to serve in Wangna such as Phrachaiyaboon, a Permanent Secretary of Pitsanulok was promoted to receive the position of Phraya Kalahom Ratchasena, and Phrapol from Pitsanulok was promoted to receive the position of Phraya Jasaenyakorn (เจ้าพระยาทิพทรงวงศ์, 2545: 15-16). These showed that Pitsanulok officials were supported by Chao Phraya Surasi.

Manpower from the Northern became a great mainspring force to ward off Burmese troops attacking the lower part of the Chao Phraya delta and protect against the Burmese invasion in the Northern cities. Also, people from the Northern cities functioned as reinforcements to drive the Burmese soldiers away from Lanna in 1774 during which Taksin brought 20,000 people from the north to help Thonburis 15,000

soldiers (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศและจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 137-140).

However, these Northern cities were not useful to King Taksin for long because the Asaewunkee war in 1775 occurred. Since this war, King Taksin needed to follow the policy of King Naresuan by canceling the policy of fighting the enemies of the northern cities and using the method of herding northern people down to Thonburi instead in order to cut Burma's forces in terms of supply and people. The King's order (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศและจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 137-140) was

"If Burma came close, hold them back as much as possible. If outnumbered, then herd the people and food supply down to Thonburi".

And when he reached Nakhonsawan he ordered the soldiers to "distribute the laws to all soldiers in the army that if any subjects could not catch up with their masters, then they need to be killed" (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศและจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 107).

After the Asaewunkee war in 1775, Northern cities became wary and exhausted from the Burmese invasion. The Northern towns were left deserted because people migrated to Thonburi. It was not until the Rattanakosin period that these Northern cities were rehabilitated again.

It can be concluded that the expansion into Northern cities of King Taksin focused on the procurement of manpower and food supply. King Taksin seized these Northern cities in order to suppress the dominance of Chao Phraya Pitsanulok. Also, King Taksin, the former governor of Tak and once a cart merchant from the Northern cities knew that he could take benefit from the intact Northern cities for people, food supply, and goods. The herding of people down to Thonburi due to the Asaewunkee war became an important factor contributing to the economic growth of

Thonburi. With more people, Thonburi got more production labour. Therefore, Taksin's expansion into Northern cities brought economic advantages in the aspect of labour.

Lanna

Lanna land was situated in the inner valley of Mainland Southeast Asia. The settlement of people were scattered within these valleys. The important basins which were main basins of Lanna cities were the Chiangrai basin and the Chiangmai Basin or Chiangrai-Lampoon basin (สร้อยสวัสดิ์ อ่องสกุล, 2544: 114). The economic fundamental was based on agriculture.

Lanna was under the government of Burma for over 216 years which was from 1558-1774. Before King Taksin had seized Lanna, Burma played an important role in Lanna because Burma saw the importance of Lanna for its security reason that Lanna could help Burma rule over the Chan State. Also, Burma could use Lanna for its people and food supply when they came down to attack Ayudhaya (สร้อยสวัสดิ์ อ่องสกุล, 2544: 129). For the Ayudhaya side, after King Chai Racha's period, no one in Ayuhya paid much attention to Lanna. . Although, King Naresuan could capture Lanna but he did not govern Lanna seriously. Sarassawadee Ongsakul (2544: 129) said about Ayudhaya's policy towards Lanna that

"The Thai kingdom during the Ayudyha period did not think of expanding its territory further to Lanna. Ayudhaya's satisfaction ceased at the occupation of Sukhothai because it thought that Sukhothai would already serve as a bump state against enemies"

Similarly, David K. Wyatt (1995: 180-181) gave his opinion based on the study on the chronicles that the Ayudhaya government paid less attention to Lanna than

to Cambodia. The roles of Ayudhaya in Lanna were little. The reason might be because Lanna was far, therefore, hard to take care of and govern. Though Ayudhaya saw the importance of Lanna in terms of strategies to protect against Burma, it could not do anything much with Lanna. It was not until the Thonburi and Rattanakosin periods that King Taksin and other kings in the Chakri dynasty saw the necessity to conquer Lanna. Sarassawadee Ongsakul (สร้อยสวัสดิ์ อ่องสกุล, 2544: 130) concluded the conditions causing the Siam government to expand itself to Lanna was

"It was because of the big lesson they received from losing Ayudhaya completely. This made the Thai leader see Burma as an enemy to be driven away from Thai territory- as far as possible. Therefore, Thai strategies during the Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin periods needed to build many protection lines against Burma by conquering the bordering states and strengthened the bordering states in an attempt to ward off the Burmese."

King Taksin first attacked Lanna in 1770 with the purpose to get rid of Burma and cease the wars in the Northern cities once and for all (สมเด็จพระบรมราชาธิบดีที่ ๑ รัชกาลที่ ๑ แห่งกรุงธนบุรี, 2514: 455-467). However, he could not conquer Chiangmai because of shortage of food supplies and forces so he retreated and went back in 1774. In 1774, King Taksin received the news that Burma was coming to attack the Thonburi Kingdom. Therefore, he decided to cut Burma's troops at Chiangmai (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศและจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 53) because Burma were taking advantage of Lanna in terms of location, forces, and food supply which were abundant (ปริศนา ศิรินาม, 2516: 94). In this war, Taksin received help from Phraya Jaban and Phrayakawila from Lampang which came to pledge their service to King Taksin. With these two peoples aid in the Lanna war, Taksin conquered

Prae, Lampang, Lampoon, and Chiangmai. Then, King Taksin ordered Chao Phraya Chakri to administrate Chiangmai. Later, Chao Phraya Chakri persuaded the Nan governor to pledge his service to King Taksin successfully (สมเด็จพระเอกาทศรถราชานุภาพ, 2514: 487). Thus, in 1774, Lanna cities, Chiangmai, Lampang, Lampoon, Prae, Nan were all under Thonburi.

However, in 1775, Burma which was stationed at Chiangsaen came back to attack Chiangmai. King Taksin ordered Chao Phraya Chakri and Chao Phraya Surasi to save Chiangmai and beat Chiangsaen (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 132-133). However, Chao Phraya Chakri and Chao Phraya Surasi had not gone there because they had to go to Pitsanulok to help fight with Asaewunkee's armies. In 1776, Burma attacked Chiangmai again. This time, Phraya Jaban saw that he was outnumbered so he left for Sawankalok. King Taksin, then, called Chao Phraya Surasi and Chao Phraya Kawila to get Chiangmai back. However, Chiangmai was damaged beyond repair and too deserted to save, King Taksin then ordered soldiers to leave Chiangmai.

After Lanna was conquered by the Thonburi kingdom, the Thonburi chronicles recorded that Thonburi gained 2,110 cannons and artilleries, 200 horses, 500 families of Thai- Mon and more than 500 families of Sawankalok people (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 101). Normally, King Taksin expanded his territory on the basis of an economic benefits gain which meant that a tributary state would provide him with increased income from tributes, labour, products, and trade routes. However, the Lanna occupation was an exception to this. King Taksin took over Lanna merely to prevent Burma from utilizing lanna cities as the place for food and labour supply. However, the conquering of Lanna in 1774 did not produce much of a fruitful outcome economically and politically because Burma came back and conquered Lanna again the year after.

Politically, although King Taksin could regain Lanna the Burmese invasion caused him to lose many people to save Lanna. Finally, King Taksin decided to herd people down to Lampang so that he could handle Burma. Also, the war with Burma for

Lanna required lots of food supplies. As a result, the food supply in Lanna was for use in Lanna only and could not be distributed down to help the Thonburi Kingdom because Lanna was at war all the time.

Commercially, war to save Lanna made it difficult for both internal and external trades to flourish. Normally, Lanna cities were an important market for Hor merchants, Ngiew merchants, and Nan merchants who came to sell forest goods such as *Viverricula indica* and Frankincense Oil in Lanna (วิไล สุทธิศิริกุล, 2528: 28). However, the war stopped them from coming to trade here. Thus, Thonburi only benefited from Lanna cities' tributes which might have forest goods which could be exported such as honey, ivory, iron (วิไล สุทธิศิริกุล, 2528: 28). Therefore, Lanna cities at that time did not produce many trade benefits to Thonburi.

The expansion into the Lanna cities in 1774 did not produce many benefits in terms of overall economy and trade. Although Thonburi gained labour, tributes, and goods from Lanna cities but Thonburi was still pestered by continual invasions from Burma. Another factor which was the great distance of Lanna cities from Thonburi prevented Thonburi from reaping food supplies and tributes fully because of the war. Finally, Thonburi needed to leave Lanna. It was not until the Early Bangkok period that the Thonburi government could benefit from Lanna fully especially from tributes collection.

5.1.3 The Southern expansion.

The territory expansion into southern cities were very important because King Taksin used the southern cities which were a safe place from war as the location for producing export products and food supply for feeding Thonburi and its armies. The prosperity of trade at the port cities in the Gulf of Siam attracted many Chinese junks to trade here. Many Chinese communities were set up there for a number of groups.

The occupation of these southern cities still allowed the cities to govern themselves especially Nakhon Sri Thammarath which was a dependency. Apparently,

the control over these cities did not focus on the governing but the economic benefits. The important cities were Nakhon Sri Thammarath and Songkhla.

Nakhon Sri Thammarath

Nakhon Sri Thammarath was an ancient city and was important since before the Ayudhaya period in both the aspects of government and economy. Nakhon Sri Thammarath was a dependency of Ayudhaya which cooperated with Ayudhaya in waging wars against Malaka for a long time. Regarding economic benefits during early Ayudhaya period, Nidhi Eiwseewong (2539: 248) concluded that "The commercial benefits gained by Ayudhaya were part of a port city system with Ayudhaya as the center of trade."

The motive that pushed Ayudhayas status from being a dependency to a major city might come from economic reasons especially the change of international trade direction. In order to obtain forest goods, minerals, and some plants, Ayudhaya needed to take control over the dependent states which yielded production (นิติ เอื้อวงศ์วงศ์, 2539: 249). However, in the late Ayudhaya period, the policy for Nakhon Sri Thammarath changed. The policy focused on the economic benefits such as tributes collection and economic monopoly.

During the Thonburi period, Nakhon Sri Thammarath was important. At that time southern cities like Nakhon Sri Thammarath were abundant with people and supplies because they were not ruined by Burmese troops like other towns. The oldness of Nakhon Sri Thammarath made it densely populated and important for sea trade as well as for being a large city port. Nakhon Sri Thammarath was a part of the commercial routes connecting the South of China to South East Asia. King Taksin acknowledged and desired it (Kuroda, 1994: 4) because it was a part of 3 trade routes which were

- 1) Saitakuapa-Karnjanadit route which was a route conveying tin from Talang and goods from the Indian ocean to the central part of the Kingdom
- 2) The shortcut from Trang to Nakhon Sri Thammarath,

3) The route from Saiburi-Songkhla which was used regularly by Chinese merchants in the eight century.

Nakhon Sri Thammarath was a port city which included transit trade and selling products made by Nakhon Sri Thammarath since the Ayudhaya period. Nakhon Sri Thammarath was the distributors of goods from China and the Indian Ocean to port cities along the coast from South Vietnam to the Sumatra coast by their own junks. Many goods produced from the southern cities were sent to Nakhon Sri Thammarath for export (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 237-238). The important product was tin which was later exchanged for weapons from western merchants by the Thonburi government. Apart from that, Nakhon Sri Thammarath produced and gathered pepper from cities for export. Strategically, Nakhon Sri Thammarath was important for the supply of food and labour for war. In addition, the occupation of the southern cities meant gaining power over other southern cities as well.

After suppressing the Chao Pimai faction, King Taksin attacked the Nakhon Sri Thammarath faction in 1769 with Chao Phraya Chakri (Kaek) as the army leader, joined by Phraya Yomarat, Phrayasripipat, and Phrayapetburi leading an army of 5,000 soldiers by land (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 491). However, they could not defeat Nakhon Sri Thammarath because of internal conflicts in the army. Then, King Taksin leading the royal army by sea with 10,000 soldiers conquered Nakhon Sri Thammarath. Nakhon Sri Thammarath's governor fled away. Therefore, King Taksin ordered the land army of Chao Phraya Chakri and the ship fleets of Phraya Pichai to capture the governor. King Taksin stayed at Songkhla. Chao Phraya Chakri Kaek got the news that the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor Phraya Pattalung, Luang Songkhla, and his wife and children escaped to Pattani. Phraya Tani could catch the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor, Phraya Pattalung, Luang Songkhla, and his wife and children and sent them back by ship to Songkhla land (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 54). Then, King Taksin returned to Nakhon Sri Thammarath to organize the government. It can be seen that King Taksin did not execute the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor like other faction heads but just

detained him and brought him to Thonburi. After that, King Taksin sent his nephew, Chao Narasuriyawong to govern Nakhon Sri Thammarath city and ordered the former Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor to be an official at Thonburi land (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 491).

However, in 1776 after Chao Narasuriyawong passed away, King Taksin sent former Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor to govern Nakhon Sri Thammarath city again. Two sons of the former Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor were ordered to be officials in Thonburi and the daughter was ordered into service in the palace section. Also, King Taksin promoted the position of Nakhon Sri Thammarath from being a major city to a dependency as well as promoted the status of the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor to Phra Chao Nakhon Sri Thammarath and furnished him with plenty of gifts as recorded in the Royal chronicles of Thonburi (ประชุมหมยรับตั้งภาคที่ 1 สมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2523: 16-22).

However, Phra Chao Nakhon Sri Thammarath did not possess full power in those days. Apart from that the cities under Nakhon Sri Thammarath such as Pattalung and Songkhla had to be under Thonburi directly instead. In addition, in returning Nakhon Sri Thammarath, King Taksin sent Chao Phraya Intarawongsa to lead warships with 500 men to set up a palace between Thalang and Takuatung to serve as a place for expediting tin tributes to Thonburi as well as accumulating sea forces for guarding outer sea (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 263). The setting up of the palace by Chao Phraya Intarawongsa at that place meant that Thonburi saw the importance of tin as an important export product.

The reasons that King Taksin sent the trustable nobility and the forces under Thonburi to control the tributes and tax collections might be two issues:

1) Although King Taksin sent the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor back to govern the city, the economic benefits needed to be taken care of as well. Therefore, King Taksin sent an official from Thonburi to maintain Thonburi's benefits and reap from the city to Thonburi as much as possible

2) The sending of the central official meant that at that time Thonburi put emphasis on the benefits gained as much as possible from the economic trades of the southern cities.

Before King Taksin subdued the Nakhon Sri Thammarath faction, Pattalung governor and Songkhla governor all came from the relatives of the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor. However, after King Taksin had seized Nakhon Sri Thammarath, he ordered his nephew, Chao Narasuriyawong to govern Nakhon Sri Thammarath and sent his page named " Chan" to act as Phraya Pattalung (ประชุมพงศาวดาร ภาคที่ 53 พงศาวดารเมืองสงขลา เมืองนครศรีธรรมราช พงศาวดารเมืองพัทลุง, 2476: 260). For Songkhla, King Taksin ordered a local influential person named "Yome" to receive the position of Phraya Songkhla. Nidhi Eiwseewong (2539:260) commented that

"The policy of King Taksin in the administration of the southern cities was an attempt to carry on the Ayudhaya policy which was to send a trustworthy person who had a high rank or position from Thonburi to govern and be the leader of the local city".

Not long after that, King Taksin changed the Pattalung governor in 1772, Songkhla governor in 1775. King Taksin ordered the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor to govern Nakhon Sri Thammarath city again in 1776. This practice seemed that King Taksin was giving power back to the locals but actually it was in contrast. This way, the power of the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor decreased because Songkhla city was under Thonburi directly. However, the relationship between King Taksin and the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor went well as you can see from the facts that after the ascend to the throne of Phraya Chakri, Phraya Chakri removed all people supporting King Taksin out of all positions including removing the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor from the post.

King Taksin's expansion of power to Nakhon Sri Thammarath meant the economic expansion into maritime trade. Apart from his forces at the eastern coast, the power over Nakhon Sri Thammarath gave him sea trade and more power over other southern cities because Nakhon Sri Thammarath was a port city of transit trade and possessed plentiful products (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 260). King Taksin utilized Nakhon Sri Thammarath as a place for commerce and economic benefit from tribute collection and rice supply for war (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 127), without taking the production labor to become soldiers for Thonburi like other cities at all.

Songkhla

Songkhla during the Ayudhaya period was previously situated at Daeng hill. Then, it was moved to the Gulf of Siam at the west coast of the mouth of Songkhla River called "Son cape shore" (สารูป ฤทธิ์ชู, 2539: 65). The transfer of Songkhla was due to its destruction by the Ayudhaya army during King Narai reign in 1680.

Geographically, Songkhla especially Daeng hill side was appropriate for politics and economy. That is to say Songkhla was a port city, suitable for voyage because the inner beach was a deep water trench suitable for anchorage (สารูป ฤทธิ์ชู, 2539: 65). Apart from that, there were two main water courses connecting between the west of the Malay Peninsula and Songkhla Lake. The two main water courses were the Satul-Songkhla Lake and the Saiburi- Songkhla lake. The two main water courses were long used for goods transportation between the two peninsulas (สารูป ฤทธิ์ชู, 2539: 95). Also, the location of Songkhla made it convenient to travel to other towns. Most importantly, Songkhla was a free port which was a center of transit trade with the Chinese people who were major entrepreneurs (สารูป ฤทธิ์ชู, 2539: 96).

Songkhla was a port city of trade. Its main business relied on trading, not agriculture although the city could do some planting. The important export of Songkhla was birdnests which was a natural resource abundant in the Kaeng island of Songkhla and important in the China market. Another export was tin which was not

produced much in Songkhla but Songkhla managed to collect from other cities for trade. Also, rice was the export product which was grown round the west of Songkhla Lake in Pattalung city and pepper was grown around Songkhla Lake (สารูป ฤทธิ์ชู, 2539: 98).

Songkhla was prominent in terms of commerce. It was a trade port city since the mid seventeenth century. Songkhla was governed by foreigners who were Islamic. Although Songkhla was subjected to Ayudhaya and under the control of Nakhon Sri Thammarath, there was evidence to show that Songkhla could pass on its political power independently and Ayudhaya functioned only as the host greeting a new governor (ยงยุทธ ชูแว่น, 2532: 83). Songkhla had independence to do its own trade. According to Chinese records, Songkhla shipped its goods to Amoy, China in 1729 for trade which corresponded with the Qing Dynasty period at the time when the maritime ban was lifted and China trade expanded into Southeast Asia as well as Chinese people migrated to settle down and sell goods in Songkhla (Kuroda, 1994: 3).

In the reign of King Narai, Songkhla was subdued because of its rebellion in 1680. However, it revived itself not long after that. Nicolas Gervaise spoke of Songkhla that "There was no other big cities on the coast of this Siam territory but Songkhla (Soncourat or Cingor) which was not well known in the country for its grandeur and beauty except its outrageous uprising against its own master recently." (แซรวาส, 2505: 54)

The prosperity of Songkhla according to Gervaises (2505: 54) description showed the wealth and prosperity from the trade of Songkhla which Ayudhaya could not have much control over. In the last half of the seventeenth century Ayudhaya changed its policy regarding the governing of southern cities by sending officials from Thonburi to govern southern cities with Nakhon Sri Thammarath as the center (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 256). Therefore, Songkhla was under the control of Ayudhaya until the fall of Ayudhaya.

In the Thonburi period, after King Taksin had seized Nakhon Sri Thammarath successfully, Luang Songkhla escaped with the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor but they were caught and removed from their positions. King Taksin appointed

his own men to be the Songkhla governor. Until 1776, King Taksin appointed a Chinese named "Hao Yieng" to be Phraya Songkhla whose title was "Luang Intarakirisombat" instead of the former Songkhla governor. Hao Yieng or Wu Yang was a Hokkian Chinese merchant who had settled down in Songkhla since 1750. He was successful growing tobacco and trading that he became rich and the head of Hokkian Chinese group who were influential in the local community (Sakurai, 199: 154). He pledged his loyalty to King Taksin when King Taksin stayed at Songkhla by giving 50 boxes of tobacco to the King. After the conquer of Nakhon Sri Thammarath (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี แผ่นดินสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 54), King Taksin granted the title of "Luang" to the birdnest duty collector of Songkhla and brought Wu Yang 's son named "Wu Yuen Yao" to become his personal guard in Thonburi. The royal chronicles of Songkhla recorded that Wu Yang had merits of paying bird nest duty in the form of money for 50 Chang each year and he also sent goods to Thonburi every year (ประชุมพงศาวดาร ภาคที่ 53 พงศาวดารเมืองสงขลา เมืองนครศรีธรรมราช พงศาวดารเมืองพัทลุง, 2476: 76). Therefore, in 1775, Wu Yang went to offer money to King Taksin, King Taksin appointed him as Luang Intarakirisombat, the position of Songkhla governor.

Considering the amount of money that Wu Yang offered to the King Taksin, it was not much because he was only a bird nest duty collector. The reason that King Taksin was fond of Wu Yang might be because King Taksin needed the trade network in southern cities from Wu Yang. Since Wu Yang migrated to Songkhla and made himself rich there, it meant that he must be a real expert and had extensive knowledge and trade connections in the southern parts round the Gulf of Siam.

Songkhla under the leadership of Luang Intarakirisombat and subjected to Thonburi in the time of Thonburi's economic expansion, King Taksin used Luang Intarakirisombat as a great help for trading (Sarasin Viraphol , 1977: 163), goods procurement for export to China, and for governing the southern cities. This meant that the separation of Songkhla from Nakhon Sri Thammarath was not only based on the politic issue to limit the power of the Nakhon Sri Thammarath governor but also based

on the economic factors which gave benefits to Thonburi after the benefit division among the Songkhla governor and the Chinese groups controlling the trade. Apart from that, King Taksin needed the Chinese people who were already in the businesses and trades at the port cities and knew the business network well. To illustrate, King Taksin utilized the junks and Chinese people under the control of Phraya Songkhla to do the junk trade for him apart from using Songkhla as the place of goods procurement and export. During King Taksin's period, Hokkien Chinese people in Songkhla played important roles no less than the Teochiu Chinese in political and economic issues. (Kuroda, 1994: 3)

Talang

Talang or Phuket as it is now was an island populated by various races; Mon came down from Pegu, Chinese people settle down since the Ayudhaya period, western people also came to trade in Talang. The first westerners were the Portuguese, then Dutch and then the French in the late Ayudhaya period, with the English in Thonburi period. (วิสันธนี โพธิ์สุนทร, 2532: 116-117) The number of its population was recorded in 1784 by Captain James Forrest who estimated the amount of Talang's population before the war with Burma were at approximately 12,000 people. (วิสันธนี โพธิ์สุนทร, 2532: 119)

Regarding the government, Talang or Phuket was governed by Ayudhaya loosely because of the distance and geographic conditions. The transportation was not convenient; therefore, the west coast was not populated very much. Land transportation was difficult because there were hills situated in the middle of the peninsula. Therefore, the trip had to be made by sea. The voyage route from Mergui to Phuket took 12 days (Adrien, 1920 cited in นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 170). Therefore, the power of Ayudhaya over Talang depended on how much Ayudhaya was superior to Mergui and Tenasserim. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2539: 170) This showed that the power of Ayudhaya over Talang was not stable.

The main product of Talang was tin. Talang used tin in exchange for goods from other cities. Regarding rice farming, rice was grown in the middle of the island. Lemon, oranges, and watermelon were also planted. (วิสันธนี โพธิ์สุนทร, 2532: 121) However,

food production was not enough for the people on Talang Island. Therefore, tin was an important product for Talang as recorded by French merchants that Tin was an important product for this town to dig up and trade in exchange for goods from merchants from other places. Talang's people all rely on tin for survival.

Talang was under Nakhon Sri Thammarath since the Ayudhaya period. In the Thonburi period, King Taksin conquered Nakhon Sri Thammarath and sent his dynasties to govern the southern cities. For Talang, King Taksin sent a Teochiu Chinese, a former official called "Phraya Talang Kang Seng" to govern Talang. In Talang, there were many settled groups of Chinese people. The main career was tin mining by producing the mineral themselves. (Koenig, 1984 cited in Skinner, 2529: 17)

Previously, Nakhon Sri Thammarath could collect economic benefit from Talang. Later, King Taksin sent Phraya Intarawongsa to collect duty in the city in 1776. (นิตินิเวศน์, 2539: 178) This removed Nakhon Sri Thammarath's power over Talang. However, Thonburi did not have real power over Talang because Talang tried to find other superior power centers which yielded it more benefits. The evidence was that Phraya Talang Kang Seng of Talang (Taksin's own man) tried to offer Talang to Britain in 1773 for protection against Siam and its independence. (Anderson, 1965 cited in นิตินิเวศน์, 2539: 186) King Taksin called Phraya Talang Kang Seng back to Thonburi and executed him. (ปัญญา ศรีนาค, 2546: 109) After that, Phraya Pimol (Khan), the former Pattalung governor, was sent to govern Talang and be the manager of west coast cities.

Phraya Pimol (Khan) had relationship with the influential people in Talang by marriage because his wife was Khunying Chan. Apart from that, Phraya Pimol (Khan) was close to a person who was very politically and economically important named Francis Light. In 1776, records showed that the Talang Department bought 962 flintlock guns, 900 Chatjeramad guns and Captain Munggu was the person who delivered these to Thonburi. (ปัญญา ศรีนาค, 2546: 109) Finally, he was titled "Phraratchakapitan". In 1776, more records show that there were contracts exchanged between the Talang

people and Francis Light who traded the tin of Talang in exchange for rice, clothes, and poppies from Francis Light. (ปัญญา ศรีนาค, 2546: 109) In 1777, Francis Light thought of taking some parts of Talang for his own economic exploitation.

There is no clear evidence as to why in 1779 King Taksin expelled Francis Light out of the kingdom and Phraya Pimol was removed from the position of the manager of west coast cities but he could still hold the Talang governor position. Panya Srinak opined that the private exchange of goods between Talang and Francis Light was unprecedented before in the royal trade monopoly system which the king was the only one who could monopoly all the items by the Royal Goods Treasury. (ปัญญา ศรีนาค, 2546: 109) After that, King Taksin sent Phraya Intarawongsa to govern the coastal towns instead of Phraya Pimol for the whole period of Taksin's reign.

In conclusion, Talang at that time was a resource for tin which was an export item of Thonburi. Regarding administration, Thonburi had slight control over Talang because of its geographical condition and internal politics in Talang.

The cities on the east coast and southern coast were important port cities and a rest stop for vessels and for hiding from monsoons in Gulf of Siam. These cities were interconnected usefully in the following routes;

1. Out of the mouth of Chao Phraya River, passing Seechang Island, Chonburi, Rayong, Chantaburi, Trad, crossing Gulf of Siam at Seechang Island to Nakhon Sri Thammarath, Songkhla, and Pattani.
2. Out of the mouth of Chao Phraya River, passing Seechang Island, Chonburi, Rayong, Chantaburi, Trad, Gong Island and crossing the Gulf of Siam to the mouth of river of Ranong.
3. Out of the mouth of Chao Phraya River, passing Seechang Island, Chonburi, Rayong, Chantaburi, Trad, Gong Island, crossing the Gulf of Siam to the mouth of the river of Chumporn, then to Bandon, Nakhon Sri Thammarath, Songkhla, and Pattani.

4. Out of the mouth of Chao Phraya River, going to Petchburi, Pranburi, Chumporn, Bandon, Nakhon Sri Thammarath, Songkhla, and Pattani.
5. Out of the mouth of Chao Phraya River, to Seechang Island, crossing the Gulf of Siam to Samroyod, Pranburi, Chumporn, Bandon, Nakhon Sri Thammarath, Songkhla, and Pattani.

From the above port cities, merchants could travel further on to 3 trading markets. If traveling further east, merchants would reach Cambodia, South Vietnam, and China. If traveling further south, merchants would reach the Malay Peninsula and islands in South East Asia. Some routes heading for the Andaman Sea headed to India and Sri Lanka (อติศร หมวกพิมาย, 2531: 141-143). Apart from that, southern cities were also the routes passed by goods from Indian Ocean traveling into the Chao Phraya River such as the route from Tanaowasee mountain range crossing into Kokodkra, the route from the west sea crossing into Songkhla Lake, and the route from Mak Island and Saiburi crossing into Songkhla and Pattani. (Breazeale , 1999: 15)

The occupation of the southern cities by Taksin after the conquer of the eastern cities meant that King Taksin had superior power over the trade network in the Gulf of Siam.

Conclusion: The power expansion of the Thonburi Kingdom

The expansion in Thonburi period gave both benefits in economic and politic. The sea port in the east was the most important especially Chanthaburi and Trad. From choosing this sea port, not only get men power but also help restored and developed the economic for a whole period. Because it was sea port for the ship that floating around, for market from Laos and Cambodia and the most important one was the place to build the ship as well. Beside, Taa-Chiew people over there help supported the king by men power and money also trading that would give a great deal for the king.

At the main city in the south was one of the great economic supports even though it wasn't really outstanding like the one in the east. It was great to take

controlled all the main cities in gulf of Siam. It also affect Hok- Keain, one of the Chinese group in Sonkhla city, headed by Praya Songkhla (Yheang) the Chinese who was important in trading , not less than Taa- Chiew. Also southern cities had a great tin which Thonburi would use for trading.

The other areas were important in geographic and resources ways. The market and trading route such as Laos Cambodia and Hatien were all given a lot advantage to find goods especially forest products which still wanted, by taking to export at the main cities at the gulf of Siam and also they could get a great benefit as well. So we could say that when King Taksin did the war to expand his power would affect a lot to economic because it was a time that Thonburi has ruled over seaport at the east and in the south. Hatien and Cambodia gave him a great power beyond trading network in gulf of Siam, Southern China Sea and Co Chin China. Beside that include many lands trading route. He also could solved starve problems inside Thonburi because he could take foods and other stuffs from these cities as well.

In the head city of the northern side and Lanna, to expand the territories for the benefit of strategy to defend Burma was the most important. Men power and recourses weren't help that much in Thonburi period because they couldn't get enough resources or bribes that much, only just for the trading route to other cities.

5.2 The economy during the Thonburi period

5.2.1 Treasury: revenue, expense and currency

Revenues and expenses incurred in such period shows the nature of Thonburi as a kingdom rather than just community. The currency also proved the expansion of the economy during the period.

5.2.1.1 Revenues

1) Incomes or benefits from war

Thonburi period was characterized by numerous wars throughout King Taksin's reign. The benefits from war induced incomes in various forms, however, they will be classified into two periods in this topic which are the income from the wars before King Taksin's ascension to the throne and the income during the wars of territorial expansion.

1.1) the wars before King Taksin's ascension to the throne

The incomes or benefits from wars before King Taksin's ascension to the throne could not then be called "government revenue" since the benefits were regarded as his own personal money.

King Taksin, then Phraya Tak, together with his small army fought their way against the Burmese out of Ayudhaya city. Later, Phraya Tak started to attack from Bangdong in accumulating workforce, weapons, food supplies, and assets, as recorded in the royal chronicle that "From there, he had gained 7 elephants ("Chang Plai" and "Chang Pang") as well as plenty of food." (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 60)

After the success with Bangdong, Phraya Tak headed towards the east which was the areas free of war, passing Ban Tong Lang, Tapanthong, Bangplasroi, and Ban Naglue. At Ban Naglue, the community leader named Klam pledged his loyalty to Phraya Tak (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 7), providing food supplies, weapons, and workforce to Phraya Tak's army. After that, Phraya Tak and his army went on to Pattaya, Najomthien, Tungkaitia, Sattaheep, Hindong (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 6), with occasional stays at those places until they reached Namkao where "Rayong governor and all departments welcomed Phraya Tak's visit as well as offered him a cart of grains." (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 7)

However, King Taksin later found out that the Rayong departments conspired to beat his army, King Taksin attacked Rayong city in response.

After the conquered of Rayong, Phraya Tak planned to attack and captured on Chantaburi. Therefore, he dispatched " Bunmee, a page, Bunrod Kaenon, and Bunma, brother of Phraya Chantaburi's wife" (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 11) to negotiate with Phraya Chantaburi for his allegiance and Phraya Chantaburi agreed to pick Phraya Tak up in the following 10 days. When it was the time, Phraya Chantaburi did not show up but ordered his men to bring 4 carts of rice grains as offerings to Phraya Tak at Rayong instead (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 8-9). This demonstrated that Phraya Chantaburi did not agree to pledge allegiance to Phraya Tak, possibly because he might assess that his army could still withstand King Taksin's troops. Apart from that, it might also be due to his good relationship with Mo Sue Lin or Mac Thein Tu, the governor of Bantaymeas. Accordingly, he was positive in the potential assistance from Bantaymeas. The sending of the rice grain offerings only signified a certain degree of compromise. King Taksin did not attack Chantaburi immediately, as explained by Nidhi laosriwong that it was because King Taksin knew well that Chantaburi at that time was too strong to capture, therefore, he led his army to subdue Naithongyu Noklek's faction at Chonburi and gained Naithongyu's allegiance (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 144). Then, Phraya Tak stayed at Chonburi to organize administrations by appointing Naithongyu Noklek to be Phraya Anuratchaburisrimahasamut. After that, he went to Rayong and Chantaburi to subdue Phraya Chantaburi. After Chantaburi, he went on to attack Chinese junks at Trad and gained "numerous amounts of gold, money, properties, and silk cloth" (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 21). After the capture on Chinese junks, he went back to Chantaburi to prepare some soldiers for attacks on Burmese troops at Poh Sam Ton camp.

It can be seen that the initial wars before Phraya Tak's ascension to the throne was characterized by King Taksin's attacks on communities and cities to obtain men, properties, weapons, and food supplies for his own men by starting to capture on small communities like Bangdong when he was equipped with only 500-1000 Chinese-

Thai soldiers. It was not until he subdued Chantaburi, a city of strength and abundance that he had gained land forces of over one thousand men, fleet forces of over 50 ships – equivalent to 5,000 men, sufficient money for building over 100 warships (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 25-26). All of these factors prepared King Taksin with all of the necessities required for leading his army to drive the Burmese out of Poh Sam Ton camp in order to show that he was worthy and rightful enough to establish himself as King of a new dynasty.

The incomes or benefits from wars before King Taksin's ascension to the throne could not then be called "government revenue" since the benefits were regarded as his own personal money and were used mainly for forces subsidies. However, the benefits to Thonburi kingdom were later acquired after the expansive wars into the provinces on the east coast which provided the state with the incomes from tributes and taxes collections as well as other trading benefits.

1.2) the wars for territorial expansion

After the ascension to the throne and the establishment of Thonburi city as the capital, King Taksin had to engage in several wars—almost throughout his reign, including wars in protection of the Kingdom and wars for territorial expansion. Under this topic, only the incomes or benefits from the wars of territorial expansion are discussed.

After the sack of Ayutthaya, the cities declared their independence which some of the leaders raised themselves to the princely rank. Therefore, King Taksin set out to crush his rivals so as to retain his sole rights to the throne. The important factions at that time comprised of 4 factions which were

- 1) Chao Phraya Pitsanulok group, covering the areas from Pitsanulok to Nakornsawan and Paknampoh
- 2) Chao Phra Fang group, covering the areas from Pitsanulok towards Nampad to Ping River

3) Nakhon Sri Thammarat acting Governor group, covering the areas from Chumporn, Patiew to Kaek

4) Krommuen Teppipit's Chao Phimai group, covering the areas from Nakorn Ratchasima to Prachinburi. According to the royal chronicle, the subjugations of these factions were recorded chronically as follows;

In 1768, King Taksin set out to attack Chao Phraya Pitsanulok faction, but got repulsed because the armies of Chao Phraya Pitsanulok positioning them at Koeichai District shot King Taksin at his shin, resulting in the retreat of Thai troops. On the very same year, King Taksin succeeded in quelling Krommuen Teppipit's Chao Phimai group and Krommuen Teppipit was eventually executed.

In 1769, Chao Phraya Pitsanulok passed away. Consequently, Chao Phra Fang attacked and captured on Pitsanulok together with its inhabitants and belongings to Sawankaburi. Pitsanulok people and some of Pichit people migrated to Thonburi. Then, King Taksin led his army to beat Nakhon Sri Thammarat acting Governor faction successfully.

In 1770, King Taksin conquered Chao Phra Fang faction at Pitsanulok and Sawankaburi.

It is believed that King Taksin had obtained a large number of assets, men, food supplies, and weapons from the suppressions. To illustrate, the number of soldiers of King Taksin increased dramatically after the attacks on those factions. For example, there were approximately 5,000 soldiers of King Taksin when they waged the war against the Burmese at Poh Sam Ton camp. Later, when King Taksin attacked Nakhon Sri Thammarat, the number of the forces of Chao Phraya Chakri (Kaek) was 5,000 men and the number of the forces of King Taksin was 10,000 men, while other units of the forces of Thonburi were also ordered to go to fight against Cambodia. This demonstrated well how many times the size of the army had expanded in such a very short time. Apart from that, King Taksin always ordered the administrations to be organized in every faction suppression together with the celebrations for people to have

fun and Buddhism support for people's morale. These events must have used a great deal of money. It is possible that Phraya Tak must have used quite a large amount of properties and resources obtained from the attacks.

Upon considering the history of the five factions which declared themselves independent after the fall of Ayudhaya, King Taksin was the only faction leader whose background was not relevant to the former ruling of the city. In contrast to the case of Krommuen Teppipit, although Krommuen Teppipit had no background from governing Phimai, his Ayudhaya royal blood line enabled him to gain support from Phimai governor. As for the other three faction leaders, they were all formerly the most influential persons in their local communities. On the contrary, King Taksin, a Siamese-Chinese Tak governor, became Thonburi community leader on the basis of his power accumulations from suppressing the provinces on the east coast and later got designated as the community head to conquer over other factions until he finally managed to build a new kingdom at Chao Phraya River.

The factors contributing to the superiority of Phraya Tak's community over other factions were partly from the economic element and its advantages in the trading. The geographical conditions enabled King Taksin to dominate the trade network in the east region which was the trade areas where Chinese merchants went back and forth doing their businesses. Furthermore, when King Taksin had successfully subdued Nakhon Sri Thammarat faction, he gained dominance over the trade network around the Gulf of Thailand where many junks passed by. These trades contributed to the strength of the Thai army because the Thai army was composed of not only its soldiers but also food supplies and weapons. In addition to the economic aspect, King Taksin also received the most support from both Chinese merchants and Chinese community (Dhiravat na Pombejra, 2004: 346). This is another factor leading to the success of King Taksin in suppressing other factions.

After quelling the factions, King Taksin started wars to expand his territories to other provinces while gathering properties, weapons, and labors of the provinces at the same time.

2) Taxes

It was assumed that the tax system was identical of Ayudhaya's which was classified into taxes, fees, royalty, and duties. The amount of the taxes was unpredictable because the economic and political conditions at that time still lacked smoothness and organization.

2.1) Taxes was the tax which the state collected from the people of all careers especially agricultural laborers.

Field tax Somdet Krom Phraya Damrongrajanuphab explained that the field tax during Thonburi period was not collected in the form of money like Ayudhaya, but in the form of rice grains due to the demand of food supplies. This practice was implemented until Rattanakosin period, in the Reign of King Rama III which the old system of money-based collection was reapplied (สมเด็จพระบรมโอรสาธิราชฯ สยามมกุฎราชกุมาร, 2515: 158).

On the contrary, Suwit Teerasasawat expounded that field tax in Thonburi period was collected in the form of money by calculating with the formula of 1 people per 1.6 rai of plantation areas. It was stated that in 2317, Thonburi kingdom cultivation areas covered 1,322,907 rai and was collected according to Ayudhaya rate which was 1 Salueng per rai, therefore, the government was able to collect field tax for 330,726 Baht per year (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2525: 122). Upon the analysis of the situation, Thonburi period was a time of wars, consequently, many growing areas were affected by wars and many labours were transformed into soldiers. Also, many plantation areas were deserted due to the migration downwards to Thonburi. Accordingly, it is likely that field tax was not collected as much as it was estimated. Suwit also mentioned about the field tax omission for up to 6,189 nobles who possessed 618,900 rais of lands—equivalent to field tax omission of 154,725 Baht. This contributed to less field tax collection.

Considering from the circumstances at the time that the demand for food supplies was high and most of the civilians were poor, it was likely that field tax was

collected in the form of rice grain rather than money. The change from collecting field tax by rice grain from by money like in Ayudhaya period was caused by the needs of rice for feeding the people and for army's food supplies.

Garden tax was the tax collected from gardening, calculated by the number of trees grown in the garden. In Ayudhaya period, there were 10 types of trees such as coconut, Plukang, Thonglang, mango, Plum mango, mangoesteen, Langsard, pepper, and orange (ยุวดี เฉลยทรัพย์, 2530: 219). It was assumed that Thonburi kingdom would charge the same rate. The gardening areas in Thonburi period were mostly the surrounding spaces around Thonburi kingdom such as Bangyirue Temple area as recorded in a part of the royal chronicle that once there was a tiger gorged up a Cambodian servant guarding a fruit garden behind Bangyirue Temple. Phraya Tak, then, ordered Phra Chao Lukterkromkhun Intarapitak, Chao Phraya Chakri, Phrayayomrat, and government servants to capture the tiger. Apart from that, the Burmese map depicting Thonburi landscapes showed us well a number of fruit gardens in the west side of Thonburi. This meant that the fruits were crucial agricultural produces in the time of hunger.

Bird Nest tax was the only tax containing more clear evidence than any other taxes. Wu yang, a Chinese wealthy man in Songkhla, was appointed as a Bird Nest tax collector by King Taksin. Wu yang delivered the tax collection to King Taksin every year at the rate of 50 Chang per year.

There were also other taxes collected by the state such as Samapat tax, water tax, market tax, casino tax, etc. However, there were not sufficient evidences indicating the amount of incomes collected from these taxes.

2.2) Royalty

Royalty is classified into ship royalty and commodity royalty (สมเด็จพระนารายณ์มหาราช, 2515: 147). Ship royalty was collected from the vessels carrying goods for sale, calculated according to the size of the ship—Length: 1 Baht per Wah, and the size of the steerage of a ship—Width: 6 Baht per 6 Sok (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสน์, 2525: 287). As for

commodity royalty, it was collected from non-consumption typed goods. Normally, it was collected from approximately 10% of the amount or the value of the merchandises.

However, it was possible that during early reign of King Taksin, the two types of royalties didn't produce much income to Thonburi kingdom because merchants were too afraid of the dangers from the wars with Burma to anchor their ships for sale in Thonburi. The State attempted to persuade foreign ships to anchor for sales but met with failures. King Taksin, therefore, had to force the ships at the mouth of the gulf to sail inwards to sell goods at Thonburi (ศุภวรรณ ขวรัตน์วงศ์, 2540: 91). Nevertheless, the incomes from the royalty was presumably increasing in the late reign of the King as trading became more prosperous.

2.3) Fees

Fee is fees collected from civilians by the state for the services rendered by the state such as court fee, nobleman appointment fee, etc.

2.4) Levi or Suai

Suai is stuffs sent to the State in place of periodical service of commoners because commoners might be unable to render the service due to the reasons that they lived too far or in the case that the State did not want much labor but preferred their delivery of things or money. However, in early Thonburi period, the state needed a great deal of labor. Therefore, it was likely that not many commoners delivered levies instead of providing their labor, at the same time that the Thonburi Kingdom was entangled with workforce control (tackled by issuing laws on commoners tattoos), resulting in little amount of duties collection. Until the late reign of King Taksin, the wars decreased and there was law enforcement on commoners tattoo for manpower control, therefore, the duties collection might have improved than earlier. Considering from the goods types in the categories of tributes and non-tributes sent to China during the late reign of the King, it was found out that there were various kinds of wild stuffs in considerable amount.

Presumably, they were partly from the duties collection, principally depending on the ability in controlling men of Thonburi kingdom.

Thread charge was a tax for Chinese inhabitants, collected once per three years. The tax was collected in a very small amount as a motive for Chinese people to migrate and settle down in Thonburi Kingdom because they were needed as labor there. Normally each Chinese immigrant must provide labor service to the kingdom for 1 month per three years but he could opt to pay small amount of money in place of the service also. If any Chinese had paid the money, they would have thread tied on their wrist sealed with Krang emblem (บุญรอด แก้วกัณหา, 2508: 169).

In 1774, it was recorded that Thonburi obtained the thread charge for only 6,495 Baht (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2525: 192). This was not because few Chinese migrated to work in Thonburi, but because Thonburi kingdom needed a large amount of labor, therefore, there were some omissions or reductions for Chinese in some categories or some jobs which the State was lacking as a motive for them to render their service to the kingdom. Accordingly, thread charge is not demanded by the State much more than labor.*

Pertaining to the overall taxes mentioned above, it could be concluded that they did not produce a large amount of incomes and they were not fully collected like in Ayudhaya period due to the war problems preventing the people from doing their

* The characteristic of thread was a rope yarn or red band affixed with Krang at the rope knot and government servant would seal it with Krang. After that the Chinese would get a receipt indicating descriptions regarding name, appearances, blemishes, and residence. For the thread tied on the left wrist, it could be removed after the official period of validation. *Later in Rattanakosin period, the income from the Chinese thread charge became important revenue because Thonburi declared open policy for Chinese, therefore, many Chinese migrated into the kingdom. In 1834, the kingdom obtained the income from thread charge up to 40,252 Baht.

jobs as usual. In addition, the unrests made it difficult for the kingdom to organize their administrations as well as to solve the hunger problem. These factors contributed to the less income from the taxes than those collected in other periods.

3) Tributes

Tributes information during Thonburi period was not much recorded in history. The importance of the tribute states or the states under the power of Thonburi kingdom was not only about the enhancement of the imperial power of King Taksin but also about the men forces for both commercial and supplies purposes. For instance, during the Asaewunkee war, King Taksin ordered the war-free provinces on the southern and east coast to supply him with rice due to the enduring war which consumed too much food supplies from the army, starting from Nakorn Sri Thammarat for 600 carts of rice, Pattalung, Chaiya, and Chantaburi for 400 carts each. If the tribute states did not have rice, they had to send money instead by calculating 5 Tamlueng for a cart of rice grain and 10 Tamlueng for a cart of rice (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 127).

All the cities summoned for rice supplies were all provincial towns, not dependencies. Even Nakorn Sri Thammarat itself was not raised to be a dependency.

Another interesting piece of information recorded in the royal chronicle (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 94) was

"Tani inhabitants pledged their allegiance to King Taksin by offering flowers, gold, and money, and Yakkatra city offered the king 10 guns."

For the part in the royal chronicle stating that Yakkatra city offered the king 10 guns, the Yakkatra city meant the Dutch East India Trade Company which did businesses with Thonburi Kingdom. As a matter of fact, Thonburi bought 1,000 guns from the Dutch East India Trade Company and the company asked Thonburi to pay in

the forms of Sappan wood and wax. It was possible that the 10 guns might be gifts sent before the same way as Thonburi sent them tusks as a gift. The royal chronicle, however, indicated Yakkatra city or Pattavia as a tribute state. Therefore, it meant that it was one of the traditional writing styles to praise a king in the royal chronicle.

Overall, it can be concluded that the incomes of Thonburi Kingdom depended on the situations in each phase. In early phase, Thonburi was not able to make a living from trades with foreign countries including both import and export like in Ayudhaya and Rattanakosin periods. Another factor was because the government system and the men control were not totally handled, resulting in not much fruitful incomes from agricultural plantation and tax collection. Consequently, the main incomes were from wars and treasure excavation from temples and Stupas in the early phase until later on that the commerce by private sectors created more incomes. In conclusion, the main revenues in Thonburi period consisted of incomes from wars, incomes from treasure excavation from temples and Stupas, and income from commercial trades.

4) Treasure excavation from temples and Stupas

The treasure excavation from temples and Stupas was another important incident occurred in the early Thonburi period, the time when King Taksin had to feed his people in Thonburi as well as he had to build the new city, including finding funds for fighting in wars. The effort in the reestablishment of the devastated kingdom meant a very high expense. After all, the incomes could not be made easily like in Ayudhaya period due to the difficulties in trade, agriculture, and taxes. Therefore, the fastest way to acquire money at that time while at the same time revive the economy by creating working capital was to excavate the treasure from temples and Stupas, including the properties buried by the citizens when they were escaping from the Burmese invaders. Some historians attributed the improved economic conditions of Thonburi kingdom in the early phase to the money via the excavation from temples and Stupas (ปรี.เจ. เดรวีล, 2543: 327).

A part in the French missionary notes by Monsieur Corre was recorded in a letter to Monsieur Mathon describing the aforementioned method of finding money as follows (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 85-86);

"Because the Siamese held some beliefs that they put lots of money and gold in parts of Buddha images like head, chest, and feet. Also, they put the money and gold in Stupas more than any other places..... In a single stupa, 5 jars of money and 3 jars of gold were found. Any attempts to break a Buddha image would not go in vain at all. Since Chinese people were diligent and loved money, Siam was still abundant like it used to be before the invasion of the Burmese. Gold was so prevalent that people grabbed a handful of them playfully. The trading price of gold was 8 carat. The Stupas were like furnaces for moulding Buddha images with pieces of amber and copper. The hallway was more black than a chimney. The capital city of Siam including temples, our homes, and Portuguese camp were more like a big field being messily dug up all around."

Nonetheless, the treasure excavation contributed to the improved economic conditions of Thonburi kingdom for the first two to three years only because the money received from digging treasure out in the first phase was gone from the economic system. The causes of such short-term economic revival were probably the

little values of those treasures in comparison with considerable needs of use for expenses in the first phase. Another cause was the economic recession in Thonburi kingdom as people were not able to make their living by normal means due to agricultural problems and relentless wars. Also, another factor was the State policy. Though the French priest recorded the events at that time that "Lots of people died because the money contained in the Stupas were all used up." (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 92), upon discretionary review, it was found out that the treasure excavations were still conducted in the late reign of King Taksin. This meant that those properties did not all vanish.

Upon comparing the time when the French missionary recorded which was 1st November 1769, it meant that the money and gold dug up by Chinese from temples and Stupas in the first phases was the important factor in economic circulation only for a short time in Thonburi period.

In the late Thonburi period, the phenomenon of treasure excavation from temples and Stupas happened once again. This time, the State acquired the income from charging the fees for digging up the properties buried in the grounds of Ayudhaya. In 1771, a nobleman called "Phra Vichitnarong" received monopoly for the treasure excavation which he had to pay the State 500 Chang in return. (นิติ เขียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 327) Although this amount of income was not much, it showed a source of incomes which might exist only in Thonburi period.

Regarding the treasure excavation from temples and Stupas in early reign of King Taksin, there was no clear evidence that the State hired the Chinese to do the digging up. However, the properties unearthed would belong to the State or the State granted concession to Chinese to excavate the treasures which Chinese had to pay the fees, like in the late reign of King Taksin.

Although the treasure excavation from temples and Stupas occurred obviously only in early reign of King Taksin and the bidding for the excavation rights happened in the late reign, actually the digging up was conducted throughout the reign but just not as much as in the early time. According to the descriptions by a Danish

traveler to Ayudhaya in 1772, he wrote about the treasure excavation in the big temples and palace remains. (เตรวีล, 2528: 60-64) This demonstrated that the incomes from temples and Stupas did not all disappear as the French missionary comprehended in his record, but they were the benefits utilized by the State from time to time—in the early reign, there were many needs, therefore, these type of assets were highly used. Later, the State received the incomes from other sources, consequently, the treasure excavations from temples and Stupas were less conducted.

5) Trade

Trade was the main revenue for Thonburi kingdom, especially international trade. The detail are to follow in the topic 5.2.3

5.2.1.2 Expense

Expenditures in Thonburi period were considerably high as King Taksin needed to use them to restore the kingdom as well as to solve the problems.

1) Expenses of waging wars

Thonburi period involved constant wars throughout King Taksin's reign. The fighting included self-defense wars and wars of territorial expansion, totaling 19 times, exclusive of a number of wars before his ascension to the throne. As a result, the war-related expenses rose the highest as each time of the wars included the high costs of many weapons, food supplies, the construction of the fortifications and camps, and the rewards for soldiers and aristocrats.

1.1) weapons

Weapons were the necessity for waging wars, probably the highest cost of all the expenses because the weapons and the materials in making the weapons were imported goods in the highest amount. The royal chronicle in Thonburi period recorded the purchase of flintlock for 3 times: 2200 flintlock in 1770, 6,000 flintlocks in 1776, and 10,000 flintlock in 1777 (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี

ฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 94), for the price of 12 Baht each, altogether amounting to 218,000 Baht .(สุวิทย์ วีระศาสนัตถ์, 2525: 210) In addition to the findings in the royal chronicle, in 1769, according to the records by the Dutch East India Trade Company, Okyapipattakosa of Thonburi kingdom ordered the purchase of 1,000 guns. (ธีรวัต ณ ป้อมเพชร, 2529: 38-39) The contact with the Dutch East India Trade Company for the purchase of guns continued throughout King Taksin's reign (See the details of weapon importation in import goods).

1.2) Food

Food supplies was a very high expense because each time of wars lasted everlastingly, resulting in labor shortages in agricultural sectors and food shortages in food supplies for war. For instance, during Asaewunkee war, King Taksin ordered the provinces to supply him with rice. If the tribute states did not have rice, they had to send money instead. King Taksin chose the provinces on the southern coast for rice provision because they were war-free at the time. In this Asaewunkee war, Chao Phraya Chakri and Chao Phraya Surasi had to abandon Pitsanulok due to food supplies shortages and soldier's exhaustion (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 146). Accordingly, buying rice for food supplies in such a high rice shortages situation cost the army the high price. On average, the State had to pay for food supplies during wartime for 360,000 – 840,000 Baht per year.

The rewards to soldiers and aristocrats were a necessary expense granted by King Taksin. Owing to the fact that Thonburi kingdom engaged in numerous wars, morale and encouragements had to be always boosted. In the royal chronicle, it was recorded that most rewards were given to army generals such as guns, horses, Khab cloth, San cloth, etc. For example, King Taksin granted his royal horse and royal gun as rewards to Chao Phraya Chakri, granted 2 guns to Chao Phraya Surasi and Chao Phraya Sawankalok (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 95). As for soldiers or noblemen in lower ranks, King Taksin would give money or rice for sustain. To illustrate, King Taksin gave rice grains to sons and wives of government

servants in defense and civil departments who accompanied him during the war at Nakorn Sri Thammarat (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 55). Also, King Taksin gave 325 Chang of money as rewards to masters and commoners who were the first to penetrate Putthaimat city.

Apart from conferring the rewards to nobles and soldiers, King Taksin also had to grant recompenses to governors or community leaders capitulating to him. For example, Naithongyu Noklek, Chonburi community leader, was designated as Phraya Anuratchaburisrimahasamut as well as was granted a silver sword, a 9 buttons Khem-Khab attire with big flower pattern in red background, gold belts decorated with gems. In addition to giving rewards to soldiers and aristocrats, King Taksin also needed to give some money to the civilians of the conquered cities. For instance, King Taksin granted 2 Chang of money to buy rice to give to the population in Chonburi free of charge. Also, he distributed some money to Chiangmai people and released some Chiangmai families from slavery, etc.

2) Expenses in purchasing food for free distribution to civilians

King Taksin used a great deal of his own personal money in purchasing food and clothes for free distribution to his people in order to boost morale and encouragements. The problem of hunger had been accumulating even before the sack of Ayudhaya. After the fall of Ayudhaya, people all dispersed escaping the Burmese. In order to gather all these people back, king Taksin needed something attractive enough to draw the scattered people back and settle down in Thonburi kingdom so that he got labors for work. One of the methods was giving clothes and food and many starved and destitute civilians came to receive his grants. The royal chronicle recorded that the number of those civilians reached over 10,000 people (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 30) when the price of rice soared up to 5 Baht per barrel while the price of rice was only 10 Baht per cart in Ayudhaya times. (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2525: 200) Apart from distributing rice to his people, he also had to boost the morale of his army by giving a barrel of rice

to every soldier. The problems of hunger and food shortages were seriously big problems in Thonburi period owing to the difficulties in farming. Contemporary evidence mentioned that the problem of starvation affected the people a lot. A French missionary stated about this hunger issue that "All civilians and subjects were affected seriously. Many people died each day due to the most abject conditions of food scarcity." (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 91)

The Chinese merchants travelling by said about the starvation and food expensiveness that villagers had to sustain their lives by digging up potato bulbs and taro bulbs as well as eating fish. (ธีรวัต ฒ ป้อมเพชร, 2531: 105) Turin (ตุนแปง, 2522: 206) recorded the incident that:

"The price of rice rocketed dramatically that it became a rare commodity in the market, making potato bulbs, taro bulbs, and asparagus important food in this starving time. Most people were plagued with strange diseases. More patients were easily prone to develop Alzheimer symptoms, be unable to speak sensibly, finally becomes a demented."

This problem of starvation needed to be tackled promptly because these starved people were the working labors for the revival of Thonburi kingdom which required tremendous loads of workforce. King Taksin's great concern over this problem was demonstrated well in the royal chronicle (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 31) in which he uttered that

"Anyone or anything whether it be a magical angel who can conjured up the

abundance of food and the happiness of the world creatures, even if he wishes one of my arm, I will cut it out for him honestly and truthfully."

In addition to the hunger problem, the problem of rice corruption for personal sale also occurred. For instance, in 1775, a servant of Luang Intaratep told King Taksin that Luang Intaratep asked for royal rice at Chang, Tak but he didn't distribute the rice to the army. He sold them to Phrayanont and sent the money from selling rice to his wife. King Taksin, then, ordered the whipping of 100 times, 10 times of rice fine, and the position removal until there was a war for him to compensate for his guilt. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 75)

That King Taksin solved the starvation problems by purchasing rice and food and distributing them to his people as well as to his soldiers for food supplies in wars like in 1770 was fundamentally caused by the conflict between King Taksin and Mac thien tu, the governor of Bantaymeas (Hatien) which hindered the importation of rice from Putthamat city. Also, Mac thien tu raided and destroyed Chantaburi and Trad completely, making the provinces on the east coast unable to do trades or import rice from other places. This obstacle pushed the rice price to soar high up to 3 Chang per cart (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 47). Consequently, King Taksin had to buy rice and give them to his people.

The cause of the starvation problem arose from the expansion of the civilians including by immigration and by taking the people from other conquered provinces. For example, obtained by sweeping people from the provinces on the northern coast after the Asaewunkee war, was barely in relation to the limited agricultural supplies. Moreover, there were numerous wars at that time. Therefore, King Taksin ordered the storage of rice in the royal barn so that it was enough to feed the army in wars. In 1776, King Taksin ordered aristocrats and workforces to do rice farming when

they were free from wars. In conclusion, the expenses in buying rice and food were the important expenditure in the early reign of King Taksin until in 1771 that the problem of starvation began to fade away when King Taksin successfully expanded his territories into Putthaimat city and Cambodia.

3) Expenses in the establishment of Thonburi kingdom

Although Thonburi city formerly had scattered population around the city, had been an important port city since Ayudhaya period, and had a considerable amount of buildings including 2 fortifications constructed in Somdet Phra Narai reign, these existing infrastructures were still considered insufficient for the increasing demands entailed in the establishment of Thonburi as a capital city. The new constructions were urgently needed to meet with the expansion of the city as well as to facilitate the migration of the people to settle down in Thonburi kingdom.

Regarding royal courts, King Taksin ordered the construction of the court and royal residences in the front and inside for his stay (ชัย เรืองศิลป์, 2534: 196-197), but no royal palace for ceremonial activities. The lack of royal palace for ceremonial activities leads to the question of whether or not King Taksin really uses Thonburi as the real and permanent kingdom. Presumably, the former city wall was used as the palace wall to surround the palace compounds because in 1771, King Taksin ordered all government servants from high ranks to low ranks in both defense and civil departments to build the wall with Tonglang woods, surrounding the city for both sides of the river from old wall corner upwards to Bangwanoi, Yai river bank, and downwards to old city wall corner where the palace was situated (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จฯ พระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 78). In the records, King taksin stated that he ordered the building of the wall because Thonburi did not have city wall. King Taksin also ordered men to dig canals to make town ditches from old city wall behind Wichaiyen fort to Huakod sacred Shrine and deposited the soil on the mounds on 3 sides by purchasing the bricks of old Prapradaeng city wall, Poh Sam Ton camp wall, and Sikuk wall to build the wall and forts. Furthermore, King Taksin built other additional official buildings on the west coast

of the river such as City hall, Royal Metropolitan Department, prisons, the Royal Goods and Weapons Treasury, Defense and Civil Court, Royal Police Department, Royal Letter department, Palace Department, Royal Court. All these were constructed in the palace court as in Ayudhaya period and they were assumed to have been built since Thonburi period for the restoration of laws and orders to normalcy, with the utilization of construction equipment purchased and the labor from royal commoners and captured slaves.

4) Expenses from religious purposes

King Taksin knew well that temples and religion was the spiritual center of the people. In order to retrieve his people' morale, he needed to restore the religion. Apart from that, the support of Buddhism, monks, nuns, and priests was principally the duty of a king. Considering from a different point of view, King Taksin needed to support Buddhism so as to legitimize his claim to be the rightful King. His effort in reviving the religion and his portrayal as a benevolent monarch was in line with the Buddhist concept. Due to the fact that King Taksin's ascension to the throne was not from the divine right of kings, he needed to portray himself as a king of merits who came to save people from all plights and revive the religion. (Gesick, 1983: 87-105)

King Taksin sacrificed his numerous assets in restoring the religion. To illustrate, lots of monks died in the wars and many left the monkhood during the fall of Ayudhaya, therefore, king Taksin ordered the construction of temples and over 200 monk's house (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 33). In 1769, King Taksin "hired loads of transcribers to complete Buddhist Scriptures at his own large expense." (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 45) Furthermore, whenever he waged the war against a city, he would grant his own money for the purposes of religious restoration in the city such as in Nakorn Sri Thammarat, Sawangkaburi, even Phra Yuan at Putthaimat city.

"King Taksin invited Yuan monks from every temple in Putthaimat to go to his palace and he granted them silk robes each. For any monk who had not received the silk robe, he would be granted 5 Tamleung of money each. Also, the monks were all offered foods abundantly."

King Taksin not only supported temples and monks in provinces, but also encouraged the monks to migrate to Thonburi. It was assumed that many monks went to stay in temples in Thonburi as evidenced in the daily army letters in Thonburi period mentioning that King Taksin offered food and boats for monks who were willing to migrate to Thonburi city (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 222). Another evidence in the records was when King Taksin returned to Thonburi after war with Burma, he ordered his men to withdraw rice in the royal barn to make offerings to the monks that he gathered from attacking the northern provinces ((พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 164-165). He also continued to make offerings of rice and monks' necessities to the monks throughout his reign. Moreover, King Taksin used a large amount of money to promote and maintain the religion as well as renovate the temples. Many Ayudhya temples were rehabilitated and replenished by the King. The French missionary mentioned about King Taksin's effort to go to renovate Phra Putthabat 3 times, but encounter some incidents preventing him from going every time (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 101).

In addition, King Taksin granted lands, ships, and some money to French missionaries to build homes and churches for the promulgation of Christianity. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 89)

Unprecedentedly, King Taksin visited French missionaries and ordered the remake of the small houses of the missionaries to be larger. Also, he ordered the building of the church wall to be continued until its completion. The support of King Taksin to French missionaries could be viewed as one of a king's religious duties like those of the kings in Ayudhaya times. From a different perspective, it was possible that King Taksin was trying to open his market with France once again as stated in the French missionaries' records mentioning about an incident in which Monsieur Lorre, governor of Pon De Shere, gave gifts to King Taksin. When King Taksin asked how much he should pay for the things, the missionary said that (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 109):

"Monsieur Lorre sent you the gifts without requesting any money. He just merely wanted you to be kind to the priests, missionaries, and Thai civilians turning into Christians in Thonburi kingdom. Also, he would like your kindness to French ships sailing for trades in Siam." In response to the reply, King Taksin said that "Then, I shall order 5 elephants to be shipped to Pon De Shere as gifts for Monsieur Lorre."

From the aforementioned, it is assumed that King Taksin might have seen the commercial benefits from supporting these missionaries as well as his actions as duties in maintaining religions in his kingdom.

5.2.1.4 Money

1) Characteristics Of Money

Thonburi period lasted only for over 14 years while experienced with many difficulties like war problems throughout the reign. Also, Thonburi period was the time after the fall of Ayudhaya and after Thonburi period, the records of the period were mostly destroyed, scattered, and lost due to the change of new dynasty. According to the preceding facts, many assumptions were raised about the truth regarding money in Thonburi period. There were many opinions in various aspects from the process of production—whether there was a production of Bullet Money (Ngern Podduang) for use. Reginald Le May opinioned that there was no new production of the bullet money in Thonburi period. King Taksin still used the old bullet money of Ayudhaya period.

In the late 1767 to early 1768, Chinese merchants from Palembang travelling for trades in Thonburi kingdom said that there was no money form used in buying things. The buying-selling was conducted on the exchange of gold and silver stuffs. (ธีรวัด ณ ป้อมเพชร, 2531: 111) At that time, King Taksin was too busy engaging in the suppression of factions so it was unlikely that he would have the time to organize the domestic systems like the production of money. Probably some bullet coins from Ayudhaya period and some gold from the treasure excavation at temples and Stupas were also used for the exchange of goods (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 93). Regarding the treasure excavation, King Taksin ordered Chinese to dig properties of Ayudhaya period. Another form of money used might be foreign money or money of other provinces because it was the time of trading with lots of different various towns, including importation and exportation as well as the wars with other towns in which victories brought a number of people and properties back to Thonburi kingdom. Therefore, money from other towns by trade and by war was imported into the money system of Thonburi period. The Notes of Krom LuangNarintaratevi recorded that there was an incident in Thonburi period which 2,000 coins were lost from Royal Goods Treasury. Each coin weighed 1 Baht 3 Saleung 1 Feung. The exact recording was that "2,000 coins were lost from Royal Goods Treasury. Each coin weighed 1 Baht 3 Saleung 1 Feung. 10 rolls of Yellow silk cloth were also lost.

They were all not retrievable despite the king's command." The lost money was assumed to be Spain money because each coin weighed 1 Baht 3 Saleung 1 Feung, corresponding with Spain money in the reign of Carlos III, King of Spain who ruled the country at the same time as King Taksin.(กรมธนารักษ์, 2545: 48) Also, the Spanish currency was used expansively in Asia during the 17th -18th century. The word "Rien" (coin) in Thai originated from the word "Real" of Spain. (บุญเกิด งอกคำ, 2526: 40)

Despite using Ayudhaya bullet money and the money of other kingdoms or towns, it was unlikely to suffice the economic needs for an economically developing kingdom like Thonburi which entailed lots of expenditures. Accordingly, it was not feasible that there was no production of the bullet money since the number of bullet money from Ayudhaya was not enough for use in numerous expenses of the kingdom at such conditions. Although King Taksin sometimes did not pay in the form of money, he bartered for goods instead. For example, he exchanged his guns for tin at the rate of 1 unit of tin per 6 guns. Also, King Taksin bartered sappan wood for guns from the Dutch East India Trade Company (ธีรวัต ณ ป้อมเพชร, 2529: 38-39). However, the money was also necessary for the expenses in the trading business especially for internal commerce which was a fundamental one.

The bullet coins used in Thonburi period comprised of 6 different sizes: 1 Baht, half a Baht, Saleung, Feung, 2 Pai, and Pai. The Ayudhaya monetary system was still implemented which included bullet coins and cowrie shells.

The characteristics of money used in Thonburi period were that the texture of the coins was made of silver. Regarding the seal, the first seal was the kingdom seal used with the symbol of Chakra (Discus)as in Ayudhaya times but the Chakra was modified to be a more godlike weapon. The second seal was still controversial by the following two assumptions:

The first opinion: A. Marques Pereira, Joseph Hass, Luang Baribalburipan, Somdet Krom Phrayadamrongrajanuphab opined that the privy seal was a Tri-seal. The second opinion: Kor.Sor.Ror. Kulab opined that the privy seal was a Tawiwut seal (2-legged fork seal) and the kingdom seal was a Chakra(Discus).

From the aforementioned assumptions, Reginald Le May concluded that there was no production of bullet coins for use in King Taksin's reign because the Tawiwut seal (2-legged fork seal) could not be found, therefore, it did not exist. Also, when Ministry of Royal Treasury gave a seal maker machine to a museum, the Tri-seal was not found. Lastly, the Tri-seal coin had hammered impression like those of Ayudhaya period.

Although Thonburi period lasted only for a short time, it was not possible that there was really no production of currency because Thonburi kingdom used large expenditures due to the expansions of the city, population, and trades. In addition, in 1774, there was a case of bullet coins forgery. The forgery must have been made out of the model of the new currency; therefore, it was plausible that there was a production of a new currency for use in Thonburi period which demonstrated the booming economy at that time.

2) Cases regarding the currency

In Thonburi period during 1774, there was a crime related to the money forgery of the bullet coin seal at Banrahaeng while King Taksin was staying at Suan Mamuang royal residence. When he found out, he ordered the execution of the guilty men. Later, in the reign of King Rama I, King Rama I issued a law for punishing anyone forging the bullet coin seal by whipping, cutting off fingers, and tattooing on the face. The forgery of bullet money seal in Thonburi period meant the expansion of the economy which created the production of the privy currency of the reign to meet the demands. As explained, the punishment of the bullet coin forger in 1774 contradicted with Le May's opinion that there was no production of the privy bullet coin of the reign in Thonburi period.

5.2.2 Manpower

Manpower was a fundamental of the economy. The number of population in each city indicated the stability and production power of the city because manpower served as a labor force of the state and aristocrats, a producer, a merchant in the exchanging level, a tax payer to state, and a soldier in wars. It could be said that the population was the indicator of the survival and the development of a kingdom. Consequently, the ruler needed to gather and control this manpower as much as possible. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 408)

5.2.2.1 The gathering of local into Thonburi kingdom

At the beginning of the establishment of Thonburi kingdom, lots of people dispersed and scattered with no place to live. The city was totally in riot: some people were taken captives by Burmese, some escaped into the forests, some set themselves up as an independent community, and loads of them were killed due to war and starvation. The survivors were all in desperate and helpless situation. King Taksin had to try his utmost to gather all the dispersed people to return to settle down in Thonburi kingdom, including the suppression and subjugation of the factions establishing themselves as independencies after the fall of Ayudhaya by applying numerous modes of motives which can be classified into 2 periods:

1) The increase of labors in the early Thonburi period

- The gathering of the civilians from Ayudhaya

After King Taksin chose Thonburi as his residence in place of the devastated Ayudhaya, he ordered the gathering of the civilians from Ayudhaya into Thonburi Kingdom for settlement.

- Persuading the nobles and the royalties at Lopburi

Before the sack of Ayudhaya, some of the royalties together with the nobles escaped the perils of war to Lopburi. When King Taksin chose to reside at

Thonburi, he sent a representative to persuade those royalties and nobles to return to Ayudhaya. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 29).

It was possible that there must have been some commoners with these royalties and nobles. Therefore, their return to Thonburi would both provide the manpower for the king and gave the king the rightful claim on his ascension to the throne as well as gave the king the revival of the royal traditions and customs typical of the Ayudhaya period.

- Persuading the faction leaders who established themselves as princely rulers to capitulate to him.

Both during the time before the fall of Ayudhaya and the time when Phraya Tak gathered his power to be the king, many provinces had already separated themselves as factions. Nidhi laosriwong (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 39) mentioned about the governing of Ayudhaya before the sack of Ayudhaya that

"There had been a prevalent phenomenon of gatherings as factions even before the fall of Ayudhaya. If most of these communities had been formed before the sack of Ayudhaya, they would have cut themselves off Ayudhaya government since they were convinced that no one could protect nor punish them anymore and that they had necessity for piracy as well."

These factions established themselves as independencies. They had their own forces but not big enough to be called 'an army'. As the governing in Thonburi was carried out loosely—that is to say—some faction leaders might be subjugated to Thonburi only by the name while they still had full power in their own territory and the government did not have much power to interfere them (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับ

สมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 37). Consequently, the politics and administration of the kingdom was still characterized by the communities and factions features. After King Taksin's ascension to the throne, many factions came to pledge their allegiance to him. King Taksin granted them the positions of nobility, gold, money, and apparels to the faction leaders as recorded in the royal chronicle.

After King Taksin ascension to the throne, he organized the internal laws and orders by appointing the nobles filled in the positions as in Ayudhaya period. He designated "provincial governors to supervise the adjacent provinces within his territorial power and to persuade the dispersed factions of the civilians to return to their hometown as before." King Taksin sent those nobles to govern and organize the administration of the provinces for the purpose of manpower control and the objective of retrieving the scattered commoners to be subjugated to Thonburi kingdom.

- The distribution of food and clothes as well as the establishment of food hall

The starvation problem from the time of Ayudhaya's pre-fall period to the time of the initial establishment of Thonburi kingdom was the major obstacle for King Taksin. To help his people, he distributed food and clothes to the starved citizens as well as set up a food hall for them. This method attracted over a ten thousand of people to queue up for his grants. However, the number of over a ten thousand of people who came for the grants, as recorded in the royal chronicle was not totally the new groups of people migrating to Thonburi. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัฬหภูมิกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 30)

Some of them might be the same groups who had already been in the subjugation of King Taksin.

2)The increase of labors from wars

There were totally 19 wars occurred in Thonburi period. The labors obtained from the wars varied according to the 4 following characteristics:

- Leaving the civilians at their hometowns

King Taksin left the civilians at their hometowns by appointing the trusted nobles to govern the captured cities for manpower control. For instance, after the conquer over Chao Phra Fang faction, King Taksin organized the administration of Pitsanulok by surveying the men forces of the northern provinces which totaled 42,000 people—a lot more than all the men in Thonburi kingdom. Initially, King Taksin did not bring all these labors into Thonburi city, but let them stay where they were (in the northern parts). The reason might be because King Taksin wanted to collect the duties from them since the provinces on the northern coast possessed an abundance of wild stuffs commodities. Also, King Taksin let them stay at their hometown for the purpose of their self-defense and the benefits of commoners summoning for Thonburi in time of wars. Another important factor was that Thonburi kingdom was still unable to produce enough food for feeding a large number of people if they had been brought down to Thonburi.

- The herding of people from the provinces into Thonburi kingdom

The herding of people from the provinces into Thonburi kingdom was a final preventive measure to protect Thonburi city from the wars when the provinces could no longer hold the enemies. For example, in Asaewunkee war, the densely-populated provinces on the northern part was unable to withstand the Burmese troops, therefore, King Taksin had to herd the people down to Thonburi for workforces to protect Thonburi as well as for preventive measure against the Burmese capturing those inhabitants to be their captives.

Unlike the preventive policy against Burma of King Naresuan, King Taksin did not collect the people from all these northern provinces in this Asaewunkee war, but "if any governor could control his province so that it could serve as a base for persuading the dispersed people to return to their hometown", King Taksin would order the governor to station back at the town such as Pichai town and Pitsanulok town. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 407-408) It could be said that the Asaewunkee war had great impacts

on the economy of Thonburi, causing both the labor forces in the capital to increase dramatically and the export goods.

- The herding of the captured captives

The herding of the war captives was done on the purpose of the utilization as labor force in Thonburi as well as the protection against the town uprising or the herding of people by the attack of other towns. To illustrate, King Taksin ordered the herding of war captives from the attack at Cambodian Maksa canal (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 84). Later, King Taksin considered that Puthaimat was hard to guard because it needed lots of manpower to withstand the enemies. Accordingly, he ordered the withdrawal of Thai army "The king commanded that Puthaimat was too vulnerable to hold—That would cost too many soldiers' exhaustion. King Taksin ordered Phraya RajaSetti to leave Puthaimat behind and to retreat to his service at Thonburi. Subsequently, Phraya RajaSetti withdrew from the war and collected all the people down to Thonburi as decreed by the king (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 407-408). In spite of this, the biggest herding of the war captives was when Srisattanakannahut city was attacked by Thai people in which numerous amounts of treasures and captives were collected. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 150) The French missionaries witnessing the incident at that time in Thonburi mentioned about the herding of the Laotian captives that more than 30,000 captives were collected, but the harshness of travelling caused almost half of them to die on the way to Thonburi. As a result, only 10,000 – 15,000 survivors were used as labor forces for Thonburi.

- Pledging allegiance to His Majesty the king.

Pledging allegiance was different from the capitulation of faction leaders because it was a direct request for depending on the protection by Thonburi kingdom. The first group who pledged their allegiance was Mon family with Phraya Jeng as head. They escaped from Burma and declared their loyalty to King Taksin, together with their

forces of approximately 3,000 men to help beat Burma (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 108). Another group was Laotian family, by the leader named Phra Wor, fleeing from the Burmese and Laotian troops to pledge their allegiance to King Taksin in 1778. Phra Wor sent Tao Pia, his representative to bear a letter and tributes to Phraya Nakornratchasima. Phraya Nakornratchasima, then, forwarded them to Thonburi. Upon receiving, King Taksin gave gifts to Phra Wor and allowed his group to settle down at Tambol Donmoddaeng (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 181). Although Phra Wor group lived too far for summoning the labors for use in Thonburi like Phraya Jeng group, theoretically, this group was under the power of King Taksin and in the areas where duties could be collected from them.

5.2.2.2 Labor forces in Thonburi period

1) Prai and Slave

The Prai system in Thonburi was revived in King Taksin's early reign from the influence of Ayudhaya's, to serve as a tool for the king to control the manpower for administering his kingdom.

Clorich Wales explained that the official organizations in charge of the Prai controlling system consisted of 2 sections: The central section and the regional section. The central section included Defense Department, Interior Department, Port Department, and Phra Suratsawadi Department (responsible for making records of Prai forces). The regional section included governors, Political Recruiting Department, platoons, and commanders in charge of controlling and recruiting Prai forces. (Welsh, 1984: 84-95)

- Prai laung

Prai laung worked for the king since he was registered until he reached the age of 70 years. The period of service (the corvee) was six months a year as in Ayudhaya times due to the high demand of labor work during the building of Thonburi city (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์, 2531: 25). Prai luang had to do services every other month so that Prai could have time for their own plantation. Despite of this, Thonburi period was a time of continuous wars, Prai luang were recruited for serving in wars, sometimes for almost a year like Asaewunkee war. This caused Prai luang unable to do their own agricultural work which affected Thonburi's economy very much. Prai luang in Thonburi period works the hardest owing to the demands for the construction of the city and the demand for soldiers in wars (วุฒิชัย มูลศิลป์, 2546: 13). If Prai luang were free from war, they had to become agricultural labor forces and they also had to pay taxes to the government

-Prai Som

Prai Som was registered with "Nai" (master) division. Normally, Prai som worked for his master for approximately five and a half months, and worked for the king 1 month per year. In Thonburi period, Prai som had to work for six months a year like Prai luang. The registration terms was the same as that of Prai luang. Usually, Prai som didn't have to work as hard as Prai luang because he was fed by his master while Prai luang had to bring food and working equipments on his own. However, the lives of Prai luang and Prai som were not much different since they were in the time of relentless wars. Therefore, Prai som needed to accompany their masters to wars like Prai luang. Apart from that, in time of no wars, nobles and Prais were recruited for construction work like city wall building in 1771 (พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรี ฉบับสมเด็จพระบรมราชาที่ 4, 2479: 78), and for farming in 1767 and 1776 to tackle the famine problem resulting from the expansion of the population in Thonburi kingdom (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพลสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 38,110)

In Thonburi period, Prai som outnumbered Prai luang because King Taksin gave more Prai som to his trusted nobles. Therefore, when there was recruitment

for wars or construction work, Prai soms were called for use mainly while Prai luang were only on duty for corvee as usual. (นิธิ เขียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 343)

-Prai suay

Prai suay was not subjected to king's affairs nor work for masters due to various reasons such as living too far and inconvenient for doing the services. However, they needed to send products or money in quite a high amount instead. Prai suay usually sent agricultural products or wild stuffs to the government because the state wanted wild stuffs so much that sometimes Prai luang were recruited to find wild stuffs or wood products such as in the late Ayudhaya period. Many assumptions regarding Prai suay in Thonburi period stated that there were not many Prai suays in Thonburi kingdom due to the demands of labor force (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสนวัต, 2531: 27). Upon analyzing from the facts that Thonburi had a problem of manpower controlling, therefore, it was highly possible that there were lots of Prai living far away, and that the number of wild stuffs as export products in the tribute lists was high (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิษ, 2523: 59), it could be said that the number of Prai suay was not little because parts of these wild stuffs were probably from Prai suays. From these analyses, it was feasible that there was not much Prai suay in the early Thonburi period, but Prai suay increased in the late Thonburi period due to improved commerce, fewer wars, and increased labor forces. These factors made the government want suays for exporting more goods because Prai suays often sent wild stuffs in place of their service. Nonetheless, the amount of suays received depended on the power and control ability of the government over each province.

All in all, Prais in Thonburi period had a hard time; they were not merely "prosperous free-man" according to the theory of Saichol Wannarat because they were in the time of capital reestablishment. Therefore, the demand for labor forces was high; the Prais were compelled to work harder than the prais of other times. Moreover, Prais were recruited for wars while they were unable to grow their own crops. This reduced the roles of agricultural production of the Prais in Thonburi—different from those of

Ayudhaya times when the Ayuhya Prais could produce lots of food enough to feed the whole kingdom and to export for sales. It was estimated that Prai suays sent a considerable amount of wild stuffs to the government.

-Thaat (Slave)

In Thonburi period, there was not much evidence regarding slaves. It was assumed that the majority of the slaves were war captives obtained from the herding of them after the wars in order to cut the manpower of the conquered city and to prevent the city uprising. Due to the high demand for labor force in Thonburi period, these captured slaves were definitely recruited as labors to the government, mostly for hard work. Sometimes, King Taksin gave these war slaves to nobles—each noble got 4-6 families of slaves—or gave these slaves to the service of the temples. Regarding the selling of Prai as slave, Wuttichai Moonsilp (2546:11) assumed that the practice of allowing Prai luang to sell themselves into slaves like in Somdet Phra Chao Tai Sra was cancelled because Thonburi kingdom needed high amount of labor forces and because it was the preventive measure against phrai luang slipping out of the corvee by becoming a slave. Other types of slaves were presumed to exist a little because people got dispersed when Ayudhaya was destroyed.

2) Chinese labor

Chinese people were important labor forces to the economy since Ayudhaya period. Up until Thonburi period, Chinese became clearly manpower existing in the mechanism of the revival of the kingdom and economy. John Crawford (1915: 103) expounded about the migration of the Chinese in Thonburi period that

“That King taksin specially supported the Chinese people meant his persuasion for lots of Chinese to settle down in Siam. Such special

allowance for Chinese people which induced the materialistic changes had been occurring in the kingdom for centuries, but this time it almost marked the greatest change."

There were numerous assumptions pertaining to the migration and settlement of the Chinese in Thonburi period. One reason was likely due to an internal incident in China. A number of Chinese people migrated to Thonburi owing to the famine in their country; they had to move out to find a place to make a living. Some Chinese wanted to escape from the government of Manchu dynasty. Another cause was an incident in Philippines in 1775: Many Chinese people who refused to convert to the religion were deported by Spanish. Another important factor attracting the Chinese to migrate to Thonburi was the fact that King Taksin was half Siamese-Chinese. This drew in Taechew Chinese to settle down in Thonburi. William G. Skinner(2529: 19) concluded that

"It was normal that King Taksin specially supported the Taechew Chinese who spoke the same language as himself. Moreover, Taechew Chinese called themselves royal Chinese. Undoubtedly, the policy had attracted lots of Taechew Chinese into Bangkok where they are now dominant at present."

During the reign of King Taksin, a large number of Chinese people migrated into Thonburi and other provinces. Upon consideration, these new Chinese immigrants together with the existing Chinese both in Ayudhaya and provinces such as provinces on the east coast and Songkhla, it was believed that these Chinese must have been important labor forces in the development of Thonburi kingdom as seen from the

fact that many roles in important work were given to Chinese merchants or commerce-related jobs were associated with Chinese people.

Preliminary documents of Thonburi usually mention King Taksin's soldier that Thai-Chinese soldier identified that Army must have a lot of Chinese soldier and several high class lords in Thonburi were Chinese therefore the number of Chinese in army who were up to Chinese lord was increased. Not only going to war, some Chinese were hired to be soldiers. These soldiers were soldier of fortune and got wage for army because Chinese were not in proletarian system but were state's employee. Chinese will receive wage as well without working for state but they had to pay tax 1 times per 3 year. Chinese can work not only in army but also any jobs in Thonburi. Recorded important jobs of Chinese labor were gold digger and money digger at temples and chedi.

Memo of French priest, letter of Monsieur Corre and the fiscal of Malacca described earning income of Thonburi by Chinese labor from gold and treasure digging. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 93)

"In the past year and this year, Chinese and Thai did nothing but destroyed Buddha and Chedi. Chinese made cash flow and recovery of Siam rapidly because of diligence of Chinese..... Therefore Trade at present is because Chinese dug gold and money that were buried under ground and contained in Chedi."

Besides gold digging, these Chinese labors were employed for other jobs according to their capacities and skill. Most works were construction. Chinese craftsmen were employed to construct Thonburi city with Chinese skill. (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 171). Chinese labors were dominant for main labor replacement because most of

proletariats were conscripted. War through reign, Chinese labor had opportunity to work for several duties in development of Thonburi expansion.

Sometimes, Chinese labor can upgrade from state's employee to be lord during lacking of expert official for example Chinese who had knowledge and skill in trading and sailing, worked for harbour department may have an opportunity to be an official as a lord. (อติศร หมวกพิมาย, 2535: 37-38)

Work characteristics of Chinese labor in position of state's employee were different from proletariat labor obviously because of no obligation for monthly attendance. Proletariat had no wage and must attend monthly. Chinese labor had wage, skill made them get more works. Not only Chinese did not adhere with proletariat system but also they got freedom to travel all over the kingdom without permission including freedom in religious respect. Life of proletariat and Chinese is highly different. However, the most important factor is unattached with proletariat system resulting in participation of Chinese labor in development of Thonburi as well as trade networking of Southeast Asia.

5.2.2.3 The enactment of laws for the control of Prai system

The problem of manpower controlling in Thonburi was a major obstacle for King Taksin to find ways to tackle throughout his reign as well as the problem of starvation. Nithi langsiwong concluded that the political nature in Thonburi was obviously different from those of other periods: Despite the fact that they were subjugated to King Taksin, many factions still had their own power. They could supervise their Prais while the government was unable to interfere the affairs. Nevertheless, King Taksin had tried his best to organize laws and orders and to control the work forces who were both the power and the economic bases by establishing the new unique "Prai system".

Prai system in Thonburi period was assumed to be revived from that of Ayudhaya period. The system was implemented since the early reign so as to control the manpower and the administrative system. The system was made stricter to gain efficiency in controlling the work forces. In 1773, King Taksin ordered the phrai to make a tattoo on the wrist naming the city and the agency. (วชิรชัย มุลศิลป์, 2546: 13)

The Prai tattooing was enacted as a law in the following year. The tattoo must show the name of the city and the nai (master) on the Prai's wrist. This was different from that of Ayudhaya when the tattoo was made into symbols at the neck, leg, face, and shin. Consequently, since 1773, the tracking of Prais was more convenient because the name of the city and the nai was already indicated there at the Prai's wrist. Under the same section, it stipulated the punishments for the royal tattoo forger up to the fatal level.

The Prai tattooing law was made effected throughout the kingdom, including Thonburi and other provinces. In Pattalung royal chronicle, it was recorded that in 1773 (The year of Snake), King Taksin ordered government servants to be a tattoo commanders at Pattalung. (ชัยวุฒิ พิชะกุล, 2528: 46) This time, the tattooing was done on the front of the hand. The enactment of law on the tattooing indicating the name of the city and the nai had been a fundamental practice ever since until Rattanakosin period. Anchalee Susayan (2545: 35) said about the enactment of the law that

"The new tattooing method must have solved the old problem of Ayudhaya in which governors and departmental officers who were responsible for the tattooing ceremony involving the use of the seal or tattoo iron from the capital might conspire the corruption together. However, in 1773 tattooing mode got rid of the problem so that the work force could be recruited correctly for

the restoration of the kingdom as well as for the preparation of wars."

The enactment of laws on the tattooing of Prai reflected the problem of manpower controlling system in Thonburi period. At that time, Prai som outnumbered Prai luang. King Taksin ordered his trusted nobles to control a large number of manpower in Thonburi and provinces regardless of ranks in official system: The official system was less important than the personal relationship and the trust between the king and the nobles. Nidhi laosriwong (นดิธิ เลี้ยวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 327) commented that

"The central government of King Taksin was unable to establish the Prai forces directly in provinces. It had to let the majority of Prai which was Prai som in the hand of the king's trusted nobles only."

This method required great deal of nobles' loyalty to the king because the nobles controlled a large number of manpower. Nidhi laosriwong concluded that this method served as a guarantee of the security for the king rather than letting Prai be in the sole hands of the high-ranking aristocrats. If the nobles were trustable, this method would prove very beneficial because King Taksin would know the number of work forces in the hands of each noble so that when he needed the labors, he could get the supplies of the nobles and prais such as the recruitment of nobles for working on the farms in 1768 and 1776 (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสยามกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 38.110). However, the rebellions and the problems in the late reign of King Taksin demonstrated that this method would not work due to the disloyalty of the nobles and the over-empowerment by giving a noble too much work forces.

Pertaining to the economic and social aspects of Thonburi period, the assumptions were that during the time of kingdom's reestablishment, the people were in abject poverty and in stark famine. The buying-selling at the lower level was little. King Taksin used the assets obtained from the wars before his ascension to the throne and the gold dug from temples and Stupas as medium for expenses and currency circulation. The goods exchange on the government level was conducted through the use of gold and precious things gained from wars and the excavation of old temples and Stupas. On the public level, it was assumed that Ayudhaya bullet coins and commodities bartering were used initially. After the commercial development and the territorial expansion, the seal of bullet coins and Thonburi's own bullet money were produced to meet the increasingly economic demand. In addition, foreign currencies were also used for the exchange of goods. Therefore, regarding the 1774 bullet money forgery, it was assumed that the bullet coins forged must have been new bullet coins produced.

Manpower was a crucial factor driving the kingdom ahead especially the kingdom restored from the fall of the old one. The duties of the labor forces in Thonburi period were divided clearly. While Prai labors in the system performed the duties of serving in wars and producing agricultural products in time of peace, the role of Chinese labors were more starkly outstanding. Chinese work forces worked as the government's specialist employees, including as hired soldiers and contributors to the development of the kingdom especially in commercial trades. Therefore, they could be promoted in the official system while the work forces in Prai system did not have the same opportunities and did not even get paid like Chinese labors.

5.2.3 Thonburi and the commercial expansion

The trade with China created satisfies benefit and was the the most important to the state since late Ayudhaya period and also for Thonburi. Usually the trading brig would depend on the weather because the brig need the wind to change the direction every 6 months for the route, so it would take off from Thailand to China in June to July

and came back in January to February, the same with going to other islands that had to take off in January to February.(Breazeale, 1999:2)

Kennon Breazeale separated the trading between Thai and China into 3 categories which are in tribute system, the trade that sell in another city and private business. Usually the trading brig in tribute system would take the product to sell in กวางตุ้ง while others will sell somewhere else because they couldn't afford the price that avoid the tax so they had to traded at Mueng Sao Tuo, Mueng Amoy and Ning bo instead. (Breazeale, 1999: 2)

Since Ayudhaya period, the trade with China had in both tribute system and private trading. But because of the different in tax and the price, the trade in tribute way would get better benefit. So King Taksin tried to open more of this kind of trade.

5.2.3.1 Tributary System trade

The relationship in tribute system or trading in China was the system that has long relationship with other countries for long times. It wasn't the equal position but China was beyond in the way of tributary state (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 3). This kind of relationship was the only on kind that China had to other countries. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 5)

Suebsang Phromboon (2525: 6) explains the relationship of tributary system in China that is based on mutual benefit exchange in a formal procedure. Tributes and souvenirs have to be gorgeous to express humbleness and allegiance. For reciprocation, the King of China will bestow a present, charter, Chinese calendar and other gifts to foreign Kings. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 6) China emphasizes the tributary ceremony by having the Department of Ceremonies that is directly in charge. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 7) The Bureau of Trading Junks is responsible for taking care of embassies and investigating letters of credence of all foreign embassies as well as facilitating for food and accommodation provision such as governmental residences. Thereafter the Mandarin will have to report to the capital city in order to ask for

permission to travel to Beijing on behalf of a foreign embassy. If the king allows the embassy to go to capital city, the War Department will receive a royal command to issue a passport as necessary. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 55) When the embassy arrives in Beijing, they have to present the letter of credence to the Department of Ceremonies for investigation and check-in. However, the embassy has to ask permission before they leave the residence. After the King has a royal command for the embassy to have an audience with royalty, the Department of Ceremonies will recommend appropriate manners in the royal palace to the embassy that takes a total of 3 days thereafter they can have an audience with royalty at Feng Tien Throne Hall where the embassy will present royal letters and tributes. According to discipline, tributes have to be produced in locality (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 56). After the tribute dedication, the embassy will receive royal permission to trade with commercial privilege including reward for the King of each country. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 8)

"China emphasizes these tributes regarded as a symbol of humbleness rather than economic benefits. Comparing between value of tributes from several countries and the reward from the King of China it is discovered that the reward from the King of China has a higher value.

While China appreciates the value of the tribute as a symbol of humbleness, countries that grant tributes are pleased for the trade that is hidden by the tributary system because those countries receive permission to trade with China directly as well as commercial privileges after they offer their tributes"

The tribute dedication of the Siam embassy to the King of China for diplomacy and trade is between Siam and China only (Wilson, 1993: 1). At the end of Ayudhaya period, between 2199 – 2309, Siam always delivered its embassy to China together with tributes totally 26 times in 110 years. (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 59)

Year 2199 – 2231	12 times
Year 2232 – 2252	1 times
Year 2253 – 2309	13 times

The frequency of embassy deliveries together with tributes to China depends on internal factors of both China and Siam.

Approaching the Chinese Tributary system of Thonburi

Because of receiving privileges from trade in the tributary system as mention above, King Taksin attempts to set up trade with the tributary system that once made income for Ayudhaya. However, trade in the tributary system needs to receive royal permission from the King of China. King Taksin therefore needs to convince the King of China to accept him as a new King of Siam before he can deliver embassy and tributes to China.

During the Thonburi period, there are a total of 4 embassy deliveries that were not received because King of China did not accept King Taksin as a new king of Siam (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิษ, 2523: 55). King Taksin could not recover trade in the tributary system that was interrupted from the Ayudhaya period. King Taksin had to trade individually first without any privilege that is different from the tributary system. Until the end of reign, he can renew the tributary system trade that can be concluded as follows:

In 1768 King Taksin delivered a royal letter with Chinese merchantman in order to offer to Qian Long, the King of China. The royal letter describes his enthronement including a request for permission to purchase metal and cannons in order to battle with Burma (ศุภวรรณ ขวรัตน์วงศ์, 2540: 93). However, in the same year the

leaders of several groups who established themselves delivered royal letters to King Qian Long to certify them as a King of Siam as well. Therefore, Qian Long emperor refused to certify the status of King Taksin including a request for purchasing metal and cannon by raising a reason (สืบแสง พรหมบุญ, 2525: 144)

"The leader of several tribes in a kingdom should praise king's heir for further rehabilitation instead of scrambling to occupy land and set themselves up to be a king immorally and wrongly."

and

"Accepted Chengchao to be king and given charter by China is not possible because it is not following an existing tradition. Chengchao should seek heirs to aid him to retrieve the country and respectfully engage to be the king but Chengchao set up himself to be the King. Therefore China did not approve because of inaccuracy and immorality. Furthermore, other 3 more states still resisted and againsted him."

In 1775 King Taksin delivered a royal request letter for the purchase of sulphur 50 picul, 500 metal pans and cannons from China. Qian Long Emperor allowed the sulphur and metal pans but not the cannons (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิษ, 2523: 51). In 1775 Qian Long Emperor allowed the purchase of 100 piculs as requested but he refused to assist the battle with Burma (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิษ, 2523: 51). After that King Taksin delivered a royal letter and tribute to China in order to purchase copper plate and borrow 1,000 copper shields including request to trade at Amoy and Ningbo cities. He was rejected

that China shields were only made of metal, trade request was rejected as well. (สืบแสงพรหมบุญ, 2525: 144)

In 1777 Qian Long Emperor allowed King Taksin to deliver embassy and tributes to him so the relationship in the tributary system had been started (ศุภวรรณชวรัตน์วงศ์, 2540: 96). In 1779 King Taksin delivered embassy together with a royal letter and tribute asking to start to trade with China immediately. However he had no full right because trade was limited to Canton only and tax must be paid because he had not receive a Loto badge that shows trading privilege by having no tax paid and no limitation of trading at Canton only (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิช, 2523: 53).

In 1781 King Taksin delivered embassy and tributes to China including several goods for selling because the King of China allowed same rights of trade as the Ayudhaya period (ศุภวรรณชวรัตน์วงศ์, 2540: 97). Tributes in year 1781 were as follows:

1 female elephant, agarwood 3 grains, amber 8 tael, bort 10 tael, 3 carpets, 15 peacock tails, 900 bird's wings, ivory 4.5 picul, 9 rhino's horns, derris 4.5 picul, sandalwood 1.5 picul, turmeric 150 picul, menthol 1.5 picul, banana blossom 1.5 picul, cardamom seed 4.5 picul, chaulmoogra seed 4.5 picul, ebony 4.5 picul, cinnamon 1.5 picul, acacia bark 1.5 picul, sappanwood 45 picul and additional irrelevant tributes such as 1 male elephant, rhino's horn 1 picul, ivory 100 picul, tin 300 picul, sappanwood 10,000 picul and pepper 3,000 picul.

The Royal letter specified that King Taksin delivered 3 fleets, 3 ships per fleet and requested f entry to Canton, Amoy and Ningbo for buying goods specifically. (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิช, 2523: 57)

The total expenses for the delivery of fleet together with the embassy was 195,500 chang 1 Baht and 87.5 quarters by having following details: irrelevant tribute 1866 chang 3 tael 2 Baht 1 quarter, department of ceremony 56 chang 5 tael,

department in Pae Ping 37 chang 10 tael, guide team 20 chang. Therefore net total was 1898 chang 18 tael 2 Baht 1 quarter. There were 11 tribute ships, 2 foreign countries ships and 9 Cantonese merchant ships that totally was 2443 chang 15 tael 1 Baht 3 quarters 1 fueng (ณัฐภัทร จันทวิช, 2523: 53).

This voyage of embassy to Canton city took a total of 33 days, waited for royal permission to receive an audience for another 27 days, after that fleets waited while the embassy went to Beijing for another 3 months.

At the conclusion of the Thonburi period, embassy was delivered to China a total of 4 times, embassy and royal letters were delivered by using private Chinese merchants as well as junks of Chinese merchants in the beginning. However, an initial attempt at trade in the tributary system did not achieve very much because the King of China did not accept King Taksin as the new king of Siam and disliked his unawareness of the custom of the tributary system. He could not recover the tributary system that was interrupted from the Ayudhaya period. Therefore King Taksin needed to trade individually but he did not receive the same privileges as the tributary system until the end of his reign when trade in the tributary system was started. When the embassy came back, the Thonburi period was ended. Therefore the achievement of setting up the tributary system for trade seems to be a heritage that creates prosperity for the early Rattanakosin period.

5.2.3.2 Private Trade

Kennon Breazeale explains that private trade with China since the Ayudhaya period used Chinese merchants in Thailand that used junks that were built in Siam. At the port of China they would pay a tax at the same rate as if they come from other ports of China because it is a domestic trade. (Breazeale, 1999: 24-25) Moreover, since the year 1957 foreign fleets have been limited the right to trade in Canton, only Chinese crews are employed more because the three criteria to determine which junk is a domestic junk are

1. Cargo ship must be built according to Chinese model
2. All ship master and crew must be Chinese
3. Ship and goods are under the regulations that aim to trade with China only.

By using this channel, the ruling class of Ayudhaya used Chinese junks for trade (Breazeale, 1999: 24-25). Junks from Siam which are usually Fu Kian and Canton will trade at Amoy, Ningbo and Shang Hai instead.

During the period of no trading with China, King Taksin gained benefit from private trade that was flourishing in current of China economy in South East Asia by executing at eastern coast city and southern city ports from goods provision to shipment for selling. In the beginning King Taksin borrowed the junks of Chinese merchants, after that junks were built because the port at the eastern coast cities have been important sources for ship building since the Ayudhaya period and are shipyards of the battleships of King Taksin. For the ship master and crew were assumed to be Chinese.

Even Thonburi will grow and develop from trade the current of China, trade with several countries occurred as well but it cannot make the same income as trading with China, emphasizing goods exchange only, most trade will deal with private trade. In the beginning King Taksin persuaded foreign merchants to trade. Those merchants did not cooperate because they were not confident in safety. Therefore King Taksin forced harbored ships at estuary into trade (ศุภวรรณ ขวรัตน์วงศ์, 2540: 91). After that King Taksin traded with Chinese merchant more, and trade expanded. In 1770 a French priest recorded his voyage by Moor ship to Bangkok to identify that bringing in cargo ships started from early reign. (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 39 จดหมายเหตุของพวกคณะบาทหลวงฝรั่งเศสซึ่งเข้ามาครั้งกรุงศรีอยุธยาตอนแผ่นดินพระเจ้าเอกทัศกับครั้งกรุงธนบุรีและครั้งรัตนโกสินทร์ตอนต้น, 2512: 115)

Important trade in early reign was with Hatien that was an important port. A lot of amount of import goods was rice. Chinese merchants who came in year 1767-1768 mentioned about deficiency and starvation condition at that time that rice's price reduced after rice cargo ship from Hatien came in. Thonburi also traded other goods with Hatien as well. (ธีรวัต ณ ป้อมเพชร, 2531: 111)

Important trade that was recorded as evidence of trading is with the East India Company of Holland (V.O.C). In 1769 Oyaa Pipattakosa sent a letter to the high commissioner of the EastIndia Company of Holland in Pattavia city in order to invite the company to establish a trade station in Thonburi again and requested to purchase 1,000 firearms (ธีรวัต ณ ป้อมเพชร, 2529: 33-40). The EastIndia Company of Holland agreed to sell 500 firearms in exchange for sapanwood or beeswax if the sapanwood is not enough (Dhiravat Na pombejra, 2004: 350). All the process of the shipment for this trade was executed by the Chinese. From this letter it identified that Thonburi expect not only to trade with China but also persuaded the East India Company of Holland to establish a trade station again.

King Taksin desired to trade with western countries like Ayudhaya period once again. However Eastern India of Hollanda Company did not return to establish trade station in Thonburi but the company traded and exchanged goods several times such as in 1773 Thonburi bought another 3,000 firearms. (Dhiravat Na Pombejra, 2004: 350) Trading still passed through Chinese who sailed between Siam and Batavia. Mainly is weapon trade, secondary is rice and horse that are necessary for army.(Blusse, 2004: 350)

After that Thonburi bought firearms from western countries again via Captain Francis Light, British merchant, having trade centre at Penang or Mark Island (อดิศร หมวกพิมาย, 2531: 263). This trade was specified as evidence that Department of Talang state bought 962 musketries, 900 Jae-ra-mad firearms, delivered to Thonburi by Captain Manggu. This purchasing did not pay with cash but exchange with tin.

Besides firearms procurement from subsidized western merchants, there is combined trade with nearby state such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam at several ports (อดิศร หมวกพิมาย, 2531: 246). Chantaburi, port where is a large market in trading with Cambodia and Vietnam, is selected. State will continuous buy for selling later. Goods are assumed to be forest products because they are required for export and they have plenty at city of Cambodia and Laos. Furthermore Chantaburi and Trad deems to be crucial areas where Chinese private merchant trade and exchange goods in South East Asia as well.

International trade as mentioned before is state trade that is recorded. However, it is believed that there is a latent trade by private individual at several cities without any record. Because of poverty and belligerency in Thonburi, goods cannot be produced therefore King Taksin has to find another way to trade. Several cities without war become good choices for private trade and they can be production and labor sources such as southern cities and eastern coast cities. Product collection shows the capacity in approaching the products as demand of market at that time including trade networking that combines Thonburi and cities that have other roles in trading.

Most goods assumed to be monopolized by government. Export in Thonburi can deduce from exchanged goods and products listed in tribute items to China because these tributes are representative of export that merchant can provide in dilated period of trade economy in region as well as deliver with tribute caravan for selling at other ports beyond Canton such as Amoy and Ningbo. Important goods are forest products and tin.

Goods that were delivered as tribute in year 2324 and product sources are concluded from document in Ayudhaya period:

Elephant main source – Nakornratchasima

Agarwood	main source –	lower area of Chao Phraya River and nearby Cambodia border
Amber	main source –	Malaya peninsula area especially Phuket
Ivory	main source –	Nakornratchasima, Pitsanulok, Chonburi, lower and rear area of Chao Phraya River
Rhino's horn	main source –	Kanchanaburi
Sandalwood	main source –	Rear area
Menthol	main source –	Malaya peninsula
Cardamon seed	main source -	Phratabong and lower area of Chao Phraya River
Chaulmoogra seed	main source -	lower area of Chao Phraya River
Ebony	main source -	Chonburi, lower area of Chao Phraya River, Malaya Peninsula
Sappanwood	main source -	Tanaosri, Kanchanaburi, Chonburi, Pitsanulok
Tin	main source -	Nakornsrihammarat, Malaya peninsula
Pepper	main source -	Nearby Cambodia border, Malaya peninsula

Even bort, peacock tail, bird's wing, ditto bark, resin, banana blossom, cinnamon, acacia bark have no any evidence specifying source clearly, they are listed as export goods since Ayudhaya period. Considering export goods with tributes in year 1781 including sources, most area of production source or source are area under Thonburi. Part of goods from levy collection cannot have fully because of people control problem but it is assume that goods will be provided by private merchant for selling.

Most of export goods were forest products entirely that is different from Ayudhaya period that have three types of export goods such as natural resources (forest products, mineral, sea products), food and agricultural products and handicraft products (จุมพฏ ขวลิขิตานนท์, 2531: 22) . Export goods that played important role were forest products because they can afford during breaking of war or they were levies from several cities or from exchange as well as collecting from eastern coastal cities where were important sources of forest product procurement from border such as Laos and Cambodia (อติศร หมวกพิมาย, 2531: 246). Period for selling of forest product is usually after rainy season because it was convenient for traveling. For example, Cochin China and Cambodia traded silk and eaglewood in February. (Alilunas, 1993: 95)

The most important forest product in Thonburi period was sappanwood because of the demand for export and it could be exchanged with other goods. The three most export forest products are sappanwood, rosewood, and ebony. (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์ วัตร, 2531: 93)

Pepper is well known in late Thonburi period because it may be production of Chinese. Pepper is economic crop and grows from expert in cultivation of Chinese immigrant mostly Teo-chiu Chinese. Important cultivation sources are along eastern coast ports where are crucial power base of King Taksin including Songkla where a lot of Hok Kian Chinese live, pepper is cultivated around Songkla Lake since B.E 22 and believe that pepper is produced for selling particularly. (สุวิทย์ ธีรศาสตร์ วัตร, 2531: 247)

Besides goods according to tribute another important export goods is tin. Tin has been exported since Ayudhaya period. Important source of tin in Thonburi period is in southern area such as Nakornsrihammarat, Songkla. Important trade source is Talang. King Taksin use Tin to exchange with other goods.

Other interesting goods are dried fish that people make then sell. From evidence of Eastern India of Holunda Company specified that Tjoseeko, Chinese merchant from Palembang, comment poverty condition in Thonburi. He brought rice, provisions and fabric to sell in Thonburi and bought dried fish in return.(ธีรวัด ณ ป้อมเพ็ชร, 2531: 110-113) He entered Thonburi in year 1767-1768. Even people starved and lacked of rice but people in city can do fishery to earn their living and sell as products as well.

5.2.3.3 The Chinese Diasporas in Thonburi economic expansion

Chinese is important labor that is dominant in economy since Ayudhaya period. The skills of the Chinese community were important in economic life and some came increasingly to be appropriated or exploited by court that lacks them. In Thonburi period, Chinese become labor that infiltrate in kingdom and economical rehabilitation mechanism obviously. Thonburi period is the period that a lot of Chinese immigrate to settle down. John Crawford (1915: 103) explained about Chinese who live in period of King Taksin that

"Because of his special support for Chinese deems to persuade these people to live in Siam and settle down. Specialty acceptance of Chinese population creates material change that has been occurred in kingdom for centuries. This time is almost the biggest change"

There are a lot of assumptions about Chinese immigration in Thonburi period. Some cause is internal event of China so a lot of Chinese immigrate because of starvation and find new workplace and some escapes from Qing dynasty administration. Another cause is from event in Philippines Island. In 1766 a lot of Chinese who did not accept to convert religion were exiled by Spanish. A significant reason causes

immigrant of Chinese is half breed, Thai-Chinese, of King Taksin attract Teo-chiu Chinese immigrate and settle down in Thonburi. William G Skinner (2529: 19) concluded that

"Normally King Taksin must support Teo-chiu Chinese especially who can speak same language as him. In his reign, Teo-chiu Chinese was called as Royal Chinese. No doubt that King Taksin's policy is to attract a lot of Teo-chiu Chinese come to Bangkok and currently there are the most"

However the most potential of main reason is prosperity of Chinese trade in territorial Southeast Asia attract Chinese from several regions to immigrate and find work especially after year 2270 that transmigration of Chinese announcement is cancelled and year 2297 King of China issue property insurance announcement for Chinese who want to return to China.

Prosperity of Chinese trade in Southeast Asia becomes channel for a lot of private Chinese merchant to be dominant in assisting King Taksin to trade in private individual. Many Chinese become crucial nobleman. Private Chinese who trade for King Taksin are not only Teo-chiu Chinese but also Canton and Hok Kian.

In King Taksin period, a lot of Chinese immigrate to both Thonburi and several cities. Considering immigrant Chinese together with existing Chinese from both Ayudhaya and several cities such as Eastern cities, Songkla believe that these Chinese must have various duties in trade networking of Southeast Asia.

Various lineages of Chinese can be separated according to race and role as follows:

Canton Chinese

The important nobleman is Yang Chin Chong or Phraya Pichai Isawan (ศุภวรรณ ขวรัตน์วงศ์: 2540, 110). He was Canton Chinese, sail for trading between Siam and China. He entered government service in year 1768 in position of royal letter sender to Chinese emperor. King Taksin also used ship of Yang Chin Chong in delivery of royal letter. After that he was promoted to be Kosathipbodi instead of Phraya Pipit because Phraya Pipit became Phraya Ratchasethi at Budhimas city instead of Mor Tsu Lin responsible for controlling treasury and trading (ประชุมพงศาวดารภาคที่ 65 พระราชพงศาวดารกรุงธนบุรีฉบับพันจันทนุมาศ และจดหมายเหตุรายวันทัพสมัยกรุงธนบุรี, 2512: 178). Obvious authority of Yang Chin Chong was his 1,686 soldiers when attacking Budhimas city that was the second ranking of army excluding royal army. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 294) Phraya Pichai Isawan was a highly faithful Chinese nobleman to King Taksin. (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 163). When he passed away in year 1777, King Taksin arranged a funeral same as royal family that accompany with Chao Narasuriyawongse.

Teo-chiu Chinese

In Thonburi period, a lot of Teo-chiu Chinese immigrated in both Thonburi and eastern coast cities. Several people were dominant in economy and trading such as Lord Jin Mua Seng promoted to be Luang Apaipanich responsible for preparation of various goods to junk for selling in private individual at China. He was allowed to build his own junk at Chantaburi in order to trade for 2 junks per year that are Chinrueng and Setthimuangchonburi (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 163). After that he was promoted to be Phra Pichai Waree responsible for controlling governmental junk to China every year. (Sarasin Viraphol, 1977: 163). Another important Teo-chiu Chinese was Tran Lien who was promoted to be Phra Pipit Vatee Kosathipbodi. After King Taksin defeated Hatien city, Phraya pipit was promoted to be Phrayarachasetthi, Hatien governor showing that King Taksin trusted him very much. (นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์, 2541: 271-274) In map of Burma recorded that Teo-chiu community was around Phraya Pipit's

house that meant Phraya Pipit was a leader of Teo-chiu Chinese in Thonburi. Teo-chiu Chinese in this reign is called as "Royal Chinese". Leonard Andaya (1999: 6) mentioned Royal Chinese that

"They seem to be a merchant of King of China. King Taksin did not rely on this Chinese regarding trade including politic and military. He appointed royal Chinese to be a concessionaire, governor and army leader through Thai gulf and Malay Peninsula in Siam"

Even they were influence in trading, politic and military the most dominant role of Teo-chiu Chinese was trading. Teo-chiu Chinese became Chinese community who influence in economy all over King Taksin reign.

Hok Kian Chinese

Hok Kian Chinese community lived in Thonburi since Ayudhaya period. Some of them immigrated when Ayudhaya was defeated. Hok Kian Chinese in Thonburi lived around Kudichin area but group of important noblemen lived in southern region. One of the most important noblemen was Hao Yiang or Wu Yang, Hok Kian merchant, who migrated to Songkla in year 1750. He succeeded in tobacco cultivation and trade until he became rich. After he surrendered to King Taksin during residing at Songkla, he was promoted to be nest concessionaire of Songkla. (ประชุมพงศาวดาร ภาคที่ 53 พงศาวดารเมืองสงขลา เมืองนครศรีธรรมราช พงศาวดารเมืองพัทลุง, 2476: 76) His merit from nest tax by dedicating 50 chang per year and always deliver to the capital city made him be promoted to be Luang Intornkirisombat governing Songkla. Hok Kian community became Chinese group who made wealthy from trade and had power and influence in Songkla area that was an important port.

Jennifer Wyane Cushman commented in case of Wu Yang that he is one of Chinese merchant who received concession monopoly in several businesses as well as was a domestic middleman that provided goods to Central Market of Bangkok. (Cushman, 2528: 93)

Wu Yang, Songkla governor, was probably another Chinese merchant who assisted King Taksin to procure goods to sell in several cities in the kingdom. Moreover, secondary lord who traded for King Taksin were Luang Prasertwanich, Phra Sombatpanich and unknown Chantaburi governor. (อดีตพรหมภักดี, 2531: 111)

Conclusion

Kingdom of Thonburi from small fortress was established after collapse of Kingdom of Ayudhaya in year 1767 leading by half blood Chinese-Siam King who was a cart merchant before he was an official at Tak city.

Expansion of Chinese trade in Southeast Asia became significant factor that made new built small town like Thonburi to strengthen in economy and politic as new dynasty of Burma and Vietnam. Even war happened through reign but Thonburi can create economical and trade progression. Not different from Fukien during administration of Zheng's family, must battle with Ching and VOC dynasty concurrently but trade was developed impressively.

King Taksin's capacity including relationship with Chinese merchant leaded accomplishment of Thonburi in entering to trade current from China that was expanding at that time like combination with existing trade networking. King Taksin occupied trade networking in eastern region before Thonburi's establishment as new capital city of Siam. Ports in this area were important market that Chinese merchant passed to trade with several cities. Merging with southern cities made Kingdom of Thonburi to be able to occupy trade networking around Thai gulf where a lot of junk traded between Southern China and Southeast Asia. King Taksin on behalf of new leader of Chao Phraya River Kingdom was most encouraged by Chinese merchant and Chinese community. Therefore he could use advantage of Chinese from different race


who settle down at important ports of Southeast Asia and trade between Southern China and Southeast Asia.

In year 1771, this year regarded as a real origin of Thonburi because Thonburi had higher power than eastern coast cities, southern cities, Hatien port and Cambodia. Thonburi can control trade networking and crucial trade route in Chinese trade current that was expanding in Southeast Asia.

For only 15 years Kingdom of Thonburi had been established and developed to have economy and political consistency. Progress and development of Thonburi were continuous until late reign and go on further shown as Rattanakosin having basis from Thonburi



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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Trading has been compared as breath of Southeast Asia since ancient time. Several ports in this region became trading centers that attracted merchant and luck seeker around the world such as Indian merchant, Chinese merchant as well as western merchant who desired to participate in profit from trading at port of Southeast Asia.

Demand of products from China was high like supply. Southeast Asia became center of trade and products exchange from China. Even a lot of Chinese merchants and Chinese immigrants settled down in Southeast Asia but trading of China had not reached the highest point. Until 18th century, royal palace of China announced policy regarding as an actual encouragement of Chinese trading in this region that was cancellation of sea prohibition. In year 2270 expansion of Chinese trade highly resulted in Southeast Asia region. Increment of trade as well as Chinese immigrants made progress in several fields for several ports and new ports were established in region. Trading atmosphere flourished and made economical progress all over Southeast Asia. After that starvation in China urgently made a big time of food import from Southeast Asia especially Siam or Ayudhaya. Rice became important export that made wealthy together with a lot of Chinese immigrant who find benefits from trade.

Role of Chinese was difficult to be separated from trading of Ayudhaya even western people like French and Dutch gained benefits from flourishing trade in Ayudhaya in 17th century period as well as governmental monopoly for mostly grabbing profit but Chinese could be a part of trade current in both Ayudhaya royal palace and private merchant. However 18th century was regarded as the maximum of trading between Ayudhaya and China. Besides rice trading increased obviously, Chinese could be promoted to be important lord in position of Phya Treasury as well.

However war problem occurred in Mainland Southeast Asia became significant factor resulting in interruption of several dominant areas in Chinese trade

current. Ayudhaya was the one of those areas where finally was attacked and seized by Burma.

Thonburi was established as new capital City of Chao Phraya River instead of Ayudhaya, leading by half blood Thai-Chinese King who was a cart merchant and soldier in the past, he was called as King Taksin afterward. King Taksin considered important of economy that could drive and strengthen kingdom therefore he attempted to carry on flourishing Chinese trade as Ayudhaya achieved before. Because of his race together with experience in being cart merchant and soldier at cities made him to be able to combine Thonburi into trade networking between Southern China and Southeast Asia quickly. Furthermore his policy in several areas supported economy and trading significantly such as territory expansion. Obviously, he foresaw benefits in occupying flourishing areas and ports. Along 15 years of Thonburi, King Taksin tried to precede trading policy as King of Ayudhaya tried before but Thonburi more succeeded in occupying ports that was trade networking.

Chinese networking at several ports including Chinese merchant who traded at several cities were dominant in good collection capacity and goods delivery to port of China of Thonburi. Chinese labors became important force for development of Thonburi Kingdom, not only trade that was an obvious role but also participation in building kingdom and being soldier in war.

15 years were very short time for a Kingdom but Thonburi could establish and develop to be a powerful country of Southeast Asia. After Thonburi collapsed, Rattanakosin could inherit being powerful country onward by possessing trade networking of Thonburi and using continuous progressive trade current of China to develop economy.

This study points to a number of several question that warrant further research. One direction for further research I would suggest here is King Rama I and his attempt to taking control of the commercial network that was created by King Taksin, is an interesting topic. As I mentioned, Chinese and King Taksin himself played an important role in the trade network of South China and Southeast Asia. His ability to

control trade network based on his relation with Chinese migrants. After he was dethroned, King Rama I was able to replace King Taksin in the trade network the dethroned king had established even though King Rama I had no ethnic connection as King Taksin.



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