

ANALYTICITY AND TRANSLATION



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บทคัดย่อ

วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ได้พยายามที่จะอธิบายและวิเคราะห์ปรัชญาของวิลลอร์ด เวน ออร์มัน ไควน ในเรื่องสองเรื่อง ซึ่งได้กลายเป็นจุดสำคัญในการถกเถียงที่ยังคงดำเนินอยู่ในวงการปรัชญาของอเมริกาสมัยปัจจุบันนี้ ข้าพเจ้าต้องการที่จะเสนอว่า เรื่องทั้งสองเรื่อง กล่าวคือ วิกฤตภาวะและการแปลงนั้นได้มีความสัมพันธ์กันอย่างใกล้ชิดในปรัชญาของไควน นอกจากนี้ข้าพเจ้ายังเสนอด้วยว่า ถึงแม้เรื่องทั้งสองนี้จะไม่ค่อยมีความสำคัญในตัวมันเองมากนัก แต่ก็จะมีมีความสำคัญในข้อสรุปที่อาจจะเป็นผลติดตามมาจากการยอมรับหรือการปฏิเสธในเรื่องทั้งสองนี้ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งในเรื่องที่เกี่ยวกับทฤษฎีความหมาย

ปรัชญาของไควนเป็นที่รู้จักกันในแง่ของการปฏิเสธความคิดเรื่อง วิกฤตภาวะและการแปลงตามความคิดดั้งเดิมที่ได้ยึดถือกันมา และตามความคิดที่ยอมรับกันมาจนเป็นปกติวิสัยโดยปราศจากการตรวจสอบใด ๆ ทั้งสิ้น ในวิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ข้าพเจ้าได้วิเคราะห์การอ้างเหตุผลของไควนในการที่ได้ปฏิเสธ ความแตกต่างระหว่างวิกฤตภาวะและสังเคราะห์ภาวะ มากไปกว่านั้นข้าพเจ้ายังได้วิเคราะห์ข้อโต้แย้งบางประการอันเป็นผลสืบเนื่องมาจากความคิดดังกล่าวของไควน ข้าพเจ้าได้เสนอความคิดในวิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ว่า ความคิดของไควนในเรื่องเหล่านี้สอดคล้องกันกับลักษณะปฏิฐานนิยม ทัศนคติกรรมนิยม และปฏิบัตินิยมอันเป็นจุดเริ่มต้นของปรัชญาของท่าน

สิ่งที่รู้จักกันโดยแพร่หลายอีกประการหนึ่งในปรัชญาของไควน คือทฤษฎีเรื่อง การไม่กำหนดแน่นอนในการแปลอันเป็นการปฏิเสธความคิดดั้งเดิมที่ยอมรับกันว่าการ แปลนั้นถูกกำหนดแน่นอนตายตัว ข้าพเจ้าได้วิเคราะห์การอ้างเหตุผลของไควนในเรื่อง ทฤษฎีการไม่กำหนดแน่นอน ในการแปลที่ปราศจากพื้นฐานภูมิหลังมาก่อน และข้าพเจ้าได้ เสนอว่า ความคิดเรื่องการไม่กำหนดแน่นอนในการแปลที่ปราศจากพื้นฐานภูมิหลังเช่นนี้ สอดคล้องตรงกันกับทฤษฎีญาณวิทยาของไควน และยังเป็นหัวใจของทฤษฎีความหมายของ ท่านด้วย

วิทยานิพนธ์ของข้าพเจ้าได้เสนอว่า ความคิดของไควนในการปฏิเสธความ แตกต่างระหว่าง วิเคราะห์ภาวะและสังเคราะห์ภาวะ และความคิดของท่านในเรื่องการ ไม่กำหนดแน่นอนในการแปลที่ปราศจากพื้นฐานนั้น มีความสำคัญมากที่สุด เพราะบทบาทของ เรื่องทั้งสองนี้ทำให้ไควนสามารถที่จะปฏิเสธความรู้ต่าง ๆ ที่ไม่ได้รับมาจากประสบการณ์ หรือการสังเกต ซึ่งก็หมายความว่า "ความหมายต่าง ๆ " ในฐานะที่เป็น "อรรถภาวะ" หรือความสัมพันธ์ต่อความนั้น ๆ ไม่ได้เป็นทางออกที่มีความสำคัญต่อทฤษฎีความหมาย หรือความจริงของพวกปฏิฐานนิยมอีกต่อไป นอกจากนี้ยังกินความต่อไปอีกด้วยว่า ปรัชญา ภาษาศาสตร์ที่ใช้ได้ค่านั้น ควรจะมีพื้นฐานอยู่ที่การสังเกตปริยายตอบสนองของมนุษย์ที่มี ต่อสิ่งเร้าในรูปของประโยค ข้าพเจ้าเสนอว่าการวิเคราะห์การอ้างเหตุผลต่าง ๆ ของ ไควนจะนำไปสู่ความคิดใหม่ ๆ ที่สละไสของปรัชญาที่ตอบปัญหาว่าปรัชญาคืออะไร ข้าพเจ้า หมายความว่า การเข้าถึงปรัชญาตามวิธีการของไควนและตัวปรัชญาของไควนเองนั้นทำให้ เราเกิดมีความคิดเข้าใจและมีทัศนะใหม่ ๆ เกี่ยวกับกิจกรรมของปรัชญา อันจะทำให้ กิจกรรมทางปรัชญาเป็นทางออก ที่มีความหมาย น่ายอมรับมากยิ่งขึ้น ข้าพเจ้าเห็นว่าความ เข้าใจในปรัชญาของไควนอย่างถูกต้องชัดเจนโดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งในส่วนที่เกี่ยวข้องกับ เรื่องทั้งสองที่วิทยานิพนธ์ฉบับนี้ได้ยกขึ้นมาพิจารณา นั้นจะนำไปสู่แนวความคิดที่เป็นจริง มากขึ้นในเรื่องความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างภาษากับโลก ("วัตถุ" กับ "คำ") นอกจากนี้ยังจะ นำไปสู่แนวความคิดที่เป็นประโยชน์มากยิ่งขึ้นในเรื่องความสัมพันธ์ของปรัชญากับวิชาอื่น ๆ อีกด้วย.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to describe and analyze the philosophy of Willard Van Orman Quine with regard to two notions which have become the center a continuing controversy in contemporary American philosophy. It is my thesis that these notions, analyticity and translation, are closely related within Quine's philosophy. It is also my thesis that although these notions are relatively unimportant in themselves, they are important in relationship to the implications which may be derived from either accepting or rejecting them, especially as regards the theory of meaning.

Quine's philosophy is noted for its rejection of traditional or intuitive or uncritical notions of analyticity and translation. In my thesis, I will analyze Quine's arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction and some of the discussion which that denial provoked. It is part of my thesis that Quine's denial is consistent with the positivistic, behavioristic, and pragmatic starting points of Professor Quine.

Quine's philosophy is also noted for its indeterminacy of translation thesis which amounts to a rejection of the traditional notion of determinate translation. In my thesis I will analyze Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of radical translation. It is part of my thesis that this notion of the indeterminacy of radical translation is consistent with Quine's epistemology and central to his theory of meaning.

It is my thesis that Quine's denial of the analytic-synthetic distinction and his indeterminacy of radical translation thesis are most significant because of the role they play in allowing Quine to reject a science of the mental. This means that "meanings" as entities and propositional attitudes are no longer viable alternatives in any positivistic theory of meaning and/or truth. It also means that a satisfactory philosophy of linguistics can be based upon the observation of human response to sentential stimulation. It is my thesis that an analysis of the Quinian arguments leads to a new and fresh metaphilosophy. That is to say, the Quinian approach to philosophy and Quine's philosophy itself allow us to reach new insights and outlooks concerning the very activity of philosophy, which make the philosophical activity a more "meaningful" and acceptable alternative. I feel that a clear understanding of the philosophy of Quine, especially as it concerns itself with the two notions under consideration in my thesis, will lead to a more realistic perspec-

tive as regards the relationship between language and the world (the "object" and the "word") as well as to a more profitable attitude as regards the relationship between philosophy and the other disciplines.



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During my stay in Thailand and while still a student at Chulalongkorn University, it was my privilege and pleasure to be a part of the philosophy faculties at two other universities: Thammasat University and Chiangmai University. To my friends and colleagues at these two institutions who have encouraged and advised me I also offer my thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

Willard Van Orman Quine is a contemporary American Philosopher. The problem of analyticity, which occupies a significant position in Quine's overall philosophy, is considered by some to be "central to an assessment of the current state of philosophy."¹ At least one historian of contemporary philosophy feels that Quine's "philosophical observations are of a distinctly fresh, not to say revolutionary, character."² Perhaps some of the freshness of Quine's Philosophy is due to the fact that he brings together in his work three related and interconnected historical trends of thought: (i) Positivism; (ii) Behaviorism; and (iii) Pragmatism.

(i) Quine as Positivist is somewhat outside of the main group of what may be called 'orthodox' or logical positivists who had their beginning in the Vienna Circle and who are much influenced by the earlier Wittgenstein as well as the mature Carnap. But despite this unorthodoxy, Quine, as positivist, is

¹Marian Dechert, "Quine, Strawson and Logical Truth," Philosophical Studies 24 (1973): 52.

²John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1968), p. 403.

in the mainstream of a philosophical tradition which can trace its immediate heritage through the legions of unnamed physical scientists as well as the well-known positivist philosophers (e.g., Bentham and Pierce) of the present and past centuries to the more distant ancestors of positivism, the Empiricists, notably Locke, Berkeley and Hume. More remotely, Quine, as positivist, can lay claim to the influential thought of Bacon, the medieval nominalists, and - as we shall see - even to Aristotle. Being a positivist means that Quine insists on the primacy of an empirical, i.e., sense experiential, starting point for all work done in philosophy and/or science, both of which, according to Quine, are of a kind. Although he can claim the nominalists as historical ancestors, and although he has indicated a certain preference for concrete physical objects on the grounds of convenience in theory building,¹ he is a realist insofar as he has no qualms in admitting the existence of abstract objects or entities such as classes, sets or numbers.² He is a physicalist,³

¹W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), # 48.

²W.V.O. Quine, "On Mental Entities," in The Way of Paradox, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 221 ff.

³Quine, Word and Object, ## 1, 48, 54.

in the sense of admitting only middle-sized physical objects which are publically observable through surface irradiations of sensory nerve cells as the origin of scientific and philosophic theory and knowledge. Although Quine accepts the existence of abstract entities, he does deny the "world of the mental" or mentalistic theories which would posit such non-physical abstract entities as minds, thoughts, ideas, concepts, intentions, propositions, meanings, etc., as being somehow separate, distinct and independent of the physical world of "collateral information."¹ Such independent mental entities are, according to Quine, the illusory results of loose and uncritical thinking and speaking.

(ii) Quine as Behaviorist² is in line with most of today's behavioristic psychologists, not the least of whom is B.F. Skinner, to name one of the more obvious representatives of the school. But here, also, Quine's heritage stretches back into historical tradition and we might cite Hume's theory of associationism as a prime forerunner of contemporary thought.

¹W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized", in Ontological Relativity, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69 ff.

²W.V.O. Quine, "Reply to Harman", in Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hintikka (eds.) Words and Objections, (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1969), p. 296.

As behaviorist, Quine aligns himself with the experimental psychologists (the physical scientists who study the human "psyche", or, to use more appropriately Quinian terminology, the brain) insofar as he insists on public observability as the touchstone and tribunal of scientific (or philosophic) theory. Moreover, he accepts the mechanism of conditioning as a primary explanatory device. Another significant manifestation of his behaviorism, is Quine's lack of scruples in calling upon the results and/or methods of experimental psychology and/or the other experimental sciences, in his search for useful information and techniques which may be adapted to or adopted by his own philosophical theory building.¹

(iii) Quine as Pragmatist is able to overcome the epistemological scepticism which dogged the early followers of Hume, as well as the sense-dataists and the phenomenologists. Moreover, his own theory of meaning begins with the Pierce's pragmatic formulation of the verification theory of meaning ("Say what difference the truth or falsity of a sentence would make to possible experience, and you have said all there is to say about meaning of a sentence.")² as a basic premise.

¹Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized", pp. 69 ff.

²W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 5.

When these three trends come together in Quine's overall philosophy, the result is philosophy in the classical or traditional sense¹ of a system or world view. Quine's system of philosophy is complete insofar as it comprises (i) a system of logic; (ii) an epistemology; and (iii) an ontology or metaphysics.

(i) Quine's logic system is somewhat of a reverse in the trend of logical development of the past century or so, especially as that trend has manifested itself in the group of philosophers called the logical positivists. Significant in his logic, is the acceptance of Tarskian principles, especially the semantic concept of truth, which tends to play down the difference between "logical" truth as opposed to "factual" truth. This feature of his logic ultimately leads to some differences between Quine and many of those contemporary thinkers who would insist upon an analytic-synthetic distinction as well as determinate translation. In his "New Foundations for Mathematical Logic"² Quine expounds a system which is more faithful to the Principia of Russell and Whitehead, although it passes over the

¹Richard Schuldenfrei, "Quine in Perspective", The Journal of Philosophy, LXIX, 1, (1972), p. 5.

²W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, (New York: Harper Torchback, 1963), pp. 80 ff.

theory of types which appears to be a vital element of that system. This "return to Russell" seems to be at odds with the trend in recent times whenever thinkers ponder the relations between mathematics and logic. Be that as it may, Quine's denial that mathematics can be reduced to or derived from "logic" pure and simple¹ seems to be a generally accepted position nowadays. Furthermore, Quine opts for an ideal of extensional logic and rejects modal or intensional logics as being theoretically not worth the effort.² Finally, in one important aspect, his logic can be seen, in a sense, as a return to the tradition of Aristotle: Quine holds that one's logical or canonical notation commits one ontologically. The more common trend has been to see logic as purely formal with no relationship to the world of "fact", and Quine rejects that trend completely.³

(ii) Quine's epistemology, from the point of view of this thesis, and I would suggest, from the point of view of the generally interested student of philosophy, is his most interesting

¹Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 403.

²Quine, "Truth by Convention", in Ways of Paradox, pp. 77 ff.

³Quine, "Reference and Modality", in From a Logical Point of View. pp. 139 ff. See also Quine, Word and Object, Chapter VIII, "Ontic Decision", pp. 233 ff.

and significant contribution to contemporary philosophy. A large part of this thesis will be devoted to an explanation and explication of Quine's epistemology. Let the following brief remarks suffice for the time being.

Epistemology, according to Quine, is that branch of science which inquires into the foundations of knowledge. As such, it is divided into two clusters of views or two theories: (a) the theory of meaning, or the cluster of views concerning the "concepts" or conceptualizations which "underlie" the various "notions" which appear in different theoretical systems. This side of epistemology, when dealing with, say, physics, would be concerned with explaining and explicating the notion of 'body'

(b) The theory of truth or the theory of doctrine is the second branch of epistemology. It is concerned with justifying those beliefs which are offered as true by the different theoretical systems. The justification takes the form of rules or axioms by which we can determine whether or not a candidate for knowledge (or truth) succeeds or not, and to what extent.

These two sides, the theory of meaning and the theory of truth, or the conceptual and doctrinal sides of epistemology, are, as we shall see in the main body of this thesis closely linked and complementary to one another.

Even more revolutionarily is Quine's reassignment of

the whole of epistemology as a chapter of psychology.¹ Much more will be said about this and Quine's epistemology as a whole. For the time being let us pass on to the last area of Quine's overall philosophy.

(iii) Quine's ontology is, perhaps, the least radical of his theories. He is, as we have seen, a realist with a physicalist starting point. And, I'm sure, there are many who would find this view perfectly acceptable, even if they disagreed with other areas of Quine's philosophy or even with his reasons for being an ontological realist and physicalist. I feel strongly that one reason for this state of affairs is that from time immemorial philosophers have almost to a man taken great delight in offering their own peculiar ontological theories. The net result of this tremendous outpouring of theory is that there is very little new under the sun. Philosophers and students of philosophy shed the most outrageous theories of being as ducks shed water. Ontology (or metaphysics, to use a word frowned upon by many contemporary thinkers) has always been a source of the wonderful and the wonderable in the world of philosophy. The task of the ontologist, of course, is not merely to state what he believes one should count as existing in this world, it is also part of his job to offer a theory, an

¹Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized", pp. 69 ff.

explanation, of what he holds to exist. The impossibility of separating ontology from epistemology, then, is obvious. But the fact is that, in the past as well as the present, many people who have passed as philosophers, have offered all sorts of ontological theories in the most intuitive¹ and uncritical ways imaginable. Quine, I hold, has done much to rectify this sad state of ontological affairs.

Quine's main claim to ontological fame is his famous version of the "to be" formulae: To be is to be the value of a bound variable.² From this we can see that it is only natural that Quine insist that logical notation commits one ontologically and that the purely formal or logical cannot be consistently or profitably separated from the purely material or factual.

Despite these many claims to fame, most of which are controversial in their own rights, Quine's most well-known claim

¹The word "intuitive" as used in this paper, if unqualified, means "intuitive" in the following Quinian sense: "By an intuitive account I mean one in which terms are used in habitual ways, without reflecting on how they might be defined or what presuppositions they might conceal." Quine, Word and Object, p. 36, n.

²Quine, "On What There is", in From a Logical Point of View, p. 13.

to fame seems to be the contemporary philosophical furor which has centered about two offshoots of his overall philosophy. Those issues are analyticity and translations. First of all Quine rejects the age-old distinction between analytic and synthetic. Secondly, Quine declares that translation is indeterminate. To understand Quine's position on these two matters, it is essential that one have a grasp of his system of philosophy as a whole, his world view.

In Chapter I of this thesis I will present the traditional views of Analyticity and the historical background for these views. Then I will present Quine's epistemology and his case against the analytic-synthetic distinction.

In Chapter II I will present the traditional views on determinate translation. Then I will present Quine's theory of language and a further elaboration of his epistemology to show why he rejects such determinate translation and the implication of such a rejection. And finally I will present the Quinian approach to a positive theory of translation.