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ภาคผนวก



1. ...the rightness of an action concerns an action not in the fuller sense of the term in which we include the motive in the action, but in the narrower and commoner sense in which we distinguish an action from its motive and mean by an action merely the conscious origination of something, an origination which on different occasions or in different people may be prompted by different motive.
2. To tell that I ought to pay my bills is to be moved towards paying them. But what I can be moved towards must always be an action and not an action in which I am moved in a particular way, i.e., an action from a particular motive; otherwise I should be moved towards being moved, which is impossible.
3. The person asking that question can perfectly well understand that, from the moral point of view, "I should do what, everything considered, I regard as right" is analytic or at least unchallengeable. But while not for a moment challenging that, he can perfectly relevantly point out that he is concerned with a different matter. He is asking why take the moral point of view at all?
4. But if paramountcy is only a necessary condition and if there are other necessary conditions...then one can ask why the satisfaction of these necessary conditions should suffice to make such life-guider paramount.
5. ...the moral point of view in properly identified in terms of a set of demands on a method for determining what to do, demands which this method must be satisfy if the resulting moralities are rightly to be regarded as constituting paramount practical reasons.
6. For this would commit him to the view that it is true of everybody that he should not acknowledge the overridingness of moral reasons but that everybody other than him should; in other words, that

everybody should not and that everybody should!

7. ...A must take B's rationality into account. Since B is rational, A must suppose that the action he expects B to perform will maximize B's expected utility, given the action B expects A to perform. A's intended action, then, is utility-maximizing for A against that possible action of B which A expects B to perform, which in turn is conceived by A as utility-maximizing for B against that possible action of A which A expects that B expects A to perform.
8. A person acts rationally only if the expected outcome of his action affords him a utility at least as great as that of the expected outcome of any action possible for him in the situation.
9. A person acting interdependently act rationally only if the expected outcome of his action affords each person [with whom his action is interdependent] a utility such that there is no combination of possible actions, one for each person acting interdependently, with an expected outcome which affords each person other than himself at least as great a utility, and himself a greater utility.
10. It might be suggested that one should assess one's choice by the conception chosen; it is rational to choose a conception of rationality if, given that conception of rationality, it is rational to choose it.
11. But when I am viewing things from an agent-relative viewpoint, I can with perfect consistency ignore that...
12. ...what we should conclude is that...justification has come to an end and we must simply **decide** for ourselves how we should act and what sort of people we will strive to be or to become. What all of this points to is that here at least decision is king.
13. Morality (having a morality or taking the moral point of view involves the making and/or using, and perhaps on occasion, uttering, of evaluative or normative judgements about rational being, their actions, traits, intentions, motives, etc., it being

understood that this does not necessarily entail judging rational beings other than oneself in any overt sense, usual as this is.

14. Evaluative and normative judgements about action, traits, ect., are moral (as versus non-moral) only if they have or would ultimately be given justifying reasons consisting of purported facts about the bearing of these actions, traits, ect., (actual, desired, or intended) on the lives of persons and sentient beings, including others besides the agent of speaker, if other are affected, as such (or as ends and not just as means), e.g. facts about their causing suffering, happiness, death, false beliefs, knowledge, good or bad experiences, etc.
15. To have a morality one must have an action or life guide whose direction is not conditioned upon one's having a certain desire, want, or end; the direction (or directions) must be perceived as to be taken in the perspective of clause 2.
16. Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof.,.we are not, however, to infer that (the) acceptance or rejection (of an ultimate end) must depend on blind impulse, or arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word, "proof" in which this question is...amenable to it... The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.
17. ...we sit down in a cool hour, i.e. when we are not under the influence of impulse, the only thing we desire, and therefore the only purpose we have, is one's own happiness, and that therefore we shall do whatever we do only in order that we may become happy.
18. ..it is a conviction that one's character and life will be approved by any rational being who contemplates it from the MPV...having this belief about oneself is a primary human good...

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