Chapter V

Language, Literature, Knowledge and Truth

5.1 Concepts of literature

The basic and common understanding of the term
'literature' is literature is art. Basicly, the work of
literature as a whole distinguishes from the other arts in that
it is "the art in which language is the medium of aesthetic
expression."[1] This is not a definition; and what remains
obscure is the concept "aesthetic expression". In fact, the
whole problem with regard to knowledge and truth which is the
concern of this thesis consists in the question as to 'what is
literature' itself. Moreover, in this research I find that the
root of the problem also consists in the question 'what is
language?'. Since this thesis is part of the programme to find
out what is ultimately literature; therefore, to define
literature or to accept any definition of literature is
considered to be self-defeating. At any rate, the key words
which signify the goal into which the attention and research
investigation is aimed are "aesthetic expression".

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[1] Philip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning, [New York: McGraw
Hill, 1964], p. 184.

However, an exploration of what the belles-letters writers have said is regarded to be relevant and worth considering. It can be established as a rational principle that in order to determine or judge the value of a product one needs to acknowledge or recognize what the producer thinks about it. It is generally recognized that one of the distinctive features of art is the mysterious nature of the artist who produces the works. That is - to know or understand or criticize or explain the works of art one should have a better understanding of the artist himself. But this thesis will not undertake to that far. What is primarily concerned here is what the artist thinks of their work, literature.

First of all, the term 'literature' to be employed later on for the discussion in this chapter needs some clarification. A source of ambiguity may result from the use of the terms 'poetry' and 'literature' in the way that they are interchangeable. In truth, as it has been generally observed, literature is taken to contain much more than just poetry in the general sense. For example, as Eagleton noted, literature includes "realist or naturalistic writing which is not linguistically self-conscious or self-exhibiting in any striking way."[2] Nevertheless, again the question consists in the enigmatic case of our ignorance of 'what is poetry.' It has

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[2]Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983], p. 6.

been mentioned in the section about Aristotle, chapter three,
that according to Aristotle the criterion of what is poetry is
not whether the thing in question is written in the form of
verse or prose. For Aristotle, poetry is mimesis. Yet all
these terms are enigmatic, obscure. However, with respect to
the fact that the specific art of literature, documentally when
it first originated, it appeared in the form of poetry in the
general concept, this thesis will adopt a metonymic ceremony of
referring. Documentally, the antique or ancient works of what
is called 'literature' are in verse forms. In this thesis, I
will grant a synedoche in which the words 'poetry' and
'literature' are used as to mean the same thing. This is a
policy to act in a correspondence to the positivist Carnap and
the neo-positivist scholar I.A. Richards. Both employed the
term 'poetry' and meant by it 'literature' in general.

Like in any other field, specialists in literature has
been attempting to define literature. I find that most of the
definitions which have been attempted seem to place the essence
of literature in its capacity to evoke emotional effect. The
Encyclopedia Britanica says of literature thus: "As an art,
literature is the organization of words to give pleasure;
through them it elevates and transforms experience; through
them it functions in society as a continuing symbolic criticism
of values."[3] Notably, I.A. Richards saw poetry as "a mode of

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[3]Kenneth Rexroth, "Art of Literature", in Encyclopedia
Britannica, [Macropaedia, Vol. 10, 1980]: p. 1041.

communication", and regarded his works of literary criticism
as a "treatise on the art and science of intellectual and
emotional navigation."[4] Before Richards, Tolstoy had spoken of
art as a way of communication; art is a means of infectioniza-
tion of feelings. He pointed out to separate good and
necessary art from bad and harmful art. To him, the good art
is the real, important and spiritual food, and the most
important criterion for the justification of good art is the
sincerity of the writers having experienced the feelings
communicated.[5] This view is reminiscent of Plato who holds
that poetry is the music for the soul.

Among the poets themself, the literary values center
around such notions as fascination, emotion, affection, beauty,
imagination, creation and ecstasy. For Edgar Allan Poe,
"poetry is the rhythmical creation of beauty." For Wordsworth,
"poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions." For
Matthew Arnold, "poetry is the most beautiful, impressive and
widely effective mode of saying things." Interestingly, for
Voltaire, "poetry says more in a few words than prose in many
words." All these seem to be different ways of saying "poetry

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[4]I.A. Richards, Practical Criticism, [London: Routledge,
1966], p. 11.

[5]Leo Tolstoy, "Art as Communication", in Artistic
Expression, edited by John Hospers, [New York: Meredith, 1971],
pp. 7 - 15.

is music in words, while music is poetry in sound."[6] Shelley,
who was most vigorous among poets in the attempt to defend
poetry, once said: "Poetry is the record of the best and
happiest moments of the happiest and best minds."[7] Peter
Westland, a literary scholar, writing about literature sought
to define the term in Shakespeare's verse as follows:

> The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact...
> The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
> And, as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.[8]

All these altogether unhappily led the positivists to think
that poetry contains nothing else other than the expression of
the basic attitude. For the positivists, for example, the
word 'heaven' in Shakespeare's verse above does not belong to
the verifiable ontological category of words, like 'the moon',

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[6] Joseph J. Brain, Poetry and Prose, [New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1967], p. 7.

[7] Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, edited by
John E. Jordan, [New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1965], p. 72.

[8] Peter Westland, Literary Appreciation, [London: The
English University Press, 1966], p. 158.

'the sun' or 'the stars', but only to a category of words of
flatus-vocis utterances which serve merely for the expression
of the basic attitude which is, in another word, unjustified
(false) belief. In a certain respect, for the positivists, the
word 'heaven' is meaningless.

Consisted in the problem of essential definition of
literature is the question of how to discriminate works of
literature from works of the other enterprises or organizations,
for example, the writings of theologists, metaphysicians,
journalists, and scientists. As Kenneth Rexroth observed:
"Literature is a form of human expression. But not everything
expressed in words - even when organized and written down - is
counted as literature."[9] Notably, according to a lexical
definition, the word in the dictionary, those writings are counted
as literature, but not as literature of the artistic concept.
In fact or in practice, there are cases in which a piece of writings
is regarded at a time as literature and not as literature at
another time, for example, the Bhagavad Giitaa. Kenneth Rexroth
noted that the nature of artistic merit is less easy to define
than to recognize.

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[9]Kenneth Rexroth, "Art of Literature", in Encyclopedia
Britannica, [Macropaedia, Vol. 10, 1980] : p. 1041.

The logic or grammar which underlies this difficulty is, in my recognition, the phenomenon of the problem between the attributive and the noun, or in other words, between the predicate and the subject. Stephen D. Ross in his Theory of Art exemplified the case by observing that Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov is generally recognized as a piece of philosophical literature whereas Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling is that of literary philosophy.[10] And in Literature and Philosophy, Ross devoted the whole book to contend and show that although "some art is best viewed in terms of criteria independent of content, it does not follow that all literature should be viewed." Against the positivists, he argued that it can not be maintained that linguistic utterances ever serve solely one or another function. The quotation below may be regarded as a summary of his contention.

> There is something particularly sublime about novels that not only succeed in purely literary terms, but contain and develop ideas of great philosophic worth without destruction of the literary values.[11]

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[10]Stephen David Ross, A Theory of Art, [Albany: State University of New York, 1982], p. 29.

[11]Stephen D. Ross, Literature and Philosophy, [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969], p. 12.

In his Theory of Literature, René Wellek seems to agree
with the above view. There is a practice to define literature
by limitting it to 'great books', or books which, whatever
their subjects, are 'notable for literary form or expression'.
He suggested that the view of 'great books' selection was
highly commendable for pedagogical purposes. "Here", he noted,
"the criterion is either aesthetic worth alone or aesthetic
worth in combination with general intellectual distinction."[12]
This view, in other words, may be identified with an ostensive
ceremony of definition. That is: 'literature' is that which is
exemplified by these books: Bhagavad Giitaa, Ramayana, the
Bible, Paradise Lost, Hamlet, Macbeth, War and Peace, The
Brathers Karamazov, Pra Abhai Mani, and etc. . However, Wellek
disagreed with the trend to define literature by identifying
with the history of civilization since this view implies "a
denial of the specific field and specific method of literary
study."[13] After all, Eagleton appeared to diverse from the
traditional 'great-books' view. The term 'literature', for
him, covers a wide range, ranking from Milton to Bob Dylan.
Thus, he wrote:

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[12]René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature,
2d ed., [New York: Penguin Books, 1978], p. 21.

[13]Ibid., p. 20.

My own view is that it is most useful to see 'literature' as a name which people give from time to time for different reasons to certain kinds of writing within a whole field of what Michel Foucault has called 'discursive practices', and that if anything is to be an object of study it is this whole field of practices rather than just those sometimes rather obscurely labelled 'literature'.[14]

Carnap's view that literatrue has a close relationship with mythology, theology and metaphysics is remarkable and supported. In his Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy, McLean began his anthology with the introductory view that : "The origins of Greek philosophy can be traced back in part to myth".[15] D.M. Mackinnon ended up his The Problem of Metaphysics with a confession that the problems had not been solved, noting in the last paragraph that:

> The questions with which we must engage are often conceptual; but more particularly they concern the hardly traceable relations of ontology, tragedy, poetry, religion. None may be swollowed up in the other and all alike are made aware that they stand in uneasy relation with the world of scientific description and explanation.[16]

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[14]Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, Ibid., p. 205.

[15]George F. McLean and Patrick J. Aspell, Readings in Ancient Western Philosophy, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970 , p.3

[16]D.M. Mackinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974 , p. 170

To conclude, what must be noted here is the demarcation case in the area of literature is similar to that in the area of science. Whereas science encounters the problem as to what is and what is not 'science', in literature too there is such a problem as to what is and what is not 'literature'. One thing pointed out from the passage above is it is hardly possible to draw the definite demarcation lines between ontology, tragedy, poetry and religion. Yet, still they are distinguishing and characterize their own lives. This problem will be discussed in the following sections.

In his article "The Attack on Literature", Wellek made a list of negative reactions to the practice of the literary art, and pointed out that the hostility resulted from the failure to recognize quality as a criterion of literature - the "quality that may be either aesthetic or intellectual, but which in either case sets off a specific realm of verbal expression from daily transactions in language."[17] Wellek then traced the history of the term 'literature' and found that the term was used differently in different periods of time and in different cultures and societies. According to his findings, the term was used in the earlier period to refer to all kinds of writing, including works of erudite nature, history, theology,

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[17]Rene Wellek, "The Attack on Literature", in The Attack on Literature and Other Essays, [Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982], p. 12.

philosophy and even natural science. "Only very slowly was the
term narrowed down to what we today call <u>imaginative literature</u>."[18]
Although it might not be a necessary condition to know the origin
of the use of the term 'literature' in order to determine the
essence of literature, knowing the history of the term may help
give a better understanding of the literary enterprise and its
relation to the other enterprises.

So far, it has been shown that, philosophers and
literary scholars can not determine unanimously as to what
literature is. Scholars appear to agree that it is impossible
to give a definite definition. The fact that the term
'literature' had been used to cover all kinds of writing
including the natural sciences is note-worthy and important.
Literature then was not devoid of cognitive content or not only
meant for emotional gratification. And the art of rhetoric is
merely an aspect of the writings. According to the old concept
of the term, literature was not meant only to contain the
rhetorical display or expression of the basic attitude. The
change of the use of the term may be regarded as consequence
of the change of the culture, the world-view and of language
itself. Man's mentality has been changing through the whole
history and along the (conceived) flow of time. In the light
of this fact, we are brought to recognize that the people who
lived in the early stage of the present civilization, e.g. the

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[18]Ibid., p. 15.

Hindus before the age of Buddha, might conceive of literature in a different way from the ninteenth century people. For them, literature might consist of a 'scientific' explanation and the 'explanation' to them was a 'successful' one. The nexus of words 'scientific', 'explanation' and 'successful' all had different meanings from ours. According to T.S. Kuhn, their language and our language are incommensurable.[19]

However, some essential features of literature can be recognized. Wellek's term 'imaginative literature' implies that literature is the work of imagination. At the present day, man has not had a science of some kind like 'a logic of imagination', and hence imagination remains to be a very subtle and mysterious faculty of the human mind. This results in that a work of art is often misunderstood. Speaking about the nature of literature, Wellek pointed out that "a literary work of art is not a simple object but rather a highly complex organization of a stratified character with multiple meanings and relationships."[20] The subtlety and complexity of the literary art constitutes another feature: that proper interpretations are required in order to understand the literary work. Another feature, since

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[19]Thomas S. Kuhn, "Metaphor in Science", in Metaphor and Thought, edited by Andrew Ortony [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], p. 416.

[20]Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, [London: Penguin Books, 1978], 2d ed, p. 27.

literature embraces the art of speech or letters, is the emphasis of a high value of rhetoric. The last feature to be listed here is the richness in metaphor.

The literary language is sometimes referred to as the metaphorical language. Beardsley once spoke of metaphors as the "nuclei of poetic meaning."[21] In this chapter, I will point out that the matter of truth and the cognitive contents in literature is connected with a proper understanding of metaphor. That truth and the cognitive contents will be recognized through the proper understanding of metaphor. Or, at least, that the recognition of truth consists in the recognition of the epistemic tributes of metaphors which are prevalent in literature. Metaphors constitute a distinctive feature of literature.

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[21]Monroe C. Beardley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, [New York: Harcourt, 1958], p. 134.

5.2 The language of literature.

Language is the medium of literature as marble or bronze or clay are the materials of the sculptor. "But", as Wellek demanded, "one should realize that language is not mere inert matter like stone but is itself a creation of man and is thus charged with the cultural heritage of a linguistic group."[22] Before Wellek, Sapir had written that language as the medium of literature comprises two layers. These are the latent content of language or our intuitive record of experience and the particular conformation of a given language or the specific how of our record of experience.[23] This led Sapir to the view that literary works are divided into two types. One is translatable without a loss of character while the other is not. According to Sapir, "every language has its distinctive peculiarities", and literature then which moves in the individual language is inevitably infected with those distinctive peculiarities.[24] Conforming to this view, Sapir once wrote: "Many primitive languages have a formal richness, a latent luxuriance of expression, that eclipses anything known to the languages of

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[22] Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature, [London: Penguin Books, 1978], 2d ed, p. 22.

[23] Edward Sapir, Language, [London: Granada Publishing] 1978, p. 223.

[24] Ibid., p. 222.

modern civilization."[25] The conclusive point is that language is complex, subtle and not an inert material. This entails that literature which essentially employs language as the medium is also complex.

There have been several answer to I.A. Richards' Emotive Theory of language, and simultaneously objections to his Independence Theory as well. According to Morris Weitz, Richards' assertion that the language of literature was primarily emotive and hence incapable of truth or falsity "is based not upon the sentences he found there in literature but primarily upon his conviction that we would get the most from literature if we read it his way." The best, the positive aesthetic way, he decided, was to read it as collections of items intimately associated with our conative-affective life.[26] That the reading somehow evokes certain responses which are naturally stocked in our conative-affective life. However, Weitz did not entirely agree. In Weitz's view, "language, as it actually operates, is not logically univocal but has many uses and many different kinds of conditions for its uses."[27] Weitz insisted upon a variety of employments of language. To

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[25]Ibid., p. 22.

[26]Morris Weitz, "Truth in Literature", in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, edited by John Hospers, [New York: Free Press, 1969] , p. 215.

[27]Morris Weitz, Hamlet and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism, [London: Faber and Faber, 1972] , p. 227.

him, each employments is irreducible to others and has its own
characteristic point. He granted that, concerning the aesthetic
corollary of language, we ought to construe the whole of
literature as the fictional use of language. But he contended
that for certain works of literature their distinctive feature
is the combination of narration and commentary upon it. That
besides the fictional elements there is "the shift from narration
to what seems to function as generalizations about the world."[28]
There are suggested or implied theses which are capable of
being assessed as true or false.

In his article "Problems of Aesthetics", John Hospers
asked what it means to say that "art is an expression of human
feeling." He pointed out to distinguish between 'a process' and
'the product resulting from that process.' To his experience,
a person can recognize certain melodies as being sad without
feeling sad himself. He conceded that "the word of art can
properly be said to contain or embody feeling qualities." But
he argued that it is not necessary to say that the work of art
is expressive of feeling qualities; "it is only necessary to
say that it has them — that it is sad or embodies sadness as a
property."[29]

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[28]Morris Weitz, "Truth in Literature", Ibid., p. 218.

[29]John Hospers, "Problems of Aesthetics", in The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, [London:
Collier-Macmillan, 1967], Vol. 1, p. 48.

Huw Morris-Jones in his article "The Language of Feelings" appeared to confirm Richards' position when he stressed the necessary of connexion between art and feeling, that art and religion tells us nothing, and that what art does is to have an emotional effect. But he contradicted himself when he said: "...the artist explores and exploits the changing ways of feeling and gives them a habitation and a name."[30] Since in that case the subject-matter of the artist's study is feeling. He observes the phenomenon of feeling occurring in human beings as an aspect of sentient beings. And his exploitation may be regarded as consisting in a process of experimentation. Feeling is indeed a manifestation of what is usually called 'the inner life', which cannot be ignored if one wants to have a complete understanding of mankind.

Actually, it is not only the poetical language which can produce emotional effects, because the other kinds of writing also have the same effects. Nevertheless, the emotive theory of artistic expression holds that the literary art causes a very special emotional effect, an harmonious adjustment of impulses, a personal attitude, not otherwise obtainable. Macdonald in her "The Language of Fiction", agreed that usually works of fiction are emotionally charged, that emotional

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[30]Huw Morris-Jones, "The Language of Feelings", in Aesthetics in the Modern World, edited by Harold Osborne, [London: Thames and Hudson, 1968], p. 102.

relationships play a large part in most fiction. But she
confessed that she herself could not provide such effects and
attitude from her experience of reading fiction, and that no
independent evidence of any such pervasive effect is offered.
She contended that when we are reading War and Peace, it is not
that we are primarily interested in either Tolstoy or ourselves
but, rather, in the presentation of characters, actions and
situations. She argued that to maintain the role of fictional
language merely as such would result in that "the vast panorama
of the novel shrinks into triviality as the instrument of the
emotional adjustments of Tolstoy and his readers." Macdonald
then concluded that "the characteristic which differentiates
fictional sentences from those which state facts is not that
the former exclusively express anybody's emotions, though many
of them have a very vital connection with emotion."[31] She
stressed further that "in fiction language is used to create.
For it is this which chiefly differentiates it from factual
statement. A storyteller performs; he does not - or not
primarily - inform or misinform. To tell a story is to
originate, not to report."[32]

[31] Margaret Macdonald, "The Language of Fiction", in
Art and Philosophy, edited by W.E. Kennick, [New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1964] , p. 302.

[32] Ibid., p. 302.

Hungerland in her article "Language and Poetry"
contended that the descriptive-emotive classification has
resulted not from a careful study of the myraid forms and
functions of language but from a dogmatic tradition or
psychological speculations. She held the position that in the
case of language, there are many different ways of having
meaning, or being meaningful. It might be true that the poetic
language has the highest tone of emotive utterance but this
cannot be considered apart from the listener's knowledge of the
linguistic conventions. "A word or sentence", she noted, "will
have emotive meaning as distinguished from just an emotive
effect, if our disposition to be affected emotionally by it
results from our learning its common linguistic uses."[33] She
argued that there is no clear-cut and that we cannot group
words into the dichotomical divisions. There are many factors
which constitute the meanings of an utterance. "Attitudes,
feelings, and emotions come in bundles." Also, what is, in
sum, conveyed by a piece of discourse depends on more than
diction and construction. What is selected for report or
description and the circumstances of the utterance enter in,
too."[34] A remarkable point of her argument is her admonition
of language evolution. She wrote:

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[33]Isabel C. Hungerland, "Language and Poetry", in Art
and Philosophy, edited by W.E. Kennick, [New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1964], p. 156.

[34]Ibid., p. 188.

We should remember that language has had an evolution, that it was not invented for classifiers, and hence we should be prepared to acknowledge forms and functions that cut across otherwise tidy groupings. We should also remember that evolution has not ended.[35]

Yevgeny Basin referred to Hotopf, Richards' staunch disciple, in his criticism of Richards' theory of the dichotomy of language. Hotopf argued that it is possible to have a neutral exposition which is not persuasive and at the same time not scientific, e.g. the language of instructions. And there cannot be a sharp division between the emotive and referential uses of language from the point of view of psychological practice either.

There can be no such thing as a pure referential use, for it will always contain certain human interests, the satisfaction of the speaker's requirements. Hotopf holds that the thesis that poetry is purely emotive, only concerned with the harmonising of the personality, is an extreme view, and perhaps the "main weakness of Richards' theory."[36]

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[35]Ibid., p. 159.

[36]Yevgeny Basin, Semantic Philosophy of Art, [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979], p. 41.

As a marxist aesthetician, Basin contended that Richards failed
to recognize the social milieu between man and the world. He
noted, applausibly, that Richards' neo-positivist position's
error consists in

> his ignoring the problems of the theory of reflection, and
> the epistemological questions of art, regarding them as
> devoid of scientific sense, and ... in his failure properly
> to understand the socio-historical essence of art and the
> communicative processes which correspond to its nature.[37]

Discussions on the language of literature also eventually
lead to the questions concerning the speaker of the language as
to, e.g., who speaks the language and how he speaks the language.
These questions may be understood as the problem of the
utterance of literature. According to Beardsley's assumption
about the nature of discourse, "a discourse is a connected
utterance in which _something_ is being said by _somebody_ about
something."[38] Beardsley saw that even though the words might
be tapped out by a chimpanzee or carved into a cliff by wind
and rain, they have this triple aspect. Concerned with the
literary utterance, Beardsley then remarked that: "In every
literary work, therefore, there is first of all an implicit

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[37]Ibid., p. 42.

[38]Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the
Philosophy of Criticism, [New York: Harcourt, 1958] , p. 238.

speaker, or voice: he whose words the work purports to be."[39]
Later he wrote: "The speaker is not to be identified with the
author of the work, nor can we learn more of the speaker than
he reveals in the poem, say, by studying the life of the
author."[40]

Namely, it is suggested that one separate Shakespeare
as a member of the English society from Shakespeare who gives
birth to the words which totally are related and form a
composition of the story of Hamlet. And 'Hamlet Shakespeare'
is not either to be identical with 'Macbeth Shakespeare'. This
view is advocated by G. Gabril, a theorist of the empirical
science of literature which has been recently established. For
this school, the interpretation of the literary work is
independent of the author's realization of the significance of
the work.[41]

[39]Ibid., p. 238.

[40]Ibid., p. 238.

[41]Gottfried Gabriel, "Fiction and Truth, Reconsidered",
in Poetics 11, [Summer 1982], p. 544.

Wellek gave the most remarkable contention. He argued
that the theory of emotive language is not sufficient to
distinguish the language of literature from the language of
science. Literature does contain thought while emotional
language is by no means confined to literature. In his view,
'the ideal scientific language is purely 'denotative': it aims
at a one-to-one correspondence between sign and referent." And
since the sign" is completely arbitrary, ...it can be replaced
by equivalent signs. The sign is also transparent; that is,
without drawing attention to itself, it directs us unequivocally
to its referents."[42] Thus scientific language tends towards
such a system of signs as mathematics or symbolic logic.

Wellek contended that literary language is far from
merely referential. It is highly 'connotative'. Wellek found
it false to limit the function of language merely to commu-
nication. Language also serves a child who talks for hours
without listeners. Literary language has its expressive side;
it conveys the tone and attitude of the speaker or writer. And
it does not merely state and express what it says; it also wants
to influence the attitude of the reader, persuade him, and
ultimately change him. According to Wellek, the poetic
reference is to a world of fiction, of imagination.

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[42] Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, <u>Theory of Literature</u>,
[London: Penguin Books, 1978] , 2d ed., pp. 22 - 23.

...the distinctions between the literary use and the
scientific use seem clear: literary language is far more
deeply involved in the historical structure of the language;
it stresses the awareness of the sign itself; it has its
expressive and pragmatic side which scientific language will
always want so far as possible to minimize.[43]

Apparently, Wellek preferred the 'denotative-connotative'
distinction rather than the 'emotive-referential' dichotomy. To
him the literary language does refer, but he did not elaborate
the referential aspect of the poetic language. I agree with
Wellek when he said: "Poetic language organizes, tightens, the
resources of everyday language, and sometimes does even violence
to them, in an effort to force us into awareness and attention."[44]
I think this 'force' consists in the rhetorical aspect of poetic
language.

But I don't agree with him on the matter of reference
and referent. I don't agree that poetic language refers to only
the world of imagination. So far this thesis has not treated
the problem of reference. This will be done in the following
section about 'metaphor'. Metaphor is usually respected as an
essential component of poetic language. I will contend that
metaphor has its own distinctive significance other than the
rhetorical feature. I will point out that the cognitive content
or the cognitive value of literature consists in the metaphoric
aspect of poetic language.

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[43]Ibid., p. 23.

[44]Ibid., p. 24.

Now, it must be noted that <u>the positivists view that
the language of literature is metaphorical language</u>. And the
use of metaphorical language, in their view, is merely a
matter of rhetoric, and thus, according to them, metaphors are
not necessary for the communication of scientific information
or discovery of what they call 'knowledge'. In short, they
view that the metaphoric language has no cognitive value.

Hence, in the following sections, I will argue that the
positivist assumption of the metaphorical language, which is
the central basis of their relegation of literature, is a
misunderstanding. I will contend that the positivists fail to
understand literature properly because they suffer from their
lack of proper investigation of the linguistic phenomenon of
metaphor. Metaphors, I will point out, do have truth-values.

5.3 Metaphor and human knowledge.

This thesis is concerned with the cognitive aspects of metaphor. Documentally, the importance of metaphor has been recognized since Aristotle in the western world of philosophical discussion. But the study of metaphor was focused merely on its rhetorical aspects. Only until in the recent time has philosophers begun to recognize its epistemic attributes, its functions in the acquisition and communication of knowledge. "Metaphor", wrote Beardsley, "is a linguistic phenomenon of peculiar philosophical interest and importance because its use in various domains raises puzzling questions about the nature and limits of language and knowledge."[45]

According to the general concept, the term 'metaphor' is taken to be contrasted with the term 'literalness' (or 'literality'); and 'metaphorical' with 'literal' respectively. By common definition, and by etymology, 'a metaphor is a transfer of meaning, both in intension and extension.'[46] Every metaphor consists of and can be analyzed into two parts : the subject and the object or complement in the general grammar terminology. In the philosophical study of metaphor, these two parts are differently named by different philosophers : for example, 'tenor' and 'vehicle' by I.A. Richards; 'subject' and 'modifier' by Beardsley; 'the principal subject' and 'the subsidiary subject'

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[45]Monroe C. Beardsley, "Metaphor", in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (Macmillan : 1967), Vol. 5, p. 284.

[46]Ibid., p. 285.

by Max Black; and 'the primary subject' and 'the secondary sub-
ject' by Richard Boyd. Boyd gave a note-worthy label of termi-
nology, however, since exactly he wrote 'the primary literal
subject and the secondary metaphorical subject'. Principally,
most philosophers agree that there are different and several
classes of metaphors, or in other words different metaphors
belong to different levels of linguistic expressions.

One of the puzzling natures of language is the prevalence
of metaphor in every individual natural language. An even more
puzzling fact about metaphor is that it is not always true or
necessary that the native speaker of a natural language will
understand the communication expressed in terms of metaphor
better than the people foreign to that language. This is a
problem of philosophical interest. Its parallel question is how
it comes about that the people can grasp the sense of the meta-
phor, for a metaphor is not an ordinary (or plainly) use of
language. The use of metaphor has been realized since man knew
to speak a language. According to Levin, there is a theory
which formulates that the human natural language grows on dead
metaphors. Metaphors, when they are familiarized, become frozen
or dead; and thus shift into the literal stage. Literal language,
then, consists of dead metaphors.[47]

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[47]Samuel R. Levin, The Semantics of Metaphors, (London:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 30-32.

5.3.1 Positivistic view of metaphor

The positivists explains the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor by proposing Emotive Theory. According to Davies, the "Emotive Theory maintains that metaphors are unverifiable and, hence, meaningless". Metaphors, they suggests, interest us inspite of their lack of a cognitive content because they possess an emotive content.[48] I.A. Richards, although it was he who, after Aristotle, seemed first to notice some important aspects of metaphor and even innovated, in his The Philosophy of Rhetoric, novel study of metaphor, also upheld this view. When we say "Man is a worm", he wrote, "we are not making statements, not even false statements; we are most probably using words merely to evoke certain attitude".[49]

However, about ten years later I.A. Richards appeared to change his view, he came to recognize more aspects of metaphor. He criticized the traditional theory that it

....made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by

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[48] Stephen Davies, "Truth-Values and Metaphors", in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XLII, No. 3, [Spring 1984], p. 299.

[49] C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, Ibid., p. 149.

comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom.[50]
For him, "The language of the greatest poetry is frequently
abstract in the extreme and its aim is precisely to send us
'gliding through an abstract process'.[51] Prior to this, he
wrote : "Language, losing its subtlety with its suppleness, would
lose also its power to serve us.[52] Notably, he even suggested
a dream that "with enough improvement in Rhetoric we may in time
learn so much about words that they will tell us how our minds
work".[53] Rhetoric, he proposed, should be a study of misunder-
standing and its remedies.

5.3.2 Metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and simile

There are some other features of language which
appear to be closely associated with metaphor. These are
metonymy and synecdoche and simile. Metonymy is a much less
familiar term than metaphor, and is closely associated with
synecdoche. Writing on metaphor and metonymy, David Lodge
referred to Lanhan and Jakobson. Lanhan defined metonymy as
"the substitution of part for the whole, genus for species or
vice versa", and in Jakobson's scheme, metonymy includes synec-
doche.[54] According to Lodge, rhetoricians and critics from

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[50]I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 94.

[51]Ibid., p. 129.

[52]Ibid., p. 73.

[53]Ibid., p. 136.

[54]David Lodge, The Modes of Modern Writing, (London:
Edward Arnold, 1977), p. 75.

Aristotle to the present day have generally regarded metonymy and synecdoche as forms or subspecies of metaphor.[55]

Lodge, however, does not agree. He agreed with Jakobson's notion of language : that language, like other systems of signs, has a twofold character. Its use involves two operations - selection and combination. He quoted Jakobson thus : "Speech implies a selection of certain linguistic entities and their combination into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity".[56] "Metaphor", Lodge wrote, "belongs to the selection axis of language; metonymy and synecdoche belong to the combination axis of language".[57] The key term which Lodge suggested for the distinction between metaphor and metonymy or synecdoche is "deletion". "Metonymies and synecdoches are condensations of contexture". "Contexture" means "the process by which any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit". Lodge summed up his notion of the distinction as follows :

> Metonymy and synecdoche, in short, are produced by deleting one or more items from a natural combination, but not the items it would be most natural to omit : this illogicality is equivalent to the coexistence of similarity and dissimilarity in metaphor.[58]

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[55] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[56] Ibid., p. 74.

[57] Ibid., p. 76.

[58] Ibid., p. 76.

Nevertheless, the problem still remains. There is no criterion to tell that one should understand a linguistic unit (a sentence) as produced by 'deleting one or more items from a natural combination' or as 'the coexistence of similarity and dissimilarity'. Perhaps, Romeo, when he says 'Juliet is the sun' he means 'Juliet is the soul that is a member or part of the Mother-Sun. Juliet is an agent or an entity that genuinely belongs to the Sun-Empire. And that Juliet is not an outsider or outcast or an alien agent in a foreign, exotic territory. Juliet is not not-part of the sun'. Or, Romeo may not mean this and the words just come through his mouth which he does not understand them at the moment. He may consider his utterance as being emotive which he may later say it again in another way such that 'The sun is the best thing to me and Juliet too is the best thing to me, so Juliet and the sun share the same similiarity of being the best thing to me'. It is, however, arbitrary and absurd to let alone the speaker to be the sole criterion of his meaning.

Simile is distinctively separated. And, in my viewpoint, it is with the presence of simile as a background against which metaphor and metonymy and synecdoche may be seen clearer and understood better. The figurative language of simile does not concern the notion or the problem or question of the concept of appearance and reality, while those of metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche obviously do. The language of simile yields simply a comparison of the two subjects. But metaphor and the others denote more than just comparison. In other words, metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche do violence to

the system of reference fixing, and hence tackle the system and problem of belief. <u>In this thesis, I adopt the view of those critics and rhetoricians who regard metonymy and synecdoche as forms or subspecies of metaphor.</u> I will contend in the following sections that because metaphor does violence to the system of reference, the language of metaphor should not be considered devoid of cognitive value. That metaphor should be ascribed with epistemic attribution.

5.3.3 Religious teaching and mysteries of metaphor

That metaphors are most prevalent or pervasive in religious teaching is well recognized. All the important prophets are said to have a good command of metaphor and poetical language. Khemananda[*], a Zen master, once gave an interview to

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[*]Khemananda is author of several books of poems and essays. He writes both in Thai and English. His recent famous book of poems written in English is The Valley. Gap of the Bangkok Post wrote of him as follows : "Khemananda is one of the four pen names of Kovit Anaketham, a 45-year-old guiding light in both Dharmma and literary circles. A professionally-trained artist from Silpakorn University who, after graduation in 1965, has held many different kinds of jobs. He taught art at a technical college, led an ecclesiastic life as a student of Bhuddadhasa, ...[but only after he had met Luangpor Tian Chittasupoe did he come to see Truth in his own light], lived in [Germany,] Australia and Singapore as a monk and founded the well-known Ariyabha Foundation - a non-sectarian society for the study and practice of religions and cultures". (Bangkok Post, Sunday July 1, 1984).

a magazine in which he said that Lord Buddha and Jesus Christ are poets.[59] Bunyat Ruangsri in his study "Buddhist Metaphor" affirmed that metaphor is one of the main features in the teaching of Lord Buddha which renders Buddha to present to his disciples an access to truth and understanding.[60] The Alkoran, too, in its original language is said to be a language of metaphor and poetry. This view that prophets are in a sense poets is supported by Munro S. Edmonson in his Lore : An Introduction to the Science of Folklore and Literature. "Poetry", he wrote, "grapples with the hard problems of ..... sharing meanings not readily shared".[61]

Metaphor has predominated in the language of religions and arts since the time of those great prophets and great poets. In those regions, metaphor does not only serve as a choice of linguistic expressions which is usually understood plainly as a figurative kind of language employed merely for the purpose of decoration, but is purposefully and naturally needed for the teaching. In Matthew, Book 13, of the Bible, Jesus said overtly why he had to teach by parables in which the messages were transmitted or communicated in terms of and by virtue of

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[59] กองบรรณาธิการ, "สัมภาษณ์ รุ่งอรุณ ณ สนธยา", ใน นิตยสารสู่ฝัน, ฉบับที่ 3 ปี 2527, หน้า 51.

[60] บัญญัติ เรื่องศรี, "บทบรรยายประกอบภาพเลื่อน เรื่อง พุทธอุปมาอุปไมย", ใน ศึกษาศาสตร์ตามแนวพุทธศาสตร์, สำนักงานคณะกรรมการวัฒนธรรมแห่งชาติ, กระทรวงศึกษาธิการ, หน้า 35-80.

[61] Munro S. Edmonsun, Lore : An Introduction to the Science of Folklore and Literature, [New York: Holt, Rinechart and Winston, 1971], p. 134.

metaphor. Explicit in Jesus' answer* is the implication that metaphor enlightens and draws in some people while also mystifies or guards against some other people. Although it is said frankly or explicity, his explicit statement remains mysterious. The mystery lies in the nature of metaphor which might be respected to be a case of linguistic phenomena which itself equally needs an explanation.

Metaphors run through the whole books of the Bible. Once Jesus said to a woman who came and fell at his feet asking for his help to her sick daughter : "It isn't right to take the children's food and throw it to the dogs". He claimed that he had been sent only to "the lost sheep".[62] Implicit in Jesus' parables are typical or prominent metaphors such that : some people are his children; some are dogs; some are the lost sheep that he is sent to fetch and then, some others are not. And, among the people, some men are sheep, some are wolves, some are snakes and some are crocodiles. These metaphors have been pervasive into the lore and literature. It has been generally accepted that religions have a tremendous influence directly or

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*The Bible reads thus : "Jesus answered, 'The knowledge about the secrets of the Kingdom of heaven has been given to you, but not to them..... The reason I use parables in talking to them is that they look, but do not see, and they listen, but do not hear or understand.'"

[62]American Bible Society, Good News Bible, [New York : American Bible Society, 1976], Matthew 15.24-26.

indirectly, on literature. These examples of metaphors may be regarded to consist in Jesus' paradigm case of metaphors. They are in a sense the strong cases of metaphors.

Jesus' answer and the implication implies further or leads to a recognition that metaphors are employed in the religious teaching not only on the purpose to reveal or to present the message but also to cover the message. In this perspective, the metaphor works as a linguistic obstacle. For example, in Jesus' case of metaphors, what might be called 'his knowledge' or the message (provided that Jesus is sincere and he really has 'a knowledge') is transmitted verbally but it is hedged in metaphors. In this case, the metaphorical expression filters the understanding of the audience, individually. My point is that this feature of metaphor has an epistemological provocation concerning the mystery of metaphor. Notably, Jesus' linguistic application and manipulation somehow indirectly discloses that there is something to be known in his metaphors, e.g. his theory of man and his theory of reference.

The above account of the feature of metaphor as the hedge or filter denotes that the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor is mysterious. The mystery of metaphor, however, may be analyzed into two sorts. That Jesus has a knowledge and he covers his knowledge in metaphors, the mysterious nature of metaphor in this sense may be elucidated with the words 'secret' and 'cryptical'. The mystery of this sense belongs, it might be termed, to the cryptical sort. It concerns the question as to what is the message itself. But this account is formulated on the presupposition that Jesus could transmit or communicate his

message in a non-metaphoric way. Here we are met with a big difficulty in the philosophy of language. There are different theories dealing with this problem. However, they can be categorized into two divisions. The one holds that the metaphorical expression can be replaced by the (so-called) literal expression; the other contends that a metaphor is unique and hence cannot be replaced. At any rate, this problem is the other side of the same coin of the mysterious nature of the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor itself. That is whether Jesus could transmit his knowledge in a non-metaphoric way is itself another question, is mysterious. The mysterious nature of metaphor in this sense might be elucidated with a cluster of modifiers : they are 'subtle', 'esoteric', 'complex', 'ambiguous' and 'imprecise' which is in fact a linguistic and philosophical matter. In short, the mystery of this sort is <u>linguistic</u>. The question concerning the nature of metaphor has been recognized to establish a problem in epistemology.

<u>5.3.4 Metaphor and the language of science.</u>

Metaphors are integral to our use of language in scientific theory as much as in poetry and common discourse. Recently, philosophers have realized that metaphors play a role in the development of scientific understanding. That is – metaphors function in scientific discovery, and in the formulation and transmission of new theories.[63] At the present, metaphor is

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[63]Andrew Ortony, "Metaphor : A Multidimensional Problem", <u>in Metaphor and Thought</u>, edited by Andrew Ortony, [Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979], p. 14.

one of the topics of special interest among philosophers of science as well as philosophers of language. Presently, since it is recognized that metaphors are also integral in science, many philosophers have come to discuss the nature and function of metaphors in the growth of human knowledge.

Here below are examples of metaphors found and listed from different papers of discussion in philosophy of science.

1. Language has a content, and it <u>floats</u> above reality like a bubble above the earth.

    (R.L. Goodstein : "Language and Experience")

2. All matter is involved in a continual <u>cosmic dance</u>.

    (Fritjof Capra : "The New Vision of Reality")

3. If these philosophers regarded the acceptance of a system of entities as a theory, an assertion, they were <u>victims</u> of the same old, metaphysical confusion.

    (Rudolf Carnap : "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology")

4. My desk is a <u>swarm</u> of vibrating molecules.

    (W.V. Quine : "Posits and Reality")

5. The brain is a sort of computer.

    (Richard Boyd : "Metaphor and Theory Change")

6. Language is a labyrinth.

    (Max Black : "The Labyrinth of Language")

Due to our being accustomed to the linguistic usage of the language of the present stage, these metaphors seem not to belong to the strong case of metaphor. Some may even hold that many of these examples are by no means metaphors. This matter involves the notion of dead metaphors. According to Davies, there is "no

a priori specification of which metaphors will die or of where they will die; a metaphor might die in Germany while continuing to live for German-speakers in Argentina".[64]

At any rate, another bundle of specimen of scientific metaphors which are often mentioned by philosophers discussing on metaphors may be cited as follows : 'the flow of energy', 'the wave of light', 'the field of magnetism', 'the cell of nucleus', 'the black hole', 'the mind's eye', 'worm-holes', 'electron cloud', and (Bohr's description of atoms as) 'miniature solar systems', etc.. However, some philosophers still argue that these are not metaphors. What is significant is that for some people these terms are prima facie metaphors, while for others they are prima facie not metaphors. This problem, in fact, consists in the problem of 'what is metaphor' itself.

Andrew Ortony in the introduction of his anthology Metaphor and Thought has summed up a pack of questions concerning the linguistic mystery of metaphor. These are listed below.[65]

1. How can metaphorical language be distinguished from literal language ?

2. How literal is literal language ?

3. Is the problem of metaphor one to be handled by a theory of language, a theory of language use, or both ?

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[64]Stephen Davies, "Truth-Values and Metaphors", in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XLII, No. 3, [Spring 1984], p. 301.

[65]Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought, [Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1979], p. 16.

4. Are the comprehension processes for metaphorical uses of language the same as those for literal uses ?

5. Can metaphors be reduced to comparisons ?

6. Is the reduction of metaphors to comparisons a fruitful approach to understanding the nature of metaphor ?

7. Are the comparisons to which one might attempt to reduce a metaphor themselves in need of explanation ?

8. Are metaphors necessary for the transmission of new scientific concepts ?

9. Are metaphors necessary for the transmission of new ideas in general ?

10. What dangers are there associated with the use of metaphors to describe new or problematical situations ?

Clearly, questions item 8-10 concern philosophers of science. But my contention is that items 1-7 must also be in their concern if science is steered to give explanation and 'scientific explanation' is to be provided through the natural language.

As an illustration, in my view, all the above questions may be expressed in my terms. Ortony's questions are tantamount to saying that : If Jesus is sincere and that he really has 'something' to say, why could he not say it out clearly and plainly ? If there really is something to be a knowledge, why must it be transmitted or expressed in terms of metaphor (which is not 'clear' and 'plain')? Even if it is secret, why is 'a knowledge' (especially 'religious knowledge') to be 'a secret'? If he really has 'a knowledge', why can metaphors afford or render him to pass his knowledge to his audience and that why cannot non-metaphorical language serve this purpose?

This illustration involves both the cryptical mystery and the linguistic mystery of metaphor. The cryptical mystery is in fact a challenge to the curious nature of science. As the historical fact characterizes it, the ideal of science is to <u>uncover</u> everything even the infinitestimal particles consisted in the nucleus of the atom. Presumably, the answer to the linguistic mystery will also yield a solution to the cryptical one. The distinction is that the one focuses on the application of metaphor and the metaphoric substance, whereas the other is an attempt to understand the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor itself.

5.3.5 Two views of metaphor

At the present, there are two distinctive theories of metaphor. The study of metaphor is ascribed to Aristotle as the first who ever theorized on the lingistic phenomenon of metaphor. In <u>Rhetoric</u>, Aristotle established the comparison theory of metaphor which is considered by later philosophers to be the special case of the substitution view of metaphor. After Aristotle there had been a long interval, the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor remained unrecognized until philosophy has reached the age of the turn of the modern time. This interval may be understood as the period in which the Aristotelean theory is exercising its influence; philosophers are spelled or trapped in the influence of the substitution theory of metaphor. Although metaphor has been a subject of serious study among the belles-lettres writers, the focus of intention is merely on the practice and conventional interpretation of metaphor rather than on understanding the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor.

Recently, it has been Max Black who began to recognize the philosophical or the epistemic significance of metaphor. Black proposed a rival theory which he termed as "the interaction view" of metaphor. Black purported the theory to be "free from the main defects of substitution and comparison views and to offer some important insight into the uses and limitations of metaphor."[66] Although Black ascribed the foreshadowing or the origin of his theory to I.A. Richards, he was nominated as the inaugurator of the novel study of metaphor. I.A. Richards, however, it must be noted here, contended that metaphors should not be translated or substituted for thus they would lose the emotive contents they purport in their original states. It was Black who introduced the epistemological study of metaphor into the interest of the present philosophers of language and science. This thesis will not expound some other theories of metaphor, for example, the emotive theory, the iconic signification theory, the verbal-opposition theory and (Beardsley's) connotation theory which most philosophers regard to be the special or minor cases of the two leading views.

According to the substitution view, "every metaphorical statement is equivalent to a (perhaps more awkward, or less decorative) literal statement".[67] This means metaphors are not really needed, in the epistemic sense, in our linguistic

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[66] Max Black, "Metaphor", in Art and Philosophy, edited by W.E. Kennick, (New York : St.Martin's Press, 1964), p. 302.

[67] Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?", in Metaphor and Thought, Ibid.,p.356.

approach to truth or knowledge or reality or whatever is the case. That is, metaphors have no genuine epistemic attribute. It is only an accident that the metaphors can work in the communication. In short, this view holds that the genuine attribute of metaphors lies only in the language decoration. Metaphors have only the aesthetical or rhetorical quality or property. As Black noted, "the purpose of metaphor is to entertain and divert."[68]

Max Black noted on the traditional notion of metaphor as follows :

> Whately defines a metaphor as "a word substituted for another on account of the Resemblance or Analogy between their significations".[*] Nor is the entry in the Oxford Dictionary (to jump to modern times) much different from this : "Metaphors : The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable; an instance of this, a metaphorical expression".[69]

This entrenched view, Black observed, may be understood to define metaphor as expressed by Barfield as "saying one thing and meaning another".[70] The characteristic transforming function involved in metaphor in this conception, which Black noted as having been explicated, consists in the notions of analogy

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[68] Max Black, "Metaphor", Ibid., p. 455.

[*] Black footnoted that this is quoted from Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (7th ed., London, 1846), p.280.

[69] Max Black, "Metaphor", Ibid., p. 453.

[70] Ibid., p. 454.

and similarity. Black then characterized this notion of
metaphor :

> If a writer holds that a metaphor consists in the presenta-
> tion of the underlying analogy or similarity, he will be
> taking what I shall call a comparison view of metaphor. .
> When Schopenhaver called a geometrical proof a mousetrap,
> he was, according to such a view, saying (though not expli-
> citly) : "A geometrical proof is like a mousetrap, since
> both offer a delusive reward, entice their victims by
> degrees, lead to disagreeable surprise, etc." This is a
> view of metaphor as a condensed or elliptical simile. It
> will be noticed that a "comparison view" is a special case
> of a "substitution view". For it holds that the metaphori-
> cal statement might be replaced by an equivalent literal
> comparison.[71]

Boyd noted on Black's conception of this view thus : "(the)
successful communication via metaphor involves the hearer
understanding the same respects of similarity or analogy as the
speaker".[72] Ortony gave a concise conclusion of this view of
metaphor that : "metaphors, in other words, are not necessary,
they are just nice". In short, in this view, the use of meta-
phor is essentially ornamental.

Black argued that the substitution view is inade-
quate or defective. "We are headed", Black wrote, "for the
blind alley taken by those innumerable followers of Aristotle

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[71]Ibid., p. 455.

[72]Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change : What is
'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?", Ibid., p. 356.

who have supposed metaphers to be replaceable by literal trans-
lations".[73] As the alternative, he proposed the theory of "the
interaction view". For Black, the sentence 'The poor are the
negroes of Europe' does not merely present some comparison
between the poor and the negroes. Following Richards, he con-
tended that "our 'thoughts' about European poor and (American)
negroes are 'active together' and 'interact' to produce a
meaning that is a resultant of that interaction".[74] Black
quoted and attributed to Richards as the antecident innovator.
Once Richards wrote :

> In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have
> two thoughts of different things active together and
> supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a
> resultant of their interaction.[75]

Black distinguished between two things : the focus
of the metaphor and the frame of the metaphor. In calling a
sentence a case of metaphor, Black wrote, "we are implying that
at least one word .... is being used metaphorically in the
sentence, and that at least one of the remaining words is being
used literally". The metaphorically used word is "the focus
of the metaphor" and the remainder of the sentence in which the

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[73]Max Black, "More about Metaphor", in Metaphor and
Thought edited by Andrew Ortony, [Cambridge : University Press,
1979], p. 22.

[74]Max Black, "Metaphor", Ibid., p. 457.

[75]I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, Ibid.,p.93.

word occurs is "the frame of the metaphor". Black explicated his notion as follows :

> ....in the given context the focal word "negroes" obtains a new meaning, which is not quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute would have. The new context (the 'frame' of the metaphor, in my terminology) imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word. And I take Richards to be saying that for the metaphor to work the reader must remain aware of the extension of meaning - must attend to both the old and the new meanings together.[76]

In " More about Metaphor", Black rethought on this point of the interaction and noted : "The duality of reference is marked by the contrast between the metaphorical statement's focus....and the surrounding literal frame".[77]

Richards Boyd remarked that one facet of Black's position is that he denied that the success of a metaphor rests on its success in conveying to the listener or reader some quite definite respects of similarity or analogy between the principal and secondary subjects. "Metaphors are open-ended than the comparison view would suggest".[78] In his own version, Black wrote : "The metaphorical utterance works by 'projecting upon' the primary subject a set of 'associated implications', comprised

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[76]Max Black, "Metaphor", Ibid., p. 457.

[77]Max Black, "More about Metaphor", Ibid., p. 28.

[78]Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change : What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?", Ibid., p. 356.

in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject".[79] Hausman phrased his perception of Black's view as follows :

> For interactionism, the meanings or sense associated with constituents of metaphors interact so that some of them are changed as they are transferred from the meaning contexts of one term to another – or alternatively, since the implied objectivism need not be at issue for the moment, the hearer interprets the meanings as interacting in this way. The outcome of these changes is a cognitive insight.[80]

Black's strong point is his contention of the creativity of metaphors. He perceives that "a metaphorical statement can sometimes generate new knowledge and insight by changing relationships between the things designated (the principal and subsidiary subjects)".[81] To avoid mistakes, however, he pointed out to distinguish between 'that metaphor creates the similarity' and 'that metaphor formulates some similarity antecedently existing'. He contended "that some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute".[82] If one believes that the world "is necessarily a world under a certain description", he said, " – or a world seen from a certain perspective. Some metaphors can create such

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[79] Max Black, "More about Metaphor", Ibid., p. 28.

[80] Carl R. Hausman, "Metaphors, Referents, and Individuality", in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XLII, No. 2, [Winter 1982], p. 182.

[81] Max Black, "More about Metaphor", Ibid., p. 37.

[82] Ibid., p. 39.

a perspective". These metaphors are, in his words, "generative metaphors"; "they can function as cognitive instruments through which their users can achieve novel views of a domain of reference".[83]

Black dismissed the question about truth values of metaphor. He stated that metaphors help enable us to see "how things are". But it is a mistake to conceive statements as how-things-are statements only when in connection with truth-value. This stategy seems to him "misguided and liable to induce distortion by focusing exclusively upon that special connection between statement and reality that we signal by the attribution of truth value".[84] Black pointed out that the concepts of truth or falsity are closely associated with such as semantic paronyms as 'lying', 'believing', 'knowing', 'evidence', 'contradiction', and others. These are just assumed conditions for agreement about ways of checking upon what is being said, and about ways of contesting or qualifying such sayings. In short, Black contended that metaphors can and do "generate insight about 'how things are' in reality", "insight into the systems to which they refer".[85] Metaphors, then, according to this view, are not merely nice but necessary.

In conclusion, Aristotelean theory of metaphor views metaphor as "diviant and parasitic upon normal usage",

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[83]Ibid., p. 40.

[84]Ibid., p. 40.

[85]Ibid., p. 41.

whereas Black's view regards metaphor as "an essential charac-
teristic of the creativity of language". Andrew Ortony, the
editor of Metaphor and Thought, labelled these opposing views in
his terms as nonconstructivism and constructivism respectively.
For the nonconstructivist, the meaning of a statement "is merely
read off". But for the constructivist, 'the use of language is
an essentially creative activity, as is its comprehension".
According to Ortony, in other words, Black's view may be consi-
dered as a pragmatic approach, and the other as a semantic
approach. It must be remarked that Black's interaction view of
metaphor poses a negation, or at least a question, to a basic
notion of positivism. Positivism postulates that reality could
be precisely described through the medium of language in a manner
that is clear, unambiguous, and, in principle, testable. For the
positivists, reality could, and should, by be literally describable.
However, this doctrine which was pervasive among philosophers in
the first quater of the 20th century has declined.

5.3.6 Metaphor, Reference and Paradigm Change

Therefore, the substitution view has no signifi-
cance in regard to the development of scientific theory. Actual-
ly, this view goes together with the basic notion of positivism
that reality should be precisely describable in the literal
language. Metaphors have no attribution in the scientific field.

Richard Boyd, in his article "Metaphor and Theory
Change : What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for", pointed out that
Black's theory provides a contrast view of metaphor in this
regard. The central claim in the interaction view may be
devided into two themes. "The first is the idea that something

new is created when a metaphor is understood". The second is about the creation of similarities, namely, that metaphors afford different ways of perceiving".[86] In the paper, Boyd argued that metaphors play an important role in scientific discovery, and in the formulation and transmission of new theories.

Boyd's contention answers the question as to 'what are metaphors for?' He argued that "the use of metaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the casual structure of the world".[87] He stated his thesis at the outset of his article as follows :

> There exists an important class of metaphors which play a role in the development and articulation of theories in relatively mature sciences. Their function is a sort of catachresis - that is, they are used to introduce theoretical terminology where none previously existed.[88]

Examples of these metaphors are the claim that thought is a kind of "information processing", and that the brain is a sort of "computer", the view that consciousness is a "feedback" phenomenon, and the suggestion that certain motoric or cognitive processes are "preprogrammed". These metaphors are called by Boyd "theory-constitutive metaphors". The utility of these metaphors in theory change crucially depends upon its open endedness.

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[86] Andrew Ortony, Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[87] Richard Boyd, Ibid., p. 358.

[88] Ibid., p. 357.

The philosophical activity of science, Boyd said,
consists in "the task of arranging our language so that our
linguistic categories <u>cut the world at its joints</u>".[89] He argued
that the employment of metaphor serves as a nondefinitional
mode of reference fixing which is especially well suited to the
introduction of terms referring to kinds whose real essences
consist of complex relational properties, rather than features
of internal constitution. Boyd denied the traditional practice
of definitional reference fixing on the ground that it presupposes
our knowledge of the 'real essences' of the objects or things
referred to. His article is set out to confirm the position of
nondefinitional reference fixing. He contended that the notion
of reference fixing in the case of theoretical terms in science
involves <u>ostension</u>, and that the notion of ostension is indeed
the notion of reference itself, Boyd once wrote :

> Normally, we introduce terminology to refer to presumed
> kinds of natural phenomena long before our study of them has
> progressed to the point where we can specify for them the
> sort of defining conditions that the positivist's account
> of language would require.[90]

The merit of the open-endedness of the theory-
constitutive metaphors lies in the recognition that these
metaphors invite the scientists to make further investigations.
Computer metaphors, for example, are introduced into psychologi-
cal theory on the basis of an informed "guess" that there are

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[89]Richard Boyd, Ibid., p. 358.

[90]Ibid., p. 371.

important similarities or analogies between their primary and
secondary subjects. "The aim of the introduction", Boyd wrote,
"of such terminology is to initiate investigation of the primary
subjects in the light of an informed estimate of their properties".[91]
Prior to this, Boyd wrote :

> The use of theory-constitutive metaphors encourages the
> discovery of new features of the primary and secondary
> subjects, and new understanding of theoretically relevant
> respects of similarity, or analogy, between them.[92]

The most significant point of Boyd's is his notion
of reference as provision of epistemic access. According to Boyd,
the central task of a theory of reference is to explain the role
of language in the acquisition, assessment, improvement, and
communication of knowledge, especially the role of language in
making possible social cooperation and rational deliberation
within these activities. "What is to be explained is our
(collective) capacity to successfully detect and discover facts
about the world", Boyd noted. He stressed further that

> The true theory of reference will be a special case of the
> true theory of knowledge : The true theory of reference for
> theoretical terms in science will be a special case of the
> true theory of the epistemology of science.[93]

He believed that "it is a misleading idealization to portray the
referential relation between language and the world as being consti-
tuted by relations of determinate reference between words and their

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[91]Ibid., p. 370.

[92]Ibid., p. 364.

[93]Ibid., pp. 380-81.

unique referents".[94] Boyd considered the provision of epistemic access as the basis of his theory of nondefinitional reference. Epistemic access is, in a sense, "the discovery of facts about the referents of terms".

Theorists of metaphor always have to face the attack against metaphor that metaphors lack lingistic precision. Science is idealized to eschew imprecision of any kind. Niels Bohr, a prominent physicist, once said : "Every scientist, however, is constantly confronted with the problem of objective description of experience, by which we mean unambiguous communication".[95] According to Ortony, science "is supposed to be characterized by precision and the absence of ambiguity, and the language of science is often thought to be correspondingly precise and unambiguous - in short, literal".[96] This notion, I think, consists in the supposition that knowledge is identical with language, that possible human knowledge must be able to express or to be stated in the (so-called literal) natural languages. This problem involves the thinking and understanding processes of the human mind which this thesis will not deal with. One suggestion to meet this problem has been that the language

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[94]Ibid., p. 379.

[95]Niels Bohr, "Unity of Knowledge", in Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, (New York : Science Editions Inc., 1961), p. 67.

[96]Andrew Ortony, Ibid., p. 1.

of metaphor has a different perspective from that of the literal one. That the person who says "Men are fish", "Men are flowers", or "Men are worms" possesses a different standpoint, or, the point at which he stands to view things. Obviously, this concerns transcendentalism.

Boyd, with his recognition of the open-endedness and inexplicability of interaction metaphors, conceded that metaphors may lack the linguistic precision. But since he had argued that such open-endedness and inexplicitness is typical of theoretical statements and of theoretical terms whose reference is not definitionally fixed, Boyd found that there is no right account of linguistic precision in science,. He contended that the imprecision is of the referential aspect. Imprecision is not a special feature of metaphors in scientific discourse, but of referring terms in general.

Boyd argued that there is no purely linguistic precision and no mere following of linguistic rules which account for precision in the use of theoretical terms. He pointed out to distinguish between 'linguistic precision' and 'methodological precision' or 'epistemological precision'. Linguistic precision is "a matter of the proper following of linguistic rules", and is believed to be the precision in the use of scientific language. Boyd noted :

> Since Locke, the empiricist view has been that this sort of precision is achieved to the extent to which general terms are associated with fixed, conventional, and explicit definitions of their extensions or referents.[97]

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[97] Richard Boyd, Ibid., p. 403.

Since Boyd had denied the definitional theory of reference, he contended there is only one sort of precision – that is, methodological precision, which is "precision in reasoning, careful experimental variables, precision in measurement, and so forth". In short, epistemological precision is "a matter of care in treating epistemological issues". Boyd concluded that "there are no distinct principles of linguistic precision in science, but rather that linguistic precision is one of the consequences of methodological precision of a quite general sort".[98]

However, Boyd's notion of metaphor and his theory of reference as epistemic access answers only the question as to 'what are metaphors for?'. It is Kuhn in his paper "Metaphor in Science" who tackles the problem as 'what is metaphor?'. It is important to notice that the question 'what is metaphor?' may be clarified as consisting of two sub-questions. They are, on the one hand, 'what should be considered as a metaphor?', and 'how to understand the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor', on the other hand, Zenon W. Pylyshyn in his article "Metaphorical Impression and 'Top-Down' Research Strategy" posed a question as to how one decide whether something is a metaphorical or a literal description. Although he agreed with Boyd that metaphors have an integral function in scientific discovery, e.g. such a metaphorical term as 'the mind's eye' has led to new discovery in cognitive psychology, he found that Boyd's examples of

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[98]Ibid., p. 406.

metaphors are not metaphors at all.[99] Boyd himself regarded
literary metaphors as consisting in the weak case of metaphors,
but his reason is because literary metaphors are often repeated
"by a variety of authors, and in a variety of minor variation"
and hence they become "frozen into a figure of speech or a new
literal expression".[100] Pylyshyn was concerned to distinguish
between metaphors that are powerful and those that are impotent.
These problems, after all, consist in the question of 'what is
metaphor?'.

T.S. Kuhn gave a striking remark concerning theory
change which involves the notion of metaphor. This thesis
considers his notification as a determining point although he
did not indicate it directly or intentionally. Kuhn first
pointed out to distinguish 'metaphor' and 'metaphor-like process',
Metaphor-like processes are "all those processes in which the
juxtaposition either of terms or of concrete examples calls forth
a network of similarities which help to determine the way in
which language attaches to the world".[101] Kuhn's important
point is the fact that theory change is often "accompanied by a
change in some of the relevant metaphors and in the corresponding

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[99]Zenon W. Pylyshyn, "Metaphorical Imprecision and 'Top-
Down' Research Strategy", in Metaphor and Thought, edited by
Andrew Ortony, Ibid., p. 431.

[100]Richard Boyd, Ibid., p. 361.

[101]Thomas S. Kuhn, "Metaphor in Science", in Metaphor
and Thought, edited by Andrew Ortony, Ibid., p. 415.

parts of the network of similarities through which terms attach to nature".[102] It is true that there are links between scientific language and the world, but those links are not given once and for all. For example, salt-in-water belonged to the family of chemical compounds before Dalton, and to that of physical mixtures afterwards. Chemical compounds and physical mixtures are <u>different natural families</u>.

It is Kuhn who pointed out to recognize the close connection between languages, our minds and our perceptions of the world. He noticed that Boyd misunderstood him in attributing to him the view that scientific theories are incomparable. For his view is that "successive theories are <u>incommensurable</u> in the sense that the referents of some of the terms which occur in both are a function of the theory within which these terms appear".[103] Kuhn contended that there is no neutral language into which both of the theories as well as the relevant data may be translated for purposes of comparison. Older languages succeeded, Kuhn noted Boyd's belief, in cutting the world at, or close to, some of its joints; but they also committed what Boyd called "real errors in classification of natural phenomena", many of which have since been corrected by "more sophisticated accounts of those joints". Kuhn argued that Boyd presupposed that nature has one and only one set of joints to which the evolving terminology of science comes closer and closer with time. Kuhn's position is "Kantian but without 'things in

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[102]Ibid., p. 416.

[103]Ibid., p. 416.

themselves' and with categories of the mind which could change with time as the accommodation of language and experience proceded."[104] Kuhn tended to believe that what we refer to as 'the world' is a product of a mutual accommodation between experience and language.

D.C. Stove in his Popper and After : Four Modern Irrationalists identified Kuhn's view with irrationalism descended from Hume.[105] But Kuhn's is more elaborate in that he recognized the determining role of language in the constructions of our perceptions or the world-views. To conclude in Popper's terms, the difference between Kuhn and Boyd lies in that they adopt different views of epistemology. Kuhn's position takes the view of pessimistic epistemology, holding that truth is not manifest and perhaps beyond the reach; whereas Boyd's is optimistic, perceiving that science is progressing toward truth. Notably, these arguments and illustrations somehow indicate that the claim of truth in science has also been challenged. Therefore, the claim that only in the area of science is valid knowledge established is questionable. The following account of the change in the reference in science and in history will help illuminate the point to a good degree.

This thesis contends that this remark of Kuhn's gives a better or clearer view of metaphor. The fact contributes

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[104]Ibid., pp. 418-19.

[105]D.C. Stove, Popper and After : Four Modern Irrationalists, (Oxford : Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 55.

some light to our determination of what metaphor is or at least
of what some metaphors are. Pointing out that Boyd misconstrued
his notion of theory change, that Boyd failed to realize the
interaction between experience and language, Kuhn asked :

> What is the world, I ask, if it does not include most of the
> .sorts of things to which the actual language spoken at a
> given time refers? Was the earth really a planet in the
> world of pre-Copernican astronomers who spoke a language in
> which the features salient to the referent of the term
> 'planet' excluded its attachment to the earth?[106]

Explicit in the quotation is the fact that the reference by the
term 'planet' in the pre-Copernican language does not include
the referent of the term 'the earth' in its extension. That is,
in the light of this fact, we are brought to recognize that
Theory Change always or often entails Reference Change.

The same case of mistake also occurs in history.
In the language of Columbus time, the primitive inhabitants of
America were referred to by the term 'the Indian' and the term
was intended to mean the inhabitants of the Indian Continent.
That is, in the reference, the primitive inhabitants of America
were mistaken to be the inhabitants of the Indian Continent.
Although the term 'the Indian' may not lose its significance,
the European people who spoke the Columbus.language committed a
mistake in referring, the term was employed to refer to a
different people from which the term was originally and inten-
tionally meant to refer. In truth, a term may have or extend to
cover more than one referent, but in principle all the referents

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[106]T.S. Kuhn, "Metaphor in Science", Ibid., p. 418.

must belong to the same family. But, in fact, the American primitive inhabitants are different peoples belonging to different natural families. Thus, the reference to the American primitive inhabitants by the term 'the Indian' is false or a mistake. Consequently, the term was in the later time, after the recognition of the mistake, modified by adding the colour word "Red".

This account of mistakes in reference in science and in history has an impact on the notion of metaphor. In the pre-Copernicus language, the sentence stating that "The earth is a planet" might be considered in the following ways.

1. The sentence is a false statement.

2. The utterance is a metaphor.

3. The word 'earth' which seems to denote an object thing has no referent, and thus refers to a fictitious entity.

4. The speaker issues a floating idea in a similar way as poets create their own systems of reference and meaning.

Similarly, for the people who spoke the Columbus language, the statement "The Indians are not the Indians" would be held to be either a contradiction, a false statement or a meaningless statement. In other words, to say that "The American primitive inhabitants are the Indians" could be regarded as a metaphorical utterance. Although this particular sentence "The American primitive inhabitants are the Indians' is not a linguistic act actually committed by the people of the Columbus language, the intention in their act of referring is the same. They denoted or referred to the people on the land and perceived them to be the Indians. It might be argued that they did not <u>intend</u> to utter a metaphor. This is no less absurd. It implies that

intention is the (or, at least, a) criterion of what is and is not a metaphor. Jesus Christ and Shakespeare, too, might contend that they did not intend to utter metaphors if "metaphor" is taken to mean the utterance which has no truth-value. It must be recognized that failing to find the truth-value of metaphors does not imply that the metaphors have no truth-value.

To conclude, theory change or, in a broader sense, paradigm change involves reference change. And reference change concerns the notion of what is and is not metaphor. According to Kuhn, the positivistic empiricists have no a priori criterion to tell which paradigm is truer than any other paradigm. Each paradigm has its own language with a system of reference. Language itself has a unique function in the paradigm. The word 'ghost' means differently between peoples of different paradigms. On the one hand, 'ghost' is taken to refer to or denote a certain kind of fictitious entities; whereas, on the other hand, for the people of a certain belief, 'ghost' refers to a real entity. In Kuhn's view, "There is no neutral language into which both of the theories as well as the relevant data may be translated for purposes of comparison".[107] Specificly, each paradigm has its own system of reference as part of the paradigm.

The whole contention of this section has been depicted to show that a metaphor is regarded as "metaphor" because it does violence to a system of reference, whereas in another system the same statement is not a metaphor. For example,

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[107]T.S. Kuhn, "Metaphor in Science", Ibid., p. 418.

the sentence "He is a Jew" said among the Thais of the present language when it is <u>taken</u> or intended to refer to a man who <u>appears</u> to be a Thai or who was born from a Thai mother is a metaphor because in the system of reference accepted among the present Thai people the words 'Thai' and 'Jew' refer to peoples of different groups, or in another word, to corporeal entities of different natural families. In other systems, however, for example, in Yiddish, "He is a Jew" is not a metaphor. Or else, it can be imagined that some Thais of the present Thai language may have their own system of reference in which "He is a Jew" means the same as "He is a crocodile" and are not at all metaphors, and that "A Jew is not a Jew" is not a contradiction either. It can be imagined further that this system of reference which is uncommon to general Thais may shift to be the common system of reference of the Thai language of a future time. Or, that this system might have been a common system of Thai of a past time. There is a historical fact that paradigms may change. But it must be noted that the fact that in history there have been changes of paradigms does not imply that there is no stop in the future.

Obviously, it has been pointed out that it is the general paradigm, the context in which the statements occur, which determines what is and is not a metaphor. It is the paradigm which prescribes truth-values to the statements occurring in it. But, according to the historical fact, if paradigm is changeable, we have no firm ground on which statements can be judged to be metaphors and that they have no truth-value. Equally obvious is the fact that the notion of what is and is not a metaphor involves the notion or concept of appearance and reality. The primitive inhabitants <u>appeared to</u>

Columbus to be the Indians (the people of a certain race). To
the pre-Copernicus astronomers, the earth appeared to be staying
still while the sun appeared to be moving around the earth.

Shakespeare's metaphor "Man is but a walking shadow"[*]
which appears to us a metaphor may not at all be a metaphor, in
the general sense, for some people. For they might reason in
such a way as 'the shadow is caused by the sunlight and if the
sun extincts, there will be no man on the earth. Man is the
product or result of the reaction between the sun (a synecdoche)
and the object just like the shadow has a certain relation and
is the result of the reaction of a fire and an object. When we
act, our shadows re-act in the same deed'. In the people's view,
"we", the corporeal men might not be 'the first cause' or 'the
first mover' of the actions of the dark colour patches on the
floor. In their view, man is just some kind of shadow.

Therefore, to them Shakespeare's metaphor does
have a truth-value. Again, this point involves the transcendence
of our senses. But that "the earth is moving around the sun"
also transcends our senses. The difference is determined by the
degree of transcendence rather than because they are cases of
perception and non-perception. We do not perceive that 'the
earth is moving around the sun', and why we believe it because
we defer to the authority of scientists. The earth does not

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[*]Originally, in Shakespeare's version is "Life is but a
walking shadow". But, contextually this statement can be taken
to be a synecdoche.

appear to our perceptions to be revolving around the sun. Otherwise; the pre-Copernicus astronomers should not have committed what we, a people of a certain paradigm, call "a mistake".

In conclusion, the problem of the truth-value of metaphors is found to consist in the problems of perception. It is found in this thesis that the study of metaphor has an impact on or involves the notions or problems of perception, appearance and reality. Concepts of 'perception', 'appearance' and 'reality' are closely interconnected. Moreover, these problems when investigated to a certain extent, are found to involve the problems of substance and essence. In the sub-atomic world in the realm of substance, man and crocodile are of no difference. The real difference, then, consists in the notion of 'essence'.

5.4 Literary interpretation and truth-value.

Most philosophers who concern themselves with the problem of truth or cognitive values in literature stipulate that literary works need to be properly interpreted in order to grasp the proper understanding of the works. Interpretation, in practice, is one of the major concerns of literary study. It is a general consensus among literary scholars that principally a poetic work consists of a theme or themes and a thesis or theses. And, interpretation is the process of determining the theme, or themes, and the thesis, or theses, of a literary work.

The problem of interpretation itself, however, is a big one which can compose up for a whole thesis or a dissertation or even a whole life-long devotion, and therefore, will not be dealt with intensively in this thesis. The inclusion here is

meant merely to point out that discussions and arguments concerning truth or cognitive values in literature have the problem of interpretation as the central focus. Principally, for one to realize the cognitive values of a poetic work, he needs to go through the process of interpretation.

Beardsley formulated the problem of interpretation in the following terms : "to determine themes and theses of a literary work, given the contextual meanings of the words and a complete description of the world of the work."[108] Peter Jones, in his Philosophy and the Novel, a study of philosophical aspects of a few great novels and of the methods of criticism, whose whole book composes of a science of literary interpretation, wrote about interpretation as follows :

> Interpretations reveal what significance or import of a text a reader has determined, and the notion of determining here suitably covers the patterns he finds as well as those he forms. Interpretation is the business of making sense of the text, rendering it coherent; this is achieved by placing emphases, drawing connections, suggesting presuppositions and implications.[109]

That themes and theses are the core of the literary works are firmly upheld. However, 'theme' and 'thesis' belong to different literary categories. And yet there is another topic always associated with these two : the 'subject' of the work.

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[108]Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Ibid., p. 403.

[109]Peter Jones, Philosophy and the Novel, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 182.

According to Beardsley, the subject is referred to by a concrete noun or nominative construction, i.e. a war, a love affair, the taming of a shrew; whereas a theme is something named by an abstract noun or phrase, i.e. the futility of war, the mutability of joy; heroism, inhumanity. For Beardsley, the substance of literature is man or human. Beardsley cited the case of <u>Oedipus Rex</u> as an example. The subject of <u>Oedipus Rex</u> includes Oedipus, Jocasta, Thebes — the objects in the play. Or the subject is the investigation of the cause of a plague — the action of the play. But the themes are pride, divine power, fate, irremediable evil, the driving spirit of man." A theme, then, is something that can be thought about or dwelt upon, but it is not something that can be called true or false."[110] In short, to identify, it might be the notion of theme by which the positivists take literature to be 'the expression of basic attitude toward life'.

But literature has more constitutions other than the poetic language (i.e. metaphor) and themes. One of the constitutions which has been well realized is the thesis. Beardsley and most other aestheticians contend that a thesis "is precisely something about, or in, the work that can be called true or false."[111] Beardsley's term "thesis" may be identified to some other aestheticians, e.g. Weitz, Hospers, with the terms "implied or suggested truth-claim". A thesis, in other words,

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[110] Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Ibid., pp. 403-404.

[111] Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Ibid., p. 404.

consists of a statement of generalizations about the world. A
thesis, sometimes, is not plainly or directly printed word by
word or line by line, but is what the reader **infers** from the
reading, a conclusion he derives at through a process of the
proper interpretation. Once Weitz wrote, "there are certain
novels which have no significant printed claims and yet do contain
important statements about the world."[112] Weitz mentioned
Proust's Remembrance as having obvious suggested truth claims
and wrote : "It seems to me that most literary works contain
these printed or suggested truth claims which we are called upon
to take as serious commentaries on life."[113] These 'serious
commentaries', most philosophers contend, are capable to be
judged as being true or false.

Examples of the theses of a few literary works are
provided in a few papers in which the philosophers argue in
supporting the claim of cognitive values in literature. Catherine
Wilson in her article "Literature and Knowledge" noted as follows:

> Morris Weitz, [who is the most noted proposition-theorist],
> claims to find in Proust the revelation that 'there are no
> essences to our emotions' : 'that jealousy, love and
> suffering manifest themselves in different ways are recog-
> nized according to different criteria'. For Peter Jones,
> Middlemarch contains the implication that past desires and
> present hopes govern our interpretation of present sensory
> experience. According to John Hospers, Paradise Lost implies
> that 'man's state after the Fall is much better, in that he

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[112] Morris Weitz, "Truth in Literature", Ibid., p. 222.

[113] Ibid., p. 221.

has free-will in a sense which he lacked before. And finally, Coleridge claims that in writing <u>Hamlet</u>, 'Shakespeare wished to impress upon us the truth, that action is the chief end of existence.'[114]

The aestheticians contend that these individual statements or propositions are appropriate for the debate under the epithets of 'truth' and 'falsity'.

Obviously, the contention that at least some poetic works contain theses imply the adoption of the position of the proposition theory. That is, in these philosophers' view, the whole chains of sentences in an artistic work can be reduced to a statement or statements of some kind which is called "proposition". Hence, they also commit a reductionism. It might be viewed that these aestheticians assume or presuppose that the authors propose these theses which they have no means to know or are susceptible to subjectivity. A suggestion of 'the implicit speaker', which has been mentioned, has been done to meet this difficulty. The thesis, in other words, is the implication of the whole work. A certain literary work, that is to say, when examined carefully through a proper process of interpretation, will yield or signify at least an inferential conclusion just in a similar manner that a certain set of mathematical statements imply the same proposition. For example, the set of '5 + 5 = 10' and '6 + 4 = 3 + 7' and '8 + 2 = 9 + 1' is said to signify or imply a tautology that

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[114]Catherine Wilson, "Literature and Knowledge", in <u>Philosophy : The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy</u>, Vol. 58, No.226, [October 1983], pp. 489-90.

'Ten is ten'. Interpretation, then, in this sense, is based on the assumption of syntactical structure of the literary work. Namely, all the narative sentences or the narrations are <u>artisticly</u> put together under a rule or rules and are governed in such a way that it is possible or plausible for readers or critics to draw at least a condense, reductional statement, rationally. This view meets a few difficulties, but the arguments has not finished.

Recently, there has been an establishment of an empirical science of literature, proposed as a new paradigm of literary study. Its leading exponent is S.J. Schmidt, a German philosopher. The study is in abbreviation called as ESL. According to Schmidt, "ESL is an attempt to construct a science of literature as a homogeneously founded and oriented net of empirical theory-elements."[115] The epistemological basis of ESL is said to be radical constructivist theories. In this research, I find it impossible to brief or expound the view in short paragraphs. A study of the interpretation in the ESL's view will compose a thesis. Since the school adopts Kuhn's view of paradigm change and the determining role of language, Schmidt's papers are full of ESL-terms. Schmidt employs the same words as are commonly found in literary criticisms, but he stipulates his ESL-meanings for his ESL-terms all throughout the papers. However, one of the essential features of ESL or the pivotal concept of this new

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[115] S.J. Schmidt, "The Empirical Science of Literature ESL : A New Paradigm", in <u>Poetics 12</u> (North-Holland : 1983), p. 19.

paradigm is the study of the interpretation of literary texts.
Once Schmidt wrote in his introduction of an issue of the Poetics
Journal on Interpretation that "interpretation has always been
and still is the core of critical activities and hence their
pivotal question."[116]

It is essential to note on such concepts as truth,
knowledge and reality according to this view. They hold that
the cognitive domain of an autopoietic system is the domain of
all descriptions that the system can produce. All cognitive
states of the cognizing individual are determined by its modes
of realizing autopoiesis and not by the conditions of an
objective (subjective-independent) environment. Thus reality or
environment are not ontological entities but a construction of
man. Schmidt quoted his own translation of Maturana : "We
literally produce the world we live in by living in it."[117]

Therefore, concepts such as absolute knowledge, absolute
truth, objective reality, ultimate foundations, or absolute
values are thus irreconcilable with this approach. ESL holds
the position that "there can only be subject-dependent knowledge

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[116]S.J. Schmidt, "Interpretation Today-Introductory
Remarks", in Poetics 12 (North-Holland : 1983), p. 71.

[117]S.J. Schmidt, "The Empirical Science of Literature",
Ibid., p. 21.

which is achieved and confirmed by successful autopoiesis.*
Even science, which seems to monopolize claims of objective
truth, according to this view, does not at all issue such thing
as being called 'objective knowledge'. To quote Schmidt,

> Scientific knowledge, too, is strictly subject-dependent.
> Its so-called exactness or objectivity is not based on
> adequate (approximate) correspondence to reality but
> scientific knowledge is the product of the cultural
> homogeneity of observers who have agreed upon certain
> categories for evaluating certain constructs as
> scientifically valid constructs.[118]

To conclude, truth, according to the ESL-view, must be
within a context and determined by the context. Interpretation
is always needed in the process of understanding. But, according
to Schmidt noting on Steinmetz, an ESL-proponent, "interpreta-
tions change with the change of frames : interpretation is
(therefore) a never-ending endeavor to produce plausible,

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*Autopoiesis is a term in cybernetics, coined by Humberto
Maturana for a special case of HOMEOSTASIS in which the critical
variable of the system that is held constant is that system's
own organization. Homeostasis is a disposition which is
generateded mathematically to include all (not only biological)
systems that maintain critical variables within limits
acceptable to their own structure in the face of unexpected
disturbance. (Source : The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought)

[118]Ibid., p. 21.

socially acceptable, and innovative text-frame-relationships."[119]

5.5 The function of literature.

This section is included in this thesis for a better understanding of the cognitive values in literature. Indirectly, the positivist devaluation of literature has given a fruitful consequence in aesthetics. Philosophers are stimulated to think and speak in advocation for an honorific status of literature and its contribution to the body of human knowledge. Below are remarks or contentions made by a few philosophers concerning their views of literature.

Many say that the art of literature is by far the most complex. D.N. Morgan in his "Must Art Tell the Truth" viewed that "it is a pedantic, philistine mistake to suppose that everything precious (to be termed 'knowledge') must be translated into bits and pieces of scientific knowledge and truth in order to be honestly enjoyed." He argued that poetry renders us to participate in the world of things known - "to know by sympathetic union with what is known."[120] Weitz contended that the world of life and experience embodied in art is too complex and irreducible to a single pattern for the test of truth of scientific kind.[121] M. Hamburger remarked that : "The truth of

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[119]S.J. Schmidt, "Interpretation Today-Introductory Remarks", Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[120]Douglas N. Morgan, "Must Art Tell the Truth", in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, Ibid., p. 240.

[121]Morris Weitz, "Truth in Literature", Ibid., p. 222.

poetry, and of modern poetry, especially, is to be found not only in its direct statements but in its peculiar difficulties, short cuts, silences, hiatuses and fusions."[122]

The poets are said to contemplate or study and have discoveries to offer to his audience. His words are not just verbal utterances signifying nothing. John Hosper found that the poets' subject matter is life. He wrote : "It is life that provides the touchstone by which we measure the truth of a characterization in literature, not the other way round. Without life there would be no characters for literature to portray."[123] T.M. Greene saw that the world the poets study is the same world of scientists. The difference consists merely in that the poets approach "this world and these experiences in a distinctive manner and with a distinctive goal in view."[124] In a coherence with this view, a few Thai literary scholars found that Trai Phum Phra Ruang has cognitive contents, but they are covered and the knowledge is expressed or revealed in the form of art. For example, Wibha Senanan wrote that "Trai Phum Phra Ruang is a treatise on cosmology."[125] The only difficulty is how one

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[122]Michael Hamburger, The Truth of Poetry, (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969), p. 41.

[123]John Hospers, "Literature and Human Nature", in Aesthetic Inquiry, edited by M.C. Beardsley, Ibid., p. 130.

[124]Theodore M. Greene, "Art as an Expressive Vehicle", in Introductory Readings in Aesthetics, Ibid., p. 83.

[125]Wibha Senanan, The Genesis of the Novel in Thailand, (Bangkok : Thai Watana Panich, 1975), p. 13.

can manage to make an access to the covered, or, how the right
and proper interpretation, the uncovering, can be acquired.

The contribution of literature to the other fields of
investigation is well-realized. E.A. Davenport viewed literature
as a performance of thought experiment. By the words "thought
experiment" he means "testing hypotheses in the mind - logically
rather than physically." He found that literature does a good
contribution to social science. "Social scientists", he wrote,
"routinely report that they find in literature evidence which
they take to confirm, refute, or criticize social science theories,
or which they take to suggest better ways of formulating social
science problems."[126] Bohr, speaking to a scientists-assembly,
pointed out that the freer display of fantasy in poetry achieved
by the juxtaposition of words related to shifting observational
situations helps unit manifold aspects of human knowledge. "The
enrichment which art can give us originates in its power to
remind us of harmonies beyond the grasp of systematic analysis."[127]
John Hospers contended that works of literature can suggest
hypotheses which may be empirically fruitful and that this is a
far more difficult task than verification.[128] Reid beheld that

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[126]Edward A. Davenport, "Literature as Thought Experiment",
in Philosophy of Social Science 13,

[127]Niel Bohr, "Unity of Knowledge", Ibid., p. 79.

[128]John Hospers, "Implied Truth in Literature", in Art
and Philosophy, edited by W.E. Kennick, Ibid., p.321.

art gives an integral insight and reveals new aspects of relation-
ships of things of our perceptions in such a way that science
will never do.[129] Barbour in his chapter "Religion and the
history of science" said that to a poet "a flower is far more
than the botanist can study." "The poet's vision of nature
portrayed much that the scientist had ignored."[130] That is :
the poet keeps a record of his observation of that which the
scientist fails to observe.

The view that all enterprises constitute a unity of
knowledge is a growing recognition. Poetry is not just an empty
display of rhetoric. Johnstone, a philosopher of scientific
attitude, in his anlysis of validity and rhetoric found that
rhetoric, the art of evocation, is only an aspect of philosophi-
cal argument. He wrote : "discovery, communication, and
rhetoric all collapse into a unitary philosophical act".[131]
Rhetoric functions as a catalyst in the communication of a
discovery. Alexander ended his article "The Philosophy of
Science, 1850-1910", posing a question that probably the fault
is on the positivists themselves in failing to understand the
theologian rather than the theologian fails to make them under-

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[129]Louis Arnaud Reid, "Art, Truth and Reality", in
Aesthetics in the Modern World, Ibid., p. 78.

[130]Ian G. Garbour, Issues in Science and Religion,
(New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 66.

[131]Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Validity and Rhetoric in
Philosophical Argument : An Outlook in Transition, (University
Park : The Dialogue Press, 1978), p.76.

stand him.[132] Sir Hermann Bondi analyzed the positivist attitude to be a result from "the lure of completeness", the ideal conditon for knowledge which science has never achieved. He pointed out that "our most successful theories in physics are those that explicitly leave room for the unknown."[133]

Shelley once said : "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world."[134] However, at the present time, there have been a recognition, by scientists, of the cognitive contents or even what might be called scientific knowledge wrapped in poetic language. Scientists are realizing that the universe is an order and not a chaos. Fritjof Capra wrote in his article "The New Vision of Reality : Parallels between modern physics and eastern Mysticism" as follows :

> In the twentieth century, however, physics has gone through several conceptual revolutions that clearly reveal the limitations of the mechanistic world view and lead to an organic, ecological view of the world; a view that shows great similarities to the view of mystics, and especially to mystical traditions of the East.[135]

Capra doscovered that modern physics can be explained in the language of Hindu mythology. Remarkably, parallel with the

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[132]Peter Alexander, "The Philosophy of Science, 1850-1910", Ibid., p. 425.

[133]Sir Hermann Bondi, "The lure of Completeness", in The Encyclopaedia of Ignorance, Ibid., p. 3.

[134]Percy B. Shelley, A Defence of Poetry, Ibid., p. 80.

[135]Fritjof Capra, "The New Vision of Reality", in Fundamental Studies and the Future of Science, edited by Chandra Wickramasinghe, (Great Britain: Caradiff Press, 1984), p. 263.

discovery in modern physics is a discovery of the relationship between mysticism, mythology, literature and science. Putnam in his paper "Philosophers and human understanding" viewed that people of different doctrines or beliefs are contributing to each other in the process of the attempt to understand themselves and their place.[136]

At any rate, most literary scholars do not realize the kind of attribution such that Capra has remarked. They have a perspective of their own. For Albert W. Levi : "Literature is the offspring of the imagination, but its function is not to create imaginary worlds with real truths in them but to create and to present us with a treasury of forms and a treasury of significances."[137] For Miall, the metaphorical language of poetry opens up a new perspective and invites us to explore our own experience and thought." Poetry does not primarily alter the language - but it may very well revolutionize thought."[138] Lastly, Wilson perceived that : "The kind of understanding which

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[136]H. Putnam, "Philosophers and Human Understanding", in Scientific Explanation, Ibid., pp. 99-118.

[137]Albert William Levi, "Literary Truth", in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 24, No. 3, [Spring 1966]. p. 381.

[138]David S. Miall, "Metaphor as a Thought-Process", in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, [Fall 1979], pp. 27-28.

literature affords cannot be represented as a body of statements occupying a particular location in the nexus of historical and scientific doctrine."[139] Literature, in short, has its own unique function. Munro Edmunsun gave the most plausible remark when he wrote :

> Science is a differentiable mode of acquiring and transmitting knowledge. In contrast to lore, it rests on a narrow base. Science attempts to come to grips with the world through a strict preoccupation with denotative meaning and logical relational statements. Lore does not reject either of these modalities but is willing to include connotation and analogy as well. We may describe lore as the primitive field from which literary patterns are derived. And what is distinctive to lore and literature is their preoccupation with connotative semantics and analogic systems of thought.[140]

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[139]Catherine Wilson, "Literature and Knowledge", Ibid., p. 496.

[140]Munro S. Edmonsun, Lore : An Introduction to the Science of Folklore and Literature, Ibid., p. 1.