



## Chapter 2

### Variations of Dualism

Underlying the dualistic view of mind-body ontology are at least two very basic intuitions. First, mental phenomena are so different from physical phenomena. By mental phenomena, we mean items of consciousness such as thoughts, feelings, beliefs, reasons, memory, the sense of values. By physical phenomena, we mean concrete things and their activities. On a pre-philosophical level, there seems to be no difficulty at all in classifying which phenomenon belongs to the mental category and which to the physical category. It is also unproblematic for the common man to avow that the two categories constitute different kinds of phenomena. The second intuition has to do with our gut feeling that certain relations hold between the mental and the physical, at least when the mental applies to the case of our own minds and the physical to our own bodies. We are quite sure that some of our desires, for example, cause our actions. Our thoughts and reasons and memories play an important role in shaping the things we do or commit ourselves to do. On the other hand, things also happen which affect our thoughts and feelings. Contact with the physical world makes an intangible imprint in our consciousness. Our sense that there exists a definite boundary between the mental and the physical is just as strong as our certainty that such a boundary is permeable, allowing influences from both sides to flow into and affect

each other. It seems reasonable to say that this intuitive knowledge is prior to any philosophical analysis.

It seems safe enough, then, in briefly sketching several versions of dualism as a background for our discussion, to bring out the content of each by focusing on how it describes the distinctness between the mind and the body and the interaction between them. Such a focus by no means implies that the distinguishing features among the dualist theories of mind are exhausted by these two intuitive assumptions. However, the distinctness and interaction between the mind and the body seem to be a necessary ingredient in any theory purporting to provide a dualistic account of mental and physical phenomena.

Dualist mind-body theories all share the common assumption that the mind and the body are two things which are distinct from one another, as opposed to the materialist theories of mind which unite under the claim that the mind is reducible to the physical states and processes of the brain. To balance the perspective, it is perhaps appropriate at this point to give a flavor of some materialist theories of mind. Here are six views which are reductive of the mental:

First, perhaps the most extreme version of these views is the idea that mental states, as such, don't exist at all. This view is held by those who call themselves "eliminative materialists." The idea is

that, contrary to a widely held belief, there really aren't any such things as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc...

A second view, often used to support eliminative materialism, is the claim that folk psychology is--in all probability--simply and entirely false... Folk psychology includes such claims as that people sometimes drink because they are thirsty and eat because they are hungry; that they have desires and beliefs, that some of these beliefs are true, or at least false... The connection between folk psychology and eliminative materialism is this: Folk psychology is supposed to be an empirical theory and the entities it "postulates"--pains, tickles, itches, and so on--are supposed to be theoretical entities on all four, ontologically speaking, with quarks and muons. If the theory goes, the theoretical entities go with it: to demonstrate the falsehood of folk psychology would be to remove any justification for accepting the existence of folk psychological entities...

A third view of this same type holds that there is nothing specifically "mental" about the so-called mental states. Mental states consist entirely in their causal relations to each other and to the inputs and outputs of the system of which they are a part. These causal



relations could be duplicated by any system that had the right causal properties. Thus, a system made of stones or beer cans, if it had the right causal relations, would have to have the same beliefs, desires, etc. as we do, because that is all there is to having beliefs and desires. The most influential version of this view is called "functionalism,"...

A fourth implausible view... is the view that a computer could have--indeed must have--thoughts, feelings, and understanding solely in virtue of implementing an appropriate computer program with the appropriate inputs and outputs...

A fifth form of incredibility is to be found in the claim that we should not think of our mental vocabulary of "belief" and "desire," "fear" and "hope," etc., as actually standing for intrinsically mental phenomena, but rather as just a manner of speaking. It is just a useful vocabulary for explaining and predicting behavior, but not to be taken literally as referring to real, intrinsic, subjective, psychological phenomena...

Sixth, another extreme view is that maybe consciousness as we normally think of it--as inner,



private, subjective, qualitative phenomena of sentience or awareness--does not exist at all.<sup>1</sup>

In relation to the mind-body distinctness assumption, it seems clear that what the above materialist versions have in common is the idea that the subjectivity of mental phenomena is, if not merely an illusion, simply not an independent category of classification; that is, the correctness or intelligibility of any theory about the mental must be dependent on some physicalist understanding of the world. Since this is not the place to try to defeat materialist theories of mind, such misguided contentions will have to be just observed in passing.

Having already made a brief digression into six materialist theories of mind, it is worthwhile, before going on with some dualist versions, to pause to mention that the mind-body problem central to this thesis belongs to the ontological category. Our mind-body problem is posed with a view to understanding the existence and relation between two distinct entities, namely, the immaterial mind and the material body. However, mind-body ontology is not the only category in which problems arise. The mind-body problem can be raised

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<sup>1</sup>John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1992) p. 6-7.

in connection with at least two other philosophically pertinent areas: the semantical category and the epistemological category.<sup>2</sup> When approached from the semantical perspective, the problems that are compelling include questions such as those which inquire about the source of meanings of terms relating mental states and processes to specific behavior or those which try to explore the relation between the external world and the introspective world of thoughts and feelings:

Where do our ordinary common-sense terms for mental states get their meaning? What would count as an adequate definition or analysis of those special concept that we apply to ourselves and to other creatures with conscious intelligence?<sup>3</sup>

In the epistemological category, we are faced, for example, with the so-called "problem of other minds" and the problem about the uniquely direct access to one own's consciousness:

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<sup>2</sup>Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1990), 2-6.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.3

On what grounds has one the right to assume that other humans, for example, enjoy any mental states at all? ...How can we distinguish a truly conscious intelligence from a complex physical system built to resemble a thinking being in all of its behavior, verbal and emotional behavior included? Would there be a difference? How could we tell? ... In sharp contrast to the opacity of the mental life of people other than oneself is the transparency of one's own mental life. Each of us is self-conscious. What is the nature of that curious access you have to the contents of you own mind, but to no other? How is it you are able to tell, without looking at your behavior, what you feel, think, and desire?<sup>4</sup>

It may also be pointed out that the decision as to which category best serves the philosophical interest of the mind-body discussion could be considered a separate problem in itself.<sup>5</sup> A larger issue connected with this question about the most fruitful area of consciousness study has to do with the competing claims among the various sciences--cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience,

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 5.



to mention only a few-to be most felicitous in terms of methodology. This chapter will not explore any areas outside our main ontological concern.

Our sketch of variations of dualism in the ontological context will try to bring out the central ideas of these versions by looking at the ways in which each presents the notion of distinctness and the picture of interaction. At first glance, it seems obvious, as far as the distinction between the mind and the body is concerned, to refer to the properties or attributes picked out by the terms "mental" and "physical". But just because these different sets of properties are picked out by two different words does not make it necessary that genuine distinction follows in the sense that the two different sets of properties can never be reduced to some common underlying descriptions. What this caveat points to is the fact that theories of mind, dualistic or otherwise, require much more than language analysis, for the distinction, or non-distinction, in question must be of an essential kind. What we are looking for is a genuine distinction in the ontological sense. In other words, if posed with the question, "What things exist?", we want to be able to incorporate into our answers information about fundamental things or fundamental kinds of things. We want to be able to answer such a question with something like "Fundamentally, there are minds as well as bodies" or, if we have been converted to materialism, "Fundamentally, only physical things exist". In the light of genuine mind-body distinction, Substance

Dualism is the most unequivocal. It will be seen that other versions of dualism with weaker or equivocal claims regarding the distinctness assumption seem unable to provide a plausible account of the second necessary ingredient, the interactive relation between the mind and the body.

One version of dualism qualifies as the weakest in the sense that it conceives of the mental and the physical in terms of two sets of properties or attributes. Mental properties belong uniquely to the mind and physical properties uniquely to the body. This version is represented by Spinoza's Double-Aspect theory in which mental and physical attributes are just two different sets of aspects of a single entity. If talk of substance must enter into this picture, then there is only one substance, that which constitutes the body and all its parts, including the brain. While the body possesses a set of physical attributes, the brain is endowed with its own mental properties enjoyed by no other physical system. However, the demotion of the notion of substance, in Spinoza's view, to a position far from the center of the controversy only shifts the problem to a new ground: how are we to think of two aspects of a single entity interacting with each other. This is not to say that we are making an a priori decision about what can interact with what. Such an a priori judgement will be improper in the light of the fact that it is an empirical matter how one thing can interact with another. What looks suspicious about the double-aspect interaction is that

interaction is usually understood in the context of different things interacting rather than different aspects of the same thing interacting. It seems that in avoiding problems associated with positing a mental substance, the Double-Aspect theory goes a considerable way toward undermining the cogency of mind-body interaction.

In Leibniz's version, on the other hand, the mind and the body do not interact. Mental states and processes and physical states and processes considered as two sets of phenomena run parallel to each other. Moreover, although the two sets are synchronized in the sense that they are meaningfully correlated, they do not stand in any causal relation. Of course, Such a synchronicity may be saved by the assumption of divine intervention although it is too high a price if we are also aiming at scientific plausibility. Admittedly, there is nothing intrinsically wrong if we reject the idea that a mind-body distinction must be a genuine distinction. We can perhaps arbitrarily prescribe that the mind-body ontology consists in nothing more than mental and physical events. However, there is something of a problem if we fail to acknowledge the fact that the claim that interaction takes place between the mind and the body is *prima facie* correct.

Another sub-version of a dualism, based on mental-physical attribute distinction, which eliminates not the presence of mind-body interaction, but the symmetry of such an interaction is epiphenomenalism.



According to this view, the interaction is one-way with the causal influences flowing only from the physical to the mental. Brain states and processes produce mental states and processes, such as thoughts and desires, but these mental items do not, in turn, determine the outcome of any physical actions. In other words, brain states and processes, which are physical, are causally responsible for both bodily actions and the mental phenomena thought to be the cause of these bodily actions.

The epiphenomenalist holds that while mental phenomena are caused to occur by the various activities of the brain, they do not have any causal effects in turn. They are entirely impotent with respect to causal effects on the physical world. They are mere epiphenomena...Think of our conscious mental states as little sparkles of shimmering light that occur on the wrinkled surface of the brain, sparkles which are caused to occur by physical activity in the brain, but which have no effects on the brain in return. This means that the universal conviction that one's actions are determined by one's desires, decisions, and volitions is false!<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

Without claiming that the proponents of the versions just discussed also center their philosophy around the idea of distinctness and interaction, it will have to be noted that whatever implausibility inherent in the three variations of dualism mentioned above seems to derive from the position which ascribes to the mind something less than full substancehood, on the one hand, and the half-hearted commitment to the prima facie correctness of the mind-body interaction, on the other. It seems reasonable to suppose that any account of mind-body ontology cannot ignore the two very basic intuitions that we all have about what constitute the mind and the body and the inescapable interface between them.

A return to the interaction assumption without at the same time being committed to the notion of substance can be accommodated within a modern concept of emergent property. Applying the idea of emergence to the mind-body ontology, we may argue that the mind, although seemingly different from the body, is nonetheless an emergent property of a purely physical system, which also includes the human body at one particular level of complexity. The idea of emergence recognizes the fact that sometimes wholes are not equal to the sum of their parts. The focus is on the organizing principles which seem to produce through complexity wider range and levels of properties not deducible from the considerations of the properties of the component parts alone. For example,

A collection of  $10^{27}$  protons, neutrons, and electrons may be all that a desk-top computer is at some level, but clearly the way in which those sub-atomic particles are put together, the way in which they are organized, is what distinguishes the computer from a crowd of  $10^{27}$  separate sub-atomic particles. Thus, at this level, that of the possible behaviors that the system can manifest, the computer is more than the sum of its parts and what makes it so is the way in which the atoms are bonded together to form particular types of material and the way in which those materials are hard-wired together into switches and circuits. The properties of the computer are a manifestation of a particular level and quality of complexity being attained. The larger and more complex the internal circuit and logic, so the more sophisticated will be the capabilities of the device.<sup>7</sup>

According to this line of reasoning, the mind or consciousness seems to exemplify a type of organizational complexity at a level

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<sup>7</sup>John D. Barrow, Theories of Everything : The Quest for Ultimate Explanation (Clarendon Press : Oxford, 1991), p. 140.



above other physical objects. Moreover, if a certain system acquires sufficient complexity, it may even be placed not just at a different level from those with lesser complexities but also in a different ontological category altogether, such as in the case between living and non-living things. The concept of emergence through complexity views reductionism in a more sophisticated light. If reductionism means only that explanations for complexity must be sought at a lower level that keeps descending to more fundamental levels, and ultimately only in the world of the most elementary constituents of reality, then reductionism is false. The kind of reductionist view consonant with the idea that the mind is an emergent property should be one which allows novel types of properties to appear at various levels of complexity, considering each novelty to be a manifestation of a particular organization at one particular level of complexity, without claiming that such a novelty can be fully understood only in terms of a descending order of analysis. In Searle's words:

A common distinction in physics is between micro- and macro- properties of systems--the small and large scales. Consider, for example, the desk at which I am now sitting, or the glass of water in front of me. Each object is composed of micro-particles. The micro-particles have features at the level of molecules and atoms as well as at the deeper level of sub-atomic particles. But each object also has certain properties such as the solidity of the table, the

liquidity of the water, and the transparency of the glass, which are surface or globe features of the physical systems. Many such surface or globe properties can be causally explained by the behaviour of elements at the micro-level. For example, the solidity of the table in front of me is explained by the lattice structure occupied by the molecules of which the table is composed. Similarly, the liquidity of the water is explained by the nature of the interactions between the  $H_2O$  molecules. Those macro-features are causally explained by the behaviour of elements at the micro-level.

I want to suggest that this provides a perfectly ordinary model for explaining the puzzling relationship between the mind and the brain. In the case of liquidity, solidity, and transparency, we have no difficulty at all in supposing that the surface features are caused by the behaviour of elements at the micro-level, and at the same time we accept that the surface phenomena just are features of the very systems in question. I think the clearest way of stating this point is to say that the surface feature is both caused by the behaviour of micro-elements, and at the same time is realized in the system that is made up of the micro-elements. There is a cause and effect relationship, but

at the same time the surface features are just higher level features of the very system whose behaviour at the micro-level causes those feature.<sup>a</sup>

While Searle may not deny that a novelty manifested at a certain level of complexity can be analysed and rendered intelligible at its own level without having to refer to its underlying constituents, he would have, as far as what he has said above goes, to deny any claim which suggests that the novelty or surface features cannot be analysed in terms of the deeper structure. This is a crucial point, for it either makes or breaks any theory based on the idea of emergence which purports to be dualistic. For the emergent-property dualist to be truly a dualist, he would have to add to his position the claim that

mental states and properties are irreducible, in the sense that they are not just organizational features of physical matter... They are said to be novel properties beyond prediction or explanation by physical science.<sup>o</sup>

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<sup>a</sup>John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1984). p. 20-3-21.

<sup>o</sup>Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1990), p. 12.



Of course, the need to choose between dualism and materialism seems to be abrogated in the context of emergent property. One talks instead in terms of different levels of complex properties and behaviors. However, such an abrogation seems only superficial, for it does not get rid of the gut instinct concerning the mysterious phenomena of the mind. But, as Churchland has emphasized<sup>10</sup>, the irreducibility of mental properties seems to contradict the idea that surface features are just organizational manifestations of lowerlevel ingredients. The main problem with the dualist emergent theory of mind is how to reconcile the claim that the mind is inexplicable by physical laws to the assumption which dissolves the mystery of the mind by attributing mental phenomena to the organizational complexity of matter.

If we consider the above problem as another example of the problems which arise from the blurring of the mind-body distinction, we confront once again the force of the intuition that minds are fundamentally different from bodies. Moreover, even if we accept as plausible the kind of ontology which focuses on levels of complexity, as in Searle's example, it is doubtful if any viable model of symmetric interaction which is found in experience can be constructed, for, whereas surface features can be said to be caused by the micro-level, it seems awkward to say that surface features such as solidity

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

cause the micro-structure to be in a certain state such as in a lattice configuration. This difficulty reflects the one which plagues the Double Aspect theory. Any mind-body distinction not based on substance distinction seems to founder either by way of the failure to explain interaction or by failing to make any genuine distinction at all.

To return to a more full-blooded dualism, it is important to note that what has often been derisively termed "naive dualism" is naive only if the mind or soul or spirit invoked in such a theory is literally thought of in terms of an immaterial substance which takes on a material form. This seems to be the view made popular by films and fictions. There is nothing in Substance Dualism which necessitates such an interpretation. Although this so-called "naive dualism" implies a spatial location for the immaterial mind, which could be right there inside the brain, there seems to be no logical inconsistency in the idea of something immaterial occupying space:

The mind is right there in contact with the brain, and their interaction can perhaps be understood in terms of their exchanging energy of a form that our science has not yet recognized or understood. Ordinary matters, you may recall, is just a form or manifestation of energy. (You may think of a grain of sand as a great deal of energy condensed or frozen into a small package, according to Einstein's relation,  $E=mc^2$ .) Perhaps

mind-stuff is a well-behaved form or energy also, but a different form of it. It is thus possible that a dualism of this alternative sort be consistent with familiar laws concerning the conservation of momentum and energy...<sup>11</sup>

Even in this passage by Churchland we can glean the tendency to blur the genuine distinction between the mind and the body. For if the mind is conceivable in terms of the concept of energy, even if it is conceived of as a form of energy as yet to be discovered<sup>12</sup>, this

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 9-10.

<sup>12</sup>There is a respectable speculation in modern physics about the existence of the fifth force of Nature in addition to the four fundamental forces: gravitational, electromagnetic, weak, and strong. See, for example, John D. Barrow, Theories of Everything: The Quest for Ultimate Explanation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). p. 84. Barrow writes: "The scenario of the 'fifth' force reminds us that there could well exist additional fundamental forces of Nature whose effects we have yet to recognize or perhaps even witness. Should we regard it as suspicious or merely fortuitous that all the forces of Nature are big enough for us to possess the expertise to detect them after a few thousand years of study? Does it not seem more probable that there exist additional forces of Nature that are intrinsically very weak, or highly selective in the things they act upon, or which have a minute range? Such forces may well exist..."



very conception would take the force away from the distinctness assumption. If mind-body interaction is conceivable in terms of energy exchange, then it seems to follow that the mental itself will be ultimately subsumable under physical laws, a consequence that would undermine the claim of mental irreducibility. If mind turns out to be a manifestation of energy, although the energy of which it is a manifestation may be different from that which physics has quantified, but a form of energy nonetheless, mind would not be impervious to physical investigations simply because the concept of energy is already a domain of inquiry in physics. The mind-body interaction in Churchland's model may be plausible, but it just detracts from the dualist point concerning genuine distinction. This difficulty serves to point out that the problem of mind-body interaction seems to be inextricably intertwined with the consideration about what kind of thing constitutes the mind and what kind of thing constitutes the body. That is, the kind of interaction proposed will make a conceptual difference to the conception of the things said to be interacting. Similarly, the kind of interacting things proposed will make a difference in the model in which their interaction may be

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possible.\*

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\*The suggestion that what kind of interaction will be possible will have to depend on what kinds of substances are being posited is also implicit in some materialist views of mind-body relation. In Donald Davidson's version called "anomalous monism" --Essays on Actions and Events, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), p.214-215-- for example, psychological events are believed to have effects on the body. But there are no psycho-physical laws in which mental causations can be incorporated. But causations require nomological directives, so the description of psycho-physical interaction is possible if an additional set of physical descriptions is given to the mind. But this evaporates the strength of the psychological causes, for the mind becomes a hybrid possessing both psychological and physical descriptions. The possibility of interaction is actually bought at the price of a clandestine reduction of the mental to the physical. Similarly, Searle's "biological naturalism"--The Rediscovery of the Mind (The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1992), ch.1-- makes a point that if something is mental, nothing precludes it from being also physical and vice versa. The mind-body distinction vanishes in an attempt to explain interaction between the brain and the mind which is a biological property of the brain.

The emphasis on the strict and irreducible distinction between the mind as one substance and the body as another, the two being conceptually and ontologically irreducible to one another, brings us to Cartesian Dualism. According to this view, substances are paradigms of interacting things. Although objections have been voiced against essential characterizations given by Descartes to each entity in his dualism, namely, his idea that the defining essence of the body is spatially extension and the defining essence of the mind is thoughts or thinking, these objections center basically on the insufficiency of such a characterizations in view of the fact that the mind incorporates more than just thinking and the body more than just being in space. However, there seems to be no objection against the notion that substances are not the kind of things which can interact. As D.W. Hamlyn confirms:

. . . even if one cannot say anything about the nature of the interaction, substances are the kind of thing between which it makes sense to speak of interaction. Indeed, as a mind-body theory, interactionism is paradigmatically a theory about the relation between two substances.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> D.W. Hamlyn, Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press London, 1984), p. 165



No doubt, the materialist will object that the mind is an immaterial substance or to the notion of immateriality altogether, but this is a different objection. An objection to the claim that the mind is an immaterial substance is not an objection to the idea that interacting entities fall naturally into the context of substance.

Although the dualist position of this thesis proceeds from the Cartesian assumption that the mind is an immaterial substance and the body a material substances and that the two substances are causally influencing each other, it will not carry the burden of other assumptions of Cartesianism. According to Hamlyn, there are three strands to why Descartes proposed his version of Substance Dualism:

There is first the thesis which Descartes inherited from his philosophical predecessors and which is there even in Aristotle. It is the thesis which Gilbert Ryle in the Concept of Mind calls the official doctrine and which he describes as treating the mind as a para-mechanical cause. In Descartes's writings that last thesis is to be found chiefly in the Passions de l'ame; it is there that he speaks clearly of the pineal gland as the seat of the soul or mind, mediating an interaction between the soul and the animal spirits in the nerves of the body. Why, however, cannot both passions and active behavior be explained purely in terms of what happens in the body and

therefore in terms of Cartesian dynamics? Descartes' answer is in effect that the workings of the intellect and anything that involves it, including rational behavior, cannot be explained in terms of his dynamics; some additional cause is required, which must be external to that system of dynamics. That is what Ryle calls a para-mechanical cause.<sup>13</sup>

This is the assumption this thesis will subscribe to. Our version of Substance Dualism holds that what constitutes the mind cannot be exhaustively explained in terms of classical mechanics. This by no means denies that it cannot be partially explicable within the framework of physics. On the contrary, it is our main argument that the kind of physics represented by quantum mechanics is shedding light on the mind-body interaction problem. More subtle understanding of the quantum reality may shed greater light on this problem, but this will be so only because physicists no longer conceive of the universe

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

from the classical perspective\* which takes no notice of the interplay between the mind and the physical events in the world.

The second strand Hamlyn has brought out concerns the "cogito". According to this line of reasoning:

It is argued that I can doubt all sorts of things, but the one thing that I cannot doubt is that I doubt and therefore think. "Cogito--I think" is therefore an indubitable truth. It is taken to follow that there must be a thinker--myself. That cannot be a body, since I can doubt the existence of all bodies, while I cannot doubt my own existence. I must therefore exist as a

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\*Both Newtonian and Einstein's theories are classical. Newton's mathematical formalism is deterministic, all interactions being conceived in terms of particles and forces. Einstein's two relativistic theories, the Special and General Theories of Relativity, agree with Newtonian determinism and its picture of the fundamental constituents of reality. In fact, Einstein solution to the puzzle of Brownian motions underlines the reality of the atoms. What is anti-Newtonian about Einstein is his treatment of the aspect of force. Einstein employs the Minkowskian space-time to spatialize time, making it geometrical and treats gravity in terms of the curvature of space-time.



thinking thing distinct from my body, which as an extended thing does not have the same status as regards indubitability.<sup>14</sup>

While the claim that one cannot doubt that one thinks is at least prima facie correct, it is not necessary for a substance dualist to maintain at the same time that he can doubt the existence of his own body. In other words, the distinction between the mind and the body does not imply indubitability about the existence of my own mind and dubitability about my body. If the distinctness assumption is understood ontologically, the epistemic implication of Descartes' cogito can be left aside. This thesis will assume only that the mind and the body are constituted by two different and irreducible kinds of substance.

The third Cartesian assumption that will not be pursued concerns the distinction between thinking and sensations. Hamlyn indicates that it is implausible to claim that "while sensations are dependent on the body they are not just bodily; they would not exist were we not thinking things".<sup>15</sup> It is not important for our

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<sup>14</sup> Hamlyn, op. cit. 167-168.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 168.

case to delve into the reasons for this implausibility. What needs to be mentioned is the fact that this thesis will not distinguish between thinking and sensations, not because they cannot be distinguished, but rather because it will part of the assumption of our brand of Substance Dualism that it is an open question whether my own mind would exist if I did not have a body. It remains an open question whether my mind would continue to exist after the demise of my own body. This thesis will include both thinking and sensations in the mental category because such inclusion does not affect what we are try to show, namely, the interaction between the mind and the body. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose that although the mind is a uniquely different substance from the body, the mind, or rather, my own mind becomes mine only in connection with the presence of my body. The idea is that although two substance such as my own mind and my own body are radically different, it is still conceivable that each requires the other for each individual existence. It is also conceivable that the body is ontologically prior to the mind. In this sense, there is no need to make the Cartesian assumption in question since it is already an open question whether even thinking can exist were we not a bodily thing.