

PARTNERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AGENCIES AND CIVIL  
SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE BUILDING PROCESS IN SOUTHERN  
BORDER PROVINCES OF THAILAND

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ความร่วมมือระหว่างองค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศและองค์กรภาคประชาสังคมในกระบวนการ  
สร้างสันติภาพในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย

นางสาวอภิษฐา โออินทร์

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต

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   PROVINCES OF THAILAND

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Field of Study                      Master of Arts in International Development Studies

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อภิชนา โออินทร์ : ความร่วมมือระหว่างองค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศและองค์กรภาคประชาสังคมในกระบวนการสร้างสันติภาพในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย

(PARTNERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AGENCIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE BUILDING PROCESS IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES OF THAILAND) อ. ที่

ปริกษาวิทยานิพนธ์หลัก : รองศาสตราจารย์ ดร. ฉันทนา หวันแก้ว, 223 หน้า.

ในพื้นที่ที่มีความขัดแย้งอย่างต่อเนื่อง ผลกระทบของความร่วมมือระหว่างองค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศ และองค์กรภาคประชาสังคมในกระบวนการสร้างสันติภาพทั้งหมดยังคงไม่มีข้อสรุปที่ชัดเจน งานศึกษาค้นคว้าครั้งนี้เสนอว่า โครงการให้ทุนขององค์กรระหว่างประเทศ ซึ่งกระตุ้นให้เกิดความร่วมมือเชิงกลยุทธ์และการสร้างเครือข่ายระหว่างผู้ทำงานสันติภาพในประเทศ ทั้งในแนวตั้งและแนวนอน จะส่งผลกระทบต่อการพัฒนาของเครือข่ายประชาสังคมเพื่อสันติภาพ เครือข่ายที่มีความเข้มแข็ง จะอำนวยความสะดวกในการเปิดพื้นที่ทางการเมืองที่มีความหมายสำหรับประชาชนรากหญ้า และชนชั้นกลางได้ ส่วนแรกของงานศึกษานี้ได้อธิบายวัตถุประสงค์ขององค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศ และแนวทางการทำงานร่วมกับ องค์กรภาคประชาสังคมในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย และเพื่ออภิปรายข้อเสนอข้างต้น งานศึกษานี้ได้ประเมินนัยสำคัญของความร่วมมือดังกล่าวต่อการพัฒนาของเครือข่ายผู้แสวงหาสันติภาพ (Peace Constituencies) นอกจากนี้ยังใช้ปรัมิติที่อธิบายการแทรกแซงเพื่อสร้างสันติภาพของจอร์น พอล เลอเดอรัค ในปี ค.ศ. 1997 เพื่อแสดงให้เห็นถึงความซับซ้อนของความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างผู้ทำงานสันติภาพ

จากการศึกษาพบว่า กรอบความร่วมมือของแต่ละองค์กรอาจมีความแตกต่างกัน แต่ก็มีลักษณะหนุนเสริมกัน ความร่วมมือระหว่างองค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศและองค์กรภาคประชาสังคมมีส่วนในการขยายตัวของเครือข่ายผู้แสวงหาสันติภาพ (Peace Constituencies) ในระดับตั้งและแนวนอน อย่างไรก็ตาม ยังไม่มีกลไกที่มีประสิทธิภาพในการเชื่อมต่อการขยายตัวของเครือข่ายที่มีลักษณะแยกส่วน ทั้งนี้ เป็นผลมาจากยุทธศาสตร์ที่ไม่เป็นเอกภาพ และปัญหาเรื่องศักยภาพเชิงสถาบันและการบริหารจัดการจากทั้งองค์กรให้ทุนระหว่างประเทศ และองค์กรภาคประชาสังคม

สาขาวิชา: การพัฒนาระหว่างประเทศ..... ลายมือชื่อนิติ.....

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In an ongoing conflict area, the contribution of partnership between International Funding Agencies (IFAs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on the entire peace building process is asserted. This study argues that IFAs' funding scheme which encourages strategic cooperation and networking between local peace actors at the vertical and horizontal levels will contribute to the development of peace constituencies. The strengthened network is to constitute a meaningful political space for grass root and middle-range leadership in multi-track peace building. The research first describes IFAs' objectives and frameworks applied to partnerships with CSOs in the southern border provinces of Thailand (Far South). In order to support the argument, the contribution of partnership on the development of peace constituencies is assessed. It also employs the model of hierarchical intervention introduced by John Paul Lederach in 1997 to illustrate the complexity of relationships among peace actors. It finds that partnerships of IFAs and CSOs have contributed in the expansion of peace constituencies at vertical and horizontal levels because of complementary cooperation frameworks. However, no effective mechanism appears to connect such fragmented expansion. It results from fragmented strategies and a struggle of institutional and managerial adjustment from both sides of the relationship.

Field of Study : International Development Studies Student's Signature .....

Academic Year : 2012 ..... Advisor's Signature .....

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## LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CfPs	Call for Proposals
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CODI	Community Organization Development Institute
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAI	Development Alternative Incorporate
DSCC	Deep South Coordination Center
DSRR	Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation
EU Delegation	Delegation of the European Union to Thailand
EUR	Euro
FCD	Foundation for Child Development
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
IFA	International Funding Agency
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
Internews	Internews Europe Association
IPP	Insiders Peace builders Platform
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV
KPI	King Prajadhipok's Institute
LA	Local Authorities
LDI	Local Development Institute
MacMuslim	Muslim Attorney Center Foundation
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSA	Non State Actors
OSI	Open Society Institute
Oxfam GB	Oxfam Great Britain
PSU	Prince of Songkla University
RfPs	Request for Proposals
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice

RTG	Royal Thai Government
SIF	Social Investment Fund
SPF	Sasakawa Peace Foundation
TAF	The Asia Foundation
ThaiPBS	Thai Public Broadcasting Service
THB	Thai Baht
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### **Background**

Since the new wave of unrest in southern border provinces of Thailand (“The Far South”) in January 2004 until February 2012, there have been 11,542 incidences of violence which have caused 5,086 deaths and 8,485 injuries. Despite the tremendous efforts and resources dedicated by the Thai government to the area, the ebb and flow of violent conflict has kept on, and has changed its form as the level of casualties is now higher than number of violent incidences (DeepSouthWatch, 2012e). Moreover, human rights violations occur throughout the area because of the enforcement of special laws which empower the state officials in the area to commit acts outside of their regular jurisdiction, which when taken advantage of, can lead to violations in human rights.

According to Neil Melvin, there are three perspectives toward the nature of contemporary conflict in the southern border provinces (Far South), its cause, and who is involved (Melvin, 2007).

- Historical grievance – the relationship of Patani to the central Thai government throughout history
- Islamic Extremism – The aim to create an Islamic order in the Far South by rejecting Thai nationalism propaganda
- Role of modern Thai politics and the global war on terror

This reflects the importance of historical background and the evolution of this region since 11<sup>th</sup> century. Patani region was a prosperous and famous port city where a number of international traders visited and settled down. During those early days, the culture and beliefs of Patani were influenced and mixed by those of the visitors including European colonizers with minimum political and ideological conflict (Aew-Sriwong, 2007, pp. 17-46). Later in 1909, Patani was fully incorporated into Siam (former name of Thailand) and divided into Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces



(Melvin, 2007, p. 3). The relationship between Siam and Patani changed from one of patronage states to one of assimilated states. Intense interventions were implemented in these areas, causing conflicts of interest between local Malay elites and the Thai government. Individuals were dissatisfied with how the elites ruled the region. It was at this time that Islamic ideology became involved in the political mobilization of Malay Muslims in the Far South. During the developmental era, there was very little infrastructural investment and outsiders were more likely to benefit from the developmental program, not local Malay people. Later in the military government era, the government tried to create a uniform education system and religion to support anti-colonialism. (Aew-Sriwong, 2007, pp. 17-46). From historical and political perspectives, Melvin concluded that the nature of the current conflict is driven by the *historian grievance* and *role of modern Thai politics*, which is later transformed into the fight of *Islamic ramification and religious ideology* as a powerful tool of separatism.

Since 2004, civil society has formed in groups in order to respond to the consequences of the Far South violence. The immediate needs of affected populations were addressed, alternative media appeared in the area, and some civil society organizations (CSOs) started activities of socialization among grass-root populations. The highlighted agenda that CSOs pursued in each period were transformed dynamically. At the same time, international agencies engaged in peace and conflict in the Far South through various projects within different sectors; for instance, The Asia Foundation and several German political foundations since 2004, UNDP since 2005 and World Bank since 2006-2007 (Burke, 2011, pp. 189-193). The European Union mobilized their funding to assist civil society organizations in the Far South since 2009 (Burke, 2011; Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009b). In the following year, USAID, United States Agency for International Development focused more support to ‘civil society around peace building’ (Burke, 2011; USAID, 2010). Several other international non-governmental organizations also started to engage in the Far South around the time of the new wave of unrest since 2004.

## **Study and Literature related to the Far South**

### 1. Peace Constituencies of the Far South

There are quite a few analyses and researches on the dynamics of the Far South CSOs. One example is the work by Chalit Thavornnukijkul (Thavornnukijkul, 2008, pp. 2-11) which describe the evolution of CSOs in the Far South and categorizes them according to their activities and establishment. The study finds that earlier civil societies in the Far South formed and exist in two patterns; groups that make a movement about religious identity and groups that represent the grass-root people in making connection between state and people. The latter groups play a role in counterbalancing the state power and constitute political space for people to participate in the development of their society. Most movements arose as a result of common problems faced by the community members such as natural resources management. The turning point of civil society in the Far South is the violent upsurge in 2004. Those early civil society groups focused more on activities that respond to the violence including rehabilitation, charity, and protection. The violence stimulated the establishment of more civil society organizations, either rooted from the area or supported from outside. The government reaction on the unrest also created a tension between state and civil society which results in the distrust of state officials. Furthermore, this study has categorized civil society into three groups:

#### a. State-established CSOs

This group was formed in accordance with the government initiatives that expect cooperation between state and people to end the violence. It appears in the forms of community security guards, land protection volunteers, community protection volunteer, etc.

#### b. CSOs that are established on their own agendas

They can be named according to their main duties such as media, religion, women, youth, human rights, or academics. In an ongoing conflict situation, human right groups usually play an outstanding role because it requires cooperation from many

stakeholders including the government and military. Some women and youth groups sometimes act as human right defenders.

c. CSOs that separate themselves from a former network

This refers to CSOs that were part of network formed according to Social Investment Fund and Community Organization Development Institute. They started their own organizations since 1997.

Overall, this study concludes that civil society in the Far South not only works under violent constraint, but also limited their role to particular missions. It lacks of work that aims for structural development of civil society as network.

Later in 2009, the situation of civil society in the Far South was synergized in a seminar on the Civil Society Network held by The Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (Chulalongkorn University), The Office of Peace and Governance (King Prajadhipok's Institute), and Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, & King Prajadhipok's Institute, 2009). In the seminar, several concerns and proposals were made by a wide range of working groups and individuals from both national and local constituencies. The outcome of the 12 focus groups during the seminar that reviewed the past successes and challenges of the peace building process in the Far South, revealed that civil society has recently formed and expanded more working networks and more public space for dialogue and exchange. Due to this, people started to realize their rights and capacity and CSOs were able to work towards the demand of communities advocating for some policy changes. Nonetheless, their work has been challenged by the lack of trust and understanding of civil society among state officials. Because of this lack of coordination and information sharing, some work by civil society groups is overlapping and encourages a race to resources and targeted beneficiaries. CSOs receiving funds from foreign organizations face difficulties in determining their responses to the conflict because most strategies for response are settled from the source of funding. There is also limited and exclusive assessment in peace building work by stakeholders (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009).

In the same seminar, Mark Tamthai expressed concerns on how the CSOs and related groups are responding to the conflict, either the planned or unplanned responses. The largest concern is in the direction of civil peace building in the Far South. There has been a lack of coordination between 1) groups that have common long-term goals, but different short-term goals, 2) groups that have different long-term goals, and 3) civil society within and outside the Far South. Without proper coordination, these groups may work to obstruct rather than complement each other. The lack of coordination could result from their different grounds of conflict understanding and their different imaginations of peace in the Far South. Apart from a concern on the lack of coordination among peace constituencies in the Far South, there is also a concern on how civil society manages the relationship with foreign donors. The partnership between insiders and outsiders is not only influenced by common interests, but also by pressure from requirements to get funding. This seminar highlighted a call among participants that there is a need to establish a council or association comprised of various CSOs in order for it to coordinate among constituencies in the Far South.

Building on existing studies, the Deep South Watch's full report of "Survey and Mapping Civil Society Organizations/Community-based organizations in the Far South" was released in 2011 and 2012 (DeepSouthWatch, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b). It details the pyramid of actors and approaches of the Far South. In Track III, there exist potential cultural agents of change including mosques, private Islamic schools, Pondok schools, and Tadeka schools. These institutions have accumulated the fundamental social capital of Malay Muslims, the majority population in the region, but interestingly they have not played an outstanding role in Far South peace building yet. An IFA 's senior officer called them 'The Sleeping Giants' (Interview T, 27 August 2012).

The term 'peace constituency' in this research refers to a network of actors in track II<sup>1</sup> and III<sup>2</sup>. The strength of such network constitutes a healthy democratic society enabling the voices of wider populations to be heard; however, it seems that most of the active peace agents in the Far South are limited to the middle class and educated

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<sup>1</sup> Civil society organizations, academics, active groups who pledge for peace

<sup>2</sup> Grass-root leadership and population

citizens in the track II. The track II and III leadership has not yet had sufficient connection and mechanism to push forward a consorted agenda for the long term solution (DeepSouthWatch, 2012a).

## 2. Third Party Intervention in the Far South

There are several studies about foreign funding agencies for CSOs in Thailand, but only one study by Adam Burke in 2011 relates particularly to the southern border provinces of Thailand in the context of peace building. This study aimed to assess how these agencies formulate and implement peace building in the Far South. According to Jonathan Goodhand (2001, pp. 67-72), there are three different responses international actors take in conflict situations which include donors “working around conflict, working in conflict, and working on conflict”. The responses derive from incentives and disincentives to take action in a different context. The Strategic Conflict Assessment applies this categorization and includes 1) the assessment of the impacts of conflict on programs, 2) the assessment of the impacts of programs on dynamic of conflict and peace in various dimensions such as political, economic, security, and social dimensions, and 3) introduce improved policy and practice specifically for each response (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004, pp. 15-17). With reference to the approach, Burke (2011, pp. 130-157) has adapted this categorization and applied it in the context of the Far South in order to analyze the motivation, interface, and practice of international agencies in working towards development and peace building in the area. The primary result is shown in the following category:

Group One refers to mainstream aid who is not considering conflict, while enhancing capacity of the Thai state-centric approaches in national development schemes.

Group Two refers to agencies that promote existing system reform, but failed to make impact, mostly because of the resistance by the Thai government.

Group Three refers to agencies that promote peace building with some programs and be able to manage the relationship with government officials and departments in order to advocate to policy change, but their impact is rather small. (Burke, 2011)

In sum, the study finds that there are varied and complex aid provisions to the Far South by different agencies which bring about a mixed contribution. This largely results from both those agencies' frameworks and commitment to peace building and constraints put on them by the Thai state. Some agencies have managed to support long term peace building through local partners, yet their contributions are rather small (Burke, 2011).

### **Problem Statement**

The International Funding Agencies (IFAs) - bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental – have engaged in the development of Thailand for more than a century. In the former days, they basically assisted the government of the host country through the construction of large infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and dams as well as military. Their involvement has different purposes which are evolving over time according to the circumstance of geopolitics at the time being, such as for the purpose of inter-country relations, the imbalance power of two political ideologies, Western and Eastern Blocs during the cold war, the instability of the regions, and others.

Prior to the arrival of intensive intervention of IFAs in the Far South in recent years, there has been an existence of local civil society organizations who work for small-scale development and advocacy in the area since the late 1990s. Since the new unrest in 2004, civil society groups started to play a crucial role in fulfilling the needs for healing and helping people who suffered from the violent conflict as well as those who work in response to human rights violations and injustice. The role of civil society in peace building has been transformed during the past 10 years.

The incoming of new third party intervention in the Far South compared to the first couple years after 2004 becomes a new phenomenon. Some are working to address socioeconomic problems, while others see the problems as political-driven and try to contribute in addressing them. Their approach to the conflict reflects their perspective towards the Far South. Nevertheless, international organizations who attempt to address the root causes of conflict in the Far South are discouraged by the Thai government if they engage politics in their national strategy. The issue of national

identity, decentralization, and democracy are often restricted, and without good relationships with key persons or government officials, they are most likely to face practical barriers and not make any impact (Burke, 2011, pp. 144-145). Therefore, it appears that civil society organizations, in IFAs' view, became more relevant to peace and conflict in the Far South recently. The evidence shows that many international organizations tend to cooperate and support civil society organizations. However, what is concerning is that some civil society organizations dedicate time and resources for the accountable, documented project management rather than addressing the initial problems due to the centralized pattern of funding. Those who receive funding from IFAs are sometimes not the ones who are familiar or deal with the real problems (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). The selection of local partners and approaches for cooperation in peace building are central to the concerns here (Reich, 2006). Moreover, frameworks and practices in peace building of local actors and IFAs differ in many dimensions, such as timeframe, approach, and position in the conflict situation (Haugerudbraaten, 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to understand the new actors and capture how they have contributed to peace building in the Far South.

In order to further investigate how the engagement of the international community with local organizations has contributed to peace building in the Far South, this research attempts to study the frameworks and practices for cooperation between International Agencies (IFAs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) for the peace building process and assess the contribution of the cooperation on the development of embedded actors – so-called 'peace constituencies' in the Far South.

The following sections explain the research question and objectives, hypothesis, significance of research, research methodology, scope, and limitation respectively.

### **Research Question**

How have cooperation frameworks and practices between IFAs and CSOs contributed to the development of the peace constituencies in the Far South?

## **Research Objectives**

1. To describe the objectives and instruments of IFAs engaging with CSOs in the Far South;
2. To analyze the cooperation frameworks and practices between IFAs and CSOs for peace building initiatives; and
3. To assess the contribution of IFAs and CSOs partnership to the development of peace constituencies in the Far South.

## **Hypothesis**

International funding agencies supporting the cooperation and networking between peace actors at the vertical and horizontal levels can contribute to the development of peace constituency in multi-track peace building, while the quality of the peace constituencies are enhanced by training, empowerment, and capacity-building of the peace actors.

## **Significance of Research**

This research focuses on the partnership of peace building actors in the conflict situation. The cooperation among various actors plays a crucial role in addressing both problems and concerns in the area. Therefore, it will contribute to the body of knowledge in peace and conflict in the Far South in at least two dimensions.

First, by offering understanding of the specific cases, contributions are made to the existing body of cooperating frameworks among multi-actors in peace building. The research findings may introduce an initial understanding of how different forms of partnerships among outsiders and embedded actors, such as civil society and government, have different contributions to the development of peace constituencies. This research can also start a contribution to a more refined discussion regarding the approaches international agencies employ to engage with civil society in the Far South. More insight in possible challenges can trigger the discussion along with more informed and critical attitudes on how civil society will handle with the cooperation and management of funding from international organizations.



The second dimension is that this research gives opportunities to learn about the contributions of international intervention and civil society organizations in peace building activities within the specific behavior of the Thai state. These failed or successful partnerships are also influenced by national security policies and political setting.

## **Research Methodology**

### **1. Methodology**

The theme of this research associates with characteristics of various local and international organizations, their responses to the conflict, and their relationship among each other; so attitudes, behaviors, and processes will be investigated. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply a '*qualitative methodology*' for collecting data and conducting analysis in order to answer the research question in the context of the Far South of Thailand.

### **2. Data Collection Tools**

#### *a. Secondary Data*

Existing literature and research will offer an analysis of the conflict situation in the Far South over time as well as the behavior of the state, the level of violence, and political settings. Literature regarding CSOs in the Far South will provide primary information and analysis regarding the existence of CSOs in the area. This secondary source will include the reports and documents provided by the organizations that will be interviewed.

#### *b. Semi-structure Key Informants Interviews*

The interview guide will be generated by the existing literature on the topic. The questions will be semi-structured in a way that the planned questions will cover the queries of perspectives, motivation, frameworks, and practices for cooperation of IFAs, INGOs, recipient CSOs, and other relevant organizations. The interview will also provide space for further relevant discussion and expression.

*c. Focus Group Discussion*

The main purpose of the focus group research is to draw upon respondents' attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions towards the development of peace constituencies. It should provide a common assessment on how far peace constituencies have been developed and some debate on the quality of peace constituencies under the framework of cooperation with IFAs. These attitudes, feelings and beliefs may be partially independent of a group or its social setting, but are more likely to be revealed via the social gathering and the interaction which being in a focus group entails.

**Table 1 Operational Definitions**

International Funding Agencies	International funding agencies that work on, around, in promoting existing system reform and peace building in the Far South (Goodhand, 2001)
Civil Society Organizations	Local and national civil society groups who engages in peace building process in the Far South. They include clubs, unions, professional associations, faith-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, foundations, and media groups. Businesses and political parties are not regarded as civil society organizations (Paffenholz, 2009).
Peace Building Initiatives	A variety of activities undertaken by civil society organizations which could contribute directly or indirectly to general goal of peace building process which is to move population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and violence to one of self-sufficiency and well-being (Paffenholz, 2009).
Southern Border Provinces of Thailand	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat provinces and 4 districts of Songkla province (Jana, Nathawee, Thepha, and Sabayoi)
Peace constituency	A network of social and political actors (groups and individuals), especially influential leaders at the Track 2 (unofficial including CSOs and academic) Track 3 (grassroots organizations) levels, who have an interest in crisis prevention and peaceful forms of conflict settlement. Peace constituencies are expected to effectively counter 'war constituencies' (networks of those who benefit from war) and 'cultures of violence'. Influential middle-range actors from different communities in a society who are willing and able to build bridges to like-minded people across the lines of conflict are seen as key for peace constituencies. These constituencies are citizen-based and grow from within a society,

	but can be supported by external actors (Berghof Foundation, 2009). The actors and activities outside the southern border provinces can also be taken into account if they aim for peace in the area.
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### 3. Selection of IFAs and CSOs

#### *a. Selection of IFAs*

As this research is for the purpose of examining current frameworks in partnership of IFAs and CSOs in a situation of violent conflict with little to no interest in generalizability but instead, to call into question or challenge an existing phenomenon that IFAs pay more attention to civil society as potential for peace constituency in the Far South, critical instances will be examined. Using Adam Burke's analysis (2011), this research focuses on international funding agencies in ***groups two*** and ***three*** as they demonstrate their interest and efforts which enable local and international partnerships to emerge with the aim to address the conflict. The research purposively selected IFAs that are active in promoting peace constituencies in the Far South, both direct and indirect approaches.

This research defines three types of international funding agencies including 1) intergovernmental funding agencies, 2) issue-based international non-governmental organizations, and 3) other non-governmental organizations. Two intergovernmental funding agencies, four issue-based international non-governmental organizations, and two other international non-governmental organizations were selected for this research. The selection is varied in term of philosophy, framework, and targeted beneficiaries; therefore, it gives a glimpse of various partnership modules.

1. Two intergovernmental funding agencies were selected as a starting point which will lead to their organizations in partnership. They are selected based on the following criteria:
  - Agencies are bilaterally cooperated to Thailand;
  - Agencies are categorized in group two or three;

- Agencies focus their assistance to a wide range of civil society organizations; and
- Agencies have different philosophy, objectives, and frameworks.

According to the selection criteria, the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand (“EU Delegation”) and the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) have been examined.

## 2. Issue-based International Non-Governmental Organizations under the funding scheme of EU Delegation

There are some international non-governmental organizations involved in the Far South that are predominately issue-based organizations (refer to Appendix C). It is reasonable therefore to include them in this analysis in order to illustrate the complexity of cooperation. In this regard, Save the Children, Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, and Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV were selected because under EU main funding scheme they involved in cooperation with selected CSOs of this research which will be elaborated in the next section.

## 3. Other International Non-Governmental Organizations working on a wide range of issues for peace building.

In order to give a comprehensive understanding of cooperation frameworks in the Far South, two international non-governmental organizations are selected namely The Asia Foundation and Sasakawa Peace Foundation because of their unique approaches towards peace building.

<b>International Funding Agencies</b>
<b>Intergovernmental Funding Agencies</b>
European Union
USAID
<b>Issue-based International Non-governmental Organizations</b>
Oxfam Great Britain
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Internews Europe Association
Save the Children
<b>Other International Non-governmental Organizations</b>
The Asia Foundation
Sasakawa Peace Foundation

*b. Selection of CSOs*

According to Paffenholz (2002), certain groups possess a particular potential for peace building and offer an initial point of departure for promotion; namely peace groups, human rights groups, women's peace groups, traditional authorities, churches and other religious associations, the media, associations, the private sector, and other groups and individuals. There are a number of local organizations who cooperate with the above selected IFAs regarding peace building in the Far South; not only direct recipients but also indirect recipients who cooperate through the direct partners. However, given the time limitation, this research selected CSOs who are direct recipients and indirect recipients of IFAs according to information available prior to the interviews and following justifications.

CSOs in human rights are mostly prominent ones who play an important role both on the ground and policy levels. Since the preliminary rise of violent conflict in the Far South, the very first civil society groups initiated healing activities for those who were affected, especially women and children. Affected women later become a key part of the healing and development tasks. CSOs in this group are necessary for the reduction of future hatred and conflict transformation. Likewise, youth are seen as vulnerable and have potential to become part of war constituencies. The production, sale and usage of drugs in the Far South put additional concern and attention towards them. Initiatives that would involve youth in the development of themselves as well as for the community can help expand peace constituencies and peace zones. There

are many context variables that are crucial for CSOs' ability to act and fulfill a constructive role in peace building. The media can influence the development of civil society protection, monitoring, and advocacy (Paffenholz, 2009). Media groups can be considered one of the CSO groups, if they are initiated from the local groups. With rapidly-growing information technology, developing the effective public communication group can be influential to peace building.

Hence, human rights, woman groups, public communication & media groups, and youth groups are selected as key peace constituencies promoted by IFAs. Apart from the said selection, this research includes community development groups and networking groups because they received substantial attention from IFAs and are considered as the essence of peace constituencies for conflict transformation process at broad context. The academia community, although not formed as an explicit civil society organization, plays a significant role to the process as they involve in a number of activities that promote peace building. Some individuals even associate in establishing CSOs and become part of the civil society movement for peace in the Far South.

<b>Civil Society Organizations</b>
<b>1. Community Development and Natural Resource Management</b>
Local Development Institute (LDI)
Wetland Research Project (PSU, Pattani)
<b>2. Human Rights and Relief</b>
Muslim Attorney Center Foundation (MacMuslim) & Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN)
Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF)
Hearty Support Group
<b>3. Women &amp; Youth</b>
Fasai Center
Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces
Civic Women
Lookieang (The Association of Children and Youth for the Peace in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand)
<b>4. Public Communication &amp; Media</b>
Deep South Watch (DSW)
Bungaraya News/ Bungaraya book
Aman News Agency
Patani Forum
FT Media & Friends (Fine Tune Production and Friends)

<b>Civil Society Organizations</b>	
5. Network	Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand
6. Academic	Deep South Coordination Center (DSCC)

The CSOs are categorized into groups according to their objectives. Although the selection based on this categorization may neglect some key actors, it is applied to this research because there lacks a study which may provide a comprehensive understanding of functional aspects of civil society actors in the Far South. This categorization is made upon available secondary data. However, the understanding of civil society's functions in peace building process will be synthesized according to activities and approaches of CSOs studied in this research. Therefore, in order to describe activities of peace constituencies in the Far South, it borrows the findings of seven civil society functions in peace building (Paffenholz, 2009, p. 5) and categorizes various activities into groups; however, does not intend to apply its entire framework of functional approach to assess relevance and effectiveness of each activity. The seven functions are as follows:

- 1) **Protection** of citizens against violence from all parties;
- 2) **Monitoring** of human rights violations, the implementation of peace agreements, etc.;
- 3) **Advocacy** for peace and human rights;
- 4) **Socialization** to values of peace and democracy as well as to develop the in-group identity of marginalized groups;
- 5) **Social Cohesion** by bringing people together from adversarial groups;
- 6) **Facilitation** of dialogue on the local and national level between all sorts of actors; and
- 7) **Service Delivery** to create entry points for peace building.

### **Scope of Research**

The scope of this research is defined in accordance with the three aforementioned objectives. This covers actors and activities aimed to contribute to the peace building process of the Far South; southern border provinces of Thailand, conducted either in

the Far South or elsewhere during 1990s - 2012. Key-informant interviews were conducted during June 2012 – February 2013, and a focus group discussion was conducted in November 2012. Key informants and participants depend on both purposive selection of this research and the cooperation and accessibility of key informants from CSOs and IFAs. After all, this research focuses its analysis on, but is not limited to, cooperation among seven international funding agencies and six civil society groups as specified in the Research Methodology.

It regards actors as central to the analysis; hence, a purposive selection of organizations is applied. Although it started out by considering a cooperation framework of IFAs, the purpose of this research is not to evaluate the performance and contribution of IFAs in particular. Rather, it focuses on an ongoing interaction between IFAs and CSOs in partnership in which degree of influences and involvement in activities from both sides of relationship is varied.

### **Limitations**

Some remarks regarding the limitations of the research are necessary.

1. **IFAs:** This research is limited to the selection of some international organizations. Each organization has its own characteristics, internal aims and strategies for partnership and program implementation. Those aspects are likely to affect different outcomes. However, according to the selection criteria, the results of this research can contribute to the body of knowledge in the Far South for several dimensions. Regarding key informants, it must be noted here that the researcher was not granted an interview with USAID; therefore, it presents and analyzes information of USAID's framework based on public documents and interviews with its beneficiaries only.
2. **CSOs:** Selected CSOs are only examples of the entire population of local actors; therefore they are not necessarily representative of all peace constituencies. The selection of such CSOs is based on certain criteria and accessibility to key informants in the research field. However, the result could provide a picture of key peace constituencies during each period of their development.



3. **Activities:** The research is restricted to the type of peace building activities which were purposively selected according to selected actors; hence, dynamics of all kind of peace building practice in the Far South were not examined.

### **Research Structure**

The research proceeds in 6 chapters. This *first* chapter describes the research question, objectives, hypothesis, and methodology. The *second* chapter provides literature review that discusses peace building, third party intervention, and peace constituencies. In the *third* chapter, the framework of IFAs engaged in the Far South such as conflict analysis, partner selection process, management approaches, and activities as well as an analysis on conflict sensitivity and state's influence on aid administration is presented. Next, the *fourth* chapter introduces selected civil society organizations and their roles to peace building. It then illustrates the visibility and development of peace constituencies during the 1990s – 2012 and influences of national security and political setting on such development. This gives opportunities for this research to discuss an alternative definition of peace constituencies. In the *fifth* chapter, the contribution of cooperation framework on the development of peace constituencies will be assessed. The *sixth* and final chapter concludes on significant research findings and discussion, and gives recommendations on how profound partnerships can be developed for a better contribution on peace constituencies and the peace building process of the Far South.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **Conceptual and Theoretical Debate**

This research is analyzed by the employment of the following concepts:

- Conflict Intervention Approaches;
- Civil Society and Peace Building;
- Third Party Intervention; and
- Peace Constituencies and Third Party Intervention

#### **1. Conflict Intervention Approaches**


In regards to conflict interventions, there are three principal discourses which each represent different levels, practices, and strategies for action in the conflict area (Fischer, 2011).

- The conflict settlement discourse (Track I) relates to a result in the form of an agreement between conflict parties, but does not necessarily address underlying causes. The actor in this formal settlement usually is official and governmental actors.
- The conflict resolution discourse (Track II) relates with process-oriented activities aimed to address the cause of violence. The actors in the resolution are non-official and non-coercive activities by non-governmental parties, who adopt problem-solving workshops and support academic institutions and civil society groups to focus on conflict analysis.
- The conflict transformation discourse (Track III) focuses on long-term peace building efforts oriented and transforming unjust social relationships and promote cooperative relationships. The actors in the transformation are local grassroots organizations, local and international development agencies, engaging in training, capacity building, empowerment, human rights, and development work.

Before the 1970s, resolution to conflict was focused on different forms of mediation at different levels, including governmental and non-governmental actors. It has been

controversial which actors are the most suitable for resolving conflicts. Later in the 1990s, the notion of civil conflict management emerged. It is based on the assumption that different actors should contribute at their own levels by applying their own approaches during certain periods of time. A variety of approaches taken in any intervention will bring about certain contributions that on its ends are complementary to other approaches. These complementary approaches are dynamically developed throughout various phases of conflict. (Paffenholz, 2002, pp. 5-7).

**Figure 1: Pyramid of Actors and Approaches to Peace building**



Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building-peace: Sustainable Development in Divided Societies*: Tokyo, 1994

In 1996, John Paul Lederach introduced the transformation-oriented approaches which place an assumption that certain conflicts cannot be resolved, but there is possibility to transform. Therefore, this approach does not aim at bringing about a

sudden end to violence, but effectively resolving and transforming conflict in the long term. In this frame, conflict offers opportunities for growth, adaptation, and learning. (Lederach, 2003; Paffenholz, 2002, p. 7). Lederach introduced the Pyramid of Actors and Approaches to Peace Building which describes the role of actors in the society of conflict situation. They consist of Level 1: The Top Leadership; Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership and; Level 3: "Grassroots" Level which are equivalent to Track I, II, and III respectively. The Pyramid places an emphasis on actors that are rooted from the country in conflict which he called 'peace constituencies.' He argues that transformation-oriented peace building approaches should create 'peace from within.' (Lederach J. P., 1994 cited in Paffenholz, 2002, p. 8).


Initially, peace constituencies will function to establish a sustainable infrastructure for conflict management in the country (Paffenholz, 2002, p. 7). Recognition and empowerment are considered key processes towards transformation as they will bring about a platform for collective actions to challenge the existing status quo and build local capacities during the processes (Rothman & Friedman 2001, cited in Bigdon & Korf, 2004, p. 7). Moreover, the empowerment, cultural sensitivity, and long-term commitment were named as the three essential building blocks for establishing peace constituencies (Berghof Foundation, 2012, p. 72).

There is no definite scope of members of peace constituencies. Thania Paffenholz (2002, p. 9) proposes that "*a peace constituency includes all civil society, unarmed, organized actors who pursue peaceful conflict management.*" while Berghof Foundation (2009) emphasizes that the essence of it is "*locally-owned peace building activities*" which can be promoted and supported by external actors. Berghof Foundation once defined the term as the following:

*"Peace Constituencies is a network of social and political actors (groups and individuals), especially influential leaders at the Track 2 and 3 levels, who have an interest in crisis prevention and peaceful forms of conflict settlement. Peace constituencies are expected to effectively counter 'war constituencies' (networks of those who benefit from war) and 'cultures of violence.' Influential middle-range actors*

*from different communities in a society who are willing and able to build bridges to like-minded people across the lines of conflict are seen as key for peace constituencies. These constituencies are citizen-based and grow from within a society, but can be supported by external actors” (Berghof Foundation, 2009).*

**Figure 2 Insiders and Outsiders to Peace Building**



Source: Ramsbotham et al., 2005 page 26

The abovementioned definitions focus on embedded civil society groups in the respective country which are diffused and poorly defined since it refers to a large number of institutions with a wide range of interests and objectives. They can be supported by outsiders such as the United Nations, international organizations, other governments, and academics. However, it is arguable whether peace constituency should include any state actors and political parties, especially if they are key conflicting parties who use violence to pursue their goals. A finding of a research project called Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) (Anderson & Olson, 2003, p. 56; CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009) indicates that inclusion of the government and military in strategic alliance for peace is very influential to the

effectiveness of peace practice by civil society. Therefore, apart from who should be involved in peace constituencies, approaches and activities that peace constituencies pursue are also very critical to the impact it can make. Empirically, according to the RPP, peace initiatives that strategize on the linkage of key people and a large number of people and linkage of personal level and sociopolitical level will tend to be more effective in moving toward Peace Writ Large. It finds that the *transferring impacts from micro to macro level is very contributable to improving the effectiveness of peace initiatives* (Anderson & Olson, 2003, pp. 54-58).

Civil peace building is different from peace negotiation at top leadership in that it is non-static and process-oriented. CSOs cannot limit their initiatives to a personal level, meaning to address consequences of the conflict for certain individuals only, but must move forward to a sociopolitical level, meaning to collectively propose for alternatives and transformation on public policy and administration for long-term solution (Anderson & Olson, 2003, pp. 9-13). CSOs, in order to do so, need power to connect with key people from conflicting party, credibility and trust from grass-root population to represent their agenda, and resources to build a network with more people in the society. This reflects a need to *build peace from the bottom up, the top down, and the middle out* according to John Paul Lederach's observation. Peace constituencies from track II & III leadership cannot make *Peace Writ Large* unless they network and integrate the top leadership of pyramid into their dialogue platform. In negotiating a relationship with them, peace constituencies must speak on the asserted ground.

## **2. Civil Society and Peace Building**

Civil society can play a role at every point of development of conflict and its resolution. Although civil society does not replace the state, it is not as weak and vague as it seems, and instead can be a powerful driver of change. To support conflict transformation, it is crucial to change the attitudes and behaviors that perpetuate conflict relationships and to develop mutually acceptable strategies to address the underlying causes of conflict (Barnes, 2009, p. 134). There seems to be three basic orientations that motivate civil society groups to work on conflict-related issues:

- CSO response rooted in a specific civil society sector (e.g. faith community, trade union, woman's organization)
- CSO focus on policy/structural changes in national, regional, and global systems
- CSO focus on addressing a specific conflict situation (local CSOs & people + conflict transformation NGOs) (Barnes, 2005)

CSOs may not possess the decisive power, but by using their unofficial and low-key statuses, CSOs can facilitate dialogue involving those close to government leaders and armed opposition groups (Barnes, 2005). Based on an analysis of a collection of accounts of civil society peace building roles and Barnes' own experience, there are eight main functions of civil society peace building: “(1) *waging conflict constructively*, (2) *shifting conflict attitudes*, (3) *defining the peace agenda*, (4) *mobilizing constituencies for peace*, (5) *reducing violence and promoting stability*, (6) *peacemaking/ conflict resolution* (7) *community-level peacemaking*, and (8) *changing root causes and building cultures of peace*” (Barnes, 2009). Although conflict involves a contest of interests between parties, many CSOs' initiatives (particularly those undertaken through grant funded projects) are depoliticized, meaning that they avoids or are unable to deal with hardliners in the conflict. While the initiative may do no harm, it may have little political relevance to conflict transformation if it fail to consider the political implications of a project (Barnes, 2009, pp. 143-144). The initiative needs to work with other level actors in pushing a structural change.

In addition, CCDP Working Paper Number 4 (Paffenholz, 2009) also examines the role of civil society in peace building processes by conducting a three-year comparative research project and taking the temporal factor into analysis and effective assessment. It suggests that the seven possible functions to be played by civil society within various stages of conflict are: *protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery*. The findings are that the relevance of the seven functions varied significantly during the different phases of conflict. According to 13 case studies in the research, CSOs' performance also varied in term of their effectiveness. Protection, monitoring, advocacy, and facilitation related

activities were highly effective, whereas socialization and social cohesion related activities were less effective. The activities of high relevance, such as protections during wars, were not necessarily equally implemented by CSOs. However, the actual implementation and funding often go to the less relevant and less effective activities.

### **3. Third Party Intervention**

Numerous international institutions were established as instruments and channels to deal with the inter-country matters. The United Nations, NATO, the European Union and many other organizations have been contributing towards facilitating development since World War Two ended in 1945. These international bodies formed under the cooperative regime between states are politically influenced, meaning they are not neutral as they might appear and often dominated by major power holders. Agendas and mandates, so-called 'the software of international architecture' which reflect through their behaviors are constructed and agreed upon by their key members (Ginty & Williams, 2009, pp. 47-48). The debate on conflict related issues is at the philosophy of 'liberal peace' promoted by these international institutions. It is viewed as a Western-oriented and favored principle that facilitates the stranglehold over the economic, political and social powers of their influential members. Even though liberal peace can create a more globally connected environment and multilayer interaction in the international political system, Ginty and Williams (2009, pp. 48-56) argued that the promotion of liberal peace such as liberalism, democracy and economics reinforces the existing power of elites in a particular society rather than creates an egalitarian structure and allocation of resources, and thus, has a possibility to increase tensions for conflicts consequently. A model of the liberal peace framework can be summarized in the following table:



**Table 2 Model of liberal peace framework**

<b>Model</b>	<b>Focus</b>	<b>Liberal Peace Framework</b>	<b>Approach</b>
Conservative	Security	Victor peace	Top-down approach
Orthodox	Institutions and the reform of governance framework	Institutional and constitutional peace	Top-down and bottom-up approach but dominated with conditional models and practice of donors, organizations, and institutions
Emancipatory	Relationship of custodianship and consent with local ownership	Civil peace	Bottom-up approach with concerns on social welfare and justice

**Source:** Adapted from Björkdahl, Richmond, and Kappler, 2009, Page 13-16

‘The hardware of international context’ is comprised of key constituted states entitled as members for international bodies and decision-makers for their own citizens. It can be seen here that the interaction of all levels actually overlap, and as a result, a complex multilateralism lens should be taken to review the role of international institutions which engage in conflict and development. The environment they operate in is often so complex and sometimes covert that several actors can either cooperate or clash.

Kazuo (2000, pp. 36-37) pointed out that the incompatibility of several different approaches and objectives by various organizations in a conflict area are the major issue in conflict and development. In fact, the lack of a common framework for operations could deteriorate the situation or other problems may arise. Kazuo suggests the establishment of a cooperative international system that is embraced through international development in order to limit the expansion of conflicts in fragile developing countries (Ginty & Williams, 2009, pp. 46-71).

Different approaches done by different actors can affect the peace building process to various extents. In transformation-oriented peace building, civil society is central to reducing violence by building cooperative relationships and driving forth positive

changes. Although various peace building measures can be implemented by different level actors, there has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary involvement of external agencies to recognizing the existence of internal peace actors embedded in every society (Paffenholz, 2002; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005, p. 25). Instead of outsiders attempting to build peace, the international community had better seek potential to build constituencies and capacity within societies. It is also necessary to learn how to transform conflict to sustained peace by emphasizing the 'bottom-up' processes (Maiese, 2003; Ramsbotham, et al., 2005, pp. 23-27). Two strategies in promoting peace constituencies are introduced in the Technical Cooperation applied by GTZ as follows:

Direct promotion of peace constituencies - It focuses on supporting civil society groups who are able to contribute to conflict prevention and constructive conflict management in both short and long term. In this strategy, identifying which groups to promote largely depends on conflict context, and socio-economic, social and religious conditions. Context-sensitive and process-oriented approach should be employed in the identification of peace constituencies and promotion instruments. The selective criteria and strategies should be adjusted according to the evolving conditions of the conflict at any specific period of time.

Indirect promotion of peace constituencies - It focuses more on war-related groups meaning those who are vulnerable for being drawn into conflict due to their particular experiences and circumstances. They, in many cases, are unemployed young people, street children, ex-combatants, and those who are cruelty affected by the attacks from one of the conflict parties (Paffenholz, 2002, pp. 11-19).

Although the ideas of transformation-oriented peace building give an impression that civil society leadership, local and national, can potentially leverage those in top leadership into the peace building process, it is undeniable that peace constituencies in periphery conflict area mostly depend on support from outsiders. Globalization enables and facilitates the political intervention of a third party, direct and indirect, within a nation-state. The notion of a 'global civil society' entails more cross-boundary cooperation among actors of the government arena to push for a movement

to solve local problems within one territory. Although Adam Burke (2011) has concluded in his study that foreign aid actually cannot go everywhere it wants to and is instead, rather restricted on how and to what it can contribute, in most circumstances its intervention is tremendously influential for the being of civil society. Due to their short term stay, international agencies may be able to accumulate and absorb the understanding of issues and networks within the country less than local civil society, but often they have a handful of resources to offer. What matters is how those resources are being used and distributed.

A late-1990s publication by Henning Haugerudbraaten (1998) once noted that there actually exist two basic concepts of peace building: the first concept is characterized by the “short-term involvement of the international community, centralism and political measures primarily undertaken by external agent.” and the second concept entails “long-term efforts by mainly indigenous actors to promote political and economic development, and a sustainable solution to the root causes of the conflict.” In practice, these concepts are not static but instead take a flexible stand between one side of the spectrum and another. It also depends on the context of the country, issues, and sectors as well as each party’s situational analysis and feasible mechanisms available.

**Table 3 Two Distinct Concepts of Peace Building**

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Outsider</b>	<b>Insider</b>
Aim of peace building	Promote good governance and dispute settlement mechanisms	Address root causes of conflict
Means of peace building	Primarily political interventions	Broader intervention in political, economic, security, and humanitarian spheres
Temporal aspect of peace building	Short term	Long term
Main actors of peace building	International community	Indigenous actors
Process/action dimension	Peace building equated to the actions undertaken	Peace building seen as the result, as the aggregate process
Organization of peace building	Peace building is centralized under the auspices of the UN, more stress on coordination than on diversity	Peace building is facilitated by a multitude of actors, more stress on diversity than on coordination

**Source:** Haugerudbraaten, 1998 (Online)

A few approaches are regarded as a framework for practice for third party intervention in order to mitigate its negative impact and enhance its positive contributions for local peace initiatives and actors.

*a. Conflict-sensitive approach*

Looking at characteristics of each program, the conflict-sensitive approach is introduced and widely mandated in many development organizations in order to guide towards constructive work in conflict situations. The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium introduces its definition as follows:

*“A conflict-sensitive approach involves gaining a sound understanding of the two-way interaction between activities and context and acting to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of intervention on conflict, within an organization’s given priorities/objectives (mandate)”* (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012).

It can be applied to assess the effectiveness of development, humanitarian assistance and peace building, but it is still extremely difficult to measure the contribution to the dynamic of peace and conflict in the broader context. However, it seems plausible to do so at the project level because the emphasis on conflict analysis at the planning, implementation, and evaluation of a project helps to design and redesign a better program for interventions. Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald & Sherriff (2005) argues that *“Framing discussion as conflict-sensitive development is one way in which constructive engagement can be approached, whereas ‘conflict transformation’ or ‘promoting peace’ can be seen as too esoteric or ‘political’.”* Taking a more strategic approach, by integrating all stakeholders to conflict sensitivity also opens a new opportunity for measuring. Conflict sensitivity focuses on the need to work beyond one’s own organization, and even beyond partner organizations’ impact, towards the change of agencies that are formerly uninterested to become more active in engaging constructively in conflict transformation (Barbolet, et al., 2005).

*b. Do No Harm*

Do No Harm is a suitable and valuable approach for micro conflict analysis, in both emergencies and development context. It envisions the negative and positive impact of aid distribution on conflict dynamics, as resources distributed to various groups will immediately affect the inter-group relationships, either exacerbating tensions or encouraging connectors. The emphasis of analysis is that any intervention made to a divided society should be based on minimizing capacities for war and maximizing capacities for peace. It is highly compatible with community-based participatory processes, as it aims at not only minimizing the negative effects of the intervention, but also helping local people to construct alternative systems for dealing with underlying causes of the conflict. Furthermore, the application of this approach does not rely on any mandates, but requires a context specific involvement where a loose platform allows each practitioner to do their own analysis and find an appropriate entry point for the projects (Uvin, 2002). However, this analysis does not include explicit conflict and peace indicators, therefore, the recognized impacts of an aid program on the entire problem are not actually measured, but implicitly lie in a just and participatory process. The process is very useful in the sense that it lays a solid

foundation on which peace building can take place. A project-based analysis within the ‘Do No Harm’ framework is less likely to be able to explain dynamics of macro level conflict, thus it should be combined with other macro conflict analysis tools for a broader purpose (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004, pp. 27-28).

#### **4. Peace Constituency and Third Party Intervention**

According to a study of experiences on peace practices by The Collaborative for Development Action, evidences conclude that although good partnerships of insiders and outsiders may not always bring about significant impact on peace building at the broad context, it contributes to the effectiveness of peace initiatives to a certain extent. On the one hand, problems in partnership can undermine programs and sometimes drive further conflicts among constituencies. On the other hand, when insiders and outsiders working together for peace, if the framework of cooperation is well-designed, it can induce potential for increased effectiveness of peace work. The study emphasized that a good partnership does not arise from the selection of the best and strongest partner, but rather depends on the process that such relationship is initiated and maintained (Anderson & Olson, 2003, pp. 35-44).

##### *a. Local Ownership*

International aid is, essentially, about *relationships*, and is not narrowly limited to the transfer of goods and services between donors and recipients. Mary B. Anderson (2001) emphasizes that such said relationships are a composition of inequitable relations which are derived from the strict requirement for accountability towards the giving side of the relationship. The one-directional flow of money unavoidably causes the struggle in practical and financial independence for local actors (Anderson, 2001, p. 295; Reich, 2006, p. 16).

On the one hand, partnership and cooperation for development and peace building enhances transparency and accountability because it increases the degree of *inclusiveness* for checks-and-balances and decision-making. The unequal partnership on the other hand can exacerbate tensions among partners and affect the achievement of the cooperation which could also be destructive to the context they are operating in. As a result, there are several attempts by donors to structure their aid delivery

mechanisms aimed at transforming an unequal patron-client relationship into power-sharing scheme and more local ownership. Nevertheless, in practice, such attempts may negatively affect their relationship because it possibly undermines mutual respect and honesty of both parties (Anderson, 2001, pp. 295-256).

Reich (2006) argues that to embrace *local ownership* as a concrete outcome of international aid for development cooperation and peace building activities is not only counterproductive, but also tends to obstruct the utilization of local capacities. The foreign-funded program which implies ‘local ownership’ as an objective is not usually in practice ‘locally perceived and led by local actors,’ but rather a program with participatory process to persuade local stakeholders to absorb and agree on an ideology and practice from outsiders. A decision-making power in designing, implementing, and adapting the project may be not provided to the grass-root in such a program. Hence, not only is the management framework utilized during the project implementation, but also during the beneficiary selection process before constituting a partnership crucial to identify ownership in certain circumstance. In reality, the poor performers (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004) may be neglected from the partnership scheme with international aid because the criteria are usually tied to the managerial performance of potential partners, rather than the relevance of initiatives to addressing the problems in the area.

#### *b. Sustainability*

A finding in the first phase of Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) reveals that peace programs need to respond to the broader societal impact, the so-called “*Peace Writ Large*” (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009). It concludes from previous experiences that peace building actors are typically mostly effective at their own level as their contributions to other levels are still very limited (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004). Therefore, program linkages among levels and across sectors/constituencies will be able to enhance *effectiveness* of peace initiatives (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2009). External actors are encouraged to operate towards a comprehensive understanding of *multi-level aspects of peace building*

*actors* in order to strengthen local capacities (Anderson, 2001, p. 298; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004).

However, apart from financial support, their role in the transfer of knowledge, skills, and know-how through technical assistance and cooperation is often seen as Western-oriented, ineffective, and costly (Riddell, 2007, pp. 195-207). The debate on conflict related issues is at the philosophy of ‘liberal peace’ promoted by these international institutions. It is viewed as a favored principle that enhances economic, political and social power of their influential leaders than builds an egalitarian structure and allocation of resource. Thus, it has a possibility to increase tensions for conflicts (Ginty & Williams, 2009, pp. 48-56).

The paradigm shift to a more effective and sustainable involvement, such as ‘Capacity Development’ appears significantly in recent years. It is a process “whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain capacity overtime (OECD, 2006)”. Although the impact measurability of capacity development is fairly doubtful, its success could be achieved by commitment to institutional strengthening and a change of both donors and recipients. Rather than expecting a remarkable impact from short-term, discrete interventions, some argue that the success of capacity development should be seen as being able to produce a constructive interaction among institutions and individuals which somehow contributes to a wider, long-term and involved process (Riddell, 2007, pp. 207-211). The institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity is therefore a significant component in promoting peace constituencies in the violent conflict situation as the international community who generally has both positive and negative experience globally should not only realize the importance of the project managerial and operational capacities of their local partners, but also the institutional capacity that encourages constituencies to develop and utilize its human and organizational capital to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts on the conflict dynamics of the circumstance(s) where it operates (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004).



## **Analytical Framework**

The findings of this research will be analyzed in three related parts as follows;

### **1. Cooperation Frameworks**

The Oxford dictionary defines Framework as “An essential supporting or underlying structure” (Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 563), and the Longman Dictionary defines Cooperation as “The act of working together for a shared purpose” (Addison Wesley Longman, 1998, p. 284). Therefore, this research defines *Cooperation Framework* as “*An underlying structure of working together for a shared purpose.*” According to the above stated definition, three indicators will be used in order to acquire the understanding of cooperation frameworks.

- ➔ Conflict Analysis and Objectives (How they see the problems and what motivates them to involve);
- ➔ Selection process/criteria (How they become partners); and
- ➔ Managerial Framework (How they work together)

Particularly, the Conflict Analysis, Objectives, and Selection Process will illustrate how partnerships are initiated under the organizational framework of both IFAs and CSOs. Management Frameworks will describe the conditions for such partnerships to be structured and maintained. Cooperation frameworks found in this research will then be analyzed on the implication of conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm approach, hence, the determination of a framework is considered from both sides of the relationship. It shows a dynamic adaptation of cooperation frameworks over time.

### **2. Development of Peace Constituencies**

The change of actors, their purposes, approaches, and activities are determined as indicators for assessment of the development of peace constituencies. They are outlined in the followings:

- ➔ Agendas - The underlying intentions or motives of a particular person or group (Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 24). It refers to the overall motivation of peace constituencies during each period of time.

- ➔ Approaches – A way of dealing with something (Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 64). Approaches in this research refer to the Pyramid of Actors and Approaches to Peace Building by John Paul Lederach.
- ➔ Actors – Local and national civil society groups who engages in peace building process in the Far South. They include clubs, unions, professional associations, faith-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, foundations, and media groups. Businesses and political parties are not regarded as civil society organizations (Paffenholz, 2009).
- ➔ Activities – A variety of activities undertaken by civil society organizations which could contribute directly or indirectly to the general goal of the peace building process which is to move the population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being (Paffenholz, 2009). Activities are translated from agendas and approaches.

The expansion, local ownership, and sustainability of peace constituencies in the Far South during 1990s to present will be assessed.


### **3. Context**

- National security policies and political settings

This will largely determine the space in which IFAs and CSOs can operate. The Thai government's aid policy and overall administration can encourage or discourage the initiatives and actions by IFAs, while national political settings can be influential to the level of participation of civil society in peace building initiatives. In analyzing national security policies, it will reveal which model of liberal peace the Thai State tends to follow (Björkdahl, Richmond, & Kappler, 2009, pp. 13-16). This also relates to the level of violence in the Deep South. On the one hand, with the increase of violence, the space for IFAs and CSOs peace building decreases because it affects the existing forms of social organizations and social networks by spreading fear, distrust and intimidation especially when civil society is often the target of violence. On the other hand, violence can be a central motive for CSOs to advocate for peace

especially the healing and human rights tasks (DeepSouthWatch, 2012a; Rattakaran, 2012). The strong civil society network may become an effective buffer for potential violence.

Figure 3 Analytical Framework



## **CHAPTER III**

### **FRAMEWORKS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING AGENCIES**

This chapter aims to describe objectives and categorize frameworks that International Funding Agencies (IFAs) engage with civil society organizations in the Far South according to the first and second objectives of this research. It proceeds in 4 parts as outlined in the following:

1. International Funding Agencies' Entry Points in the Far South – provides the historical dimension of third party intervention particularly on peace constituencies in the Far South;
2. Framework of Selected IFAs – describes their objectives and instruments for intervention by exploring their philosophy, conflict analysis, beneficiaries selection process, and managerial framework;
3. Implication of Conflict Sensitivity – Analyze cooperation framework with regard to its conflict sensitivity.
4. State's Influences on Aid Administration– considers influences of aid administration as to illustrate the context in which IFAs pursue peace building support since these influences have also contributed to the extent to which partnership with CSOs have developed.

#### **International Funding Agencies' Entry Points in the Far South**

Overall, foreign funding to Thai CSOs started in Thailand around 1950s (Chutima, 2007, pp. 73-94; Pongsapich & Kataleradabhan, 1997, pp. 52-58). For Thai CSOs, foreign embassies in Thailand and foreign non-governmental organizations have been their major source of funding for several decades. There are various ways foreign funding agencies are matched to local beneficiaries in Thailand. In the former years, agreements to provide grants to CSOs were easily made through personal relationships, which play a crucial role in deciding either formal or informal partnerships since early 1990s up until the present. This was largely because of trust in the persons, which compromises the requirement of reports submission, both narrative and financial, to donors. However, two decades later, the formal practice of

signing a financial aid contract requires CSOs to strictly submit reports within a specific timeframe and conditions. Failure to do so can cause termination of either the contract or even long-term relationship with the donors. The increasing essence of legal promises for grant-making has dramatically challenged CSOs receiving foreign funds, and has already discouraged some small CSOs to benefit from it. For example, any project modifications will strictly require the approval of donors in advance. Indicators to measure the project attainment must be put in place such as a logical framework or objective-oriented project planning. Some donors demand CSOs to show how the projects can be sustained in the long run and even ask for co-financing. The requirement to work closely with the Thai government is sometimes very difficult to comply with, especially for some advocacy CSOs who are often on the opposite side of the government.

The idea of aid effectiveness is a result of the obligation to be responsible for money donated by the 'back donors,' referring to the government and the public of donors' countries. These back donors can also be influential in determining priorities/preferences in aid policy. As a result, it can be seen that funding agencies often concentrate on some particular areas, issues, and sectors, which made it more difficult for CSOs working on specific issues and approaches to find resources. Gawin Chutima (Chutima, 2007) highlighted that this donor-centric framework is actually a translation of the power relation between givers and receivers of which the latter are often in the inferior position. The relationship of foreign funding to CSOs will never be an equal one even though several efforts to transform have been initiated by the giving side of relationship.

In the mid-1990s, some donors withdrew or decreased their funding to Thai CSOs due to Thailand's economic expansion that raises the country up to the middle income level and thus became disqualified for foreign aid. Some had managed to stay low profile and continued to support to their long-standing partners. Recently, new funding agencies also appear with large amount of money, yet are extremely bureaucratic and difficult to access. Many CSOs expressed that the aforementioned conditions mainly prevent them from accessing such available funds; and the lack of funding is the top among all problems Thai CSOs are currently facing nowadays.

The following table exemplifies several foreign funds to Thai CSOs since the 1950s up until 2007 as well as their motivations and characteristics. According to field research, most of them are a major source of funding for CSOs in the Far South as well.

**Table 4 Foreign Funding to nation-wide CSOs in Thailand since 1950s up to 2007<sup>3</sup>**

IFAs	Examples	Subject to	Characteristics
Foreign Embassies/ Bilateral Aid Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TACAP<sup>4</sup> and AusAID by Australia Embassy</li> <li>- MAF<sup>5</sup> and Canada Fund by CIDA<sup>6</sup></li> <li>- GGP<sup>7</sup> through Japanese Embassy</li> <li>- British Embassy</li> <li>- Democracy Fund by US Embassy</li> <li>- UK Embassy</li> <li>- The Netherlands Embassy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aid policy of respective government</li> <li>- Personal interest of the ambassador</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Easy access, simple criteria, but become more difficult in recent years</li> <li>- Startup fund (Seed grant)</li> <li>- Limited in size</li> <li>- Limited in how it can be used (price quotations, no support for salaries/training/intangible items)</li> <li>- Subject to change drastically and abruptly</li> <li>- Only be supplementary for CSOs who already had core funding</li> <li>- CSOs' projects receiving bilateral funds must be approved by TICA<sup>8</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>3</sup> This table is summarized from Chutima, G. (2007). Funding for NGOs in Thailand: The Politics of Money in the Nonprofit Sector. In S. Shigetomi, K. Tejapira & A. Thongyou (Eds.), *The NGO Way: Perspectives and Experiences from Thailand*: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization.

<sup>4</sup> Thai-Australian Community Assistance Programme (TACAP)

<sup>5</sup> Mission Assistance Fund (MAF)

<sup>6</sup> Canada International Development Agency

<sup>7</sup> Grants for Grass-roots Project (GGP)



IFAs	Examples	Subject to	Characteristics
Bilateral Funds beyond embassy level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DANCED<sup>9</sup></li> <li>- European Commission and Global Environment Facility Medium-Size Project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aid policy of respective government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large in size</li> <li>- Specific in issues of interest</li> <li>- Bureaucratic and inaccessible for small CSOs or community-based organizations</li> </ul>
Foreign Non-governmental Funds	<p>The Asia Foundation, Terre des Hommes (TdH), Friedrich Nauman Stiftung (FNS), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBS), The Ford Foundation, CARE International, Save the Children Fund, OXFAM, CCF, etc.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aid policy of their back donors</li> <li>- Organizations' philosophy and main focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited in size</li> <li>- Specific in issues of interest</li> <li>- Either carrying out the activities themselves or by supporting smaller NGOs/CSOs in their grassroots activities</li> <li>- Reporting and management system are mostly easy access using simple criteria, but sometimes have to comply with its back donors' complex framework</li> </ul>

<sup>8</sup> Thailand International Development Cooperation Agencies under Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<sup>9</sup> Danish Government agency created to help put Agenda 21 from the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development into practice


<b>IFAs</b>	<b>Examples</b>	<b>Subject to</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
UN agencies	UNICEF, UNDP, and ILO	Specific issues of interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Easy access, simple criteria</li> <li>- Specific in issues of interest</li> <li>- Available occasionally</li> <li>- May/may not be consistent with major problems in CSOs' operational areas in particular</li> <li>- Only be supplementary for CSOs who already have core funding</li> </ul>

Early entry points of IFAs in the Far South are mostly a result of nationwide grant-making to Thai CSOs, and not many had particularly focused on the Far South conflict until the bursting violence in 2004. The oldest foreign funding foundation in the area is The Asia Foundation (TAF) (Chutima, 2007). Started in 1954, TAF focused on social welfare and basic human development which is also covered in the area of the three southernmost provinces. TAF's program in the Far South in the former days was to work with educational institutions in the area to reform the secular curriculum of private Islamic secondary schools. By improving the quality of education in the Far South where cultural and linguistic identity are distinct from the rest of the country, TAF hoped that equal rights to public services would be created, enhancing more economic and social opportunities for young people within the region. At that time, there were no active CSOs or working groups, nor were there any foreign funding agencies in the area. During the transition to Thailand's new constitution in 1997, TAF initiated a program to promote civic education for civil society, local government, and community nationwide which the Far South civil society also took part in (Interview T, 27 August 2012; The Asia Foundation, undated-b).

Later that same year following the Asian financial crisis, the Thai government accepted a loan from the World Bank, which also included USD-120-million Social Investment Fund (SIF) for a period of 40 months. This fund attempted to alleviate poverty for people who were affected economically and socially by the crisis in 1997. It used a participatory approach to increase their well-being by promoting empowerment and long-term self-reliance, expecting non-government agents to be actors of governance (Salim, 2001). This fund was initially very controversial because it was perceived by a number of CSOs as neo-colonization from a 'First World' country. It caused a divide among CSOs in the Far South. Although SIF aims to fund networks of CSOs in the last period, they seem to be ineffective. At that time, there was no profound relationship among groups in the Far South yet, so what appeared was some have gathered up shortly in order to meet the requirement of the fund. Then, the relationship ended soon after the funding was finished. (Interview D, 4 July 2012). Moreover, among a number of reports on the successes and failures of

the program, Shinichi Shigetomi presented an interesting result to his study showing that the conditional string attached with intergovernmental loans could have the effect on power relations within the arena of local politics as well. By the World Bank's condition to making a grant to communities directly, it required setting up provincial committees, which in the case study half of them are local level bureaucrats, to approve and monitor sub-projects. What emerged were intermediary agents that formed a network between the provincial level leaders and grassroots leaders to distribute the fund as shown in Figure 5 (Shigetomi, 2007). Although there is no concrete study of the project in the southern border provinces, the presence of the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) and the Community Organization Networks (Salim, 2001) giving grants at that time, are examples of intermediary agents in the area because of incompatibility in capacity of IFAs and local communities. Whether this new system is more efficient or not is yet to be answered, but the structure seems to remain until present days.

**Figure 4 System Change resulting from Social Investment Fund**



In addition, embassy funds such as the Canada fund and AusAID have been providing supplementary grants to some newly-emerged CSOs in the Far South. An independent journalist was very impressed that the Canadian Embassy funded the Tang Num Newspaper<sup>10</sup> – so much so that the journalist retained close follow-up with the Canadian ambassador on the matter. Unfortunately, this relationship came to an end after the said ambassador's term ended. The easy access and reporting system encourages small CSOs and individuals to benefit from the fund. (Interview Y, 22 June 2012). Even so, because embassy funds mostly do not provide staff salaries, rent, and utility expense, it is quite challenging for small CSOs without core-funding to manage the use of an embassy fund in their operation (Interview AA, 27 September 2012).

Later when human rights violations and violence took place in the Far South beginning in 2004, there was a need of assistance for the affected populations. The Muslim Attorney Center, The Asia Foundation (TAF), and several other organizations initiated a program called Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network by training about laws enforcement, legal procedures, and investigation skills for young leaders to provide basic legal services in local communities. Furthermore, TAF also provided short term grants to some local media group such as Bungaraya News and Aman News Agency. Apart from TAF, Open Society Institute (OSI) is one of the names mentioned by many key informants from small local CSOs, such as Hearty Support Group, Patani Forum, Muslim Attorney Center, and Aman News Agency. These funding agencies applied consultative grant making to local CSOs whose managerial and operational capacity was limited. Therefore, foreign embassy and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) become the crucial sources of seed grants for many CSOs to start up their activities in response to the conflict.

Other international non-government organizations (INGOs) also entranced the Far South after 2004. Internews Europe Association conducted journalist trainings for individuals and media groups beginning in 2005, Oxfam Great Britain began awarding grants to the Wetland Research Project since 2005, and Save the Children

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funded youth activities for Fasai Center, Makhampom, and Lookrieang in 2008 (Interview D, 4 July 2012; Interview O, 1 August 2012; Interview P, 10 June 2012). As it was the first time involvement reached the Far South, these grants helped these INGOs familiarize themselves with the area and the issue. However, most of these INGOs are limited to an area of interest and specialization. There are also funds channeled through religious institutions from Islamic organizations and Middle East governments. They are mostly distributed in the form of charity for commodities, construction, and scholarships directly donated to mosques and Islamic schools (Burke, 2011, p. 150)<sup>11</sup>. In 2009, a large amount of funding provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand (EU Delegation) for wide sectors arrived in the Far South.

### **Framework of International Funding Agencies**

The idea of peace constituency highly focuses on the domestic actors who can be strengthened from outside through a variety of measures. Although civil society seems to play a more compatible and suitable role in the long-term conflict transformation, they still have some vulnerability and limitations such as insufficient financial and human resources. An international community trying to promote peace in a country has to identify ‘who’ and ‘how’ in order to strengthen these constituencies. Each organization follows different processes of identifying peace constituencies for promotion. Certain steps introduced by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) are Country analysis for crisis prevention and conflict management, Conflict sensitive analysis, Setting priorities, Needs assessment, Process and program promotion, Strategic alliances, and Criteria for Promotion (Paffenholz, 2002). Different frameworks for cooperation emerge as a result of such highly context-specific steps.

On a whole, the cooperation framework not only determines how the international agencies analyze the situation, but also how they assess the need and prioritizes what and who to support. The donor-centric analysis such as desk-study may be less likely

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<sup>11</sup> Informal discussion with academics from Prince of Songkla University

to allow room for conflict sensitivity in their program, meaning less interaction between the program and context, while donors who integrate all stakeholders in the analysis and assessment may be able to respond more to the context and issues. However, apart from the conflict analysis, the framework could also include a selection process and fund delivery mechanisms of their own or of their back donors. These policies and procedures may be subtle to go through, but they are significantly influential to the impact of a foreign funding agencies' program on the development of constituencies. IFAs were purposively selected according to their approaches and targeted beneficiaries.

The following section is a result of data collection including key informant interviews and publicly-available documents from an intergovernmental funding agency; the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand (EU Delegation) and 6 international non-governmental organizations; Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and The Asia Foundation, while only publicly-available documents were used for another intergovernmental funding agency; the United States Agency for International Development. Interviews with CSOs and overall field observation also contributed to the following. It proceeds in 3 parts:

1. Conflict Analysis and Objectives
2. Peace Constituencies Selection Process
3. Management Framework

## 1. Conflict Analysis and Objectives

### a. Intergovernmental Funding Agencies

#### 1) The Delegation of the European Union to Thailand (EU Delegation)

The European Union's contribution in international development, even though is classified by the OECD/DAC as part of multilateral aid, de facto acts in many ways like a bilateral aid donor (Riddell, 2007, p. 67). The EU has followed the Far South situation cautiously, and the greatest concern is the ability of the Thai government to prevent the situation from exacerbating into a larger sub-region issue (Kiatpongsan, 2011, pp. 94-96).

In analysing the conflict in the Far South, the EU's program officer noted that *"The EU Delegation does not conduct the diagnosis particularly for the situation in the Far South before its engagement, but rather generalize it the same as the general trend of national politics. That said, although the country has reached the middle income level status, there seems to be high social marginalization, low social cohesion, and political polarization in the society. These issues were partly caused by the highly-centralized development process which could fuel the conflict and violence in places where culture and identity are different from other parts of the country. Therefore, for the EU Delegation, the decentralization process is a very crucial component to the solution, but civil society and the affected population are unable to access state-funding to mobilize and express their grievances and demands"* (Interview A, 10 August 2012). In principle, this analysis results from the "European Commission Checklists for root causes of conflict," a desk-based conflict analysis framework which focuses on structural root causes of conflict at national and regional levels by using checklists and external research capacity (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004). The program officers emphasized that inequality and marginalization are among the roots of the conflict; therefore, the EU Delegation has contributed to financing a wide range of *'development initiatives'* in the area. Apparently, socioeconomic issues at the local level are focused within the EU's scope of intervention. Through this approach, the EU Delegation expects to make an impact on preventing any harm to the stability of the country. Although the EU's central



understanding of the Far South may not be comprehensively explained, it believes that the *demand-driven mechanism* employed for grant making will somehow fulfill this gap of understanding. (Interview A, 10 August 2012).

For the first time in 2009, Thailand received a specific allocation under the Non State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA & LA) Program by the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand. This program is to support actions in the three southern provinces within the area of good governance and human rights under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Instrument for Stability (Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009b). This is an *“actor-oriented”* program aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations and local authorities as a pre-condition for a more equitable, open and democratic society through support to their *“own initiatives”* (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009). The program therefore supports actions aimed at promoting an inclusive and empowered society in Thailand to facilitate NSA & LA participation in poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2011).

The overarching objective of the largest current program by the EU Delegation is *to promote local non-state actor and local authorities’ involvement to contribute to poverty alleviation within the context of enhancing efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in the South of Thailand* (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009, p. 5). The budget was offered only for the Far South in 2009-2010 and expanded to the entire country in 2011-2012. This program is considered and approved on an annual basis with the budget of EUR 16.8 million (THB 840 million) for NSA and EUR 4 million (THB 200 million) for LA during 2009-2012. Although the overarching theme is quite similar during the four years, different emphasizes are attached for each year. They include the following specific objectives:

1. To build the capacity of NSA and LA to plan and manage development projects;
2. To contribute to a more enabling environment for NSA and LA involvement;

3. To enhance the capacity of NSA to deliver community-based services in partnership with local authorities in order to promote reconciliation;
4. to fight social exclusion and marginalization by providing free legal assistance to vulnerable groups of society; and
5. To promote local culture as a way to build confidence and mutual understanding among different societal groups (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009, 2011, 2012).

Under this program, the EU Delegation's role is not only to make grants for CSOs, but also to build an environment and incentives for cooperation among peace constituencies in the Far South. According to the EU's interpretation, capacity development is called "organizations as open systems" (European Communities, 2005). It refers to the OECD definition and believes that external parties cannot 'do' the capacity development of others but are able to support the capacity development process. With the combination of internal factors and a suitable environment, capacity can be developed (European Communities, 2005). By the belief that this capacity building is a domestic affair and should be initiated by committed insiders, the EU intentionally avoids focusing on capacity development support elements such as training and consultancy. Apart from several training sessions for proposal writing, the EU Delegation does not conduct capacity building activities by itself. However, the first objective of the EU's Thematic program for Thailand is to build the managerial, operational and technical capacities to plan and implement projects for non-state actors in the Far South (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009, p. 5). In doing so, the principle of 'quality partnership' requires EU's beneficiaries to have contributions to each partner by building these capacities. If local CSOs want to conduct capacity building activities for their own, an amount of budget can be proposed for such component. The EU program officers also confirmed that the EU Delegation's aim is not to constitute a network but expect such network to form itself under an environment and condition its program attempts to provide (Interview A, 10 August 2012).

## 2) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The United States through the United States Agency for International Development has been operating in Thailand since 1950 and has contributed more than USD 1.1 billion to the country's development (USAID, 2009). Its aid programs generally focus on promoting democracy and freedom, taking the stand of liberal peace. However, a few key goals to achieve such objective are (1) to stimulate economic growth and development; (2) to bring poor countries out of poverty and; (3) to support countries by programming and funding for humanitarian assistance (Riddell, 2007, pp. 55-59). Prior to its current in-country intervention, the US Government continues its support to CSOs in the Far South through US-associated organizations like The Asia Foundation and Internews Europe Association (Burke, 2011), as well as the occasional US embassy fund.

This research intended to include data from an interview with USAID in its analysis; unfortunately, the request for an interview was refused. Therefore, further description and analysis about USAID in this research will be based on secondary data and interviews with USAID's beneficiaries in the Far South. In 2009, the Governance and Vulnerable Populations (GVP) Office of USAID launched an analysis of the Far South conflict. It came forth together with the Request for Proposals (RfPs) for US-based organizations to manage grants under contract. In the said analysis, several root causes of the conflict were mentioned and recognized. The past resentment against Thai imperialism and long-time abuse of power by government officials are among the root causes which were further complicated by poor education, poverty, unemployment, cultural/linguistic alienation of ethnic Malays and crime factors. USAID perceived that in the 1990s, issue-based CSOs were successful in expanding political space to participate in a public policy debate and formalizing their role in the polity. However, this success has been undermined by a combination of factors – including the financial crisis, reduced levels of foreign assistance and Thaksin's intolerance of opposition voices, especially the voice of civil society. USAID openly criticizes that political crisis and conflict in the Far South were largely exacerbated by

the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Chinawatra<sup>12</sup> hardline approach. The use of intolerance within the executive power has overridden the checks and balances in the area and the overall Thai political system. In addition, the presence of the Thai military together with its handy power obstructed an adequate political solution. It views that this unhealthy democratic environment has wrecked the strengths and capacity of civil society organizations in the society to participate in government oversight and long-term peace building (USAID/RDMA, 2009, pp. 9-13).

In April 2010, USAID's Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA) launched a three-to-five-year program with the budget of USD 30 million (THB 960 million) aiming *“to foster constructive civil society engagement with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) as a means to building consensus for democratic political processes and mitigating extremism”* (USAID/RMDA, 2010). USAID granted the program to a US-based corporation named ‘Development Alternatives Incorporated’ (DAI) to act as a prime implementer (USAID/RMDA, 2010). The program consists of three main objectives, including:

1. Enhancing capacities of key independent agencies to provide effective government oversight (20 percent of program resources),
2. Strengthening the capacity of Thai civil society organizations and media to serve as checks and balances for political processes and public policy (45 percent of program resources), and
3. Supporting civic peace-building efforts and diminishing the potential for radicalization and escalation of violent conflict in southern Thailand (35 percent of program resources) (USAID/RMDA, 2010).

Among the other intergovernmental agencies analyzed in this research, the USAID has the most overt expression of its intervention to support peace building in the Far South, placing government oversight by civil society as the ultimate goal. It emphasizes supporting the causes and consequences of conflict, building trust within community, and building trust between citizens and the state. These focuses will complement activities under the first and second objectives by *“providing*

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<sup>12</sup> Prime Minister Thaksin's ruling government was during 2001-2006.

*opportunities for civic leaders and CSOs to engage with the Human Rights Commission or other independent agencies on peace building activities (Objective 1) and providing necessary linkage to CSOs across the country that may strengthen the public demand for a peaceful solution to the conflict; so-called national level constituencies for peace (Objective 2)” (USAID/RDMA, 2009).* The combination of these three components is ultimately expected to constitute ‘*solid public participation mechanisms*’ so as to establish democratic governance and long-term peace in the country (US Watch/Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Thailand, 2009; USAID/RDMA, 2009; USAID/RMDA, 2010).

Principally, USAID’s intervention approach employs a “Conflict Assessment Framework” which focuses on broad scope, synthesis of desk study, workshop, and follow-up integration into programming strategy for the country it is operating in. Such framework allows interactions between its program and context (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004). “The Sapan Program: Strengthening Thai Democracy” was initiated under the said program. In the RfPs, USAID claimed that its program component for the Far South will be flexible and will respond to needs as they emerge. In doing so, there will be ongoing consultation among parties, including the Contractor, USAID Contracting Authority, and stakeholders on the ground (USAID/RDMA, 2009, p. 16). Contracting conditions between contractor and USAID were all specified according to the home country’s regulations. Although the framework to engage with CSOs will be designed later together with more situational assessment, CSOs will still have to follow some US-based regulations such as procurement and in-kind contribution if they enter into relationship with USAID (USAID/RDMA, 2009).

Regarding capacity development, USAID and DAI aim to provide training to enhance operational and managerial capacities to CSOs, but they found that most local CSOs are not yet strengthened in institutional capacity, meaning they lack of human resources and a well-established organizational structure. The development of operational and managerial capacity takes time and proper methodology to be internalized into local CSOs whose staff, equipment, and knowledge is ready for a formal project management.

To sum, the overarching objective of the largest current program by the EU Delegation is “to *promote local non-state actor and local authorities’ involvement to contribute to poverty alleviation within the context of enhancing efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in the South of Thailand*” (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009, p. 5), while the USAID program overall objective is “to *foster constructive civil society engagement with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) as a means to building consensus for democratic political processes and mitigating extremism*” (USAID/RDMA, 2009, p. 13). Although the EU Delegation and USAID analyze conflict in the Far South from different framework and place their emphasis on the different root-cause assumptions, they conclude on the need for “more civic engagement in the process to address their perceived roots of the conflict in the Far South”.

*b. Issue-based International Non-Governmental Organizations*

The following issue-based INGOs were selected because they have been involved in the Far South both by their own resources and by the EU Delegation’s. The following INGOs provide a dynamic understanding of the relationships between back donors, intermediaries and civil society organizations. The various levels of intensity of partnership scheme can explain other dimensions of contribution to the peace constituency as well.

1) Save the Children (Promoting youth activities)

Save the Children interprets the background of the conflict to involve a separatist movement aiming at creating an independent Islamic state. They believe this separatist movement has existed since the late 1960s. This violence is exacerbated by historical grievances stemming from discrimination against the ethnic Malay Muslim population and discontent with forced assimilation driven by the Thai government. The organization also analyzes consequences of violent conflict on children in the Far South based on field research (interviews and group discussions) with youth groups and organizations in the area in 2007. It finds two main consequences, including livelihoods and education of children. Moreover, most organizations/agencies working in the area work on short-term bases, project-based, hand-outs without long

term plans or strategies. Only small local based groups such as Fasai Center, Lookrieng, Friends of Victims Group (Glum Puea Krop Krua Phu Soon Sia), Thai Muslim Friend of Women Group (Glum Puen Ying Thai-Muslim), and a few others work longer term but with lower capacity. Save the Children promotes a child's right to protection by directly funding youths and the institutions around them such as schools, families, and communities. It applies grant making, monitoring the relevance, quality, applicability, and impact of program implemented by the local groups, capacity building, and technical assistance. (Interview P, 10 June 2012)

## 2) Internews Europe Association (Promoting media activities)

Internews Europe Association, a media development organization, views that media in Thailand is highly centralized in Bangkok. Even though it appears that there is a diversity of media outlets in Thailand, media tends to be Bangkok-based and have Bangkok-perspective of the world. Internews aims at improving the stories of the Far South in the national coverage to enhance the equality in negative and positive stories of the area. Moreover, it assesses that most of local media does not work as a driver of change, but rather a complaining space. In other words, the media works mostly to express grievances and discomfort and report only events while there are rarely alternatives or solutions proposed to the problems. Internews hopes that the journalists in the Far South can explore public policy issues in much greater depth. Alternative media should be able to provide more detail towards policy and development issues which have not really been covered in the south. Internews first started in the Far South in 2005. Before the EU program, Internews tended to work much more with national media. This worked for a while, however, the interest about the Far South started to die out in the mainstream media. Receiving EU funding under the CfPs, Internews decided to change the strategy to focus on local civil society by trainings and encouraging local media to improve their skills to create their own online media outlet and tell their own stories. It expected that with a stronger network of local journalists, stories can be picked up by national coverage or civil society can create their own space which reflects the needs from communities better. (Interview O, 1 August 2012). It applies international standards training, mentoring, and small grant making.

3) Oxfam Great Britain (Promoting natural resources management activities and women groups)

Oxfam Great Britain has its focuses for Thailand in promoting better livelihoods through sustainable agriculture, environment, and occupation since 2004 (Oxfam International, 2012). It attests that more measures to address the poverty situation in the Far South must be taken because the government's development schemes cannot really reach all areas and that violent incidents worsen existing poverty conditions in the Far South (Interview Z, 27 August 2012). Its involvement in the Far South started in 2005 by giving grants to the Wetland Research Project led by a team from Prince of Songkla University, Pattani campus until 2009. It then received grants from the EU Delegation under the Call for Proposals together with Prince of Songkla University partners including Wetland Research Project and Civic Women. In the 2009-2012 EU-funded projects, the role of women was mainstreamed into each component of the project. Oxfam GB has just gone through its organizational restructuring and that changed all team members in the department, and its strategy shifts to focus more on right-based issues and promotion of participation of marginalized groups especially women in Disaster Risk Reduction and peace in the Far South. This enhances the possibility for women groups in the Far South to continue the relationship with Oxfam while that of livelihoods and natural resources management groups were lessened (Interview V, 2 July 2012; Interview Z, 27 August 2012). The fact that 'women' and 'peace' is actually the global theme of Oxfam can justify this shift of its strategy. Oxfam's program officer explained that this new strategy does not come out from nowhere, but was concluded from brainstorming among its partners, other women groups, Deep South Watch, and many other stakeholders. Although livelihoods and environment are not the main focus any more, their old partner like the Wetland Research Project still can get funding if they can propose a project that fits in the new theme (Interview Z, 27 August 2012). It applies grant making, technical assistance, and international exchange for CSOs in the Far South.



#### 4) Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV (Promoting human rights groups)

Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV (KAS), a German political foundation, has promoted three principles including freedom, justice, and solidarity in Thailand since 1979. KAS assessed that CSOs in the Far South, especially advocacy CSOs, have limited interaction with the government and a lack of funding. Due to these reasons, it aims to encourage a continuous dialogue and develop active networks in the political sphere at the national and international level. Its first involvement in the Far South was through funding made to Assumption University (2004) and Mahidol University (2008-2010) for publishing research, organizing seminars and trainings about the Far South. Through the academic network, KAS was then introduced to Cross Cultural Foundation and Muslim Attorney Center for the first time. As ‘rule of law’ is one of KAS’s promoting issues, three parties agreed to propose a project to the EU Delegation together in 2010. It was also the first time KAS worked with CSOs for peace and conflict in the Far South (Interview E, 5 June 2012).

In sum, these issue-based INGOs have recognized root causes of conflict but focused their contribution to addressing the consequences of the violent conflict for different targeted groups. However, their objectives and approach are not static, but transformed according to the phase of conflict and the needs from the local level. Under the framework of the EU Delegation’s funding to civil society, these European NGOs together with their domestic partners have moved towards transformation-oriented approaches where local people and organizations are empowered to take part in addressing the consequences of the conflict rather than remaining vulnerable victims. It can be seen that they all use the bottom-up approach in their interventions. Some have made an effort to deal with the governmental sector, but there seems to be no significant interaction at the policy level yet. This therefore distinguishes them from the international non-governmental organizations for peace building explained in the following section.

*c. Other International Non-Governmental Organizations*

The following provides samples of INGOs which provide support to peace building activities at various levels. They may be influenced by the philosophical framework of their back donors, but are fairly independent in their selection processes.

1) Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Promoting media groups and peace groups)

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) is a Japanese private foundation, of which the budget is born from interest of managing endowment fund by Nippon Foundation, another Japanese private foundation<sup>13</sup>. SPF focuses on fostering international understanding, exchange, and cooperation, not development in particular. Unlike other intergovernmental agencies or issue-based organizations, SPF gives grants to non-Japanese organizations and is selective towards the organizations that it tends to make a significant impact, rather than targeting those organizations that have a wide range of activities. In 2008, SPF revised its program priorities. SPF had several talks and consultations with experts in Japan and Asia in order to determine the targeted area to support peace in conflict, including Mindanao, Aceh, Southern Thailand, Sri Lanka, and East Timor. A survey was conducted in those areas in order to assess the needs of international support. Southern Thailand, at the time of the survey, has little international funding and support in comparison to other regions. SPF thinks local peace building efforts in the Far South should gain international support and this conflict should be viewed in a larger international picture of regional dynamics in Southeast Asia. SPF believes that it is not an appropriate strategy for civil society in Southern Thailand to bring the issue of Deep South conflict as a matter of religious or ethnic identity but rather, should bring it as a universal problem of injustice, human rights, and a call for democracy. From that perspective, SPF thinks the availability of objective information on the conflict in Southern Thailand is essential. In addressing such concerns, SPF chose to work with alternative media and utilized its international network to enhance exchange and experience of local actors through capacity building

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<sup>13</sup> Nippon foundation's resources come from profits of boat racing

and tour visits to other countries. Therefore, it applies grant making and international exchanges for local and national CSOs (Interview F, 27 May 2012).

- 2) The Asia Foundation (Promoting various groups such as human rights groups, media groups, peace groups, and academia)

The very first international agency to support CSOs in the Far South, The Asia Foundation (TAF), has been supporting CSOs to address both immediate effects and root causes of the conflict since 2004. The Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN) program is one of the very first actions for immediate needs that arose from increasing distrust among the security officers and communities. TAF views that the government dedicating resources to security and development is not the correct solution. Through several decades of its operation in the Far South, TAF analyzed that the root causes of conflict are the government's ignorance on ethnicity, history, and identity of Malay Muslims and that results in public service provisions that do not respond to the needs of the majority in the region. TAF acts as both an implementing partner and donor for a wide range of activities, such as assisting King Prajadhipok's Institute to publish policy recommendations to distribute to policy makers, grant making to local media, disseminating Far South issues through national media, supporting academics to study on options for decentralization, fostering deliberative dialogue at local level, and trust-building activities with local communities and state officials. TAF relies mostly on international funding agencies for resources to be used in the Far South, but is very selective. It does not accept any grant making or contract that seems to be centralized or complicated. It emphasizes consultative project implementation in the Far South; therefore their grant-making is accessible for either small or well-established CSOs. According to its long term presence, TAF's staffs are mostly equipped with trust and connection among key actors in the area, while the organization itself possesses a good reputation among governmental members (Interview T, 27 August 2012).

In sum, these two INGOs are distinct from others because they are promoting activities for peace at various levels. While Sasakawa Peace Foundation promotes local media as a means to empower local citizens to connect with national level

together with international exchange as a means to mobilize the issue to regional level, The Asia Foundation supports a wide range of actors and activities that aim to make impact on personal level and sociopolitical level.

## **2. Peace Constituencies Selection Process**

### *a. Intergovernmental Funding Agencies*

The research finds that despite the goals that have been set, who actually can engage in using resources of the EU Delegation and USAID will largely be identified through their selection process and criteria.

#### 1) The Delegation of the European Union to Thailand (EU Delegation)

Under the EU program, at least 2-year registered local/national CSOs or at least 3-year registered European NGOs are eligible for EuropeAid financing and can submit projects in response to a call for proposals with an emphasis on the quality of partnership. CSOs are encouraged to submit a brief description of their projects, a so-called 'Concept Note,' and then those selected will be informed to write a full application which will be evaluated by the evaluation criteria including 1) financial and operational capacity; 2) relevance; 3) methodology; 4) sustainability and; 5) budget and cost-effectiveness. CSOs must pass the evaluation criteria No. 1) and 2) before the rest will be considered (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2009). The eligibility of activities and costs are broadly defined which allows room for more activities to be proposed and more costs to be covered.

To date, there are in total 4 Restricted Call for Proposals (CfPs), including CfPs 2008, CfPs 2009-2010, CfPs 2011, and CfPs 2012. In CfPs 2008 and CfPs 2009-2010, the overarching objectives are to promote non-state actors and local authority involvement in peace and reconciliation particularly for southern Thailand. At the time of research, there were 12 grant contracts regarding the Far South awarded to 7 international agencies, 1 national CSO, 2 local CSOs, and 2 university-based organizations (Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009c, 2010) (Refer to Appendix C for more details). Although the majority of grantees are European NGOs, all of them have partnered with local and national CSOs according to the

requirement of the EU Delegation. Later, partly due to the uprising of red and yellow shirt movements which intensify the political polarization in the society (Interview A, 10 August 2012), the Delegation decided to expand CfPs for the entire country in 2011 focusing on strengthening the capacities of NSA and LA which promoted the interests of the most marginalized groups, while supporting advocacy and raising awareness actions, at creating platforms for constructive dialogue, and ultimately at creating the conditions to ensure that decision making processes are carried out in consideration of the needs and interests of all the societal groups in Thailand (Contracting Authority: European Union, 2011, pp. 5-6). The same criteria are applied for the third and fourth CfPs.

Under this framework of the EU Delegation, the requirement of having to be a legislated body for a couple years, to declare the past experience and award via a complicated documentation system, and to pass standard evaluation criteria can help IFAs to verify the credibility of CSOs that will be granted a partnership with the EU Delegation. It implies that their trust in CSOs is built based on available evidences only. Those who are not qualified under the EU' standard are automatically excluded. Hence, through the strict management scheme and requirements of its potential beneficiaries, most of the EU Delegation's beneficiaries are the ones that are already strengthened to certain extents, such as European NGOs, Bangkok-based organizations, and university-based organizations. The European Commission defines the result of its approach as to sustain the champions (European Commission, undated). It strives to maintain and sustain existing capacity and activities to live on or sometimes to be further strengthened. Moreover, the EU approach of grant making somehow has distanced itself from the beneficiaries. For example, there is no consultancy or content-related training organized by the EU Delegation, and no/very slight amendment of proposed projects can be made by the EU (European Communities, 2005). Consequently, the emphasis on a demand-driven approach and clear selection process has enhanced trust between the EU Delegation and the public. This research finds that the EU Delegation's framework rarely caused criticism from the EU's beneficiaries, except that it is inaccessible for a number of small organizations rooted in the Far South.

## 2) The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The third component of the program determines DAI to use technical assistance, training and/or financial assistance to agents of change in the Far South. USAID targets both short-term responsive activities and transformation-oriented activities to be conducted by their beneficiaries. It perceives civic and religious leaders, CSOs, community media, and academics as key agents of change for the Far South, and that civic peace building activities will increase public demand to resolve the conflict peacefully (USAID/RDMA, 2009, p. 16). Particularly, expected results of the third component are to:

1. Increase capacity and visibility of advocacy CSOs and civic leaders working to promote peace building activities;
2. Reduce the pool of “recruitable” youths into the insurgent groups and more sustainable livelihood opportunities for youth; and
3. Expand constituencies for a peaceful resolution of the southern conflict at the local, national, and elite political level (USAID/RDMA, 2009, p. 16).

In this regard, the USAID approach is to conduct both direct and indirect promotion of peace constituencies of the Far South (Paffenholz, 2002). This promotion is done through identifying local beneficiaries whose activities have an impact on the peace constituencies and prevent the development of war constituencies. From the field research in the Far South between June and August 2012, it appears that most USAID’s grantees are small newly-emerged organizations, working groups, and universities, such as Luuk Rieng (since 2002), Women and Peace Association (We Peace) (since 2008), Patani Forum (since 2011), FT Media & Friends (since May 2012), and Yala Rajaphat University. By interviewing some of its grantees, it appeared that the USAID’s grantee selection process initiates in various forms such as direct personal approach, training sessions, and information gathering sessions. For example, DAI directly approached Patani Forum because it was interested in the main ideas and activities of the group (Interview B, 18 June 2012), while the partnership with Lookrieang with DAI and USAID was a result of the participation of its senior coordinator in OPERACY; empowerment training course held in the previous year

(Interview AA, 27 September 2012). This research finds due to the fact that partnerships under USAID's framework are initiated via personal relationships, trust is built upon the credibility of CSOs' members or leaders who associates with reliable institutions. For example; Patani Forum is led by a university lecturer and professional journalist from Bangkok, while FT Media & Friends are led by a former international journalist based in Bangkok. Trust in individuals is not the only thing that initiates the partnership; the process of how partnerships are maintained is also complementary to further building trust.

In brief, CSOs do not have to be a permanent legislated body before applying for grants, but conduct the activities related to civic peace-building efforts and peaceful resolution at all levels (USAID/RDMA, 2009, p. 20). Moreover, its grantees noted that *"Small CSOs must be open-minded to the strict time and resource management schemes applied in the USAID-funded project in order to uplift their transparency and accountability, and be able to maximize the use of their human and organizational capital with close support and consultation from DAI personnel"*(Interview AA, 27 September 2012). Its grantees informed that DAI hired an external company to assess their current capacity together with the potential to be developed (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview B, 18 June 2012). However flexible and accessible this framework is, USAID's beneficiaries will have to be registered in a certain form before grants are made because it is required by Grants Under Contracts. The USAID and DAI initially apply very strict and centralized framework for CSOs to manage a project, but then later relax some regulations when capability of CSOs has been proven (Interview AA, 27 September 2012). Through this process, trust is strengthened among IFAs and CSOs. However, this framework has prevented some working groups from access to funding because they are not ready to be registered and afraid that they will face some difficulties to manage official requirement from the government once the USAID program is finished (Interview F, 22 June 2012).

All in all, the selection of peace constituencies by USAID reflects its intention to nurture and strengthen CSOs rooted from the Far South whose activities are related to peace building at various levels. However, USAID's Audit Report of the program

accepts that there were initial public misgivings about USAID and a lack of confidence in its intentions. It is challenging to establish viable partnerships in the Far South after USAID's 15-years of no in-country participation (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012). This coincides with the outcome of 12 focus groups during a seminar in 2009 concluding that one of the most concerns by civil society in the Far South is the incoming of large funding from an international agency to the area in 2009 (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). Even though USAID had good intentions, it struggled to reach more targeted CSOs because it did not have a good intermediary who could connect with the constituencies and negotiate with the funding agency (Interview X, 19 June 2012). Accordingly, the program has modified its approach to involve more universities in Thailand, expecting that there will be more collaboration with CSOs (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012).

*b. Issue-based International Non-Governmental Organizations*

Unlike the EU and USAID, most INGOs have approached local and/or national CSOs through personal connection and tend to employ consultative processes of problem identification and strategic project planning. Save the Children and Oxfam Great Britain offered grants to small working groups whose work is matched with their agenda in order to empower them in the work they do and to make connections in the area. In selecting a partner or beneficiary, these issue-based INGOs highly depend on 1) the preference and framework by source of funding and; 2) the capacity of local actors. Once they enter into a partnership with the centralized framework of the EU Delegation, suddenly their role is transformed from granters to intermediaries and monitors even though the EU emphasizes the quality of partnership.

For instance, although the EU Delegation expressed their interest and paid several visits to Muslim Attorney Center (MacMuslim) and its activities long before the first CfP, limited capacity in financial management and English reporting prevented it to partner with the EU directly in this CfPs scheme. In 2009, MacMuslim then had to partner with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung<sup>14</sup> who has gained a lot of experience with

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<sup>14</sup> Before the partnership with MacMuslim and CrCF, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung normally partners with central government's administrative and juristic bodies and mostly advocates national issues.



thematic budget lines and have developed their management capacity to work with the European Commission aid, but has fairly limited field experience and network on the Far South issues (Interview U, 16 June 2012).

Due to the shortcoming of its funding, Save the Children had to end partnerships with their favorite small youth groups including Fasai Center, Luuk Rieng, and Makampom in the Far South. In 2010, it then built a new relationship with well-established organizations from the Bangkok such as Foundation for Child Development (FCD) and Mahidol University Research Center for Peace Building (MURP) because of both its own mandate to partner with registered organizations only and the same requirements by large funding sources like the EU (Interview P, 10 June 2012).

University personnel who have been advocating for several issues in the Far South, such as women leadership, natural resource management, and community-based development had to gather up to apply in response to the EU's CfPs and be monitored and supported by Oxfam Great Britain who is supporting Wetland Research Project in the past 5 years (Interview D, 4 July 2012; Interview V, 2 July 2012).

Meanwhile, IFAs with some implementations and network in the Far South like Internews Europe Association, in the EU funded project had to partner with ThaiPBS and Prince of Songkla University only, in spite of its initial intention to include MacMuslim and other small media groups whom were not yet registered at that time (Interview O, 1 August 2012).

Generally, through the EU-funded projects, some local and national CSOs got helped by European CSOs such as Save the Children, Oxfam GB, and Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, in writing reports, fixing financial and accounting problems. Sometimes, these European NGOs made advance payments for local partners when the process with the EU took an unexpectedly long period of time. After all, those ad hoc activities by European NGOs have contributed towards addressing difficulties for local/national CSOs to comply with donors' regulation, but have not yet made a remarkable improvement to the capacity of peace constituencies.

It can be seen that these issue-based organizations under the EU centralized scheme mostly have to act like an intermediary between the source of funding and the end-users of such fund. They are similar to DAI under USAID's program but differ in a way that local and national CSOs under the EU's program can voluntarily choose their intermediary while CSOs under USAID's program have to communicate with its donor through an intermediary selected by USAID. Therefore, it really depends on the commitment of these European NGOs in the Far South. This research finds that those European NGOs that have a close relationship with local/national CSOs prior to the Call for Proposals by the EU and have organizational mandates and experiences of intervention in conflict situation still continue to contribute to the development of their partners in a certain way, such as Internews, Oxfam GB, and Save the Children. Those of late-comers tend to end their partnership when the project was done such as Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV.

*c. Other International Non-Governmental Organizations*

Apart from the issue-based agencies who select their constituency according to their area of interest, small funding agencies also work on a higher level peace building, meaning to focus on CSOs that try to address roots of the conflict and transformation rather than its consequences. With their limited resources, these organizations are being selective in identifying the constituencies that are likely to make a significant impact on building peace and are specialized. The first and the latest international agencies in the Far South foresee the possibility of transformation. Sasakawa Peace Foundation's officer spent several months in the area before identifying neutral, multi-religious, and networking persons/groups who can act as a platform for mobilization of robust peace efforts. Deep South Watch was selected because it is under the umbrella of Prince of Songkla University, contains Buddhist and Muslim members, and has collaborative management facilitating other constituencies with a platform. King Prajadhipok's Institute is a semi-government organization who work towards top and middle leadership peace dialogue, and is also supplementary supported. Since the new unrest wave, The Asia Foundation uses its consultative process and personnel's relationship with local actors to find its partners and support

the activities that commit to both immediate response and root cause solution. Its targeted constituencies are defined according to the phase of conflict.

In sum, partnerships of CSOs and INGOs are likely to emerge from personal relationships and connections. The deciding factors in the selection process are mostly subject to IFAs' area of interest, past outcome of CSOs' activities, and capacity in project management. Although they seem no different from the centralized framework by large funding agencies, in practice there appear several procedures for compromise and adaptation. Therefore, easy access and criteria are applied. However, when these INGOs enter into the centralized framework of large funding agencies themselves, small CSOs will face more challenges in manage the relationship with them because they must be able to comply with not only the INGOs, but also the back donors. Otherwise, former partnerships may have to be ended.

**Table 5 IFAs' Partner Selection Process**

<b>IFAs</b>	<b>Targeted Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Selection Process</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>
<b>Intergovernmental Funding Agencies</b>			
Delegation of the European Union to Thailand	Non-state actors and local authorities	- Call for Proposals	Universities, European CSOs, Bangkok-based Institutions, and local CSOs
United States Agency for International Development	Issue-based CSOs and Advocacy NGOs	- Technical assistance - Training - Consultative grant making via an international contractor	Universities, and Newly-emerged CSOs
<b>Issue-based International Non-governmental Organizations</b>			
Oxfam Great Britain	CSOs promoting women's role in peace building and sustainable natural resources management	- Consultative grant making - International Exchange	Small working groups → Universities and Right-based CSOs (women)
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV	CSOs who works in support to rule of laws	- Consultative grant making - Support CSOs for their seminar and training project	National governmental bodies → Local/National CSOs
Internews Europe Association	National media, local journalists, and universities	- International standard training, mentoring, and fellowships	National media → Local media

IFAs	Targeted Beneficiaries	Selection Process	Beneficiaries
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institutional support through small grants, technical upgrades, and long-term income generation schemes</li> <li>- Development of innovative communication platforms and systems</li> </ul>	
Save the Children	Children and CSOs promoting child's rights protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Consultative grant making and capacity building to children; and</li> <li>- Communicating knowledge to those with influence over children's lives as well as support them in promoting child rights protection mechanism (grants and capacity building)</li> </ul>	Small working groups → Bangkok-based Institutions
<b>Other International Non-governmental Organizations</b>			
The Asia Foundation	CSOs promoting governance, law, civil society/women's participation/economic reform and development/ and international relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Consultative grant making within four areas of programming interest: Governance, Law, and Civil Society/ Women's Participation/ Economic Reform and Development/ and International Relations</li> </ul>	Small working groups, Bangkok-based Institutions, Universities, Media, Schools, and Communities

IFAs	Targeted Beneficiaries	Selection Process	Beneficiaries
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training &amp; Workshop</li> <li>- Publication</li> </ul>	
Sasakawa Peace Foundation	CSOs who can enhance networking with local and national levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Consultative grant making</li> <li>- International exchange program</li> </ul>	Local media groups, new journalism schools, and semi-governmental organization

**Remark:** → means the change to new partners after joining grant making program under the Call for Proposals by the EU Delegation.

### 3. Management Framework

Overall, a managerial framework can include financial disbursement, a reporting system, and an evaluation process during the problem identification, implementation, and evaluation of the project/program. There are a few components to look at such as “what is offered,” “how it is delivered” and “how it is monitored.” Three modalities of funding scheme can be summarized in Table 6 and 7, including project funding, program/core funding, and block grants via contractors.

**Table 6 Funding Modality**

<b>Modality</b>	<b>Agencies/Organizations</b>
Project funding	Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and The Asia Foundation
Program/core funding	EU Delegation, USAID
Block grants via contractors	EU Delegation, USAID

**Table 7 Grant Delivery Mechanism**

<b>Current Grant Delivery Mechanism</b>	<b>IFAs &amp; INGOs</b>
Installment/ In-cash contribution	EU Delegation, USAID, Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and The Asia Foundation
In-kind contribution	USAID

*\*An in-kind contributions are a non-cash input which can be given a cash value.*

Intergovernmental funding agencies fund CSOs through a program funding and block grants via contractors. The EU Delegation provides grants directly to its beneficiaries (Contractors) for a program with several components and usually awards grants from one year up to four years. The work plan will be specified year by year in order to allow more flexibility according to the changing context. Nevertheless, all activities

must contribute to the achievement of goals and indicators set since the contract is signed. The EU applies the co-funding with its beneficiaries in the expectation that CSOs should be able to mobilize its own resources by themselves or from other IFAs and do not solely depend on public support. Apart from expenses for activities, most administrative expenditures including rents, utility, salary, office equipment, and etc. are provided. EU beneficiaries are also allowed to sub-grant to small CSOs with an easier and less-strict reporting system, but the amount is pretty limited.

Reporting will be submitted to the EU in English twice a year (Interim and final reports). The evaluation process will be conducted by a beneficiary, external auditor, and the EU Delegation. It will make an installment of first year funds after the contract has been signed, then the beneficiaries must submit the interim and final reports according to the specified timeframe. The EU delivery of funds will be subject to the delivery of financial and narrative reports as well as the following-year plan from its beneficiaries. In this regard, local CSOs who partner with INGOs under the EU's program will have to submit monthly reports to INGOs in order to inform the overall progress of the project (Interview A, 10 August 2012).

The USAID employs grants under contract to approach CSOs by hiring DAI to conduct award management, technical assistance, and capacity building with a constant consultation and approval by the USAID/RDMA. The management framework is designed and adapted through time by the contractor. Unlike the EU, USAID not only provides grants to CSOs and Independent Agencies, but also to trainings, capacity building, and empowerment activities for its beneficiaries and the general public. According to interviews with its grantees, the project will jointly be developed by the grantees, DAI, and USAID. The contracts will initially be signed for probation (often less than a year) in order for the CSOs to adapt and prove their capacity in project management. Then, the possibility of extension will be considered a few months before the first period ends (Interview B, 18 June 2012).

Regarding USAID's delivery mechanism, grants with cash components will not be issued to non-US organizations until receiving the approval of USAID. Hence, grants under contract (GUC) in the Sapan program were be both in-cash and in-kind.



Program activities are incrementally funded up to a five-year period subjecting to the availability of funds. USAID believes that this approach will be especially useful in Thai context given the varying degrees of management capability that currently exist. The use of in-kind grants will expand to more potential grantees, especially new emerging organizations or associations, by alleviating much of the procurement burden. Beneficiaries may over time strengthen internal management controls allowing them to manage more resources directly (USAID/RDMA, 2009). Apart from expenses for activities, most administrative expenditure including rents, utility, salary, office equipment, and etc. are provided.

The reporting system is more frequent for the USAID's beneficiaries. They will have to submit a work and expense plan, the so-called 'Milestone' to DAI, prior to the organization of each activity, and an expenditure summary at the end of activity (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview B, 18 June 2012). DAI will monitor the activities of local beneficiaries while the progress of the contractor (DAI) performance will be evaluated by the Office of Inspector General, USAID overseas, consisting of document review and field interviews.

Other INGOs outside the EU scheme will usually employ project funding mechanisms with CSOs using a simple reporting system, but hardly provide administrative expenses. Most INGOs fund CSOs for concrete projects implemented by either CSOs themselves or CSOs and INGOs in partnership. Funds can be delivered together with IFAs' intensive involvement during the implementation and evaluation or one-off delivery which requires only simple financial and narrative reports at the end of projects. It really depends on the eagerness of INGOs and the intention of such fund. If it is for learning process among partners, the former approach will be applied. On the contrary, if it only aims for a short-term supplementary fund for CSOs, the latter will tend to be applied.

#### 4. Summary of Partnerships in the Far South

According to the above mentioned frameworks, this research finds that partnerships between CSOs and IFAs mostly results from several factors including:

- a. Evolving agenda of IFAs;
- b. Eligibility of CSOs according to the IFAs' framework;
- c. Eligible activities that will be supported;
- d. CSOs' criteria to select IFAs as donors;
- e. CSOs' ability and willingness to develop and become familiar with IFAs' working style, and
- f. IFAs' ability and willingness to adapt their framework to a more manageable one for wider groups and organizations, especially locally-driven initiatives.

As there are a number of actors mentioned in this research, to avoid further complication, the following summarizes the four partnerships as a result of several mentioned factors.

##### 1. IFAs – Government Related Organizations

- *USAID – Independent Agencies*
- *EU Delegation – Local Authorities*

Some donors intend to fund local authorities and government related organizations. The EU Delegation opened a call for proposals from Local Authorities (LA) in 2008-2011. However, there were hardly any proposals submitted to them from local authorities during the four years. Since the EU Delegation's budget was cut in 2012, this call for CfPs for LA was closed in 2012. USAID does not directly support governmental-independent agencies, but rather promotes their outreach to civil society instead. They organized some public events to educate people about the role and authority of these independent agencies, such as the National Human Rights Commission and Office of the Auditor General (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). Other INGOs coordinate and report their project's attainment to local and national

authorities expecting that they will witness and apply approaches foreign-funded projects have demonstrated.

## **2. IFAs - International Intermediaries - Domestic Beneficiaries**

- *USAID – DAI – Local CSOs/ Universities*
- *EU Delegation – Issue-based INGOs – Local/National CSOs/ Universities*

USAID's cooperation framework explains this partnership very well. Via the international contractor, USAID tries to nurture and strengthen the new-born CSOs; therefore, its beneficiaries are local CSOs rooted in the Far South. Due to certain international standards, the contractor and USAID assessed that local CSOs are less-developed than they thought, so that a number of them are not compatible to USAID's managerial framework. One of the measures it took was to go through local universities, provide training and build capacity for certain groups. The USAID's contractor uses a consultative grant making mechanism, and closely and frequently monitors its end-users throughout the contract's term.

The EU Delegation, although not intended, granted a number of award contracts to European NGOs who partner with local/national CSOs. The EU Delegation monitors granted projects through documentation; therefore, its relationship with local CSOs mostly through the European contractors is quite weak. If any local CSOs fall into this partnership scheme, they must also delegate an amount of funds to share with the European NGOs. Therefore, less benefit goes to the end-beneficiaries and projects. According to the EU CfPs, every contractor is allowed to apply the block grant making small CSOs outside of contractual partnership; however, it appeared that not many contractors have applied this flexible grant making-mechanism to other local CSOs in the area.

In sum, for an effort of centralized schemes like the EU Delegation and USAID to reach out to more embedded actors in the society, incompatibility of capacity is a major obstacle. Having an intermediary is beneficial to the local actors in a way that it increases the accessibility of available funds for local rooted civil society organizations and groups. Under this partnership of the EU Delegation, CSOs are

assisted in handling documentation and financial requirements by the intermediary (European NGOs). The quality of partnership very much depends on the compatibility of local CSOs and intermediary contractors as well as their commitment to the Far South. However, having an intermediary does not mean that local beneficiaries can disregard the strict managerial framework of their donors. Instead, all rules and regulations are still applied. On the contrary, the USAID and its intermediary address this incompatibility by providing intensive training to develop their capacity as requested by CSOs and applying an adjustable mechanism. Although it seems the flexibility of partnership with USAID is beneficial to local CSOs, it is yet to comply with inflexible US-based regulations.

**Table 8 IFAs - International Intermediaries - Local/National CSOs**

IFAs	Intermediaries	Local/National CSOs
USAID	Development Alternative Incorporated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Patani Forum</li> <li>- Lookrieang</li> <li>- FT Media &amp; Friends</li> <li>- Rajaphat Yala University</li> <li>- Women and Peace Association (We Peace)</li> <li>- Universities outside the region</li> <li>- Prachathai (Alternative political and social news website)</li> <li>- Etc.</li> </ul>
EU Delegation (CfPs)	Save the Children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Foundation for Child Development</li> <li>- Mahidol University</li> </ul>
EU Delegation (CfPs)	Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Muslim Attorney Center Foundation</li> <li>- Cross Cultural Foundation</li> </ul>
EU Delegation (CfPs)	Oxfam Great Britain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Wetland Research Project</li> <li>- Civic Women</li> <li>- Prince of Songkla University</li> </ul>

**Remark:** List of Local/National CSOs in the last column is obtained from key informant interviews and organizations' website; therefore, it may not include other CSOs which have not been mentioned in both sources.

### 3. IFAs – Local/National CSOs

- *EU Delegation, Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, The Asia Foundation – Local/National CSOs*

Since 2008, although the EU tends to promote European NGOs, there are also local and national CSOs receiving funds directly, namely Pattani Province Small-Scale Fisher Network Association (PSSFA), Suratthani Catholic Foundation, and Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand. Although the relationship between the EU Delegation and local and national CSOs is closer, it is not strengthened due to the fact that the EU Delegation monitors via documentation and does not intend to provide any consultation or technical assistance.

Outside of the EU funding module, INGOs make grants to both local and national CSOs in accordance with their area of interest and the back donors' preferences. They perform as either donors or implementers, mostly using a consultative process. They are Internews Europe Association, Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and The Asia Foundation. Among all, Internews Europe Association and The Asia Foundation take on intensive role of implementers since they apply international standard trainings and initiate the use of some technical tools for peace building activities in their projects respectively.

**Table 9 IFAs - Local/National CSOs**

<b>IFAs</b>	<b>Role of IFAs</b>	<b>Local/National CSOs</b>
EU Delegation	Donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pattani Province Small-Scale Fisher Network Association (PSSFA)</li> <li>- Suratthani Catholic Foundation</li> <li>- Plan Parenthood Association of Thailand</li> <li>- Prince of Songkla University</li> <li>- Wetland Research Project (before the CfPs)</li> </ul>
Oxfam Great Britain	Donor (before the CfPs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Wetland Research Project</li> </ul>
Save the Children	Donor (before the CfPs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fasai Center</li> <li>- Makhampom</li> <li>- Lookrieang</li> </ul>
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV	Donor (before the CfPs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assumption University</li> <li>- Mahidol University</li> </ul>
Internews Europe Association	Donor & Implementing partner (before and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aman News</li> <li>- Bungaraya News</li> <li>- MacMuslim</li> <li>- Other media corporations in Bangkok</li> </ul>

IFAs	Role of IFAs	Local/National CSOs
	after the CfPs)	
Sasakawa Peace Foundation	Donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deep South Watch</li> <li>- King Prajadhipok's Institute</li> <li>- Fasai Center</li> </ul>
The Asia Foundation	Donor & Implementing partner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bungaraya News</li> <li>- MacMuslim</li> <li>- King Prajadhipok's Institute</li> <li>- Aman News Agency</li> <li>- Center of Culture Protection for Democracy– Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Civil Society Network Narathiwat</li> <li>- Foundation of Islamic Culture Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Graduate Network for Development of Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN)</li> <li>- Pattani Community Radio Network</li> <li>- Southern Peace Media Volunteer Network</li> <li>- Student Federation of Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Women and Peace Group</li> <li>- Etc.</li> </ul>

**Remark:** List of Local/National CSOs in the last column is obtained from key informant interviews and organizations' website; therefore, it may not include other CSOs which have not been mentioned in both sources.

#### 4. IFAs – Local/National Implementing Partners – Local Communities

- *The Asia Foundation – Local/National Implementing partners – Local Communities*

In the Far South, there is hardly any direct support of INGOs to local communities. If the INGO is an implementer of the project, there will always be local/national CSOs accompanying and benefitting from IFAs' involvement. Therefore, while it may appear to be a partnership between an INGO and the local community, in practice, it typically is implemented through local CSOs.


**Table 10 IFAs – Local/National Implementing Partners – Local Communities**

<b>IFAs</b>	<b>Local/National Implementing Partners</b>
The Asia Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Bungaraya News</li> <li>- Muslim Attorney Center</li> <li>- King Prajadhipok’s Institute</li> <li>- Aman News Agency</li> <li>- Center of Culture Protection for Democracy– Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Civil Society Network Narathiwat</li> <li>- Foundation of Islamic Culture Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Graduate Network for Development of Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN)</li> <li>- Pattani Community Radio Network</li> <li>- Southern Peace Media Volunteer Network</li> <li>- Student Federation of Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Women and Peace Group</li> <li>- Etc.</li> </ul>

**Remark:** List of Local/National CSOs in the last column is obtained from key informant interviews and organizations’ website; therefore, it may not include other CSOs which have not been mentioned in both sources.

All in all, the CfPs’ mechanism by the EU Delegation results in several paths of cooperation, including local authorities, local CSOs, national CSOs, and issue-based INGOs. However, the EU officers explained that the EU Delegation does not intend to synergize or build a strategic alliance among the various actors it has supported. While the EU framework mostly supports well-established organizations, the USAID aims at strengthening small CSOs rooted in the area. From that same perspective, USAID also allows the participation of more people by encouraging more grassroots leadership. USAID involves civil society through technical and financial assistance. Its beneficiaries are local CSOs rooted in the Far South, independent agencies, and CSOs from other regions who may conduct activities beneficial to peace building in the Far South. By this three-legged contribution, USAID aims to build linkages between these groups. It is arguable whether a mechanism that sustains the champions or a mechanism that nurtures and strengthens local embryonic organizations is more contributable to a sustained peace from within the Far South.

**Figure 5 Third Party Intervention in the Far South**



**GRASS-ROOT POPULATION & INSTITUTIONS**



### **Summary of Frameworks for The Promotion of Peace Constituencies**

According to the frameworks of IFAs presented previously, there appear to be at least four distinct frameworks for promoting peace constituencies in the Far South.

- a. A suitable environment for development of peace constituencies at their own level*

It is cooperation that third party intervention enhances opportunities for peace constituencies to develop and expand their locally-owned initiatives using their own instruments and approaches. It emphasizes a provision of resources.

- b. Intensive assistance to strengthen local peace constituencies to go beyond their own level*

It is cooperation that third party intervention takes part in the development of local activities and approaches for peace building by providing technical tools and consultancy as well as synergizing activities for all actors at all levels it intervenes and ensuring they are complementary to each other. It emphasizes technical assistance and strategic cooperation.


- c. Building linkages between government-related organizations and peace constituencies*

It is cooperation that third party intervention tries to partner with both the government and non-government sectors in order to foster linkages and cooperation between them. It emphasizes building trust between state officials and civil society as well as encouraging civil society to work towards policy changes.

- d. Connecting peace constituencies to international level for development of peace constituencies in the Far South*

It is cooperation that third party intervention enhances opportunities for peace constituencies to exchange lessons and experience from peace constituencies in other regions who are in similar contexts of intra-state conflict. It emphasizes the exchange and cooperation across countries.

**Figure 6 IFAs' Frameworks for Promotion of Peace Constituencies**



### **Implication of Conflict Sensitivity**

A framework that allows two-way constructive interaction, from the beginning until the end of the relationship, would make the donor more attractive. It goes beyond conventional technical support by IFAs to constituting mutual understanding on how each party analyzes the situation and the challenges both parties are facing. For extremely centralized donors, what had happened in most cases is the transfer of resources in exchange with financial and narrative reports in a constant communication about the projects. EU's beneficiaries constantly consult with EU program officers about project modifications and regulations. So do USAID's and others'. This is normal practice in most IFAs, but particular thought-provoking discussions about the contents between donors and beneficiaries could make the relationship become livelier.

Save the Children has accompanied Fasai Center, Makhampom, and Lookrieang throughout their activities, and at the end they all come together in order to synergizing the lessons learned by all parties. The director of Fasai Center felt comfortable during the discussion because it is not only the donors that evaluated the CSOs, but also the CSOs' point of view towards the donor were also reflected (Interview G, 2 July 2012). Similarly, wall activity<sup>15</sup> is applied in developing mutual understanding with its partners and evaluating outcomes under the EU-funded project.

On the one hand, SPF although mostly giving grants rather than technical training, provides opportunities in the international exchange of key persons from the Far South. With its Southeast Asia survey of civil society's capacity and roles for peace building, SPF witnessed processes of success and failure in Mindanao, Aceh, East Timor, and Southern Thailand. Knowledge and experience have been transferred to constituencies. Deep South Watch learned from SPF's experience and realized that it had to improve current strategies for peace building (Interview L, 4 July 2012). Other CSOs' leaders were invited to Japan to learn how community radio network works there. Representatives from Deep South Journalism School visited Aceh province to

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<sup>15</sup> Wall activity encourages the implementing partners to come together and develop mutual understanding on the project implementation and outcomes in order to enable local partners to write reports in the proper way.

exchange their experiences and build a regional relationship (Interview L, 4 July 2012). On the other hand, the program officer of SPF, after several consultative meetings, was amazed by the innovative way of thinking and creativity of Deep South Watch. She also learned so much about the situation from them (Interview F, 27 May 2012).

The role of the donor as a facilitator for an exchange among global civil society is somehow more charming than an expert from developed world giving lectures. Although constituencies from other conflict regions speak different languages, they have faced similar grievances and are constituted for the same purpose. It is easy to understand the mindset and thoughts of each other despite the language. However, this regional exchange would not happen with local capacity and resources, because these activities are costly compare to other local and national ones. If the back donors of the private IFAs had not supported this expenditure, it is less likely that such exchanges would have happened often. The former team of Oxfam GB used to facilitate Wetland Research Project's officers for several field visits abroad in the past, but recently cannot do so because its back donor does not support for such expense (Interview Z, 27 August 2012).

In addition, Berghof Foundation with the support of an academic who has theoretical and practical experiences of conflict and peace building from several countries provides international lessons learnt and thought-provoking discussion for systemic thinking on the problems. The idea of nurturing the ripeness of conflict for negotiation stimulates hopes of 'peace from the bottom.' The continuing dialogues were realized as import by several CSOs. Civic Women and Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand also gained some technical support from the Foundation. By cooperation with many other organizations, such as Deep South Watch, SPF, KPI, UNDP, PSU, etc., the "Insiders Peace builders Platform (IPP)" was initiated (DeepSouthWatch, 2012d). Although the outcome has not been measured here, it has already created a momentum of dialogues for peace in the Deep South recently.

This research finds that program implementation of IFAs in the Far South has the application of organization's mandates that involve conflict sensitivity. At

program/project levels, IFAs realize and are aware of not doing more harm than good. Promoting peace through local actors who are more familiar with cultural and political contexts in the Far South bring about the most effective responses to the context and immediate measure to prevent conflict.

The EU system ensures credibility of its beneficiaries noting that it is least likely that they will contribute to harm in the Far South (Interview A, 10 August 2012). Moreover, the EU's more-than-one-year of funding based on annual plans allows more comprehensive programming and greater flexibility to adjust activities and approach (European Commission, undated). Despite the EU's framework which appears to allow conflict sensitivity throughout the program cycle, indicators specified in program's logical framework may rigidly determine the direction of activities to be pursued which limits less constructive interaction between context and program. The obligation to uphold promises in the contract with donors sometimes puts pressure on the local implementers, especially when the context is largely influenced by the state's policy and communities, rather than the project itself. For example, Civic Women was very concerned with their aim to have at least 5% of women participate in local authorities' committee, as it may not be achieved because it solely depends on the authorities' policy (Interview V, 2 July 2012). The Wetland Research Project had difficulties managing funds for their community-based activities because of the changes in community demand throughout the four-year program which results in no funding for non-specified activities (Interview D, 4 July 2012). Experiencing this centralized mechanism brought about uneasiness for university personnel struggling to comply with strict schedules and unacquainted working papers in the EU-funded project. However, it is agreed in the focus group discussion that the standard managerial framework is necessary for good governance in civil society organizations in the Far South.

USAID and DAI have moved to more adaptable and flexible approaches once they learnt that CSOs had less capacity than initially anticipated. DAI tries to ensure that its technical capacity building will do no harm in the context by gradually paving the foundation of capacity development for a sustained organizational capacity of CSOs (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012). The Asia Foundation supported CSOs'

immediate responses to the violence and long-term solution according to the situation and demand from the Far South. Sasakawa Peace Foundation with close interaction with Deep South Watch is very careful in establishing 'Media Development Fund' as transferring of money can do more harm than good if not well-managed (Interview F, 27 May 2012; Interview X, 19 June 2012).

All in all, the intention for conflict sensitivity appears in every IFA's framework. CSOs in the Far South are also highly sensitive to the context. However, in practice, the context assessment has not been done beyond the evaluation of the impact of the changing context on the program. The changing context directly affects project attainment, and the changing context caused by a program affects the entire peace building process. This research does not specifically identify which CSOs can make an impact more than others, therefore the discussion is not about who should be granted a partnership with IFAs. Instead, beyond project/program level, this research finds that IFAs' selection process is critical to the development of peace constituencies.

The new international faces will begin their involvement in the Far South by conducting information gathering, workshops, and meetings with targeted CSOs as their preparing process. Basically, a wide range of constituencies contributed in problem and program identifications through those meetings and deliberation, but some are not financially supported to take actions out of the ideas they have contributed. Processes that enhance dialogues among actors but do not simultaneously entail common actions have disempowered some CSOs to join such processes. Dialogues and deliberations are very important to the peace building process, especially in order to enhance understanding and to synergize and coordinate their activities, but this very beginning process to engage with CSOs has influenced the potential of further dialogues.

### **State's Influences on Aid Administration**

According to Adam Burke's study, some IFAs have tried to implement local adaptations of global peace building policies but they often found it hard to do so.

International funding to promote reform or change faces greater practical barriers than funding the state to extend existing structures of centralized governments. In Burke's study, group two agencies including The World Bank, UNDP and the EU found that considerable resistance from the Thai state stopped or delayed their plans. For example, an EU's moderate program to work on the root causes of conflict was initially suspended and quietly ignored by the Thai government, but did eventually continue through a non-governmental channel at a later date (Burke, 2011, pp. 144, 147). On the one hand, IFAs such as The Asia Foundation, some German political foundations and the EU have quietly behind the scenes been able to continue their assistance to CSOs involved with human rights protection and justice advocacy (Burke, 2011, p. 151). On the other hand, agencies in group three such as the USAID sub-contract program management and fund large US-based NGOs and foundations directly. These bodies are still subject to Thai government approval and monitoring, but sub-contracting may dilute attention. USAID has to retain a low-profile in order to maintain relationships with key people in the Thai government while being able to support activities on the ground (Burke, 2011, p. 153). It can be seen that the agenda of IFAs is not only influenced by their global framework towards peace building but also largely by the Thai government's resistance on external intervention.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **PEACE CONSTITUENCIES IN THE FAR SOUTH**

This chapter aims to introduce selected civil society organizations and their role in peace building. It then illustrates the visibility and development of peace constituencies during the 1990s – 2012 as well as the contextual influences to such development. It proceeds in five parts as outlined in the following:

1. Civil Society Organizations in the Peace Building Process – exemplifies domestic actors that are active and influential to the peace building process in the Far South. They are listed according to the objectives of each civil society group;
2. Visibility of Peace Constituencies in the Far South – provides the historical development of peace constituencies in the Far South;
3. Summary of Influences of National Security Policies and Political Settings on Peace Constituencies – considers influences of national security policies and political settings so as to illustrate the context in which CSOs pursue peace building activities since these influences have also contributed to the extent to which actors and discourses of peace constituencies have developed;
4. Summary of Development of Peace Constituencies – provides a synthesis of such development in actor and discourse aspects; and
5. Discussion on Definition of Peace Constituencies – generates a discussion on defining peace constituencies.

#### **Civil Society Organizations in the Peace Building Process**

The continual visibility of stakeholders and agendas in the peace building process emerged in accordance with both local and national context. There are a number of organizations working for peace in the Far South. Each performs their own functions which sometimes require an interface and cooperation with others. The following introduces selected CSOs that have had an outstanding role and contribution to the peace constituencies in the Far South since the 1990s until present. Each CSO is categorized into groups according to their main objectives and activities which may



be overlapped because CSOs in the Far South usually work in several related issues. It is based on data collection by key informant interviews, field observation, and documents. More details of their names, objectives, and main activities can be referred to in Appendix B.

## **1. Community Development & Natural Resource Management**

### *a. Local Development Institute*

The Local Development Institute was initially established through the seed grant of the Canada International Development Agency. It aims to strengthen the capacity of communities and civil society organizations to propose and implement their own provincial development plan. LDI has been extensively engaged in the Far South since 1997 because it was one of the intermediaries for the Social Development Fund. It has a long-standing relationship with community development CSOs as well as networks in the area; therefore, LDI has the capacity to contribute to the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand. Its activities are distributing funds from Block grants through Community-Driven Development, a peace-building partnership fund, training and implementation support, monitoring, evaluation, and knowledge management.

### *b. Wetland Research Project*

Wetland Research Project led by a promising team from Prince of Songkla University (PSU) maintains a strong and wide-spread connection with several community-based networks for natural resource management and conservation all over the Far South. With very few members, it adopts a community-based strategy focusing on strengthening community leadership and initiating community funds. Before the new unrest in 2004, the main source of its funding was from issue-based foreign agencies and embassy funds such as Asian Wetland, Wetland International, Canada Fund, and AusAID, which are limited in size and short in term. It was once granted a large chunk of money from the EU Delegation. Since it originated from the advocacy issues of governmental development projects, early activities were mostly against the governments' operation. Therefore, Wetland Research Project has hardly received government or military support. This is due to the reason that it must be careful about the relationship with the government so that its targeted population will not lose faith in its operation. Despite its struggle to get funding throughout the last two decades, the activities can continually be carried on at the community level. During 2005-2008, Wetland Research Project received constant funding from Oxfam GB, and

currently received a 4-year grant from the EU Delegation by partnering with other advocates from Prince of Songkla University and Oxfam GB (Interview D, 4 July 2012).

## **2. Human Rights & Relief**

### *a. Muslim Attorney Center Foundation*

The Muslim Attorney Center Foundation (MacMuslim) was originated in 2004 by a group of Muslim lawyers in order to provide legal assistance to people charged with national security cases in the Far South. Throughout its nine-year operation in the Far South, MacMuslim became one of the most trusted organizations by people in the Far South (DeepSouthWatch, 2012c) because of its commitment to help people facing injustice. A number of its members are spread throughout many communities. Not until the last couple of years, MacMuslim largely relies on voluntary team and short-term foreign funding such as the Global Human Rights Fund, Open Society Institute (OSI), The Netherlands Embassy, and The Asia Foundation (TAF). Although its burden is growing larger every year necessitating more resources, it has been careful in accepting funds from outsiders. MacMuslim, an organization of Muslims and for Muslims, had consulted with religious leaders before accepting American money from TAF, or from OSI founded by a famous Jewish financial investor in order to ensure that accepting this funding is not against religious principle. Undeniably, there exists contesting religious and political ideologies towards Islam. MacMuslim decided not to accept foreign funding from the Muslim world because it is risky that the organization may be misunderstood by the public and the government with involvement in international terrorism (Interview U, 16 June 2012). Currently, MacMuslim received a two-year grant from the EU Delegation in partnership with the Cross Cultural Foundation and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

### *b. Hearty Support Group*

Hearty Support Group, a small group of Muslimahs (Muslim women) working to help Malayu detainees charged for national security cases and their families, and coordinates closely with MacMuslim and Cross Cultural Foundation. It also offers

scholarships and occupational funds for families of detainees. Resources are from their own fundraising in the Far South and sometimes from international funding agencies such as Open Society Institute and the US Embassy. Hearty Support Group has a hard time building trust with the Department of Corrections and Thai military which sometimes results from misunderstandings reported by media outlets (Interview Q, 21 June 2012).

### **3. Women & Youth**

#### *a. Fasai Center*

Fasai Center, a southern youth coordination center lived on from an initiative by several child-related independent agencies in 1996. The Center provides consultancy and financial support to youth development activities for existing youth networks in the Far South (Maitreepan, undated). It has a youth network in five border provinces including Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, Songkla, and Satul. Fasai Center is able to launch a few of its own projects annually because it cannot access enough funding. It received short-term funding from Save the Children in 2008 and Sasakawa Peace Foundation in 2010. Its institutional capacity depends very much on its voluntary members, thus, is not suitable for doing project management in foreign agencies' working style which requires permanent competent personnel for paperworks. Nonetheless, members and leaders of Fasai Center are actively involving in other CSOs' activities, for example, helping Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand to organize '200 Far South public forums'<sup>16</sup> funded by Reform Assembly and the World Bank in the area of their network (Interview G, 2 July 2012).

#### *b. Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces (Young Khidmat)*

Young Khidmat, a long-standing youth network uses faith and a religious pillar to support children in violent-affected areas since 2002. It originated from the government initiatives through the Community Organization Development Institute. It was also the first time that youth, especially those who are at risk of being misguided, had a chance to work in the network and learn several skills to be applied

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<sup>16</sup> See more details in Thai at [<http://deepsouthwatch.org/node/3637>]

in the Far South (Office of the Narcotics Control Board, 2009). Young Khidmat has received funding from several governmental agencies such as the Office of Provincial Social Development and Human Security, ISOC, and the Office of the Narcotics Control Board. However, it currently maintains its loose network and work in many communities using funds from a business invested by its members. A reason for not depending on outside funding is that its members witness the past and current peace initiatives funded by outsiders are usually ‘event-oriented’ such as short term workshops, meetings, and seminars. There are not many tangible actions from those events. They do not want to lose its reputation and trust with communities by getting involved (Interview K, 29 June 2012).

*c. Civic Women*

Civic Women is originated from a group of Muslim women and students from Prince of Songkla University during the first few years of the unrest in order to help violent-affected women and youth in the Far South. The entry point of their work is a service delivery for the victims with some efforts to psychologically heal them. Their current activities are intensive leadership training for women, advocacy work through media, radio, website, publication, forums, and workshops, conducting research and strengthening women’s networks in the Far South. Civic women received funding from the EU Delegation in partnership with other groups and Oxfam GB.

*d. Lookrieang*

Lookrieang originated from a group of youths in Yala province who gathered up to help the women and children victims of violence. It aims to develop youth and children affected by the violence to be able to receive psychological relief as well as encourage leadership among them. It was supported partially by AUSAID, and now is a grantee of USAID who supported it to become a registered organization.

#### **4. Public Communication & Media**

*a. Deep South Watch*

While most of media groups/organizations act normally like one of the CSOs working towards their issues of interest (producing and distributing media outlets), Deep South Watch, under an umbrella of the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) at Prince of Songkla University (PSU), delivers a new form of CSOs' output. Its website, books, and forums provide a platform for lubricating slowly-moving cogs to move faster and louder. CSOs, academics, funding agencies, media, government and others can be both users and producers of knowledge of the Far South through this platform. Deep South Watch works towards certain issues including decentralization, justice, and peace dialogue. It adopts strategies of knowledge, public communication, and civil society; therefore, its potential partners must work on the same ground and goal. Deep South Watch was directly funded by UNDP and Sasakawa Peace Foundation while some of their members work on individual research projects funded by various organizations. Through this funding, Deep South Journalism School and Deep South Photojournalism were founded under supervision of Deep South Watch in 2010 (Interview L, 4 July 2012).

*b. Bungaraya Group*

At the time of this research, Bungaraya Group, a former news website rooted from university students in the Far South since 2007, is learning to become a successful social entrepreneur producing local books. It used to receive funding from The Asia Foundation and training from Internews Europe Association. However, they believe that there are several alternative news agencies that have emerged recently to disseminate the same set of information and most of them have more capacity and willingness to manage projects in foreign donors' style than Bungaraya does. It aims to integrate high school students in the region into the movement for peace through their products expecting that this young targeted group will play a role in conservation of Malay Muslim culture (Interview I, 22 June 2012).

*c. Patani Forum*

In the Far South, whether existing CSOs really represent the voices of affected population is skeptical. Media and public communication CSOs emerge to give some alternative inputs into the southern information ecosystem. Patani Forum is one of them. It originated from a group of journalists, students, and academics who aimed to produce knowledge of the Far South by focusing on in-depth knowledge from as many stakeholders as possible. Its methodology is fairly similar to Deep South Watch; however, with less academic-like outputs. With funding from USAID and OSI, it aims to get stories of the population in the Far South heard nationwide for a better understanding among Thai society. It not only uses the recent incoming foreign aid to produce and deliver expected outputs but also to strengthen the organization (Interview B, 18 June 2012, Interview). Despite its embryonic status, having academic professionals and international journalists as leaders increases their capacity to adapt to donors' working style.

*d. FT Media & Friends*

FT Media & Friends are among one of the newest CSOs during the time of this research (2012). It originated from a group of journalists from Bangkok and the Far South. They produce unconventional media about the Far South, such as documentary and video movie. It currently focuses on in-depth story telling of affected people who became drivers of change. With the USAID funding, FT Media & Friends was able to disseminate their documentaries in many provinces throughout Thailand.

## **5. Networking**

The assessment of peace actors in the Far South in 2009 concluded that civil society has formed and expanded more working networks and more public space for dialogue and exchange (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). Informal relationships among actors at local and national levels have existed. In the past, although CSOs in the Far South tend to cooperate with others as their usual manner, it is rather limited within the same or related working groups and lacks a common

purpose. There has not been much cross association in the past. Even if there is any, it is only for a one-time cause, not for the overall resolution of the Far South. A group of academics in the region initiated that a higher level of cooperation among civil society is needed.

*a. Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand*

For the first time in 2011, a network named ‘Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand (Sapa Pracha Sangkhom Chaidan Tai) was established to act on coordinating and facilitating the work between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Far South. The initial twenty members are CSOs that have been working in the region for quite a long time, and are interested in the dialogue process. It aims at four strategic actions including 1) expanding democracy; 2) maintaining justice; 3) developing quality of life for Far South population, and; 4) supporting and promoting local identity, religion, and culture to every community (DeepSouthWatch, 2011c). It plans to have dialogue with all stakeholders in the pyramid by not only focusing on the top and middle leadership, but also integrating the grassroots in the process. Public forums, meetings, and group discussions with the population in local communities of the Far South will be held in order to gain a sound understanding from the ground. Meanwhile, through the same activities, political communication can effectively be made on the ground. Most of early CSOs such as Wetland Research Project, Fasai Center, Civic Woman, Local Development Institute, and Young Muslim Association of Thailand join this process because its members are highly trusted within local communities in their own network (Interview R, 30 June 2012, Interview).

## **6. Academic**

Despite its strength in institutional and financial capacity, educational institutions - schools and universities - in the area do not play a leading role in supporting civil society. The relationship of university and civil society is rather individual. It is usually limited and subject to the personal interest of its lecturers and officers (Interview V, 2 July 2012; Interview X, 19 June 2012). Several CSOs have



university's professors as consultants. Some university personnel take some time off their official duty to work on their own organizations, to name a few, Civic Women, Patani Forum, Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation (DSSR), and Wetland Research Project, but rather be independent from using university's resources. Apart from integrating peace and conflict into its curriculum, there are only a few official establishments of university cooperation with civil society for peace building. For example, having privilege to a house in the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani's campus enables Deep South Watch to act as civil society platform without much struggle to cover its administrative costs.

### **Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South**

In the context of Thai society and every other, civil society is made up of embedded actors which exist but may or may not be visible in public policy, making processes at local and national levels. Compared to an authoritarian system, a democratic system allows space for civil society to take action to certain extent. A more complicated mixture of power in Thailand differentiated such spaces according to ruling governments and interest groups at times. The transition of power in Thai society leverages between military, government, and monarchy (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1997).

Although Thai democracy has been granted since 1932, there has been a struggle in democratization up until the present depending largely on the socio-economic changes and complexity of interests. From time to time, sudden military coups took up ruling power over the country, while governments often opposed any proposal of reforms that results in constitutional and administrative change which would enhance political participation, especially during the 1990s. Such struggle creates tensions of increasing demands and conflicts within the Bangkok-centralized arena. The authoritative bodies such as government and military see collective actions of non-state actors, including foreign interventions and grass root movement as a threat to national security. This mentality was crucially shaped by the United States during the Cold War era, which used the military to become strongly involved in the politics of Thai society. After the popular uprising in 1973, the recognition and acceptance of

political participation by a non-traditional power arose in accordance with the changing security and development nexus in Thailand (Samudavanija, 1997). Non-traditional power in this regard refers to non-government and non-military power like power of the peoples.

The 1997 Constitution was commonly regarded as the People's Constitution' since it guaranteed Thai citizens more rights and liberties than they had ever enjoyed before. It empowers communities to take part in management, maintenance, preservation, and exploitation of natural resources and the environment as well as fosters greater decentralization (Wong, 2007, p. 2). Civil society in the periphery area, like the southern border provinces of Thailand responds and reacts to both local incidents and the national polity of Thai society. By relating local context to the national polity, visibility and evolution of constituencies can be illustrated dynamically. The following explain visibility and development of peace constituencies in four periods. This research finds that there appear to be new agendas, approaches, and actors for building peace in the Far South within each period. The turning point of each period is influenced by the circumstance of local, national, and international politics.

### **1. Livelihoods and Development of Local Communities (1990s-2003)**

To begin with, like other regions of Thailand, the people in the Far South have also struggled to sustain their livelihoods amidst the changing socioeconomic conditions. According to Committee on Studies of Development Path for Human Security's Report (2007, pp. 8-74), it reveals that the education system and natural resource management are among several human security problems which require special resolution due to a unique cultural and social circumstance of the region. In addition, several development projects by the local and central governments have negatively affected the livelihoods of people, such as mangrove forest management by local authorities, dam construction, and national park legislation. As a result, local people had to form themselves in order to protest and advocate against these development schemes and problems. For example, the civil society movement against the project of Saiburi dam since 1992 had been able to stop the construction of the dam in 1995 (Isranews, 2009a). The land dispute between state and citizens due to the declaration

of Su-ngai Padi National Park in the Far South since 1999 results in several interactions and negotiations between affected population and the related government bodies (Isranews, 2009b). Chumchon Satha Network (Kampong Tagwa) initiated community development by using four pillar leaders including: village headman, religious leader, natural leader, and local authority, to empower community members to involve in development process since 2002 (Chumchon Satha Network, 2009). ***Wetland Research Project*** was one of the very active groups in collaboration with other community networks within the three provinces. The development of this active civil society group arose in response to socioeconomic pressure which encouraged community members to take part in the problem solving process for their locality. They were supported by academics from local universities and non-government organizations from outside the region, such as ***Local Development Institute (LDI)***, Community Organization Development Institute (CODI), Pattanathai Foundation, ChumchonThai Foundation, etc.

After the 1997 financial crisis in East and Southeast Asia, non-governmental organizations from outside started to play a role in building civil society groups in the Far South through several development projects such as the Social Investment Fund (SIF) funded by the World Bank, the Baan Man Kong Project (public housing) by CODI, and the Local Community Development Plan by LDI (Thavornnukijkul, 2008). This is also a result of civil society movement throughout the country due to the execution of 1997 constitution. By all means, the Social Investment Fund had introduced civil society in the Far South to public spaces which are not limited under the operation of government sector any more. At that time, ***women and youth*** still played a supportive role in the development of civil society (Salae, 2010, p. 122). People's main source for media in the area is ***community radio***; a crucial communicating channel for civil society especially at a grass-root level (Kai-nunna, 2010b, p. 25).

## **2. Short-term Responsive Activities (2004-2006)**

The role of non-traditional power used to tackle public concerns in the Far South became apparent in 2004. An upsurge of violence by insurgency and Thai military

gave rise to civil society groups to organize themselves in response to a number of dispersed incidents in the area. Actually, since the new wave of unrest started in 2002, there are a number of human rights violations due to the actions by military authorities whose power was subsequently reinforced by the special enforcement of martial law in 2004, emergency decree in 2005, and internal national security act in 2008. International Crisis Group (2005, pp. 7-8) launched a report on Thailand's Emergency Decree in 2005 and provided substantive evidences of the impact on civil society in the Far South. In their case study, most villagers do not know much detail about the decree but many understand that it gives police and soldiers authority to arrest and detain without charge, and any abuses committed by them will go unpunished. Although state officials denied the existence and use of blacklists, villagers in their studied districts said local officials had drawn up blacklists of suspects, and military officers came to the homes of those suspects and instructed them to surrender or face arrest. Several also alleged extra-judicial executions by government agents. Many similar cases have been reported to the *Muslim Attorney Center*, making its members targets for intimidation and harassment. The enforced disappearance of human rights lawyer, Somchai Neelapaijit in 2004 is one of the key incidents explained how civil society was threatened and suppressed during this period. Not to mention villagers who are too scared to make reports of human right violations to anyone because of this climate of fear. In entirety, during 2005-2010, there were 3,264 people charged by special laws in the Far South (Prachathai, 2011) which including 297 torture cases during 2007-2011 (Interview U, 16 June 2012).

This phenomenon has drawn attention towards the Far South among several non-governmental organizations, both domestic and international. Their presence has supported local groups to work against injustice and human right violations in the area since then.

While human right defenders provide legal assistance to victims, there is also a need to heal the families of those victims. Even though the government has set up the Policy and Operating Commission for Rehabilitation of People Affected by the Unrest in the Southern Border Provinces in 2005, civil society, especially *women leaders and students from Prince of Songkla University*, initiated outreach to such affected

people before that, literally since the Krue-Se mosque incident in April 28, 2004. Their activities at that time were mainly to fulfill the immediate needs and heal psychological problems with home-visiting and grant making (Ratthakaran, 2012; Salae, 2010, p. 124). Later, organizations from outside appeared in the region such as *Mahidol University* conducting capacity building and empowerment activities for these victims. According to Barnes (2009, p. 136), people-to-people dialogues among people with some common attribute will contribute in changing perception and lessening hatred. Haffisa Salae (2010, pp. 128-133) finds in her study that with their cultural and social capital, women in the Far South have capacity in bonding people in the same groups and bridging between different groups like government, community, and civil society groups in from outside. They work with youth for rehabilitation, advocate with the government about injustice and bridging divide between Buddhists and Muslims in their communities.

Although Muslimah (Muslim women) used to play a supportive role in families, some directly or indirectly affected by the violence, started to gather in groups to support and strengthen other individuals within and outside their communities, such as *Civic Women, Lookriang, Women against violence, and Women and Peace Association (We Peace)*. For these groups, public acceptance is very crucial; hence, constant communication with the public and outstanding role of its members is one of the keys to success. Its working style is different from other CSOs because of its voluntary basis and movement on sensitive issues. The result of the empowerment project cannot be attained or seen within a normal project timeframe. These groups are rich in trust as their members have accumulated for years; therefore any intervention had better come with profound understanding of Muslimahs' role in Islamic culture (Interview V, 2 July 2012).

### **3. Policy and Strategic Activities (2007-2009)**

It can be seen that most civil society groups are visible in response to the immediate consequences of violence during the first few years of the unrest. Since the level of violence has been declining since the end of 2007, their burdens on immediate responses to the violence also decreased. While all of them still perform their

responsive duties, some have started to work strategically towards policy and the national level. For example, human right defenders tried to systemize their experiences and knowledge of some court cases that could be demonstrated and make known to the government and the public in order to persuade them to change structurally (Interview U, 16 June 2012). In addition, new civil society groups emerged due to an accumulated pressure from the former years. The civil society realized that a number of national media outlets about the Far South have constituted a misperception of the Far South among people in the rest of the country which affects negatively to any changes in the long run. According to a study by Nuannoit Thammasathien (2010), national media coverage of the conflict in the Far South is unreliable and problematic because it often emphasizes a dramatic violent dimension of the conflict and does not examine the roots of it. The biased coverage results from national media's incomprehensive mechanism of information gathering as it is highly influenced by official sources and there is a lesser tendency to obtain adequate information from the locality. Therefore, there appears to be an attempt at cooperation between local media and the national by *Isranews* in the mid of 2005. Later in 2006 - 2009, new media groups rooted from the Far South started to produce media outlets through their low-cost channel like news websites; such as *Bungaraya News and Aman News*. These groups work in the field in order to have more information from the people's aspect. They offer alternative input to the entire information set so that Thai society is not overwhelmed by the biased information and can also have a glimpse of cultural, social, and economic aspects of the people in the Far South (Kai-nunna, 2010b).

Despite their role since the beginning of the violent conflict, Muslim women were not widely accepted and recognized among the public until 2009 (Salae, 2010, p. 123). This new role was reinforced when *women and youth were equipped with a space for public communication and media*. Many CSOs tried to develop this capacity for women; consequently, quite a few radio and television programs were produced by women from the Far South such as *Saing Jak Phu Ying Chai Dan Tai* by Civic Women and *San Fan Su Hua Jai Diew Kan* by the working group for communication with people and strengthening their mind (Kai-nunna, 2010b, p. 27). According to the

working committee for coordination of government and non-government organizations in psychological rehabilitation (2011), there are currently 16 active groups in the Far South.

After the military coup in September 2006, the new ruling government by General (ret.) Surayud Chulanont gave a positive sign of more peaceful measures in the Far South. However, it appears opposite in the area since there were surround and search operations and a large scale militarization since June 2007. After 6 years of protracted conflict in the Far South, there seems to be no a bright end to the problems. During 2007 - 2008, some Thai politicians had expressed interest in an autonomous administration in the Far South as an alternative solution. Autonomy is a sensitive term as its extent can go to the independence of Patani which is fairly unaccepted within Thai society. Police Captain Dr. Chalerm Yubamrung was widely criticized by the public when he expressed the notion of 'Special Administration for Patani' in the mid of 2008 (Muslim for Peace Foundation, 2008). Although their expressions were seen as a part of the Bangkok political game, they have signaled the possibility of a significant alternative to the security and development measures all governments have been taking over the past six years (Puengnetr, 2009). Subsequently, a group of academics launched a study and recommendations on the long-term solution for the Far South emphasizing the importance of various forms of decentralization. For instance, '*New governance proposals for Thailand's Southern Region*' was published by Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Dr. Duncan McCargo in October 2008 (Jitpiromsri & McCargo, 2008), and '*A Report on The Protection of Minority's Rights and the Models of Political System Under Ethnic Differences: Lessons from the European Countries*', and '*The Autonomous Questions: Conflict Transformation in the Three Southern Border Provinces*' was written by Associate Professor Chantana Banpasirichote Wungaeo from Chulalongkorn University in 2009 (Wungaeo, 2009a, 2009b). Literally, these *academic proposals and politician signals* have shaken the old paradigm of conflict resolution in Thailand.

Before 2009, expressing the notion of decentralization, autonomy, or independence in public was forbidden. People hardly spoke about these issues because they were afraid that it would affect their relationship with the government officials (Kai-nunna,

2010b). In 2009, the People Network for Development of Participatory Governance in Southern Border Provinces, Deep South Watch, Civil Society Committee of southern border provinces, King's Prajadhipok Institute, People Development Council, and Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, Prince of Songkla University formed a strategic alliance to obtain public opinions about this and came up with the *'Draft Patani Administration Act' in 2011 and 2012*. This strategic alliance is considered the first public movement towards an unconventional issue like autonomy in the Far South. This also results in an ongoing intensive debate about decentralization among academic, CSOs, and communities in the Far South. The viable cooperation between local and national media is a factor that made a say of autonomy possible in Thai society because such a change of political structure needs an approval from the rest of the country. Therefore, media cooperation could help them understand more of the context in the Far South (Kai-nunna, 2010a). Nevertheless, these efforts from the ground have not yet been seriously picked up by any ruling governments because they have been busy with the color politics in Bangkok since 2009 until present.

#### **4. Conflict Transformation and Peace Building (2010-2012)**

The conflict transformation approach by civil society in the Far South started after there was little constructive response from the government and military in accordance with civil society groups' policy recommendations and proposals. Some networking events were organized by CSOs in order to provide opportunities for coordination among more people/groups/organizations that were performing common peace duties, such as the Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network and Deep South Media Festival I & II. Apart from work-related networks, CSOs and grass-root populations have recently connected with each other through peace-related networks. These networks are not limited to any particular works but are synergized through all sorts of actors. During these events, several key messages appear which determine the direction of peace building by civil society in the Far South during this period.

A seminar on Civil Society Network held by the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (Chulalongkorn University) and the Office of Peace and Governance (King



Prajadhipok's Institute) in 2009<sup>17</sup> concluded that ***“civil society in the Far South would like to take a leading role in building peace for the Far South and will constitute strong leadership at grassroots and middle range levels”*** (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). Proposing some unconventional agendas together with more people will change the climate of fear which arose from suppression by the insurgency and Thai state in the former years. By doing so, it required a more proactive role of civil society organizations. Recommendations on process and agenda of civil peace building were synthesized and resulted in a call for coordination and networking among all actors in order to advocate for social and political changes with the government and insurgency (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009).

In May 2012, Peace Festival<sup>18</sup> called for nearly 1,500 participants from local communities, government, and armed forces to discuss key issues in the Far South. This event was marked as the first-ever, face-to-face discussions between military officials and young men who experienced physical and mental abuse at the hands of security personnel while in detention. During the festival, there was a formal Declaration adopted by the 12 local partners, which stated: ***“We the people of the southernmost provinces have a strong will to take part in ending this sub-national conflict and beg all societal sectors to sincerely support local initiatives ... as it might be too late to solely depend on the government”*** (Pichaikul, 2012).

The first International Conference on Political Science, Public Administration, and Peace Studies in ASEAN Countries<sup>19</sup> was held in Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai campus in October 2012, a few months after the holy month of Ramadan in August 2012 where the frequency and damages of violence rocketed to the highest of all times. One of the key messages that were distinct from the former events is that ***“apart from the structural change to be made together with grass-root population and the Thai state, civil society can contribute in guiding the insurgents to acknowledge alternatives to violence”***. Civil society in the Far South has been quite

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<sup>17</sup> Funded by Friedrich Naumann Foundation

<sup>18</sup> Funded and implemented by The Asia Foundation and its partners [<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2012/06/13/a-pathway-to-peace-for-thailands-restive-south/>]

<sup>19</sup> Funded by UNDP and a few other domestic institutions [<http://aseanpspa.psu.ac.th/index.php>]

active in their strategies to involve local communities, government, and military, but has been unable to involve the insurgency in their process; the influential conflicting party in the conflict. That said, in order to achieve a sustainable peace, civil society not only works in response to the conflict, but can also help both conflicting parties to imagine a desired society together by putting the central to ordinary people.

All in all, it can be seen that decentralization, autonomy, and peace dialogue were discussed fairly extensive in this new political space. These activities provided opportunities for dialogues among CSOs and sometimes policy makers, yet their purposes are mainly socialization with the expectation that there might be mutual actions among them. After the very first seminar of civil society network in the Far South in 2009, there was a call for an establishment of a coordinating organization or association of civil society in the Far South (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). In 2011, Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand was formed and considered the most sophisticated network of CSOs in the Far South, though it may not be as sophisticated as it can be yet. It contains a cross association of local CSOs who also have connections with local communities at the grassroots level, governments, and insurgents. This network is strategically working towards linkages between key people at the top leadership and more people from the ground in order to find a political solution for the Far South. *“By turning the pyramid upside down, Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand expects to make momentum of the grassroots leaders and institutions to counterbalance with elites in track I and II”* (Interview R, 30 June 2012).

In this period, along with protection, advocacy and monitoring functions, many CSOs began new functions of socialization and facilitation such as empowerment and capacity building activities for local communities and available socialization institutions – including schools, religious and secular associations, clubs, and families. During 2011-2012, more attention has been paid to these existing institutions. For example, newly-established journalism schools, such as the Deep South Journalism School, expanded their targeted groups from professional journalists to students in Pondok and Tadeka schools (Traditional Islamic schools). Mahidol University tried to integrate peace and democracy in the curriculum of primary and high schools while

a women's group (Lookrieang) prioritized reading-promotion activities with targeted children. Human rights defenders started to promote democracy, rights, and roles among school youths. It can be seen that CSOs not only advocate to the top leadership, but also realize that cultural foundation and social institutions of the society are very important for any changes to be made in the future. Therefore, 2011 and 2012 have witnessed a number of public forums, workshops, deliberations among civil society in the Far South and outside. Not only have there been more events, but there have also been more CSOs emerging with new and old forms of activities, such as *Patani Forum and FT Media & Friends*.

Generally, socialization and facilitation activities among the grass-root population are still limited, such as deliberative dialogue activities and community forums in 2010<sup>20</sup> and public forums named 'Chai Dan Tai Jad Kan Ton Ang (Autonomous Southern Border Provinces)' in 2012-2013<sup>21</sup>. Despite a low-profile status in peace building initiatives during the past 7 years (2004-2010), CSOs in community development and natural resources management groups and youth groups started to take a leading role in this grass-root socialization because of their extensive networks of local communities they have worked with since the 1990s. Overall, civil society in the Far South has transformed itself as peace constituencies since the new unrest in 2004. Peace constituencies have been visible from different dimension, and most of them are the results of violent incidents and have emerged in response to society's interest. During the past 9 years, their activities were transformed from short-term responsive to transformation-oriented ones. While development and short-term responsive activities are still highly relevant, CSOs currently socialize and participate in dialogue processes more than before. Under the local and national context, unconventional actors – like local media and women – and agendas – like autonomy and decentralization – are visible at different phase of conflict. Some groups like community development and natural resources management are now able to utilize their community network in the grass-root socialization process. What has not been

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<sup>20</sup> Funded and implemented by The Asia Foundation  
[<http://asiafoundation.org/project/projectsearch.php?country=thailand&programLimit=12&year=>]

<sup>21</sup> Funded mainly by Reform Assembly and partially by The World Bank  
[<http://deepsouthwatch.org/node/3637>]

seen from the components of peace constituencies in the Far South is its substantive relationship with the ruling governments. No direct channel for CSOs appears to make policy inputs. Although the government has accepted more actors from civil society in their decision-making process, its visibility does not come with an affirmed power to put pressure on certain actions yet. Along the timeline illustrated below, their activities are very dynamic and have contributed to the peace building process to various extents.

**Table 11 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development**

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003		2004-2006		2007-2009		2010-2012	
<b>Local and National Context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1997 financial crisis since Jul 2, 1997</li> <li>- 1997 People's Constitution was in effect on Oct 10, 1997</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Militants raided and rob the weapon depots of the 4th Engineering Battalion at the Military Camp on Jan 4, 2004</li> <li>- Krue-Se Mosque attack on Apr 28, 2004</li> <li>- Tak Bai massacre on Oct 25, 2004</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Declining level of violence since the end of 2007</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frequent violent incidents with higher casualties, continued human right violation by the military but decrease in number and improve in implementation</li> <li>- The disturbance made Aug 2012 to be the month with more than 300 events of unrest, the highest of all time</li> </ul>	
<b>Ruling Governments</b>	Former governments	Thaksin (May 2001 – Sept 2006)	Surayud (Oct. 2006 - Jan 2008)		Somchai/ Samak	Abhisit (Dec 2008 - Aug 2011)		Yinglak (Aug 2011 - present)
<b>Government/ Military Reactions in the Far South</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accepted World Bank loans which included Social Investment Fund for community and civil society in 1997</li> <li>- SBPAC and Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) Task Force 43 were dissolved on April</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Instituted Martial Law in Pattani, Yala, Narathiw as since Jan 2004</li> <li>- Enacted Emergency Decree since Jul 20, 2005</li> <li>- Reestablished SBPAC in Sept 2006</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Surround and search operations/ large scale militarization since Jun 2007</li> <li>- Prime Minister Samak Sunthoravej expressed the possibility of autonomy administration in the Far South</li> <li>- Reports of enforced</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The enforcement of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act on Dec 30, 2010 which allows formation of a peace building council</li> <li>- National Security Council Policy on the Far South for year 2012-2014 was launched</li> </ul>	

<sup>22</sup> Uprising of People's Alliance for Democracy

<sup>23</sup> United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship

<b>Peace Constituencies</b>	<b>1990s - 2003</b>	<b>2004-2006</b>	<b>2007-2009</b>	<b>2010-2012</b>
	30, 2002		disappearances, extra-judicial executions, torture and other ill treatment (often of human rights defenders) re-appeared with greater frequency and detail. - Internal Security Act in some area was in effect in Feb 2008	on Mar 2012
<b>Community Development &amp; Natural Resources Management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local communities protested against development projects and natural resources management in their locality</li> <li>- Community development activities to serve socioeconomic purposes were conducted and supported by Bangkok-based organizations since 1997</li> </ul>	Maintain and expand the area of activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Livelihood and community development</li> <li>- Conservation and restoration of natural resource management</li> <li>- Training for sustainable agriculture</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity building for community leaders</li> <li>- Socialization with their extensive networks at grassroots level which is complementary to activities of CSOs' network</li> </ul>
<b>Human rights &amp; Relief</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human right advocacy organizations from outside supported local groups to provide legal assistance to persons charged by special national-security-related laws and other human right violation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local groups are strengthened and expand their network</li> <li>- Strategic litigation</li> <li>- Research and synthesize past experiences in legal assistance in order to demonstrate effective practices to authorities at implementing level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advocacy with authorities at local level for implementation and national level for structural change in special laws</li> <li>- Activities of education for peace, human rights and democracy in schools</li> <li>- Legal empowerment, capacity building for communities members and sub-networks</li> </ul>
<b>Women &amp; Youth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and youth had supportive role in community development and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and youth started to play a role in psychological healing for their neighbors and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women attend forums and seminars held by outsiders to express their grievances to the</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some women and youth groups were strengthened</li> <li>- More use of public</li> </ul>

<b>Peace Constituencies</b>	<b>1990s - 2003</b>	<b>2004-2006</b>	<b>2007-2009</b>	<b>2010-2012</b>
	social and cultural activities within the locality	more women conducted and joined activities outside communities.	public and government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women gather in groups within and between communities to interface and negotiate with the government and to access funding for their initiatives</li> <li>- The role of youth and women groups in peace building is recognized more than before</li> </ul>	communication and media by women groups to advocate for peace and justice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Empower children in communities and in schools to voice out their concerns and to be a driver of change</li> <li>- Women utilized existing radio network to communicate with the public</li> </ul>
<b>Public Communication &amp; Media</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community radio</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local newspaper (Tang Nam Newspaper)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local media groups produce news websites reporting from local perspectives</li> <li>- The first news agency in the Far South (Aman News Agency)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Journalism schools (DSJ &amp; DSP)</li> <li>- Local media groups are linked with national media more than before</li> <li>- Outreach to empower school youths to report the situation from their viewpoints</li> <li>- New local media and public communication groups which has linkage to national constituencies</li> <li>- Deep South Media Network</li> </ul>
<b>Networking</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Network of local communities for natural resources management</li> <li>- CSOs formed themselves as a network in order to meet the requirement of Social Investment Fund</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Home-visiting by women groups</li> <li>- Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network</li> <li>- University students network working against human rights violation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The very first seminar on the role of civil society in peace building and conflict transformation concluded that it is no longer the deal between Thai state and separatist only, but also civil society will take part in</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand established in 2011</li> <li>- A number of public forums among CSOs and local communities</li> <li>- Socialization within traditional institutions, such as</li> </ul>

<b>Peace Constituencies</b>	<b>1990s - 2003</b>	<b>2004-2006</b>	<b>2007-2009</b>	<b>2010-2012</b>
			building peace	community association, such as schools, mosques, and etc.
<b>Academic</b>	- Support Community development groups in protesting against controversial development projects	- Educational institutions' personnel in Bangkok and the Far South support CSOs in human rights and relief	- Proposals of decentralization and autonomy	- Support CSOs in training and capacity building of CSOs and grass-root population
<b>Highlighted agenda</b>	<i>Strengthen communities for development problems</i>	<i>Deal with consequences of violent incidents and human right violation</i>	<i>Propose decentralization and new administration for the Far South</i>	<i>Capacity Development, Public Participation, Empowerment, and Peace Dialogues</i>
<b>Activities of peace constituencies</b>	<i>Livelihoods and Development of Local Communities</i>			
	<i>Short-term Responsive Activities</i>			
	<i>Policy and Strategic Activities</i>			
	<i>Civil Peace Building Activities</i>			



## Summary of Influences of National Security Policies and Political Settings on Peace Constituencies

Along the timeline of development of peace constituencies, the Thai state's reaction to the violent conflict in the Far South has influenced the expansion and suppression of civil society peace actors as well as generated the development of discourses among peace constituencies.

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012		
<b>Local and National Context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1997 financial crisis since Jul 2, 1997</li> <li>- 1997 People's Constitution was in effect on Oct 10, 1997</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Militants raided and rob the weapon depots of the 4th Engineering Battalion at the Military Camp on Jan 4, 2004</li> <li>- Krue-Se Mosque attack on Apr 28, 2004</li> <li>- Tak Bai massacre on Oct 25, 2004</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Declining level of violence since the end of 2007</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frequent violent incidents with higher casualties, continued human right violation by the military but decrease in number and improve in implementation</li> <li>- The disturbance made Aug 2012 to be the month with more than 300 events of unrest, the highest of all time</li> </ul>		
		Uprising of PAD <sup>24</sup> or Yellow Shirts in Bangkok which leads to Thailand political crisis of 2005 to 2006 which led to Military Coup on Sept 19, 2006	Major anti-government rallies by UDD <sup>25</sup> or Red Shirt in April 2009 and in Mar – May 2010, leading to violent clashes with military forces in Bangkok			
<b>Ruling Governments</b>	Former governments	Thaksin (May 2001 – Sept 2006)	Surayud (Oct. 2006 - Jan 2008)	Somchai/Samak	Abhisit (Dec 2008 - Aug 2011)	Yingluck (Aug 2011 - present)
<b>Government/ Military Reactions in the Far South</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Accepted World Bank loans which included Social Investment Fund for community and civil society in</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Instituted Martial Law in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat since Jan 2004</li> <li>- Enacted Emergency Decree since Jul 20, 2005</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Surround and search operations/ large scale militarization since Jun 2007</li> <li>- Prime Minister Samak</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The enforcement of the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act on Dec 30, 2010 which allows formation of a peace</li> </ul>		

<sup>24</sup> Uprising of People's Alliance for Democracy


<sup>25</sup> United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 1997 SBPAC and Civilian-Police-Military (CPM) Task Force 43 were dissolved on April 30, 2002</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reestablished SBPAC in Sept 2006</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sunthoravej expressed the possibility of autonomy administration in the Far South</li> <li>- Reports of enforced disappearances, extra-judicial executions, torture and other ill treatment (often of human rights defenders) re-appeared with greater frequency and detail.</li> <li>- Internal Security Act in some area was in effect in Feb 2008</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- building council National Security Council Policy on the Far South for year 2012-2014 was launched on Mar 2012</li> </ul>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

In 2011, The Office of the Auditor-General of Thailand has launched a report on the government budget dedicated to resolving the Far South conflict through development and security since 2004 and up to 2009, and it appears a continuous rise of expenditures by both administrative authorities and military. Even with this, the protracted violent conflict does not seem to come to an end. Isranews investigated further and found that a total budget for the Far South has rocketed to nearly THB 200 billion during 10 years (Wangsap, 2012).

**Figure 7 Budget of Thai Government to Solve the Conflict in the Far South during 2004 - 2013**



**Source:** Isranews Agency (Wangsap, 2012)

However, within the perspectives of civil society and the international community, development projects and security forces are not as instrumental as it seems in resolving this political phenomenon. Since the new unrest in 2004, several development schemes were implemented by military, government, and non-government agencies. During 2004 – 2008, the Thai government budget of THB 69.8 billion was allocated to the three southern border provinces in response to the unrest. However, only 19 percent was allocated for the development and capacity building of the Far South while the rest was concentrated on security and peacekeeping issues (Sarntisart, 2011, p. 15). Looking closely at the Policy for Administration and Development of Southern Border Provinces for the years 2012-2014, no mechanism or budget allocation for civil society to act and participate in the peace building process has been mentioned even though this policy emphasizes very much on public participation in development and peace building (Interview X, 19 June 2012).

CSOs studied in this research depend mostly on public support and fundraising as they are non-government and non-profit. According to the focus group discussion, the six participants concluded that there are three types of CSOs with respect to their relationship with funding sources. These three types consist of the following:

1. Conservative CSOs – those who deny public support especially from controversial sources such as first world-based organizations, domestic private companies, multinational corporations, and the governments. They are religion-related organizations and groups.
2. Moderate CSOs – those who are open to foreign sources of funding but tend to be cautious on accepting governmental or military support. They are afraid of government influence on their initiatives which could affect their legitimacy among the targeted population. They are advocacy-CSOs such as human rights groups and natural resources groups. Often, these groups are challenged by the conservative CSOs and the government.
3. Progressive CSOs – those who are open to any sources of funding including the government. They have to maintain their principles while building a progressive relationship with governmental bodies. They are youth groups.

Therefore, apart from no provision of resources by the government to civil society in the Far South, there are also other conditions which influence the selection of funding sources, such as legitimacy and trust among civil society and the State. Violence stimulated the establishment of more civil society organizations, either rooted from the area or supported from outside. However, the government's reaction on the unrest also created tension between state and civil society which results in the distrust of state officials (Thavornnukijkul, 2008). CSOs that perform monitoring and advocacy functions such as human rights defenders are often suspected by the authorities (Interview U, 16 June 2012). During 2004 – 2008, some university students were arrested without charge. From 2005 to 2011, there were 22 people who disappeared in the Far South. MacMuslim's former leader, lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit, was reported missing since early 2004, still faced with the obstruction made by the state officials nowadays. For example, once they held a training activity in a village which was conducted in Malayu language. Their activities were disrupted for a while

because the officers were suspicious as to the context of the activities as they did not understand the language (Interview U, 16 June 2012). Another example is that with the status of non-registered groups, Bungaraya news reporters could not investigate the incidents everywhere they wanted (Interview I, 22 June 2012). Muslim women who became connectors between local authorities and community members had to be cautious on their relationship with both sides as trust could be challenged and destroyed (Interview V, 2 July 2012).

In sum, the explicit influence of the political context on the development of peace constituencies is a result of the implementation of national security policies by the issuance of special laws such as the emergency decree and national security act. This results in distrust between civil society and the government. Meanwhile, the implicit influence is the result of political discourses made by key stakeholders who bring about both hope and fear for the future of the Far South. Also, significant political situations in Bangkok often distracts the political will of the government and military from the Far South, therefore, several proposals by peace constituencies are not taken into consideration. The direction and pace of peace building processes in the Far South is still highly up to the political atmosphere within parliament, therefore, under the national security policies and political settings the contributions of peace constituencies on peace processes are sometimes neglected.

### **Summary of Development of Peace Constituencies in the Far South**

According to the timeline of visibility of peace constituencies in the Far South during the 1990s – 2012, peace constituencies have been developing in their quality and expanding their networks over time. This research finds that peace constituencies are not only associated with the development of actors but also the development of agendas, approaches, and activities for the peace building process. Peace constituencies develop towards certain directions as outlined in the following:

1. Agendas – towards the proactive role of civil society organizations to build peace and expand a political space for constituencies to transform the conflict;
2. Approaches – towards a transformation-oriented approach and efforts in pursuing multi-layer peace building;

3. Actors – new unconventional actors becoming a driver of change such as women, media, youth, and strategic networking;
4. Activities – towards empowerment and capacity building activities for a wide range of actors especially at the community level and activities that enhance dialogues such as socialization and facilitation; and
5. Functions – towards functions that generate dialogues such as socialization and facilitation.

Social capital including networks, the understanding of issues, creditability and acceptance to the general public and the Thai government, trust, and context sensitivity has gradually been accumulated and institutionalized into CSOs' groups/organizations. Even though there appear to be significant changes in peace building process in the Far South, the transformation of a horizontal and vertical conflict-prone atmosphere to a peaceful society by peace constituencies still faces quite a number of constraints. A non-traditional power like civil society is still fragmented and less likely to counterbalance a traditional power equipped with resources and capacity like the military and central government. Two problems were discussed in the focus group discussion and interviews including 1) donor dependency and 2) human resources development.

On the first issue, a number of CSOs and networks in the Far South are still donor dependent. Referring to the interviews, most key-informants in the Far South assess the development of CSOs that they are mostly at the embryonic stage, and not all are strengthened in institutional and operational capacities for project management. Therefore, accessibility to funding is a challenging matter for many of them especially small working groups and organizations. The participants expressed that the dependency results from the fact that CSOs do not usually plan for their own domestic fundraising which is problematic in itself. Resources acquired through fundraising sometimes incentivize CSOs not to strictly control the use of it because there is no concrete owner of the money and someone to account for it. When transparency and accountability were questioned among CSOs' members, some of them have already become disunited and dissolved. Although the use of foreign money is more systematically managed and transparent, such international public supports are

constrained by their discontinuity and insufficiency. On the second issue, a lack of peace workers was seen a very important problem for CSOs in the Far South. Each CSO has not yet had a proper process for recruiting more leaders. It is suggested that, instead of working alone, activities of a network provide opportunities to seek for, empower and strengthen leaders at various levels.

### **Discussion on Definition of Peace Constituencies**

As ‘civil society’ and ‘peace constituencies’ became recognized as an important player in peace building process, an argument on a concrete definition of peace constituencies and its elements may be necessary for the understanding of their role in the process. The term ‘Constituency’ places its emphasis on a number of electors within a society who select their representatives to the parliament to decide the interest of such constituencies. The actor-based definition by Berghof Foundation divides civil society into two opposite ends; peace constituencies and war constituencies. Thus, an indicator to measure the development of peace constituencies is limited to the expansion in the number of people joining the movement for peace. By having such a simplistic view of civil society in the peace building process, the consideration of peace constituencies’ development may neglect the grey area in between. Within the same societal groups, there might be constituencies who are reluctant to take sides. For example, the government, who is an indirect representative of constituencies, still struggles to counterweight with a rigid and centralized structure of military and other interest groups. Due to the fact that during the time of ongoing armed conflict in the Far South a concerted solution among constituencies has not yet been attained, fragmented demands of different civil society groups therefore have weakened civil society’s power to negotiate with other actors. In addition, this quantitative viewpoint of peace constituencies often overlooks the direction and pace of the development, and constituencies for peace may not be distinguishable from civil society in other context. The new definition that associates with political discourses (agendas & approaches) will therefore provide a discrete understanding of civil society actors particularly for the peace building process. According to the illustration of peace constituencies’ development in the previous section, this research proposes for a broader definition.

To begin with, a discussion from civil society themselves is provided. The participants of the focus group discussion conclude their normative definitions of Partnership, Network, and Peace Constituencies as follows:

“Partnership is a cooperative relationship between certain actors emerged from a mutual intention to achieve common goals. There exists an ongoing exchange of knowledge, resources, experience, and benefits in a partnership which is usually varied in scope and degree. It can be regarded as relationships between individuals or between organizations, formal or informal, and long or short term. Actions by each actor in partnership are sometimes concerted and must be all complementary to one another.” (Focus group discussion, 15 November 2013)

“Network is *an open system* of various partnerships. There are two levels of a network. One level is a network which consists of actors *working closely together* on a certain cause while another is an extensive network whose members are *connected more by common goals than actions*. Actors in the latter network interact through their participation in activities conducted by other actors. A learning site is crucial to the development of this network.” (Focus group discussion, 15 November 2013)

“Peace constituencies are a loosely defined network of peace actors which is developed under a process of working towards an *inclusive* environment with equal chances for participation for strategic alliances. This network has a *blurred scope* of membership. At a certain period of time, it can include Track 2 and 3 as well as Track 1, but most importantly this network at any time must be as open and inclusive as possible. Consisting of various levels of partnership, peace constituencies require a number of *sophisticated connectors* of all domestic and international levels for extensive cross association. Moreover, it emphasizes *a common direction of peace building*, a so-called “*Strategy*” among diverse groups. Such strategy is progressively developed through *learning processes* within and outside the network. Therefore, peace constituencies are not a static network but are instead *dynamic and varied*.” (Focus group discussion, 15 November 2013)



For civil society actors, learning processes and inclusiveness are considered key elements of peace constituencies. Inclusiveness refers to the expansion of conventional and unconventional actors involved in the peace process while learning processes contain new strategies as well as political discourses that justify them.

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
<b>Highlighted Agenda</b>	<i>Strengthen communities for development problems</i>	<i>Deal with consequences of violent incidents and human right violation</i>	<i>Propose decentralization, new administration, and other alternatives for the Far South</i>	<i>Capacity Development, Public Participation, Empowerment, and Peace Dialogues</i>
<b>Discourses</b>	Conflict management	Conflict management	Conflict Resolution	Conflict Transformation/ Alternative approach
<b>Key Actors</b>	Track I	Track I	Track I and II	Track I, II, and III

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

According to the previous review of visibility and the development of peace constituencies in the Far South, it can be seen that the actors of peace constituencies are simultaneously expanded along with the development of worldviews towards peace building by these actors. Hence, this research proposes a definition as it appears below:

*‘Peace Constituencies’ are networks of social and political actors based in societies affected by armed conflict. They engage in efforts to enhance the inclusive participation of all stakeholders in a comprehensive peace building process. Their interest is to enhance the legitimacy of the peace process as well as the outcome of the political settlement by including actors from Tracks 2 and 3 and by working towards a genuine conflict transformation (Apichaya O-In & Norbert Ropers, 2013)*

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONTRIBUTION OF PARTNERSHIPS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE CONSTITUENCIES**

This chapter aims to assess how the cooperation of IFAs and CSOs has contributed to the development of peace constituencies. This assessment is in accordance with the analytical framework presented in Chapter II. It then proceeds in four parts as outlined in the following:

1. Direction and Pace of the Peace Building Process (Agendas & Approaches) – assesses the contribution to the discourse-based development of peace constituencies;
2. Sector-based Aspects of the Peace Building Process (Actors & Activities) – assesses the contribution to the actor-based development of peace constituencies;
3. Overcoming Contextual Constraints – assess the contribution on addressing certain constraints derived from the actions of state and capacity of CSOs; and
4. Quality of Peace Constituencies (Conflict Sensitivity, Local Ownership and Sustainability) – generates a discussion on characteristics and elements of peace constituencies as contributed by the partnerships of IFAs and CSOs.

#### **Direction and Pace of Peace Building Process**

Peace constituencies relate to the development of discourses which transcend from one to another in each period. The timeline of peace constituencies (Refer to Table 11 in Chapter IV) illustrated such changes. On the whole, the contribution of partnership has been made in the direction and pace of the peace building process associating with certain discourses. In order to assess this contribution, overall agendas and approaches of IFAs and CSOs towards peace building in the Far South have been demonstrated and compared.

## **1. Agendas**

The timeline of the development of peace constituencies in the Far South concludes that agendas of peace constituencies in the Far South moves towards the proactive role of civil society organizations to build peace and expand a political space for constituencies to transform the conflict.

This research finds that visibility and motivation of peace constituencies during each period are mainly influenced by local needs as well as national security policies and political setting. Even though IFAs do not respond directly to those contexts, their intervention agendas seem to be coherent and complementary to their constituencies' agenda.

The early visibility of peace constituencies in 2004-2006 associates with service delivery, protection and monitoring in response to consequences of human rights violations and violent upsurge. Simultaneously, the early intervention of IFAs is to support these services at the time of emergency. IFAs acknowledge the role of CSOs in fulfilling the gap of urgent assistance to affected populations which could not or have not been provided by the state. The violent conflict gives opportunities for CSOs to emerge as service providers, and they utilize this service delivery approach as an entry point to other agendas in the following periods. Violent incidents dramatically decreased in 2008, which then gives room for CSOs and IFAs to recognize what the root causes of all sudden incidents during the past four years (2004-2007) have been. Once root causes were realized, CSOs reconsidered and reframed their strategies in order to make a structural change. This attention was paid to proposals from civil society to the ruling governments to resolve the conflict. The connotation of justice, decentralization and autonomy was mentioned more than ever during 2007 until present. Even though the conflict analysis of all IFAs studied emphasizes that the decentralization process is an alternative to the solutions for the Far South, no overt IFA involvement appeared in most of these controversial proposals during this period. Instead, there was more involvement from CSOs and academics from Bangkok in the process.

Finally, in the last period between 2010 – 2012, witnessed the IFAs' commitment to promote local orientated activities and non-governmental channels to peace building, while CSOs have realized the importance of cultural and community institutions as drivers of change in the future social movement. Therefore, the agenda to include a wide range of actors from various levels in the peace building process aligned with the IFAs' motivation to promote non-governmental actors to build peace such as 'civil around peace building' by USAID, 'non-state actors' by the EU Delegation, 'international cooperation of non-governmental sector' by Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 'dialogue and active networks in the political sphere at the national and international level' by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung EV, and etc. These agendas are translated into practice via activities and approaches to peace building are supported by IFAs over time.

## **2. Approaches**

Referring to the Pyramid of Actors and Approaches, peace constituencies in the Far South have moved towards using a transformation-oriented approach for building peace. They do not only build peace from the middle out – concentrating themselves as agents of change, but also by empowering vulnerable populations at the grassroots level to take part in peace building from the bottom up. Some peace constituencies in the Far South have made efforts to pursue multi-layer peace building activities by cooperating with the governments, military, and peace constituencies at both national and regional levels. IFAs have diverged their approach to peace building through domestic actors but very rarely were projects or programs implemented directly by IFAs themselves (Burke, 2011). They provided either financial assistance or technical assistance with different degrees of involvement in CSOs' activities.

### **Sector-based Aspect of Peace Building Process**

According to the previous detailed discussion about the peace building agenda and approach, this section provides a conclusion regarding the contribution of partnerships on the development of peace building actors according to the 'Pyramid of Actors and Activities' by John Paul Lederach. In the Far South, there is a substantive visibility of new actors in the public sphere during the past 9 years. They include local media,

women, human rights volunteers, youth groups, and networking which mostly emerged due to the consequences of conflict; however, each group has developed to different extents due to internal and external factors. Not only do CSOs work collectively and cooperate more in cross association, but the vulnerable were also strengthened and have become outstanding leaders in the peace building process. In the local area, the influential actors from Track III were strengthened to have dialogues and be a part of Track II.

The expansion of peace constituencies can go from either local to national or international scales. While strong CSOs expand and nurture their sub-networks in the Far South, some other small CSOs are being nurtured and strengthened to conduct activities outside the region. In addition, local CSOs have partnered with Bangkok-based organizations whose interests are related to peace and development in conflict situations, such as Local Development Institute (LDI), Community Organization Development Institute (CODI), Thai Public Broadcasting Service (ThaiPBS), King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI), Foundation for Child Development (FCD), the Office of Reformation, the Office of Health Promotion Fund (Sor Sor Sor), and university-based organizations. These Bangkok-based partners; Track II actors, are either non-government organizations or independent government agencies supporting CSOs nationwide. The relationships range from donors, expertise providers, and implementing partners, but they are rather horizontal, in other words, meaning equal in partnership. Although they are rooted domestically, these Bangkok-based organizations are still considered as outsiders, the reason being that they are not chronically affected by conflict like local organizations. However, they can be a part of peace constituencies in the Far South because they work under the social and political structure of the country and do not associate with the institutions of authorities. Occasionally, the cooperation of local and Bangkok-based organizations enhanced more strategic initiatives for advocacy at the national level. For example, the partnership of Cross-cultural Foundation and MacMuslim applies a very strategic approach to advocate for both personal and structural changes. Moreover, there appears a connection between peace constituencies in the Far South and other part of Thailand which occurred through media and facilitation by international donors.

### 1. Contribution to the Development of Peace Building Initiatives (Activities)

Since activities conducted by CSOs and supported by IFAs are the translation of agendas and approaches, they are used to substantiate the contribution. Activities conducted by CSOs evolve from the development of local communities, short-term responsive activities during the upsurge of violence, policy and strategic activities after the military coup in 2006, and recently civil peace building activities as appeared below.

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
Activities	<i>Livelihoods and Development of Local Communities</i>			
		<i>Short-term Responsive Activities</i>		
			<i>Policy and Strategic Activities</i>	
				<i>Civil Peace Building activities</i>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

Despite the emergence of new activities and approaches, former ones are simultaneously maintained throughout every period. For example, while human rights protection and violence-responsive activities such as legal assistance and rehabilitation are prioritized during the upsurge of violence in 2004-2006, community development activities continued at the same time. Recently in 2010-2012, deliberation, capacity building, and advocacy at local and national levels were prominent among other activities, yet as the violence kept on, short-term responsive activities continued. When they happen simultaneously, it gives opportunities to transform victims into agents of changes. In this regard, CSOs also adapt their approaches in their same activities in order to response to the context. For example, MacMuslim and Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network have been functioning well in monitoring and protecting human rights, and later have realized that they also need to advocate by using their experience as supporting evidences, and empower youths, women, and religious leaders to perform monitoring, protection, and advocacy functions in the future. Like women groups, they responded to the consequences of

violence and human right violations for a while and then realized their capacity to advocate for structural changes at practical and policy level. Community development groups that stay low-key during the violent disperses have accumulated extensive relationship throughout those years, and will be the first who make a mass movement when any changes are going to be made.

To assess the contribution of cooperation between IFAs and CSOs on the development of activities of peace constituencies, the following analysis demonstrate the contributions of each civil society group.

*a. Community Development and Natural Resources Management*


In the early period of development, socioeconomic problems are highlighted as the prominent issues for the area. Intensive development schemes by the local and central government affected and brought about grievances to local communities. Development projects such as dam projects, land disputes over national park legislation, and natural resources management have negatively affected livelihoods, which gave opportunities for this group to emerge. As these controversial issues were initially against the governments' initiatives, their activities have to rely on support from the international community. These groups are moderate CSOs who accept foreign funding but avoid state's influence on their agenda.

For example, Wetland Research Project received funding from Asian Wetland and Wetland International to conduct research on the situation of wetland in the Far South and the Saiburi dam project since 1991. The EU Delegation also supported its activities in the Far South through Prince of Songkla University during 1995-1997. During that time, agriculture, conservation, and an increasing participation of local communities in provincial policy decision making were among their main activities. (Interview D, 4 July 2012).

During 1998-2001, there appeared community-owned initiatives in response to the Social Investment Fund (SIF) from the World Bank's loan which aimed to provide social assistance and build social capital. Community Organization Networks emerged to distribute social fund financing directly to needy groups in the form of

social assistance and cash transfers (Salim, 2001). According to Chalit Thavornukijkul (2008), after the SIF program finished in 2001, some of these community organization networks separated and set up their own organizations working on their own causes. Local Development Institute (LDI) was given a seed grant by the Canadian International Development Agency in 1984 and has been working on projects in collaboration with the World Bank and local partners to strengthen communities and civil society in the Far South through the SIF since 1998 up until present. Its relation with the Bank has also continued up until present (Interview N, 26 September 2012).

After the new wave of unrest in 2004, Oxfam Great Britain who promotes activities to improve the livelihoods of the poor has started to give grants to natural resource management groups in the Far South because it foresees that continuing violence will worsen poverty conditions in the area. Wetland Research Project in collaboration with community networks benefited from this grant making for nearly 5 years until it joined the EU thematic program for non-state actors in 2009. Its activities are based on local communities and natural resources networks such as Saiburi River, Lan Kwai wetland, Pattani basin, and Sungai Kolok River (Interview D, 4 July 2012).

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
<b>Community Development &amp; Natural Resources Management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local communities protested against development projects and natural resources management in their locality</li> <li>- Community development activities to serve socioeconomic purposes were conducted and supported by Bangkok-based organizations since 1997</li> </ul>	Maintain and expand the area of activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Livelihood and community development</li> <li>- Conservation and restoration of natural resource management</li> <li>- Training for sustainable agriculture</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity building for community leaders</li> <li>- Socialization with their extensive networks at grassroots level which is complementary to activities of CSOs' network</li> </ul>
				
<b>Third Party Intervention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Asian Wetland</li> <li>- Wetland International</li> <li>- EU Delegation (Before CFPs)</li> <li>- World Bank (SIF)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Oxfam GB</li> <li>- AusAID</li> <li>- UNDP</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU Delegation (CFPs)</li> <li>- Oxfam GB</li> </ul>



**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

These grants provided to the civil society groups for natural resource management contribute in **maintaining the activities and expanding areas of action** conducted by existing CSOs. For example, the four-year grant from the EU Delegation allows its beneficiaries such as Wetland Research Project to expand the area of their operation (from 8 villages to 24 villages) and plan ahead for several years. In addition, the size and several components of programs funded by the EU Delegation and Oxfam GB encourage cross-cutting issues to be simultaneously addressed, such as supporting the role of women in development initiatives (Interview D, 4 July 2012). Integrating gender issues in their program reflects the **mainstreaming of conflict prevention into the development program**. The main objective of these CSOs engaging with local communities has shifted from humanitarian assistance (SIF) to strengthening the capacity of communities' leaders and members in order to take part in solving the natural resources problems and manage locally-owned development projects.

After all, CSOs in partnership with IFAs like the EU Delegation and Oxfam GB have contributed to the peace building process as they **expand the participation of grassroots people, especially marginalized groups in local development process**. The public participation at the local level constitutes a visibility of traditional institutions in the process of peace. A cooperative relationship within local communities which is a basis of conflict transformation was strengthened under this development process although the scale of their current initiatives is unable to cover the whole area. Leonhardt and Nyheim (1999 cited in Brenk & Veen, 2005, p. 403) argue that to be effective, development policy and practice require the application of peace as the ultimate objective in mind. The transformation of a culture of violence to a culture of peace requires that people can trust in their personal security and institutions of justice. Better livelihoods and equality are perceived by these development-oriented IFAs and CSOs as a fundamental element for the peace building process in the Far South. Therefore, this participatory development process conducted by community development and natural resource management groups is seen as preparedness for the structural transformation of conflict. Community-based

organizations supported by IFAs may not take a leading role in resolving the conflict, but their collective practice of development within and between communities will be complementary to other peace-related activities by other groups, such as networking, women, and youth groups whose activities rely on access to constituencies at all levels.

*b. Human Rights & Relief*

Since the disperse of violence in 2004, a number of human rights violations in the Far South have drawn the attention of IFAs and Bangkok-based organizations, especially human rights-related groups. These IFAs and Bangkok-based organizations in noting the increase in violence have assisted local groups in preventing further human rights violations. The International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch, and the Association for the Prevention of Torture supported MacMuslim to develop and access complaining channels regarding the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and other human rights violations, while the Global Human Rights Fund, Open Society Institute, and The Asia Foundation provided funding for local human rights defenders.

With the experience of mobile legal aid during the Indian Ocean Tsunami with The Asia Foundation, in 2004 MacMuslim developed SPAN, a network of paralegal volunteers trained to provide basic legal services within their communities as well as civic and legal education trainings through workshops held in schools, community halls, and prisons (The Asia Foundation, undated-a). The SPAN enhanced its capacity to develop strategic plans to promote the role of youth in democratic development. In this regard, youth leaders applied skills from deliberative dialogue projects for the plans (Interview J, 17 June 2012). Human rights defenders in the Far South were the prominent groups who connected and influenced many stakeholders, and the network's visibility is the result of tremendous demand for assistance by affected citizens. Their strategy is not to confront the authorities, but to enhance dialogues for understanding between state and citizens and bring about a judicial procedural justice for Malay Muslim in the Far South. Therefore, it depends very much on their personal relationship with state officials. With a Bangkok-based

partner like Cross Cultural Foundation, strategic campaigning becomes more effective. The legal empowerment process is initiated with further support from the EU Delegation (Interview S, 13 June 2012; Interview U, 16 June 2012). **The protection and monitoring functions of human rights defenders were internalized into the grass-roots population as they became active citizens embedded in communities and supervised by MacMuslim.**

However, the secretary-general of MacMuslim emphasized that the organization and its networks developed this far because it relied on the community's capacity and network as resources for its activities in order to eventually transfer the responsibility and ownership to them. **The partnership with IFAs mostly provides opportunities to expand and strengthen the members of its network.**

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
<b>Human rights &amp; Relief</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Human right advocacy organizations from outside supported local groups to provide legal assistance to persons charged by special national-security-related laws and other human right violation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local groups are strengthened and expand their network</li> <li>- Strategic litigation</li> <li>- Research and synthesize past experiences in legal assistance in order to demonstrate effective practices to authorities at implementing level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advocacy with authorities at local level for implementation and national level for structural change in special laws</li> <li>- Activities of education for peace, human rights and democracy in schools</li> <li>- Legal empowerment, capacity building for communities members and sub-networks</li> </ul>
<b>Third Party Intervention</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- Human Rights Watch</li> <li>- Global Human Rights Fund</li> <li>- Association for Prevention of Torture</li> <li>- Open Society Institute</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- EU Delegation</li> <li>- International Commission of Jurists</li> </ul>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

*c. Women & Youth*

Women and youth groups are highly related in a way that they are rooted from the consequences of violent conflict. Most of them are those who are indirectly affected by human rights violations and violent incidents. However, their role changes at a different pace and holds different conditions. While women gradually involved political aspects of peace building, youth groups maintained their activities to empower young people and prevent them from recruitment to war constituencies.

On the one hand, peace work conducted by affected women whose proximity and directness to the conflict is high is considered to be maintained voluntarily; otherwise it will affect their acceptance by the public and the government. Moreover, Muslim women who participate in sensitive public issues sometimes face cultural constraints such as within their role in the private and public spheres; therefore, it is important to use public communication to raise awareness and understanding about their activities (Interview V, 2 July 2012). On the other hand, the professionalization of volunteer groups such as Muslim women has raised the visibility of local women in the public, especially those who did not associate with reliable institutions before. Therefore, strengthening a voluntary organization to become a professional non-government organization would bring it into the perspective of the public and the government because that associates transparency and good governance (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). Some women leaders such as the Hearty Support Group coordinated closely with human rights defenders, while others work to support women and youth groups such as Civic Women and Luuk Rieng Group.

**In the early period, women and youth groups relied on domestic fundraising** (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview D, 4 July 2012; Interview Q, 21 June 2012). For example, Hearty Support Group started up its activities by fundraising from the public in their locality (Interview Q, 21 June 2012). Friends of Victim Group (Glum Peuan Phu Soon Sia) is a local group led by personnel from PSU-Pattani, and was initially granted by a Senator in Bangkok (Salae, 2010, p. 124). Luuk Rieng Group held a fundraising for the first time to organize an art camp for violent-affected children in 2004 and later received support from private sectors and


some independent agencies.<sup>26</sup> Fasai Center was initiated and supported by child-related independent agencies (Maitrepan, undated). Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces was initiated from provincial government-related organizations and continually received support from the authorities such as Internal Security Operations Command, Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and Provincial Office of Social Development and Human Security (Interview K, 29 June 2012). Most of the abovementioned groups have to fundraise in order to maintain their activities (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview D, 4 July 2012; Interview Q, 21 June 2012). However, this domestic fundraising is problematic in itself. A participant from the focus group discussion gave an example of a group of widows who fundraised for their activities but was unable to clarify the use of acquired money to its members. The group then faced disputes among members and finally dissolved.

**When women's role for peace building was recognized and accepted, they were then able to access funding from foreign embassies (AusAID and Canada Fund), Open Society Institute, The Asia Foundation, and others.** For instance, in 2008, The Asia Foundation (TAF) worked with the Women's Network for Stopping Violence and Promoting Peace to conduct training of women paralegal volunteers. In 2009, it worked with the Deep South Woman Network for Peace (DEEPPEACE) to conduct training programs to build the capacity of female victims of violence. The Women and Peace Group was granted funding to organize a workshop to promote civic education, human rights, and legal education for female youth and training in press media and radio production for female reporters in 2009-2010 (The Asia Foundation, undated-a).

Civic Women was provided technical assistance by UN Women, UNDP, and foreign academics, and in 2009 it was granted by the EU Delegation via Prince of Songkla University and Oxfam GB to improve cross understanding and confidence building across southern communities (Interview V, 2 July 2012).

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<sup>26</sup> More about history of Luuk Rieng Group at <http://www.lookrieang.com/main/background-activities.php>

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
<b>Women &amp; Youth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and youth had supportive role in community development and social and cultural activities within the locality (Salae, 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women and youth started to play a role in psychological healing for their neighbors and more women conducted and joined activities outside communities (Interview V, 2 July 2012; Salae, 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Women attend forums and seminars held by outsiders to express their grievances to the public and government</li> <li>- Women gather in groups within and between communities to interface and negotiate with the government and to access funding for their initiatives</li> <li>- The role of youth and women groups in peace building is recognized more than before (Interview D, 4 July 2012; Interview V, 2 July 2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some women and youth groups were strengthened</li> <li>- More use of public communication and media by women groups to advocate for peace and justice</li> <li>- Empower children in communities and in schools to voice out their concerns and to be a driver of change</li> <li>- Women utilized existing radio network to communicate with the public (Interview G, 2 July 2012) (Salae, 2010)</li> </ul>
				
<b>Third Party Intervention</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Domestic fundraising</li> <li>- Bangkok-based organizations</li> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- Open Society Institute</li> <li>- AusAID</li> <li>- Canada Fund</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Oxfam GB</li> <li>- EU Delegation</li> <li>- Internews Europe Association</li> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> </ul>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

**With their advocacy work through media, radio, website, publication, forums, and workshops, these women groups were widely recognized in the public sphere. Moreover, the development of media groups has also contributed to women in the Far South by enhancing their recognition at a wider scale. FT Media & Friends produced a documentary about a Muslimah victim<sup>27</sup> who became one female leader within the Civic Women project. She worked to bridge the gap**

<sup>27</sup> Her story in Thai at [<http://prachatai.com/journal/2010/10/31613>]

between state officials and other victims in local communities. Her story was broadcasted on ThaiPBS and in other regions of Thailand<sup>28</sup>.

WePeace and Luuk Rieng Group were also funded through grants by USAID. The EU financing scheme is inaccessible to them. Moreover, unlike receiving embassy funds, the coordinator of Luuk Rieng Group felt more comfortable managing a USAID fund because it also supports all administrative costs. This allows them to focus more on the implementation of the project while their managing system is strengthened. With close advisory by DAI, it took only four months to prove their capacity, and consequently the group was granted in-cash instead of in-kind contribution. Moreover, the coordinator has become one of the active OPERACY<sup>29</sup> trainers and plans to conduct training for her networks in order to empower potential leaders while strengthening her group with financial assistance from USAID. (Interview AA, 27 September 2012).

#### *d. Public Communication & Media*

Media is a lubricating factor to advocate issues from all constituencies. Issues that pop up on websites and newspapers will tend to make more recognition and reaction than those that were not picked up by the media. The media can support and strengthen civil society efforts via positive media coverage and can also play an important role in socialization by strengthening particular images and removing stereotypes in society (Paffenholz, 2009, p. 22). However, the mainstream media can often play a destructive role due to biased reporting (Paffenholz, 2009, p. 14).


In the early period, the only existing public communication channels were community radio and local newspaper. These local media outlets were granted funds from the Social Investment Fund and Canada Fund to produce stories of the Far South and communicate among people in the area. For example, the independent journalist mentioned the consultative method CODI (one of intermediaries in SIF) applied in grant makings to individuals and CBOs during the Social Investment Fund in 1998. Through the intermediaries, the capacity to do formal project management was not yet

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<sup>28</sup> Documentary named “The Agent of Change” launched in 2012 by FT Media & Friends

<sup>29</sup> A leadership and empowerment training

strictly required at that time, and this fund is therefore open and accessible for everyone. For a small informal group of people, this open grant making scheme is more suitable to Thai context than the current foreign funding (Interview Y, 22 June 2012).

Peace Constituencies	1990s - 2003	2004-2006	2007-2009	2010-2012
<b>Public Communication &amp; Media</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community radio</li> <li>- Local newspaper (Tang Nam Newspaper) (Interview Y, 22 June 2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Isranews</li> <li>- Bangkok-based media (Interview I, 22 June 2012; Kainunna, 2010b)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local media groups produce news websites reporting from local perspectives</li> <li>- The first news agency in the Far South (Aman News Agency)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Journalism schools (DSJ &amp; DSP)</li> <li>- Local media groups are linked with national media more than before</li> <li>- Outreach to empower school youths to report the situation from their viewpoints</li> <li>- New local media and public communication groups which has linkage to national constituencies</li> <li>- Deep South Media Network (Interview L, 4 July 2012; Interview M, 22 June 2012)</li> </ul>
				
<b>Third Party Intervention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World Bank (SIF)</li> <li>- Canadian Embassy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internews Europe Association</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internews Europe Association</li> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- Open Society Institute</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internews Europe Association</li> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- Open Society Institute</li> <li>- Sasakawa Peace Foundation</li> <li>- USAID</li> </ul>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

After 2004, the IFA that suddenly began to provide their assistance to the development of media in the Far South was Internews Europe Association, a media development NGOs. In 2005 it started to **train news reporting regarding conflict and emergency situations for Bangkok-based commercial media** expecting that



positive coverage from the Far South would make a positive impact in Thai society's perception towards the problem (Interview O, 1 August 2012). Isranews was an initiator of cooperation between local and national journalists at that time. On the one hand, it is the cheapest way to build peace constituencies outside the region with the media. On the other hand, it is not easy to do because the marketability of Far South stories prevented the recognition of such stories at the national level. Commercial media turned down reporting too many stories from the Far South after a while (Interview M, 22 June 2012; Interview O, 1 August 2012; Nuannoi Thammasathien, 2012). At the national level, the conflict in the Far South is one of the issues that Thai people in other regions do not really appreciate. If they do, their attention is drawn to certain violent reports and news. Moreover, media outlets from Bangkok professional journalists, even though well-trained, still reflect Bangkok-based worldviews of the Far South. One key informant from local media CSO expressed that *"This strategy therefore did not respond to actual needs in a way that local voices have not been expressed through this effort"* (Interview I, 22 June 2012).

Consequently, IFAs shifted to focus more on **local capacities for public communication and the media**. In 2008, while Internews provided technical assistance for new local media groups to produce and distribute media outlets via website, The Asia Foundation implemented projects and granted seed funding for traditional communication channels as well as new media groups in the Far South. In 2008-2010, The Asia Foundation (TAF) worked with Pattani Community Radio Network to develop a radio program series to educate citizens on the role of civic participation in governance, human rights and legal education in the Far South (The Asia Foundation, undated-a). In 2009, TAF funded Bungaraya Group to conduct a public opinion poll and operate community media productions; however, travel and other expenses for investigating incidents in the field were not provided (Interview I, 22 June 2012; The Asia Foundation, undated-a). Aman News Center received a short-term grant (6 months) from TAF for operating as a news agency, conducting training workshop for Malay-language citizen reporters, and organizing public forums in 2009, yet expenses to investigate incidents in the field are not provided (Interview F, 22 June 2012; The Asia Foundation, undated-a). Most of TAF's contribution to

local media groups was made through its seed grants. **CSOs for public communication and media mainly obtained technical skills from Internews and used financial resources from TAF to start up their operation.**

However, some key informants from media groups confirmed that their problem is not the lack of technical skills. If they have no resources for data collection and investigation in the field, such skills become meaningless. Media skills cannot be built in one or two years but instead needs ongoing practices to gain the recognition of quality. Moreover, it takes a while to find people who are committed to report on the south, especially if there are no opportunities for making professional journalism an occupation. That being said, corporates invest very little for non-marketable stories from the Far South. Thus, media capacity building appears problematic at the local level when IFAs do not really provide adequate resources for producing media outlets and practice despite the fact that its development is all about resources. Their toughest mission is to stay committed and to find ways to continue living (Nuannoit Thammasathien, 2012).

In 2010-2012, CSOs realized that in order to make a larger impact they must go 'online' and promote more dialogue at the local and national levels (Interview L, 4 July 2012). At the local level, CSOs utilized the local media network to broadcast their dialogues and activities. Apart from media groups, some other CSOs established their own platform for public communication, such as website, community radio, forums, and local television channels with support from Bangkok-based organizations and IFAs. For example, funded by the EU Delegation and technically supported by Internews, Civic Women was able to continue its radio program in the Far South called "*Voices from Southernmost Women (Siang Phu Ying Chai Dan Tai)*"<sup>30</sup> for another year in 2011 (Interview V, 2 July 2012). MacMuslim participated in an in-depth training with Internews under the EU funded project and established a website to disseminate information about its activities and strategies.

Deep South Watch has one of the most active platforms to promote activities of CSOs in the Far South. Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) who has made personal

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<sup>30</sup> The program started in 2010 under a research project funded by Thailand Research Fund

connection with CSOs in the Far South since 2008 decided to fund Deep South Watch with a grant for three years (2010-2012). The consultative project development requires several meetings and deliberations with local media groups in the Far South. In 2011, SPF supported a network of alternative media, journalism schools, and international exchange of peace media. Deep South Journalism School, Deep South Photographers, and Deep South Design Center were established under supervision of Deep South Watch. Trainers of the new schools were those of Internews' trainees. **The contribution of IFAs in the previous period was inherited and developed further with the support from the new coming third party intervention like SPF.** Such journalism schools can currently afford to expand their program in Tadeka schools and local communities by asking fund from UNDP<sup>31</sup> (Interview L, 4 July 2012). In this period, targeted beneficiaries also expanded to existing socialization institutions like religious schools. **The process of media development in the Far South, particularly technical skills has transferred from international standard training by IFAs to local training by local trainers.**

On the whole, the contribution of cooperation between these media groups and IFAs is still very small compared to the impact they are able to make. One of the key informants interviewed expressed that to do media development for a particular area and cause like the Far South; a number of committed people are required to work together – like an army. The lack of manpower, resources and trust among them are major problems for their development in the long run (Interview M, 22 June 2012). The incompatibility for cooperation and the fragmentation of these mentioned groups has prevented such ideal media army to emerge. However, the existing contribution each has made to peace building is complementary to the entire process. From a perspective of a former international journalist, the media environment in the Far South is very niche because there are no big media corporations monopolizing information market here. Diversity is definitely desirable in the information ecosystem in the Far South. (Interview M, 22 June 2012). In a highly diverse society, it is very important for donors to be aware of the influence of particular media groups

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<sup>31</sup> UNDP's brochure of Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation program listed Deep South Journalism School as one of the beneficiaries.

on the overall peace building process. Their resources can make a multiplied effect which may manipulate the peace building process to a particular way.



*e. Networking*

While some IFAs believe that their role is limited to strengthening each of them, others go beyond to support networks local actors try to build. For example, the EU Delegation has no intention to build a network even though it has the potential to synergize all beneficiaries from wide sectors. Its underlying principle is that constituencies should know best about who to network with, and by emphasizing on the quality of the partnership, will eventually increase the likelihood of a broader network (Interview A, 10 August 2012). The Asia Foundation also gives priority to strengthen each peace actor and let the network emerge naturally (Interview T, 27 August 2012). However, in practice, a number of TAF's projects involved more than one local partner. Other issue-based INGOs, such as Save the Children, Oxfam GB, and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung working for concrete projects with a few domestic partners were able to make a network within communities but were less likely to support networks among CSOs. USAID is more ambitious in trying to lay the groundwork for public participation & democratic governance mechanism through its resources and technical assistance nationally. Sasakawa Peace Foundation goes much further in its aim to foster the civic network and cooperation at the regional level.

Andres Serbin (2005, pp. 55-57) excerpted some unpublished works and synthesized characteristics and functions of the network for conflict transformation and peace building. An organizational form of networks becomes favorable in the context of violent conflict where problems are so dynamic that individual rigid structures are not suitable and where loose connections are preferable to formal organizational ties. Each network serves different purposes. The more passive network, or in other words – interest groups, has limited engagement with the outside and tends to serve the needs of its members through sharing information and experiences, facilitating dialogue, and providing expertise while the more active network tend to project outwardly to make impact at a wider scale by engaging advocacy, campaigning, and lobbying. If such a network becomes proactive, its functions would go beyond to

engage early warning or actual interventions to resolve conflict. This highly engaged, proactive network demands high levels of commitment from its members, a more formalized structure, and the more passive network requires less or otherwise. The types of network are distinguished by its functions, themes, and topic below in Table 12.

**Table 12 Functions of Networks**

Engagement With outside	Functions	Characteristics	Sample Networks in the Far South
Passive	Sharing information and experience	Less commitment required	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community Organization Networks</li> <li>- The Southern Teacher Association and Federation</li> </ul>
		Loose informal network	
	Facilitating dialogue Providing expertise		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces</li> <li>- Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network</li> <li>- Student Federation of Southern Thailand</li> <li>- Women's Network for Stopping Violence and Promoting Peace</li> <li>- Deep South Woman Network for Peace</li> <li>- Civic Women</li> <li>- People Network for Development of Participatory Governance in Southern Border Provinces</li> <li>- Deep South Peace Media Network</li> <li>- Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand</li> </ul>
	Advocacy, Lobbying, and Campaigning		
	Early warning Coordination between member groups		
Proactive	Collective interventions to prevent or resolve conflict	High level of commitment required	
		More formalized structure	

Source: Adapted from Serbin, 2005, p. 56

The research finds that most networks in the Far South are currently the active type. The networks rooted from the Far South developed from being passive in responding to violent consequences in order to protect and rehabilitate affected people in their own groups. Later, their role changed to a more active one with advocacy and

campaigning activities. For example, some of the affected people turned out to be leaders by facilitating a dialogue between other affected people and state officials as witnessed in women and human rights groups. Meanwhile, networks stimulated by the outside like Bangkok-based organizations and IFAs initially play an active role.

A networking form of organization emerged since the 1990s. The Social Investment Fund plays a crucial role in this emerging network for social causes in the early period. Community Organization Networks are one obvious sample because they appeared all of a sudden to perform as a distributor of cash transfers, and disappeared as soon as their function was fulfilled, yet had left the spirit of working within the public sphere for several groups. Some of them are not really a network, but only a group or organization of people (Interview D, 4 July 2012).

Since 2004, **civil society has gathered in groups in order to respond to the consequences of violent conflict.** The first and foremost group is human rights defenders, SPAN and MacMuslim in 2004. Due to the fact that MacMuslim has been committed to the Far South since 2004 and has constantly been provided assistance from IFAs, even though sometimes it is not adequate, it currently plans to expand and strengthen more independent sub-networks such as SPAN, Muslimah, assistant lawyers, and others in order to decentralize its organizational structure (Interview U, 16 June 2012). Deep South Watch did the same when Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) approached them in 2009. Three networks were established for peace media education (DSJ, DSP, and DSDC) (Interview L, 4 July 2012). The capacities of these sub-networks were nurtured and strengthened by their core organizations and became fairly independent in their growth strategies. All in all, the **decentralization process gradually takes place at the organizational level in order to foster the networking environment at the local level.**

Women groups are among those who tend to work in an organizational form of network of individuals from several areas. According to Civil Society Mapping (DeepSouthWatch, 2012b), there are seven active women groups, and all of them are in the form of loosely-tied network. The key informant from one women's group views that an organizational form of networking is very suitable for women in the Far

South because the transformation of the Muslimah role, from one that is supportive to leading, is a cultural and political change. It requires safety and public understanding to work outside their private sphere; therefore, collective action is applied to overcome some social constraints (Interview V, 2 July 2012). They are increasingly recognized, and developed. More IFAs tend to support networks of women such as Oxfam GB and USAID. Youth networks are also rooted from the local such as Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces and networks under the supervision of the Fasai Center. They are also loosely-tied, yet mostly supported through adult organizations. This research did not witness many youth-owned organizations entering into partnerships with IFAs directly except the Student Federation of Southern Thailand. Sasakawa Peace Foundation funded Deep South Media Network which organized Deep South Civil Media Festival I in 2011 & Deep South Civil Media Festival II in 2012. On the whole, these abovementioned networks were established in order to coordinate among individuals/groups/organizations that are performing common peace duties such as media, human rights defenders, and women. **Since these networks are emerging solely in response to local needs, the contribution of cooperation made to them is therefore to maintain the local initiatives and provide opportunities for the expansion of sub-networks as witnessed in the expansive organization's design of MacMuslim and Deep South Watch.**

Apart from networking for a certain cause, CSOs in the Far South also had opportunities to do cross association under foreign-funded projects. Starting in 2010, TAF worked with its 10 local partners<sup>32</sup> to organized Community Forums to promote conflict management and mitigation through deliberative dialogue. The projects included forums for community input in the southern peace process through deliberative dialogue; introductory workshop for local facilitators of the community

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<sup>32</sup> Aman News Agency; Center of Culture Protection for Democracy–Southern Thailand; Civil Society Network Narathiwat; Foundation of Islamic Culture, Southern Thailand; Graduate Network for Development of Southern Thailand; Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN); Pattani Community Radio Network; Southern Peace Media Volunteer Network; Student Federation of Southern Thailand; Women and Peace Group

dialogue process in the Far South; intensive training for deliberative dialogue facilitators; workshops on deliberative dialogues; workshop on deliberative dialogue issue book development; and training of deliberative dialogue facilitators. In 2011, a project was initiated to strengthen influential Thai leaders who advocated for increased community engagement in policy development and its implementation in the conflict environment of southern Thailand included 12 local partners.<sup>33</sup> Lastly, in 2011 TAF worked with 8 local partners<sup>34</sup> on one very sensitive issue of the Far South; history. It contributed to improved relations between the government of Thailand and the local Thai-Malay community by demonstrating that enhanced cultural space and respect can be provided to this ethnically distinct community within the parameters of the Thai state and to support for the development (The Asia Foundation, undated-a). Most of TAF's local partners in these networking activities were those who had been in partnership with them before. Although these projects involved diverse groups and organizations, activities do not bring about a long-term commitment of locally-grown initiatives; therefore networking ended soon after the project's completion.

In 2011, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand was formed and considered to be the most sophisticated network of CSOs in the Far South, though it may not be as sophisticated as it should yet. It contains a cross association of local CSOs who also have connections with local communities at the grassroots level, governments, and insurgents. This network is strategically working towards linkages between key people within top leadership and more people from the ground in order to find a political solution for the Far South. It can be seen that their goal is the


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<sup>33</sup> Aman News Agency; Association of Women for Peace; Islamic Cultural Foundation; King Prajadhipok's Institute; Pattani Community Radio Network; Prince of Songkla University, The Institute for Peace Studies; Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network; Southern Peace Media Volunteer Network; Walailak University, School of Liberal Arts, Regional Studies Program; Women and Peace Group

<sup>34</sup> Aman News Agency; Prince of Songkla University, Department of Malay Studies; Prince of Songkla University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences; Foundation of Islamic Culture, Southern Thailand; Muslim Siam Forum for Art & Culture; Office of the Administrative Court; Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN); Walailak University, The School of Liberal Arts, Regional Studies Program



intervention to resolve the conflict based on the interest of people by engaging with as many stakeholders as possible. This network is yet to become proactive as recently it is attempting to collect an assertive conclusion from the ground which is very challenging. The cooperation with IFAs has contributed to technical capacity and financial supplementary to this network as it is mainly supported by the Reform Assembly.

<b>Peace Constituencies</b>	<b>1990s - 2003</b>	<b>2004-2006</b>	<b>2007-2009</b>	<b>2010-2012</b>
<b>Networking</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Network of local communities for natural resources management</li> <li>- CSOs formed themselves as a network in order to meet the requirement of Social Investment Fund (Interview D, 4 July 2012)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Home-visiting by women groups (Salae, 2010)</li> <li>- Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network</li> <li>- University students network working against human rights violation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The very first seminar on the role of civil society in peace building and conflict transformation concluded that it is no longer the deal between Thai state and separatist only, but also civil society will take part in building peace (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009)</li> <li>- Several women networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand established in 2011</li> <li>- A number of public forums among CSOs and local communities</li> <li>- Socialization within traditional institutions, such as community association, such as schools, mosques, and etc.</li> </ul>
				
<b>Third Party Intervention</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- World Bank (SIF)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- Political Development Council</li> <li>- Friedrich Naumann Foundation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reform Assembly</li> <li>- The Asia Foundation</li> <li>- World Bank</li> <li>- Sasakawa Peace Foundation</li> </ul>

**Sources:** Extract from Table 12 Timeline of Peace Constituencies Development; a summary of Visibility of Peace Constituencies of the Far South (Chapter III)

Apart from local networks, peace constituencies from the Far South were introduced to constituencies in other parts of Thailand through activities organized by DAI. For

example, 6 universities from every region of Thailand have had opportunities to sit together to discuss their strategies and reflect on how they can benefit from working together (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). Patani Forum has so far been able to organize forums in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Chiangmai, Ubonratchathani, Nakorn Ratchasima, and Bangkok provinces in order to build dialogues with other localities (Interview B, 18 June 2012). Fine Tune Production was able to promote its documentary about the Far South in many provinces. Networking with CSOs outside the Far South initially included more people at the sociopolitical level; however, its impact to peace building is yet to be seen as these small CSOs are just beginning to commit to the road of building peace. Moreover, it could not be called an active network yet as these events just brought together civil society to have dialogues and information exchange which has raised awareness of the Far South in their Thai society's perspective. However, in the long run, this passive network could potentially initiate constituencies nationwide campaigning for the peaceful resolution of conflict in the Far South if it was committed and further supported. Similarly, Sasakawa Peace Foundation is fostering a network of Southeast Asia peace constituencies by trying to connect them together, yet it is still rather a passive network.

The focus group discussion concluded that the current situation of peace constituencies in the Far South experience problems of insufficient strategic networking because there are no connectors among CSOs. Consequently, the conclusion that CSOs in the Far South have distrust among each other which is made visible after the incoming foreign money was not solely applicable. It is true that CSOs are still fragmented in their agenda and divided into groups because most CSOs in the Far South emerged from a few progressive-minded leaders and not all members. CSOs' establishment process is fragile in itself because it can be dissolved at any time if members are divided. The situation has recently changed when CSOs have realized the importance of networking. However, once a network is established, members are not always committed and trustworthy. The fragmentation of network's members is still a problem. Each organization perceives the problem from different angles, so it is difficult for diverse groups to arrive at a concerted conclusion.

Moreover, the lack of transparency has intensified the suspicion among its members. For example, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand still consists of some CSOs' leaders whom some members believe to be associated with non-transparent procedures such as secretly receiving direct support from the military. This network is deemed fragile in a way that if efforts put in the network are influenced by suspected interest groups like military, some members may delegitimize others and finally dismiss themselves from the network. However, it is currently not seen as a problem because the council is not yet developed until their decisive role is acceptable among the public, but if it lives on until then, this fragility may harm the constituency badly.

It can be seen that transparency and sincerity are very important to the success of peace constituency. Apart from transparency and sincerity, effective connectors are also very important. Although a legitimate network is managed by diverse groups in a decentralized manner, it is evitable that trustworthy and widely-respected connectors are part of the success. The Far South requires persons whose social capital is remarkable to sit in the driver's seat, in other words, persons with some charisma whose relationship with the popular is strengthened.

Some IFAs have tried to use their programs to generate opportunities for the connection of peace constituencies. For example, the USAID assessed that CSOs are committed to certain policy reforms and to the constituencies they represent, but lack basic skills in organizational development and management – such as strategic planning, financial management, fundraising, networking, and media outreach. It perceived that these skills are needed for building long-term programs, partnerships, and sustainable organizations (USAID/RDMA, 2009). Therefore, DAI utilizes the wide-sector grant making and act as a connector for peace constituencies in the Far South and country-wide by introducing them to voluntarily connect to each other if common ground is asserted (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). However, as its outreach to civil society in the Far South faced difficulty in building trust, significant impact is yet to come. Media & Public Communication groups supported by USAID are seen to be quite responsive to the international connector (DAI) since they are currently active in strategic planning and joint activities. The World Bank is very

active in using its Peace Building Partnership Fund to support networks of women, youth, natural resources, and Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand in the Far South (Interview N, 26 September 2012). However, since these networks of women, youth, and natural resources are not only stimulated from local needs but more also from the funding agencies, some participants were concerned that they will easily dissolve after the funding is finished.

## 2. Contribution to the Development of Peace Constituencies (Actors)

This research finds that the process of development of peace constituencies can be outlined as follows:

**Starting up ①** – As peace constituencies became visible to serve local needs, it appears that a partnership of IFAs and local groups in the primary phase have contributed in providing an opportunity to start up local initiatives in response to the consequences of conflict. *The involvement of IFAs can be either a provision of a seed grant or technical assistance to a wide range of organizations and groups; therefore, a flexible cooperation framework is applied to support short-term responsive activities.* The partnership gives an opportunity for IFAs to learn the situation from their local partners.

**Maintaining and expanding ②** – As some local groups have already become visible and influential in the perspective of the authorities and local communities, they expand their sub-networks and develop their organizations to be influential in middle range leadership. Agenda, approach, and activities were developed to work with multiple-layer of peace building actors. As some part of peace constituencies become strong, the partnership with IFAs has contributed in *maintaining and expanding the visibility and role of these strong constituencies in dialogues with the top, middle, and grass-root levels.* Strong constituencies are able to enter into a partnership with the committed and centralized framework of some IFAs mostly through a professional intermediary because of incompatible capacity of local and international actors. The provision of resources is prominent in sustaining locally-owned agendas, approaches, and activities. Meanwhile, *local communities and small CSOs rooted from the Far*


*South enter into partnerships with IFAs whose frameworks encourages them to be more accountable and transparent through capacity development activities.*

**Strengthening ©** – Because of political and social constraints, certain activities of some actors such as campaigning and socialization of the larger Thai society and advocating towards the authorities are yet to make significant impact. Media is primarily seen to be instrumental in making the former contribution; however, several efforts that relied on national and local media have made such little contribution in bringing understanding of the Far South into the perspective of the larger Thai society. Legitimacy and acceptance is the key to the latter contribution on advocating activities with the ruling governments and military. There appear both national and international efforts to connect constituencies from Bangkok, other part of the country, and other countries with peace constituencies in the Far South in order to overcome constraints of national security policies and political settings at each phase. *The partnership with IFAs not only contributed in maintaining activities at the local level, but also simultaneously expanded the recognition of local actors beyond their levels by facilitating dialogues among them.* With the intensive involvement of IFAs in strengthening locally-grown actors, facilitating dialogues among constituencies, and providing resources for actions, those actors were strengthened and made visible at local, national, and international levels. *This visibility at various levels provides an opportunity for peace constituencies in the Far South to expand their political space and increase the legitimacy of their agendas if this space brings about an asserted voice of constituencies from the whole country in the near future.* However, this long-term attainment is yet to be witnessed. It can be seen that one of the prominent factors that is influential to peace constituencies' development process is their partnership with different international funding agencies. In fact, IFAs applied a mixture of these frameworks in their intervention which differentiated the partnership and its contribution to the development of peace constituencies. However, it appears that various partnerships have complementarily contributed to peace constituencies if seen as a whole.

The following provides a synthesis on the development of civil society actors in peace building process in the Far South and contribution made by the partnership of IFAs and CSOs. It classifies cooperation framework in two groups:


1. Conventional frameworks
2. Unconventional frameworks

*a. Conventional Frameworks*



As violent conflict in the Far South has not yet come to an end, local initiatives to address the consequences of conflict are still necessary. Therefore, frameworks of cooperation that provide a suitable environment for the development of agenda, approach, and activities of strong constituencies at local level are required. This also maintains and expands the actions for strengthening a relationship with grassroots and top leadership. The EU Delegation, The Asia Foundation, Sasakawa Foundation, USAID, Save the Children, and Oxfam GB are among those who have contributed to this development. Partnerships in their development-oriented scheme have contributed in the process of strengthening local communities to become visible in the public sphere which recruited more constituencies for peace from the grass-root level

for a preparation of conflict transformation. A cooperation of IFAs and CSOs under the first framework contributed to the starting up **(A)** and maintaining **(B)** activities of CSOs at local level entails the promotion of actions and dialogues within and between local communities. Thus, these partnerships have expanded and strengthened local constituencies.



In the highly-local-ownership scheme of the CfPs, the EU specifies its broad framework and provides a mechanism that allows local needs to be proposed by domestic actors. Even then, there exists the problem of incompatibility between community-rooted groups and international actors under this scheme; it was addressed by an inclusion of intermediaries in the cooperation. In this regard, a development program is achieved by a combination of top-down and bottom-up efforts of international funding agencies<sup>35</sup> which Goodhand and Lewer consider as the most effective way for IFAs to work ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict (Goodhand and Lewer, 2001 cited in Brenk & Veen, 2005; Goodhand, 2001, pp. 11-15). It allows policy and programming to lean on more conflict-sensitive approaches to certain extents because IFAs’ ignorance of the local context and culture is addressed through the demand-driven mechanism.

However, one of the EU’s objectives is to promote local culture as a way to build confidence and mutual understanding among different societal groups, but when reviewing granted projects (Refer to APPENDIX C) there rarely appears to be a


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<sup>35</sup> Top-down efforts are regarded as the framework identified by the headquarter of aid agencies which then disseminated downward while bottom-up efforts are regarded as the practice identified by people in the field – pressure from below, based on experience, working with local partners, and consultation with beneficiaries.

concrete project to build interfaith dialogues between Buddhists and Muslims despite the fact that these cross-religion dialogues are very crucial for the reconciliation of a divided society like the Far South. According to its emphasis on development initiatives, most projects proposed for the EU's grant making are related to actions rather than dialogues. The said dialogue to enhance the mutual understanding of different religious groups is only a bi-product of such actions.


Moreover, the EU's framework rarely contributed to strategic alliance because the development of approach and activities by CSOs were separately done, especially under the current EU funding scheme. Unless there is a strong alliance among CSOs to constitute a common strategy in partnership with IFAs, the project development cycle is likely to be framed and considered solely within the scope of a project. Due to the findings that so far there appears no proactive network in the Far South at the time of research, such strategic alliance and action at local level is yet to be attained. Moreover, asking if Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand has an aim to use its prospective strategic alliance for communication, negotiation and dialogue with IFAs, the answer is spontaneously 'No' (Interview R, 30 June 2012). The fragmented agenda, approach, and activities prevented an expansion of peace constituencies on the ground to make more contribution on a peace building strategy.

*b. Unconventional Frameworks*





Frameworks of cooperation that associate with not only an environment for action but also a promotion for dialogue with a wide range of actors are also complementary in promoting the recognition of peace constituencies and their activities. Internews Europe Association, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and The Asia Foundation are among those who contributed to this development by promoting media groups to facilitate more dialogues at the local and national levels. The cooperation with IFAs whose agenda is to enhance a better understanding of the Far South have contributed in the starting up **Ⓐ**, maintaining **Ⓑ**, and strengthening **Ⓒ** of several local media groups from the Far South. Their actions are related to building the capacity of local actors to utilize a media platform and skills to get their voices heard, and their dialogues emerge due to media network civil society trying to build.



However, due to their project-based approach and limited resources, partnerships of IFAs are tied directly to some key local actors. Although the promotion of civil society activities on the Deep South Watch's platform has made a momentum on the recognition of the social movement in the Far South, it contributed less to the horizontal expansion of an active alliance within middle leadership. The expansion goes rather vertical as journalism schools have recruited more peace constituencies from the grassroots level to express their voices in the public sphere. Promotion of dialogue that has not simultaneously been conducted with the promotion of a wide range of actors by IFAs is less likely to enhance complementariness of activities or constitute a proactive strategic alliance for peace.

A mixture of the conventional framework with a simultaneous promotion of dialogues for a wide range of actors at various levels enhances potentials for a mutual

commitment of peace constituencies at the local level and strategic alliance at the national level. The Asia Foundation and USAID are among those who contributed to this development. Under partnership with them, peace constituencies were supported at the local level and at the same time were introduced into the perspective of authorities, local communities, and national constituencies. The Asia Foundation's partnership with a wide range of actors by either grant making or implementing a project contributed to enhance opportunities for visibility of many small CSOs and opportunities to learn from each other and occasionally work together under its projects/programs. Projects related to dialogues across several actors are one of TAF's emphases. The Deliberative Dialogue Project is a concrete example of an interfaith community dialogue in the Far South (Pichaikul, 2012). Constituencies from many parts of Thailand were provided resources for actions at their own locality as well as an environment for strategic planning with constituencies from other parts of the country – especially with USAID. The compatibility of local and international actors was addressed through intensive assistance by DAI. The initiatives by various actors, although monitored strictly under the scope of the donor, are freely synergized on a common ground to be complementary to each other. The cooperation with IFAs which act somewhat as a connector of potential peace constituencies throughout the country has contributed in providing opportunities to do strategic planning for the resolution of social and political issues in Thailand. However, the impact and continuity of such strategic cooperation was unclear during the time of research.



To conclude, considering a sector-based aspect of CSOs in partnership with IFAs, the combination of the two aforementioned frameworks for cooperation has contributed to the expansion of peace constituencies which allows them to address the conflict at both the horizontal and vertical levels. However, the partnerships of IFAs and CSOs which foster an open and inclusive cooperation among civil society actors are most beneficial to their development. Even so, it is still limited because of the fragmented agenda among domestic actors.

In order to illustrate more about the contribution on the horizontal and vertical dimensions of conflict transformation in the Far South, several civil society functions are briefly discussed in the following section.

### **Functional Aspects of Peace Constituencies**

Referring to the Sector-based Aspect of the Peace Building Process, the contribution of each group to the process as a whole is varied in accordance with the functions they take up for achieving their objectives. Civil society does not only develop its members, activities, and discourses, but also transform its functions in order to serve the changing political, social and cultural contexts. According to the functional approach for analyzing the contribution of civil society to peace building (Paffenholz,

2010), this research classifies seven functions into three groups. The evolution of functions for civil society organizations studied in this research is as follows:

1. Service Delivery – Most CSOs such as human rights, women and youth groups have started their role in the Far South by performing humanitarian and philanthropy work to assist the victims of violent incidents and special laws' enforcement; therefore, service delivery has become the main function during the first few years after the new wave of unrest. The service delivery function enhances an opportunity for CSOs to communicate with local communities' members who are the most affected population of this conflict. Similarly, IFAs started their cooperation with CSOs by providing assistance for humanitarian and philanthropy.
2. Protection, Monitoring, Advocacy – These three functions have been simultaneously performed as they are related. The ineffectiveness of service delivery in the long run encourages civil society to start a more active role as to advocate towards policy change and monitor such changes from various aspects. However, the function of protection is still ambiguous as they are mostly established by the assistance of the government and military. The advocacy and monitoring function enhances an opportunity for civil society to communicate with authorities – the so called top leadership. IFAs are acting as watchdogs from an outsider-perspective and acting as a supporter for local advocacy and monitoring conducted by local CSOs.
3. Socialization, Social Cohesion, and Facilitation – Civil society who used to advocate, monitor, and provide services put their efforts to an additional function that emphasizes on creating spaces for dialogues. The functions of socialization, social cohesion and facilitation then became famous words in the Far South during the time of research. Local actors moved towards activities that facilitate dialogues between groups; however, it is interesting that an intensive debate between different societal groups with opposing standpoints has not been very apparent in the Far South. IFAs take a supportive role in making dialogues function. The actors of these functions vary from local to international levels, so some IFAs did try to provide an environment for

connecting constituencies. However, their efforts in cooperation with CSOs have made a small contribution to the whole process. This results from a fragmented agenda and approaches of both sides of relationship.

### **Quality of Peace Constituencies**

According to the normative definition of “Peace constituencies”<sup>36</sup> given by the participants of the focus group discussion, inclusiveness and a learning process are emphasized as key elements. Therefore, it is very reasonable to regard local ownership and sustainability as important qualities of peace constituencies because these qualities reflect civil society’s perspectives on the gap between ideal constituencies and its current existence.

#### **1. Local Ownership**

The local ownership of peace constituencies was argued at two different levels. First, local ownership is considered the aspect of peace building actors who benefit from third party intervention in respect to peace constituencies as a whole. Second, key informants regard the local ownership at project level considering the involvement of IFAs in CSOs’ activities.

The application of a Call for Proposals mechanism has strength in that it is solely guided by the demand, by supporting the actors through the work they do. It ensures better ownership. EU Program officers put the emphasis on this “demand-driven characteristic” of their program because in practice proposals that pass the EU’s certain criteria will obtain funding without any amendment (Interview A, 10 August 2012). Although it claimed that a wide range of stakeholders benefits from the EU’s best practice especially civil society organizations, the distribution of funding appeared is rather unbalanced. According to the Mid-term Review of 2009 program, 58 percent of overall EU funding to Thailand was granted to universities and institutes from the central region who are mostly research-focused due to the fact that they are well-experienced in preparing proposals (Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009a). Small unregistered civil society groups can be beneficial only as

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<sup>36</sup> Refer to Discussion on Definition of Peace Constituencies in Chapter IV

associates or sub-grantees from these large organizations which are quite rare (Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009b). A women advocate from Prince of Songkla University who was part of the EU funded project expressed that *“Not many EU direct beneficiaries utilize a sub-granting mechanism to distribute resources for relevant working groups or if any very small”* (Interview, 2 July 2012). Therefore, the question arose that a demand-driven model refers to the demand by whom. This reflects a gap of perception between donors and recipients. For instance, the criterion of being a legislated body has immediately excluded a number of small working groups whose demand may be higher and more urgent than those 58 percent. Although the competitive environment of the CfPs will ensure objectivity, transparency, and accountability of projects conducted by those who demonstrated capacity in delivering (European Commission, undated), it is arguable whether a mechanism that sustains the champions or mechanism that nurtures and strengthens local embryonic organizations is more contributable to a sustained peace from within the Far South. This recent pattern of beneficiaries could be a result of “EU Direct Centralized Management” when it makes a Call for Proposals which are very complex. Such complexity has brought about a range of different administration problems for its recipients (Riddell, 2007, p. 69), especially grass rooted civil society organizations. It can easily discourage community-based organizations with limited human capital to take part in the funding scheme. When asking whether a compromising process is employed for those CSOs whose activities are much needed for a particular time-being, the only measure appears is the proposal-writing training and information session by the EU (Interview A, 10 August 2012).

The EU’s funding scheme and other IFAs who tend to work with only existing strong institutions have contributed to sustaining these institutions which are sometimes called by some key informants as a gatekeeper or snatcher (Interview, not verified). It depends whether their activities are actually beneficial to people or not. For example, if a foreign-funded action research by an educational institution in the Far South does not provide opportunities to community organizations to participate and grow, the benefit may only go to the researcher and not the citizens who are the actual owner of issues (Interview, not verified).

On the contrary, there are two perspectives on USAID's program in the Far South. Some non-recipient CSOs, either their proposal being rejected or intentionally not to take part in, view that the program's management methodology is considered too centralized and is strictly controlled by the international contractor. For example, the Faculty of Political Science, Prince of Songkla University (Pattani Campus) once worked with DAI to conduct seminars in the southern provinces for 3 months in 2011 (Prince of Songkla University, 2011), but refused to continue the partnership because they think that DAI's management framework does not match with their working style, especially the in-kind components of grants and inflexible disbursement system. This inflexibility caused many difficulties through the project implementation (Interview X, 19 June 2012). Some key informants even think this management framework allows an intensive intervention by USAID and DAI in their peace building initiatives. On the contrary, small CSOs who already enter into partnership with USAID and DAI positively consider this mechanism as tools to strengthen their organizations and increase public acceptance through their enhanced transparency. The emphasis on giving grants to increase the visibility of small working groups in the area also strengthens the argument of local ownership for USAID's funding scheme. However, the management framework of DAI required its local partners to meet certain indicators specified by DAI's work plan required by USAID; therefore, the initiatives of these local CSOs may reflect the strategy of the donor more than their own. Yet, all key informants from USAID's grantees recall the fact that "the USAID and DAI do not intervene in the contents and implementation of their activities at all" (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview B, 18 June 2012; Interview M, 22 June 2012).

## **2. Sustainability**

Sustainability associates with the continuity of "Capacity" and "Resource" to address problems at all levels. According to the frameworks for cooperation, two consequences appear regarding sustainability of civil society organizations and peace constituencies in the Far South which are derived from the philosophy of IFAs about capacity development and the approaches of CSOs. This research finds two different perspectives towards 'sustainability' in the Far South. They are elaborated as follows:

*a. Community Resources and Voluntary Capacity*

The sustainability of the development-oriented framework used by the EU Delegation, issue-based INGOs, and The Asia Foundation ensures that local communities and the vulnerable are empowered to engage in either action or dialogue relating to public issues. Therefore, the visibility and development of peace constituencies under this framework is sustained through the expansion of the number of competent volunteers embedded in local communities and strengthening the infrastructure and institutions for peace building in the area. It is expected that such volunteers will mobilize the public forces and make significant impact as local communities have the sole legitimacy for conflict resolution and transformation. Now many CSOs in the Far South are yet to develop their capacity in response to the incoming international source of funds; hence, they would like more time and space to grow and become an effective driver of change (Interview L, 4 July 2012). Long-term partnership with the international community is still required; however, decision making to fund is not in the hands of domestic constituencies at all. For example, the EU's program budget was cut in 2012 and it is not certain that the European Commission will buy-into this program again in the future (Interview A, 10 August 2012). Moreover, most of EU direct beneficiaries are national and international organizations that in many cases perform as an umbrella body for local CSOs. When they decided to shift to another area of operation and follow a new framework from a source of funding, it may be problematic to the work of local actors.

*b. Public Resources and Professional Capacity*

The fact that civil society organizations are predominately working on a voluntary basis, they rely on fundraising. The Thai government does not pay much attention to them, therefore, no budget is allocated to supporting their work directly (Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, et al., 2009). Media and networking groups are different from the human rights, women and youth groups who are connected directly with the grass-root population; therefore, the sustainability is seen from a different perspective. DAI (an implementing partner of USAID) perceived that since some civil society groups such as media and networking could not afford to train and empower local



communities, they should be developed through professionalization. DAI emphasized good governance and transparency which allows small CSOs to gain recognition from the government and the public, and the visibility of constituencies is solely given to the credit to local partners (Interview AB, 14 February 2013; Interview B, 18 June 2012). Under this framework, CSOs were nurtured on a different basis and their direction of development is exposed vertically to more interaction with the government and general public.

On the whole, it appears that CSOs who move towards the grass-root population and rely on communities as the resources of their activities have less concerns on the sustainability of their organizations. For example, the Wetland Research Project learned from past experience that foreign support cannot last forever, and it prepared to be ready for a shortcoming period. It then established a development fund for itself and for each community it is operating in. The Project officer noted that *“Even though the group will not receive any resources in the future, activities at the local level can still continue. I can move on to other relevant duties”* (Interview D, 4 July 2012). MacMuslim’s secretary-general told his colleagues to understand that their compensation may be reduced after this EU funded project. He noted that *“Their work is very much in need and it will still depend on foreign aid in the near future. However, with a number of recruited human resources in their sub-network from the former programs, protection, monitoring, and service delivery at the grassroots level will still function”* (Interview U, 16 June 2012). The sustainability of these CSOs in partnership with IFAs refers to opportunities to expand and maintain constituencies in order to transfer the ownership of activities to actual owners of the issues. Yet, this network of local communities still needs a strong coordinating body to facilitate all activities in respect to their strategy. As a result of discontinuity of funds, a few CSOs shifted their approach to a more self-dependent one, such as Bungaraya news and Young Khidmat who have started their business to support the work they do (Interview I, 22 June 2012; Interview K, 29 June 2012). MacMuslim and small media groups plan on doing the same thing (Interview M, 22 June 2012; Interview U, 16 June 2012). Nonetheless, their success is still uncertain and may require restructuring and transformation which is a complete different thing.

Moreover, discontinuity of resources for CSOs can be addressed by handing over the tasks to authorities who have more resources and personnel. Several IFAs and CSOs partnerships try to demonstrate the good practice and international lessons learned for development and peace building initiatives to the government by keeping them informed and taking part in where possible. The Project Officer noted that “*For example, Wetland Research Project does not have to do mangrove forest restoration because the local authorities and private sector have picked up the activities in their work plan*” (Interview D, 4 July 2012). However, the intention to do so is always obstructed by a lack of political will and the rotation of administrative officials and politicians nationally and locally. For example, The World Bank planned to pass on the Community-driven development pilot approach to one of the governmental initiatives (Panom Project), but recently failed to do so because such an initiative was dismissed due to the change of ruling government (Interview N, 26 September 2012).

In addition, some initiatives had a hard time coordinating with educational institutions despite that it is expected within the role of collaborating with CSOs. For example, Internews hopes that their training center can be a media resource hub for civil society, journalists, and students. It is expected to continue on after Internews’ involvement in the south if the Prince of Songkla University (PSU) buys the idea. The project manager admitted that “What is expected to be inherited have not jointly established by the inheritors, so the expected result has not really been achieved and sustainability has not been possible.” (Interview O, 1 August 2012). However, it appears at a later date that Internews’ effort was taken up by local groups to initiate a media resources hub of their own; Deep South Journalism School. Therefore, local ownership entails more sustained initiatives.

Comparing with USAID’s, its local beneficiaries were believed to be stronger in management and access to funding through the professional assistance by DAI (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). It is true that these local organizations are now visible to the public and recognized by IFAs; however, like building trust with the government, CSOs need continuing interaction with foreign donors before they are trusted and provided public support.

All key informants expressed that most CSOs have little concern on their capacity to do the peace work they have been doing for years, but having to manage the peace work according to the donor's style has suffocated them. The incompetence within the operational and managerial capacity is one of the obstacles that prevent small local CSOs from participating in foreign donors' grant making. English communication, writing proposals and reports, strict timelines, and complicated financing systems are the largest complaints from CSOs. Local CSOs are aware that certain development within these capacities must be attained so that they can continue benefiting from IFAs while donors fully realized those common complaints and have tried to address them by all possible means. The development of operational and managerial capacity takes time and proper methodology to be internalized into local CSOs whose staff, equipment, and knowledge are ready for a formal project management system. The specific project timeframe has shortened the time to learn and practice especially when the relationships of IFAs and CSOs do not continue after a project's completion. CSOs whose operational and managerial capacity is strengthened will be more likely to access foreign funding and continue their activities. These CSOs are equipped with competent human resources and suitable organizational structure for dealing with a foreign framework. Other small CSOs who face a limited institutional capacity are struggling to develop their activities. The efforts by IFAs to strengthen such capacities have not yet attained significant outcomes because their efforts are mostly ad hoc activities in response to the compliance of IFAs. They are rarely internalized into the local organizations' structure. On the contrary, efforts to empower and strengthen institutional capacity were obstructed by a lack of trust and former relationships between in-country public and donors.

By all means, the requirement to meet a standard managerial and operational capacity may have professionalized peace constituencies, and enhanced more possibility to access foreign funds. Reich (2006) argued on the contrary that a well-established operating system may fulfill the needs of outsiders more adequately than supporting inside development needs. In a society, existing social institutions such as grassroots organizations and small active groups who deliver effective peace work might

function less formally. This informality derives a perception of a lack of managerial and operational capacity among local CSOs, despite the fact that they are the most competent operator of peace building at the local level. In fact, activities of conflict transformation associated with changes in perceptions, interpretations and social norms, are highly culturally-sensitive. The objectives by IFAs mostly aims at building the capacity of peace constituencies in continuing to do their work effectively and strategically expecting that it will contribute towards peace building and reconciliation in the Far South. The association of capacity building activities in the program may improve skills, knowledge, and raise awareness for CSOs, but as the literature said, to measure the outcome of such effort is ambiguous. For example, while several IFAs' attempts in capacity development for media workers and journalists in the Far South have nurtured more new journalists, it takes some time to introduce them to basic media, reporting about the south, and to go into more depth around public policy. The Internews' project was ended before it could start in-depth training due to the project's short timeframe (Interview O, 1 August 2012). One of local media actors noted that *"Discontinued trainings and the unavailability of resources for local journalists to produce media outlets will make their interest in the media fade away"* (Nuannoi Thammasathien, 2012).

Some IFAs whose aim is to strengthen newly-emerged CSOs emphasize their role in institutional capacity building, meaning the ability to maximize the use of human and organizational capital. Human resources and organizational structure are important for CSOs' sustainability. It goes beyond the capacity of project management to the recruiting of potential leaders, trainings of committed staff, and strengthening the current organizational structure that is inefficient. Among IFAs mentioned in this research, USAID is very outstanding in its efforts to do technical capacity building for civil society, independent agencies, and media. The ultimate aim is to enhance organizational capacity in developing issue-based campaigns, monitoring human rights, etc. for CSOs. Initially, DAI conducted an assessment of the capacities of CSOs, and found that their capacities are less developed than anticipated. Therefore, DAI has introduced an empowerment training course called OPERACY<sup>37</sup> in order to

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<sup>37</sup> A leadership and empowerment training

help the Sapan Program identify more potential participants and enhance more willingness to absorb innovative technical capacity to be provided among CSOs' leaders (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012, pp. 15-16). OPERACY is the training of the trainers. It seeks potential leaders to empower stakeholders in their network to fully understand their own perception and expectations. This self-awareness and leadership training will be a basic foundation of organizational capacity followed by further management and operational training (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012, pp. 15-16). Luuk Rieng Group and the Women and Peace Association are among those of potential leaders who have become trainers (Interview AB, 14 February 2013).

Although this research has witnessed that long-standing CSOs are able to persist because they have holdovers in the organization, it is not sustainable unless CSOs prepare young generations from the locale to inherit the work so that the web of relationships for peace which former leaders have been weaving will also not disappear. Luuk Rieng's senior coordinator likes the OPERACY very much and plans to conduct the training to her networks in order to empower potential leaders while strengthening its organization with financial assistance from USAID (Interview AA, 27 September 2012). Currently she was invited to a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to the training in Penang, Malaysia. The DAI's program manager noted that "*Now, she has expertise*" (Interview AB, 14 February 2013). However, despite its half way, the Sapan program has achieved nowhere close to the targeted number of people attending joint oversight awareness-raising campaigns (Office of Inspector General USAID, 2012, pp. 4-6). A five-year program may be not sufficient for such an ambitious effort, especially where trust is central to the decision to participate.

Apart from USAID, other INGOs also support human resource development in the Far South but their effort is rather small. Every year, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) funds scholarships for MacMuslim members to hold an internship in Bangkok while The Asia Foundation have granted scholarships for MacMuslim's young volunteers to study law at PSU and later work for the organization. Having an informal discussion with one student whom is currently awarded a scholarship, she

has a strong commitment to work for her own community and the Far South in the future<sup>38</sup>. Apart from the IFAs' effort, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand is organizing 200 public forums in the Far South provinces, and the chairperson of the Council noted that "*One of the expected results is the observation and recruitment for potential leaders from each community*" (Interview R, 30 June 2012). Managerial and operational capacity may be influential to the access to funding; meanwhile, strengthening institutional capacity can help CSOs to be sustained in the long run.

Interestingly, the institutional capacity for conflict sensitivity has not been emphasized by IFAs. Barnes (2005) argued that one of the challenges that limits the impact of CSOs' initiatives on peace and conflict dynamics is the ability to apply the 'do no harm' principle in their initiatives. With current available resources, CSOs have expanded their initiatives beyond their capacities and they may not be able to sustain initiatives that have been started. It is more likely to create tension and divide when their projects failed to respond to the expectation it had stimulated. However, according to field observation, it appears vice versa. Local CSOs highly hold conflict sensitivity in their initiatives. Most of them are fully aware of and prepared for the struggle they might face after the funding is finished.

In sum, concerns over Local Ownership, Conflict Sensitivity, and Sustainability were discussed holistically during the focus group discussion. It revealed interdependency among them, and reflects the fact that CSOs and IFAs may have to sacrifice one in order to achieve the other. However, peace constituencies facing certain constraints justify their choices differently.

An ultimate conclusion on the local ownership in Far South peace initiatives has not been obtained; however, it is agreed that sole local ownership will not necessarily lead to a preferable result. On the one hand, a framework that highly emphasizes local ownership is complementary to the conflict sensitivity of CSOs because of its broader scope and high flexibility in proposed projects. Due to the fact that some orientation

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<sup>38</sup> Informal discussion with a student during an activity under EU-funded project, Capacity building for paralegal initiative "SPAN" on 17 June 2012 at Narathiwat province

activities may be required to pave the basis prior to actual actions, a loosely monitoring and relaxing circumstance is preferred for some activities. The EU Delegation's Call for Proposals is outstanding in this local-ownership characteristic. Flexibility and modification due to the changing context are crucial in conflicting region like Far South; nonetheless, all participants accepted that this approach may not be sustained in a way that it does not go beyond the attainment of projects' outcomes. The establishment of committed organization and partnership is not promoted. It depends very much on the commitment of connectors between the EU Delegation and local CSOs, such as Save the Children, Oxfam GB, and Internews. Although local ownership and conflict sensitivity are very complementary to the development of peace constituencies' activities, strengthening capacities of CSOs in the long run is an inevitable indication of their sustainability. Close consultation from the beginning, during, and towards the end of projects is adopted by UNDP, USAID, and other INGOs. Similarly, this latter approach is doubted in its direction and attainment.

### **Overcoming Contextual Constraints**

In the conflict region where the government is influential and decisive in what can and cannot be done through its legislative power, an acceptance from the government is necessary for CSOs to maintain their organizations and activities and advocate their issues to the policy level. As explained in Chapter IV, since 2004 civil society has been suppressed by the enforcement of special laws and a lack of trust between state officials and small CSOs, the activities of civil society was frequently suspended and obstructed. Meanwhile, some CSOs working with grass-roots only and often disregarding a connection with the government may not have a standing space in the negotiating field and even an ability to make significant changes. Hence, building trust with the government in order to constitute their legitimacy and enhance their visibility in the Far South is inevitably important to their development.

The contributions made on the legitimacy and credibility of peace constituencies in the Far South appear in two ways; 1) through IFAs' involvement and state sensitivity

and 2) through frameworks that enhance capacity to be recognized at local and national levels.

First, the involvement of the international community in peace building in the Far South has contributed indirectly to the recognition of some advocacy CSOs and that recognition has brought about an inevitable acceptance of such CSOs by the authorities. For example, several visits by delegations of foreign embassies and international funding agencies enhanced MacMuslim's recognition at the national and international level. The Secretary-General of MacMuslim noted that "*When the EU Delegation paid a visit to us, we became more recognized.*" (Interview U, 16 June 2012). After all, international recognition of local CSOs may not contribute directly to the peace building process, but these international civil societies have performed the role of a monitoring party during the process. Two prominent CSO leaders noted the same thing that "*Thai governments are very sensitive to the involvement of those foreign personnel especially when they deal with advocacy CSOs like us (Civic Women & MacMuslim). If we can utilize this state sensitivity towards international community, we can twist and use it as our protection mechanism.*" (Interview U, 16 June 2012; Interview V, 2 July 2012). However, international recognition may not always guarantee an accommodating circumstance for peace constituencies to work smoothly at the local level. This has been witnessed from occasional disruptions by state officials in activities of advocacy CSOs in the area. Therefore, trust in peace constituencies has not really been built and the stronghold of national sovereignty has still largely prevented any active intervention by the international community in the Far South.

Second, some international funding agencies aim to constitute the credibility of CSOs through their assistance. For example, assistance for an official establishment and professionalization of newly-emerged CSOs promoted by USAID has brought small CSOs into the government's perspective because their official visibility allows a process of monitoring from the Thai government and their professionalism enhances transparency and governance of their organizations (Interview AA, 27 September 2012; Interview B, 18 June 2012). Moreover, recognition of these CSOs was also enhanced when they were directly supported to be visible at the national and



international level. However, like the first contribution, this establishment and recognition does not guarantee trust. Partnership with the international community can only be an umbrella protecting any harm made to the reputation of these CSOs as the increasing legitimacy and credibility of some CSOs is mainly a result of continual interaction between authorities and civil society for a mutual commitment and benefit.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS**

The study of partnership between international funding agencies and civil society organizations in the peace building process in the southern border provinces of Thailand has three objectives which are 1) to describe the objectives and instruments of IFAs engaging with CSOs in the Far South; 2) to analyze the frameworks and practices for cooperation between IFAs and CSOs for peace building initiatives, and; 3) to assess the contribution of IFAs and CSOs partnership to the development of peace constituencies in the Far South.

This research used a qualitative methodology by employing three data collection methods. They included secondary data, semi-structure interviews of key-informants, and focus group discussion. Key-informants included representatives of civil society organizations in Bangkok and the Far South, representatives from international funding agencies and international non-government organizations that were active in the Far South during the time of research. This research has employed the theoretical concepts of third party intervention, peace building, and conflict transformation for its analysis. It is important to note that the analytical framework of this research is based on cooperation frameworks of IFAs and CSOs; hence the impact assessment of peace building initiatives is not particularly argued.

The research initially argued a hypothesis which stated that cooperation frameworks and practices which encourage the strategic cooperation and networking between local peace actors at the vertical and horizontal levels will contribute the largest to the development of peace constituencies. The strengthened network can constitute a meaningful political space for grass root and middle-range leadership in multi-track peace building. Such frameworks and practices associate with empowerment and capacity development activities for a durable practice of peace from within.

## Summary of Research Findings

### 1. IFAs' Objectives and Instruments to Engage with CSOs

In order to identify the objectives and instruments of IFAs, this research collects the data from IFAs such as their philosophy, conflict analysis of the Far South, selection process, and management framework. This data explains how partners are identified, what activities are carried out and who are supported according to such objectives and instruments. This research finds that international funding agencies that have a common goal to promote peace in the Far South through their intervention place their contribution on a different basis. The EU Delegation, Save the Children, and Oxfam GB emphasize *development* as a means to peace and reconciliation because its end is capacity building and empowerment of the people. This is different from USAID, The Asia Foundation, and Internews Europe Association who promote the philosophy of *democracy* which places an emphasis on the participation of the public in policy-making and the monitoring process. Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV and Sasakawa Peace Foundation are distinct from others as the former promotes the *rule of law and justice* while the latter promotes *exchange and cooperation* at local, national, and international level. The thematic emphasis of development, democracy, and rule of law and justice reflects the entire intention to address socioeconomic and political aspects of the violent conflict which contribute towards the stability of the country and security of persons in the region. One may argue that development is not the root cause of this Far South conflict, but it is irrefutable that livelihoods and development problems need assistance. Interestingly, addressing the cultural aspects of the conflict is not apparent in the frameworks of the studied IFAs, but rather it appeared in the implementation of local actors. However their objectives are framed, it appears that all studied IFAs and INGOs expect a strengthened capacity and empowerment of the people as an outcome.

The instruments used to engage with CSOs ranged from a highly top-down framework to a fairly participatory one. In partnerships where IFAs engaged with CSOs through a top-down framework, there often appears an intermediary between IFAs and local beneficiaries. Such an intermediary plays a crucial role in generating

communication between the two which is quite challenging because it has to communicate and negotiate between two different languages; both the language of insiders and outsiders. Initially, USAID under particular mandates and procedures has selected an intermediary for its potential beneficiaries whereas the EU Delegation provides a circumstance that its beneficiaries can voluntarily select their own intermediary whom can be either domestic organizations or international non-governmental organizations. On the contrary, INGOs as either an intermediary or an independent party connect directly with CSOs through different degrees of participation. Technical assistance and consultative sessions are their tools. In sum, there are four related objectives of IFAs towards peace building in the Far South. They are outlined as follows:

1. A suitable environment for the development of peace constituencies at their own level
2. Intensive assistance to strengthen local peace constituencies in going beyond their own level
3. Connecting peace constituencies to the regional level for the development of peace constituencies in the Far South
4. Building linkages between government-related organizations and peace constituencies

## **2. Analysis of Frameworks and Practices for Cooperation**

To analyze the frameworks and practices for cooperation in a conflict situation, conflict sensitivity is cautiously considered. This research finds that the implementation of most programs/projects through local partners enhances more context sensitivity. The incompatible capacity of international and local actors was addressed by either including intermediaries or intensive capacity development activities in IFAs' program. Interestingly, this research finds that selection criteria and process is very critical to do no harm beyond the project/program level because there is tension that exacerbates between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of IFAs during the selection process. When the preparation phase includes everyone but some are eventually excluded from the selection due to non-clarified criteria, the

concentration of financial assistance increases tensions among constituencies as a result of a competitive environment to access funding. More importantly, the inclusiveness of different religious groups has not been significantly fostered and stressed in the selection criteria of several IFAs. Therefore, partnership of IFAs and CSOs does not really give importance for the resolution of horizontal conflict which entails cooperation framework with a lack of cultural sensitivity.

### **3. Contribution of IFAs and CSOs Partnership to the Development of Peace Constituencies**

#### **1. Direction and Pace of the Peace Building Process (Agendas, Approaches, and Activities);**

The research finds that IFAs' intervention agendas seem to be coherent and complementary to peace constituencies' agenda. Both sides of the relationship have applied a 'complementary approach to peace building.' CSOs conducted activities that contributed to the peace building process from both a bottom-up and middle out approach while IFAs strengthen CSOs at the middle leadership level as well as provide opportunities for them to empower more leadership from the grassroots level. CSOs connected more at their own level, yet were unable to connect their sub-networks with others. The contribution of partnerships varied among each group because they emerged and developed at different phases.

##### **a. Community Development and Natural Resources Management**

The partnership contributed in maintaining the activities and expanding areas of action as well as mainstreaming conflict prevention into a development program. The expansion of the participation of grassroots people, especially marginalized groups in the local development process is a preparation for conflict transformation. It empowers vulnerable people from the grassroots level to participate in a process of change, either a personal or structural one.

##### **b. Human Rights & Relief**

The protection and monitoring functions of human rights defenders were internalized into the grass-root population as they became active citizens embedded in

communities. Therefore, the partnership with IFAs mostly provides opportunities to expand and strengthen the members of its network.

#### c. Women & Youth

In the early period, women and youth groups relied on domestic fundraising. When women's role in peace building was recognized and accepted, they were then able to access funding from IFAs, mostly as seed grants or through the participation of foreign-funded projects. With their advocacy work through media, radio, website, publication, forums, and workshops, these women groups were widely recognized in the public sphere. Moreover, the development of media groups has also contributed to women in the Far South by enhancing their recognition at a wider scale.

#### d. Public Communication & Media

IFAs' initial efforts were to train news reporting regarding conflict and emergency situation for Bangkok-based commercial media. However, this strategy did not respond to the actual needs in a way that local voices have not been expressed through this effort. IFAs then shifted to focus more on local capacities for public communication and media. CSOs for public communication and media mainly obtained technical skills and used financial resources from IFAs to start up their operation. Later, the process of media development in the Far South, particularly technical skills, had transferred from international standard trainings by IFAs to local trainings by local trainers. The contribution of cooperation between these media groups and IFAs is still very small compared to the impact they are able to make because of social constraints. Local and national media efforts are faced with highly-influential mainstream media in Bangkok and limited mechanisms in making stories from the Far South more attractive.

#### e. Networking

Since 2004, civil society gathered into groups in order to respond to the consequences of violent conflict. There was an expansion of networks at the local level as a result of the decentralization process which gradually took place at the organizational level of CSOs in track II in order to foster the networking environment at the local level.

Since these networks were emerging solely in response to local needs, the contribution of cooperation made to them is therefore to maintain the local initiatives and provide opportunities for the expansion of sub-networks. Apart from networking for a certain cause, CSOs in the Far South also had opportunities to do a cross association under foreign-funded projects. This research finds that most networks in the Far South are currently the active type. The networks rooted in the Far South developed from being interest groups responding to violent consequences in order to protect and rehabilitate affected people in their own groups. Later, their role changed to a more active role through advocacy and campaigning. In 2011, the most sophisticated network of CSOs in the Far South was established to perform as a local connector of several CSOs in the Far South. At the same time, some IFAs acted as an international connector to bridge constituencies from various levels.

## 2. Development of Peace Constituencies

IFAs applied a mixture of frameworks in their intervention which differentiated the partnership and its contribution to the development of peace constituencies. It appears that various partnerships have complementarily contributed to peace constituencies if seen as a whole. There are three cooperation frameworks which give a complementary result as follows:

1. Frameworks of cooperation associate with an environment to conduct development-oriented actions that have contributed in the process to strengthen local communities to become visible in the public sphere which recruited more constituencies for peace from grass-root level for a preparation of conflict transformation. (No obvious connector).
2. Frameworks of cooperation that associate with not only an environment for action but also a promotion for dialogue with a wide range of actors are also complementary in promoting the recognition of peace constituencies and their activities. This emphasizes on action of facilitation of dialogues is among constituencies using media. (Key local actors as a connector).
3. Frameworks of cooperation with a simultaneous promotion of dialogues and action for a wide range of actors at various levels enhanced potentials for a

mutual commitment of peace constituencies at the local level and strategic alliance at the national level. (International funding agencies as a connector).

This research takes the first framework as a conventional one because the cooperation is not intended to bring about the connectors and may not be crucial for the context of peace building while the second and the third frameworks entail more connections among actors from different levels because the development of peace constituencies is equivalent to the development of ‘networks’ at various levels and is less crucial in other contexts.

Regarding the contextual influences such as national securities, partnership with international community can only be an umbrella protecting any harm made to the reputation of these CSOs as it increases recognition in the public. However, trust in some CSOs is mainly a result of continual interaction between authorities and civil society for a mutual commitment and benefit. Therefore, the partnership contributed indirectly to legitimacy and credibility of peace constituencies in the Far South.

### 3. Quality of Peace Constituencies

Discussion on the quality of peace constituencies is stimulated on the current situation of peace constituencies and their activities that are influenced by partnership with various international funding agencies.

First, IFAs’ funding schemes reflects the ownership of peace initiatives in the Far South. With regard to the EU Delegation’s CfPs, peace projects were initiated by local CSOs. It ensured high local ownership of approach and activities because the EU Delegation does not associate with any intervention in such initiatives. Programs/projects from the partnership with USAID, issue-based and other INGOs were mutually developed, and involvement of IFAs is quite intensive. However, local partners are the prime implementing partner in the area. Moreover, the transformation-oriented approach enhances the spirit of ownership of peace practices in the Far South among citizens in Track 3.

Second, sustainability of peace initiatives in the Far South enhances when peace constituencies are able to adopt a transformation-oriented approach. The



empowerment of the grassroots population in joining the process is beneficial in building civic leaders and relying more on local human resources, and less on outside resources. Apart from these resources, capacity development activities were adopted to strengthen local capacities. However, most of them served the requirement of foreign donors in addressing incompatibilities in managerial and operational capacities for formal project management.

## **Discussion**

Haugerudbraaten (1998) sorted out that there is likely to be a certain tension between the conceptualizations of peace building by the international community and indigenous actors. This research shows that IFAs and CSOs have quite common projections of the peace building process in the Far South which regards locally based citizens and organizations as main peace builders. IFAs and CSOs conceptualize peace building as an aggregate process which involves a modification of social structures through a number of broader developments. It witnessed from ongoing and comprehensive intervention by several IFAs, such as the EU Delegation, USAID, and The Asia Foundation through its local partners. Their outcome depends on the combined effect of a number of actions occurring at different levels. In the Far South, it appears that policy level third party intervention is quite compatible to peace constituencies. In practice, the incompatibility emerges rather from the underlying organizational limitations. For example, a strict project management framework of IFAs prevents the outreach of their support to a number of actions by the community rooted organizations whose capacity is not compatible with foreign donors. The lack of funding from back donors disables some IFAs to simultaneously grant large and comprehensive programs at different levels. The suspicion on the political agenda of IFAs affects the trust-building process among potential beneficiaries. Issue-based INGOs limit their partnership with particular actors for some actions of interest occurring separately.

Nonetheless, their different frameworks and limitations for practice were as a whole complementary to such an aggregate process. The EU Delegation provides an enabling environment to large organizations whose capacity is strengthened. Some

locally-grown organizations access the partnership with an assistance of competent international intermediaries. At the same time, small organizations whose reputation and performance are not yet visible are able to access a partnership with USAID. Meanwhile, the least competent organizations and informal institutions are able to access partnerships with the most flexible and committed agencies like The Asia Foundation and other INGOs. It can be seen that local actors with various levels of capacity are in partnership with IFAs whose frameworks are designed to serve their need. Undoubtedly, there will still be a number of organizations/working groups who do not associate with IFAs directly but benefit from the outcome of current efforts; traditional socialization institutions such as schools, mosques, religious schools, communities, and etc.

Reich (2006) argues that the foreign-funded programs which imply 'local ownership' as an objective are not usually in practice 'locally perceived and led by local actors,' but rather a program with a participatory process to persuade local stakeholders to absorb and agree on the ideology and practice from outsiders. The research finds that local ownership of foreign funded programs was embraced through their funding mechanisms. The interpretation of local ownership is varied among actors from different standpoints, interest, and limitation. As explained before, peace constituencies are the main peace builders who determined their own peace building agendas due to influences from political settings and local context. In fact, sensitive agendas were sometimes stimulated from constituencies in Bangkok and received by local capacities. The determination of a peace building agenda was then well received by international funding agencies who are rarely front line players. However, activities and functions of local actors are sometimes influenced by international funding agencies' perception and expectation on the impact of their intervention on peace and conflict in the Far South.

Kazuo (2000, pp. 36-37) suggested the establishment of a cooperative international system in order to limit the expansion of conflict in the respective country. This research finds that IFAs have coordinated among them with regard to addressing the problem of fragmentation in the Far South. No matter what approaches IFAs take or what activities they support, every intervention will point towards a contribution to

building peace. However, what happens on the ground is CSOs conduct complementary actions to expand peace constituencies, but not so much the mechanism to connect them. The connection of peace constituencies depends on the characteristic of connectors.

For example, human rights defenders developed to an extent a way in which they are able to connect their sub-networks together relying on area-based expansion of a common issue. Constituencies can connect easily in their area. On the contrary, issue-based expansion like women groups and media groups recruited constituencies from the same attribute which may limit the connection to a directly affected population.

Likewise, by weaving the web on a number of partnerships, IFAs have the potential to become a connector of peace constituencies through their framework for cooperation, yet it depends on their characteristics. Those who partner with a wide range of local actors to conduct activities in the area have the potential to connect their beneficiaries and increase a synergy of actions while those who partner with a few key actors have less potential to do so. The latter relies on a strategic alliance on the ground which does not yet develop to have a capacity to do so.

Although this research does not attempt to assess the contribution of partnership on the peace building process, it may not entail further discussion or research if the whole picture is not mentioned. With reference to Adam Burke's assessment of international funding agencies, his research concluded that the impact of foreign aid in addressing periphery conflict like the Far South is rather small. Their efforts were obstructed by the rigid restrictions of the government of the host country and the incompatible local capacities. Supposing that this research put civil society as the central actor in building peace in the Far South, it is obvious that civil society is the most legitimate actor as they are affected directly by the physical, cultural, and structural violence imposed by the government, military, and insurgency movement. It may be concluded that the partnership of IFAs and CSOs has contributed to bring the oppressed voices of people in conflict society onto the public agenda, however, the transformation-oriented efforts of civil society might not be taken up to an

effective resolution of conflict if inclusiveness and the political will of conflicting parties are not expressed and committed. If one recalls the Pyramid of Actors and Activities, addressing a conflict successfully will ultimately depend on not only legitimacy but also power for negotiation between top, middle and grass-root leadership.

## **Recommendations**

### 1. Recommendation for further research

This research assesses the contribution based on the selection of IFAs and CSOs. It finds that partnerships of IFAs and CSOs are not linear, but rather a complicated web of relationships with more than two actors at a time. It is also dynamic. Therefore, in-depth research on a case study of a particular local group will give a complete picture of cooperation and consequently its contribution. It may stimulate a discussion of what combination of partnership can be complementary to each other.

### 2. Recommendation of frameworks and practices

According to the focus group discussion, it is agreed that partnerships of CSOs and IFAs have more potential to contribute to the development of peace constituencies in the Far South.

- There was a call for international donors to coordinate among themselves and CSOs. To develop peace constituencies, sources of funding must build their own network, produce a common strategy, and effectively communicate it to CSOs. Current coordination among international donors requires CSOs in the Far South to be able to explain how their activities contribute to peace; however, a mechanism for CSOs to communicate, monitor and negotiate over such a strategy is not yet in place. There should be connectors between peace constituencies and the network of international donors. IFAs shall not only focus on the sustainability of a program, but also encourage and support for the sustainability of organizations and networks.

- While peace constituencies are nurturing with support from outsiders, CSOs should call for a public space for them and the grass-roots population to frame their understanding of what they are facing and how their activities will contribute to the broader peace. Political ideology is constructed through an exchange and activities within and outside the network. In the Far South, activities and working styles of civil society are a product of incidents constructed through the learning process. The establishment of a network is influenced by the domestic common need to produce a concerted agenda, not all by a pressure from foreign donors. However, in order for the network to live on, sufficient and continuing resources from foreign donors are instrumental.
- An ideal constituency must be able to develop their own working system and organizational structure and expand their targeted members in both track 2 and 3 by inheriting local ownership to communities using their capacities.

This research suggests that partnerships of IFAs and CSOs could be improved by evolving frameworks and continuing dialogues among stakeholders in partnership. Stakeholders cannot make a profound partnership unless allowing time for exchanging and dialogue.

## APPENDICE

### APPENDIX A IFAs' Objectives and Scope of Intervention


IFAs	Organization's Overarching Objective	Current project/program	Scope	Period
<b>Intergovernmental Funding Agencies</b>				
European Union	Facilitate local non-state actor and local authority involvement to contribute to poverty alleviation within the context of enhancing efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in the South of Thailand	Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development	Development at local level	Annual-based
USAID	Support civil peace-building efforts and diminish the potential for radicalization and escalation of violent conflict in southern Thailand	Supporting Citizen Engagement and Peace Building in Thailand	Peace building at local and national levels	3-5 years
<b>Issue-based International Non-governmental Organizations</b>				
Oxfam Great Britain	Improve socio-economic opportunities for poor women affected by the conflict, and promoting woman's roles in peace building and improve sustainable natural resources management by communities, particularly in agriculture and fishery and help the communities prepare for	Enhanced Food and Livelihoods Security for Vulnerable Men and Women in the South of Thailand	Development at local level and peace building at local level	Individual project



<b>IFAs</b>	<b>Organization's Overarching Objective</b>	<b>Current project/program</b>	<b>Scope</b>	<b>Period</b>
	and minimize the impact of natural disasters			
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Promote rule of law to foster peace and freedom by encouraging a continuous dialog at the national and international levels to develop networks in the political and economic spheres	Improvement of Access to Justice for Civilians in the Far South Provinces in Thailand	Rule of law at local and national levels	Individual project
Internews Europe Association	Build long term capacity of local media and other players in the information ecosystem including the quality of the coverage of the south nationally with national media outlet and the quality of reporting from local civil society media to develop resilient and reliable communication flows for the benefit of the wider population	Capacity Building for Dialogue and Development in Southern Thailand	Information dissemination at local and national levels	Individual project
Save the Children	Prevent the cycle of violence and reducing poverty levels by promoting peace and meaningful participation of children in community-based development, contributing to a fuller realization of child's rights and greater respect of diversity in Thailand	Kampong Suenae: Building Happy Communities for Children	Development at local level	Individual project

IFAs	Organization's Overarching Objective	Current project/program	Scope	Period
<b>Other International Non-governmental Organizations</b>				
The Asia Foundation	Promote peaceful conflict resolution, encourages citizen engagement in the political process, and supports innovative programs that will build more responsive and transparent systems of governance	Promoting peaceful conflict resolution, encouraging citizen engagement in the political process, and supporting innovative programs	Peace building at local and national levels	Individual project
Sasakawa Peace Foundation	Promote a healthy relationship by networking CSOs in the Far South with national and international constituencies in order to constitute an objective view towards the problems as well as enhance relationship with Malay world	Far South Peace Media Network Development Project	Peace building at local, national, and regional levels	Individual project




## APPENDIX B CSOs' Objectives and Activities


CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
<b>1. Academic</b>				
<p>Deep South Coordination Center (DSCC) &amp; Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation (DSRR)</p> 	Far South	To help in inclusive and coherent relief for violent-affected people in order for them to access to the support as soon as possible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Produce updated and accurate data base, progress report as to follow up the relief support.</li> <li>- Promote academic collaboration within and outside universities as well as government and independent agencies by organizing annual conference, providing high quality research, and manage knowledge for long term prevention and solution</li> <li>- Act as space for brainstorming and idea-exchanging by providing management system to access to targeted population with constant monitoring and follow-up</li> <li>- Encourage people from local communities to participate in problem-</li> </ul>	2006

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
			solving and build a strong network <sup>39</sup>	
<b>2. Community Development and Natural Resource Management</b>				
Local Development Institute (LDI) 	Bangkok-based	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To strengthen the capacity of communities and civil society organizations in the Deep South to propose and implement their own provincial development plan<sup>40</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Block grants through Community-Driven Development</li> <li>- Peace-building Partnership Fund</li> <li>- Training and implementation support</li> <li>- Monitoring, evaluation, and knowledge management</li> </ul>	1984
Wetland Research Project (PSU, Pattani) 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To increase participation of communities in natural resources management</li> <li>- To develop the quality of life of population in the Far South, especially traditional fishery groups around Pattani Basin</li> <li>- To enhance self-sufficiency among them</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Workshop for community's better understanding of public policy, sustainable agriculture, and natural resource management, and occupational training</li> <li>- Field operational activities</li> <li>- Conservation and restoration of mangrove forest, wetland, animal species, etc.</li> </ul>	1991

<sup>39</sup> More about DSRR at <http://www.dsrrfoundation.org/download/bookheart6.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> More about LDI at [http://www.ldinet.org/2008/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=blogcategory&id=13&Itemid=33](http://www.ldinet.org/2008/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=13&Itemid=33)



CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conservation of local wisdom and culture</li> <li>- Advocate on provincial policy and planning</li> </ul>	
<b>3. Human Rights and Relief</b>				
<p>Muslim Attorney Center Foundation (MacMuslim) &amp; Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN)</p> 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To disseminate knowledge and information on human rights and basic laws,</li> <li>- To assist people and organizations suffering from injustices and human rights abuses,</li> <li>- To collaborate with attorneys and human rights lawyers to provide greater understanding that is useful to individuals, communities, and the country, and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Providing free lawyer service for indigent defendant affected by human rights violation and strategic litigation</li> <li>- Training for paralegal, assistant lawyers, and human rights lawyers</li> <li>- Establishing Muslim Attorney Centers in three provinces</li> <li>- Producing legal manual and publishing regulations related to special laws enacted in the southern provinces since 2008 and reports of problems and</li> </ul>	2003

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To associate with national and international human rights organizations<sup>41</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>recommendations to justice court and government: Case of justice procedures in the Deep South</li> <li>- Expanding the volunteer network to cover every southern border provinces</li> <li>- Developing the body of knowledge on human rights</li> <li>- Networking with human rights organizations worldwide and advocating for national public policy changes<sup>42</sup></li> </ul>	
Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) 	Bangkok-based	To promote understanding across different cultures, and work for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy	Capacity Building, Legal Assistance and Strategic Litigation, Trial Observation, Fact Finding <sup>43</sup>	2005
Hearty Support	Far South	To promote access to justice, rehabilitation,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To raise fund for needed families of</li> </ul>	2007


<sup>41</sup> More about MacMuslim and SPAN at [[http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_29557-1522-1-30.pdf?111130044435](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29557-1522-1-30.pdf?111130044435)]


<sup>42</sup> More about MacMuslim's activities at [[http://th.macmuslim.com/?page\\_id=2](http://th.macmuslim.com/?page_id=2)]


<sup>43</sup> CrCF Brochure available at [[http://voicefromthais.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/yada\\_crcef\\_brochure\\_pdf.pdf](http://voicefromthais.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/yada_crcef_brochure_pdf.pdf)]

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
Group 		peace building	detainees, such as scholarship, occupational investment, and support to the elderly. - To build public awareness of the situation of detainees families <sup>44</sup>	
<b>4. Women &amp; Youth</b>				
Fasai Center 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To encourage children and youths to act on activities to develop themselves and society</li> <li>- Support children and youths to work as a team to create activities based on certain issues</li> <li>- To build a network of children and youths for exchange and learning</li> <li>- To coordinate between government and non-government sectors at local and national levels</li> <li>- To disseminate information about child</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Textbook written by children</li> <li>- School of life of homeless children</li> <li>- Tadeka relations</li> <li>- Kiew Koi Fund fundraised and managed by children,</li> <li>- Youth camp,</li> <li>- Public forum, etc.</li> </ul>	1996

<sup>44</sup>More about Hearty Support Group (Duayjai) at <http://duayjaisupport.wordpress.com/>

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		<p>and youth development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To facilitate advocacy and movement at policy level</li> </ul>		
<p>Youth Leader Network of Southern Border Provinces</p> <div data-bbox="90 759 279 895" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: fit-content;"> <p>Young Khidmat</p> </div>	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To build capacity of youth network to be able to work with government, work in team, write project proposal</li> <li>- To give advice to other youth networks and support them in doing activities/development</li> <li>- To help the poor children or orphans by coordinating with the government</li> <li>- To prevent and solve the problems of vulnerable youth groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Business</li> <li>- Helping orphans, providing scholarship and shelter</li> <li>- Capacity building for youth leaders</li> </ul>	2002
<p>Civic Women</p> <div data-bbox="48 1118 323 1201" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; width: fit-content;">  </div>	Far South	To improve cross community understanding and confidence building across southern communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Intensive leadership training</li> <li>- Promote women to participate in policy reformation committee of government</li> <li>- Conduct research and strengthen women network in the Far South</li> <li>- Advocacy work through media, radio,</li> </ul>	2004




CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
<p>Lookieang (The Association of Children and Youth for the Peace in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand)</p> 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To develop youth and children affected by the violence to be able to receive psychological relief as well as encourage leadership among them</li> <li>- To be a temporary and semi-permanent shelter for them</li> <li>- To organize any activities in order to advocate against violence on children and youth together with capacity development for new young leaders and drivers of change</li> <li>- To provide space for dialogues and participation of youth in the activities in the area and the whole society</li> <li>- To be a coordination center of fundraising for scholarships and daily expenditures for youth and children in</li> </ul>	<p>website, publication, forums, and workshops</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promote governance and public participation</li> <li>- Relief shelter for children</li> <li>- Anti-violence school</li> <li>- Promotion of reading</li> </ul>	2002


CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		the Deep South <sup>45</sup>		
<b>5. Public Communication &amp; Media</b>				
Deep South Watch (DSW) 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To organize and manage the database systems for monitoring and analyzing the Southern violence and its consequences,</li> <li>- To bring about a valid understanding and awareness about violence and conflicts in this sub-region, and</li> <li>- To formulate public sphere for participation from various social sectors, sharing the processes of conflict resolutions<sup>46</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Monitoring and advocating public policies</li> <li>- Peace building Support</li> <li>- Database Systems and Data Analyses</li> </ul>	2006
Bungaraya News/ Bungaraya book	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To deliver Deep South news which bases on facts and fair to everyone and be an alternative channel for general public to follow the news</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- News website</li> <li>- Produce Thai-English-Malayu books</li> <li>- Library</li> <li>- Public seminar</li> </ul>	2007

<sup>45</sup> More about Lookrieang at <http://www.lookrieang.com/main/about.php>

<sup>46</sup> More about Deep South Watch at [<http://deepsouthwatch.org/english/about#.UIpqCyjRYwo.email>]




CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To perform as a training space for students interested in public communication, technology, politics, writing, and be a place for exchange and dialogue</li> <li>- To become a social entrepreneur supporting local culture and language in schools</li> </ul>		
<p>Aman News Agency</p> 	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To provide in-depth news and reports on Deep South issues</li> <li>- To be an alternative to the mainstream media</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- News Agency, special reports in Thai, English, Bahasa, and Arabic languages</li> <li>- Journalist training</li> <li>- Public forum</li> </ul>	2007
<p>Patani Forum</p> 	Far South with some Bangkok-based members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To produce the common body of knowledge and collaboration in research and development with educational institutions, government, and non-government at the local, national, and international levels in order to enhance better understanding and acceptance of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Publication, analyses, and articles</li> <li>- Public forum (Patani Café) with mosques, coffee café, educational institutions, and communities both in and off the Far South</li> <li>- Public lectures by Patani forum's personnel</li> </ul>	2011

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		history, cultural diversity leading to reconciliation in Thai society <sup>47</sup>		
FT Media & Friends (Fine Tune Production and Friends) 	Far South with some Bangkok- based members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To produce comprehensive, creative, and enjoyable media outlets that provide useful information for the society and to tell stories besides daily news and analyses in order to enhance a better understanding of recent significant issues of affected communities regarding social, political, cultural, environmental issues in the Deep South<sup>48</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Multi-media production</li> <li>- Skills training</li> </ul>	2012
<b>6. Network</b>				
Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand	Far South	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To act on coordinating and facilitating the work between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Meeting</li> <li>- Public forum</li> <li>- Group discussion</li> <li>- Public communication</li> </ul>	2011

<sup>47</sup> More about Patani Forum at [<http://www.pataniforum.com/aboutus.php>]

<sup>48</sup> More about Fine Tune Production at <http://prachatai.com/journal/2012/03/39620>

CSOs	Origin	Objectives	Main Activities	Since
		<p>the Deep South in order to advocate on the following strategic actions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To expand democracy</li> <li>- To maintain justice</li> <li>- To develop quality of life for Deep South population and</li> <li>- To support and promote local identity, religion, and culture to every community</li> </ul>		

**APPENDIX C Direct Beneficiaries of EU grants for projects in the Far South awarded during 2009-2012**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Action location</b>	<b>Total grant in €</b>	<b>Duration</b>
Oxfam GB	“Enhanced food and livelihoods security for vulnerable men and women in the South of Thailand”	United Kingdom	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	470,258	36 months
Pattani Province Small-scale Fisher Network Association	“Empowering Small-Scale Fisher folk’s Network for Poverty Reduction in Southern Thailand”	Thailand	Pattani province, Thailand	142,207	36 months
Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand under Patronage of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother	“Family Planning, Reproductive Health, and Income Generation for Southern Thailand Border Provinces”	Thailand	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	414,000	36 months
Internews Europe Association	“Non-state Actors Capacity Building for Dialogue and Development”	France	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	338,315	18 months
Save Children Sweden	“Kampong Suenae: Building Happy Communities for Children”	Sweden	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	725,422	36 months
Suratthani Catholic Foundation	“Improvement of Access to Sustainable Livelihood Government Support Systems for Conflict Affected Sub Districts in the South of Thailand”	Thailand	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	476,955	36 months
AIDS ACCESS Foundation	“Improved Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment and Prevention Services in Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkla, and Yala Provinces”	Thailand	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkla	188,540	36 months

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Action location</b>	<b>Total grant in €</b>	<b>Duration</b>
Deep South Coordination Centre, Princess of Naradhiwas University	“Long Term Improving Quality of Life of People Affected from an Unrest Situation in Southernmost Thailand”	Thailand	Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat	590,898	36 months
Prince of Songkla University	“Capacity building at various levels for the relief of those affected by the violence in the Deep South”	Thailand	Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, Songkla -- Thailand	681,525	48 months
Raks Thai Foundation	“Development of Sustainable Community Extension Services for Women and Children Most Affected by the Unrest and Violence in the Deep South”	Thailand	Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat	650,000	48 months
Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung EV	“Improvement of Access to Justice for Civilians in the Deep South Provinces in Thailand”	Germany	Four Deep-south Provinces: Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkla, Thailand	612,157	24 months
ACTIONAID LBG	“Strengthening Civil Society Roles in Poverty Alleviation”	United Kingdom	Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani	412,492	36 months
<b>Total Grant Amount (EUR)</b>				<b>5,702,769</b>	

Source: Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Beneficiaries of grants and contracts [Retrieved on May 29, 2012] & (Delegation of the European Union to Thailand, 2009c)

## APPENDIX D Key Informants

Name	Position	Organization	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
Arunsiri Phothong & Luca Pierantoni	Program officers	the Delegation of the European Union to Thailand	10 August 2012	Bangkok
Ekkarin Tuansiri	Director	Patani Forum	18 June 2012	Pattani
Chris Felley	Program Manager - South	USAID Sapan Program DAI (Thailand) Ltd.	14 February 2013	Phone Interview
Lamai Managarn	Coordinator:	Wetland Research Project PSU	4 July 2012	Pattani
Li Saengsanthitam	Project Manager	Konrad Adeneur Stiftung	5 June 2012	Bangkok
Maho Sato Akiko Horiba	Program officer	Sasakawa Peace Foundation	27 May 2012	Bangkok
Mariam Chaisanthana	Director	Fasai Center	2 July 2012	Pattani
Metta Kuning, Ph.D	Director	Deep South Coordination Center	3 July 2012	Pattani
Muhamad Anwar Hajiteh	Coordinator	Bungaraya Group	22 June 2012	Pattani
Muhammad Ameen Dueraoh	Founder	Young Khidmat	29 June 2012	Pattani
Muhammad Ayub Pathan	Managing editor	Deep South Watch	4 July 2012	Pattani
Nuannoi Thammasathien	Coordinator	Fine Tune Production (FT Media & Friends)	22 June 2012	Pattani

<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>	<b>Place of Interview</b>
Nuchanad Janthawiseth	Project Manager	Local Development Institute	26 September 2012	Pattani
Oren Murphy	Asia Director	Internews Europe Association	1 August 2012	Bangkok
Pathamapond Yiamsudhisopon & Thammachat Krairit	Program officers	Save the Children	10 June 2012	Bangkok
Pattama Him-mee-na	Coordinator	Hearty Support Group	21 June 2012	Pattani
Prasith Meksuwan	President	Civil Society Council of Southernmost Thailand	30 June 2012	Yala
Ruengrawee Pichaikul	Senior Program Officer	The Asia Foundation	27 August 2012	Bangkok
Sittipong Chantarawiroj	Secretary General	Muslim Attorney Center Foundation	16 June 2012	Pattani
Soraya Jarmjuree	Coordinator	Civic Women	2 July 2012	Pattani
Assistant Professor Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Ph.D.	Lecturer	Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity	19 June 2012	Pattani
Suwat Jarmjuree	Independent journalist	N/A	22 June 2012	Pattani.
Tuwaedaniya Meringing	Coordinator	Aman News Agency	22 June 2012	Pattani
Wandee Krichanan	Program officer	Oxfam Great Britain	27 August 2012	Bangkok
Wankanok Pohitaedaoh	Manager	Luuk Rieng Group	27 September 2012	Yala

**APPENDIX E Participants of Focus Group Discussion**

**Date:** 13 December 2012

**Place:** Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus

1. Mr. Prasit Meksuwan
2. Ms. Lamai Managarn
3. Mr. Anukul Awaeputeh
4. Mr. Romadon Panjor
5. Mr. Ekkarin Tuansiri
6. Mr. Abdulloh Hjmaroning



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## **BIOGRAPHY**

Apichaya O-In was a Senior Analyst in international leading law consultancy. She graduated from Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University with major in development economics. Then, she spent 2 years in international law firm where she had experience in cross-boundary issue for private sector.

The experience in private sector and academic interest in international phenomenon since her bachelor's degree made her decide to join the international development studies program which then even enriched her with more experience with research and development issues.