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**THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE KHMER ROUGE – ROYAL
GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS**

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สถาบันวิทยบริการ

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
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พลเรือน ที่ดำรงอยู่เป็นเวลานานของกัมพูชา ระหว่างที่ได้รับอำนาจการปกครองครั้งแรกของรัฐบาลกัมพูชา
ฝ่ายที่แยกตัวของเขมรแดง แยกออกจากชนชั้นสูง ของเขมรแดง อนุรักษนิยม และเจรจากับรัฐบาล นโยบาย
ที่ทุกฝ่ายมีชัยชนะ เสริมต่อการแยกตัว นโยบายนี้ตั้งอยู่บนเป้าหมายทางเศรษฐกิจ ข้อตกลงแบ่งปันอำนาจ
และคำสัญญา ที่จะพัฒนาบริเวณที่ไม่สำคัญ

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1993 ถูกละเมิดเพื่อให้ได้รับ ความสวามิภักดิ์ของกลุ่มเขมรแดง ที่แยกตัวกลุ่มหนึ่ง พระราชบัญญัตินี้กำหนด
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สิ่งแวดล้อม ที่ได้รับอำนาจให้ปกป้องเขตสงวนพันธุ์สัตว์ป่า ในวิล เวง

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บรรจบกัน ณ นโยบายที่ทุกฝ่ายมีชัยชนะในความขัดแย้ง ซึ่งทรัพยากรป่าไม้มีบทบาท การเจรจาเพื่อ
สันติภาพจำเป็นต้องกล่าวถึง การบริหารทรัพยากรธรรมชาติ และรวมการบริหารนี้ อยู่ใจกระบวนการเพื่อ
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The 1996 Khmer Rouge (KR) defections were a precursor for the ultimate termination of Cambodia's protracted civil. During the Royal Government of Cambodia's (RGC) first mandate, KR factions broke from the hard-line KR elites and negotiated with the government. The Win-Win policy encouraged these defections. This policy was based on economic goals, a power sharing agreement and promises of development for marginalized areas.

Because the political parties viewed defecting KR units as valuable political commodities, they used shadow state politics to extend their respective patron-client systems to include former-KR people. Peace was achieved, but laws and the environment were sacrificed to achieve that peace. For example, the Royal Decree of 1993 was contravened to secure the allegiance of one KR faction. This decree designated a protected area in one former-KR stronghold, in Veal Veng, Pursat province. Moreover, the Win-Win policy failed to address and integrate natural resources management into the negotiation framework for peace and reintegration. This was imperative for many KR strongholds possessed vast forests and the potential for timber extraction. In the post-conflict development period, there has been conflict over natural resource management between the reintegrating community and the Ministry of Environment who is mandated to protect the wildlife sanctuary in Veal Veng.

This research analyzes the motives for peace, which reveals the government's intentions for peace were not financial but political. Shadow State politics explains how economic considerations and natural resource wealth were transformed into political commodities. The currents of economics and politics converged in the Win-Win policy.

In conflict where forest resources have played a role, the peace negotiations must address natural resources management and include this management in the reintegration process. This will ensure environmental protection and provide sustainable livelihoods for reintegrating communities. A community-based post-conflict development strategy including natural resource (forest) management can be a model for peace building where conflict has involved forest resources.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT (THAI)	iv
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF MAPS (APPENDIX A)	x
LIST OF FIGURES (APPENDIX B)	xi
LIST OF CHRONOLOGIES AND LAWS (APPENDIX C)	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Rationale.....	1
1.2 Historical Context of Research.....	2
1.3 Literature Review and Knowledge Gap.....	7
1.4 Research Question.....	11
1.5 Hypothesis.....	11
1.6 Research Objectives.....	12
1.7 Analytical Framework.....	12
1.8 Limitations.....	14
1.9 Site Selection.....	15
1.10 Methodology.....	16
1.10.1 Data Collection.....	17
1.10.2 Selection of Cases.....	18
1.10.3 Scope of Study.....	19
1.10.4 Ethical Implications.....	19
CHAPTER II POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE PEACE	
NEGOTIATIONS	20
2.1 Paris Peace Accords and the UNTAC Election.....	20

2.2 Post-UNTAC Power Sharing and The Royal Government of Cambodia.....	22
2.3 Ieng Sary's Democratic National Union Movement.....	25
2.4 Khmer Rouge Front 505 Negotiations in Veal Veng.....	28
CHAPTER III MOTIVATIONS FOR PEACE.....	31
3.1 Data from Interviews.....	33
3.2 Data from Maps.....	37
3.3 The Khmer Rouge Front 505's Motives for Peace.....	39
3.4 The Royal Government of Cambodia's Motives for Peace.....	41
3.4.1 Funcinpec, CPP and Khmer Rouge Defections.....	41
3.4.2 CPP Negotiates with Front 505 in Veal Veng.....	42
3.5 Shadow State Politics.....	45
3.6 The Win-Win Policy.....	46
3.6.1 Power Sharing.....	48
3.6.2 Land Rights and Access to Natural Resources.....	50
3.6.3 Promises of Development.....	52
3.6.4 Reconciliation.....	53
3.7 Conclusion.....	55
CHAPTER IV REINTEGRATION DEVELOPMENT.....	58
4.1 Socio-economic Baselines prior to Reintegration.....	58
4.1.1 Wartime until Reintegration: 1979 – 1996.....	58
4.1.2 Transitional Phase: 1996 – 1999.....	59
4.1.2.1 Landmines.....	62
4.1.2.2 Malaria.....	63
4.1.2.3 Poverty.....	64
4.1.2.4 The Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary	65
4.1.3 Post-Conflict Development: 2000 – today.....	66
4.1.4 Post-Conflict Development Inputs.....	67
4.1.4.1 The Reintegration Process.....	67
4.1.4.2 Infrastructure.....	70

4.1.4.3 Capacity Building.....	74
4.2 Conclusion.....	79
CHAPTER V.....	82
5.1 Legal Instruments for Protected Areas.....	82
5.1.1 Royal Decree.....	82
5.1.2 Protected Area Law.....	84
5.1.3 Current Laws for Management in Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary.....	86
5.2 Logging and Natural Resources Management.....	87
5.2.1 Forest Exploitation in Cambodia.....	87
5.2.2 Logging in Veal Veng.....	88
5.2.3 Natural Resource Management in Veal Veng.....	90
5.3 Factors and Trends Influencing Natural Resource Management.....	93
5.3.1 Community-based Natural Resources Management.....	95
5.3.2 Market Economy and Threat from ‘Outsiders’.....	96
5.4 Perceptions of Natural Resources Management.....	97
5.4.1 Zoning System: Potential for Conflict Resolution.....	99
5.5 2005 Migration Law.....	101
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION.....	104
6.1 Conclusion in Terms of Research Question.....	104
6.2 Conclusion in Terms of Research Objectives.....	106
6.3 Discussion.....	109
6.4 Implications.....	112
6.5 Theoretical Considerations.....	113
REFERENCES.....	117
APPENDICES.....	124
APPENDIX A: MAPS.....	125
APPENDIX B: FIGURES.....	132
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGIES AND LAWS.....	136
BIOGRAPHY.....	147

LIST OF MAPS

APPENDIX A

Map	Page
1. Map of The Kingdom of Cambodia (Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction Pursat, 2006).....	126
2. Map of Pursat Province (Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction Pursat, 2006).....	127
3. Map of Veal Veng District (Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction Pursat, 2006).....	128
4. Map of Protected Areas in Veal Veng District (Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction Pursat, 2006).....	129
5. Map of Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary's Zoning system (Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction Pursat, 2006).....	130
6. Map of Cambodian Forest Cover 1976, 1997, 2002 (Save Cambodia's Wildlife, 2006: 43).....	131
7. Map of Cambodia Forest Disturbance (Save Cambodia's Wildlife, 2006: 45).....	132

LIST OF FIGURES

APPENDIX B

Figure	Page
1. Mr. Mung’s Representation of the Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	133
2. Mr. Koom Say explaining Zoning system, Anlong Reab commune, July 15 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	134
3. UNHCR funded elementary school, Pramaowy commune, July 26 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	134
4. <i>Wat Geery Bo Thumbewuh</i> , Pramaowy commune, July 26 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	135
5. Health staff at Pramaowy health centre, Pramaowy commune, July 14 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	135
6. Market in Pramaowy, Pramaowy commune, July 26 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	135
7. Mr. Ung Yong, Pursat town, July 27 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	136
8. CMAC Operational Base, Pramaowy commune, July 26 th , 2006 (Martin O’Brien-Kelly).....	136

LIST OF CHRONOLOGIES AND LAWS

APPENDIX C

Document	Page
1. Chronology of Cambodian History relating to Veal Veng.....	137
2. Chronology of the Veal Veng Peace Process and Reintegration.....	141
3. Royal Decree of 1993.....	145

สถาบันวิทยบริการ
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
CARERE	Cambodian Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program
CDC	Commune Development Committee
CEDAC	Centre d'Etude et de Development Agricole Cambodgien
CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
DCO	Disadvantaged Cambodian's Organization
DCO	Disadvantaged Cambodians Organization
DK	Democratic Kampuchea
DNUM	Democratic National Union Movement
FFI	Fauna and Flora International
FUNCINPEC	United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IDPs	Internally Displaced Person
KCP	Kampuchean Communist Party
KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
KR	Khmer Rouge
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MSF	Medicine Sans Frontieres
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

NFTPs	Non-Timber Forest Products
NGC	National Government Cambodia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resources Management
PA Law	Protected Areas Law
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PLG	Partnership for Local Governance
PLG	Partnership for Local Governance
PPA	Paris Peace Accords
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRDC	Provincial Rural Development Committee
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PSWS	Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary
RACHA	Reproductive and Child Health Alliance
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
SCW	Save Cambodia's Wildlife
SOC	State of Cambodia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia
VDC	Village Development Committee
WFP	World Food Program

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 RATIONALE

Natural resources management is popular in today's development and rural poverty alleviation lexicon. This is certainly the case in Cambodia, where a large majority of the kingdom's population live in rural areas and depend directly on land, forest and water resources for their survival. Without proper and effective management of these resources, both the environment and the livelihoods of families are at risk. This situation is embodied within the history of the reintegration process of a former- Khmer Rouge (KR) community and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) in Veal Veng district, Pursat province.

Veal Veng was a KR stronghold abundant in natural resources. The KR peace negotiations there, the ensuing reintegration process, governmental political ambitions and development goals contrasted with sustainable natural resources management and protection of a unique wildlife sanctuary. When the 1996 KR defections heralded in peace and reintegration, the Veal Veng population became heavily dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods. Consequently, the local community's natural resource management practices conflicted with Cambodia's laws for environmental protection. The process of reintegration and reconciliation is revealed through the conflict, and attempts at resolution, between the former-KR community and the Ministry of Environment (MoE). In order to comprehend the tension spanning desires for post-conflict development/reintegration and environmental protection, it is necessary to investigate the historical conditions and motivations of the parties formerly in conflict.

For the root causes of today's disagreement concerning natural resources management are found in the violent conflict of the past and the peace negotiations of 1996.

1.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF RESEARCH

CIVIL WAR AND THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA REGIME

The Cambodian civil war began in the early 1970s; emerging as victors, the now-infamous Khmer Rouge (KR)¹ communist movement came to power in 1975. From 1975 through to 1979, the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime ruled the country and hundreds of thousands Cambodians perished, either from execution, hunger or disease. The regime was overthrown in 1979 by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Vietnamese backed Khmer National Salvation Front. In the Vietnamese offensive, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)² retreated to defensive strongholds along the northwestern the border. During the 1980's, the KR and other politico-military parties resisted 'Vietnamese occupation' of Cambodia under a coalition government named the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). As the dynamics of geo-politics changed in the late 1980's, the world powers----namely the US, China and USSR----had withdrawn their involvement from the Cambodian crisis.

¹ The Khmer Rouge movement was originally known----incognito----as the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP). Kampuchea is the Khmer name for what we call in English, Cambodia. Thus, Cambodia under the rule of the KCP was named Democratic Kampuchea (DK). After DK's overthrow by Vietnam, the KCP renamed itself the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK). From the time of the Paris Peace Accords till the UNTAC elections, DK was reincarnated as the National Government of Cambodia (NGC).

² KR military forces were also known, prior to the first mandate of the RGC, as the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).

THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS

The Paris Peace Accords (PPA) of 1991 welcomed ‘a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict’. The repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of Cambodia and Cambodians was one of the largest, most complex peace building initiatives in UN history; by its end in 1993 close to 400,000 Cambodian refugees had been repatriated and it had cost the international community over \$US 2 billion. The first repatriation, under the auspices of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme (CARERE), was mandated to resettle the refugees and internally displaced peoples (IDPs) prior to the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC) elections of 1993. Peaceful the elections were, and lauded as a democratic success, but nationwide peace remained elusive until close to the end of the decade. Despite the successful UNTAC elections, the transition to a market economy, Cambodia’s pending entry into the regional organization, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and vague hopes that justice would be taken against crimes committed by the KR, this burgeoning democracy was still entangled in a civil war. NADK forces had refused military demobilization and rescinded participation in the UNTAC elections.

THE KHMER ROUGE DEFECTIONS OF 1996

The KR threat to national security and post-conflict reconstruction proved naught and 1996 saw the disintegration of KR forces. Ieng Sary, once DK’s foreign minister, broke from the hard-line KR movement under Pol Pot’s command. This fissure among the elite cadre caused a domino effect as other regional KR military divisions anticipated the ultimate demise of the movement, and began negotiating their defections with the

RGC and the Royal Cambodia Armed Forces (RCAF). The strategy of Hun Sen's Win-Win policy encouraged defections in the KR ranks and established a framework for peace and reintegration in the post-conflict period. Unlike the first negotiations and peace accords of the early 1990's, which were through and through an international matter, the reintegration of KR forces, not five years later, was a Cambodian matter replete with a contentious granting of amnesty to high ranking KR commanders, Phnom Penh political wrangling resulting in the coup d'etat of 1997 and proven collusion between the government and KR in unconstitutional business deals with foreign logging companies.

Establishing formal ties with the KR was a complex issue because it welcomed the genocide perpetrating KR back into civilian life and the political fold. Another issue which further complicated the negotiations and reintegration process in 1996 was the tense political atmosphere and the tenuous alliance between the co-ruling Prime Ministers----Funcinpec's (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) since Ranariddh and CPP's (Cambodians People's Party) trongman, Hun Sen. On the other hand, another more remote and debatable theory exists. The peace negotiations were also complicated because KR strongholds possessed an abundance of timber and gems, upping the ante for the price of peace. Large scale timber extraction and the ensuing environmental destruction had become a sensitive issue since the collusion between political and battlefield 'enemies', viz. the RGC and KR, had been publicized by organizations such as Global Witness (1995a, 1995b).

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IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN CAMBODIA'S POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Forests became the most politicized resource of the government's first mandate (LeBillon, 2000, 2002). They were essential to both the emerging social power structures within the RGC and also sustaining the KR's military threat. In the mid-1990's the stronghold of Pailin, located in the Cardamom Mountains, was the target of numerous RCAF dry season offensives; this extremely resource rich area provided the KR with significant income. With the forest and mineral resources so plentiful in these KR strongholds, and so essential to the movement's survival, the cash-strapped Royal Government would have certainly been more than concerned about the status of those natural resources when mass-defections began in 1996.

THE WIN-WIN POLICY

The Win-Win policy's goal was to encourage KR defections, ultimately bring the civil war to an end by promising power sharing through decentralized governance, land rights and guarantees of life and security for former-KR³ communities. Inherent in the deal was that KR soldiers who agreed to abandon the communist movement and join the RGC and RCAF were free to live off their land to use natural resources, and improve their lives towards socio-economic reintegration. Surprisingly, given the value of forest resources, viz. timber commodities, and the potential rents they could provide, the peace negotiations failed to directly address the natural resources in the former-KR strongholds. For example, in the Veal Veng district of Pursat province, the peace deal contravened the

³ 'KR' will be used to identify Khmer Rouge individuals, groups and military units prior to reintegration. 'Former-KR' will indicate the same individuals, groups or military units following the advent of reintegration. Thus the context will determine which will be used.

Royal Decree of 1993 on the Designation of Protected Areas. This legal decree, signed by King Norodom Sihanouk, had previously designated much of the Cardamom Mountains in Pursat as a wildlife sanctuary to protect the indigenous fauna and flora and managed by the MoE. This was the same area where former-KR communities were pursuing post-conflict community development based on the resources of the natural environment.

The Win-Win policy succeeded in bringing peace to Veal Veng. But the inherent government promises----with regard to land rights, which implied natural resource usage---were incongruent with the mandate of the MoE and their Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary (PSWS) which, ostensibly put precedence on conservation rather than on the livelihoods of the former-KR community. The Win-Win policy has undermined intentions for protection and conservation hopes in Veal Veng. From the community point of view, the PSWS is inimical to reintegration and reconciliation, because the protected area puts constraints on natural resource usage, thus impacting livelihoods and development.

NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

But what might not be so apparent is that natural resources management (NRM) by MoE could be a blessing in disguise for the community. For the Veal Veng community has always relied on forests and land resources for sustaining their livelihoods. Without managed environmental protection, outsiders and the free market pose a more direct threat to the environment, and thus community livelihoods. Correlatively, development is a mixed blessing as it will improve standards of living but also put pressure on their local environment.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND KNOWLEDGE GAP

There has been ample research into the link between natural resources and conflict in the Cambodian context. Puangthong's work "Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide" (2004) tracks Thailand's involvement and influence in the Cambodian conflict and its transition to peace. From an anti-communist stance in the early 1970's, Thai foreign policy adapted to accept the KR along the Thai-Khmer border. In the 1980's, Thailand even provided assistance and support to the wrecked KR forces. Thai links to the KR in the late 1980's and 1990's became more economic that Thai companies were the most important business partner of the KR's logging and gems business.

However, the Thai-KR business partnership often involved the tacit participation of the Cambodian government. They also had vested financial interests because they profited from forest concessions in KR controlled areas. Financial collusion between the three parties was disrupted in early and mid 1995 as a cutting ban, then an export ban on logs was introduced by the RGC; moreover, this log export ban, emasculated the KR's ability to trade with Thailand. This was the main reason causing KR divisions to defect to the government side. Puangthong's work provides a basis for understanding of how Thailand's waning economic influence affected the political balance between the KR central elites, KR factions and the RGC inside Cambodia.

Global Witness has tracked the corruption, governmental collusion and environmental destruction in Cambodia as a result of unsustainable logging. And LeBillon revealed how the kingdom's forestry sector was symptomatic of Cambodia's governance problems and he highlighted how timber commoditization was necessary to the country's post-conflict reconstruction. Though instructive, none of these has directly

investigated the role which natural resources played in the KR peace negotiations and reintegration process of the latter half of the 1990's.

Several reports by Global Witness have also tracked the corruption, governmental collusion and environmental destruction in Cambodia as a result of unsustainable logging. (Global Witness, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) Global Witness has thoroughly researched the destructive logging of Cambodia's forests since the mid-1990's. It's well documented that KR forces used the proximity to the Thai border to finance their guerilla war against the RCAF. It's estimated that this trade in conflict timber earned different KR factions \$US 210,000 per week (Global Witness, 1996) or the total earnings for the KR centre from the timber and gem trade was approximately \$US 10 - 20 million per month (Global Witness, 1995b).

There has been legislation to attenuate the deleterious logging. International pressure has been effective in restricting logging and funding to the KR. On January 1st, 1995 the RGC implemented a ban on the cutting of fresh timber. Despite these efforts, greed and a transnational ethos of corruption, have undermined the attempts to end the uncontrolled logging of Cambodia's forests. Thailand, continued importing timber from Cambodia despite the total export ban, and thus contravened Cambodia's national laws, its own and international law as well (Global Witness, 1996). Because of Thai involvement, rampant corruption and mismanagement of Cambodia's forests, peace and stability in Cambodia have been precluded.

In 1996, the defection of Ieng Sary in Pailin and his dissident faction known as Democratic National Union Movement (DNUM) signaled a change in the dynamics of the timber trade and heralded the beginning of peace negotiations. Global Witness (1996) reported that the Ieng Sary rebel KR faction possessed 135,500 cubic metres of 'stockpiled' timber and was worth upwards of \$US 47.5 million. This vast potential windfall might have been a motive for his defection and his overtures to the RGC promised a successful negotiated settlement, however, the nuances of that deal and

negotiations were neither clear, nor transparent. The following explains the complexity of the deal

Whilst Ieng Sary's change of allegiance may mean a cessation of fighting in this region, until it is under the complete political, military and legislative authority of the RGC it must still be considered as an area of KR control, albeit a more "liberal" faction. Timber revenues will therefore benefit the KR and not the RGC, strengthening Ieng Sary's bargaining position. Thus, timber exports from these regions will be of great concern to the international donors, as will any trade that benefits the KR.

(Global Witness, 1996)

Global Witness' research clearly identified the relationship between the RGC and KR in the unsustainable and illegal timber exploitation. Moreover, Global Witness has emphasized the financial interests in the KR-RGC relationship, while their specific research into Ieng Sary's faction alludes to political aspects as well.

Forests, and their commoditization into timber, were essential to both prolonging and bringing an end to Cambodia's civil war. This contradictory phenomenon, with its underlying currents and social manifestations, was investigated and explained by LeBillon (2000) in *The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989 – 1999: War, Peace and Forest Exploitation*. He follows up this article with *Logging in Muddy Waters: The Politics of Forest Exploitation in Cambodia* (2002). In the former, LeBillon highlights the salience of forests and timber in Cambodia's conflict and eventual path towards peace and reconstruction. LeBillon cited timber as, "the most politicized resource of a reconstruction process" (2000: 785). Because of the relationship between natural resources and the political process of transition, LeBillon conceived Cambodia's experience as one which is associated with 'political ecology'⁴.

⁴ Political ecology is defined as 'the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also between classes and groups within society itself' (LeBillon 2000, cited in Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987:17)

Logging in Muddy Waters (LeBillon, 2002) examined the unrestricted exploitative cutting of the 1990's and the fact that commodity chains⁵ were formed around the logging industry. These social manifestations----the groups of actors who were involved and organized logging----were based on Cambodian society's patron-client system. This social structure eclipsed the state apparatus, because commodity chains functioned informally, and neither transparently nor legally. Contradictory relationships were formed because of the political ethos of the time----which dictated empowering one's own clients was paramount. What seemed like irrational actions, RCAF commanders entering into logging deals with KR cadre for example, were comprehensible if the arrangement strengthened one's social power base. LeBillon used two concepts, 'formal' and 'shadow state' politics----the latter concept he takes from Reno⁶. Undisclosed parallel budgets were formed and forest concessions were granted without public bidding through shadow state practices, serving to empower either the CPP or Funcinpec parties and consequently undermining the RGC.

LeBillon emphasized that problems in the forestry sector were symbolic of Cambodia's governance problems. His research has revealed the political salience and significance of timber. Though instructive, none of the prior literature has directly investigated the role natural resources played in the KR peace negotiations and reintegration process in the latter half of the 1990's----despite the fact that timber was the most politicized resource of Cambodia's reconstruction period. How did shadow state politics shape and influence the RGC's approach to a negotiated settlement? Moreover, as LeBillon's excellent research describes the political-financial power lines which converge in Cambodia's forests, the question here is, how his useful framework describing the machinations of shadow state politics can be applied to the RGC's approach to the peace deals with the KR?

⁵ LeBillon cites Ribbot (1998: 307 – 308), commodity chains are “a series of interlinked exchanges through which a commodity and its constituents pass from extraction or harvesting to production to end use”.

⁶ 'Shadow state' politics refers to when rulers are “drawing authority from their abilities to [informally] control markets and their material rewards”. (LeBillon 2002, cited in Reno, 1995)

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The research can be summarized into the following question:

What role did natural resources have in the Khmer Rouge – Royal Government of Cambodia peace negotiations and reintegration process?

1.5 HYPOTHESIS

The peace negotiations possessed both economic and political power currents. Reintegration was based on the expansion of the free market into former-KR strongholds. Reconciliation was achieved by power sharing politics. The government's Win-Win policy contained and united these two aspects, economics and politics, reintegration and reconciliation; consequently, ending Cambodia's prolonged civil conflict presented an opportunity for economic and political investment. Marginalized KR areas required economic development while the Royal Government's two coalition partners took advantage of the symbolic KR hierarchy to politically empower their respective parties. The KR and RGC's motives for peace were dissimilar but perfectly matched. The Win-Win policy of the CPP, designed to encourage defections, exchanged power sharing and land rights (implying the use of natural resources) for peace and the allegiance of defecting KR divisions---land and natural resource wealth was transformed into a valuable political commodity. The Win-Win policy fused economics and politics; these dual aspects cannot be clearly divided, the former was manifest, while the latter was relegated to the shadows.

1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

To frame the research, and answer the research question, these are the objectives:

1. To determine if natural resources was a factor in the KR – RGC peace negotiations and reintegration process.
2. To identify the benefits that a former- KR community gained from the reintegration process.
3. To analyze the motivations of former- KR communities and the RGC in seeking a negotiated settlement towards peace and reintegration.
4. To assess the perceptions of a former- KR community concerning the outcome of the ‘peace deal’ with regard to natural resource management.

1.7 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To assess whether natural resources played a role in the peace negotiations, it is imperative to understand the motives of the parties coming to negotiate. Therefore, analysis must focus on the motives of the KR divisions and the RGC in pursuing a negotiated settlement. As motives are unseen phenomenon it is useful to order them into a conceptual framework. Thus for analytical purposes, the concepts of ‘push factor’ and ‘pull factor’ will be employed to simplify the motives of the parties in conflict.

Push factor, in the present research, describes the present situation of an individual or group which motivates them towards transforming that situation. This factor considers the past or present circumstances.

Pull factor describes the yet to be actualized, but (theoretically) possible situation which motivates an individual or group to transform their present situation. This factor considers future circumstances.

It is more than instructive, it is necessary to further analyze the motivations of the Cambodian government. At that period “the government was beset not only by corruption but also by the tensions of intra-party factionalism and political adventurism of certain politicians” (Brown and Zasloff, 1998: 212). To this end, the present research borrows from LeBillon’s perspicacious and insightful research (2000, 2002) elucidating Cambodian government’s political economy in the forestry sector.

In LeBillon’s research into the exploitative logging, political ecology of transition and power politics of Cambodia during the 1990’s, he used two concepts to render the Royal Government’s actions comprehensible. This dualism is the sometimes mutually exclusive, sometimes not conceptual pair of ‘formal state’ and ‘shadow state’⁷ politics (2000: 798, 2002: 564). Formal state governance functions according to and within the bounds of the official institutions which are checked and balanced by the political bodies and legal frameworks of the state. Shadow state governance (Reno, 1995: 3) is when leaders “are drawing authority from their abilities to control markets and their material rewards”. As LeBillon explained “[these] sides of states are not neatly divided, as actors and relations overlap, but this conceptual division helps in understanding the supposedly ‘irrational’ behavior of the state during periods of crisis or transition” (2000: 798). Shadow state politics works through manipulation of the market and legal system. Leaders who are able to direct money, investment and funding to clients or away from

⁷ LeBillon cites Reno (1995: 3)

enemies are functioning in the realm of the shadow state. The free market system is no longer free because it has been co-opted and perverted by rulers who informally and illegitimately use the state's institutions to consolidate their authority.

The context in which LeBillon employed the concept of shadow state governance elucidates the political power struggle over forests within the RGC; making the context of the present research much more akin than it is not, because this research investigates how the implementation of the Win-Win policy operated according to shadow state politics (See Chapter III). In the context of the KR peace negotiations, it is argued that shadow state politics, and its complement, can be applied to explain the government's strategy and approach to the negotiations and reintegration process.

1.8 LIMITATIONS

ACCESS TO HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS

With few contacts in the national RGC, data collection was limited to the provincial, district and village level. As the 1996 negotiations were affairs of national security, the participants from the government side were high ranking RCAF/RGC generals and officials, therefore access was problematic. A more complete and accurate account of the negotiations and the Win-Win policy would have been provided if the researcher could have gained access to these officials in Phnom Penh.

LANGUAGE

While the researcher is proficient in the Khmer language, in most interviews a translator was used. In all cases the translator was familiar to both the researcher and the interviewee. Nonetheless, the skills and personal biases of the translators could have influenced the content of translation.

1.9 SITE SELECTION

Veal Veng district was chosen because of its familiarity to the researcher. For a year and a half the researcher had been worked with a local Cambodian NGO and had previously established a network of informants; a good relationship was maintained between many people therefore access to delicate issues was granted. As well, most of Veal Veng district is a protected area, the PSWS, which imports the issue of natural resources management and protection into the research objectives. In this sense, it is unique.

Veal Veng district was incorporated into Pursat province on August 6th, 1997. Prior to this it was a KR stronghold, where Front 505 controlled the area. KR forces first arrived in Veal Veng in 1979. Pramaowy is the district centre, thus the district office is also there. There are five communes, 25 villages, 1,678 families and 7,880 people residing in Veal Veng today. The total land area is 484,800 hectares. There are.

1.10 METHODOLOGY

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with former-KR people, provincial and district staff. Key informants and those who had first person experiences of the negotiations and living conditions in Veal Veng were also selected for interviews. As a third source of data and different point of view on the events, current and former non-governmental organization (NGO) staff in Veal Veng were also interviewed. Initially, these interviewees introduced to the researcher to other individuals who were integral or who had participated in the peace process.

When it was possible, key informants, were interviewed twice and on different days. This provided the researcher the chance to read the results and analyze, refocusing questions for the next interview. Second interviews were more structured than the first as the researcher identified key issues and questions which remained unanswered or ambiguous in the first interview. Of all the individuals interviewed, the researcher was able to do follow-up interviews with ten people.

As there is a lack of official documents relating to the negotiations and reintegration, research relied heavily on individual accounts. This reliance on personal accounts can be problematic. Triangulation was used to verify and confirm the story or account of one interviewee with another. When possible, an account of the negotiations from the standpoint of a former-KR individual was compared and contrasted with one from a government official; similarly, a story from a district authority was juxtaposed with a villager's account.

To further understand the background history and grasp the ethos surrounding the peace negotiations, the archives of Cambodia's two main newspapers (The Phnom Penh Post and Cambodia Daily) were used as references. The years between 1995 and 1999

were targeted with particular attention paid to 1996, the year when the KR movement began to falter and mass defections began.

1.10.1 DATA COLLECTION

Background research material was consulted prior to field research. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have written reports on the repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and reconciliation in former-KR areas. In order to grasp the political climate in 1996 and the circumstances surrounding the negotiations The Cambodian Daily and Phnom Penh Post newspapers were consulted as they reported closely on the events and news of the period in question. The data and history garnered from the newspapers was essential to put the events and people in their correct position regarding time and place.

Field research consisted of visiting people in their homes and offices in Veal Veng district, both in the district centre, Pramaowy and in Anlong Reab commune. The data gathered in these interviews was nearly exclusively qualitative (i.e. opinions, impressions, personal histories and feelings). Interviews with provincial staff were conducted in Pursat town, the provincial centre. Quantitative data related to demographics and development statistics were collected from the Pursat Department of Planning and the Seila Programme office in Pursat.

A month was spent in Cambodia and interviews were arranged throughout July 2006. Interviews were conducted in English, French and Khmer. On one occasion an interview was conducted in French and on four occasions the researcher was without a translator and conducted the interview in Khmer. Follow-up interviews were clarified with the aid of a translator. One translator was provided by the MoE while on all other

occasions the translators were known to the researcher and interviewee. It was decided not to hire a translator unfamiliar to the area and people, therefore proficiency in English might have been sacrificed for choosing a translator who had a relationship with the individual being interviewed.

1.10.2 SELECTION OF CASES

Candidates for interviews, representing the KR position, were selected because they: (1) were KR soldiers or commanders in Veal Veng or Samloat; (2) resided in the previous locations prior to reintegration and continue to do so; (3) were participants in the peace negotiations; (4) held administrative posts since reintegration or do presently; (5) were identified at least two people as a good source of information. Higher ranking officials were targeted and villagers fulfilling one of these requirements were selected.

Candidates from the government or government agencies were selected because they: (1) participated in the peace negotiations and reintegration process; (2) were integral in bringing development inputs to Veal Veng; (3) were identified by at least two people as a good source of information.

Regarding the third group of candidates, NGO staff and other key informants, they were chosen because: (1) they were key informants on a specific issue relevant to the research; (2) had resided in Veal Veng prior to, during and after reintegration.

1.10.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Temporally, the scope of this research focuses on the mid-1990's until the present time. The year of the KR defections was 1996, thus this year stands out from the rest as does 2003 when protection and monitoring of the protected area began in Veal Veng. An understanding of the background history, as far back as 1979 (if not before), was required to understand the time period under investigation, though its not included in the research findings. Though many families, who were never part of or akin to the KR movement, have migrated to live in Veal Veng. Their point of view was excluded from this research. Former-KR communities, commanders, administrators and high ranking leaders and officials from the RGC/RCAF represent the body of the research. The environment of Veal Veng is also included.

1.10.4 ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

It would have been instructive (and the research would have benefited from the specific details) to learn about the illegal logging activities in Veal Veng. This topic was excluded from interviews. Illegal logging is a sensitive topic in Cambodia; this information was not likely forthcoming and could have been a dangerous topic to breach and likely would have undermined the success of the research.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

2.1 PARIS PEACE ACCORDS AND THE UNTAC ELECTION

Though signatories to the peace agreements of 1991, the KR refused to demobilize the NADK in July 1992. They later pulled out altogether from the elections in April 1993. Some analysts have explained this as proof that the KR never had any intention to participating in the peace process, others nuance this, citing the supposed Vietnamese presence and failure of UNTAC to provide a neutral and fair environment for the elections (Roberts, 2001: 94, 95). But both Heder and Ledgerwood (1996) and Brown and Zasloff (1998), citing internal party documents and interviews, allude to the KR's honest intentions towards the peace process, though attempting to take advantage of the peace agreements, using violence if necessary. The PDK perceived that UNTAC had not disengaged the CPP's control of the state, thus the atmosphere prior to the elections was not neutral, it was being determined by the CPP. Khieu Saphan (pers. comm., May 16th, 2005) stated that the Paris accords were not truly implemented, and thus the cause of problems in the elections as well as conflict in post-UNTAC Cambodia.

The 1993 elections promised the KR an opportunity for real political power, since DK had been deposed of in 1979 this had been elusive. The party ideology targeted the rural population and it was this strategy in which the PDK would gain political ground and power (Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996). The decision to withdraw, as argued by Roberts (2001), is explained as reactive to the actual political conditions and not contrived.

The Khmer Rouge quite clearly viewed the PPA as positive, in the sense that it empowered them in a political fashion previously denied by the de facto leadership in Phnom Penh...the Party position changed as a consequence, not of pretext, but of the realization that a central proviso crucial to the way the Khmer Rouge viewed a free and fair general election was not met by UNTAC's civil administration component.

(Roberts, 2001: 102)

Together Funcinpec, Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) and the DK formed a not unfriendly relationship against the CPP. But the CPP and KR were bitter enemies. The PDK viewed CPP as a Vietnamese backed regime and the main threat to transforming their military power into political weight. In reaction to UNTAC's inability to separate the CPP party from the state, the KR considered it a foregone conclusion that the CPP would win the elections. Moreover, as the incumbent party, the CPP was expected to be victorious at the polls. The situation meant that all the KR's territory and military strength would not be exchanged into equivalent political power. Therefore, the PDK rescinded political campaigning and the elections. They missed the opportunity to become politically involved and it was a miscalculation on their part because CPP did not win the elections to the surprise of everyone.

“Unless Pol Pot and other PDK leaders publish their memoirs, we may never know definitely whether the PDK intended to cooperate in the implementation of the Paris Agreements: (Brown and Zasloff, 1998: 145). But events clearly showed that the KR's decision to refuse the political solution for peace, this emasculated and isolated them even further. This opportunity for participation in the political process would come again when KR defections began in 1996, when the Win-Win policy was offered to end the civil war once and for all.

2.2 POST-UNTAC POWER SHARING AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA

The elections in May 1993 brought a 90% voter turnout. The Funcinpec party⁸, led by Prince Ranariddh⁹ won the election with 45% of the vote and gained 58 seats while the CPP¹⁰ garnered 38% and 51 seats (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 159). In reaction to the results, the incumbent CPP hinted that riots might occur and demanded a rerun in the voting. Violence and a near secessionist movement came to naught, and in June a coalition government was formed with Prince Ranariddh as First Prime Minister, Hun Sen as Second and Prince Sihanouk assumed the throne he abdicated in 1955, becoming the King and head of state. On July 1st, 1993, the ‘intricately balanced’ government was approved; Brown and Zasloff (1998: 175) state insightfully

In light of the coup d’etat of Hun Sen in July 1997, the wisdom of creating two prime ministers to govern following the election but prior to the promulgation of the constitution is not self-evident. The more usual parliamentary practice of naming a single prime minister from the party winning the most votes (FUNCINPEC) and inviting leaders from other parties garnering substantial votes (CPP, BLDP) to take cabinet posts in a coalition government might have reduced Hun Sen’s tendency to think in July 1997 that he had a right to overthrow the ‘first’ (but not superior) prime minister.

As stated, the first coalition government was innately problematic and perhaps the whole process of formation was undemocratic. This is debatable, but what this reveals is

⁸ This is a French acronym, but in English it stands for The United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia and is also known as the royalist party because of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s affiliation.

⁹ Ranariddh is King Sihanouk’s son. He left the monarchy to pursue politics and lead Funcinpec.

¹⁰ The CPP originated in 1991 from the communist State of Cambodia (SOC) which was backed by Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The SOC was the Cambodian reincarnation of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) which ruled the country from 1979 until 1989.

that the seeds of conflict were already sown, and the power sharing agreement was from the start, inevitably leading towards the coup in 1997.

The CPP lacked the democratic legitimacy of winning the first elections in 1993; but Ranariddh's Royalist party was dwarfed by CPP's bureaucratic, military and judicial control of the state. In hindsight, Micheal Hayes (Hayes, 1998) a veteran Cambodian journalist stated "A Funcinpec-led coalition government...was unworkable, Funcinpec lacked the human resources and network of party allies to carry out administrative tasks effectively". Many Cambodians say that the CPP runs throughout the country, from the grassroots level and connecting CPP people all the way up to the big men (*niak thom*) in Phnom Penh (pers. obs.). The middle phase of the government's first mandate was more conflict than accord, and the political parties pursued realpolitik, marginalizing human rights and the rule of law, while accepting corruption and condoning impunity.

LeBillon (2002: 568) describes the *modus vivendi* between the two coalition parties

This compromise [coalition government] was oriented towards building their own private power base rather than independent state institutions, which could become obstacles or rivals to their personal power base and the interest of their followers. Both co-prime ministers attempted to consolidate their power base through complex and interrelated networks of clientelism and the embezzling of public revenues.

The most well known and audacious example of this consolidation of power by undermining the state and its law was the RGC's collusion with KR forces in the destructive logging of the northwest frontier's forests. The KR had been outlawed in 1994 which made them an illegal group; despite this, the forest spoils were significant enough for either political party composing the coalition government to sign forest concessions with foreign companies which would enrich themselves---even if this benefited their enemies, weakened state control and destroyed the environment.

In describing the RGC after the elections in 1993, Dr. Ung Sophan¹¹ used a common Khmer expression saying “One train, two coaches” (pers. comm., July 1st, 2006).¹² To anyone unfamiliar with Cambodian politics, the train represents the people, the state, and ultimately the kingdom, while the coaches are the co-Prime Ministers, Rannaridh and Hun Sen, leading their respective political parties, Funcinpec and CPP. During that first mandate, each coach attempted to advance and care for his own supporters, while the fragile train was put under increasing pressure until it broke down in the coup d’etat in July 1997.

The power sharing agreement between the co-prime ministers meant that CPP control of the state’s institutions and districts should have been attenuated through allocations to Funcinpec members. But, two years into the first mandate and many of the provincial and commune level positions were not yet filled with Funcinpec members. In March 1996, the first Prime Minister (Ranariddh), voiced his grievances and displeasure with the situation, alluding to Funcinpec, its members and ministers as ‘puppet’ politicians (Barber & Munthit, 1996) and he threatened to withdraw from the government. By the early summer tensions in Phnom Penh has escalated because regional KR forces had broke from central command in Anlong Veng and emerged as a weighty factor in the political (im)balance.

The latent antagonism within the coalition government only became apparent as the rebel-KR factor came into play. The negotiations with Ieng Sary and his dissident KR group in 1996 represented a microcosm into the relationship between the co-prime ministers, the KR and the Kingdom of Cambodia.

¹¹ Dr. Sophan is the Deputy Director of the Pursat Department of Health, and though he is not a expert on the politics of his nation, he provided an account of what is commonly understood by government officials.

¹² The meaning of this metaphor is identical to other well known ones: ‘two-faced’ or ‘two-headed’ which have also been used to describe the coalition government.

2.3 IENG SARY'S DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNION MOVEMENT

The KR movement in the mid- to later 1990's can be divided into three main categories. The first were the hard-line group under the command of the 'old guard'---- Pol Pot, Ta Mok and Son Sen-----residing in Anlong Veng. The second group was the faction of dissident rebels based in Pailin and Phnum Malai which broke away from the KR centre in Anlong Veng. This faction formed the DNUM political party under the leadership of Ieng Sary; the DNUM pursued negotiations by pressing their demands on the government. The last group were the KR divisions in Samloat and Veal Veng who defected without demands to the government. Not every KR military unit fell into one of these three categories, but for the purpose and scope of the present research, the division is acceptable. Moreover, this categorization is not based on geographical location but in the groups' relationship with the government. In regards to a negotiated settlement, the first group of hard-line KR were intractable and truculent, the second, DNUM, were amenable to negotiations but demanded concessions from the government while the third group accepted the government's strategy for peace.

In mid 1996, the split in Phnom Malai and Pailin was the result of KR divisions repudiating commands from the central leadership ostensibly under Pol Pot's command in Anlong Veng. Influential cadres, Ta Mok and Son Sen, had been sent [from Anlong Veng on orders from Pol Pot] to put down a rising rebellion against a re-collectivization policy of emerging private property (Renegade Khmer Rouge, 1996). Ieng Sary pursued a liberal, moderate line in his area of command, building a Buddhist *wat* in Pailin and allowing private property and a nascent market economy. As well, Ieng Sary had been open to peace negotiations while the Anlong Veng core remained obdurate. In Sary's own words:

We are of the opinion that if Khmer and Khmer continue to shed their own blood, our nation will be reduced to nothing. But the dictatorial group of Pol Pot, Ta Mok, Son Sen continues to wage this endless war....As a

patriot, I cannot accept this kind of situation. This is the reason that led to the break away from the dictatorial group....to form the Democratic National United Movement.

(Interview With Ieng Sary, 1996)

The DNUM rebel-KR units did not immediately enter the government fold. They were on their own, still in conflict with the RCAF and they often engaged in open conflict with hard-line KR forces still loyal to the movement. Negotiations between the DNUM rebel factions were complicated because of issues such as the autonomy of Pailin, retaining a separate armed force, the potential for DNUM to participate in the political process; in addition the decision to grant amnesty to Ieng Sary for crimes of the past regime was contentious. This loaded issue was quickly resolved in September 1996, in a display of realpolitik both co-Prime Ministers asked the King to grant amnesty to Sary. Amnesty would speed along the reintegration and bring the highly symbolic Pailin and Phnum Malai rebel-KR forces onto the government side. The amnesty was given despite not being put in front of the National Assembly for a two-thirds majority approval (Watkin, 1996).

On October 23rd, 1996, Hun Sen visited Ieng Sary in his base in Pailin. Hun Sen promised schools and roads and was prepared to let soldiers, police, village and commune leaders all keep their land, jobs and guns (The tears and the fears, 1996; Decherd & Serey, 1996). Despite the sanguine meeting, hand shaking and friendly words, the two sides remained at odds. Though progress had been made, negotiations were stalemated because of incongruent demands, but events transpired which tipped the power into the government's hands.

The northwest was still in a state of war, and threats from both hard-line KR forces and Ieng Sary's DNUM faction remained. The DNUM breakaway faction was attempting to band together with other KR divisions, to oppose the hard-liners and unite to present a strong bargaining position in negotiations with the RGC/RCAF. Small scale fighting took place between the Pailin DNUM forces and Samloat KR divisions as both

divisions were negotiating separately with the government while trying to expand their zone of control---an important asset when sitting at the negotiating table.

KR Front 505, which controlled northwestern Pursat and southern Battambang province (south of Pailin), had also broken from the hard-line KR elites in mid-1996 but remained independent from the RGC and DNUM. Initial meetings with the RCAF had proved sufficient to build trust, in July and August Front 505 decided to defect directly to the RGC (Mr. Kim Rin, July 12th, 2006), choosing not to ally their forces with Sary's DNUM faction. This event transpired to weaken the DNUM's position. In the ensuing chaos fostered by the negotiations and defections, KR rebels forces were turning against each other and following more KR defections (Front 205 and 909), DNUM was left with little choice but reintegration on the government's terms. "Internal rivalries and fears of an imminent armed clash between the renegade Khmer Rouge factions prompted the official integration of Ieng Sary's forces under the Royal government umbrella last week", because, "Three breakaway commanders, 909 chief Him Paut, and Front 250 commanders, Ean Phan and Sok Chhean....decided not to join DNUM because it sought conditions in joining with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces" (Chaumeau & Munthit, 1996).

Even though the dissident factions in Pursat province formed an alliance with the RGC prior to DNUM, it was Ieng Sary's initial break from Pol Pot which set future defections in motion and paved the way for the peace negotiations. "Ieng Sary's break in 1996 and start of the peace negotiations influenced what happened later in Veal Veng" (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 13th, 2006).

2.4 KHMER ROUGE FRONT 505 NEGOTIATIONS IN VEAL VENG

The first meeting between KR military units controlling Samloat and Veal Veng (KR Front 505) and the RCAF occurred in Krapeu Pi commune (on the Pursat-Battambang provincial border) on September 16th, 1996 (Mr. U. Yong, July 13th, 2006). Subsequent meetings took place in Thailand where the two sides continued to agree on a provisional ceasefire. In these initial meetings, the two parties were not engaged in bargaining, but building trust and informally discussing demands; soldiers were given vaccinations for TB, cholera, polio as well as other illnesses (Mr. K. Rin, pers. comm., July 12th, 2006) as well as other goods (i.e. bread, cigarettes, and some cash). Further meetings were agreed upon to pave the way for negotiations.

A month later, demobilization began in Kravangh district when KR commanders from Front 505 met with Mr. Pek Sikhen who was then Pursat's deputy provincial governor. At this time, both sides agreed to peace within the framework of the Win-Win policy. Mr. Ung Yong¹³ (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006) said there was a formal ceasefire announced between the Veal Veng KR divisions and the RCAF, the negotiations concerned military matters but were based on the Win-Win policy (See Chapter 3.6). Demobilized soldiers changed their Mao-style guerilla fatigues for new RCAF uniforms. They also received rice, medicines and a small amount of cash.

Development aid and the fulfillment of the Win-Win policy's promises were immediately precluded and the district remained isolated because of the 1997 coup d'état in Phnom Penh and renewed conflict broke out in Samloat. As a result of these events, the reintegration process was delayed and the population was left in a state of limbo during this transition stage between war and peace.

¹³ Mr. Ung Yong was the KR commander of division 695, part of Front 505. He's originally from Takeo province and he came to Veal Veng in 1987. He was instrumental in encouraging KR divisions to defect and begin negotiations. Upon reintegration he became the District Governor of Veal Veng. Today he is a devout Buddhist and extremely superstitious.

The coup in 1997 arose because of the controversy over Sam Rainsy, the exile of Funcinpec minister Prince Sirivuddh, Rannaridh's demands for veritable power sharing between the coalition partners and competition to acquire defecting KR units was the final trigger (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 239, 240). Both the CPP and Funcinpec were looking for a 'tilt in power' which would improve their chances of winning the 1998 elections. This is proven by the events prior to the July coup: Funcinpec loyalist General Nhiek Bun Chhay had negotiated the defections of the hard-line KR centre, ostensibly bringing about the final chapter of the civil war. Sensing this shift in power, on July 5th, 1997 RCAF troops loyal to Hun Sen attacked Funcinpec military and political headquarters, hunted down Funcinpec leaders, commanders and routed their military. War spread to the north and northwest, though violence endured only two days in Phnom Penh; Rannardih, in France, was caught off-guard and was charged with importing weapons and colluding with the KR in organizing a plot against Hun Sen.

Renewed fighting in Samloat was caused by rebel KR units abandoning their defection agreements to re-join hard-line KR forces. It was reported in Global Witness' (1998) report *Going places: Cambodia's Future on the Move*, that the commander of Front 909 returned to hard-line KR forces because the government had taken \$23 million worth of cut logs and equipment. This resulted in 10 months of open conflict, causing turmoil in the reintegration process and shattering the fragile ceasefire which had been agreed to less than a year before. "The perceptions of KR forces was that the government had broken promises about keeping possessions, the timber was cut and considered the property of that military division. News of the fighting spread to Veal Veng", recalled Mr. Ung Yong (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). Families fled, anticipating combat on a large scale, back to the refugee camps in Thailand (Chong Khao Phlu) and Kravangh district. So it was 1999 before the IDPs and refugees returned to settle with the help of UNHCR in the villages of Veal Veng.

The substantive issues of the negotiations, viz. the details of the Win-Win policy, were put into effect much later, on August 6th, 1997. Veal Veng joined Pursat province as the sixth district and Pramaowy was declared the district centre. Five communes were delineated: Pramaowy, Krapeu Pi, O'Saum, Anlong Reab and Thmah Dah. Mr. Ung Yong was appointed governor of the district, with two former-KR officers as deputies and one RCAF deputy commander serving as the third in the power sharing makeup.



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CHAPTER III

MOTIVATIONS FOR PEACE

Why did the KR Front 505 divisions¹⁴ explore negotiations and ultimately defect to the RGC? What were their motives? A variety of factors could have pushed or pulled the KR military units in Pursat province towards a negotiated settlement. Foremost, it must be stated that as the Thai border was closed to log exports in 1995, the KR's main source of income became severely restricted. War fatigue was a contributing factor motivating soldiers to negotiate. Disenchantment with the KR elites in Anlong Veng, and a growing apostasy from orthodox communist principles was reason enough for Ieng Sary and other commanders to break from the KR movement----maybe this scenario was analogous to the Pursat rebel faction. Low standards of living among soldiers contributed to a deflated morale, this was reinforced because of the material disparity between commanders who seemed to be adept capitalists (Khmer Rouge May Be Losing, 1996). Whatever the motives were, the RGC had been contacting KR units in Veal Veng by radio and letters passed through loggers since early 1995 (Mr. B. Bunloak, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006). Front 505 had reasons for defection; while the government had their own----these will be explored after.

Inquiring into a soldier's motives for peace, requires in some circumstances a simple and straightforward answer, but the Cambodian conflict deserves deeper analysis. After 20 years of deleterious civil war, both sides longed for peace, but at what cost? Central to this research is the theory that forests, and its commoditization, in KR strongholds played a role in the peace negotiations and reintegration process. This theory

¹⁴ The KR Front 505 was comprised of eight divisions (36, 695, 19, 905, 277, 91, 305 and 26) which controlled territory in Pursat and southern Battambang province.

implies that both KR and RGC's motivations were influenced by, or that each party identified timber as a factor in negotiations and the reintegration process.

The armed conflict of the on-going civil war in the mid 1990's was a military stalemate. Brown and Zasloff (1998: 254) describe the fighting, "The motley Royal Army was not capable of dislodging the Khmer Rouge from their territory by head-on military assault....the Khmer Rouge were not capable of overthrowing the government, nor even of gaining control of significant amounts of territory". This stalemate might have been in the interest of KR commanders because they could have enriched themselves from the profitable and unregulated trade in conflict timber. The KR movement had been profiting immensely from the exploitation of Cambodia's forests: from the late 1980's into to mid-1990's, estimates ranging from \$US 10 to \$US 20 million per month are stated as fact by numerous sources (this figure indicates the profits accrued by the KR central command). Rebel greed is a common explanation for conflict based on natural resources (Ross, 2003; Humphreys, 2005).

Profitable trade of this sort might be motivation against peace negotiations: this situation is termed the Domestic Conflict Premium Mechanism by Humphreys (2005: 17). This mechanism describes how rebel groups getting rich from natural resources during a war are often indifferent towards seeking conflict resolution. Those groups tend to prolong the war and undermine attempts at negotiated settlements. Moreover, prolonged conflict, especially at a limited level or military stalemate, is the best possible scenario for armed groups because they can amass large profits from the state of relative instability and lawlessness. This mechanism ostensibly describes the Cambodian situation where KR elites were amassing small fortunes. But countering this domestic mechanism is Humphreys International Conflict Premium Mechanism (Humphreys, 2005: 18) which identifies the influence of adjacent countries. Neighboring states might collude with rebel groups by exchanging cash and supplies for primary commodities or isolate them by closing the border. Thailand had been the KR's financial lifeline as they

provided cash, goods, medicine and protection for processed and uncut logs. Puangthong's research (2004) into the evolution of Thai-KR links substantiates the powerful influence that neighboring states have.

The factors which influence the continuation/termination of a civil war are numerous and complex. Mechanisms and models are instructive (Humphreys, 2005), but without investigating the motives of the parties seeking a negotiated settlement any analysis will be lacking. For this reason, it is imperative to ask what the motivations were of the KR divisions in Pursat province, for they were ostensibly profiting----to some degree----from logging and not embroiled in high level combat. This will lead into investigating the government's motives for seeking peace.

3.1 DATA FROM INTERVIEWS

Mr. Keo Sokouern was a KR and then a Khmer Serei¹⁵ soldier during the war in Battambang and Banteay Meanchey provinces respectively¹⁶. When this researcher asked him about KR motives for peace and any influence that natural resources might have played in the negotiations, he described the situation prior to reintegration to elucidate his point. "The standard of living of most KR soldiers was very low, despite all the money from selling timber to Thailand because most of the money was sent to the KR central command [KR elites in Anlong Veng]". For this reason, there was little incentive for KR units in Veal Veng to continue fighting as they didn't receive significant profits from the timber trade and their lives were neither safe nor comfortable. Their families

¹⁵ Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) were, supposedly, as their name implies Cambodian 'freedom' fighters, but their actions fell short of any virtuous goal. The reputation they earned was more akin to bandits or organized crime. They were one of the political-military factions residing on the border during the 1980's and early 1990's.

¹⁶ In 1993 he began working for the Ministry of Environment; consequently, as he was a Natural Resources Conservation Officer for the Communities Department of MoE (Ministry of Environment), he was one of the first MoE field staff in Veal Veng district in 2000.

lived in Thai refugee camps away from the front lines. “They [KR soldiers in Veal Veng] could not win the war, so it was not worth fighting for” (pers. comm., July 4th, 2006).

Mr. Ek Sophal¹⁷ was a high ranking KR commander in the 1970’s and 1980’s; today he is the Head Ranger of the Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary. According to Mr. Sophal, “Power sharing was the most important aspect in the peace negotiations” (pers. com., July 6th, 2006). This government policy was the reason why KR communities decided that peace was the best option, and he added that power sharing was guided by the Win-Win policy. Control over the forest resources in Veal Veng and the timber trade were not part of the negotiations. He underpinned what he previously said stating, “We wanted peace, and the negotiations [Win-Win policy of the government] were a good deal for us” (ibid.)

In 1996, Mr. Ban Bunloak¹⁸ was present at one of the first Front 505-RCAF meetings in Kravangh district. When the researcher questioned him about the motivations of KR divisions and communities for defecting, he replied that an end to the fighting was the only thing on his mind. He and other KR commanders didn’t view the abundance of forests and potential for lucrative trade as a ‘bargaining chip’ in the negotiations; equally, the government’s negotiators did not discuss their status in the negotiations. Natural resources were never addressed in any of the KR-RGC meetings which he attended prior to and during the reintegration process. “At that meeting in Kravangh, we talked about the Win-Win policy” (Mr. B. Bunloak, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006).

¹⁷ Mr. Ek Sophal joined the KR military movement in 1970 in Takeo province. During the early 1970’s he fought in Koh Kong province, eventually he commanded over 1,000 men when he was the top commander of Koh Kong province in the late 1970’s. In 1986 he came to fight in Veal Veng when Nuon Chea was the highest ranking commander in the region. He settled in Pramaowy in during reintegration.

¹⁸ Mr. Bunloak was an officer in one of the Pursat divisions. He first came to Veal Veng in 1979 and settled in Pramaowy in 1993. Today, as a result of the power sharing agreements contained within the Win-Win policy he is one of three Deputy District Governors of Veal Veng district.

The key informant to this research project is Mr. Ung Yong, the Governor of Veal Veng district and former-KR commander of division 695. When asked about the negotiations and motivations, he replied,

There were no talks about who got the trees, negotiations were first about a ceasefire. Then we talked about arranging more meetings. The government offered us the Win-Win policy and how we would all come to live under one law, Cambodian law. The Win-Win policy was very important for us, it is excellent.

(Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 27th, 2006).

The researcher then asked about his own personal motivation in seeking peace, “I was bored of war¹⁹, and that’s why I chose an administrative position instead of a commander in the RCAF” (Ibid.).

Mr. Kim Rin²⁰ was part of the Salvation Front²¹. With the inauguration of the RCAF, he became a commander of the fourth rank in the RCAF. In 1984 to 1986, he served as a deputy commander initiated in the K5²² Project into Thmah Dah commune. He was a government representative at the first RGC-KR meetings in Krapeu Pi (a commune in Veal Veng) in 1996. He stated that the topic of natural resources was never discussed at this meeting, nor in other subsequent negotiations. Initially, he said, the two sides talked about the possibility of a ceasefire, the Win-Win policy and convincing the

¹⁹ This is the literal translation, but the common English expression, “I’m sick and tired of war” is characterizes his feeling (pers. obs., July 27th, 2006).

²⁰ Mr. Rin studied military management and soldier health in Vietnam. From 1979 on, he fought in Pursat province where during a brief period after the KR retreated he was the governor; and then in the 1980’s he fought in Veal Veng.

²¹ The Vietnamese backed Cambodian military resistance to the KR.

²² This was a counter-insurgency strategy, also known as the ‘Bamboo Wall’ project. The People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) planned to advance on the KR defensive jungle positions, building a road (much of which is still used today) and cutting the trees to push the KR guerillas into Thailand (LeBillon, 2002: 565). This infamous offensive cost the lives of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodian soldiers.

KR leaders (among others, Mr. U. Yong²³ and Mr. B. Bunloak) of the government's desire for peace.

Veal Veng district's power sharing agreement dictated that of the three deputy governors, one of them was to be from the RGC. This individual, upon reintegration and still today is Mr. Che Chiew²⁴. These negotiations involved the power sharing and development aspects of the Win-Win policy, and had nothing to do with cutting forests or negotiating over the local natural resources (Mr. C. Chiew, pers. comm., July 26th, 2006).

From these interviews, key informants and actors plainly denied that Veal Veng's forest resources played the major role in the peace negotiations. These findings seem to invalidate the theory that the KR used timber as a bargaining chip to improve their negotiating position; correlatively, the theory linking natural resources to financial rents, and that this link was a motive in the RGC's intentions for peace was not confirmed. But what has been reproduced here are stories, recollected versions and first hand experiences of involved persons---many of whom might speak from a position of interest concerning logging and natural resource exploitation²⁵. In summary these interviews, though they have been verified through triangulation, need to be corroborated with the actual state of the forests in Veal Veng.

²³ Mr. Ung Yong and Mr. Kim Rin lived with each other in Veal Veng and developed a close relationship; then Mr. Rin invited Mr. Yong and some other KR cadre to come to Pursat to receive training in human right issues and meet with UNDP and UNHCR.

²⁴ He was a not a high ranking government official or general but a RCAF deputy commander. He knew about the negotiations as he was present in Phnum Kravangh district during the second RGC-KR meeting in 1997.

²⁵ According to an anonymous source, the district authorities and perhaps some staff members of MoE have been and still are complicit in illegal logging and hunting. Illegal logging is a sensitive subject, thus many people are reticent to speak truthfully on the subject.

3.2 DATA FROM MAPS

This type of data is based on satellite imagery (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006) and historical facts. To confirm that the forest resources were not an issue in the negotiations, it is necessary to find evidence showing the quality and quantity of Veal Veng's forests and compare their status prior to and after reintegration. Logically, if there was significant change in the forests there must be a cause. If there is a cause it must be attributable to something. If that something, upon analysis points to the government's management of the natural resources this might reveal a governmental plan or agenda regarding the forest resources in the northwestern area of the Cardamom Mountains.

These indicators will provide objective evidence to complement information supplied from interviews. Was there a preponderance of logging following reintegration and peace, and have the mountains around Veal Veng become significantly denuded? Were any forest concessions²⁶ granted in the area? Has there been a change in forest cover? If there has been a change, why?

The Atlas of Cambodia (2006: 43, 45) contains 'Forest Disturbance' and 'Forest Cover' maps which indicate that very little land has been cleared in Veng Veal. When compared to other areas in the northwest, viz. Sampouv Luon, Pailin and Samloat, Veal Veng is conspicuous for its lack of cleared land and less disturbed forests (See Appendix A, Map #7). All these locations are former-KR strongholds, but Veal Veng has retained significant forest cover when compared to maps showing the years 1976, 1997 and 2002(See Appendix A, Map #6). Obvious agricultural clearing and forest disturbed as a result of roads and villages is to be expected, as this indicates nascent community development which began in 2000.

²⁶ A forest concession is when a government rents out and awards land for forest harvesting rights to individuals, companies or communities who assume the responsibility for management and harvesting.

This proves that since the onset of reintegration no large scale logging operations have occurred in the new district. There has been a paucity of totally cleared land, and only forest disturbance along roads and in recently settled villages but nothing indicates a remarkable change in forest cover or the existence of an organized logging operation. Small scale illegal logging has occurred (Global Witness, 2001: 31) but this was never a high-level military operation carried on a large scale. If this had been the case, either the recently integrated local community had undertaken a logging enterprise, the RGC had permitted logging to begin, the RCAF had been busy in 'protecting' Cambodian forests---profiting from it as well---or there was some collusion between any or all of these parties. But this is unnecessary speculation and counter-factual, for it is irrelevant because the quality and quantity of forest in Veal Veng has not conspicuously changed. This argument is supported by the mapping data.

An even more significant indicator is that the RGC never granted a forest concession in Veal Veng after the negotiations were finalized. Forest concessions, in KR controlled zones, had been granted to foreign logging companies by the RGC during the war (Global Witness, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; LeBillon, 2000, 2002), but never in the KR controlled region of Veal Veng. This could easily be explained by the remoteness and poor infrastructure of the area, in contrast to Pailin which is well connected to Thailand. But in the post-conflict period, from 1997 onwards, where violence was no longer a threat and road construction was forthcoming, the opportunity to profit from the district's forests was pressing.

From these two indicators, one, the quality and quantity of Veal Veng's forests, two, that the RGC never granted a forest concession in the district, it is valid to assert that the Cambodian government never had, or never acted upon, economic interests. Greed, at the worst, or a desire to generate income did not motivate the RGC and RCAF to make peace with Front 505---the cynicism is erroneous.

CONCLUSION FROM DATA

The theory that the RGC had financial motives in approaching the negotiating table, and that forest commoditization was a factor in the negotiations, is not tenable. Therefore, the economic hypothesis central to this research is invalid. It is invalidated because both former-KR individuals and RGC/RCAF officials denied that the government party to the peace talks negotiated for control of the forest resources; consequently, this implies that the indigenous natural resources were not viewed by the government negotiators as potential commodities to profit from. These accounts were not contradicted by denuded hills upon reintegration, nor the existence of a forest concession in Veal Veng. In summary, forest resources were not used by Front 505 as a bargaining chip and the government was not pushed to control the timber trade, nor pulled by potential profits in signing a logging concession. As the hypothesis emphasizing financial motives has failed to explain the events, this research must identify different motives behind the government's intentions for peace.

3.3 THE KHMER ROUGE FRONT 505 MOTIVES FOR PEACE

The export ban on timber and Thailand's sometimes perfunctory enforcement²⁷ of it was the main factor eroding the financial base of KR forces across the northwest. On a macro-level, this economically isolated position was certainly a push factor forwards negotiating. But in regard to Veal Veng, what other push factors were identified? Peace

²⁷ Thailand insists it respects the laws of its neighbours, denying that timber imports have taken place in breach of the RGC timber cutting and export bans. Global Witness evidence (film) and official Thai documents show that timber exports from Cambodia have continued after the RGC export ban, generating significant tax revenue for the Thai Government. (Global Witness, 1996).

was often cited, but specifically what does this mean? Peace meant that families could finally live together (Mr. E. Sophal, pers. comm., July 6th, 2006; Mr. B. Bunloak, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006; Mrs. H. Porn, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006; Mr. J. Koom, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). Mr. Long Mos stressed that peace meant he no longer had to live in fear (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). It's safe to surmise that what Mr. Yong meant in saying, "I'm bored of war" is equivalent to desiring a state of peace, longing for security and being worn with war fatigue. Mr. Chay Mung said war fatigue motivated him and others to consider negotiations (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). To summarize, the dangerous and impoverished living conditions in the conflict zone and war fatigue among soldiers were the push factors motivating KR units in Veal Veng to explore peace negotiations.

Front 505's attitude towards the government was not one of truculence, they deeply desired peace, but were unsure of the RGC's stance on negotiations. There was deep antagonism between the two sides. This is summed up in a quote from a KR official (cited in Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 252) who explained the careful rapprochement between the KR and RGC, "Everyone wants peace. We want peace. But how can we go blindly....We have to discuss how to unify the army so we feel safe and they feel safe". Guarantees of safety, development and the strategy of power sharing embodied the Win-Win strategy (See Chapter 3.3) provided the security and framework for how peace could be achieved. Many of the former-KR individuals interviewed stated that the Win-Win policy was central to the peace negotiations. Therefore (as will be explained in Chapter 3.5) the Win-Win policy was the pull factor which motivated the divisions in Veal Veng to defect and begin the process of reintegration.

3.4 THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA'S MOTIVES FOR PEACE

As to the RGC, what were their motives (in terms of push and pull factors) in extending the olive branch and offering the Win-Win policy as a panacea for all? This analysis requires an explanation of how the coalition political parties positioned themselves with respect to the disintegrating KR movement.

3.4.1 FUNCINPEC, CPP AND THE KHMER ROUGE DEFECTIONS

Funcinpec's strategy towards KR forces contrived to strengthen the military power of the party. The royalist party lacked the size, weapons and experience of RCAF units loyal to the CPP. If Ranariddh could negotiate high ranking positions in the RCAF for the DNUM commanders, they would become Funcinpec clients allied to the First Prime Minister. DNUM's top commanders, Ee Chhean and Sok Pheap, were rumored to have been promised generalships or deputy chief of staffs, and Ranariddh was goading the DNUM rebel faction to wait for reintegration, until he had secured those positions for them (Chaumeau & Munthit, 1996). Once achieved, reintegration would proceed and the former-KR division of DNUM----rumored to be as large as 30,000----would integrate with the RCAF, but under the patronage of Prince Ranariddh.

Secret meetings²⁸ and negotiations were made, not under the name of the RGC, but with the name and authority of the political parties.

²⁸ On Pchum Ben, one of Cambodia's most important holidays where Khmer pay respects to their ancestors, Ranariddh on a secret visit, sought to 'stroke the tiger' by publicly meeting Ieng Sary and praying together at a temple. This conspicuous display of friendship and trust was shown on TV and it's no surprise that, "a foreign analyst said the political positing between Funcinpec and CPP is heating up" (Decherd, 1996) in response to that pre-emptive visit to Pailin, and foreshadowing the second prime minister's trip there a week later.

Undermining this situation [CPP negotiations with DNUM] further are the independent talks between DNUM and Funcinpec----headed by [Funcinpec] General Nhek Bun Chhay and cemented by Prince Norodom Ranariddh's 'secret' trip to Pailin the previous week. Hun Sen only knew that Ranariddh was leaving when the latter was already 15 minutes out of Phnom Penh.

(The tears and the fears, 1996)

At that time, in mid-October, all bets were on Funcinpec negotiating for the 'prize' that Ieng Sary symbolized. The KR and PDK had tended to oppose the CPP, considering the party pro-Vietnamese, as it was a reincarnation of the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)----both Hanoi backed regimes. In contrast, the PDK and Funcinpec (as well as the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)) had formed the CGDK in 1982 to counter the SOC, thus they had a history together----not so much based on friendship but in their united opposition to the CPP. The KR and CPP relationship was characterized with enmity and was hinted at by an anonymous Funcinpec source explaining the KR tilt towards Funcinpec saying "I never saw the will of the Khmer Rouge to talk with the CPP" (Chameau and Munthit, 1996). This kinship between the KR and Funcinpec was explained clearly in the aptly named Phnom Penh Post article "Royalists work rebel split for profit" (Grainger & Barber, 1996) which also cited Hun Sen's unhappiness at Funcinpec's superior negotiating position.

3.4.2 CPP NEGOTIATES WITH FRONT 505 IN VEAL VENG

It was apparent in this researcher's visits to Veal Veng district that it is a CPP area. The small Funcinpec office looks abandoned and lies far from the centre of Pramaowy, the district centre. To say there is a preponderance of CPP signs on private land is an understatement, to say there is no Funcinpec presence is closer to the truth

(pers. obs., July 2006). The deputy governor is an original CPP man, the large CPP sign displayed on his property is proof of this (Ibid.). The most powerful man in Pursat province is a member of the national assembly and a high ranking official in the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy, his constituency is Veal Veng district---H.E. Suy Sem is a CPP man. The CPP social power structure runs deep in Veal Veng, down to the village level where the Anlong Reab commune chief, and the village chiefs of Krang Rongnyang, Steung Thmei, Kandal and Eak Pheap have all identified their allegiance with CPP signs (Ibid.).

If seeing is not proof enough, a resident of Pramaowy since 1999, Mr. Phorn stated simply “Veal Veng is a CPP place” (pers. comm., July 16th, 2006) and providing the reason for this situation he added, “Ung Yong [district chief of Veal Veng] negotiated with the CPP factions of the RCAF, not Funcinpec.”

The defection, and subsequent reintegration of Front 505 happened without ‘conditions’. This was in contrast to DNUM’s demands for autonomy and high-ranking positions in the RCAF. As has been cited previously, the negotiations in Veal Veng were based on the government’s Win-Win policy (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 13th, 2006; Mr. K. Rin, pers. comm., July 12th, 2006). Finalizing a negotiated settlement with Front 505 was imperative for a number of reasons. The first was that bringing the 505 divisions into the government fold meant that DNUM was precluded from presenting a unified rebel-KR position in the negotiations. If DNUM could unite all rebel-KR factions (Front 205, 505 and 909) of the northwest, the Royal Government would have to bolster their offer in the peace deals. Strategically, the location of Front 505’s zone of control was in Samloat and Veal Veng, just south of the DNUM stronghold in Pailin. By dividing the rebel forces, isolating them, politically and geographically, the RGC was able to achieve peace on their own terms, terms set out in the Win-Win policy.

Front 505 broke from the Anlong Veng KR central command because they had been ordered to attack the DNUM rebels (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 27th, 2006), fortunately the order was repudiated. Both the DNUM and the RGC were eager to welcome them, as 505 (along with Fronts 205 and 909²⁹) represented a key rebel-KR faction which controlled significant territory and resources.

In September 1996, the RGC won the allegiance of Front 505 as they defected to the government side. “The Win-Win policy is excellent....we were tired of war, in not defecting to the government there could have been much more fighting, so the peace deal was agreed” replied Mr. Ung Yong (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006) when asked about the relationship between the negotiations, Ieng Sary’s DNUM faction, and the RGC.

As Front 505 came to the government side, aligned with the CPP, Ieng Sary and other rebel division commanders recognized Hun Sen as the government’s true power broker. Following the defection of Front 505, in November, Front 250 and 909 publicly announced their defections alongside Hun Sen. The three commanders declared they would not join DNUM because it had sought conditions in joining the RCAF (Chameau & Munthit, 1996). As a result, DNUM’s bargaining position was undermined, and their defection and reintegration occurred not two weeks later. The mood surrounding this decision was not met with smiles and was echoed by Ieng Sary’s secretary, Long Norin, saying “This integration is not our will” (Ibid.). By securing the defections of rebel-KR Front 505, 250 and 909, CPP strengthened its position via both DNUM and Funcinpec.

²⁹ These Fronts controlled territory in and around Samloat and Battambang province, holding positions north of Veal Veng.

3.5 SHADOW STATE POLITICS

In summary, the motives of the RGC, or the 'two-headed' coalition government were not financial but political. There was an on-going power struggle in Phnom Penh and securing the allegiance of defecting KR groups was key to assuring an electoral victory in 1998. The election was the pull factor motivating both CPP and Funcinpec to negotiate a settlement with any or all rebel-KR factions. As to the push factor, the then-present and emasculated power sharing coalition government of Funcinpec and CPP was the unworkable situation they both sought to transform to their advantage. The push and pull factors fit together. In order to gain the upper hand, the parties relied on shadow state practices.

Shadow state practices are characterized by leaders empowering themselves through their abilities to manipulate the market and divert financial rewards. When Hun Sen met with Ieng Sary in November 1996, he was accompanied by Mr. Boon Ma, reputedly Cambodia's richest man at the time. "Boon Ma's presence, and the reported rash of timber and gem contracts signed by CPP officials with Thai and Pailin businesses, was a clear sign that economic power.....came to town on Hun Sen's Mi-26 helicopter (a gift from Boon Ma)" (The tears and the fears, 1996). Hun Sen could have controlled Pailin's pace of development, or caused it to stagnate, through his clients and connections in the international community and he wielded this clout as leverage in the DNUM peace negotiations. This included directing development works such as schools, hospitals; including using his own resources, and those of the international community to build a road to Pailin (Ibid.). Ranariddh, because Funcinpec was less wealthy and less connected, lacked the ability to use financial rewards to his party's advantage. Funcinpec could not use financial rewards and promises of development inputs as leverage in the negotiations, and this emasculated their position, eroding the authority of the First Prime Minister.

Shadow state politics was also employed to secure the Front 505 defections, but the situation and financial rewards were different than those in Pailin. In 1993, a Royal Decree (See Chapter 5.1.1) designated the mountains in and around Veal Veng as a protected area. This wildlife sanctuary was reserved for scientific research and to preserve the rich biodiversity and ecology of that range of the Cardamom Mountains. But this legal status was incompatible with the Win-Win policy and securing the defections of the KR military units controlling the area. The Royal Decree was contravened by the CPP negotiators because the guidelines of the Win-Win policy allowed former-KR communities the right to live in the protected area as well as use the indigenous natural resources (See Chapter 3.6.2). The government was not allocating financial and development rewards like in Pailin, but allowing communities land ownership and land usage, including natural resources, to promote development; even if this was deleterious to the environment and in contradiction to the legally binding Royal Decree. To elucidate the argument further, an explanation of the Win-Win policy is necessary.

3.6 THE WIN-WIN POLICY

The Win-Win policy was aimed at motivating KR military units to defect from the movement and reintegrate into mainstream Cambodian society. This politico-military strategy, intending to terminate the prolonged civil conflict, was implemented in 1996. As defections began little by little in the mid-1990's, the policy strengthened the government's position and attrition weakened the KR central command's regional power base. It has been articulated in either a three or five point policy, but the salient aspects are the same. Win-Win is so called because KR military units and communities would not lose---punishment was precluded while individuals' previously held advantages

were included-----as a result of defection. The government won because touch, experienced and disciplined former-KR troops were integrated into the RCAF ranks. The territory previously outside the RGC's control became amalgamated into the kingdom and the on-going civil war approached its ultimate termination.

The Win-Win strategy is underpinned by economic goals. Reintegration was to be achieved by improving standards of living and these were to be raised by extending the free market into the marginalized former-KR strongholds. Trade fosters economic inter-linkages, both internal and external. The abundance of natural resources and plentiful land in former-KR strongholds were a perfect fit for the Win-Win policy. Reintegration and reconciliation were to be achieved by stimulating trade and the economy, infrastructure was the sine qua non for all these.

The Win-Win policy was a Hun Sen backed CPP strategy which was taken and adapted from Vietnam (Mr. P. Sam Ouern, pers. comm., July 22nd, 2006; Mr. C. Samnang, pers. comm., July 24th, 2004). Fucinpec's strategy for negotiations have been termed 'stroking the tiger' (Balance of power, 1996). The differences in policies, in terms of strategy and substantive matters in negotiations, were insignificant compared to what lay behind the negotiators: power. KR factions were likely to negotiate with the party which held and wielded the most power, the party which could offer their community the best deal for reintegration.

Hun Sen, in a speech on November 15th, 2001 delivered on the occasion of his acceptance of an honorary degree from Ramkhamhaeng University, in Thailand outlined the 'Win-Win' policy in a three point strategy:

1. Providing guarantee for security, life and physical safety to all those who had volunteered to defect from the Pol Pot's political and military organization in order to join the government and the mainstream of the society.

2. Their career and profession were protected through the process of integration, except for those who had political function.
3. Their mobile and immobile private property is being recognized by the government.

(MAIF, 2001)

The basic outline of the Win-Win policy, in either a three or five point strategy, was confirmed in a conversation with Mr. Yong (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). The five point version of the Win-Win policy, according to him, is articulated as follows:

1. The land and community in which you reside will be recognized as yours, if you wish to continue living there. If not, you are able to resettle anywhere in the country.
2. The ‘advantages’ which you have accrued prior to reintegration will remain as yours (house, possessions, property, money, etc.)
3. Upon reintegration, you will retain an equivalent position in the RGC or RCAF.
4. We’ll forget about the past, wrongs committed during the war will be left in the past. We work together to reconcile and there will be no more killing.
5. The RGC and RCAF will guarantee your security, and provide development opportunities for your livelihood.

3.6.1 POWER SHARING

The Win-Win policy included a power sharing deal between defecting KR administrators and commanders with government forces and administrators. Mr. Ek Sophal (pers. comm., July 6th, 2006) stated that, “Power sharing was the most important aspect in the negotiations”. This refers to a modus vivendi reflecting the government’s guarantees that reintegrated KR functionaries would receive an equivalent position in the government---in either the civil administration or the armed forces. This approach retained the hierarchy, power structure and chain of command within the former-KR administration and military. By leaving the social structure in place, this strategy facilitated the transition and integration of former-KR communities into the Cambodia

society. It's unlikely that KR leaders would have been amenable to peace if their positions would have been usurped by 'outsiders'.

“CPP sources say [Hun] Sen is prepared to let soldiers, police, village and commune leaders all to keep their jobs” (The Tears and the Fears, 1996). Power is exerted from political and administrative positions and former-KR people required some share of these to feel secure in the new government. Positions were made available in the civil administration, either at the village, commune or district level.

Apart from plans for civil integration, the Win-Win policy was also a pragmatic and tactical military strategy. Defecting KR divisions and soldiers were not demobilized, but integrated into the government forces. As dissident KR forces sided with the government, the RCAF went from strength to strength. As reported in The Cambodia Daily on October 1st, 1996, the co-prime ministers reiterated the fact that integrating KR forces into the RCAF was a fundamental step in insuring that long time enemies can work together in resisting the threat from hard-line KR still operating in many provinces (Decherd, 1996).

The specifics of power sharing were not detailed and set in stone. When asked about his role as the sole government representative in a former-KR stronghold, Mr. Che Chiew (pers. comm., July 26th, 2006) explained the nature of power sharing and replied

Power sharing did not come down to a figure----25% and 75% for example-----as it was more a need to understand each other, so we must live together. I came to bring Cambodian law, make the people in Veal Veng understand the new laws we would live under together. KR people lived under a different law before, now this [Veal Veng] is Veal Veng district so the laws are different.

Part of the power sharing agreement was the establishment of the Veal Veng district, which involved delineating district and commune boundaries----this process

refers territorial integration----and preparing an administrative structure. In Veal Veng district, the top former-commander assumed the governor's position, two other former-KR deputies filled the positions of deputy governor and the third deputy governor's job went a RCAF officer and representative of the government. The upper administrative structure in Veal Veng district was established and staffed as follows:

- Mr. Ung Yong (ex-KR commander of division 695) – Governor of District
- Mr. Ban Bunloak (ex-KR officer) – Deputy Governor
- Mr. Khoy (ex-KR officer) –Deputy Governor
- Mr. Che Chiew (RCAF deputy commander) –Deputy Governor

Another instance of power sharing and incorporating former-KR technicians and administrators into the new government is in the district health department. During the war Mr. Chay Mung was the most respected and skilled KR medical officer in Veal Veng; upon reintegration he worked side by side provincial health staff to set-up health services in the district. Today he is the Chief of Health in the district. All the local health staff working today were originally KR medical soldiers. They received training and returned to their positions as government health staff.

3.6.2 LAND RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES

A policy of forced resettlement would have been inimical to placating rebel-KR factions and making them amenable to peace. The KR soldiers had fought for these lands, repelling both Vietnamese and RCAF attacks in the 1980's and 1990's. At the first historic meeting between Hun Sen and Ieng Sary, on October 23rd, 1996, the second Prime Minister was quoted as saying, "You [defecting KR soldiers and communities] all have the right to continue and stay at your house, on your own land, as you are" (Decherd

& Serey, 1996). This was in accord with what Y Chhean, the renegade faction's military leader and commander of Pailin's Division 415, reiterated by replying, "The lands on which our people are now living and planting crops and rice are really their own property which will be surely recognized and protected by the Cambodian Royal Government" (ibid.).

The Win-Win policy was concerned with economic development (Mr. C. Chiew, pers. comm., July 26th, 2006), and land rights were essential to this. For with private property legally granted to soldiers-turned-farmers, and allowed access to the indigenous resources, the reintegrating families could begin post-conflict development---- initially at a subsistence level. LeBillon (2002: 576) related the substance of the peace deal with regard to control of land, confirming the government's emphasis on local development by explaining that "Defecting Khmer Rouge commanders remained in partial control of their territory and resources, even obtaining tax exemptions and promises of development assistance". With governmental inputs such as roads, health services and schools, the community could begin to improve their own lives and take advantage of the emerging free market in these formerly communist areas. Mr. Chai Sareth, the present Governor of Pursat province, explained to this researcher that the Win-Win policy was about improving the socio-economic conditions of former-KR communities. This was accomplished by letting reintegrated soldiers develop their lands, through ownership and with the help of the government (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

An aspect of the policy which certainly appealed to many KR soldiers was the introduction of private property and land rights. The right to private property was very important; moreover, in one KR zone [Malai] approaching the negotiating table, the most common words apart from 'peace' and 'reconciliation' are 'property' and the contemptuous 'collectivization' (Peace and politics, 1996). The latter refers to the orthodox communist practice of communal farming, production and living. While power

sharing might have been important to upper cadre, for soldiers “property is the key” (Former foes toast, 1996).

Reintegration can only be successful if there is economic integration and, in the case of many KR strongholds, an improvement in the impoverished standards of living. As the KR zones were literally marginalized from the rest of the kingdom, creating economic inter-linkages was the sine qua non for successful reintegration. Former-KR communities, with their own land and having access to the indigenous natural resources, could begin agriculturally based development.

3.6.3 PROMISES OF DEVELOPMENT

By developing infrastructure, the government was creating the conditions to stimulate trade and make future economic headway into the natural resource rich areas. Roads, particularly the one linking Pailin to the rest of the country, were to underpin reintegration. The US had stated interest in building such a road and a US spokesman said “one of the methods that the [US] ambassador is convinced is very effective [encourage breaking with the Khmer Rouge] is opening up roads to trade” (United States Interested, 1996). Reintegration cannot succeed without the economic integration of marginalized former war zones with mainstream society and a market economy. Land rights and infrastructure development were prerequisites for these. Ballard (2002: 5) lists many factors which contribute to sustainable reintegration including agricultural production (subsistence and commercial), non-farming income generation, gainful employment, and small businesses; these in turn are influenced by community circumstances, socio-economic-politico policies of the state and access to basic services in the community. The economic plans of the RGC and strengthening access to basic

services, as Ballard notes, were integral for sustained peace and were included in the Win-Win policy.

As Hun Sen stated in his speech on November 15th, 2001, the government was now responsible for “providing guarantees for security, life and physical safety to all those who had volunteered to defect from the Pol Pot's political and military organization”. These three aspects, security, life and physical safety, could only be assured through the provisions of basic development such as health services, infrastructure, and agricultural inputs.

When asked about the specifics of the Win-Win policy, Mr. Che Chiew, declared that it was essentially about development (pers. comm., July 26th, 2006). When Mr. Chay Mung (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006) described the Win-Win policy, he used the term ‘country building’. Country building according to him was moving on from a period of war and destruction, becoming modern like other countries and development. Country building and development were some of his personal motives for wanting to defect and join the Royal Government.

According to Mr. Kim Rin, reintegrating areas would be able to receive development benefits from NGOs (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006). This last point is important, because, in fact it was NGOs (i.e. UNDP, UNHCR, and AusAid) who were responsible for most of the funding for post-conflict reconstruction.

3.6.4 RECONCILIATION

In agreeing to defect, Hun Sen said that former-KR soldiers, “have not confessed or surrendered by joining the government” (Decherd & Rotha, 1996). This statement

emphasizes the reconciliation element inherent in the Win-Win policy. In defecting, the government's 1994 legislation outlawing the KR was rescinded. Reintegrated KR people had been granted the status of citizens under Cambodian law. In short, the Win-Win policy was not a legal instrument concerned with justice.

Nonetheless, defections did include issues of justice, for they were impossible to avoid completely in that current ethos and with lingering memories of the past. The amnesty granted to Ieng Sary, which precipitated the negotiated settlement between the RGC and the DNUM, was highly symbolic. Though Ieng Sary was granted amnesty by King Norodom Sihanouk, Watkin (1996) explained that the Royal pardon did not preclude future prosecution from trials charging him with crimes against humanity committed during the DK regime. What the amnesty did provide was immunity from the Vietnamese verdict for the death sentence³⁰ and from the 1994 legislation against the KR movement.

“Amnesty was not part of the Win-Win policy” stated Mr. Ung Yong (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). Reconciliation, (‘national reconciliation’ as it was often termed) was not in a legal sense, it was a social sense in that all Cambodians would come to work together and would not dwell on past wrongs committed. Reconciliation was based on the power sharing agreements of the Win-Win policy and would be achieved by fostering economic development at the community level. This sense of reconciliation underpinned the work of CAREERE II and Seila. This is described in a CAREERE report (UNDP/Cambodia, 2001: 47)

The reconciliation program had two phases: (1) confidence and trust building through providing agriculture and infrastructure support; (2) civil integration...that the first phase of the reconciliation component, concrete benefits were brought to former KR areas so as to build and contact with the population...the second phase was dedicated to extend SEILA structures and programme in these communities.

³⁰ When the Vietnamese occupied Phnom Penh in 1979 they sentenced the top ranking KR and PDK cadre to death in absentia for crimes committed during 1975 and 1979.

Religious and ethnic complications were non-existent in these peace negotiations. Reconciliation would be achieved through the development of marginalized areas and the management of this development would be handled by a decentralized governance structure administered through local people, both former-KR individuals and RGC officials.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The Win-Win policy was the CPP's strategy to bring an end to the civil war. KR forces were already weary of fighting a war they had no chance of winning, soldiers lived separate from their families and standards of living were low. The Win-Win policy offered what the KR communities needed: political power sharing, private property/land rights, and guarantees that reintegrating communities would receive development and security. Reintegration would be achieved by letting the free market transform previously marginalized areas. A cash economy was nascent in former-KR strongholds, and development would be based on the use and extraction of natural resources and on subsistence based agriculture. To manage the development and existence under one law, Cambodian law, required power sharing between former-KR leaders/administrators and RGC officials; moreover, basic development inputs, both physical and social (See Chapter IV), were needed to initiate post-conflict development and improve the standards of living among reintegrating communities.

The Win-Win policy functioned implicitly with shadow state politics machinations. In a sense, the economic power of government negotiators enabled them to tempt KR commanders into defection. Mr. Spohal said that during the negotiations, gifts of villas in Phnom Penh, Landcruisers and recently demined land in Battambang

province were offered to high ranking KR cadre and commanders (pers. comm., July 6th, 2006). Hun Sen used the Win-Win policy to allocate and direct development aid and infrastructure to impoverished areas, and this served to consolidate his power base and strengthen his precarious position as the second Prime-Minister in the coalition government. The Royal Decree was contravened, by shadow state practices, to secure the defections of the Veal Veng KR factions. By circumventing the legal status of the Royal Decree, land rights were given to former-KR communities, this implied usage of protected natural resources.

So to speak of the RGC's motivations for peace is erroneous, for two reasons. One, in reality, the RGC was a divided entity which had progressively bifurcated since its inception in 1993. The coalition partners operated separately, often in conflict. Two, the political parties were not so concerned with bringing peace to Cambodia, they were taking advantage of the situation to tilt the balance of power in their favor: motivations for peace were actually motivations for strength.

With respect to Veal Veng and the Front 505 defections, the CPP negotiators³¹ were not going to risk failure or complicating negotiations by considering the Royal Decree of 1993, which designated Veal Veng as a protected area. The deal would not likely have been sealed if the RGC demanded the communities of Veal Veng relocate elsewhere or denied them access to the indigenous natural resources; moreover, this would have been contravening the Win-Win policy which was the substance of the negotiations and the sine qua non for peace. The Win-Win policy was the pull factor motivating KR groups to end armed conflict. Disregarding the Royal Decree and permitting former-KR communities to use, abuse, or exploit the natural resources within a protected area was of such insignificant import compared to the realpolitik of the day. The CPP required a strong rural support base. The power sharing inherent in the Win-

³¹ RCAF Generals Keo Pong and Pol Saroeun were responsible for the Veal Veng faction negotiations (Mr. Ung Yong, pers. comm., July 13th, 2006; Rotha & Decherd, 1996).

Win policy, enabled Hun Sen's clients to make headway into former-KR areas, transforming them into CPP strongholds.



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CHAPTER IV

REINTEGRATION DEVELOPMENT

4.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASELINES PRIOR TO REINTEGRATION

The government's first socio-economic survey of Veal Veng district was conducted in 2000. Thus socio-economic statistics on Veal Veng prior to 2000 are non-existent and even the government's Commune Database of 2004 lacks specific data in some categories (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006: 33, 89, 111). Therefore this research relies heavily on first hand and first person accounts.

4.1.1 WARTIME UNTILL REINTEGRATION: 1979 – 1996

Mr. Chay Mung³² provided a description on the living conditions and standards of health of KR soldiers in Veal Veng,. He recounted a chronological summary of health, medical services and illness among KR soldiers and their dependents.

He began describing the early years when retreating KR forces first arrived in the Cardamoms Mountains saying, “We had no support, nothing whatsoever and during 1979 and 1980 many, many people [KR soldiers and dependents] died of starvation and malaria”. By 1981, the NADK central command had reorganized and reconnected their

³² He was a high ranking KR military medical officer during the civil war and is presently the Chief of Health in Veal Veng District in Pramaowy

supply lines. As a result, from 1981 on, support was reestablished and the living conditions of KR guerillas fighting in the jungles of the Cardamom Mountains improved. “Our [KR guerrilla soldiers] lives weren’t so bad because there was food (rice, canned fish and cooking oil), medicine and basic health services provided from the DK centre” (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

During this period, the families of KR soldiers were living in the Chong Khao Phlu refugee camp in Thailand and even KR guerilla soldiers could retreat to the camps for food, medicine and safety. “Conditions were difficult, and there was warfare but we had supplies and our families were protected,” reported Mr. Juab Coom, a KR guerilla soldier who fought mostly in Thmah Dah commune (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

4.1.2 TRANSITIONAL PHASE: 1996 – 1999

Funding, material and medical support from KR elites in Anlong Veng was curtailed and eventually ceased once the Veal Veng and Samloat military divisions broke from under their command. Due to the drawn out negotiation process, renewed combat in the northwest and the coup d’etat in 1997, the government was unable to fill and replace that support until 2000. Veal Veng’s remoteness and lack of access further hindered provisions of government aid and emergency assistance from NGOs.

Ms. Barbara Callebaut, a doctor and representative of Medicine Sans Frontieres (MSF), joined one of the first KR-RGC meetings and conducted an evaluation mission to Krapeu Pi commune in Veal Veng district in May 1997. In her report (Callebaut, 1997) she stated, “Drinking water is taken from the rivers, pumps are non-existent and agriculture is difficult as it is rain dependent. There is an absence of water storage jars”. The lack of roads and bridges meant transport was only accessible to 4x4 vehicles during

the dry season and in the wet season many villages could only be accessed by tractor. In regards to the population's health, malaria incidence occurred in 70% of the population (Ibid.). Other health problems included amoebic dysentery, respiratory infections (especially among children), and some cases of Typhoid fever. Health services were only curative and vaccinations were non-existent. To sum up the standard of living of the reintegrated former-KR communities, Ms. Callebaut remarked, "In this period of transition [from centralized public services to market economy and democracy] the population finds itself in a vulnerable position" (Ibid.).

Mr. Buoy Phorn, the World Food Program (WFP) storekeeper, arrived to work in Veal Veng in 1999³³. He approximated that 30 families lived around the new district centre of Pramaowy town, though there was only six small wooden shacks for permanent shelter (Mr. B. Phorn, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006). The district was connected to the rest of the province by a narrow track wide enough for only a motorcycle. The WFP truck, bringing in supplies from Pursat took 15 days to make the trip----a distance of 125 kilometres! "Of the approximately 30 families living around Pramaowy in 1999, only a few had a mosquito net, if they did there was only one for the whole family. These few nets were not impregnated" (Ibid.).

Mr. Mung estimated that all inhabitants (100 per cent)----which at this time included some KR families who had left the refugee camps----were chronically ill with malaria between 1997-2000. He also cited diarrhea and influenza as being widespread among the population (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 15th, 2006). Furthermore, tents were the most common shelter, there was next to no agriculture being undertaken, medicine was extremely scarce and health services were non-existent (Ibid.).

Dr. Ung Sophan (pers. comm., July 6th, 2006) was responsible for organizing the structure of health services in Veal Veng in 1999 and 2000. He stated that malaria was

³³ WFP was the first NGO to begin work in Veal Veng.

the most significant threat to the health of the population. “They [former-KR soldiers and dependents] were all extremely thin and pale and there were many disabled individuals” (Ibid.).

It’s not surprising that Dr. Sophan identified a high number of disabled individuals as some of the land in Veal Veng and North Western Cambodia is considered as some of the most heavily mined land in the world (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006:14) and a PRDC/CARERE Project Agreement stated that 30% of the land in Veal Veng was mined (CARERE II/UNDP, 2000).

In 1993, after nearly 15 years of combat in the forests and mountains of Veal Veng, Mr. Juab Coom settled in Pramoawy. “Reintegration, and the years following it were the hardest to live”, and he singled out 1999/2000 as unique, saying, “they were the worst” (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). In 1997, he lost his leg when he stepped on a landmine less than 20 metres from his house.

Mr. Cheng Samnang, a Senoir Provincial Program Advisor for the Partnership for Local Governance,³⁴ explained that due to the extreme poverty, nascent reconciliation process, and danger in the form of landmines and malaria, “Veal Veng district after reintegration was insecure” (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006).

Mr. Yong (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006) confirmed what Mr. Samang said about the potentially dangerous living conditions in Veal Veng. More accurately, he identified three threats to human security and one direct constraint to development and improving the lives of former-KR people living in the district. The former are: landmines, malaria, and extreme poverty; while the latter is the existence of a wildlife sanctuary, viz. the PSWS, encompassing the villages and lands in Veal Veng.

³⁴ Mr. Samnang had previously worked with CARERE I and CARERE II in Pursat province during the 1990’s.

4.1.2.1 LANDMINES

A grave threat to lives and livelihoods in Veal Veng are the landmines which were planted during the decades of civil war. “It has been estimated that between 4 and 6 million landmines have been laid in Cambodia.... moreover, the mine problem is mainly concentrated in the northwest part of the country bordering Thailand” (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006: 14). Small signs with a white skull and cross-bones on a red background³⁵ are ubiquitous along the roads and around houses in Veal Veng (pers. obs., May, 2005). For example, *The Atlas of Cambodia* (2006: 15) shows the landmine contamination of Veal Veng district: much of western Thmah Dah commune is conspicuous as a block of one unbroken minefield and road #56 (from Phnum Kravangh to Pramaowy town) is heavily mined on both sides.

Mr. Taylor Owen³⁶ (pers. comm., July 29th, 2005) explained the intricacies which landmines present, in terms of poverty and human security. Landmines are an obvious security threat, but they also present a latent danger. The former need not be explained---landmines maim and kill---while the latter compounds and exacerbates latent security issues. Land conflict has often been a result of contaminated land. A lack of safe land leads to land scarcity, which inevitably erupts into violence. It is often the poor and disadvantaged who loose out in getting cleared land, thus they are forced to endanger themselves and their family by entering minefields for subsistence practices or searching for mines and UXOs to sell as scrap metal. Without mine clearance, agricultural lands are just unused empty fields and village growth is stymied; in short, development is precluded.

³⁵ ‘Danger! Mines!’ is boldly written on these signs.

³⁶ Mr. Owen is currently a doctorate student at Oxford University. Some of this his research, inter alia, describes how poverty can be a threat to human security. He has undertaken research in Cambodia on two occasions.

In identifying landmines as a threat to human security and an obstacle to development, Mr. Ung Yong is cognizant that without further mine clearing the district will remain impoverished and marginalized (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006). Clearance of mines and UXOs reduces poverty, fosters social cohesion, enables infrastructure projects and returns the community land to its rightful owners.

4.1.2.2 MALARIA

Malaria, as has been alluded to previously (MSF, 1997; Dr. U. Sophan, pers. comm., July 1st, 2006, Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006) posed the biggest health threat to the population during the transition period from war to peace.

One cause of the endemic malaria was uninformed and incorrect taking of medicine. This was common after medicinal support from the KR central command ceased prior to reintegration. Mr. Pok Sam Ouern (pers. comm., July 21st, 2006) explained the situation

People did not know which medicines to take, so they took anything they could get, which was usually outdated and useless medicine brought in from Thailand. Even if they had cold, they might assume they had malaria and take any antibiotics until the cold went away. These practices have led to high resistance in the malarial parasites in the region.

This analysis was confirmed by Dr. Sophan (pers. comm., July 1st, 2006) and Mr. Chay Mung (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006), who also added that a lack of mosquito nets during this period was also a contributing factor to rampant malarial infections.

An important factor which explains the high prevalence of malaria among the Veal Veng population is that people during the transition period depended on forests for

their livelihoods (i.e. hunting, logging, gathering wild potatoes and other forest products). Mainstream agriculture based livelihoods keeps people from entering the forests and putting themselves at risk from contracting malaria.

4.1.2.3 POVERTY

There is no data available on levels of poverty in Veal Veng commune, as the last national census was compiled in 1998 (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006: 13) when there was little to no access into Veal Veng. With no market access, low soil fertility, meager infrastructure, limited education and knowledge of agriculture----all within a newly relocated community----extreme poverty defined life in Veal Veng. 1999 and 2000 were the worst years because the government and NGOs had only just begun to allocate emergency relief after support from the KR centre had ceased three or four years previously. “People had no rice----they ate wild potatoes----no medicine, houses were makeshift tents, malaria was rampant and the population at large was very sick” (Mr. B. Phorn, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006).

There were many factors which compounded the poverty in Veal Veng. The previously mentioned malaria and landmines exacerbated the dire situation. Another important factor is the lack irrigation in the district, even today (Dept. of Planning, 2004; Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 13th, 2006; pers. obs., July 2006). Rain fed agriculture is tenuous at best, thus food security continues to be at risk. Additionally, the land in Veal Veng is infertile (*The Atlas of Cambodia*, 2006: 99) and once land has been denuded and cleared, it loses what little fertility it had (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006). The local population is unlikely to thrive from agriculture alone so farmers must clear large tracts of land to make their work productive and profitable.

4.1.2.4 PHNOM SAMKOS WILDLIFE SANCTUARY

The last constraint is unlike the others. The PSWS was not a factor in the transition period because it emerged in the later in 2003. The PSWS is a constraint because it limits development because it has regulated natural resource usage in Veal Veng. It will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Mr. Yong highlighted three threats to the population and these are consistent with other accounts (i.e. Ms. Barbara Callebaut's MSF report (1997), and the accounts of Mr. Mung, Mr. Phorn, Mr. Sam Ouern and Dr. Sophan). In summary, during the transition period, particularly in 1999, the population was at high risk from malaria, landmines and poverty. During the previous period of conflict, the soldiers had support from the KR centre and their families lived in refugee camps, thus living conditions were clearly better. Malaria has always been a problem since the KR and PAVN forces fought in the Cardamom Mountains, but without drugs and mosquito nets supplied from the outside, infections proliferated. Living conditions, in tents or makeshift shelters, could not obviate malarial mosquitoes. The transition from soldier to farmer was hindered because knowledge of agriculture was limited, as were agricultural inputs such as tools, seeds and draft animals. Landmines also obstructed agricultural practices. For nearly twenty years prior, people survived off provisions of rice, both the soldiers at the front and the families in refugee camps. This left them extremely vulnerable. Like the infamous stories from the DK regime's work camps (in 1975 to 1978), where Cambodians scavenged for food in the forest to survive, in Veal Veng former-KR people relied on eating wild potatoes and cassava.

4.1.3 POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT: 2000 - TODAY

Many of the human security threats in Veal Veng continued unabated into the development period, even today many families live in extreme poverty. Although NGOs and the government allocated emergency and longer term development inputs, the population did not benefit from these immediately.

Daltry (2002) conducted a survey in O'Saum commune for Fauna and Flora International (FFI) which highlighted serious health problems in the communities; she stated

Of the houses visited as part of this social assessment, 75% had a family member incapacitated with weakness and/or fever...Widespread illness caused a labour shortage during the rice-growing season of 2000 that led to rice shortages for many families by February 2001.

Disadvantaged Cambodian's Organization (DCO) was one of the first Khmer NGOs to work in the region. According to the Executive Director, Mr. Pok Sam Oeurn (pers. comm., July 21st, 2006), families in Pramaowy survived by scavenging for food and put their lives at risk (i.e. malaria and landmines) by going into the forest to hunt, log and collect non-timber forest products (NFTPs).

The first socio-economic survey compiled by the Pursat Department of Planning (Pursat Department of Planning, 2001) ranks Veal Veng district, and its 5 communes, as the poorest areas of the province. Among the data, some statistics stand out as significant in relation to the level of poverty among the inhabitants of the district in 2000.

- There were 1,014 families and 5,021 people residing in Veal Veng
- There were 740 thatch houses (73% of families)

- There were 26 primary (grades 1-6) school classrooms and 34 teachers
- There were no secondary school classrooms or teachers
- There were 14 nurses, two trained midwives and no doctors
- There was one health centre, and no health posts
- 33 toilets were in use
- There were 19 tractors, vehicles or other plowing machines in use
- There were 236 families raising pigs

4.1.4 POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT INPUTS

4.1.4.1 THE REINTEGRATION PROCESS AND THE CAMBODIAN REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM II AND SEILA PROGRAM

CARERE, under the auspices of UNHCR and UNDP, carried out the resettlement of IDPs, repatriated the refugees living in camps on the border, and provided both emergency support and short term development projects towards ensuring peaceful national elections in 1993. Following the changing conditions and needs of the country, CARERE II and the Seila³⁷ program continued the work of CARERE with more emphasis on long term development. CARERE II gained the reputation for being a key actor in the national reconciliation process in the mid-1990's and was responsible for making contact with former-KR factions and addressing their immediate rehabilitation needs. In addition, CARERE II provided the financial and technical support for the Seila program. The Seila program is a nationally owned institution working to strengthen

³⁷ Seila in Khmer means 'foundation stone', thus it connotes that object which a building (and implying development) is based upon.

decentralized governance towards tackling rural poverty and promoting local development.

The RGC and RCAF were responsible for the peace negotiations while it was CAREERE II and Seila that became the lead institutions for bringing reintegration benefits and helping with reconciliation in Veal Veng (Mr. C. Song, pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006). Village and commune level officials, who were former-KR people, contacted both NGO staff alongside provincial government authorities to build a strong relationship towards reintegration. According to Mr. Samang (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006) funding for post-conflict development projects was provided through CAREERE II, to the village and commune committees; thus planning together (between former-KR people and government authorities) was achieved at a local and decentralized level, this fostered reconciliation.

The reintegration process combined the expertise of UNDP's CAREERE II, the RGC's Seila program, provincial officials and the former-KR leaders in their areas. "The CAREERE Program, at the request of the national and provincial governments, designed a program in these newly integrated areas to promote a secure environment conducive to reconciliation between the government and the affected communities" (UNDP/Cambodia, 2001: 49). In delivering post-conflict development inputs outlined in the Win-Win policy, UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR and WFP) and other NGOs under the leadership of provincial governors and the Provincial Rural Development Committee (PRDC) formulated a plan for reintegration. Funding³⁸ was channeled through CAREERE II and Seila while the local authorities at the village and district level identified, in collaboration with the PRDC, how the money should best be invested.

In the first phase of reintegration, characterized as post-conflict development and reintegration, infrastructural projects began while provisions of medicines, basic health

³⁸ In different KR strongholds, funding was provided by a number of sources, including AusAid, UNDP, European Commission and the Swedish development Agency (Mr. C. Song, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006).

services and agricultural inputs were allocated to the communities. Through this, “reconciliation component, concrete benefits were brought to the former-KR areas so as to build trust and contact with the population” (UNDP/Cambodia, 2001: 48). The second phase, characterized as social reconciliation, civil integration through capacity building implanted Seila governance structures to former-KR communities. These Seila participatory rural development and decentralized structures (i.e. grassroots government such as village committees) offered the opportunity for former-KR leaders and commanders to participate effectively in the governmental administration.

Reintegration and reconciliation were fostered because the process was approached by ‘not coming from Phnom Penh’, it was through and through a decentralized grass-roots strategy. As stated in the UNDP/Cambodia report (2001: 49) CAREERE II/Seila was able to avoid unnecessary antagonism between government civil servants and Khmer Rouge local authorities because those KR administrators and technicians were able to continue their duties and remain at their positions while absorbing the Seila principles of grass-roots participation, good governance, and decentralized decision making with ease.

Post-conflict development in Veal Veng district began in early 2000. This took the form of basic, and much needed, infrastructure projects. Funding was provided by AusAid through the Australian Embassy for \$US 500,000. This total sum was divided between the former-KR strongholds in Veal Veng and Samloat---\$US 270,000 was allocated to Veal Veng district and the rest to Samloat.

UNHCR was the lead agency in post-conflict emergency relief and short-term development because Veal Veng district received refugee families who had been residing in the Chong Khao Phlu refugee camp. Thus UNHCR was mainly responsible for repatriation and resettlement, and the initial infrastructural inputs in the new district; initially CAREERE II/Seila Program emphasized the social aspects of post-conflict reintegration and reconciliation by empowering local governance.

In identifying the benefits that former-KR Veal Veng community received as a result of reintegration, the infrastructure repairs and physical inputs which were initially built following reintegration will be described first. This will be followed by the social aspects, such as capacity building. Finally, a short description of the NGOs (and their projects) who have in the past and are currently contributing to the continuing post-conflict development in the district will be listed.

4.1.4.2 INFRASTRUCTURE

SECONDARY ROAD #56

Reintegration required that Veal Veng district, and all its five communes, become accessible and connected to mainstream Cambodia. To this end, an infrastructure project was required to connect the remote district to the provincial centre (Pursat town and Highway #5) to Phnom Penn, Pursat, Battambang and Poipet (See Appendix A). Prior to reintegration, the provincial and secondary road #56 connected Pursat town through to Phnum Kravangh district and onto the previous Veal Veng district centre, Tuol Kruous, which was also a police and RCAF military outpost.

A year round accessible road was needed to span the 30 kilometres between Tuol Kruous and Pramaowy. Construction began in February 2000 and was completed six months later. The total cost of this infrastructure project was \$US 130,000 (Mr. C. Song, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006.). In subsequent conversations with the Veal Veng District Governor, (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 13th, 2006) he recounted that demining this 30 kilometres stretch of road produced over 2000 mines.

Today the trip from Pursat town to Pramaoway takes at most three and half hours and there is year round access. This road, as well as culverts and the repair or construction of new bridges has been essential for, “facilitating service delivery and strengthening the linkages [social and economic] with local and regional markets as well as improving communication” (Ballard, 2002). Today, NGOs such as DCO have encouraged cash-crop production because agricultural products can now reach larger markets in Pursat and Battambang.

In 2002, another road linking Pramaowy westwards to Thmah Dah commune and the Thai border was completed and funded by the Engineering Group of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (Daltry, 2002). This road is 75 kilometres long and also connects Anlong Reab commune, and the villages of Krang Rongieng and Daik Krahom. It is hoped that this will eventually improve the economy through cross-border trade with Thailand.

SCHOOLS

In 2000, schools were built in Pramaowy, Anlong Reab and Krapeu Pi communes with funding from UNHCR and the Seila Program; and presently [2006] there are 20 primary schools and one secondary school (Mr. Ung Yong, pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). In the years following reintegration, two schools were built with six classrooms each in each of the district’s five communes. Funding was provided through a number of sources including the Seila Program, UNHCR, AusAid, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Commune Fund and some private donations (Seila Report, 2006). The primary school in Pramaowy was completed in June, 2000 at the cost of \$US 10,800.

PAGODA³⁹

A pagoda (in Khmer *wat*) was built in 2000 in Pramaowy town. It was completed in March 2000 and inaugurated as *Wat Geery Bo Thumbewuh*. Without a *wat*, the reconciliation process could not have moved forward. In Khmer culture, a *wat* is where the community comes to assemble and finds its identity. Mr. Chhun Song⁴⁰ described the need for a pagoda in Pramaowy, “to cleanse the sins of the past.” (pers. comm, July 3rd, 2006). Today there is one Abbot and 6 young monks living at the *wat*. On July 7th, 2006, Bot Savong, the highest Buddhist patriarch in the Kingdom of Cambodia made a visit to the *wat* and presented it with an auspicious and symbolic Po tree.

HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE

The health centre in Pramaowy was partially funded by UNHCR through CAREERE II and the Seila Program. The health post is situated in Pramaowy and comprises three buildings, two of which were funded by AusAid and UNHCR and one from the government through a loan from the ADB (Pursat Provincial Report, 2006). Construction began and was finished in 2000.

According to Dr. Sophal (pers. comm., July 1st, 2006), the Deputy Director of Pursat’s Health Department and who was responsible for organizing and setting up the health system in Veal Veng, the cost of the Health Centre was around \$US 20,000. This

³⁹ Pagoda is the commonly used English word to translate the Khmer *wat*. This refers to Buddhist temple or monastery.

⁴⁰ Mr. Song is the Deputy Governor of Pursat province and in , and in 1999/2000 he was the Chief of Pursat’s Seila Program.

price included a microscope, furniture and other equipment as well as an initial supply of medicine. This was confirmed by Mr. Mung (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

Health posts were later built to provide basic health services to people living in O'Saum, Anlong Reab, Krapeu Pi and Thmar Dah communes. They were built in 2002 with government funding allocated through the Seila Program to the Commune Fund. "The health posts were built with funding from the government, built by the local people and with local resources when they were available---such as wood for the walls" (Dr. U. Sophan, pers. comm., July 2nd, 2006).

DEMINING

Ballard (2002) identified the security threat and development limitations due to landmines in former-conflict zones in Cambodia, he stated "landmines have been a ubiquitous problem in nearly all returnee areas". But in Veal Veng, there was no initial funding for demining activities like there were in other areas. This lack of funding and services, which are essential for development and peace building, was filled by the former-KR soldiers of division 695 who took it upon themselves to demine areas surrounding their villages. This began in 1999 according to Mr. Yong (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006).

In 2001, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) arrived to set up Demining Unit #5 and #12. Since then, CMAC has cleared 79 minefields for a total of 3,763,606 square metres. They have destroyed 1,966 anti personnel mines, 23 anti tank mines and 2,215 unexploded ordnances. In addition, CMAC has collected 4,972,809 fragments. (Mr. Khun Ratana⁴¹, pers. comm., Aug. 27th, 2006). Today there are still many

⁴¹ Mr. Ratana is the CMAC Chief of Secretariat of Public Relations.

minefields remaining in Veal Veng, but the demining work accomplished thus far has decreased the threat to the population and enabled development to expand.

FOOD-FOR-WORK SCHEMES

The WFP began their Food-for-Work program in 1999. The people of all communes were participants in clearing land, constructing tertiary roads, building bridges and culverts in exchange for rice, canned fish, salt and cooking oil (Mr. Buoy Phorn, July 16th, 2006, pers. comm.; Daltry, J., 2002). Mr. Buoy Phorn remarked that probably all small infrastructure projects accomplished during the project's duration have been either replaced, destroyed or washed away. Nonetheless, the small inputs helped in the early development of the district and the people benefited as well. According to the Pursat Provincial Report (2006) WFP's Food-for-Work scheme built 12 wooden bridges in the district.

4.1.4.3 CAPACITY BUILDING

HEALTH

Capacity building of health staff was urgently needed upon reintegration. In discussions with the district chief of health (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006) and the deputy of the Pursat department of health (Dr. U. Sophan, pers. comm., July 2nd, 2006), they outlined the first training inputs for health staff in Veal Veng. For example, five individuals, who were once KR nurses, became government health staff started receiving a rice allowance and small salary. In 1997, they were sent to Battambang to

receive health training. This training was followed-up with another capacity building training session in 1999 for an expanded group of health staff. After this training (and the equipment and medicine allocations from UNHCR) the health staff at the Pramaowy health centre and health posts were able to provide MAP, or Minimum Activity Package. This entails the basic diagnosis, health services and provision of common medicines. Even today there is no qualified doctor working in Pramaowy.

This example of capacity building and training for former-KR functionaries has likely made the biggest impact in improving the standard of living in the district. This is particularly so for sick people who have contracted malaria, they no longer have to depend on a mixed bag of medicines including traditional cures, out-dated pills and assorted unknowns or incorrect diagnoses.

EDUCATION

CARERE II/Seila and the PRDC organized teacher training lasting 51 days to 26 primary school instructors. This teacher training was provided by the Pursat Provincial Department of Education in the provincial centre. Teaching and educational materials as well as textbooks were given to these new teachers by a local Khmer NGO, DCO. Today there are 41 primary school teachers instructing in all five communes of Veal Veng. As of 2004, a middle school opened in Pramaowy and there are four teachers.

DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE

In 2000, a CARERE II/Seila initiative provided training to 61 local Veal Veng officials on a wide range of topics such as human rights, gender awareness, community development, financial planning and good governance. Seila, with technical and financial assistance from CARERE II, and the Partnership for Local Governance (PLG)⁴², provided management training to the new Veal Veng government officials in district. Reconciliation was achieved by building the capacity of local officials thus empowering them.

CARERE II's strategy for post-conflict reconciliation was to strengthen local governance. Seila established village development committees (VDCs) and commune development committees (CDCs) to strengthen decentralized governance and promote reconciliation. In planning together at the village level (between refugees or IDPs, and between either former-KR people or RGC staff who had come to work and live in Veal Veng) individuals came to understand each other and create a sense of ownership for the decisions and development projects which were being undertaken by their community.

Seila/PLG, in promoting decentralized governance, empowered local governments by providing them with training and management skills necessary for them to effectively plan and implement development projects needed in their villages and communes. Mr. Cheng Samnang explained the strategy, saying, "Seila established VDCs and CDCs, the PLG provided money directly to these localized institutions so that at a decentralized level, those people could decide which development issues were important to them" (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006).

⁴² The Partnership for Local Governance continued providing the technical and financial support to Seila, once CARERE II's mandate was terminated in 2001.

Capacity building did not target groups of people, but the VDV's or CDCs, where both IDPs, refugees, former-KR and people from the rest of Cambodia, worked together. There was no identification or inherent discrimination between the history and past of one Cambodian from another.

Seila/CARERE2 was able to avoid any unnecessary antagonism between government civil servants and KR local authorities and population. The KR administrators and technicians were given the opportunity of continuing to carry out their duties, absorbing the SEILA principles of grassroots participation, good governance, democratic structures and decentralized decision making with great facility

(UNDP/Cambodia, 2001: 39)

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Peace has offered the chance for NGOs to begin a wide variety of projects in Veal Veng. What the government has accomplished with foreign funding---NGO's, both international and Khmer, have expanded and improved. A resident of Pramaowy, and a former-KR soldier, who received employment as an ambulance driver from a Khmer NGO said that having NGOs come to work in the community is one of the most obvious benefits from reintegration and peace (Mr. L. Mos, pres. comm., July 14th, 2006,).

Fauna & Flora International is a British-based international conservation organization. They provide management and technical expertise to MoE, who is the government ministry responsible for the PSWS. FFI began working in Veal Veng in 2000 but only conducting surveys of the animal and plant life. Since 2003, FFI has partnered with ministry staff in managing the wildlife sanctuary.

Disadvantaged Cambodians' Organization (DCO) funded teachers' salaries, educational materials and other textbooks in 2000 for one of the new schools. Since 2004, DCO has a community development program on health care/malaria, income generation, and women's literacy. Apart from providing a microscope, refresher training courses to local nurses and impregnating mosquito nets, they've invested in a fully equipped ambulance to transport seriously ill patients to the provincial hospital in Pursat town. The income generation project has two sub-projects, one in bamboo basket production and the other in cash crop production. The program will run for three years, finishing in 2007 (Mr. P. Sam Ouern, pers. comm., July 21st, 2006).

Save Cambodia's Wildlife (SCW) has an environmental education and awareness program on-going in Veal Veng district. It began in 2005 and intends to disseminate information on the protected area and the importance of conservation in Veal Veng. SCW is attempting to inform the population about the benefits, rules and regulations of the wildlife sanctuary. Their project is a sub-contract funded by FFI. This current program ends this year, in 2006.

Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) was conducting literacy classes in some villages. These classes emphasized women's and child health, and they supported awareness education in family sanitation. Their project is called "Literacy for Women's Health and Empowerment".

Reproductive and Child Health Alliance (RACHA) works to increase the supply of, demand for, and access to quality reproductive and child health services in Cambodia.

Centre d'Etude et de Development Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) is a Khmer NGO which has a contract with FFI to aid in agricultural extension and

intensification services. Their project will focus on income generation in crops and improved agricultural practices among the farming population.

Anakut Kumar has a project in vocational training, its being funded by FFI. The goal is to encourage local handicraft production by providing training and micro-finance to participants.

4.2 CONCLUSION

Since reintegration, and once development inputs were allocated in 2000, three of the four obstacles for an improved standard of living have been attenuated, viz. landmines, malaria and poverty. This leaves the fourth constraint, the existence of a protected area, as the remaining development constraint which has yet to be dealt with. It alone became a problem when peace was achieved, and Veal Veng became Veal Veng district. Integration meant that Veal Veng was then subsumed under Cambodia law, including the law on Protected Areas.

To compare standards of living, in terms of socio-economic indicators, at the embryonic stage of reintegration with four years later, statistics from the Pursat Department of Planning (2000; 2004) are here presented:

2000

- There were 1,014 families and 5,021 people residing in Veal Veng
- There were 740 thatch houses (73% of families)
- There were 26 primary (grades 1-6) school classrooms and 34 teachers
- There were no secondary school classrooms or teachers

- There were 14 nurses, 2 trained midwives and no doctors
- There was one health centre, and no health posts
- 33 toilets were in use
- There were 19 tractors, vehicles or other plowing machines in use
- There were 236 families raising pigs

2004

- There were 1,438 families and 6,789 people in Veal Veng
- There were 839 thatch houses (58% of families)
- There were 46 primary (grades 1-6) school classrooms and 41 teachers
- There were five secondary (7-9) school classrooms and five teachers
- There were 15 nurses, two trained midwives and no doctors
- There was one health centre, and four health posts
- 62 toilets were in use
- There are 37 tractors, vehicles or other plowing machines in use
- There were 445 families raising pigs

These indicators are not definitive of a increasing standard of living but allude to an improvement in socio-economic conditions. One indicator not shown here, is the on-going training of health staff in the district. Though the number of staff members remains the same, they are much more skilled than when they first received health training in 1997 and 1998 (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

There was no market in Pramaowy in 2000 (Dr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 2nd, 2006). In 2004, fresh vegetables were scarce and ice was not available. Presently, there are both locally grown vegetables and imported produce from Pursat town and Phnum Kravangh, ice can be bought every second day (pers. obs., July 6th, 2006). Agricultural products such as sesame, soya beans and green beans are now transported out of the

district and sold at markets in Pursat and Kravangh, and two NGOs have started income generation projects making bamboo products (pers. obs, July, 2006).

Regarding malaria, Mr. Mung (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006) estimated that in 2000 all people (100 per cent) in Veal Veng were infected with malaria, and today he dropped that statistic to 40 per cent. In explanation of this significant drop, he singled out the fact that the government and NGOs have given out (and continue to give out) impregnated mosquito nets. Landmines pose little threat to people living around the villages, though many places in Thmah Dah commune are still high risk areas (Mr. Yong, pers. comm., 27th, 2006). CMAC has scaled back their work in Veal Veng, and deminers have been consolidated in one location in Pramaowy.

It is the feelings of individuals, however, which should be considered in assessing development gains and changes in standards of living. “Really, life here is easier today as we have development----road, bridge, health services, schools and we received training; peace has remained and I can live with my family, my grandchildren can go to school”, explained Mr. Ban Bunloak (pers. comm., July 8th, 2006) when asked about how life has changed since reintegration. Akin to this attitude, Mrs. Hem Porn stated “Our standard of living is better, but still it is hard” (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). The population is quite unanimous on this issue: life has improved in Veal Veng since the end of conflict and development began.

The goal of the government’s Win-Win policy was to reintegrate marginalized former-KR communities with mainstream. But the strategy alone was lacking, for reintegration and reconciliation to succeed, development inputs, both physical and social were necessary. The physical inputs (i.e. health posts, schools, roads, wells and administrative offices) have fostered reintegration; whereas the social inputs (i.e. including decentralized governance, capacity building of local officials, teacher and nurse training) have built social links towards reconciliation.

CHAPTER V

NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

PHNOM SAMKOS PROTECTED AREA

The majority of land in Veal Veng district⁴³ is delimited within a wildlife sanctuary. As the second tallest mountain in Cambodia is Samkos Mountain, the protected area is named the PSWS. This area is under the authority and management of MoE. FFI, an international British NGO working in fauna and flora protection and conservation, is providing managerial and technical advice to MoE.

5.1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR PROTECTED AREAS

5.1.1 ROYAL DECREE

His Royal Excellency King Norodom Sihanouk's Royal Decree of November 1993 on the Creation and Designation of Protected Areas legally placed a large portion of Veal Veng into the category of a wildlife sanctuary. This wildlife sanctuary was one of 23 protected areas designated under this Royal Decree.

⁴³ The PSWS is 333,750 hectares, Veal Veng's total land area is 484,800 hectares.

According to Global Witness (2001: 13), “Such is the region’s [western Cardamoms] biodiversity that it is now considered , along with Madagascar, the Amazon and the Malaysian forests, as one of the world’s most important regions of biodiversity.” The first scientific surveys in Veal Veng were done in 2000 and 2001 by FFI and found evidence of tigers, rhinos and the previously thought extinct Siamese crocodile. This tropical rainforest possesses both endangered and endemic species, previously unknown plants and tracts of forest in which humans have never intruded. “No one knows what they will find if they go for surveys into the southern parts of the sanctuary,” declared a well respected international wildlife photographer who has captured on film many of the sanctuary’s rare species (Mr. J. Holden, pers. comm., July 7th, 2006). For reasons of scientific importance and biodiversity, the Cardamoms are a unique and valuable ecological treasure which deserves the legal status as a wildlife sanctuary and the protection given by MoE and FFI.

Monitoring, protection and management of the sanctuary began in 2003 when funding was secured through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the European Union and the UN Foundation. A decade had elapsed between the time of the official declaration in 1993 and the first stages of management and protection in 2003. As a royal decree, protected areas should be sacrosanct and unassailable, taking precedence over other laws. This is made explicit:

Article 4: Precedence

This kret takes precedence over other legal instruments and shall not be deemed to be void on the grounds that existing instruments may be inconsistent with it.

(Royal Decree, 1993)

To further elucidate the law protecting the PSWS, the FFI management advisor to MoE’s Caradamom Mountains Wildlife Sanctuaries Project, stated cogently, “MoE is the

highest authority in Veal Veng, all NGOs, government institutions and departments must report to the MoE if they want to carry out activities within the sanctuary” (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006). Considering Article #4 of the Royal Decree and Mr. Paley’s statement concerning MoE’s authority in protected areas, the villages and communes within Veal Veng do not function as conventional local governance and district administrations ought to.

5.1.2 PROTECTED AREA LAW

The long awaited Protected Area Law (PA Law) has yet to be passed by the National Assembly. The PA Law is the legal instrument for protection and management complementing the Royal Decree.

Article 1 - This law defines the framework of management, conservation and development of protected areas. The objectives of this law are to ensure the management, conservation of biodiversity, and sustainable use of natural resources in protected areas.

(Protected Area Law (draft), 2005)

Once it has been passed, the specific rules of NRM will be clear for the district chief, commune council, village chiefs, and villagers who reside within any protected area. The PA Law will provide concrete guidelines for conservation, protection of endangered species and how the community can sustainably benefit from the natural resources. In addition, the PA Law states that land titles and ownership must be agreed upon by MoE.

The PA Law includes a zoning system which categorizes natural resource usage areas among the villages and throughout the communities. Article 11 pertains to the zoning system; every protected area will be divided into four zones:

Core zone: Is a zone of high value for conservation of rare, endangered, vulnerable and threatened animal and plant species and a delicate ecosystem.

Entry into this zone is prohibited, except by authorized officials of the National Protection and Conservation Administration and Scientific researchers conducting a study in purpose of defense and conservation national resources, biodiversity and environment shall obtain advance permission from the Ministry of Environment.

Conservation zone: Is a zone adjacent to the core zone which is of value for conservation of natural resources, ecosystem, slope and landscape.

Entry into this zone shall be by obtaining advance permission from the Natural Protection and Conservation Administration of the area.

The use of forest products for livelihood by the local communities and indigenous ethnic minorities without strong impacts on biodiversity shall be under close monitoring of National Protection and Conservation Administration.

Sustainable use zone: Is a zone of high economic value contributing to national economic development, to the management and conservation of the protected area itself, and to promoting the living conditions of local community people and indigenous ethnic minorities.

After consulting with relevant Ministries and Institutions, local authorities, and local communities in accordance with passed relevant laws, the Royal Government of Cambodia may permit to be developed and invested in this zone according to request from Ministry of Environment.

Community zone: Is a zone for socio-economic development of community and indigenous ethnic minorities with existing houses, rice fields and vegetable gardens.

(Protected Area Law (draft), 2005)

Without the PA Law, the legal basis for MoE's management work in any protected area, including Veal Veng, is ambiguous. Consequently, once it is passed,

MoE's claim and right to manage that 333,750 hectares in Veal Veng district will be undisputable.

5.1.3 CURRENT LAWS FOR MANAGEMENT IN PHNOM SAMKOS WILDLIFE SANCUTARY

The Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management of 1996 and the Declaration 1033 of 1994 form the basis of MoE's current legal framework for management in the PSWS (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., Aug. 7th, 2006). With reference to land usage, MoE prohibits the practices contained within Article #3 of Declaration 1033.

Article 3 - Absolutely prohibiting of occupying, clearing, setting fire to clear new land for house construction, rice farming, orchid field and expansion for private ownership or institutions in the protected areas.

(Declaration 1033, 1994)

With regard to wildlife protection the following regulations apply:

Article 2 - Absolutely prohibiting on poaching, hunting, trapping all kind of wildlife and fishing, including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds and aquatic animals, to take meat, ivory, born, feather, horns, leather, furs and blood and the hunting game.

(Declaration 1033, 1994)

These practices have been cited as examples of how the management and protection of MoE constrains the natural resources usage of the community in Veal Veng

and hinders development (Mr. J. Koom, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006; Mr. K. Say, pers. comm., July 15th, 2006; Mr. K. Sokouern, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006)⁴⁴.

In conclusion, the PA Law will clarify the NRM rules for communities living within protected areas. This clarity has been lacking and a cause of confusion and conflict within Veal Veng district (Mr. L. Huch, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006). Often commune councils and the district governor's decisions have conflicted with rules declared by MoE, viz. encouraging land clearing before participatory land use planning had started to demarcate the boundaries of different zones (anonymous source, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006). Once the legal framework exists----the PA Law----to subsume previous laws and declarations, the commune administration and the district authorities can, it is hoped, work together with MoE to sustainably manage and enforce the rules of the PSWS.

5.2 LOGGING AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

5.2.1 FOREST EXPLOITATION IN CAMBODIA

Large scale logging in Cambodia emerged in the late 1980's because of two main factors. One, the KR movement's most loyal patron, the People's Republic of China (PRC), had been supporting their communist client up until a peace settlement was imminent. International political dynamics changed as the Paris Peace Accords were signed. Chinese funding ceased and the KR were left without a foreign donor/patron, military backing and a lifeline for survival. Secondly, in late 1989, the Thai government placed a ban on domestic logging, consequently prices for timber increased fivefold

⁴⁴ Their references were not made directly to Article #3, but in discussions describing how the communities' livelihoods are restricted by the PSWS.

within a three year period (LeBillon, 2000: 789). Pristine, vast tracts of forest in Cambodia quickly caught the attention of Thai logging companies which had been underexploited because of Cambodia's civil war.

Prior to the UNTAC period, there was vast logging throughout the north western frontier. 1992 in particular, was marked by a flurry of intense logging activity (Rainforest Action Network Report; 1994, cited in Global Witness, 1995a). Cross-border trading links between the KR, and other Cambodian political parties, with Thai companies have been well researched, and have clearly identified collusion on the part of the RGC in unsustainable logging practices which consequently enriched their battlefield enemy (Global Witness, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; LeBillon, 2000, 2002; Puangthong, 2004). In 1994, the government authorized 750,000 cubic metres of timber to be exported, earning the government \$32 million and as 70% of the timber originated from KR controlled areas, that faction received at least \$15 million (LeBillon, 2000: 793).

The publication of these secret deals, highlighting Thai-RGC complicity with the KR was effective in restricting the cross-border trade. On January 1st, 1995 the RGC implemented a ban on the cutting of fresh timber, which was followed by a total timber export ban in May 1995. This legislation prevented further destruction of Cambodia's forests and was also a factor in encouraging KR defections (Ibid.).

5.2.2 LOGGING IN VEAL VENG

Not much is known about the details of logging in Veal Veng. There is a marked absence of literature investigating logging in Veal Veng; in contrast to other KR strongholds (particularly the high profile Pailin) which typify how the trade in timber (and gems) financed the continuation of civil conflict. Global Witness (1995, 1996, 1997

and 1998) has conducted thorough research into the cross-border trade in conflict timber; but there is only some mention of Pursat province (Global Witness, 1998, 2001: 41-43). Nonetheless, the dynamics in the Veal Veng logging and timber trade followed the trends of better known KR strongholds.

Mr. Ek Sophal provided an account of the logging in Veal Veng (pers. comm., July 6th, 2006).

In the 1980's there was logging, a lot in 1986 and 1987. The logging was selective for certain species and financed the KR. 1992 was also a busy year for cutting, then in 1993 it diminished. In the following years, KR people logged to support their families, still selling the timber to Thailand. During the time of reintegration, logging continued but was more for families settling and clearing land for agriculture. Logging, for luxury wood, (and forest crimes in general) peaked again in 2002 before protection began.⁴⁵

Mr. K. Sokouern (pers. comm., July 4th, 2006) confirmed these general logging trends in Veal Veng. Both interviewees agreed that 1992 was a particularly active year for logging, which fits most other accounts for that year (LeBillon, 2000, 2002; Global Witness, 1995a). Logging and export to Thailand continued until around the time of reintegration, though this trade was not as preponderant as 1992. Interestingly, their accounts did not point to any change in cross-border trade as a result of international pressure on Thailand to close the border in 1995 and 1996 which was alluded to in the previous research (LeBillon, 2000, 2002; Global Witness, 1995a, 1996b). In fact, Mr. K. Sokeurn stated that the KR allowed Thais to enter Cambodian territory during that period. This was not confirmed by Mr. E. Sophal, who said that after 1993 logging was being done by KR people for survival. Despite this, they are in agreement that logging steadily decreased until around the time of reintegration. From their accounts, harvesting timber

⁴⁵ At the very end of our interview, Mr. Sophal mentioned off-hand that during the war, the KR had a system of NRM which included the prohibition of killing elephants and tigers, and trees of only a certain size were cut. This has not been substantiated by other sources and was even ridiculed as absurd by the translator (who is a MoE ranger) and other individuals when asked for confirmation. This researcher is skeptical and honestly admits that he has disregarded this anomalous information.

was, at that time, for local use and not export. Land clearing for agriculture emerged as a reason for cutting trees.

In 2000 and 2001, when Veal Veng was connected to Pursat and National highway #5, a cash economy emerged as luxury wood, wildlife and other forest products were exchanged for dollars (Mr. P. Sam Ouern, July 17th, 2006). This fact was confirmed by Daltry (2002: 70, 71), in O'Saum commune, with new road construction, the largest economic force was harvesting yellow vine, a NFTP used in make-up and traditional medicine.

5.2.3 NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN VEAL VENG

Logging, as stated in previous accounts, had been a source of cash for KR forces and then at a later stage timber was used to build houses when families settled in villages (Mr. K. Sokouern, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006). What is of interest is that natural resource dependence increased with the advent of peace and during the transition phase of reintegration. During the late 1980's and early 1990's, timber was commoditized, but this changed as natural resource usage became community focused. Agriculture emerged, NFTPs were gathered for sustenance, and hunting was important as a source of protein. During the war, men were soldiers, but the transition to peace meant that they adapted to farming and transformation was reflected in the natural resource usage of the community. This is explained easily. On the one hand, material support (i.e. rice and medicine) from the KR centre ceased as the Veal Veng military faction defected; on the other hand, emergency aid and development inputs from the government and NGOs had not yet taken root in the community. The villagers, habituated to external material assistance, had to rely on the natural environment for their survival during the transition period.

When the researcher asked about the use of natural resources, particularly forests, for his family's livelihood, Mr. Say⁴⁶ replied that "it was very important" (pers. comm., July 15th, 2006). He continued adding, the people of the village (Krang Rongieng in Anlong Reab commune) cleared land for farming and have relied on forests (timber and NFTP) since they settled here before reintegration. "Life was extremely hard during reintegration and we survived by clearing land and using natural resources", he concluded (Ibid.).

A former-KR guerilla soldier who is now a farmer recounted that he came to Veal Veng in 1993. He went to Chong Khao Phlu refugee camp after reintegration in 1998 to get his family. He brought them back and they settled in Pramaowy. "In 2000, we had no support, no house so we cut trees for a house, cleared land for agriculture and survived off the land" (Mr. J. Coom, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). Though he is poor, he has a large house built with excellent quality wood. This is common in Veal Veng. For example, in Thmah Dah commune, the majority of houses are well made, with ample timber cut in thick planks (pers. obs., July 18th, 2005).

One of the first NGOs to work in Veal Veng was the WFP. Mr. Buoy Phorn, a WFP staff member, recalled when he initially came to Pramaowy that

Everyone was cutting the forest, but for their own use, timber for houses and clearing land to begin agriculture. Before this time, there was very little cleared land as KR soldiers didn't depend on agriculture, support came from the KR centre, as well, before peace negotiations very few

⁴⁶ Mr. Say is the Anlong Reab commune chief. Many sources within FFI and MoE have identified him as responsible for the illegal logging in the commune. He would not talk about or admit logging for profit existed in the past.

families were living in Veal Veng so there was not such a need for feed many people, only the soldiers.

(Mr. B. Phorn, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006)

Daltry's report on the economy of the O'Saum commune (2002: 70) identified the reliance on subsistence farming and from harvesting the natural resources, mainly NFTP's such as cardamom and yellow vine, around their villages. This dependence on natural environment was confirmed by Mr. P. Sam Ouern (pers. comm., July 17th, 2006); he described how villagers were so poor that they survived eating NFTP's and wild potatoes, there was no rice.

What emerges from these accounts is that natural resource dependence in Veal Veng has always been a way of life. During the war, forests were transformed into timber to support the NADK. This management was centralized within the KR central elites, local units garnered small amounts of cash, but material support was returned to sustain the soldiers (Mr. K. Sokoeurn, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006). Once the KR forces operating in Veal Veng broke from the KR central elite, they had recourse to nothing but what nature could provide. The forest resources, including timber, NFTP's and wildlife, provided shelter, food, construction material, an object of barter and a source of cash. The government had not yet brought development to the area, so without natural resources the former-KR communities would have starved to death or died from illness and exposure.

As the district opened up, with road #56's completion, forest exploitation and forest crime proliferated, for the demand of Cambodia's domestic market came to commoditize the timber and wildlife. At this point, there was a real threat to the sustainability of Veal Veng's natural resources.

5.3 FACTORS AND TRENDS INFLUENCING NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Research has identified three overlapping phases which reflect the distinct NRM and usage in Veal Veng. The divisions are not clear cut, nor specific to date but are general trends indicating the nature of natural resource use.

The first is characterized by centrally commanded timber extraction for export to Thailand; this phase corresponds to the late 1980s until the logging export bans and defections of KR regional factions circa 1996. Timber was the main resource being exploited, other crimes also included hunting wild game. Profits were being accrued by the KR central elites, the Veal Veng divisions received some monetary benefit but this was negligible. The main reason that logging was occurring, and on such a grand scale was to fund the KR movement, its military and political endeavors.

The second phase is qualified by community based natural resource extraction, where forests were not commoditized but used. The transition period of reintegration into development encompasses this type of NRM. In the reintegration phase, logging was still occurring, but hunting and land clearing emerged as two factors characterizing the NRM of this period. Forests, mainly luxury timber, was being sold to Thailand still but as soldiers began to settle and families returned from the refugee camps, timber was in demand for houses and local use. Animal husbandry was non-existent therefore, hunting provided communities with an important source of protein and NFTP's were collected for medicine and sustenance as well. Apart from some trade with Thailand, resource extraction was not cash producing: natural resources were used, not traded.

The third phase, began from the onset of protection and management by MoE when the PSWS became officially and de facto a protected area. MoE had funding and

human resources in place and the ability to begin enforcing the rules and regulations of a protected area in 2003⁴⁷. Cutting trees was widespread though prohibited. Hunting was illegal. Land clearing far away from the village was banned.

With the zoning system de facto in place, the regulations for resource usage are clearer. Bamboo, if it is in the sustainable use zone can be used to make houses, baskets and other products. Other bamboo products are sold in markets in Pursat and Battambang. Illegal logging continues, it is exclusively targeting luxury species. Other NFTP's which cannot be harvested within the aforementioned zones are found illegally in the protection and core zones (anonymous source, pers. comm., July 18th, 2006). Forest crime has diminished since the advent of management, as has the pace of land clearing. Harvesting is balanced between community use and income generation. Cash crops are sold outside the district.

Prior to MoE protection of the PSWS, building a new house only required clearing a plot of land and cutting trees to produce timber. In 2003, the population was prohibited from doing either of those. The same situation applied to agriculture, if in the past a farmer wanted to expand his fields he would, at most, seek approval at the local level, his village, commune or the district chief---which might have required some payment, official or not. Now it's out of the question, even if that individual approached the MoE. As a result, villagers have resorted to cutting tracts of forest for agriculture which cannot be seen from the road (pers. obs., June, 2006).

⁴⁷ At this time, management was based on the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management of 1996 and the Declaration 1033 of 1994.

5.3.1 COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

During the transition phase towards post-conflict development, the use and management of natural resources became a communal activity. Logging was no longer for export to Thailand, but for the development of the families who were settling in the community. Using natural resources became necessary for their survival: soldiers became loggers to build their houses; soldiers became farmers to feed their families and in times of desperation, soldiers even became forest scavengers searching for wild tubers and other edible NFTP. Individuals joined together, in their military units, to go fell trees or hunt game for their families (Mr. E. Sophal, pers. comm., July 6th, 2006). Clearing land was accomplished by families joining together. The local resources were used according to need and the needs of the population, emerging from decades of conflict, were similar. At that time, “There was no law on NRM” (Ibid.). Thus community members participated as a group in logging, hunting, land clearing and agriculture: it was a community based affair, so despite an absence of laws, rules or regulations there was a NRM ‘system’ in place.

In a poorly developed isolated region, abundant in natural resources, with a small population functioning on a communist-style economy, there is little need for rules and regulations on NRM. Such was the situation in Veal Veng before development began and a market economy emerged. Mr. Cheng Samnang echoed this line of thought, and confirmed what Mr. Ek Sophal previously stated, by saying, “Today Veal Veng needs NRM, before reintegration there was little need for a law or rules because there was no threat from outside and the population was so small” (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006). With a communist-style leadership and hierarchy, it was not necessary to codify the practices relating to the extraction of natural resources, for there was a high degree of solidarity among KR groups and cadre have been able to specialize in the control of their own population (Ballard, 2001: 7). Individuals undertaking extraction ventures for profit

never occurred. Moreover, there were no outsiders coming into the new district, so a free market economy had not yet come to commodify and threaten the indigenous natural resources. This is not to say the community-based NRM practices were sustainable or innocuous though. Conditions such as limited infrastructure/equipment, lack of a market and widespread illness among the population meant that environmental destruction was attenuated.

5.3.2 MARKET ECONOMY AND THE THREAT FROM ‘OUTSIDERS’

When road #56 was completed and the remote district opened up to the rest of the country, community-based NRM was transformed by the demands of the domestic market which were fueled by Cambodia’s continuing post-conflict reconstruction. “Between peace and the beginning of management of the PSWS, including protection activities, forest crimes flourished,” stated Mr. Richard Paley (pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006). There was a bull market for the region’s valuable resources such as bushmeat, yellow vine, cardamom, beng and kresna wood because a cash economy was emerging. The local natural resources were being commoditized by outsiders who were willing to exchange dollars for timber, wild game and NFTP. An anonymous source (pers. comm., July 8th, 2006) explained the dynamics of natural resources exploitation and absence of a law protecting the wildlife sanctuary: It was not the local population that was profiting from the natural riches abundant in their area. Locals got a small cut from extracting the timber and hunting wild animals, but they were exploited as much as the natural resources were. It was outsiders with equipment, trucks and money who organized crews for cutting luxury or hunters for tracking wild animals. In conclusion, the source said “When MoE cracks down and arrests locals for cutting trees, they are targeting the wrong people” (Ibid.).

5.4 PERCEPTIONS OF NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

According to Mr. Yong (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006) the PSWS limits the opportunity of villagers to develop and improve their standards of living. During the war and transition period, KR soldiers and dependents could freely harvest and use all and any natural resources for their livelihood, be it logging, hunting, collecting NFTP or clearing land for agriculture. With protection from MoE, this way of life was no longer possible. This same attitude, though far more unequivocally than Mr. Ung Young, was reflected by Mr. Koom Say (pers. comm., July 15th, 2006), “Life was very difficult here, we relied on natural resources to survive and then [since 2003, when protection began] we lose part of our livelihood, and can’t develop.”

In the Veal Veng peace negotiations of 1996, there was no mention that the lands granted to defecting KR communities actually existed within a protected area and wildlife sanctuary (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 13th 2006). Mr. Yong was under the impression that Veal Veng would be incorporated as a conventional district. This was confirmed by Mr. Kim Rin, who met with Mr. Yong several times during the negotiations (pers. comm., July 12th, 2006). In late 2000, Mr. Yong first heard about the existence of the PSWS, but that nothing came of it until 2003 when protection began.

Most other inhabitants only learnt of the PSWS in 2003, including connected local government staff such as the Commune Chief of Anlong Reab and the District Chief of Health. Mrs. Hem Porn, a resident of Pramaowy, recounted bitterly that she first knew about the existence of a wildlife sanctuary and its prohibitions on logging in 2003 when her son was caught and arrested cutting trees (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006).

The communities’ perception of the government’s NRM, implemented by MoE with the aid of FFI, is not in any way positive. In their minds, the wildlife sanctuary is

inimical to reducing poverty, improving their lives and fostering reconciliation with mainstream Cambodia (pers. obs., July 2006, Mr. L. Huch, July 14th, 2006, Mr. C. Mung, July 14th, 2006, Mr. K. Sokoeurn, July 4th, 2006). There is a feeling that what used to be theirs has been stolen from them, and they will remain impoverished because of it (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006; Mr. L. Huch, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006). It is imperative to remember that the majority of the population are former-KR who are still in the slow process of reconciliation, and ‘outsiders’ forcefully imposing rules on their lives is not taken lightly.

The MoE Natural Resources Conservation Officer, in the communities department, Mr. Keo Sokouern “Knows what’s happening in the villages and is aware of the community’s sentiments” (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006). He’s worked in Veal Veng since 2000, but at that time. When asked his impression of the inhabitants’ (former-KR people) attitude towards MoE’s protection and monitoring activities since they started in 2003 he said, “They were not happy with the situation then, but with more communication between MoE, SCW and district authorities things have improved” (Mr. Keo Sokouern, pers. comm., July 4th, 2006).

There is a very high degree of solidarity among the population concerning land and natural resource usage, their ideas are united in opposition against the limitations imposed on them (pers. obs.). Nearly all families have farms as the economy has yet to develop significantly. Former-KR administrators and subsistence farmers are of the same mind when they talk about the presence of MoE in Veal Veng. This uniformity in perception was confirmed by Mr. Leng Huch⁴⁸ (pers. comm., July 16th, 2006), “The whole population, Mr. Yong [District Governor] and farmers, think this [anger at MoE].” Mr. Phorn, an outsider prior to 1999 but is well known throughout the district, commented that the community is unanimous in it’s attitude towards MoE and FFI (pers. comm., July 17th, 2006).

⁴⁸ Mr. Huch is a Field Officer for Save Cambodia’s Wildlife, a Khmer NGO doing environmental awareness campaigns in villages and communes in Veal Veng district.

Mr. Huch (pers. comm., July 16th, 2006.) remarked that a ‘protected area’ or ‘wildlife sanctuary’ (*dumbon calpeas tomajiat*) was a new word for the people in Veal Veng and it was a foreign concept which was hard to understand when first introduced. When MoE and FFI arrived in 2003 and started enforcing the *dumbon calpeas tomajiat* it was a source of confusion and anger among the population.

Latent conflict emerged within the community as MoE rangers, in the eyes of the population, perpetrated inscrutable acts undermining their efforts to improve their standards of living, such as arrest loggers, confiscate chain saws, and monitor land clearing. Their animus is understandable considering their habitual reliance of natural resources. Mr. Huch reproduced the thinking and voices of villagers by saying, “How can we live without cutting trees for land clearing, building houses and selling? You are not supporting us to survive, so we cut trees, hunt and clear land for agriculture, we have no other choice” (Ibid.). This description of poverty and natural resources usage as a source of cash and sustenance has been admitted as an understandable and tenable fact by a FFI staff member who works for the PSWS (anonymous source, July 18th, 2006).

5.4.1 ZONING SYSTEM: POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The PA Law has not been passed in the National Assembly, but MoE is now implementing the zoning system (See Appendix A) as if it de facto existed (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006). When the law is passed, rules and regulations will be clear and management will be simplified. Mr. Huch (pers. comm., July 16th, 2006) stated that the process was conducted according to PLUP⁴⁹ and that it involved MoE, FFI, district, commune and village authorities as well as villagers. As the zones become known, and

⁴⁹ Participatory Land Use Planning.

information about which practices are permitted in which areas, conflict should diminish; the needs of community and protection it is hoped will be balanced. There will be a quality of legitimacy which has lacked MoE's previous work in the communities residing in Veal Veng. The delineation of zones, as they have been drawn today will stand for 15 years, at which time and if MoE deems it efficacious, they can be modified.

Is this participatory system a panacea for the conflict between the community, the district authorities and MoE?

Mr. Yong is sanguine about the zoning system. Though he never said that the system is the solution to conflict over NRM, he remarked that families can survive on the territory demarcated for 15 years (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). In contrast, Mr. Say at explained his views on the zoning system by bringing out the official map of the PSWS zones (See Appendix B, Figure #2). "All the people in Anlong Reab commune are not happy with MoE....the zoning system doesn't change anything," he said (pers. comm., July 15th, 2006).

When this researcher asked about the zoning system, Mr. C. Mung drew a schema (See Figure #1, Appendix B) to explain why they still considered the PSWS to be an unfair constraint on their livelihoods. The schema can be summarized as "unfair" (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 15th, 2006). He considered the territory delineated within the core zone and conservation zone prodigiously large when compared to the sustainable use and the community zone. "There should be a balance between protection of nature and community development and standards of living here", he explained, gesturing to the schema he had drawn, emphasizing the size difference between the two representations. He added that the local district office supports equal land sizes for the community and conservation zones, but because of the unequal ratio problems have not been resolved. "The zoning system has not solved problems here, and problems will remain," he

reflected; in terms of equitable NRM, he considers the community and sustainable use zones should be equal to conservation and core zones (Ibid.).

The community's perception that the zoning system is a panacea for equitable NRM is not positive. The PSWS is still conceived perniciously and most individuals interviewed were still skeptical for the future. The fact remains that if not today, then tomorrow the zoning system will certainly constrain the livelihoods of villagers. "Even with the zoning system, maybe our lives will be better but what about my children's children. How will our future generations survive?" questioned Mrs. Hem Porn (pers. comm., July 14th, 2006). This argument was repeated in other conversations and its valid (Mr. C. Mung, pers. comm., July 14th, 2006; Mr. Phorn, pers. comm., July 16th, 2006). Like the rest of Cambodia, running young children are ubiquitous in Pramaowy (pers. obs.).

Population growth will put pressure on the lands and forests to produce for the families, likewise, pressure will build against the limits of the zoning system. Time will tell how MoE and the growing community mitigate this fact. A hopeful solution offered by Mr. Richard Paley (pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006) is that a large factory opens in Pursat or Battambang province, and there is an outflow of people from Veal Veng to find work there.

5.5 2005 MIGRATION LAW

In an attempt to retard population growth and protect the environment, the district authorities have declared that no further migration into the PSWS is permissible. Obviously, MoE has lauded this move. The community's perceptions of current NRM is symbolized in the issue of migration. Concerns of the local community (for further

development, reintegration and reconciliation), levels and power of governance, MoE's legal claim to the PSWS and pressure of the free market are all intertwined in the migration law.

First, the community has an interest in encouraging further migration into Veal Veng (Mr. C. Samnang, pers. comm., July 12th, 2006). Increased migration invites development, money and these underlie hopes for reintegration and reconciliation between this former-KR area and people with mainstream Cambodia. Mr. Say explained why he favors increased migration into Veal Veng saying, "As more people move, there will be more development and infrastructure. They will bring money and there will be jobs" (pers. comm., July 15th, 2006). This is a legitimate argument. But the issue of migration is not as simple as many inhabitants understand it: increased migration will bring development which will put further pressure on the environment and competition for the local resources will increase. The community relies---legally or illegally---on natural resources for their livelihoods, and increased migration will lead to greater scarcity.

Mr. Cheng Samnang echoed Mr. Say's thinking but qualified it by adding

The community wants to be mainstreamed with Cambodian society---for reasons of reintegration---so they favor migration, but this can also impoverish them as outsiders are smart with business and have the means to extract resources easily. Migration is dangerous to the livelihoods of people now residing in Veal Veng

(pers. comm., July 12th, 2006)

Secondly, MoE backs any law banning or restricting migration into the PSWS but they lack any real legal power to enforce it. Rules and regulations determining (restricting) migration are not formulated or put into force by either MoE, nor at the district level---it's within the mandate and power of the national government. When Mr.

Ung Yong was asked about the Migration Law, he replied that even the MoE cannot legally enforce this, as Cambodian national law states that people have the right to migrate anywhere in the country. Thus, though he agrees with the law, it is actually out of his jurisdiction to enforce (pers. comm., July 27th, 2006)⁵⁰. MoE, as in the past and present, is emasculated from truly protecting the wildlife sanctuary. Other ministries comprising the RGC, for instance the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, wield far greater power than MoE.

Just as MoE's plan for NRM is a balancing act between wildlife protection and the community's need for natural resource usage, so is the issue of migration. Migration would lead to more development and a greater sense of reintegration but it also threatens the people's reliance on forests and land; in addition, the delicate modus vivendi---symbolized in the system of zoning---between MoE and the community could be undermined if the population expands. Definitive of the situation, MoE limits development and restricts natural resource usage, but these regulations will ensure sustainable management of the resources while protecting the community's livelihoods (and the biodiversity of the Cardamom Mountains).

The issue of migration also highlights the relationship of actors and parties involved in the PSWS: the local community/district government, the MoE and the RGC in Phnom Penh. Even if the intentions of the population are in accord with the district governor, and these with MoE, the national government can always complicate matters by pressing its own agenda in the district. Where laws are so easily circumvented the relationship between the former-KR community, the district authorities, the MoE, the RGC and the environment is neither stable nor official.

⁵⁰ This problem might be solved through land titling. If there was a moratorium of granting more land titles, perhaps no further migration would occur.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

6.1 CONCLUSION IN TERMS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

To begin the conclusion, the research question ought to be repeated: what role did natural resources have in the Khmer Rouge – Royal Government of Cambodia peace negotiations and reintegration process?

Natural resources were the spoils of peace. The Royal Government, or more precisely a CPP aligned military envoy, included access and guaranteed usage of local natural resources, including NFTP, timber, wildlife and land, to the rebel-KR Front 505 faction and community in Veal Veng peace negotiations. This package was contained in the Win-Win policy. The status of the resources was not made explicitly, issues such as power sharing, promises of continued employment in the RGC, guarantees of moveable and immovable property and land rights were the substance of the Win-Win policy. Access and usage of resources were subsumed in the promises on land rights, for KR soldiers became former-KR farmers upon reintegration and their families survived on subsistence agriculture and extraction of forest resources.

To draw attention to the specific role of natural resources in the Veal Veng peace negotiations is to miss the point. Mr. Yong, the former-commander of KR division 695,

became the District Governor meaning that he had free reign over the resources within his sphere of control---such is customary in Cambodian culture. It was implied in the power sharing agreements, that the new administration could ‘consume’ the land and resources. Many former-KR strongholds, including Veal Veng, existed in a state of semi-autonomy, not necessarily as an official policy but due to the remoteness of the area and incipient status of being recently incorporated into the kingdom.

Projecting power towards the periphery of a state requires compromise between the central government and regional leaders, in the past this was the case as it is today. Chandler, the prominent Cambodian scholar, (2000) described the socio-political structure of traditional Cambodian society in the 1800’s. He referred to ‘*chaovay sruk*’⁵¹ who were the king’s clients outside Phnom Penh. “These men enjoyed considerable freedom and considerable power. They were authorized to collect taxes from their *sruk*, which meant that they had access to any surplus crops they could lay their hands on” (Chandler, 2000: 110). These regional rulers could ‘consume’ (Ibid.) the territory and clients which had been appointed under their control by the king, as if it was their right do to so.

By securing the relationship with the CPP, the former-KR commanders of Front 505 were fitted into an already existing patron-client system. Hun Sen was, and still is, at the top. The perquisites of this new relationship meant that the newly integrated government officials and administrators were allowed to ‘consume’ the territory, granted through the Win-Win policy. Mr. Ung Yong has the title and position of district governor, in Khmer, *chaovay sruk*. Thus in the peace deal, the territory granted to Mr. Yong, as the district governor, was his to consume---but only because he was connected

⁵¹ This is an etymological argument. The present day title of a district leader is a *chaovay sruk*; *chaovay* is translated as boss or leader while *sruk* is district. Obviously the context and relations have changed today, but the connotation is the same. Chandler’s interpretation of *chaovay sruk*, in the 1800s is similarly translated today as ‘district governor’.

into the CPP patron-client system⁵². No formal document exists to prove this *modus vivendi* and power sharing compromise between the prime minister and district governor, for this is an example of shadow state machinations; moreover, it is part of Khmer culture, innate in the politics and hierarchy of the society. By establishing the socio-political link, the governor had free reign to exploit and profit from his position as the local ruler of a remote region, in this case Veal Veng district.

In fact, natural resources were more important in the reintegration process. Natural resources were to underpin the economic goals of reintegrating communities and improve their standards of living. The Veal Veng community had always relied on forest resources, either exporting timber to Thailand during the war or to begin post-conflict community development during reintegration. At times during the transition period, NFTP's and wild game were the very, and only, sustenance for former-KR communities. The defections of the Veal Veng KR faction occurred in 1996, but it was four years before the government and NGO's came to provide emergency relief and development assistance. In that period of transition, a particularly dire time for the population living in the mountains and forests of Veal Veng, forest resources served as construction materials, a source of protein, medicine, fuel and a source of cash. Timber resources were not exported during times of peace, for unlike the period of armed conflict the Thai border had been closed to log exports since 1995. It was not until the new district was connected to Cambodia that the area's vast and valuable forests were commoditized, once again. For without a market, forests will not be commoditized and transformed into money.

6.2 CONCLUSION IN TERMS OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

⁵² The district governor knows about everything that goes on in Veal Veng, illegal logging does not happen unless he allows it, therefore he's involved and profiting from it (Anonymous source, pers. comm., June 2nd, 2005).

Natural resources were a factor in the KR-RGC peace negotiations in Veal Veng. Though land and forest resources were not directly addressed in the peace deal, they were part of the Win-Win policy's guarantee that the land of former-KR people would continue to be theirs upon reintegration. The negotiations enabled KR communities to keep their land, and use it to improve their lives and develop their former-conflict area. Though not conceived explicitly as a bargaining chip in the negotiations, acquiring land ownership and use of the indigenous natural resources was essential in encouraging KR people to defect to the government side, end their armed struggle and begin post-conflict development.

The reintegrating former-KR community in Veal Veng received physical and social development inputs in 1999 and 2000. As to the former, roads, health infrastructure and services, medicine, schools, district offices, a *wat*, bridges, wells and demining services were invested in the new district. An initial total of \$US 270,000 was sunk into infrastructure repairs, and post-conflict reconstruction. To the latter, former-KR administrators, nurses, teachers, technicians and rulers received capacity building training on all aspects related to their field of expertise. Seila program's decentralized governance structures, VDCs and CDCs, were transplanted into Veal Veng district to empower local authorities to promote rural development. A wide range of NGOs have been able to provide services to the community as well.

The Veal Veng KR faction was motivated to pursue negotiations and defect to the government's side because the soldiers thought that continued fighting was futile and they could not win without an open border to trade with Thailand. Their main source of income had been curtailed due to the log export ban of 1995. War fatigue had weathered KR soldiers' morale; they lived apart from their families and in fear. For these reasons, Mr. Yong and several other division commanders considered the government's offers for negotiation. The Win-Win policy was a good deal, as it offered them a position in the

government, it guaranteed their property, livelihoods, security under Cambodian law, land rights and access and use of Veal Veng's abundant natural resources.

Shadow state politics were used by Hun Sen, and his political social power base to entice KR factions into defecting into the CPP fold. Promising development inputs and contravening national laws were examples of the modus operandi of the times. The coalition government of the first mandate was in reality a 'two-headed' government competing to acquire financial rents, a greater share of power and a broader politico-social structure. The two co-prime ministers held this weak mode of governing and unworkable agreement in contempt. The disintegrating KR movement was an opportunity for Funcinpec to level the imbalances, and Ranariddh and his generals aggressively pursued rebel factions in the northwest. Hun Sen wielded all his economic clout to outmaneuver Ranariddh. Rebel-KR factions represented valuable political commodities, and recruiting them into either the CPP or Funcinpec patron-client social structure would be tantamount to victory in 1998. The motives of the Royal Government were political; motivations for peace were actually motivations for power.

During the transition from war to peace, natural resource usage was not determined by any law or management system in Veal Veng. The community extracted timber, hunted for wild game, cleared land and gathered NFTPs on a need basis. The community depended on forest resources for survival. But in 2003, this (non-codified) community-based NRM was usurped because the land they considered as their own had been designated a protected area by the Royal Decree of 1993. When management and protection began with MoE's arrival, regulations prohibited former natural resource usage which had been a way of life previously. This interference from the MoE was met with anger and confusion. The community considered the wildlife sanctuary a constraint to development, inhibiting reintegration and precluding an improvement in their standards of living. But the former-KR community's anger was not directed at either the national government in Phnom Penh, nor the district government, but at MoE and FFI. In

2003 conflict reached a peak, but since then increased awareness concerning the environment has improved the community's attitude. The introduction of a zoning system has the potential to further improve the relationship between MoE, FFI and the community, as well as clarify what is permissible in terms of natural resource usage.

6.3 DISCUSSION

RECOMMENDATIONS

The researcher feels it is pointless in making recommendations to the PSWS and Veal Veng community. On the one hand, MoE has come to a better understanding of the community's needs while the community has learnt about the importance of conservation and NRM. On the other hand, and unfortunately, shadow state politics seems to continue today in Cambodia. As long as the government continues to act unconstitutionally and break its own laws, recommendations are futile. The biggest threat to the PSWS is not the people in Veal Veng, perhaps not even illegal loggers but the Cambodian government itself. The hypothesis of this research identified financial and political motives pushing and pulling the government to negotiate for peace. At that time, circa 1996 and during the peace negotiations, political imperatives eclipsed financial concerns. As Hun Sen has finally consolidated his political power, and Funcinpec is longer presents a challenge (Ana & Samean, 2006), financial interests have superseded political concerns. In July 2006, during the time of this field research, the RGC granted a 10,000 hectare mining concession in the PSWS, for antimony and chromium (Mr. R. Paley, pers. comm., July 26th, 2006). The Royal Decree, and now the PA Law, have been contravened once again. But unlike the KR peace negotiations in the mid-1990's, this instance cannot be defended

or put into a context of civil war, where in times of crisis and transition national laws can be disregarded for issues of national security.

LESSONS LEARNED

Violent conflict which has started over, or has been sustained by natural resources requires a unique genre of peace negotiations. NRM must be included in the negotiations if that peace is to be sustainable; further, the state of the environment must also be considered and NRM therefore must be incorporated into the reintegration framework. The Veal Veng case is an example of negotiations which did not directly address the natural resource wealth of a former-conflict zone, despite the clear link between natural resources and that conflict. MoE was presented with a difficult challenge in trying to protect the environment, for the community lacked any understanding about the importance of environmental protection and the purpose of a protected area. Protection and monitoring activities began two years prior to the Save Cambodia's Wildlife's environmental awareness campaign in 2005 so it was no surprise that the community was angry at MoE and confused with their regulations. The Veal Veng community has habitually perceived the environment as a source of material and food, a vast resource to be used---in contrast to how MoE conceives the same space. What, if any are the lessons learned that can be taken away from the case study of Veal Veng?

When this researcher asked Mr. Yong about the Win-Win policy and the Royal Decree, he did not consider the work of MoE to directly contradict the promises made during the peace negotiations. He was not unequivocal though, for he considers the limits of the wildlife sanctuary to be unfair. "I would still have agreed to defect and end the fighting if the government had told me about the protected area status of Veal Veng" (Mr. U. Yong, pers. comm., July 27th, 2006). His animus points to the root of the

problem: a lack of awareness among the population about the protected area and about the importance of resources management and biodiversity. An awareness campaign about the importance of the environment and the necessity of NRM should have begun with the onset of management, if not before. This tactic was lacking, but it is more significant than failing to consider the community's perceptions of the PSWS. It reveals that MoE has not fully considered the undeniable fact that communities live within the PSWS and rely on the natural resources. MoE's strategy for protection has ignored the community's habitual reliance on forests. As a result, MoE has fostered more conflict than accord. To be fair, though, MoE and FFI need to present a hard-line position on management and from that stance, negotiate and soften their position in order for the outcome to be something akin to conservation and protection. Moreover, MoE's work and claim to the PSWS is tenuous. There is a fine line, and sometimes their work has to be perfunctory, for high-ranking people have interests in illegal logging operations within the wildlife sanctuary (anonymous source, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006).

Without economic development and increased trade, reintegrating communities will continue to be reliant on forest resources. With some modicum of development (i.e. roads and schools) people in the community can engage in mainstream economic practices (i.e. growing cash crops, transporting cash crops, motorcycle repair, trading and selling foodstuffs and durable goods, or teaching). Increased farming has meant more land clearing, this is both detrimental and beneficial to the environment: in the short term land is denuded, but in the long term mainstream agricultural practices lessen the community's dependence on forests (Mr. R. Paley, July 3rd, 2006). If MoE prohibited land clearing, farmers would enter deep into the forest to clear land, log for cash and hunt for food. Illegal practices would retreat further from view. This is a harmful approach to environmental protection and conducive to conflict. The community of families and farmers, and their development must be conceived as partners in MoE's goal for environmental protection. Therefore, development and an improvement in the community's standards of living should also be MoE's conservation goals. MoE and FFI

seem to be internalizing this strategy. In this vein, Mr. R. Paley alluded to the future existence of Community Protected Areas, of which 19 are planned in the PSWS (pers. comm., July 3rd, 2006).

6.4 IMPLICATIONS

A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH TO REINTEGRATION AND POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT WHEN THE CONFLICT INVOLVED NATURAL RESOURCES

Peace building and reintegration requires post-conflict development. This development requires funding for the roads, schools, hospitals and other infrastructural repairs. For many states recovering from civil wars, they are not in the financial position to fund this necessary reconstruction. But with natural resource management emphasizing the reintegration community's needs, the cost of the necessary development inputs can be covered through the extraction of natural resources.

In an attempt to put forth some ideas towards a post-conflict development model based on natural resource (forest) management, the Cambodian experience (not necessarily limited to Veal Veng and the PSWS) will be taken as a point of departure. From the Cambodian context (in looking back in hindsight) a forest concession to fund post-conflict development could have been an effective method to foster economic reintegration, social reconciliation and attenuate conflict within the community.

For this model to be effective, it must be community-based. This means focusing on the needs of the reintegrating community, with respect to mitigating environmental

destruction, and encouraging people's participation in the choice of development projects. Moreover, ensuring transparency of funds generated from the concession is imperative. This model can be sustainable, for it would be in the interests of and under the shared management of the community. The national government would receive some rents while the local community would benefit from development inputs. Power sharing, between the national and local government would be required and would import some degree of transparency and legitimacy to the process. Any degraded land would be returned to the community as a sustainable use or buffer zone between the community and those areas of sensitive and important biodiversity. Balance is required. To protect the environment it has to be destroyed. Yes, 10,000 hectares, for example, of forest would be 'sacrificed' for the reintegration process and to initiate nascent development. In the short-term, a logging concession certainly harms the environment but it is an investment for the future----for future generations and on-going protection and conservation of the area's natural resources.

A post-conflict development strategy based on natural resource (forest) management can be used as a departure point for future peace negotiations when that conflict has involved natural resources. Without this, the dangers of poverty exacerbating environmental destruction and the power of the free market system will consume the natural resources and could extirpate both the livelihoods of the community and the environment.

6.5 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: WAR, PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION

The case of the Cambodian conflict and peace building typifies an unusual relationship between violent conflict, peace, development and environmental destruction.

Armed conflict over the past decades has spared Cambodia's forests (LeBillon, 2000: 786). In 1992, 60 per cent of the country was covered in forests, but only two years later forest cover was estimated at 49 per cent (Brown and Zasloff, 1998: 227). If it was the case, as LeBillon stated, that war has protected Cambodia's forests, how can the pace of logging and loss of forest cover be explained?

The Cambodia civil war is a case of conflict sustained by natural resources; Humphreys (2005: 12) identified the Feasibility Mechanism: when a rebel group gains control of resources and exploits them to continue funding their armed conflict. The KR movement continued to pose a military threat in the 1980's and 1990's because of financing generated from the trade in conflict timber. This was a cause of great environmental destruction, but it was not the conflict in and of itself that denuded the hills and clear cut large sections of land. Environmental damage caused by war is insignificant⁵³ when compared to the devastation caused by capitalism, viz. when the free market commoditizes forests, valuing the latter as timber. Hyper-development in Thailand in the late 1980's and 1990's has destroyed far more of Cambodia's environment when compared to the civil war. Armed conflict did not clear cut Cambodia's previously virgin tropical forests. Thailand declared a logging ban in early 1989, within three years timber prices increased five-fold (Hirsch, 1995; Royal Forest Department, 1996 cited in LeBillon, 2000: 789). The KR, and other political parties, took advantage of the timber bull market in Thailand to profit from that demand. Cambodia, entangled in a civil war, became the perfect source for the Thai economy's need for timber.

By analyzing the events and relationships, development in Thailand was the independent variable causing the destruction of forests in Cambodia. 1992 has been cited as the busiest logging year (Mr. E. Sophal, pers. comm., July 6th, 2006; Mr. K. Sokoeurn,

⁵³ Conflict does destroy the environment, the K5 Bamboo Wall project in the Cambodian conflict is an example of this. The point is that war does not directly intend to destroy the environment, it is a subsequent effect.

pers. comm., July 4th, 2006) and according to Global Witness (1995a) timber companies in Cambodia took part in what was described as a "logging frenzy" in 1992. As the price of timber was sky rocketing in Thailand, Cambodia was signing the PPA and looking towards the elections in 1993----in short, the country was preparing for peace. Peace was another variable contributing to the destruction of Cambodia's forests. The political campaigns of the NGC, Funcinpec and the BLDP, required huge financing to fund their political campaigns. Forests in their respective areas of control were traded for cash to compete in the political context. With peace emerging, post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding were set to begin and these required primary commodities such as sand, timber, stones, charcoal, and land. Another variable that cannot be overlooked is the weak governance in Cambodia, which could do little to mitigate the surge in natural resource consumption and environmental destruction caused by the boom in construction.

Conventionally we consider development to be constructive while war connotes destruction. But in the context of the environment, and in the case of Cambodia, the converse seems to be the case. Fast track development, in the 1980's and 1990's, in many South East Asian nations caused environmental destruction; in Thailand ecological degradation has been a hallmark of high-speed economic development (Bello, Cunningham and Kheng Po, 1998: 175). This was precluded because of Cambodia's civil war. During the war and into the 1990's, Cambodia's forests were commoditized and its environment degraded because of a booming economy in neighboring Thailand. As peace lingered with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 elections, logging flourished. Emerging from decades of war, peace promised development and development required timber. Forests were re-commoditized, equally by foreign logging companies and Cambodia's incipient reconstruction which was creating domestic demand. With successful peace negotiations between the KR and Royal Government, armed conflict was resolved. Those former conflict areas were integrated with the country and the free market made headway, commoditizing and threatening what remaining natural resources there were. Without conflict to inhibit the free market's

commoditization and destruction of the environment, its up to the government to mediate the deleterious effects of capitalism: thus the need for NRM.

The logical terms must be isolated, then the argument can be made clearly. The process of development commoditizes natural resources, which in turn causes environmental destruction. A state of war inhibits development, destroying infrastructure and redirecting a nation's economy away from investment. Therefore development is precluded as violent conflict extends through a nation. Armed conflict does not protect the environment but attenuates the effect of development. This implies, in the context of the environment, that war is indirectly, not constructive, but protective and development is destructive.

The degree to which this induction from the Cambodian contexts matches the broader picture of the international arena is beyond the scope of this research and conclusion. What have other conflicts involving natural resources experienced in terms of peace, post-conflict development and environmental destruction? Is Cambodia's case unique? Therefore, this conclusion identifies potentially fruitful theoretical research into the relationship between armed conflict, peace-building, post-conflict development in virtue of the free market system and environmental destruction.

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
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
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APPENDIX A: MAPS


MAP #1: THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA




MAP #2: PURSAT PROVINCE



MAP #3: VEAL VENG DISTRICT




MAP#4: PROTECTED AREAS IN VEAL VENG DISTRICT



**MAP#5: PHNOM SAMKOS WILDLIFE SANCTUARY'S
ZONING SYSTEM**



MAP #6: CAMBODIA'S FOREST COVER: 1976, 1997, 2002



APPENDIX B: FIGURES

Figure 1: Mr. C. Mung's representation of the Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary




Figure 2: Mr. Koom Say explains the PSWS Zoning system



Figure 3: UNHCR funded elementary school, Pramaowy



Figure 4: Wat Geery Bo Thumbewuh, Pramaowy commune



Figure 5: Health staff at Pramaowy health centre



Figure 6: Market in Pramaowy commune




Figure 7: Mr. Ung Yong, District Chief of Veal Veng



Figure 8: CMAC Operational Base, Pramaowy commune



APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGIES AND THE ROYAL DECREE OF 1993**CHRONOLOGY#1: CAMBODIAN HISTORY RELATING TO VEAL VENG****1975**

April – KR forces won the civil war, took Phnom Penh and the DK regime assumed control of the state.

1979

January– DK regime was overthrown by PAVN and Salvation Front forces. KR military units retreated to the northwest along the Thai border.

1982

June - The CGDK was formed between the DK, Funcinpec and KPNLF who represented the government in exile.

Logging began in mid to late 1980's. Timber was exported to Thailand and generated income for the KR and the other political factions.

1991

October– The Paris Peace Accords were signed, and all parties agreed to demobilization and future participation in elections.

1992

All political-military factions engaged in large scale logging along the northwestern frontier.

January – CARERE began repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees.

February – UNTAC was established by the UN Security Council.

July – KR military forces withdrew from the disarmament and demobilization process.

1993

Armed conflict continued with KR forces.

April– KR forces, who previously rescinded demobilization, also refused to join the democratic process of the UNTAC elections.

May– Funcinpec won the election but without an outright majority.

June– Sihanouk was restored as King and head of state.

November– The Royal Decree on the Designation of Protected Areas was declared.

September– In a power sharing agreement, Ranariddh was declared First Prime Minister and Hun Sen became the Second Prime Minister.

1994

The KR movement was declared illegal.

1995

RCAF offensive into the KR stronghold of Pailin was successful but KR forces reclaimed it soon after.

1996

Defections began and Win-Win policy was implemented.

August – Ieng Sary broke from KR hard-liners Pol Pot and Ta Mok and formed DNUM.

August – Widespread defections occurred in Veal Veng and Samloat. DNUM finally integrated with RGC.

September – King Sihanouk granted amnesty to Ieng Sary.

1997

Funcinpec aligned military units continued talks with KR forces in Anlong Veng.

November – A rebel-KR faction in Samloat reneged on defecting and began combat with the government because the RGC usurped timber and logging equipment from their zone of control.

July – Hun Sen launched a coup d'état, deposed his co-prime minister thus emasculating Funcinpec.

August – Veal Veng was inaugurated as Veal Veng district, the fifth district in Pursat province.

1998

April – Pol Pot's death meant the last remaining KR threat in the stronghold of Anlong Veng disappeared.

July – CPP won the second elections but without a majority.

2000

January – Post-conflict development began in the former-KR strongholds of Veal Veng and Samloat.



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CHRONOLOGY#2: VEAL VENG PEACE PROCESS AND REINTEGRATION

AUGUST 1996

Ieng Sary broke from the hard-line KR movement and formed the Democratic National Union Movement (DNUM). This rebel-KR faction controlled Pailin, north of Samloat and Veal Veng. Ieng Sary, and the two commanders divisions 415 and 450, Ee Chean and Sok Pheap, announced their intentions to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the RCAF and RGC.

SEPTMBER 1996

KR elites in Anlong Veng, under the command of Pol Pot and Ta Mok, ordered Front 505 (who controlled Veal Veng south of Pailin), to attack the dissident KR faction under Ieng Sary's command. Violence nearly erupted, but Front 505 commanders repudiated the order.

SEPTMEBR 16th, 1996

In Veal Veng, KR Front 505's division commanders met with the RCAF in Krapeu Pi commune. Armed conflict remained between government forces based in Kravangh and KR forces in Veal Veng. The government party outlined the Win-Win policy and what it meant for KR soldiers wanting to defect. The sides discussed a ceasefire, and government forces encouraged the Veal Veng faction to break from Pol Pot's command (Mr. K. Rin, pers. comm., July 12th, 2006) RCAF forces promised to protect defecting military units from KR factions still loyal to the central command. Initial meetings were trust-building missions, and the parties agreed to future meetings.

OCTOBER 1996

The Veal Veng KR forces met with Pursat province's deputy governor, Pik Sikhen, and a cease-fire was finalized, from the date on there was no further combat in Veal Veng (Mr. B. Banloak, pers. comm., July 8th, 2006). In mid-October, KR soldiers changed into RCAF uniforms and received supplies, medicine and other goods (Rotha and Decherd, 1996).

OCTOBER 15th, 1996

First Prime Minister Ranariddh made a surprise visit to Pailin to meet with Ieng Sary. The two leaders discussed requests of DNUM, the possibility of autonomy for Pailin and the extension of the date set for military reintegration (Decherd, 1996).

OCTOBER 22nd, 1996

Second Prime Minister Hun Sen made his presence and power felt in the negotiations by visiting Ieng Sary, and promising DNUM jobs and land rights upon reintegration (Decherd and Serey, 1996).

NOVEMBER 2nd, 1996

KR Fronts 205 and 909 (whose zone of control was around Samloat) aligned themselves with Hun Sen, refusing to side with DNUM in making demands on the government. With Fronts 205, 505 and 909 on the government's side, DNUM was completely isolated.

NOVEMBER 6th, 1996

DNUM backed down from their previous demands and accepted reintegration on the government's terms. Thus the Win-Win policy was implemented and DNUM's intentions for autonomy of Pailin was not granted.

MAY 2nd, 1997

The first civilian evaluation mission to the newly reintegrated district was undertaken. NGOs, such as, UNDP, Medicine Sans Frontieres and Care accompanied the governments' team of provincial officials, both military and civilian (Callebaut, 1997). This fact finding mission was sent to assess the socio-economic situation of the villages in Veal Veng.

AUGUST 6th, 1997

Nearly a year later after the official cease-fire, Veal Veng was inaugurated as Veal Veng district. Veal Veng joined Pursat province as the 6th district and the power sharing agreement was implemented. According to Mr. Yong, the district governor, no official document exists concerning either the cease-fire or agreement to the dictates of the Win-Win policy (pers. comm., July 13th, 2006).

JANUARY 2000


The first post-conflict development inputs were allocated and infrastructure projects began. Construction of the road, school, district office and health centre began. Following this, capacity building of Veal Veng local authorities begins. Village development committees, and the commune councils are formed in the district.

FEBRUARY 2003

MoE and FFI begin protection and management of the protected area in Veal Veng district.

2005

The PSWS Zoning system is demarcated throughout the wildlife sanctuary containing Veal Veng communities.



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**CAMBODIAN LEGAL DOCUMENT#1: ROYAL DECREE ON THE
DESIGNATION OF PROTECTED AREAS**

REACH KRET (ROYAL DECREE)

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
NATION, RELIGION AND KING.

Made on 1st. November 1993

CREATION AND DESIGNATION OF PROTECTED AREAS

We
His Majesty Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Varaman
King of Cambodia

Declare the following:
Regulations

Article 1: Responsibility for a National Protected Areas System

The Secretariat of State for Environment is responsible for supervising the planning and development of a National Protected Areas System incorporating the protection of terrestrial, wetland and coastal environments. The Secretariat has the authority to establish and chair appropriate inter-ministerial co-ordination committees concerning policy and technical needs of protected areas. The management and administration of the National Protected Areas System is the joint responsibility of the Secretariat in collaboration with other competent institutions. The system will include the following categories of reserves with the following management objectives.

National Parks: Natural and scenic areas of significance for their scientific, educational and recreational values.

Wildlife Sanctuaries: Natural areas where nationally significant species of flora and fauna, natural communities, or physical features require specific intervention for their perpetuation.

Protected Landscapes: Nationally significant natural and semi-natural landscapes which must be maintained to provide opportunities for recreation and tourism.

Multiple-use Management Areas: The areas which provide for the sustainability of water resources, timber, wildlife, fish, pasture and recreation with the conservation of nature primarily oriented to support these economic activities.

Article 2: Designation of Protected Areas

That the terrestrial, wetland and coastal ecosystems indicated on the accompanying maps be managed and developed as according to the following designations.

	Area (ha.)	Locality
1. National Parks		
Kirirom	35,000	Koh Kong
Phnom Bokor	140,000	Kampot
Kep	5,000	Kampot
Ream	150,000	Kompong Som
Botum - Sakor	171,250	Kampot and Kompong Som
Phnom Kulen	37,500	Siem Reap
Virachey	332,500	Rattanakiri and Stung Treng
	Area (ha.)	Locality
2. Wildlife Sanctuaries		
Aural	253,750	Koh Kong, Pursat, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Speu
Beng Per	242,500	Kompong Thom
Peam Krasop	23,750	Koh Kong
Phnom Samkos	333,750	Koh Kong
Roniem Daun Sam	178,750	Battambang
Kulen – Promtep	402,500	Siem Reap and Preah Vihear
Lomphat	250,000	Rattanakiri and, Mondolkiri
Phnom Prich	222,500	Mondolkiri
Phnom Nam Lyr	47,500	Mondolkiri
3. Protected Landscapes		
Angkor	10,800	Siem Reap
Banteay Chhmar	81,200	Banteay Meanchey
Preah Vihear	5,000	Preah Vihear
4. Multiple Use Management Areas		

Dong Peng	27,700	Koh Kong
Samlaut	60,000	Battambang
Tonle Sap	316,250	Kompong Chhang, Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Battambang and Pursat.
Total Area	3,327,200	

Article 3: Amendments

This protected area system may be amended or extended in the future on the basis of scientific information relating to biological conservation and the maintenance of the productivity of the Cambodian landscape.

Article 4: Precedence

This kret takes precedence over other legal instruments and shall not be deemed to be void on the grounds that existing instruments may be inconsistent with it.

Article 5: Application

This Kret applies valid throughout the Kingdom of Cambodia from the date of signature below.

Made on 1st November 1993

Signed

Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Varaman.

สถาบันวิจัยประชากร
จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

BIOGRAPHY

Martin Joseph O'Brien-Kelly was born in Calgary, Alberta, Canada on November 20th, 1976. He studied Philosophy at Bishop's University in Lennoxville, Quebec. It was not long after that he went to South Korea to teach English, pick up photography and experience something of Asia. After nearly three years of work and travel----and a brief summer at home----he took a volunteer position with a Canadian NGO, CWARS, in Cambodia. From there he worked for a small Khmer NGO in Pursat province where he first visited and worked in Veal Veng district. Two years in Cambodia, offered the chance to continue photography and experience life among rural Cambodians. Academia and Ultimate brought him to Bangkok, Thailand where he enrolled at Chulalongkorn University to study International Development Studies and on the weekend play disc with the BKK Soidawgz.



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